


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EXPLAINED

IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER;

WITH

COPIOUS ILLUSTRATIONS.

BY

GEORGE CRABB, A. M.

AUTHOR OF THE UNIVERSAL TECHNOLOGICAL DICTIONARY; AND THE
UNIVERSAL HISTORICAL DICTIONARY.

A NEW EDITION

REVISED AND CORRECTED

BY

J. H. HEDLEY.

Sed cum idem frequentissime plura significant, quod *synonyma* vocatur,
jam sunt aliis alia honestiora, sublimiora, nitidiora, jucundiora, vocaliora.
QUINTIL. INST. ORAT. lib. ix.

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PRINTED FOR JULIUS WUNDER.

1839.

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PREFACE.

The high character which this work has maintained in England from its first publication down to the present period, and its acknowledged utility to all students of the English language and literature, render any comment unnecessary. In presenting this edition to the Public, the publisher trusts, that by the attention which has been paid to the revision and corrections, it will be found in every respect deserving of their approbation and confidence.

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ENGLISH SYNONYMES

EXPLAINED.

TO ABANDON, DESERT, FORSAKE, RELINQUISH.

ABANDON, from the French *abandonner*, is a concretion of the words *donner a ban*, to give up to a public ban or outlawry; To *abandon* then is to expose to every misfortune which results from a formal and public denunciation; to set out of the protection of law and government; and to deny the privileges of citizenship.

DESERT, in Latin *desertus* participle of *desero*, that is *de* privative and *sero* to sow, signifying unsown, unplanted, cultivated no longer. To *desert* then is to leave off cultivating; and as there is something of idleness and improvidence in ceasing to render the soil productive, ideas of disapprobation accompany the word in all its metaphorical applications.

FORSAKE in Saxon *forsecan* is compounded of the primitive *for* and *sake, seek, secan*, signifying to seek no more, to leave off seeking that which has been an object of search.

RELINQUISH, in Latin *relinquo*, is compounded of *re* or *retro* behind and *linquo* to leave, that is to leave what we would fain take with us, to leave with reluctance.

ABANDON and *desert* are employed for persons or things; *forsake* for persons or places; *relinquish* for things only.

With regard to persons the three first terms express moral culpability in a progressive ratio downwards; *abandon* comprehends the violation of the most sacred ties; *desert* a breach of honour and fidelity; *forsake* a rupture of the social bond.

We *abandon* those who are entirely dependent upon us for protection and support; they are left in a helpless state exposed to every danger; a child is *abandoned* by its parents

We *desert* those with whom we have entered into coalition; they are left to their own resources; a soldier *deserts* his comrades; when misfortune overtakes a man he is frequently *deserted* by his former friend.

We *forsake* those with whom we have been in habits of intimacy; they are deprived of the pleasures and comforts of society; a lover *forsakes* his mistress, a man *forsakes* his companions.

When *abandoned* by our dearest relatives; *deserted* by our friends, and *forsaken* by the world, we have always a resource in our Maker.

With regard to things (in which sense the word *relinquish* is synonymous) the character of *abandoning* varies with the circumstances and motives of the action, according to which it is either good, bad, or indifferent; *deserting* is always taken in an unfavourable or bad sense; the act of *forsaking* is indifferent; that of *relinquishing* is prudent or imprudent.

A captain may *abandon* his vessel when he has no means of saving it, except at the risk of his life; a true soldier will never *desert* his colours; birds will mostly *forsake* their nests when they discover them to have been visited; men often inadvertently *relinquish* the fairest prospects in order to follow some favourite scheme which terminates in their ruin.

TO ABASE, HUMBLE, DEGRADE, DISGRACE, DEBASE.

To **ABASE** expresses the strongest degree of self-humiliation, from the French *abaisser*, to bring down or make low, which is compounded of the intensive syllable *a* or *ad* and *baiser* from *bas* low, in Latin *basis* the base, which is the lowest part of a column. It is at present used principally in the Scripture language, or in a metaphorical style, to imply the laying aside all the high pretensions which distinguish us from our fellow-creatures, the descending to a state comparatively low and mean.

To **HUMBLE**, in French *humilier*, from the Latin *humilis* humble, and *humus* the ground, naturally, marks a prostration to the ground, and figuratively, a lowering the thoughts and feelings.

To **DEGRADE**, in French *degrader*, from the Latin *gradus* a step, signifies to bring a step lower; figuratively, to lower in the estimation of others. It supposes already a state of elevation either in outward circumstances or in public opinion.

DISGRACE is compounded of the privative *dis* and the noun *grace* or favour. To *disgrace* properly implies to put out of favour, which is always attended more or less with circumstances of ignominy, and reflects contempt on the object.

DEBASE is compounded of the intensive syllable *de* and the adjective *base*, signifying to make very base or low.

The modest man *abases* himself by not insisting on the distinctions to which he may be justly entitled; the penitent man *humbles* himself by confessing his errors; the man of rank *degrades* himself by a too familiar deportment with his inferiors; he *disgraces* himself by his meannesses and irregularities, and *debases* his character by his vices.

TO ABASH, CONFOUND, CONFUSE.

ABASH is an intensive of *abase*, signifying to abase thoroughly in spirit.

CONFOUND and **CONFUSE** are derived from different parts of the same Latin verb *confundo* and its participle *confusus*. *Confundo* is compounded of *con-* and *fundo* to pour together. To *confound* and *confuse* then signify properly to melt together or into one mass what ought to be distinct; and figuratively, as it is here taken, to derange the thoughts in such a manner that they seem melted together.

Abash, which is always taken in a bad sense, expresses more than *confound*, and *confound* more than *confuse*.

Shame contributes greatly to *abashment*; what is sudden and unaccountable serves to *confound*; bashfulness and a variety of emotions give rise to *confusion*.

The haughty man is *abashed* when he is humbled in the eyes of others, the wicked man is *confounded* when his villainy is suddenly detected; a modest person may be *confused* in the presence of his superiors.

TO ABATE, LESSEN, DIMINISH, DECREASE.

ABATE, from the French *abattre*, signified originally to beat down, in the active sense; to come down, in the neuter sense.

DIMINISH, or, as it is sometimes written, *minish*, from the Latin *diminuo*, and *minuo* to lessen, and *minus* less, expresses, like the verb **LESSEN**, the sense of either making less or becoming less.

DECREASE is compounded of the privative *de* and *crease*, in Latin *cresco*, to grow; signifying to grow less.

The first three are used transitively or intransitively; the latter only intransitively.

Abate respects the vigour of action: a person's fever is *abated* or *abates*; the violence of the storm *abates*; pain and anger *abate*.

Lessen and *diminish* are both applied to size, quantity, and number; but the former mostly in the proper and familiar sense, the latter in the figurative and higher acceptation: the size of a room or garden is *lessened*; the credit and respectability of a person is *diminished*.

To *decrease* is to diminish for a continuance: some things *decrease* so gradually that it is some time before they are observed to be *diminished*.

In the abstract sense the word *lessening* is mostly supplied by *diminution*: it will be no *abatement* of sorrow to a generous mind to know that the *diminution* of evil to itself has been produced by the abridgement of good to another.

TO ABDICATE, RESIGN.

ABDICATE Lat. *abdico* signifies to call or cry off from a thing.

RESIGN, Lat. *resigno*, signifies to sign away from one's self.

To *abdicate* is a species of informal resignation. A monarch *abdicates* his throne who simply declares his will to cease to reign; but a minister *resigns* his office when he gives up the seals by which he held it.

ABETTOR, ACCESSARY, ACCOMPLICE.

ABETTOR, or one that abets, gives aid and encouragement by counsel, promises, or

rewards. An ACCESSARY, or one added and annexed, takes an active, though subordinate part. An ACCOMPLICE, from the word *accomplish*, implies the principal in any plot, who takes a leading part and brings it to perfection.

Abettors propose, *accessaries* assist, *accomplices* execute.

The *abettor* and *accessary*, or the *abettor* and *accomplice*, may be one and the same person; but not so the *accessary* and *accomplice*.

In every grand scheme there must be *abettors* to set it on foot, *accessaries* to co-operate, and *accomplices* to put it into execution: in the gunpowder plot there were many secret *abettors*, some noblemen who were *accessaries*, and Guy Fawkes the principal *accomplice*.

TO ABHOR, DETEST, ABOMINATE, LOATH.

THESE terms equally denote a sentiment of aversion.

ABHOR, in Latin *abhorreo*, compounded of *ab* from and *horreo* to stiffen with horror, signifies to start from with a strong emotion of horror.

DETEST, in Latin *detestor*, compounded of *de* from or against, and *testor* to bear witness, signifies to condemn with indignation.

ABOMINATE, in Latin *abominatus*, participle of *abominor*, compounded of *ab* from or against, and *ominor* to wish ill luck, signifies to hold in religious abhorrence, to detest in the highest possible degree.

LOATH, in Saxon *lathen*, may possibly be a variation of load, in the sense of overload, because it expresses the nausea which commonly attends an overloaded stomach. In the moral acceptation it is a strong figure of speech to mark the abhorrence and disgust which the sight of offensive objects produces.

What we *abhor* is repugnant to our moral feelings; what we *detest* contradicts our moral principle; what we *abominate* does equal violence to our religious and moral sentiments; what we *loath* acts upon us physically and mentally.

Inhumanity and cruelty are objects of *abhorrence*; crimes and injustice of *detestation*; impiety and profaneness of *abomination*; enormous offenders, of *loathing*.

TO ABIDE, SOJOURN, DWELL, RESIDE. INHABIT.

ABIDE, in Saxon *abitan*, old German *beiten*, comes from the Arabic or Persian *but*, or *bit*, to pass the night, that is, to make a partial stay.

SOJOURN, in French *sejourner*, from *sub* and *diurnus* in the day time, signifies to pass the day, that is, a certain portion of one's time in a place.

DWELL, from the Danish *dwelger* to abide and the Saxon *dwelian*, Dutch *dwalen* to wander, conveys the idea of a moveable habitation, such as was the practice of living formerly in tents. At present it implies a perpetual stay, which is expressed in common discourse by the word *live*, for passing one's life.

RESIDE, from the Latin *re* and *sideo* to sit down, conveys the full idea of a settlement.

INHABIT, from the Latin *habito*, a frequentative of *habeo*, signifies to have or occupy for a permanency.

The length of stay implied in these terms is marked by a certain gradation.

Abide denotes the shortest stay; to *sojourn* is of longer continuance; *dwelt* comprehends the idea of perpetuity, but *reside* and *inhabit* are partial and local—we *dwelt* only in one spot, but we may *reside* at or *inhabit* many places.

These words have likewise a reference to the state of society.

Abide and *sojourn* relate more properly to the wandering habits of men in a primitive state of society.

Dwell, as implying a stay under a cover, is universal in its application; for we may *dwelt* either in a palace, a house, a cottage, or any shelter.

Live, *reside*, and *inhabit*, are confined to a civilized state of society; the first applying to the abodes of the inferior orders, the others to those of the higher classes. The word *inhabit* is never used but in connexion with the place *inhabited*.

The Easterns *abode* with each other, *sojourned* in a country, and *dwelt* in tents. The poor have their cottages in which they *live*; the wealthy provide themselves with superb buildings in which they *reside*. In some countries of the East, the souls of the dead are believed to *inhabit* the form of birds.

ABILITY, CAPACITY.

ABILITY, in French *habilité*, Latin *habilitas*, comes from *able*, *habile*, *habilis*, and *habeo* to have, because possession and power are inseparable.

CAPACITY, in French *capacité*, Latin *capacitas*, from *capax* and *capio* to receive, marks the abstract quality of being able to receive or hold.

Ability is to capacity as the genus to the species. *Ability* comprehends the power of

doing in general, without specifying the quality or degree; *capacity* is a particular kind of *ability*.

Ability may be either physical or mental, *capacity* is mental only. Hence we say an *able* commander; an *able* statesman; a man of a *capacious* mind; a great *capacity* of thought. What he has the *capacity* to conceive he has the *ability* to execute.

Abilities, when used in the plural only, is confined to the signification of mental endowments, and comprehends the operations of thought in general; *capacity* on the other hand is that peculiar endowment, that enlargement of understanding, that exalts the possessor above the rest of mankind.

Many men have the *abilities* for managing the concerns of others, who would not have the *capacity* for conducting a concern of their own.

We should not judge highly of that man's *abilities* who could only mar the plans of others, but had no *capacity* for conceiving and proposing any thing better in their stead.

TO ABJURE, RECANT, RETRACT, REVOKE, RECALL.

ABJURE, in Latin *abjuro*, is compounded of the privative *ab* and *juro* to swear, signifying to swear to the contrary, or to give up with an oath.

RECANT, in Latin *recanto*, is compounded of the privative *re* and *canto* to sing or declare, signifying to unsay, to contradict by a counter declaration.

RETRACT, in Latin *retractus*, participle of *retraho*, is compounded of *re* back, and *traho* to draw, signifying to draw back what has been let go.

REVOKE AND RECALL have the same original sense as *recant*, with this difference only, that the word *call*, which is expressed also by *voke*, or Latin *voco*, implies an action more suited to a multitude than the word *canto* to sing, which may pass in solitude.

We *abjure* a religion, we *recant* a doctrine, we *retract* a promise, we *revoke* a command, we *recall* an expression.

What has been solemnly professed is renounced by *abjuration*; what has been publicly maintained as a settled point of belief is given up by *recanting*; what has been pledged so as to gain credit is contradicted by *retracting*; what has been pronounced by an act of authority is rendered null by *revocation*; what has been mis-spoken through inadvertence or mistake is rectified by *recalling* the words.

TO ABOLISH, ABROGATE, REPEAL, REVOKE, ANNUL, CANCEL.

ABOLISH, in French *abolir*, Latin *aboleo*, is compounded of *ab* and *oleo* to lose the smell, signifying to lose every trace of former existence.

ABROGATE, in French *abroger* Latin *abrogatus*, participle of *abrogo*, compounded of *ab* and *rogo* to ask, signifying to ask away, or to ask that a thing may be done away; in allusion to the custom of the Romans, among whom no law was valid unless the consent of the people was obtained by asking, and in like manner no law was unmade without asking their consent.

REPEAL, in French *rappeler*, from the Latin words *re* and *appello*, signifies literally to call back or unsay what has been said, which is in like manner the original meaning of REVOKE.

ANNUL, in French *annuller*, comes from *nul*, in Latin *nihil*, signifying to reduce to nothing.

CANCEL, in French *canceller*, comes from the Latin *cancello* to cut crosswise, signifying to strike out crosswise, that is to cross out.

Abolish is a more gradual proceeding than *abrogate* or any of the other actions. Disuse *abolishes*; a positive interference is necessary to *abrogate*. The former is employed with regard to customs; the latter with regard to the authorized transactions of mankind.

Laws are *repealed* or *abrogated*; but the former of these terms is mostly in modern use, the latter is applied to the proceedings of the ancients. Edicts are *revoked*. Official proceedings, contracts, &c. are *annulled*. Deeds, bonds, obligations, debts, &c. are *cancelled*.

ABOMINABLE, * DETESTABLE, EXECRABLE.

THE primitive idea of these terms, agreeable to their derivation, is that of badness in the highest degree; conveying by themselves the strongest signification, and excluding the necessity for every other modifying epithet.

The ABOMINABLE thing excites aversion; the DETESTABLE thing, hatred and revulsion; the EXECRABLE thing, indignation and horror.

In the ordinary acceptation of these terms, they serve to mark a degree of excess in a very bad thing; *abominable* expressing less than *detestable*, and that less

* Vide Abbé Roubaud's Synonymes; "Abominable, detestable, execrable."

than *execrable*. This gradation is sufficiently illustrated in the following example. Dionysius, the tyrant, having been informed that a very aged woman prayed to the gods every day for his preservation, and wondering that any of his subjects should be so interested for his safety, inquired of this woman respecting the motives of her conduct, to which she replied, "In my infancy I lived under an *abominable* prince, whose death I desired; but when he perished, he was succeeded by a *detestable* tyrant worse than himself, I offered up my vows for his death also, which were in like manner answered; but we have since had a worse tyrant than he. This *execrable* monster is yourself, whose life I have prayed for, lest, if it be possible, you should be succeeded by one even more wicked."

ABOVE, OVER, UPON, BEYOND.

WHEN an object is ABOVE another, it exceeds it in height; when it is OVER another, it extends along its superior surface; when it is UPON another, it comes in contact with its superior surface; when it is BEYOND another, it lies at a greater distance. Trees frequently grow *above* a wall, and sometimes the branches hang *over* the wall or rest *upon* it, but they seldom stretch much *beyond* it.

In the figurative sense the first is mostly employed to convey the idea of superiority; the second of authority; the third of immediate influence; and the fourth of extent. Every one should be *above* falsehood: those who are set *over* others generally have the means of exerting a beneficial influence *on* the minds of their inferiors, which may conduce *beyond* measure to the general welfare.

TO ABRIDGE, CURTAIL, CONTRACT.

ABRIDGE, in French *abrégé*, Latin *abbreviare*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ab* and *breviare*, from *brevis* short, signifying to make short.

CURTAIL, in French *courte* short and *tailler* to cut, signifies to diminish in length by cutting.

CONTRACT, in Latin *contractus*, participle of *contraho*, is compounded of *con* and *traho*, signifying to draw close together.

By *abridging*, in the figurative as well as the literal sense, the quantity is diminished; by *curtailing*, the magnitude or number is reduced; by *contracting*, a thing is brought within smaller compass.

Privileges are *abridged*, pleasures *curtailed*, and powers *contracted*.

ABRIDGEMENT, COMPENDIUM, EPITOME. DIGEST, SUMMARY, ABSTRACT.

THE first four terms are applied to a distinct work, the two latter to parts of a work.

An ABRIDGEMENT is the reduction of a work into a smaller compass. A COMPENDIUM is a general and concise view of any science, as geography or astronomy. An EPITOME is a similarly general and concise view of historical events. A DIGEST is any materials digested in order. A SUMMARY comprehends the heads and subdivisions of a work. An ABSTRACT includes a brief but comprehensive view of any particular part.

ABRUPT, RUGGED, ROUGH.

ABRUPT, in Latin *abruptus*, participle of *abrumpe* to break off, signifies the state of being broken off.

RUGGED, in Saxon *hrugge*, comes from the Latin *rugosus* full of wrinkles.

ROUGH, is in Saxon *reoh*, high German *rauh*, low German *rug*, Dutch *ruig*, is Latin *rudis* uneven.

These words mark different degrees of unevenness. What is *abrupt* has greater cavities and protuberances than what is *rugged*; what is *rugged* has greater irregularities than what is *rough*. In the natural sense *abrupt* is opposed to what is unbroken, *rugged* to what is even, and *rough* to what is smooth.

A precipice is *abrupt*, a path is *rugged*, a plank is *rough*.

The *abruptness* of a body is generally occasioned by a violent concussion and separation of its parts; *ruggedness* arises from natural, but less violent causes; *roughness* is mostly a natural property, although sometimes produced by friction.

TO ABSCOND, STEAL AWAY, SECRETE ONE'S SELF.

ABSCOND, in Latin *abscondo*, is compounded of *abs* and *condo*, signifying to hide from the view, which is the original meaning of the other words; to *abscond* is to remove one's self for the sake of not being discovered by those with whom we are acquainted.

TO STEAL AWAY is to get away so as to elude observation.

TO SECRETE ONE'S SELF is to get into a place of secrecy without being perceived.

The first implies haste, the second artifice, the third a degree of fear.

Dishonest men *abscond*, thieves, *steal away* to avoid detection, and fugitives *secrete* themselves.

ABSENT, ABSTRACTED, DIVERTED, DISTRACTED.

ABSENT, in French *absent*, Latin *absens*, comes from *ab* from and *sum* to be signifying away or at a distance from an object.

ABSTRACTED, in French *abstrait*, Latin *abstractus*, participle of *abstraho*, or *ab* from and *traho* to draw, signifies drawn or separated from all objects.

DIVERTED, in French *divertir*, Latin *diverto*, compounded of *di* or *dis* asunder and *verto* to turn, signifies to turn aside from the object that is present.

DISTRACTED of course implies drawn asunder by different objects.

A want of attention is implied in all these terms, but in different degrees and under different circumstances.

Absent and *abstracted* denote a total exclusion of present objects; *diverted* and *distracted* a misapplied attention to surrounding objects, an attention to such things as are not the immediate object of concern.

Absent and *abstracted* differ less in sense than in application: the former is an epithet expressive either of a habit or a state, and precedes the noun; the latter expresses a state only, and is never adjoined to the noun: we say a man is *absent* or an *absent man*; he is *abstracted*, but not an *abstracted man*.

We are *absent* or *abstracted* when not thinking on what passes before us; we are *diverted* when we listen to any other discourse than that which is addressed to us; we are *distracted* when a multiplicity of objects are presented to our imagination at the same time.

The *absent* man has his mind and person never in the same place; he is *abstracted* from all the surrounding scenes; his senses are locked up from all the objects that seek for admittance; he is often at Rome while walking the streets of London, or solving a problem of Euclid in a social party. The man who is *diverted* seeks to be present at every thing; he is struck with every thing, and ceases to be attentive to one thing in order to direct his regards to another; he turns from the right to the left, but does not stop to think on any one point. The *distracted* man can be present at nothing, as all objects strike him with

equal force; his thoughts are in a state of vacillation and confusion.

TO ABSOLVE, ACQUIT, CLEAR.

ABSOLVE, in Latin *absolvo*, is compounded of *ab* from and *solvo* to loose, signifying to loose from that with which one is bound.

ACQUIT, in French *acquitter*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ac* or *ad*, and *quit*, *quitter*, in Latin *quietus* quiet, signifying to make easy by the removal of a charge.

These two words convey an important distinction between the act of the Creator and the creature.

To *absolve* is the free act of an omnipotent and merciful being towards sinners; to *acquit* is the act of an earthly tribunal towards supposed offenders.

By *absolution* we are released from the bondage of sin and placed in a state of favour with God; by an acquittal we are released from the charge of guilt, and reinstated in the good estimation of our fellow creatures.

One is *absolved* from an oath, *acquitted* of a charge, and *cleared* from actual guilt.

Absolve is also sometimes used in the sense of setting free from a charge, as from an obligation in which sense it comes still nearer to the words *acquitted* and *clear*; but it is thus used mostly in the grave style, and carries with it the idea of setting one altogether free from the consequences of a charge.

ABSOLUTE, DESPOTIC, ARBITRARY, TYRANNICAL.

ABSOLUTE, in Latin *absolutus*, participle of *absolvo*, signifies absolved or set at liberty from all restraint as it regards persons; unconditional, unlimited, as it regards things.

DESPOTIC, from *despot*, in Greek *δεσποτην* a master or lord, implies being like a lord, uncontrolled.

ARBITRARY, in French *arbitraire*, from the Latin *arbitrium* will, implies belonging to the will of one independent of that of others.

TYRANNICAL signifies being like a tyrant.

Absolute power is independent of and superior to all other power: an *absolute* monarch is uncontrolled not only by men but things; he is above all law except what emanates from himself. When this absolute power is assigned to any one according to the constitution of a government, it is *despotic*. *Despotic* power is therefore something less than *absolute* power: a prince is

absolute of himself, he is *despotic* by the consent of others.

Arbitrary and *tyrannical* do not respect the power itself, so much as the exercise of power: the latter is always taken in a bad sense, the former sometimes in an indifferent sense. With *arbitrariness* is associated the idea of caprice and selfishness; with *tyranny* is associated the idea of oppression and injustice. Among the Greeks the word *τυραννος*, a tyrant, implied no more than what we now understand by *despot*, namely, a possessor of unlimited power: but from the natural abuse of such power, it has acquired the signification now attached to it, namely, of exercising power to the injury of another.

Absolute power should be granted to no one man or body of men; since there is no security that it will not be exercised *arbitrarily*. In *despotic* governments the *tyrannical* proceedings of the subordinate officers are often more intolerable than those of the Prince.

TO ABSORB, SWALLOW UP, INGULF, ENGROSS.

ABSORB, in French *absorber*, Latin *absorbeo*, is compounded of *ab* and *sorbeo*, to sup up, in distinction from SWALLOW UP; the former denoting a gradual consumption; the latter a sudden envelopment of the whole object. The excessive heat of the sun *absorbs* all the nutritious fluids of bodies animal and vegetable. The gaming table is a vortex in which the principle of every man is *swallowed up* with his estate.

INGULF, compounded of *in* and *gulf*, signifies to be inclosed in a great gulf, which is a strong figurative representation for being swallowed up. As it applies to grand and sublime objects, it is used only in the higher style.

ENGROSS, which is compounded of the French words *en gros* whole, signifies to purchase wholesale, so as to swallow up the profits of others. In the moral application therefore it is very analogous to *absorb*.

The mind is *absorbed* in the contemplation of any subject, when all its powers are so bent upon it as not to admit distraction: the mind is *engrossed* by any subject when the thoughts of it force themselves upon its contemplation to the exclusion of others which should engage the attention.

TO ABSTAIN, FORBEAR, REFRAIN.

ABSTAIN, in French *abstenir*, Latin *abstineo*, is compounded of *ab* or *abs* from and *teneo* to keep, signifying to keep one's self from a thing.

FORBEAR is compounded of the preposition *for*, or *from*, and the verb to bear or carry, signifying to carry or take one's self from a thing.

REFRAIN, in French *refrèner*, Latin *refræno*, is compounded of *re* back and *fræno*, from *frænum* a bridle, signifying to keep back as it were by a bridle, to bridle in.

The first of these terms marks the leaving of a thing, and the two others the omission of an action. We *abstain* from any object by not making use of it; we *forbear* to do or *refrain* from doing a thing by not taking any part in it.

Abstaining and *forbearing* are outward actions, but *refraining* is connected with the operations of the mind. We may *abstain* from the thing we desire, or *forbear* to do the thing which we wish to do; but we can never *refrain* from any action without in some measure losing our desire to do it.

It is a part of the Mahometan faith to *abstain* from the use of wine; but it is a Christian duty to *forbear* doing an injury even in return for an injury; and to *refrain* from all swearing and evil speaking.

ABSTINENCE, FAST.

ABSTINENCE, is a general term, applicable to any object from which we abstain; FAST is a species of abstinence, namely, an abstaining from food: the general term is likewise used in the particular sense, to imply a partial *abstinence* from particular food; but *fast* signifies an abstinence from food altogether.

Fridays are appointed by the Church as days of *abstinence*; and Good Friday as a day of *fast*.

ABSTINENT, SOBER, ABSTEMIOUS, TEMPERATE.

THE first of these terms is generic, the rest specific.

ABSTINENT (*v. To abstain*) respects every thing that acts on the senses, and in a limited sense applies particularly to solid food.

SOBER, from the Latin *sobrius*, or *se brius*, that is, *sine ebrius*, not drunk, implies an abstinence from excessive drinking.

ABSTEMIOUS, from the Latin *abstemius*, compounded of *abs* and *temetum* wine, implies the abstaining from wine or strong liquor in general.

TEMPERATE, in Latin *temperatus*, participle of *tempero* to moderate or regulate, implies a well regulated abstinence in all matters of sensual indulgence.

We may be *abstinent* without being *sober*,

sober without being *abstemious*, and all together without being *temperate*.

An *abstinent* man does not eat or drink so much as he could enjoy; a *sober* man may drink much without being affected. An *abstemious* man drinks nothing strong. A *temperate* man enjoys all in a due proportion.

A particular passion may cause us to be *abstinent* either partially or totally; *sobriety* may often depend upon the strength of the constitution, or be prescribed by prudence: necessity may dictate *abstemiousness*, but nothing short of a well disciplined mind will enable us to be *temperate*.

TO ABSTRACT, SEPARATE, DISTINGUISH.

ABSTRACT, *v.* *Absent*,

SEPARATE, in Latin *separatus*, participle of *separo*, is compounded of *se* and *paro* to dispose apart, signifying to put things asunder; or at a distance from each other.

DISTINGUISH, in French *distinguer*. Latin *distinguo*, is compounded of the separative preposition *dis* and *tingo* to tinge or colour, signifying to give different marks to things, by which they may be known from each other.

Abstract is used in the moral sense only; *separate* mostly in a physical sense; *distinguish* either in a moral or physical sense. We *abstract* what we wish to regard particularly and individually; we *separate* what we wish not to be united; we *distinguish* what we wish not to confound. The mind performs the office of *abstraction* for itself, *separating* and *distinguishing* are exerted on external objects. Arrangement, place, time, and circumstances serve to *separate*: the ideas formed of things, the outward marks attached to them, the qualities attributed to them, serve to *distinguish*.

By the operation of *abstraction* the mind creates for itself a multitude of new ideas: in the act of *separation*, bodies are removed from each other by distance of place: in the act of *distinguishing*, objects are discovered to be similar or dissimilar. Qualities are *abstracted* from the subjects in which they are inherent: countries are *separated* by mountains or seas: their inhabitants are *distinguished* by their dress, language, or manners.

TO ABUSE, MISUSE.

ABUSE, in Latin *abusus*, participle of *abutor*, compounded of *ab* from and *utor* to use, signifies to use away or wear away with using; in distinction from MISUSE, which signifies to use amiss.

Every thing is *abused* which receives any sort of injury: it is *misused*, if not used at all, or turned to a wrong use. Money is *abused* when it is clipped, or its value any way lessened; it is *misused* when it is spent in excess and debauchery.

ABUSE, INVECTIVE.

ABUSE (*v.* *To abuse*) is here taken in the metaphorical application for ill-treatment of persons.

INVECTIVE, from the Latin *inveho*, signifies to bear upon or against. Harsh and unseemly censure is the idea common to these terms; but the former is employed more properly against the person, the latter against the thing.

Abuse is addressed to the individual, and mostly by word of mouth; *invective* is communicated mostly by writing. *Abuse* is dictated by anger, which throws off all constraint, and violates all decency: *invective* is dictated by party spirit, or an intemperate warmth of feeling in matters of opinion. *Abuse* is always resorted to by the vulgar in their private quarrels: *invective* is the ebullition of zeal and ill-nature in public concerns.

The more rude and ignorant the man, the more liable he is to indulge in *abuse*: the more restless and opiniated the partisan, whether in religion or politics, the more ready he is to deal in *invective*. We must expect to meet with *abuse* from the vulgar whom we offend; and, if in high stations, our conduct will draw forth *invective* from busybodies whom spleen has converted into oppositionists.

TO ACCEDE, CONSENT, COMPLY, ACQUIESCE, AGREE.

ACCEDE, in Latin *accedo*, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *cedo* to go or come, signifies to come or fall into a thing.

CONSENT, in French *consentir*, Latin *consentio*, compounded of *con* together, and *sentio* to feel, signifies to feel in unison with another.

COMPLY comes probably from the French *complaire*, Latin *complaceo*, signifying to be pleased in unison with another.

ACQUIESCE, in French *acquiescer*, Latin *acquiesco*, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *quiesco*, signifies to be easy about or contented with a thing.

AGREE, in French *agréer*, is most probably derived from the Latin *gruo*, in the word *congruo*, signifying to accord or suit.

We *accede* to what others propose to

us, by falling in with their ideas: we *consent* to what others wish, by authorising it: we *comply* with what is asked of us, by allowing it, or not hindering it: we *acquiesce* in what is insisted by accepting it, and conforming to it: we *agree* to what is proposed by admitting and embracing it.

We object to those things to which we do not *accede*: we refuse those things to which we do not *consent*, or with which we will not *comply*: we oppose those things in which we will not *acquiesce*: we dispute that to which we will not *agree*,

To *accede* is the unconstrained action of an equal; it is a matter of discretion: *consent* and *comply* suppose a degree of superiority, at least the power of preventing; they are acts of good-nature or civility: *acquiesce* implies a degree of submission; it is a matter of prudence or necessity: *agree* indicates an aversion to disputes; it respects the harmony of social intercourse.

Saxony has *acceded* to the Prussian Customs system. The Hanse towns refuse their *consent*. Austria hesitates to *comply*. The smaller states *acquiesce*. All ought to *agree* in the promotion of the general good.

ACCEPTABLE, GRATEFUL, WELCOME.

ACCEPTABLE signifies worthy to be accepted.

GRATEFUL, from the Latin *gratus* pleasing, signifies altogether pleasing; it is that which recommends itself. The *acceptable* is a relative good; the *grateful* is positive: the former depends upon our external condition, the latter on our feelings and state: a gift is *acceptable* to a poor man, which would be refused by one less needy than himself; harmonious sounds are always *grateful* to a musical ear.

WELCOME signifies what is come well or in season for us.

Acceptable and *welcome* both apply to external circumstances, but the former is confined to such things as are offered for our choice, the latter refers to whatever happens according to our wishes: we may not always accept that which is *acceptable*, but we shall never reject that which is *welcome*: it is a *grateful* task to be the bearer of *welcome* intelligence to our friends.

ACCEPTANCE, ACCEPTATION,

Though both derived from the verb *accept*, have this difference, that the former is employed to express the abstract action generally; the latter only in regard to the single object of words. A book, or whatever else is offered to us, may be worthy

of our *acceptance* or not. A word acquires its *acceptation* from the manner in which it is generally accepted by the learned.

ACCIDENT, CHANCE.

ACCIDENT, in French *accident*, Latin *accidens*, participle of *accido* to happen, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *cado* to fall, signifies the thing falling out.

CHANCE, in French *chance*, most probably comes from the Latin *cadens*, and signifies like the former the thing falling out.

Accident is said of things that have been: *chance* of things that are to be. That is an *accident* which is done without intention; that is a *chance* which cannot be brought about by the use of means. It is an *accident* when a house falls; it is a *chance* when and how it may fall.

Accidents cannot be prevented: *chances* cannot be calculated upon. *Accidents* may sometimes be remedied; *chances* can never be controlled: *accidents* give rise to sorrow, they mostly occasion mischief; *chances* give rise to hope; they often produce disappointment;

ACCIDENT, CONTINGENCY, CASUALTY.

ACCIDENT, *v.* *Accident*, *chance*.

CONTINGENCY, in French *contingence*, Latin *contingens*, participle of *contingo*, compounded of *con* and *tango*, to touch one another, signifies the falling out or happening together; or the thing that happens in conjunction with another.

CASUALTY, in French *casualité*, from the Latin *casualis*, and *cado* to fall or happen signifies the thing that happens in the course of events.

All these words imply whatever takes place independently of our intentions. *Accidents* express more than *contingencies*; the former comprehend events with their causes and consequences; the latter respect collateral actions, or circumstances appended to events; *casualties* have regard simply to circumstances. *Accidents* are frequently occasioned by carelessness, and *contingencies* by trivial mistakes; but *casualties* are altogether independent of ourselves.

The overturning a carriage is an *accident*; our situation in a carriage, at the time, is a *contingency*, which may occasion us to be more or less hurt; the passing of any one at the time is a *casualty*. We are all exposed to the most calamitous *accidents*; and our happiness or misery depends upon a thousand *contingencies*: the best concerted

scheme may be thwarted by *casualties*, which no human foresight can prevent.

ACCIDENTAL, INCIDENTAL, CASUAL, CONTINGENT.

ACCIDENTAL, *v. Accident.*

INCIDENTAL, from incident, in Latin *incidens* and *incido*, or *in* and *cado* to fall upon, signifies belonging to a thing by chance.

CASUAL, *v. Casualty.*

CONTINGENT, *v. Contingency.*

Accidental is opposed to what is designed or planned, *incidental* to what is premeditated, *casual* to what is constant and regular, *contingent* to what is definite and fixed. A meeting may be *accidental*, an expression *incidental*, a look, expression &c. *casual*, an expense or circumstance *contingent*. We do not expect what is *accidental*; we do not suspect or guard against what is *incidental*; we do not heed what is *casual*; we are not prepared for what is *contingent*. Many of the most fortunate and important occurrences in our lives are *accidental*; many remarks, seemingly *incidental*, do in reality conceal a settled intent; a *casual* remark in the course of conversation will sometimes make a stronger impression on the minds of children than the most eloquent and impressive discourse or repeated counsel; in the prosecution of any plan we ought to be prepared for the numerous *contingencies* which we may meet with to interfere with our arrangements.

ACCOMPANIMENT, COMPANION, CONCOMITANT.

ACCOMPANIMENT is properly a collective term to express what goes in company, and is applied only to things; COMPANION, which also signifies what is in the company, is applied either to persons or to things.

CONCOMITANT, from the intensive syllable *con* and *comes* a companion, implies what is attached to an object, or goes in its train, and is applied only to things.

When said in relation to things, *accompaniment* implies a necessary connexion; *companion* an incidental connexion: the former is as a part to a whole, the latter is as one whole to another: the *accompaniment* belongs to the thing accompanied inasmuch as it serves to render it more or less complete; the *companion* belongs to the thing accompanied inasmuch as they correspond: in this manner singing is an *accompaniment* in instrumental music; but a picture may be the *companion* of another picture from their fitness to stand together.

The *concomitant* is as much of an append-

age as the *accompaniment*, but it is applied only to moral objects: thus morality is a *concomitant* to religion.

TO ACCOMPANY, ATTEND, ESCORT.

ACCOMPANY, in French *accompagner*, is compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *compagner*, in Latin *compagino* to put or join together, signifying to give one's company and presence to any object, to join one's self to its company.

ATTEND, in French *attendre*, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tendo* to tend or incline towards, signifies to direct one's notice or care towards any object.

ESCORT, in French *escorter*, from the Latin *cohors* a cohort or band of soldiers that attended a magistrate on his going into a province, signifies to accompany by way of safeguard.

We *accompany* those with whom we wish to go; we *attend* those whom we wish to serve; we *escort* those whom we are called upon to protect or guard. We *accompany* our equals, we *attend* our superiors, and *escort* superiors or inferiors. The desire of pleasing or being pleased actuates in the first case; the desire of serving or being served, in the second case; the fear of danger or the desire of protecting, in the last place.

One is said to have a numerous *company*, a crowd of *attendants*, and a strong *escort*; but otherwise one person only may *accompany* or *attend*, though several are wanting for an *escort*. Friends *accompany* each other in their excursions; princes are *attended* with a considerable retinue whenever they appear in public, and with a strong *escort* when they travel through unfrequented and dangerous roads.

Accompany and *attend* may likewise be said of things as well as persons. In this case the former is applied to what goes with an object so as to form a part of it; the latter to that which follows an object as a dependant upon it. Pride is often *accompanied* with meanness, and *attended* with much inconvenience to the possessor.

TO ACCOMPLISH, EFFECT, EXECUTE, ACHIEVE.

ACCOMPLISH, in French *accomplir*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ac* or *ad* and *complir*, in Latin *compleo* to complete, signifying to complete to the end.

EFFECT, in Latin *effectus*, participle of *efficio*, compounded of *ef* or *ex* out of or up, and *facio* to make, signifies to make up until nothing remains to be done.

EXECUTE, in Latin *executus*, participle of *exequor*, compounded of *ex* and *sequor*, to follow, signifies to follow up or carry through to the end.

ACHIEVE, in French *achever*, from *chef*, a chief, signifies to perform as a chief.

We *accomplish* an object, *effect* a purpose, *execute* a project, *achieve* an enterprise. Perseverance is requisite for *accomplishing*, means for *effecting*, abilities for *executing*, and spirit for *achieving*. Some persons are always striving to attain an end without ever *accomplishing* what they propose. It is the part of wisdom to suit the means to the end when we have any scheme to *effect*. Those who are readiest in forming projects are not always the fittest for carrying them into *execution*. That ardour of character which impels to the *achievement* of arduous undertakings belongs but to very few.

ACCOMPLISHED,* PERFECT.

THESE epithets express an assemblage of all the qualities suitable to the subject; and mark the qualification in the highest degree. ACCOMPLISHED refers only to the artificial refinements of the mind; PERFECT is said of things in general, whether natural or artificial, mental or corporeal.

An acquaintance with modern languages and the ornamental branches of the arts and sciences constitutes an *accomplished* person: the highest possible degree of skill in any art constitutes a man a *perfect* artist. An *accomplished* man needs no moral endowment to entitle him to the name: a *perfect* man, if such an one there could be, must be free from every moral imperfection, and endowed with every virtue. *Accomplished* is applied only to persons; *perfect* is applicable not only to persons but to works, and every thing else as occasion requires; it may likewise be employed in a bad sense, to magnify any unfavourable quality.

The same distinction is kept up between these words in their abstract sense. An *accomplishment* is that which serves to adorn; a *perfection* is that which gives solid value.

TO ACCOST, SALUTE, ADDRESS.

ACCOST, in French *accoster*, is compounded of *ac* or *ad*, and the Latin *costa* a rib or side; signifying to come by the side of a person.

SALUTE, in Latin *saluto*, from *salus* health, signifies to bid good speed.

ADDRESS, in French *addresser*, is compounded of *ad* and *dresser*, from the Latin *dirigi*, preterite of *dirigo* to direct or apply,

signifying to direct one's discourse to a person.

We *accost* a stranger whom we casually meet by the way; we *salute* our friends on re-meeting; we *address* indifferent persons in company. Curiosity or convenience prompt men to *accost*; goodwill or intimacy to *salute*; business or social communication to *address*. Rude people *accost* every one whom they meet; familiar people *salute* those with whom they are barely acquainted; impertinent people *address* those with whom they have no business.

We must *accost* by speaking; but we may *salute* by signs as well as words; and *address* by writing as well as by speaking.

ACCOUNT, RECKONING, BILL.

ACCOUNT, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *count*, signifies to count to a person, or for a thing; an *account* is the thing so counted.

RECKONING, from the verb *to reckon*, signifies the thing reckoned up.

BILL, in Saxon *bill*, in all probability comes from the Swedish *byla*, to build, signifying a written contract for building vessels, which in German is still called a *beilbrief*; hence it has been employed to express various kinds of written documents. These words, which are very similar in signification, may frequently be substituted for one another.

Account is the generic, the others the specific terms: a *reckoning* and *bill* is an *account*, though not always *vice versa*: *account* expresses the details, with the sum of them counted up; *reckoning* implies the register and notation of the things to be reckoned up; *bill* denotes the details with their particular charges.

We speak of keeping an *account*, of coming to a *reckoning*, of sending in a *bill*. Customers have an *account* with their tradespeople; masters have a *reckoning* with their work-people; tradesmen send in their *bills* at stated periods.

Account, from the extensive use of the term, is applicable to every thing that is noted down, the particulars of which are considered worthy of notice, individually or collectively: merchants keep their *accounts*; an *account* is taken at the Custom House of all that goes in and out of the kingdom; an *account* is taken of all transactions, of the weather, of natural phenomena, and whatever is remarkable. *Reckoning*, as a particular term, is more partial in its use: it is mostly confined to the dealings of men with one another; in which sense it is superseded by the preceding term, and now serves

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Accompli, parfait.“

to express only an explanatory enumeration, which may be either verbal or written. *Bill*, as implying something charged or engaged, is used not only in a mercantile, but a legal sense: hence we speak of a *bill* of lading; a *bill* of parcels; a *bill* of exchange; a *bill* of indictment, or a *bill* in parliament.

ACCOUNT, NARRATIVE, DESCRIPTION.

ACCOUNT, *v.* *Account*, *reckoning*.

NARRATIVE, from *narrate*., is in Latin *narratus*, participle of *narro* or *gnaro*, which signifies to make known.

DESCRIPTION, from *describe*, in Latin *describo* or *de* and *scribo*, signifies to write down.

Account which is the most general of these terms has no reference to the person giving the account; a *narrative* must have a narrator; a *description* must have a describer. An *account* may come from one or several quarters, or no specified quarter; but a *narrative* and *description* bespeak themselves as the production of some individual. An *account* may be the statement of a single fact only; a *narrative* must always consist of several connected incidents; a *description*, of several unconnected particulars respecting some common object. An *account* and a *description* may be communicated either verbally or in writing; a *narrative* is mostly written. An *account* may be given of political events, natural phenomena, and domestic occurrences; as the signing of a treaty; the march of an army, the death and funeral of an individual: a *narrative* is mostly personal, respecting the adventures, the travels, the dangers, and the escapes of some particular person: a *description* does not so much embrace occurrences, as characters, appearances, beauties, defects, and attributes in general. *Accounts* from the armies are anxiously looked for in time of war; whenever a *narrative* is interesting, it is a species of reading eagerly sought after: the *descriptions* which are given of the eruptions of volcanoes are calculated to awaken a strong degree of curiosity. An *account* may be false or true; a *narrative* clear or confused; a *description* lively or dull.

ACCURATE, EXACT, PRECISE.

ACCURATE, in French *accurate*, Latin *accuratus*, participle of *accuro*, compounded of the intensive *ac* or *ad* and *curo*, to take care of, signifying done with great care.

EXACT, in French *exacte*, Latin *exactus*, participle of *exigo* to finish or complete, de-

notes the quality of completeness, the absence of defect.

PRECISE, in French *précis*, Latin *præcisus*, participle of *præcido* to cut by rule, signifies the quality of doing by rule.

A man is *accurate* when he avoids faults; *exact* when he attends to every minutia, and leaves nothing undone; *precise*, when he does it according to a certain measure. These epithets, therefore, bear a comparative relation to each other; *exact* expresses more than *accurate*, and *precise* more than *exact*. An account is *accurate* in which there is no misrepresentation; it is *exact* when nothing essential is omitted; it is *precise* when it contains particular details of time, place, and circumstance.

Accuracy is indispensable in all our concerns be they ever so ordinary; *exactness* is of peculiar importance in matters of taste; and in some cases, where great results flow from trifling causes, the greatest *precision* becomes requisite: we may, however, be too *precise* when we dwell on unimportant particulars; but we never can be too *accurate* or *exact*. Hence the epithet *precise* is sometimes taken in the unfavourable sense for affectedly exact. An *accurate* man will save himself much trouble; an *exact* man will gain himself much credit; and a *precise* man will take much pains only to render himself ridiculous.

Accuracy, moreover, concerns our mechanical labours, and the operations of our senses and understandings; *exactness* respects our dealings with others; *precision* is applied to our habits and manners in society. We write, we see, we think, we judge *accurately*; we are *exact* in our payments; we are *precise* in our modes of dress. Some men are very *accurate* in their particular line of business, who are not very *exact* in fulfilling their engagements, nor very *precise* in the hours which they keep.

TO ACCUSE, CHARGE, IMPEACH, ARRAIGN.

ACCUSE, in Latin *accuso*, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *causa* a cause or trial, signifies to bring to trial.

CHARGE, from the word *cargo* a burden, signifies to lay on a burden.

IMPEACH, in French *empêcher* to hinder or disturb, compounded of *em* or *in* and *pes* the foot, signifies to set one's foot or one's self against another.

ARRAIGN, compounded of *ar* or *ad* and *raign* or *range*, signifies to range, or set at the bar of a tribunal.

The idea of asserting the guilt of another is common to these terms. *Accuse* in the

proper sense is applied particularly to crimes, but it is also applied to every species of offence; *charge* may be applied to crimes, but is used more commonly for breaches of moral conduct: we *accuse* a person of murder; we *charge* him with dishonesty.

Accuse is properly a formal action; *charge* is an informal action: criminals are *accused*, and the *accusation* is proved in a court of judicature to be true or false: any person may be *charged*, and the *charge* may be either substantiated or refuted in the judgment of a third person.

Impeach and *arraign* are both species of *accusing*; the former in application to statesmen and state concerns, the latter in regard to the general conduct or principles; with this difference, that he who *impeaches* only asserts the guilt, but does not determine it; but those who *arraign* also take upon themselves to decide: statesmen are *impeached* for misdemeanours in the administration of government: kings *arraign* governors of provinces and subordinate princes, and in this manner kings are sometimes *arraigned* before mock tribunals: our Saviour was *arraigned* before Pilate; and creatures in the madness of presumption *arraign* their Creator.

TO ACCUSE, CENSURE.

ACCUSE, *v.* To accuse, charge.

CENSURE, in French *censure*, in Latin *censura*, is derived from *censor*, a Roman magistrate who took cognizance of the morals and manners of the citizens, as also of the domestic arrangements of the city. It signifies not only the office of censor, but, in an extended sense, the act of blaming or punishing offenders against morality, which formed a prominent feature in his office.

To *accuse* is only to assert the guilt of another; to *censure* is to take that guilt for granted.

We *accuse* only to make known the offence, to provoke inquiry; we *censure* in order to inflict a punishment.

An *accusation* may be false or true; a *censure* mild or severe.

TO ACKNOWLEDGE, OWN, CONFESS, AVOW.

ACKNOWLEDGE, compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *knowledge*, implies to bring to knowledge, to make known.

OWN is a familiar figure, signifying to take to one's self, to make one's own: it is a common substitute for *confess*.

CONFESS, in French *confesser*, Latin *confessus*, participle of *confiteor*, compounded

of *con* and *fateor*, signifies to impart to any one.

AVOW, in French *avouer*, Latin *advoveo*; signifies to vow, or protest to any one.

Acknowledging is a simple declaration; *confessing* or *owning* is a specific private communication; *avowal* is a public declaration. We *acknowledge* facts; *confess* or *own* faults, *avow* motives, opinions, &c.

We *acknowledge* in consequence of a question; we *confess* in consequence of an accusation; we *own* in consequence of a charge; we *avow* voluntarily. We *acknowledge* having been concerned in a transaction; we *confess* our guilt; we *own* that a thing is wrong; but we are ashamed to *avow* our motives. Candour leads to an *acknowledgment*; repentance produces a *confession*; the desire of forgiveness leads to *owning*; generosity or pride occasions an *avowal*.

ACQUAINTANCE, FAMILIARITY, INTIMACY.

ACQUAINTANCE comes from *acquaint*, which is compounded of the intensive syllable *ac* or *ad* and *quaint*, in old French *coint*, German *gekannt* known, signifying known to one.

FAMILIARITY comes from *familiar*, in Latin *familiaris* and *familia*, signifying known as one of the family.

INTIMATE, from *intimate*, in Latin *intimatus*, participle of *intimo* to love entirely, from *intimus* innermost, signifies known to the innermost recesses of the heart.

These terms mark different degrees of closeness in the social intercourse; *acquaintance* expressing less than *familiarity*, and that less than *intimacy*.

Acquaintance springs from occasional intercourse; *familiarity* is produced by a daily intercourse; which wears off all constraint, and banishes all ceremony; *intimacy* arises not merely from frequent intercourse, but unreserved communication. An *acquaintance* will be occasionally a guest; but one that is on terms of *familiarity* has easy access to our table; and an *intimate*, likewise, lays claim to a share at least of our confidence. An *acquaintance* with a person affords but little opportunity for knowing his character; *familiarity* puts us in the way of seeing his foibles, rather than his virtues; but *intimacy* enables us to appreciate his worth.

These terms may be applied to things as well as persons, in which case they bear a similar analogy. An *acquaintance* with a subject is opposed to entire ignorance upon it; *familiarity* with it is the consequence of frequent repetition; and *intimacy* of a steady and thorough research. In our intercourse

with the world we become daily *acquainted* with fresh subjects to engage our attention. Some men have by extraordinary diligence acquired a considerable *familiarity* with more than one language and science; but few, if any, can boast of having possessed an *intimate acquaintance* with all the particulars of even one language or science. When we can translate the authors of any foreign language, we may claim an *acquaintance* with it; when we can speak, or write it freely, we may be said to be *familiar* with it; but an *intimate acquaintance* comprehends a thorough critical *intimacy* with all the niceties and subtleties of its structure.

TO ACQUIRE, OBTAIN, GAIN, WIN, EARN.

ACQUIRE, in French *acquiescer*, Latin *acquirere*, is compounded of *ac* or *ad* and *quaero* to seek, signifying to seek or get to one's self.

OBTAIN, in French *obtenir*, Latin *obtineo*, is compounded of *ob* and *teneo* to hold, signifying to lay hold or secure within one's reach.

GAIN and WIN are derived from the same source; namely, the French *gagner*, German *gewinnen*, Saxon *winnen*, from the Latin *vinco*, Greek *καίνομαι* or *νικω* to conquer signifying to get the mastery over, to get into one's possession.

EARN comes from the Saxon *tharnan*, German *erndten*, Friezlandish *arnan* to reap, which is connected with the Greek *αγρηναι* to take or get.

The idea of getting is common to these terms, but the circumstances of the action vary. We *acquire* by our own efforts; we *obtain* by the efforts of others, as well as ourselves; we *gain* or *win* by striving; we *earn* by labour. Talents and industry are requisite for *acquiring*; what we *acquire*, comes gradually to us in consequence of the regular exercise of our abilities: in this manner, knowledge, honour, and reputation, are *acquired*. Things are *obtained* by all means, honest or dishonest; whatever comes into our possession agreeable to our wishes is *obtained*; favours and requests are always *obtained*. Fortune assists in both *gaining* and *winning*, but particularly in the latter case; a subsistence, a superiority, a victory or battle, is *gained*; a game or a prize in the lottery is *won*. A good constitution and full employment are all that is necessary for *earning* a livelihood. Fortunes are *acquired* after a course of years; they are *obtained* by inheritance, or *gained* in trade: they are sometimes *won* at the gaming table, but seldom *earned*.

Scholars *acquire* learning, *obtain* rewards, *gain* applause, and *win* prizes, which are often hardly *earned* by the loss of health.

TO ACQUIRE, ATTAIN.

ACQUIRE, *v.* To *acquire*, *obtain*.

ATTAIN, in Latin *attineo*, is compounded of *ab* or *ad* and *teneo* to hold, signifying to rest at a thing.

To *acquire* is a progressive and permanent action; to *attain* is a perfect and finishing action: we always go on *acquiring*; but we stop when we have *attained*. What is *acquired* is something got into the possession; what is *attained* is the point arrived at. We *acquire* a language; we *attain* to a certain degree of perfection.

By abilities and perseverance we may *acquire* a considerable fluency in speaking several languages; but we can scarcely expect to *attain* to the perfection of a native in any foreign language. *Acquirements* are always serviceable; *attainments* always creditable.

ACQUIREMENT, ACQUISITION.

Two abstract nouns, from the same verb, denoting the thing acquired.

ACQUIREMENT respects rather the exertions employed; ACQUISITION, the benefit or gain accruing. To learn a language is an *acquirement*; to gain a class or a degree, an *acquisition*. The *acquirements* of literature far exceed in value the *acquisitions* of fortune.

ACRIMONY, TARTNESS, ASPERITY, HARSHNESS.

THESE epithets are figuratively employed to denote sharpness of feeling corresponding to the quality in natural bodies.

ACRIMONY, in Latin *acrimonia*, from *acer* sharp, is the characteristic of garlic, mustard, and pepper, that is, a biting sharpness.

TARTNESS, from *tart*, is not improbably derived from *tartar*, the quality of which it in some degree resembles; it is a high degree of acid peculiar to vinegar.

ASPERITY, in Latin *asperitas*, from *asper*, and the Greek *ασπερος* fallow, without culture and without fruit, signifying land that is too hard and rough to be tilled.

HARSHNESS, from *harsh*, in German and Teutonic *herbe*, *herbisch*, Swedish *kerb*, Latin *acerbus*, denotes the sharp rough taste of unripe fruit.

A quick sense produces *acrimony*: it is too frequent among disputants, who embitter each other's feelings. An acute sensibility coupled with quickness of intellect produces *tartness*: it is too frequent among

females. *Acrimony* is a transient feeling that discovers itself by the words; *tartness* is an habitual irritability that mingles itself with the tone and looks. An *acrimonious* reply frequently gives rise to much ill-will; a *tart* reply is often treated with indifference, as indicative of the natural temper, rather than of any unfriendly feeling.

Asperity and *harshness* respect one's conduct to inferiors; the latter expresses a strong degree of the former. *Asperity* is opposed to mildness and forbearance; *harshness* to kindness. A reproof is conveyed with *asperity*, when the words and looks convey strong displeasure; a treatment is *harsh* when it wounds the feelings, and does violence to the affections. Mistresses sometimes chide their servants with *asperity*; parents deal *harshly* with their children.

TO ACT, DO.

ACT, in Latin *actus*, from *ago* to direct, signifies the putting in motion.

DO, in German *thun*, comes probably from the Greek *θεῖναι* to put, signifying dispose, put in order, or bring to pass.

We *act* whenever we *do* any thing; but we may *act* without *doing* any thing. The first of these words is intransitive, and the second transitive: we *do* not *act* a thing, but we always *do* a thing. The first approaches nearest to the idea of *move*; it is properly the exertion of power corporeal or mental: the second is closely allied to *effect*; it is the producing an effect by such an exertion. They *act* very unwisely who attempt to *do* more than their abilities will enable them to complete: whatever we *do*, let us be careful to *act* considerately.

ACTION, ACT, DEED.

THE words *action*, *act*, and *deed*, though derived from the preceding verbs, have an obvious distinction in their meaning.

ACTION, in French *action*, Latin *actio*, signifies *doing*.

ACT, in French *acte*, Latin *actum*, denotes the *thing* done: the former implies a process: the latter a result.

Action is a continued exertion of power: *act* is a single exertion of power; the physical movement; the simple *acting*. Our *actions* are our works in the strict sense of the words; our *acts* are the operations of our faculties. The character of a man must be judged by his *actions*; the merit of *actions* depends on the motives that give rise to them: the *act* of speaking is peculiar to man; but the *acts*

of walking, running, eating, &c. are common to all animals.

Actions may be considered either singly or collectively; *acts* are regarded only individually and specifically: we speak of all a man's *actions*, but not of all his *acts*; we say a good *action*, a virtuous *action*, a charitable *action*, but an *act*, not an *action* of goodness, an *act* of virtue, an *act* of faith, an *act* of charity, and the like. It is a good *action* to conceal the faults of our neighbours; but a rare *act* of charity among men. Many noble *actions* are done in private, the consciousness of which is the only reward of the doer; the wisest of men may occasionally commit *acts* of folly, which are not imputable to their general character.

Act and *deed* are both employed for what is remarkable; but *act* denotes only one single thing; *deed* implies some complicated performance, something achieved: we display but one quality or power in performing an *act*; we display many, both physical and mental, in performing a *deed*: A prince distinguishes himself by *acts* of mercy; the commander of an army by martial *deeds*.

Acts of disobedience in youth frequently lead to the perpetration of the foulest *deeds* in more advanced life.

ACTION, GESTURE, GESTICULATION, POSTURE, ATTITUDE.

ACTION, *v.* To act.

GESTURE, in French *geste*, Latin *gestus*, participle of *gero* to carry one's self, signifies the manner of carrying one's body.

GESTICULATION, in Latin *gesticulatio*, comes from *gesticulator* to make many gestures.

POSTURE, in French *posture*, Latin *positura* a position, comes from *positus*, participle of *pono*, signifying the manner of placing one's self.

ATTITUDE, in French *attitude*, Italian *attitudine*, is changed from *aptitude*, signifying a propriety as to disposition.

All these terms are applied to the state of the body; the former three indicating a state of motion; the latter two a state of rest. *Action* respects the movements of the body in general: *gesture* is an *action* indicative of some particular state of mind; *gesticulation* is a species of artificial *gesture*. Raising the arm is an *action*; bowing is a *gesture*.

Actions may be ungraceful; *gestures* indecent. A suitable *action* sometimes gives great force to the words that are uttered; *gestures* often supply the place of language between people of different na-

tions. *Actions* characterise a man as vulgar or well-bred; *gestures* mark the temper of the mind. An extravagant or unnatural *gesture* is termed a *gesticulation*; a sycophant, who wishes to cringe into favour with the great, deals largely in *gesticulation* to mark his devotion; a buffoon who attempts to imitate the *gestures* of another will use *gesticulation*; and the monkey who apes the *actions* of human beings does so by means of *gesticulations*.

*Posture** is a mode of placing the body more or less differing from the ordinary habits; *attitude* is the manner of keeping the body more or less suitable to the existing circumstances. A *posture*, however convenient, is never assumed without exertion; it is therefore willingly changed; an *attitude*, though not usual, is still according to the nature of things; it is therefore readily preserved. A *posture* is singular; it has something in it which departs from the ordinary carriage of the body, and makes it remarkable: an *attitude* is striking; it is the natural expression of character or impression. A brave man will put himself into a *posture* of defence, without assuming an *attitude* of defiance.

Strange and forced positions of the body are termed *postures*; noble, agreeable, and expressive forms of carriage, are called *attitudes*: mountebanks and clowns put themselves into ridiculous *postures* in order to excite laughter; actors assume graceful *attitudes* to represent their characters. *Postures* are to the body what grimaces are to the face; *attitudes* are to the body what air is to the figure; he who in walking assumes the *attitudes* of a dancer, puts himself into ridiculous *postures*; a graceful and elegant *attitude* in dancing becomes an affected and laughable *posture* in another case.

Attitude and *posture* are figuratively applied to other objects besides the body: armies assume a menacing *attitude*; in a critical *posture* of affairs, extraordinary skill is required on the part of the government.

ACTION, AGENCY, OPERATION.

ACTION, v. *To act.*

AGENCY, v. *To act.*

OPERATION, in Latin *operatio*, from *opera* labour and *opus* need, signifies the work that is needful.

Action is the effect, *agency* the cause. *Action* is inherent in the subject: *agency* is something exterior; it is, in fact, putting a thing into *action*; in this manner the whole world is in *action* through the *agency* of the

Divine Being. *Operation* is action for a specific end, and according to a rule; as the *operation* of nature in vegetation.

ACTIVE, DILIGENT, INDUSTRIOUS, ASSIDUOUS, LABORIOUS.

ACTIVE, from the verb to *act*, implies a propensity to act, to be doing something without regard to the nature of the object.

DILIGENT, in French *diligent*, Latin *diligens*, participle of *diligo*, to choose or like, implies an attachment to an object, and consequent attention to it.

INDUSTRIOUS, in French *industrieux*, Latin *industrius*, is probably changed from *endostruus*, that is *endo* or *intro* within, and *struo* to build, make, or do, signifying an inward or thorough inclination to be engaged in some serious work.

ASSIDUOUS, in French *assidu*, in Latin *assiduus*, is compounded of *as* or *ad*, and *siduus* from *sedeo* to sit, signifying to sit close to a thing.

LABORIOUS, in French *laborieux*, Latin *laboriosus*, from *labor*, implies belonging to labour, or the inclination to labour.

We are *active* if we are only ready to exert our powers, whether to any end or not. We are *diligent* when we are active for some specific end. We are *industrious* when no time is left unemployed in some serious pursuit. We are *assiduous* if we do not leave a thing until it is finished. We are *laborious* when the bodily or mental powers are regularly employed in some hard labour.

A man may be *active* without being *diligent*, since he may employ himself in what is of no importance; but he can scarcely be *diligent* without being active, since *diligence* supposes some degree of activity in one's application to a useful object. A man may be *diligent* without being *industrious*, or he may *diligently* employ himself about a particular favourite object without employing himself constantly in the same way; and he may be *industrious* without being *diligent*, since *diligence* implies a free exercise of the mental as well as corporeal powers, but *industry* applies principally to manual labour. *Activity* and *diligence* are therefore commonly the property of lively or strong minds, but *industry* may be associated with moderate talents. A man may be *diligent* without being *assiduous*; but he cannot be *assiduous* without being *diligent*, for *assiduity* is a sort of persevering *diligence*. A man may be *industrious*, without being *laborious*, but not *vice versa*; for *laboriousness* is a severer kind of *industry*.

* Roubaud; "Posture, attitude."

The *active* man is never easy without an employment; the *diligent* man is contented with the employment he has; the *industrious* man goes from one employment to the other; the *assiduous* man seeks to attain the end of his employment; the *laborious* man spares no pains or labour in following his employment.

ACTIVE, BRISK, AGILE, NIMBLE.

ACTIVE, *v.* Active, diligent.

BRISK has a common origin with *fresh*, which is in Saxon *fresh*, Dutch *frisch* or *bersk*, Danish *frisk*, *fersk*, &c.

AGILE, in Latin *agilis*, comes from the same verb as active, signifying a fitness, a readiness to act or move.

NIMBLE is probably derived from the Saxon *nemen* to take, implying a fitness or capacity to take any thing by a celerity of movement.

Activity respects one's transactions; *briskness* one's sports: men are *active* in carrying on business; children are *brisk* in their play. *Agility* refers to the light and easy carriage of the body in springing; *nimbleness* to its quick and gliding movements in running. A rope dancer is *agile*; a female moves *nimbly*.

Activity results from ardour of mind; *briskness* from vivacity of feeling; *agility* is produced by corporeal vigour, and habitual strong exertion; *nimbleness* results from an habitual effort to move lightly.

ACTIVE, BUSY, OFFICIOUS.

ACTIVE, *v.* Active, diligent,

BUSY, in Saxon *gebysgod*, from *bisgian*, *beschäftigt*, from *beschäftigen*, to occupy, and *schaffen* to make or do, implies a propensity to be occupied.

OFFICIOUS, in French *officieux*, Latin *officiosus*, from *officium* duty or service, signifies a propensity to perform some service or office.

Active respects the habit or disposition of the mind; *busy* and *officious*, either the disposition of the mind, or the employment of the moment: the former regards every species of employment: the latter only particular kinds of employment. An *active* person is ever ready to be employed; a person is *busy*, when he is actually employed in any object; he is *officious*, when he is employed for others.

Active is always taken in a good, or at least an indifferent sense; it is opposed to lazy: *busy*, as it respects occupation, is mostly in a good sense; it is opposed to being at leisure; as it respects disposition, it is always in a bad sense: *officious* is never

taken in a good sense; it implies being *busy* without discretion. To an *active* disposition, nothing is more irksome than inaction; but it is not concerned to inquire into the utility of the action. It is better for a person to be *busy* than quite unemployed; but a *busy* person will employ himself about the concerns of others, when he has none of his own sufficiently important to engage his attention: an *officious* person is as unfortunate as he is troublesome: when he strives to serve he has the misfortune to annoy.

ACTOR, AGENT.

ACTOR is used for one who acts a part, or who represents the actions and characters of others, whether real or feigned. AGENT is said of those who simply act for, or in the stead of another.

Actors require the power of imitating actions; *agents* the power of performing them. *Actors* serve for the diversion of others; *agents* are employed for the benefit of others.

ACTOR, PLAYER.

The ACTOR and PLAYER both perform on a stage; but the former is said in relation to the part that is acted, the latter to the profession that is followed. We may be *actors* occasionally without being *players* professionally, but we may be *players* without deserving the name of *actors*. Those who personate characters for their amusement are *actors* but not *players*; those who do the same for a livelihood are *players* as well as *actors*; hence we speak of a company of *players*, not *actors*. So likewise in the figurative sense, whoever acts a part real or fictitious, that is, on the stage of life, or the stage of a theatre, is an *actor*; but he only is a *player* who performs the fictitious part; hence the former is taken* in a bad or good sense, according to circumstances; but the *player* is always taken in a less favourable sense, from the artificiality [which attaches to his profession.

ACTUAL, REAL, POSITIVE.

ACTUAL, in French *actuel*, Latin *actualis*, from *actio* a deed, signifies belonging to the thing done.

REAL, in French *reel*, Latin *realis*, from *res*, signifies belonging to the thing as it is.

POSITIVE, in French *positif*, Latin *positivus*, from *pono* to place or fix, signifies the state or quality of being fixed, established.

What is *actual* has proof of its exist-

* Vide Girard „Acteur, comedien.“

ence within itself, and may be exposed to the eye; what is *real* may be satisfactorily proved to exist; and what is *positive* precludes the necessity of a proof. *Actual* is opposed to the suppositious, conceived or reported; *real* to the feigned, imaginary; *positive* to the uncertain, doubtful.

Whatever is the condition of a thing for the time being is the *actual* condition; sorrows are *real* which flow from a substantial cause; proofs are *positive* which leave the mind in no uncertainty. By an *actual* survey of human life, we are alone enabled to form just opinions of mankind; it is but too frequent for men to disguise their *real* sentiments, although it is not always possible to obtain *positive* evidence of their insincerity.

TO ACTUATE, IMPEL, INDUCE.

ACTUATE, from the Latin *actum* an action, implies to call into action.

IMPEL, in Latin *impello*, is compounded of *in* towards, and *pello* to drive, signifying to drive towards an object.

INDUCE, in Latin *induco*, is compounded of *in* and *duco*, signifying to lead into an object.

One is *actuated* by motives, *impelled* by passions, and *induced* by reason or inclination.

Whatever *actuates* is the result of reflection; it is a steady and fixed principle: whatever *impels* is momentary and vehement, and often precludes reflection; whatever *induces* is not vehement, though often momentary.

ACUTE, KEEN, SHREWD.

ACUTE, in French *acute*, Latin *acutus*, from *acus* a needle, signifies the quality of sharpness and pointedness peculiar to a needle.

KEEN, in Saxon *cene*, probably comes from *snidan* to cut; signifying the quality of being able to cut.

SHREWD, probably from the Teutonic *beschreyen* to enchant, signifies inspired or endowed with a strong portion of intuitive intellect.

In the natural sense, a fitness to pierce is predominant in the word *acute*: and that of cutting, or a fitness for cutting, in the word *keen*. The same difference is observable in their figurative acceptation.

An *acute* understanding is quick at discovering truth in the midst of falsehood; it fixes itself on a single point with wonderful celerity. A *keen* understanding cuts or removes away the artificial veil under which the truth lies hidden from the view.

A *shrewd* understanding is rather quick at discovering new truths, than at distinguishing truth from falsehood.

Arguments may be *acute*, reproaches *keen*, and replies or retorts *shrewd*. A polemic, or a lawyer, must be *acute*, a satirist *keen*, and a wit *shrewd*.

TO ADD, JOIN, UNITE, COALESCE.

ADD, in Latin *addo*, compounded of *ad* and *do*, signifies to put to an object.

JOIN, in French *joindre*, Latin *jungo*, comes from *jugum* a yoke, and the Greek *ζευγω* to yoke, signifying to bring into close contact.

UNITE, in Latin *unitus*, participle of *unio*, from *unus* one, implies to make into one.

COALESCE, in Latin *coalesco*, compounded of *co* or *con*, and *alesco* for *cresco*, signifies to grow or form one's self together.

We *add* by affixing a part of one thing to another, so as to make one whole; we *join* by attaching one whole to another, so that they may adhere in part; we *unite* by putting one thing to another, so that all their parts may adhere to each other; things *coalesce* by coming into an entire cohesion of all their parts.

Adding is either a corporeal or spiritual action; *joining* is mostly said of corporeal objects; *uniting* and *coalescing* of spiritual objects. We *add* a wing to a house by a mechanical process, or we *add* quantities together by calculation: we *join* two houses together, or two armies, by placing them on the same spot: people are *united* who are bound to each other by similarity of opinion or sentiment: parties *coalesce* when they agree to lay aside their leading distinctions of opinion, so as to co-operate.

Nothing can be *added* without some agent to perform the act of *adding*; but things may be *joined* by casually coming in contact; and things will *unite* of themselves which have an aptitude to accordance; *coalition* is that species of union which arises mostly from external agency. The *addition* of quantities produces vast sums; the *junction* of streams forms great rivers; the *union* of families or states constitutes their principal strength; by the *coalition* of sounds, diphthongs are formed.

Addition is opposed to subtraction; *junction* and *union*, to division; *coalition*, to distinction.

TO ADDICT, DEVOTE, APPLY.

ADDICT, in Latin *addictus*, participle of *addico*, compounded of *ad* and *dico*,

signifies to speak or declare in favour of a thing, to exert one's self in its favour.

DEVOTE, in Latin *devotus*, participle of *devoveo*, signifies to vow or make resolutions for a thing.

APPLY, in French *appliquer*, Latin *applico*, is compounded of *ap* or *ad*, and *plico*, signifying to knit or join one's self to a thing.

To *addict* is to indulge one's self in any particular practice; to *devote* is to direct one's powers and means to any particular pursuit; to *apply* is to employ one's time or attention about any object. Men are *addicted* to vices; they *devote* their talents to the acquirement of any art or science: they *apply* their minds to the investigation of a subject.

We are *addicted* to a thing from an irresistible passion or propensity; we are *devoted* to a thing from a strong but settled attachment to it: we *apply* to a thing from a sense of its utility.

Addict is seldomer used in a good than in a bad sense; *devote* is mostly employed in a good sense; *apply* in an indifferent sense.

TO ADDRESS. APPLY.

ADDRESS is compounded of *ad* and *dress*, in Spanish *derecar*, Latin *direxi*, preterite of *dirigo* to direct, signifying to direct one's self to an object.

APPLY, v. To *addict*.

An *address* is immediately directed from one party to the other, either personally or by writing; an *application* may be made through the medium of a third person. An *address* may be made for an indifferent purpose or without any express object; but an *application* is always occasioned by some serious circumstance.

We *address* those to whom we speak or write; but we *apply* to those to whom we wish to communicate some object of personal interest. An *address* therefore may be made without an *application*; and an *application* may be made by means of an *address*.

An *address* may be rude or civil, an *application* may be frequent or urgent. It is impertinent to *address* any one with whom we are not acquainted, unless we have any reason for making an *application* to them.

ADDRESS, SPEECH, HARANGUE, ORATION.

ADDRESS, v. To *address*.

SPEECH, from *speak*, signifies the thing spoken.

HARANGUE, probably comes from *ara* an altar, where *harangues* used to be delivered.

ORATION, from the Latin *oro* to beg or entreat, signifies that which is said by way of entreaty.

All these terms denote a set form of words directed or supposed to be directed to some person: an *address* in this sense is always written, but the rest are really spoken or supposed to be so; a *speech* is in general that which is addressed in a formal manner to one person or more; an *harangue* is a noisy tumultuous *speech* addressed to many; an *oration* is a solemn *speech* for any purpose.

Addresses are frequently sent up to the throne by public bodies. *Speeches* in Parliament, like *harangues* at elections, are often little better than the crude effusions of party spirit. The *orations* of Demosthenes and Cicero, which have been so justly admired, received a polish from the correcting hand of their authors, before they were communicated to the public.

TO ADDUCE, ALLEDGE, ASSIGN, ADVANCE.

ADDUCE, in Latin *adduco*, compounded of *ad* and *duco* to lead, signifies to bring forwards, or for a thing.

ALLEDGE, in French *alleguer*, in Latin *allego*, compounded of *al* or *ad* and *lego*, in Greek *λεγω* to speak, signifies to speak for a thing.

ASSIGN, in French *assigner*, Latin *assigno*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *signo* to sign or mark out, signifies to set apart for a purpose.

ADVANCE, comes from the Latin *advenio*, compounded of *ad* and *venio* to come, or cause to come, signifying to bring forward a thing.

What is *adduced* tends to corroborate or invalidate; what is *alleged* tends to criminate or exculpate; what is *assigned* tends to justify; what is *advanced* tends to explain and illustrate. Whoever discusses disputed points must have arguments to *adduce* in favour of his principles: censures should not be passed where nothing improper can be *alleged*; a conduct is absurd for which no reason can be *assigned*: those who *advance* what they cannot maintain expose their ignorance as much as their folly.

We may controvert what is *adduced* or *advanced*; we may deny what is *alleged*, and question what is *assigned*.

TO ADHERE, ATTACH.

ADHERE, from the French *adherer*, La-

tin *adhæreo*, is compounded of *ad* and *hæreo* to stick close to.

ATTACH, in French *attacher*, is compounded of *at* or *at* and *tach* or *touch*, both which come from the Latin *tango* to touch, signifying to come so near as to touch.

A thing is *adherent* by the union which nature produces; it is *attached* by arbitrary ties which keep it close to another thing. Glutinous bodies are apt to *adhere* to every thing they touch: a smaller building is sometimes *attached* to a larger by a passage, or some other mode of communication.

What *adheres* to a thing is closely joined to its outward surface; but what is *attached* may be fastened to it by intervention of a third body. There is an universal *adhesion* in all the particles of matter one to another: the sails of a vessel are *attached* to a mast by means of ropes.

In a figurative sense the analogy is kept up in the use of these two words. *Adherence* is a mode of conduct; *attachment* a state of feeling. We *adhere* to opinions which we are determined not to renounce; we are *attached* to opinions for which our feelings are strongly prepossessed.

ADHESION, ADHERENCE.

These terms are both derived from the verb *adhere*, one expressing the proper or figurative sense, and the other the moral sense or acceptance.

There is a power of *adhesion* in all glutinous bodies; a disposition for *adherence* in steady minds.

ADJACENT, ADJOINING, CONTIGUOUS.

ADJACENT, in Latin *adjiciens*, participle of *adjicio*, is compounded of *ad* and *jacio* to lie near.

ADJOINING, as the words imply, signifies being joined together.

CONTIGUOUS, in French *contigu*, Latin *contiguus*, comes from *contingo* or *con* and *tango*, signifying to touch close.

What is *adjacent* may be separated altogether by the intervention of some third object; what is *adjoining* must touch in some part; and what is *contiguous* must be fitted to touch entirely on one side. Lands are *adjacent* to a house or a town; fields are *adjoining* to each other; and houses *contiguous* to each other.

TO ADMIT, * RECEIVE.

ADMIT, in French *admettre*, Latin *admitto*, compounded of *ad* and *mitto*. signifies to send or suffer to pass into.

RECEIVE, in French *recevoir*, Latin

¹ Girard; „Admettre, recevoir.“

recipio, compounded of *re* and *capio*, signifies to take back or to one's self.

Admitting is an act of relative import; *receiving* as the act of persons is always a positive measure: a person may be *admitted* into a house, who is not prevented from entering; he is *received* only by the actual consent of some individual.

We *admit* willingly or reluctantly; we *receive* politely or rudely. Foreign ambassadors are *admitted* to an audience, and *received* at court. It is necessary to be cautious not to *admit* any one into our society, who may not be an agreeable and suitable companion; but still more necessary not to *receive* any one into our houses whose character may reflect disgrace on ourselves.

When applied to unconscious agents there is a similar distinction between these terms. Ideas are *admitted* into the mind by means of association; things are *received* by others in consequence of their adaptation to each other.

TO ADMIT, ALLOW, PERMIT, SUFFER, TOLERATE.

ADMIT, v. *To admit, receive.*

ALLOW, in French *allouer*, compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad* and *louer*, in German *loben*, old German *laubzan*, low German *laven*, Swedish *lofwa*, Danish *love*, &c. Latin *laus* praise, *laudare* to praise, signifies to give consent to a thing.

PERMIT, in French *permettre*, Latin *permitto*, is compounded of *per* through or away, and *mitto* to send or let go, signifying to let it go its way.

SUFFER, in French *souffrir*, Latin *suffero*, is compounded of *sub* and *fero*, signifying to bear with.

TOLERATE, in Latin *toleratus*, participle of *tolero*, from the Greek *τλᾶω* to sustain, signifying also to bear or bear with.

The actions denoted by the first three are more or less voluntary; those of the last two are more or less involuntary: *admit* is less voluntary than *allow*; and that than *permit*. We *admit* what we profess not to know, or seek not to prevent; we *allow* what we know, and tacitly consent to; we *permit*, what we authorise by a formal consent; we *suffer* and *tolerate* what we object to, but do not think proper to prevent. We *admit* of things from inadvertence, or the want of inclination to prevent them: we *allow* of things from easiness of temper, or the want of resolution to oppose them; we *permit* things from a desire to oblige or a dislike to refuse; we *suffer* things from want of ability to remove them; we *tolerate* things from motives of discretion.

What is *admitted*, *allowed*, *suffered*, or *tolerated*, has already been done; what is *permitted* is desired to be done. To *admit*, *suffer*, and *tolerate*, are said of what ought to be avoided; *allowed* and *permit* of things good, bad, or indifferent. *Suffer* is employed, mostly with regard to private individuals; *tolerate* with respect to the civil power.

TO ADMIT, ALLOW, GRANT.

ADMIT, *v.* To admit, receive

ALLOW, *v.* To admit, allow.

We *admit* the truth of a position; *allow* the propriety of a remark; *grant* what is desired.

ADMITTANCE, ACCESS.

ADMITTANCE marks the act or liberty of admitting (*v.* admit, receive).

ACCESS, from *accedo* to approach or come up to, marks the act or liberty of approaching.

We get *admittance* into a place or a society; we have *access* to a person.

Admittance may be open or excluded; *access* may be free or difficult.

We have *admittance* when we enter; we have *access* to him whom we address.

Servants or officers may grant us *admittance* into the palaces of princes; but the latter only can allow us *access* to their persons.

ADMITTANCE, ADMISSION.

These words differ according to the different acceptations of the primitive from which they are both derived; the former being taken in the proper sense or familiar style, and the latter in the figurative sense or in the grave style.

The ADMITTANCE to public places of entertainment is on particular occasions difficult. The ADMISSION of irregularities, however trifling in the commencement, is mostly attended with serious consequences.

TO ADMONISH, ADVISE.

ADMONISH, in Latin *admoneo*, is compounded of the intensive *ad* and *moneo*, to advise, signifying to put seriously in mind.

ADVISE is compounded of the Latin *ad* and *visus*, participle of *video* to see, signifying to make to see or to show.

Admonish mostly regards the past; *advise* respects the future. We *admonish* a person on the errors he has committed, by representing to him the extent and consequences of his offence; we *advise*, a person as to his future conduct, by giving him rules and instructions. *Admonition* serves to put

people on their guard against evil; *advice* to direct them in the choice of good.

ADMONITION, WARNING, CAUTION.

ADMONITION, *v.* To admonish.

WARNING, in Saxon *warnien*, German *warnen* probably from *wahren*, to perceive, signifies to make to see.

CAUTION, from *caveo* to beware, signifies the making aware.

A guarding against evil is common to these terms; but *admonition* expresses more than *warning*, and that more than *caution*.

An *admonition* respects the moral conduct; it comprehends reasoning and remonstrance; *warning* and *caution* respect the personal interest or safety; the former comprehends a forcible representation of the evil to be dreaded; the latter a simple appraisal of a future contingency. *Admonition* may therefore frequently comprehend *warning*; and *warning* may comprehend *caution*, though not *vice versa*. We *admonish* a person against the commission of any offence; we *warn* him against danger; we *caution* him against any misfortune.

Admonitions are given by persons only *warnings* and *cautions* are given by things. The young are *admonished* by the old; the death of friends or relatives serves as a *warning* to the survivors; the unfortunate accidents of the careless serve as a *caution* to others to avoid the like error.

TO ADORE, WORSHIP.

ADORE, in French *adorer*, Latin *adoro*, that is *ad* and *oro* to pray to.

WORSHIP, in Saxon *weorthscype*, is contracted from *worthship* implying either the object that is worth, or the worth itself; whence it has been employed to designate the action of doing suitable homage to the object which has worth, and, by a just distinction, of paying homage to our Maker by religious rites,

Adoration is the service of the heart towards a Superior Being, in which we acknowledge our dependence and obedience by petition and thanksgiving: *worship* consists in the outward form of showing reverence to some supposed superior being. *Adoration* can with propriety be paid only to the one true God; but *worship* is offered by heathens to stocks and stones.

We may adore our Maker at all times and in all places, whenever the heart is lifted up towards him; but we *worship* him only at stated times, and according to certain rules. We seldom *adore* without *worshipping* but we too frequently *worship* without *adoring*.

TO ADORE, REVERENCE, VENERATE, REVERE.

ADORE, *v.* To adore, worship.

REVERENCE, in Latin *reverentia*, reverence or awe, implies to show reverence, from *revereor* to stand in awe of.

VENERATE, in Latin *veneratus*, participle of *veneror*, probably from *venere* beauty, signifying to hold in very high esteem for its superior qualities.

REVERE is another form of the same verb.

Adoration has been before considered only in relation to our Maker: it is here employed in an improper and extended application to express in the strongest possible manner the devotion of the mind towards sensible objects.

Reverence is equally engendered by the contemplation of superiority, whether of the Supreme Being, as our Creator, or of any earthly being, as a parent. It differs, however, from *adoration*, in as much as it has a mixture of fear arising from the consciousness of weakness and dependence, or of obligation for favours received.

To *revere* and *venerate* are applied only to human beings, and that not so much from the relation we stand in to them, as from their characters and endowments; on which account these two latter terms are applicable to inanimate as well as animate objects.

Adoration in this case, as in the former, requires no external form of expression; it is not properly to be expressed but by the devotion of the individual to the service of him whom he adores: *reverencing* our Maker is altogether an inward feeling: but *reverencing* our parents includes in it an outward expression of our sentiments by our deportment towards them: *revering* and *venerating* are confined to the breast of the individual, but they may sometimes display themselves in suitable acts of homage.

Good princes are frequently *adored* by their subjects: it is a part of the Christian character to *reverence* our spiritual pastors and masters, as well as all temporal authorities: we ought to *venerate* all truly great men while living, and to *revere* their memories when they are dead.

TO ADORN, DECORATE, EMBELLISH.

ADORN, in Latin *adorno*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ad* and *orno*, in Greek *ορναω* to make beautiful, signifying to dispose for the purpose of ornament.

DECORATE, in Latin *decoratus*, participle of *decoro*, from *decorus* becoming, signifies to make becoming.

EMBELLISH, in French *embellir*, is

compounded of the intensive syllable *em* or *in* and *bellir* or *bel*, in Latin *bellus* handsome, signifying to make handsome.

We *adorn* by giving the best external appearance to a thing; we *decorate* by annexing something to improve its appearance; we *embellish* by giving a finishing stroke to a thing that is well executed. Females *adorn* their persons by the choice and disposal of their dress: a head dress is *decorated* with flowers, or a room with paintings: fine writing is *embellished* by suitable flourishes.

Adorn and *embellish* are figuratively employed; *decorate* mostly in the proper sense. The mind is *adorned* by particular virtues which are implanted in it: a narrative is *embellished* by the introduction of some striking incidents.

TO ADULATE, FLATTER, COMPLIMENT.

ADULATE, in Latin *adulatus*, participle of *adulor*, is changed from *adoleo* to offer incense.

FLATTER, in French *flatter*, comes from the Latin *flatus*, wind or air, signifying to say what is airy and unsubstantial.

COMPLIMENT comes from *comply*, and the Latin *complaceo* to please greatly.

We *adulate* by discovering in our actions an entire subserviency: we *flatter* simply by words expressive of an unusual admiration; we *compliment* by fair language or respectful civilities. An *adulatory* address is couched in terms of feigned devotion to the object: a *flattering* address is filled with the fictitious perfections of the object: a *complimentary* address is suited to the station of the individual and the occasion which gives rise to it. Courtiers are guilty of *adulation*; lovers are addicted to *flattery*; people of fashion indulge in *compliments*.

Adulation can never be practised without falsehood; its means are hypocrisy and lying, its end private interest: *flattery* always exceeds the truth; it is extravagant praise, dictated by an overweening partiality, or, what is more frequent, by a disingenuous temper: *compliments* are not incompatible with sincerity, unless they are dictated from a mere compliance to the prescribed rules of politeness or the momentary desire of pleasing. *Adulation* may be fulsome, *flattery* gross, *compliments* unmeaning.

TO ADVANCE, PROCEED.

ADVANCE, in French *avancer*, from the Latin *advenio*, signifies to come near or toward.

PROCEED, in Latin *procedo*, signifies to go forward.

To *advance* is to go towards some point; to *proceed* is to go onward in a certain course. The same distinction is preserved between them in their figurative acceptation. A person *advances* in the world, who succeeds in his transactions and raises himself in society; he *proceeds* in his business, when he carries it on as he has done before.

ADVANTAGE, BENEFIT, UTILITY, SERVICE.

ADVANTAGE, in French *avantage*, probably comes from the Latin *adventum*, participle of *advenio*, compounded of *ad* and *venio* to come to, signifying to come to any one according to his desire, or agreeable to his purpose.

BENEFIT, in French *bienfait*, Latin *benefactum*, compounded of *bene* well, and *factum* done, signifies done or made to one's wishes.

UTILITY, in French *utilité*, Latin *utilitas*, and *utilis* useful, from *utor* to use, signifies the quality of being able to be used.

SERVICE, in French *service*, Latin *servitum*, from *servio* to serve, signifies the quality of serving one's purpose.

Advantage respects external or extrinsic circumstances of profit, honour, and convenience; *benefit* respects the consequences of actions and events; *utility* and *service* respect the good which can be drawn from the use of any object. *Utility* implies the intrinsic good quality which renders a thing fit for use; *service* the actual state of a thing which may fit it for immediate use: a thing has its *utility* and is made for *service*.

A large house has its *advantages*: suitable exercise is attended with *benefit*: sundials have their *utility* in ascertaining the hour precisely by the sun: and may be made *serviceable* at times in lieu of watches. Things are sold to *advantage*; persons ride or walk for the *benefit* of their health; they purchase articles for their *utility*, and retain them when they are found *serviceable*.

ADVANTAGE, PROFIT.

ADVANTAGE, v. *Advantage*, *benefit*.

PROFIT, in French *profite*, Latin *profectus*, participle of *proficio*, compounded of *pro* and *facio*, signifies that which makes for one's good.

The idea common to these terms is of some good received by a person. *Advantage* is general; it respects every thing

which can contribute to the wishes, wants, and comforts of life; *profit* in its proper sense is specific; it regards only pecuniary advantage. Situations have their *advantages*; trade has its *profits*.

Whatever we estimate as an *advantage* is so to the individual; but *profits* are something real: the former is a relative term, it depends on the sentiments of the person: what is an *advantage* to one may be a *disadvantage* to another; the latter is an absolute term: *profit* is alike to all under all circumstances.

ADVERSE, CONTRARY, OPPOSITE.

ADVERSE, in French *adverse*, Latin *adversus*, participle of *adverto*, compounded of *ad* and *verto*, signifies turning towards or against.

CONTRARY, in French *contraire*, Latin *contrarius*, comes from *contra* against.

OPPOSITE, in Latin *oppositus*, participle of *oppono*, is compounded of *ob* and *pono*, signifying placed in the way.

Adverse respects the feelings and interests of persons; *contrary*, regards their plans and purposes; *opposite* relates to the situation and nature of things. Fortune is *adverse*; an event turns out *contrary* to what was expected; sentiments are *opposite* to each other.

Circumstances are sometimes so *adverse* as to baffle the best concerted plans. Facts often prove directly *contrary* to the representations given of them. People with *opposite* characters cannot be expected to act together with pleasure to either party.

ADVERSE, INIMICAL, HOSTILE, REPUGNANT.

ADVERSE, v. *Adverse*.

INIMICAL, from the Latin *inimicus* an enemy, signifying belonging to an enemy.

HOSTILE, in Latin *hostilis*, from *hostis* an enemy, signifies the same.

REPUGNANT, in Latin *repugnans*, from *repugno*, or *re* and *pugno* to fight against, signifies warring with.

Adverse may be applied to either persons or things; *inimical* and *hostile* to persons or things personal; *repugnant* to things only: a person is *adverse* or a thing is *adverse* to an object; a person, or what is personal, is either *inimical* or *hostile* to an object; one thing is *repugnant* to another. We are *adverse* to a proposition; or circumstances are *adverse* to our advancement. Partisans are *inimical* to the proceedings of government, and *hostile* to the possessors of power. Slavery is *repugnant* to the mild temper of Christianity.

Adverse expresses simple dissent or opposition: *inimical* either an acrimonious spirit or a tendency to injure; *hostile* a determined resistance; *repugnant* a direct relation of variance. Those who are *adverse* to any undertaking will not be likely to use the endeavours which are essential to ensure its success. Those who dissent from the church establishment, are *inimical* to its forms, its discipline, or its doctrine: many of them are so *hostile* to it as to aim at its subversion. The restraints which it imposes on the wandering and licentious imagination is *repugnant* to the temper of their minds.

ADVERSE, AVERSE.

ADVERSE (*v. Adverse*), signifying turned against or over against, denotes simply opposition of situation. AVERSE, from *a* and *versus*, signifying turned from or away from, denotes an active removal or separation from. *Adverse* is therefore as applicable to inanimate as to animate objects, *averse* only to animate objects. When applied to conscious agents *adverse* refers to matters of opinion and sentiment, *averse* to those affecting. We are *adverse* to that which we think wrong; we are *averse* to that which opposes our inclinations, our habits, or our interests.

ADVERSITY, DISTRESS.

ADVERSITY, *v. Adverse*.

DISTRESS, from the Latin *distingo*, compounded of *dis* twice, and *stringo* to bind, signifies that which binds very tight, or brings into a great strait.

Adversity respects external circumstances; *distress* regards either external circumstances or inward feelings, *Adversity* is opposed to prosperity; *distress* to ease.

Adversity is a general condition, *distress* a particular state. *Distress* is properly the highest degree of *adversity*. When a man's affairs go altogether *adverse* to his wishes and hopes, when accidents deprive him of his possessions or blast his prospects, he is said to be in *adversity*, but when in addition to this he is reduced to a state of want, deprived of friends and all prospect of relief, his situation is that of real *distress*.

TO ADVERTISE, PUBLISH.

ADVERTISE, from the Latin *adverto*, compounded of *ad* and *verto* to turn to, signifies to turn the attention to a thing.

PUBLISH, in Latin *publico*, that is, *facere publicum*, signifies to make public.

Advertise denotes the means, and *publish* the end. To *advertise* is to direct the public attention to any event, by means of a printed circular; *publish* is to make known either by oral or a printed communication.

We *publish* by *advertising*, but we do not always *advertise* when we *publish*. Mercantile and civil transactions are conducted by means of *advertisements*. Extraordinary circumstances are speedily *published* in a neighbourhood by circulating from mouth to mouth.

ADVICE, COUNSEL, INSTRUCTION.

ADVICE, *v. To admonish*.

COUNSEL, in French *conseil*, Latin *consilium*, comes from *consilio*, compounded of *con* and *salio* to leap together, signifying to run or act in accordance; and in an extended sense implies deliberation, or the thing deliberated upon, determined, and prescribed.

INSTRUCTION, in French *instruction*, Latin *instructio*, comes from *in* and *struo* to dispose or regulate, signifying the thing laid down.

The end of all the actions implied by these words is the communication of knowledge, and all of them include the accessory idea of superiority, either of age, station, knowledge, or talent. *Advice* flows from superior professional knowledge, or an acquaintance with things in general; *counsel* regards superior wisdom, or a superior acquaintance with moral principles and practice; *instruction* respects superior local knowledge in particular transactions. A medical man gives *advice* to his patient; a father gives *counsel* to his children; a counsellor gives *advice* to his client in points of law; he receives *instructions* from him in matters of fact.

Advice should be prudent and cautious; *counsel*, sage and deliberative; *instructions* clear and positive.

AFFABLE, COURTEOUS.

AFFABLE, in French *affable*, Latin *affabilis*, from *af* or *ad*, and *fari*, to speak, signifies a readiness to speak to any one.

COURTEOUS, in French *courtois*, from the word court, signifies after the refined manner of a court.

We are *affable* by a mild and easy address towards all, without distinction of rank, who have occasion to speak to us: we are *courteous* by a refined and engaging air to our equals or superiors who address themselves to us. The *affable* man invites to inquiry, and is ready to gratify curiosity;

the *courteous* man encourages to a communication of our wants, and discovers in his manners a willingness to relieve them. *Affability* results from good-nature, and *courteousness* from fine feeling. It is necessary to be *affable* without familiarity, and *courteous* without officiousness.

AFFAIR, BUSINESS, CONCERN.

AFFAIR, in French *affaire*, is compounded of *af* or *ad* and *faire*, in Latin *facio*, to make or do, signifying the thing that makes, does, or takes place for a person.

BUSINESS, from *busy* (v. *Active*), signifies the thing that makes or interests a person, or with which he is busy or occupied.

CONCERN, in French *concerner*, Latin *concerno*, compounded of *con* and *cerno*, to look, signifies the thing looked at, thought of, or taken part in.

An *affair* is what happens; a *business* is what is done; a *concern* is what is felt. An *affair* is general; it respects one, many, or all: every *business* and *concern* is an *affair*, though not *vice versa*. *Business* and *concern* are personal; *business* is that which engages the attention; *concern* is that which interests the feelings, prospects, and condition, advantageously or otherwise. An *affair* is interesting; a *business* is serious; a *concern* momentous. The usurpation of powers is an *affair* which interests a nation; the adjusting a difference is a *business* most suited to the ministers of religion; to make our peace with our Maker is the *concern* of every individual.

Affairs are administered; *business* is transacted; *concerns* are managed. The *affairs* of the world are administered by a Divine Providence. Those who are in the practice of the law require peculiar talents to fit them for transacting the complicated *business* which perpetually offers itself. Some men are so involved in the *affairs* of this world, as to forget the *concerns* of the next, which ought to be nearest and dearest to them.

TO AFFECT, CONCERN.

AFFECT, in French *affecter*, Latin *affectum*, participle of *afficio*, compounded of *ad* and *facio*, to do or act, signifies to act upon.

CONCERN, v. *Affair*.

Things *affect* us which produce any change in our outward circumstances; they *concern* us if only connected with our circumstances in any shape.

Whatever *affects* must *concern*; but all that *concerns* does not *affect*. The price of corn *affects* the interest of the seller;

and therefore it *concerns* him to keep it up, without regard to the public good or injury.

Things *affect* either persons or things; but they *concern* persons only. Rain *affects* the hay or corn; and these matters *concern* every one more or less.

Affect and *concern* have an analogous meaning likewise, when taken for the influence on the mind. We are *affected* by things when our *affections* only are awakened by them: we are *concerned* when our understanding and wishes are engaged.

We may be *affected* either with joy or sorrow: we are *concerned* only in a painful manner. People of tender sensibility are easily *affected*: irritable people are *concerned* about trifles.

TO AFFECT, ASSUME.

AFFECT, in this sense, derives its origin immediately from the Latin *affecto* to desire after eagerly, signifying to aim at or aspire after.

ASSUME, in Latin *assumo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sumo* to take, signifies to take to one's self.

To *affect* is to use forced efforts to appear to have; to *assume* is to appropriate to one's self.

One *affects* to have fine feelings, and *assumes* great importance.

Affectation springs from the desire of appearing better than we really are; *assumption* from the thinking ourselves better than we really are. We *affect* the virtues which we have not; we *assume* the character which does not belong to us.

To *affect* is always taken in a bad sense; but to *assume* may be sometimes an indifferent action at least, if not justifiable. Men always *affect* that which is admired by others, in order to gain their applause; but they sometimes *assume* a name or an authority, which is no more than their just right.

TO AFFECT,* PRETEND TO.

AFFECT, v. To *affect*, *concern*.

PRETEND, in Latin *pretendo*, that is *prae* and *tendo*, signifies to hold or stretch one thing before another by way of a blind.

These terms are synonymous only in the bad sense of setting forth to others what is not real: we *affect* by putting on a false air; we *pretend* by making a false declaration. Art is employed in *affecting*; assurance and self-complacency in *pretending*. A person *affects* not to hear what it is convenient for him not to answer; he *pretends* to have

* Vide Trusler, "To affect, pretend to."

forgotten what it is convenient for him not to recollect. One *affects* the manners of a gentleman, and *pretends* to gentility of birth. One *affects* the character and habits of a scholar; one *pretends* to learning.

AFFECTION, LOVE.

AFFECTION, from the verb *affect* (v. *To affect*), denotes the state of being kindly *affected* towards a person.

LOVE, in low German *leeve*, high German *liebe* (whence the English *lief*), low German *leef*, high German *lieb* dear or pleasing, the Latin *libet* it is pleasing, and by metathesis, from the Greek *philos* dear, signifies the state of holding a person dear.

These words express two sentiments of the heart which do honour to human nature; they are the bonds by which mankind are knit to each other. Both imply good will: but *affection* is a tender sentiment that dwells with pleasure on the object; *love* is a tender sentiment accompanied with longing for the object: we cannot have *love* without *affection*, but we may have *affection* without *love*.

Love is powerful in its effects, awakening vivid sentiments of pleasure or pain; it is a passion exclusive, restless, and capricious. *Affection* is a chastened feeling under the control of the understanding; it promises no more pleasure than it gives, and has but few alloys. Marriage may begin with *love*; but it ought to terminate in *affection*.

AFFECTIONATE, KIND, FOND.

AFFECTIONATE, from *affection* (v. *Affection*), denotes the quality of having *affection*.

KIND, from the word *kind*, kindred or family, denotes the quality of feeling engendered by the family tie.

FOND, from the Saxon *fandian* to gape at, and the German *finden* to find or seek, denotes a vehement attachment to a thing.

Affectionate and *fond* characterise feelings. *kind* is an epithet applied to outward actions, as well as inward feelings; a disposition is *affectionate* or *fond*; a behaviour is *kind*.

Affection is a settled state of the mind; *kindness* a temporary state of feeling, mostly discoverable by some outward sign: both are commendable and honourable, as to the nature of the feelings themselves, the objects of the feelings, and the manner in which they display themselves; the understanding always approves the *kindness* which *affection* dictates, or that which springs from a tender heart. *Fondness* is a less respectable feel-

ing; it is sometimes the excess of *affection*, or an extravagant mode of expressing it, or an attachment to an inferior object.

A person is *affectionate*, who has the object of his regard strongly in his mind, who participates in his pleasures and pains, and is pleased with his society. A person is *kind*, who expresses a tender sentiment, or does any service in a pleasant manner. A person is *fond*, who caresses an object, or makes it a source of pleasure to himself.

TO AFFIRM, ASSEVERATE, ASSURE, VOUCH, AVER, PROTEST.

AFFIRM, in French *affirmer*, Latin *affirmo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *firmitas* to strengthen, signifies to give strength to what has been said.

ASSEVERATE, in Latin *asseveratus*, participle of *assevero*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *severus*, signifies to make strong and positive.

ASSURE, in French *assurer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *as* or *ad* and *sure*, signifying to make sure.

VOUCH is probably changed from *vow*.

AVER, in French *averer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *a* or *ad* and *verus* true, signifying to bear testimony to the truth.

PROTEST, in French *protester*, is compounded of *pro* and *testor* to call to witness as to what we think about a thing.

All these terms indicate an expression of a person's conviction.

To *affirm* is to declare a thing as a fact on our credit. To *asseverate* is to declare it with confidence. To *vouch* is to rest the truth of another's declaration on our own responsibility. To *aver* is to express the truth of a declaration unequivocally. To *protest* is to declare a thing solemnly, and with strong marks of sincerity.

Affirmations are made of the past and present; a person *affirms* what he has seen and what he sees. *Asseverations* are strong *affirmations*, made in cases of doubt to remove every impression disadvantageous to one's sincerity. *Assurances* are made of the past, present, and future; they mark the conviction of the speaker as to what has been, or is, and his intentions as to what shall be. *Vouching* is an act for another; it is the supporting of another's *assurance* by our own. *Averring* is employed in matters of fact; we *aver* as to the accuracy of details; we *aver* on positive knowledge that sets aside all question. *Protestations* are stronger than either *asseverations* or *assurances*; they are accompanied with every-

act, look, or gesture, that can tend to impress conviction on another.

Affirmations are employed in giving evidence; whether accompanied with an oath or not: liars deal much in *asseverations* and *protestations*. People *aver* where they expect to be believed. *Assurances* are altogether personal; they are always made to satisfy some one of what they wish to know and believe. Whenever we *affirm* any thing on the authority of another, we ought to be particularly cautious not to *vouch* for its veracity if it be not unquestionable.

TO AFFIRM; ASSERT.

AFFIRM, *v.* To affirm, asseverate.

ASSERT, in Latin *assertus*, participle of *asserto*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sero* to connect, signifies to connect words into a proposition.

To *affirm* is said of facts; to *assert*, of opinions: we *affirm* what we know; we *assert* what we believe.

Whoever *affirms* what he does not know to be true is guilty of falsehood; whoever *asserts* what he cannot prove to be true is guilty of folly.

We contradict an *affirmation*; we confute an *assertion*.

TO AFFIX, SUBJOIN, ATTACH, ANNEX.

AFFIX, in Latin *affixus*, participle of *affigo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *figo* to fix, signifies to fix to a thing.

SUBJOIN is compounded of *sub* and *join*, signifying to join to the lower or farther extremity of a body.

ATTACH, *v.* To adhere;

ANNEX, in Latin *annexus*, participle of *annecto*, compounded of *an* or *ad* and *necto* to knit, signifies to knit or tie to a thing.

To *affix* is to put any thing as an essential to any whole; to *subjoin* is to put any thing as subordinate part to a whole: in the former case the part to which it is put is not specified; in the latter the syllable *sub* specifies the extremity as the part: to *attach* is to make one thing *adhere* to another as an accompaniment; to *annex* is to bring things into a general connexion with each other.

A title is *affixed* to a book; a few lines are *subjoined* to a letter by way of postscript; we *attach* blame to a person; a certain territory is *annexed* to a kingdom.

TO AFFLICT, DISTRESS, TROUBLE.

AFFLICT, in Latin *afflictus*, participle of *affligo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *fligo*, in Greek *ἄλίσσω* to press hard signifies to bear upon any one.

DISTRESS, *v.* Adversity.

TROUBLE signifies to cause a tumult, from the Latin *turba*, Greek *τὺρβη* or *θορυβος*, a tumult,

When these terms relate to outward circumstances, the first expresses more than the second, and the second more than the third.

People are *afflicted* with grievous maladies. The mariner is *distressed* for want of water in the midst of the wide ocean: or an embarrassed tradesman is *distressed* for money to maintain his credit. The mechanic is *troubled* for want of proper tools, or the head of a family for want of good domestics.

When they respect the inward feelings, *afflict* conveys the idea of deep sorrow; *distress* that of sorrow mixed with anxiety; *trouble* that of pain in a smaller degree.

The death of a parent *afflicts*; the misfortunes of our family and friends *distress*; crosses in trade and domestic inconveniences *trouble* us.

AFFLICTION, GRIEF, SORROW.

AFFLICTION, *v.* To afflict.

GRIEF from *grieve*, in German *grämen*, Swedish *gramga*, etc.

SORROW, in German *sorge*, etc. signifies care, as well as sorrow.

All these words mark a state of suffering which differs either in the degree or the cause, or in both.

Affliction is much stronger than *grief*; it lies deeper in the soul, and arises from a more powerful cause; the loss of what is most dear, the continued sickness of our friends, or a reverse of fortune, will all cause *affliction*; the misfortunes of others or the failure of our favourite schemes, will occasion us *grief*,

Sorrow is less than *grief*; it arises from the untoward circumstances which perpetually arise in life. A disappointment, our own mistake, or the negligences of others, cause *sorrow*.

Affliction lies too deep to be vehement, it discovers itself by no striking marks in the exterior; it is lasting, and does not cease when the external causes cease to act; *grief* may be violent, and discover itself by loud and indecorous signs; it is transitory, and may cease even before the cause which gave birth to it: *sorrow* discovers itself by a simple expression; it is still more transient than *grief*.

A person of a tender mind is *afflicted* at the remembrance of his sins: he is *grieved* at the consciousness of his fallibility and proneness to error; he is *sorry* for the faults which he has committed.

Affliction is allayed; *grief* subsides: *sorrow* is soothed.

TO AFFORD, YIELD, PRODUCE.

AFFORD is probably changed from *affered*, and comes from the Latin *affero*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *fero*, signifying to bring to a person.

YIELD, in Saxon *geldan*, German *gelten* to pay, restore, or give the value, is probably connected with the Hebrew *ilad* to breed, or bring forth.

PRODUCE, in Latin *produco*, compounded of *pro* forth and *duco* to bring, signifies to bring out or into existence.

With *afford* is associated the idea of communicating a part, or property of some substance, to a person; meat *affords* nourishment to those who make use of it; the sun *affords* light and heat to all living creatures.

To *yield* is the natural operation of any substance to give up or impart the parts or properties inherent in it; it is the natural surrender which an object makes of itself: trees *yield* fruit; the seed *yields* grain; some sorts of grain do not *yield* much in particular soils.

Produce conveys the idea of one thing causing another to exist, or to spring out of it; it is a species of creation, the formation of a new substance: the earth *produces* a variety of fruits; confined air will *produce* an explosion.

Afford and *produce* have a moral application; but not *yield*: nothing *affords* so great a scope for ridicule as the follies of fashion; nothing *produces* so much mischief as the vice of drunkenness. The history of man does not *afford* an instance of any popular commotion that has ever *produced* such atrocities and atrocious characters as the French revolution.

TO AFFORD. SPARE.

AFFORD, *v.* To *afford*, *yield*.

SPARE, in German *sparen*, Latin *parco*, Hebrew *perek* to preserve, signifies here to lay apart for any particular use.

The idea of deducting from one's property with convenience is common to these terms; but *afford* respects solely expenses which are no more than commensurate with our income; *spare* is said of things in general, which we may part with without any sensible diminution of our comfort.

There are few so destitute that they cannot *afford* something for the relief of others, who are more destitute. He who has two things of a kind may easily *spare* one.

AFFRONT, INSULT, OUTRAGE.

AFFRONT, in French *affronte*, from the Latin *ad* and *frons*, the forehead, signifies flying in the face of a person.

INSULT, in French *insulte*, comes from the Latin *insulto* to dance or leap upon. The former of these actions marks defiance, the latter scorn and triumph.

OUTRAGE is compounded of *out* or *utter* and *rage* or *violence*, signifying an act of extreme violence.

An *affront* is a mark of reproach shown in the presence of others; it piques and mortifies: an *insult* is an attack made with insolence; it irritates and provokes: an *outrage* combines all that is offensive; it wounds and injures. An intentional breach of politeness is an *affront*: if coupled with any external indication of hostility it is an *insult*: if it break forth into personal violence it is an *outrage*.

AFRAID, FEARFUL, TIMOROUS, TIMID.

AFRAID is changed from *afeared*, signifying in a state of fear.

FEARFUL, as the words of which it is compounded imply, signifies full of fear.

TIMOROUS and **TIMID** come from the Latin *timidus* fearful, *timor* fear, and *timeo* to fear.

The first denotes a temporary state, the three last a habit of the mind.

Afraid may be used either in a physical or moral application, either as it relates to ourselves only or to others; *fearful* and *timorous* are only applied physically and personally; *timid* is mostly used in a moral sense.

It is the character of the *fearful* or *timorous* person to be *afraid* of what he imagines would hurt him; it is the characteristic of the *timid* person to be *afraid* of offending or meeting with something painful from others.

Between *fearful* and *timorous* there is little distinction, either in sense or application, except that we say *fearful* of a thing, not *timorous* of a thing.

AFTER, BEHIND.

AFTER respects order; **BEHIND** respects position. One runs *after* a person, or stands *behind* his chair.

After is used either figuratively or literally; *behind* is used only literally.

Men hunt *after* amusements; misfortunes come *after* one another: a garden lies *behind* a house; a thing is concealed *behind* a bush.

TO AGGRAVATE, IRRITATE, PROVOKE, EXASPERATE, TANTALIZE.

AGGRAVATE, in Latin *aggravatus*, par-

participle of *aggravo*, compounded of the intensive syllable *ag* or *ad* and *gravo* to make heavy, signifies to make very heavy.

IRRITATE, in Latin *irritatus*, participle of *irrito*, which is a frequentative of *ira*, signifies to excite anger.

PROVOKE, in French *provoquer*, Latin *provoco*, compounded of *pro* forth, and *voco* to call, signifies to challenge or defy.

EXASPERATE, Latin *exasperatus*, participle of *exaspero*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ex* and *asper* rough, signifying to make things exceedingly rough,

TANTALIZE, in French *tantaliser*, Greek *ταρταλιζω*, comes from *Tantalus*, a king of Phrygia, who having offended the gods, was destined by way of punishment to stand up to his chin in water with a tree of fair fruit hanging over his head, both of which, as he attempted to allay his hunger and thirst, fled from his touch.

All these words, except the first, refer to the feelings of the mind, and in familiar discourse that also bears the same signification; but otherwise respects the outward circumstances.

The crime of robbery is aggravated by any circumstances of cruelty; whatever comes across the feelings irritates; whatever awakens anger provokes; whatever heightens this anger extraordinarily, exasperates; whatever raises hopes in order to frustrate them tantalizes.

An appearance of unconcern for the offence and its consequences aggravates the guilt of the offender: a grating harsh sound irritates if long continued and often repeated: angry words provoke, particularly when spoken with an air of defiance: when to these are added bitter taunts and multiplied provocations, they exasperate: the weather by its frequent changes tantalizes those who depend upon it for amusement.

AGGRESSOR. ASSAILANT.

AGGRESSOR, in Latin *aggressor*, participle of *aggredior*, compounded of *ag* or *ad* and *gredior* to step, signifies to step up to, fall upon, or attack.

ASSAILANT, from *assail*, in French *assailer*, compounded of *as* or *ad*, and *salio* to leap upon, signifies to leap upon or attack any one vehemently.

The characteristic idea of *aggressor* is that of one person going up to another in a hostile manner, and by a natural extension of the sense commencing an attack: the characteristic idea of *assailant* is that of one committing an act of violence.

An *aggressor* offers to do some injury either by word or deed; an *assailant* ac-

tually commits some violence: the former commences a dispute, the latter carries it on with a vehement and direct attack.

An *aggressor* is blameable for giving rise to quarrels; an *assailant* is culpable for the mischief he does.

An *aggressor* may be an *assailant*, or an *assailant* may be an *aggressor*, but they are as frequently distinct.

AGITATION, EMOTION, TREPIDATION, TREMOR.

AGITATION, in Latin *agitatio*, from *agito*, signifies the state of being agitated.

EMOTION, in Latin *emotio*, from *emotus*, participle of *emoveo*, compounded of *e* out of, and *moveo* to move, signifies the state of being moved out of rest or put in motion.

TREPIDATION, in Latin *trepidatio*, from *trepido*, to tremble, compounded of *tremo* and *pede*, to tremble with the feet, signifies the condition of trembling in all one's limbs from head to foot.

TREMOR, from the Latin *tremor*, signifies originally the same state of trembling.

Agitation refers either to body or mind, *emotion* to the mind only, *trepidation* and *tremor* to the body only.

Agitation of mind is a vehement struggle between contending feelings; *emotion* is the awakening but one feeling; which in the latter case is not so vehement as in the former.

Distressing circumstances produce *agitation*; affecting and interesting circumstances produce *emotions*.

Agitations have but one character, namely, that of violence: *emotions* vary with the object that awakens them; they are *emotions* either of pain or pleasure, of tenderness or anger; they are either gentle or strong, faint or vivid.

With regard to the body, an *agitation* is more than a *trepidation*, and the latter more than a *tremor*: the two former attract the notice of the bystander; the latter is scarcely visible.

Emotions of terror or horror will throw the body into a *trepidation*; those of fear will cause a *tremor* to run through the whole frame.

AGREEABLE, PLEASANT, PLEASING.

The first two of these epithets approach so near in sense and application, that they can with propriety be used indifferently, the one for the other; yet there is an occasional difference which may be clearly defined.

The AGREEABLE is that which agrees with or suits the character, temper, and feelings of a person; the PLEASANT that which pleases; the PLEASING that which is adapted to please.

Agreeable expresses a feeling less vivid than *pleasant*; people of the soberest and gravest character may talk of passing *agreeable* hours, or enjoying *agreeable* society, if those hours were passed *agreeably* to their turn of mind, or in that society which suited their taste; but the young and the gay will prefer *pleasant* society, where vivacity and mirth prevail, suitable to the tone of their spirits.

A man is *agreeable* who by a soft and easy address contributes to the amusement of others; a man is *pleasant* who to this softness adds affability and communicativeness.

Pleasing marks a sentiment less vivid and distinctive than either. A *pleasing* voice has something in it which we like; an *agreeable* voice strikes with positive pleasure upon the ear.

A *pleasing* countenance denotes tranquillity and contentment; it satisfies us when we view it; a *pleasant* countenance bespeaks happiness: it gratifies the beholder, and invites him to look upon it.

TO AGREE, ACCORD, SUIT.

AGREE is compounded of *a* or *ad* and *gree* or *gruo*, which root is found in the verb *congruo*, signifying to fit to a thing.

ACCORD, in French *accord*, from the Latin *chorda* the string of a harp, signifies the same as to be in tune or join in tune.

SUIT, from the Latin *secutus*, participle of *sequor* to follow, signifies to be in a line, in the order a thing ought to be.

An *agreement* between two things requires an entire sameness; an *accordance* supposes a considerable resemblance; a *suitableness* implies an aptitude to coalesce.

Opinions *agree*, feelings *accord*, and tempers *suit*.

Two statements *agree* which are in all respects alike: that *accords* with our feelings which produces pleasurable sensations: that *suits* our taste which we wish to adopt, or in adopting gives us pleasure.

Where there is no *agreement* of opinion, there can be no assimilation of habit; where there is no *accordance* of sound, there can be no harmony; where there is no *suitability* of temper, there can be no co-operation.

TO AGREE, COINCIDE, CONCUR.

In the former section *agree* is compared with terms that are employed only for things; in the present case it is compared with words as they are applied to persons only.

AGREE implies a general sameness.

COINCIDE, from the Latin *con* together and *incido* to fall, implies a meeting in a certain point.

CONCUR, from *con* together and *curro*

to run, implies a running in the same course, and acting together on the same principles.

Agree denotes a state of rest; *coincide* and *concur* a state of motion, either towards or with another.

Agreement is either the voluntary or involuntary act of persons in general; *coincidence* is the voluntary but casual act of individuals, the act of one falling into the opinion of another; *concurrence* is the intentional positive act of individuals; it is the act of one authorizing the opinions and measures of another.

Men of like education and temperament *agree* upon most subjects: people cannot expect others to *coincide* with them, when they advance extravagant positions: the wiser part of mankind are backward in *concurring* in any schemes which are not warranted by experience.

AGREEMENT, CONTRACT, COVENANT, COMPACT, BARGAIN.

AGREEMENT signifies what is agreed to (*v. To agree*).

CONTRACT, in French *contracte*, from the Latin *contractus*, participle of *contraho* to bring close together or bind, signifies the thing thus contracted or bound.

COVENANT, in French *covenante*, Latin *conventus*, participle of *convenio* to meet together at a point, signifies the point at which several meet, that is, the thing agreed upon by many.

COMPACT, in Latin *compactus*, participle of *compingo* to bind close, signifies the thing to which people bind themselves close.

BARGAIN, from the Welsh *bargan* to contract or deal for, signifies the act of dealing, or the thing dealt for.

An *agreement* is general, and applies to transactions of every description, but particularly such as are made between single individuals, in cases where the other terms are not so applicable; a *contract* is a binding *agreement* between individuals; a simple *agreement* may be verbal, but a *contract* must be written and legally executed; *covenant* and *compact* are *agreements* among communities; a *covenant* is commonly a national and public transaction; a *compact* respects individuals as members of a community, or communities with each other; a *bargain*, in its proper sense, is an *agreement* solely in matters of trade; but applies figuratively in the same sense to other objects.

The simple consent of parties constitutes an *agreement*; a seal and signature are requisite for a *contract*; a solemn engagement on the one hand, and faith in that engagement on the other hand, enter into the nature

of a *covenant*; a tacit sense of mutual obligation in all the parties gives virtue to a *compact*; an assent to stipulated terms of sale may form a *bargain*.

Friends make an *agreement* to meet at a certain time; two tradesmen enter into a *contract* to carry on a joint trade; the people of England made a *covenant* with King Charles I, entitled the solemn covenant; in the society of Freemasons, every individual is bound to secrecy by a solemn *compact*; the trading part of the community are continually striking *bargains*.

AIM, OBJECT, END.

AIM is in all probability a variation of *home*, in old German *haim*. It is the *home* which the marksman wishes to reach; it is the thing aimed at; the particular point to which one's efforts are directed; which is had always in view, and which every thing is made to bend to the attainment of.

OBJECT, from the Latin *objectus*, participle of *ob* and *jacio* to lie in the way, is more vague; it signifies the thing that lies before us; we pursue it by taking the necessary means to obtain it; it becomes the fruit of our labour.

END in the improper sense of *end* is still more general, signifying the thing that ends one's wishes and endeavours; it is the result not only of action, but of combined action; it is the consummation of a scheme; we must take the proper measures to arrive at it.

It is the *aim* of every good Christian to live in peace; it is a mark of dulness or folly to act without an *object*; every scheme is likely to fail, in which the means are not adequate to the *end*.

We have an *aim*; we propose to ourselves an *object*; we look to the *end*. An *aim* is attainable, an *object* worthy, an *end* important.

TO AIM, POINT, LEVEL AT.

AIM, signifying to take aim (*v. Aim*) is to direct one's view towards a point.

POINT, from the noun *point*, signifies to direct the point to any thing.

LEVEL, from the adjective *level*, signifies to put one thing on a level with another.

Aim expresses more than the other two words, inasmuch as it denotes a direction towards some minute point in an object, and the others imply direction towards the whole objects themselves. We *aim* at a bird; we *point* a cannon against a wall; we *level* a cannon at a wall. *Pointing* is of course used with most propriety in reference to instruments that have points; it is likewise a less decisive action than either *aiming* or *level-*

velling. A stick or a finger may be *pointed* at a person, merely out of derision; but a gun is *levelled* or *aimed* with an express intent of committing an act of violence.

The same analogy is kept up in their figurative application.

The shafts of ridicule are but too often *aimed* with little effect against the follies of fashion: remarks which seem merely to *point* at others without being expressly addressed to them, have always a bad tendency: it has hitherto been the fate of infidels to *level* their battery of sneers, declamation, and sophistry, against the Christian Religion only to strengthen the conviction of its sublime truths in the minds of mankind at large.

TO AIM, ASPIRE.

AIM (*v. Aim*) includes efforts as well as views, in obtaining an object.

ASPIRE, from *as* or *ad* to or after, and *spiro* to breathe, comprehends views, wishes, and hopes to obtain an object.

We *aim* at a certain proposed point, by endeavouring to gain it; we *aspire* after that which we think ourselves entitled to, and flatter ourselves with gaining.

We *aim* at what is attainable by ordinary efforts; we *aspire* after what is great and unusual.

An emulous youth *aims* at acquiring the esteem of his teachers; he *aspires* to excel all his competitors in literary attainments.

AIR, MANNER.

AIR, in Latin *aer*, Greek *αἴρ*, comes from the Hebrew *aor*, because it is the vehicle of light; hence in the figurative sense, in which it is here taken, it denotes an appearance.

MANNER, in French *manière*, comes probably from *mener* to lead or direct, signifying the direction of one's movements.

An *air* is inherent in the whole person; a *manner* is confined to the action or the movement of a single limb. A man has the *air* of a common person; it discovers itself in all his *manners*. An *air* has something superficial in its nature; it strikes at the first glance: *manner* has something more solid in it; it develops itself on closer observation. Some people have an *air* about them which displeases; but their *manners* afterwards win upon those who have a farther intercourse with them.

An *air* is indicative of a state of mind; it may result either from a natural or habitual mode of thinking: a *manner* is indicative of the education; it is produced by external circumstances. An *air* is noble or simple, it marks an elevation or simplicity of character: a *manner* is rude, rustic, or awkward,

for want of culture, good society, and good example. We assume an *air*, and affect a *manner*. A prepossessing *air* and engaging *manners* have more influence on the heart than the solid qualities of the mind.

AIR, MIEN, LOOK.

AIR, *v.* Air.

MIEN, in German *miene*, comes, as Adeling supposes, from *mähen* to move or draw, because the lines of the face which constitute the mien in the German sense are drawn together.

LOOK signifies properly a mode of looking or appearing.

The exterior of a person is comprehended in the sense of all these words.

Air depends not only on the countenance, but the stature, carriage, and action: *mien* respects the whole outward appearance, not excepting the dress: *look* depends altogether on the face and its changes. *Air* marks any particular state of the mind: *mien* denotes any state of the outward circumstances *look* any individual movement of the mind. We may judge by a person's *air*, that he has a confident and fearless mind; we may judge by his sorrowful *mien*, that he has substantial cause for sorrow; and by sorrowful *looks*, that he has some partial or temporary cause for sorrow.

We talk of doing any thing with a particular *air*; of having a *mien*; of giving a *look*. An innocent man will answer his accusers with an *air* of composure; a person's whole *mien* sometimes bespeaks his wretched condition; a *look* is sometimes given to one who acts in concert by way of intimation.

ALARM, TERROR, FRIGHT, CONSTERNATION.

ALARM, in French *alarmer*, is compounded of *al* or *ad* and *armes* arms, signifying a cry to arms, a signal of danger, a call to defence.

TERROR, in Latin *terror*, comes from *terreo* to produce fear.

FRIGHT, from the German *furcht* fear, signifies a state of fear.

CONSTERNATION, in Latin *consternatus*, from *consterno* to lay low or prostrate, expresses the mixed emotion of terror and amazement which confounds.

Alarm springs from any sudden signal that announces the approach of danger. *Terror* springs from any event or phenomenon that may serve as a prognostic of some catastrophe. It supposes a less distinct view of danger than *alarm*, and affords room to the imagination, which commonly magni-

fies objects. *Alarm* therefore makes us run to our defence, and *terror* disarms us.

Fright is a less vivid emotion than either, as it arises from the simple appearance of danger. It is more personal than either *alarm* or *terror*; for we may be *alarmed* or *terrified* for others, but we are mostly *frightened* for ourselves. *Consternation* is stronger than either *terror* or *affright*; it springs from the view of some very serious evil.

Alarm effects the feelings, *terror* the understanding, and *fright* the senses; *consternation* seizes the whole mind, and benumbs the faculties.

We are *alarmed* for what we apprehend; we are *terrified* by what we imagine; we are *frightened* by what we see; *consternation* may be produced by what we learn.

ALERTNESS, ALACRITY.

ALERTNESS, from *ales* a wing, designates corporeal activity or readiness for action; ALACRITY, from *acer* sharp, brisk, designates mental activity.

We proceed with *alertness*, when the body is in its full vigour; we proceed with *alacrity* when the mind is in full pursuit of an object.

ALL, WHOLE.

ALL and WHOLE are derived from the same source, that is, in German *all* and *heil* whole or sound, Dutch *all*, *hel*, or *heel*, Saxon *al*, *wal*, Danish *al*, *ald*, Greek *olos*, Hebrew *chol* or *hol*.

All respects number or quantity; *whole* respects a single body with its components; we have not *all*, if we have not the *whole* number; we have not the *whole*, if we have not *all* the parts of which it is composed. It is not within the limits of human capacity to take more than a partial survey of *all* the interesting objects which the *whole* globe contains.

When applied to spiritual objects in a general sense, *all* is preferred to *whole*; but when the object is specific, *whole* is preferable: thus we say, *all* hope was lost; but, our *whole* hope rested in this.

ALL, EVERY, EACH.

ALL is collective; EVERY single or individual; EACH distributive.

All and *every* are universal in their signification; *each* is restrictive; the former are used in speaking of great numbers; the latter is applicable to small numbers. *All* men are not born with the same talent, either in degree or kind; but *every* man has a talent peculiar to himself: a parent divides his property among his children, and gives to *each* his due share.

TO ALLAY, SOOTH, APPEASE, ASSUAGE.

To ALLAY is compounded of *al* or *ad* and *lay*, to lay to or by, signifying to lay a thing to rest, to abate it.

SOOTH probably comes from *sweet*, which is in Swedish *söt*, Low German, &c. *söt*, and is doubtless connected with the Hebrew *sot* to allure, invite, compose.

APPEASE, in French *appaier*, is compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *paix* peace, signifying to quiet.

ASSUAGE is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *suage*, from the Latin *suasi* perfect of *suadeo* to persuade, signifying to treat with gentleness, or to render easy.

All these terms indicate a lessening of something painful. In a physical sense a pain is *allayed* by an immediate application; it is *soothed* by affording ease and comfort in other respects, and by diverting the mind from the pain. Extreme heat or thirst is *allayed*; extreme hunger is *appeased*.

In a moral sense one *allays* what is fervid and vehement; one *soothes* what is distressed; one *appeases* what is tumultuous and boisterous; one *assuages* grief or affliction.

TO ALLEVIATE, RELIEVE.

ALLEVIATE, in Latin *alleviatus*, participle of *allevio*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad*, and *levo* to lighten, signifying to lighten by making less.

RELIEVE, from the Latin *relevo*, is *re* and *levo* to lift up, signifying to take away or remove.

A pain is *alleviated* by making it less burdensome; a necessity is *relieved* by supplying what is wanted. *Alleviate* respects our internal feelings only; *relieve* our external circumstances. That *alleviates* which affords ease and comfort; that *relieves* which removes the pain. It is no *alleviation* of sorrow to a feeling mind, to reflect that others undergo the same suffering; a change of position is a considerable *relief* to an invalid, wearied with confinement.

ALLIANCE, LEAGUE, CONFEDERACY.

ALLIANCE, in French *alliance*, from the Latin *alligo* to knit or tie together, signifies the state of being tied in a moral sense.

LEAGUE, in French *ligue*, comes from the same verb *ligo* to bind.

CONFEDERACY or confederation, in Latin *confederatio*, from *con* and *foedus* an agreement, or *fides* faith, signifies a joining together under a certain pledge.

* Relationship, friendship, the advantages of a good understanding, the prospect of aid

* Vide Girard and Roubaud: „Alliance, ligue, confederation.“

in case of necessity, are the ordinary motives for forming *alliances*. A *league* is a union of plan, and a junction of force, for the purpose of effectuating some common enterprise, or obtaining some common object. A *confederacy* is a union of interest and support on particular occasions, for the purpose of obtaining a redress of supposed wrong, or of defending right against usurpation and oppression.

Treaties of *alliance* are formed between sovereigns; it is a union of friendship and convenience concluded upon precise terms, and maintained by honour or good faith. *Leagues* are mostly formed between parties or small communities; as they are occasioned by circumstances of an imperative nature: they are in this manner rendered binding on each party. *Confederacies* are formed between individuals or communities; they continue while the impelling cause that set them in motion remains; and every individual is bound more by a common feeling of safety, than by any express contract.

Confederacy is always taken in a civil or political sense: *alliance* and *league* are sometimes employed in a moral sense; the former being applied to marriage, the latter to plots or factions. *Alliance* is taken only in a good acceptation; *league* and *confederacy* frequently in relation to that which is bad. *Alliances* are formed for the mutual advantage of the parties concerned; but *leagues* may have plunder for their object, and *confederacies* may be treasonable.

ALLIANCE, AFFINITY.

ALLIANCE, v. *Alliance, league.*

AFFINITY, in Latin *affinitas*, from *af* or *ad* and *finis* a border, signifies a contiguity of borders.

Alliance is artificial; *affinity* is natural: an *alliance* is formed either by persons or by circumstances; an *affinity* exists of itself: an *alliance* subsists between persons only in the proper sense, and between things figuratively; an *affinity* exists between things as well as persons: the *alliance* between families is matrimonial; the *affinity* arises from consanguinity.

TO ALLOT, ASSIGN, APPORTION, DISTRIBUTE.

ALLOT is compounded of the Latin *al* or *ad* and the word *lot*, which owes its origin to the Saxon and other northern languages. It signifies literally to set apart as a particular lot.

ASSIGN, in French *assigner*, Latin *assigno*, is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *signo*

to sign, or mark to, or for, signifying to mark out for any one.

APPORTION is compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *portion*, signifying to *portion* out for a purpose.

DISTRIBUTE, in Latin *distributus*, participle of *dis* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow or portion out to several.

To *allot* is to dispose on the ground of utility for the sake of good order; to *assign* is to communicate according to the merit of the object; to *apportion* is to regulate according to the due proportion; to *distribute* is to give in several distinct portions.

A portion of one's property is *allotted* to charitable purposes, or a portion of one's time to religious meditation; a prize is *assigned* to the most meritorious, or an honourable post to those whose abilities entitle them to distinction; a person's business is *apportioned* to the time and abilities he has for performing it; his alms are *distributed* among those who are most indigent.

TO ALLOT. APPOINT. DESTINE.

ALLOT, *v.* To allot, assign.

APPOINT, in French *appointer*, Latin *appono*, that is, *ap* or *ad* and *pono* to place. signifies to put by.

DESTINE, Latin *destino*, of *de* and *stino*. *sto* or *sisto*, signifies to place apart.

Allot is used only for things, *appoint* and *destine* for persons or things. A piece of ground is *allotted* for cultivation; a person is *appointed* as steward or governor; a youth is *destined* for a particular profession. *Allotments* are mostly made in the time past or present; *appointments* respect either the present or the future; *destinations* always respect some distant purposes, and include preparatory measures. A conscientious man *allots* a portion of his annual income to the relief of the poor: when public meetings are held it is necessary to *appoint* a particular day for the purpose; our plans in life are defeated by a thousand contingencies—the man who builds a house is not certain he will live to use it for the purpose for which it was *destined*.

TO ALLOW. GRANT. BESTOW.

ALLOW, *v.* To admit, allow.

GRANT is probably changed from *guarantee*, in French *garantir*, signifying to assure any thing to a person by one's word or deed.

BESTOW is compounded of *be* and *stow*, which in English, as well as in the northern languages, signifies to place; hence to *bestow*, signifies to dispose according to one's wishes and convenience.

That is *allowed* which may be expected, if not directly required; that is *granted* which is desired, if not directly asked for; that is *bestowed* which is wanted as a matter of necessity.

What is *allowed* is a gift stipulated as to time and quantity, which as to continuance depends upon the will of the giver; what is *granted* is perfectly gratuitous on the part of the giver, it is a pure favour, and lays the receiver under an obligation; what is *bestowed* is occasional, altogether depending on the circumstances and disposition of both giver and receiver.

A *grant* comprehends in it something more important than an *allowance*, and passes between persons in a higher station; what is *bestowed* is of less value than either. A father *allows* his son a yearly sum for his casual expenses, or a master *allows* his servant a maintenance: kings *grant* pensions to their officers; governments *grant* subsidies to one another: relief is *bestowed* on the indigent.

In a figurative application, merit is *allowed*, an indulgence or privilege is *granted*, applause is *bestowed*.

A candid man *allows* merit even in his rivals. In former times the kings of England *granted* certain privileges to some towns, which they retain to this day. Those who are hasty in applauding, frequently *bestow* their commendations on very undeserving objects.

ALLOWANCE, STIPEND, SALARY, WAGES, HIRE, PAY.

All these terms denote a stated sum paid according to certain stipulations.

ALLOWANCE, from *allow* (*v.* To admit, allow), signifies the thing *allowed*.

STIPEND, in Latin *stipendium*, from *stips* a piece of money, signifies money *paid*.

SALARY, in French *salaire*, Latin *salarium*, comes from *sal* salt, which was originally the principal *pay* for soldiers.

WAGES, in French *gage*, Latin *vadium*, from the Hebrew *igang* labour, signifies that which is *paid* for labour.

HIRE expresses the sum for which one is *hired*, and PAY the sum that is to be *paid*.

An *allowance* is gratuitous; it ceases at the pleasure of the donor; all the rest are the requital for some supposed service; they cease with the engagement made between the parties. A *stipend* is more fixed and permanent than a *salary*; and that than *wages*, *hire*, or *pay*: a *stipend* depends upon the fulfilling of an engagement, rather than on the will of an individual; a *salary* is a matter of contract between the giver and receiver,

and may be increased or diminished at will.

An *allowance* may be given in any form, or at any stated times; a *stipend* and *salary* are paid yearly, or at even portions of a year; *wages*, *hire*, and *pay*, are estimated by days, weeks, or months, as well as years.

An *allowance* may be made by, with, and to persons of all ranks; a *stipend* and *salary* are assignable only to persons of respectability; *wages* are given to labourers, *hire* to servants, *pay* to soldiers or such as are employed under government.

TO ALLUDE, REFER, HINT, SUGGEST.

ALLUDE, in Latin *alludo*, is compounded of *al* or *ad* and *ludo* to sport, that is, to say any thing in a cursory manner.

REFER, in Latin *refero*, signifies to bring back, that is, to bring back a person's recollection to any subject by mentioning it.

HINT may very probably be changed from *hind* or *hehind*, in German *hinten*, signifying to convey from behind, or in an obscure manner.

SUGGEST, in Latin *suggestus*, participle of *suggero*, is compounded of *sub* and *gero* to bring under or near, and signifies to bring forward in an indirect or casual manner.

To *allude* is not so direct as to *refer*, but is more clear and positive than either *hint* or *suggest*.

We *allude* to a circumstance by introducing something collaterally allied to it; we *refer* to an event by expressly introducing it into one's discourse; we *hint* at a person's intentions by darkly insinuating what may possibly happen; we *suggest* an idea by some poetical expressions relative to it.

There are frequent *allusions* in the Bible to the customs and manners of the east. It is necessary to *refer* to certain passages of a work when we do not expressly copy them. It is mostly better to be entirely silent upon a subject, than to *hint* at what cannot be entirely explained. Many improvements have owed their origin to some ideas casually *suggested* in the course of conversation.

Allude and *refer* are always said with regard to things that have positively happened, and mostly such as are indifferent; *hint* and *suggest* have mostly a personal relation to things that are precarious. The whole drift of a discourse is sometimes unintelligible for want of knowing what is *alluded* to, although many persons and incidents are *referred* to with their proper names and dates. It is the part of the slanderer to *hint* at things discreditable to another, when he does not dare to speak openly; and to *suggest* doubts of his veracity which he cannot positively charge.

TO ALLURE, TEMPT, SEDUCE, ENTICE, DECOY.

ALLURE is compounded of the intensive syllable *al* or *ad* and *lure*, in French *leurre*, in German *luder*, a *lure* or *tempting* bait, signifying to hold a bait in order to catch animals, and figuratively to present something to please the senses.

TEMPT, in French *tenter*, Latin *tento* to try, comes from *tentus*, participle of *tendo* to stretch, signifying by efforts to impel to action.

SEDUCE, in French *seduire*, Latin *seduco*, is compounded of *se* apart, and *duco* to lead, signifying to lead any one aside.

ENTICE is probably, *per metathesis*, changed from *incite*.

DECOY is compounded of the Latin *de* and *coy*, in Dutch *koy*, German, &c. *koi*, a cage or enclosed place for birds, signifying to draw into any place for the purpose of getting them into one's power.

We are *allured* by the appearances of things; we are tempted by the words of persons as well as the appearances of things; we are *enticed* by persuasions: we are *seduced* or *decoyed* by the influence and false arts of others.

To *allure* and *tempt* are used either in a good or bad sense; *entice* sometimes in an indifferent, but mostly in a bad sense; *seduce* and *decoy* are always in a bad sense. The weather may *allure* us out of doors: the love of pleasure may *allure* us into indulgences that afterwards cause repentance. We are sometimes *tempted* upon very fair grounds to undertake what turns out unfortunately in the end: our passions are our bitterest enemies; they *tempt* us to sin. When the wicked *entice* us to evil, we should turn a deaf ear to their representations; those who know what is right, and are determined to practise it, will not suffer themselves to be *enticed* into any irregularities. Young men are frequently *seduced* by the company they keep. Children are *decoyed* away by the evil-minded, who wish to get them into their possession.

Allure does not imply such a powerful influence as *tempt*: what *allures* draws by gentle means: what *tempts* acts by direct and continued efforts; it tries the power of resistance. *Entice* supposes such a decisive influence on the mind, as produces a determination to act; in which respect it differs from the two former terms. *Allure* and *tempt* produce actions on the mind, not necessarily followed by any result; for we may be *allured* or *tempted* to do a thing, without doing the thing; but we cannot be *enticed* unless we are led to take some step. *Seduce*, and

decoy, have reference to the outward action, as well as the inward movements of the mind which give rise to them: they indicate a drawing aside of the person as well as the mind; it is a misleading by false representation. Prospects are *alluring*, offers are *tempting*, words are *enticing*, charms are *seductive*.

ALLY, CONFEDERATE.

Although derived from the preceding terms (*v. Alliance confederacy*), these words are used only in part of their acceptations.

An ALLY is one who forms an *alliance* in the political sense; a CONFEDERATE is one who forms *confederacies* in general, but more particularly when such *confederacies* are unauthorized.

The Portuguese and English have been *allies*. William Tell had some few particular friends who were his *confederates*.

ALONE, SOLITARY, LONELY.

ALONE, compounded of *all* and *one*, signifies altogether one, or single; that is, by one's self.

SOLITARY, in French *solitaire*, Latin *solitarius*, from *solus* alone, signifies the quality of being *alone*.

LONELY, signifies in the manner of *alone*.

Alone marks the state of a person; *solitary* the quality of a person or thing; *lonely* the quality of a thing only. A person walks *alone*, or takes a *solitary* walk in a *lonely* place.

ALSO, LIKEWISE, TOO.

ALSO, compounded of *all* and *so*, signifies literally all in the same manner.

LIKEWISE, German *gleich* like, and *Weise* manner, signifies in like manner.

TOO, a variation of the numeral *two*, signifies what may be added or joined to another thing from its similarity.

These adverbial expressions obviously convey the same idea of including or classing certain objects together upon a supposed ground of affinity. *Also* is a more general term, and has a comprehensive meaning, as it implies a sameness in the whole; *likewise* is more specific and limited in its acceptation; *too* is still more limited than either, and refers only to a single object.

„He said it *also*“ implies that he said it in common with other persons or other things: „he said it *likewise*“ expresses that he said the same thing, or in the same manner, as others: „he said so *too*“ signifies that he said it in addition to others.

ALWAYS, AT ALL TIMES, EVER.

ALWAYS, compounded of *all* and *ways*,

is the same as, under all circumstances, through all the ways of life, that is, uninterruptedly.

AT ALL TIMES, means, without distinction of time.

EVER, implies, for a perpetuity, without end.

A man ought to be *always* virtuous, that is, whether in adversity or prosperity; and *at all times* virtuous, that is, in his going in and coming out, his rising up and his lying down, by day and by night; he will then be *ever* happy, that is, in this life, and the life to come.

AMBASSADOR, ENVOY, PLENIPOTENTIARY, DEPUTY.

AMBASSADOR is supposed to come from the low Latin *ambasciator* a waiter, although this does not accord with the high station which they have always held.

ENVOY, from the French *envoyer* to send, signifies one sent.

PLENIPOTENTIARY, from the Latin *plenus* and *potens*, signifies one invested with full powers.

DEPUTY, signifies one deputed.

Ambassadors, *envoys*, and *plenipotentiaries*, speak and act in the name of their sovereigns, with this difference, that the first is invested with the highest authority, acting in all cases as the representative; the second appears only as a simple authorized minister acting for another, but not always representing him; the third is a species of *envoy* used by courts only on the occasion of concluding peace or making treaties: *deputies* are not deputed by sovereigns, although they may be *deputed* to sovereigns; they have no power to act or speak, but in the name of some subordinate community, or particular body. The functions of the first three belong to the minister, those of the latter to the agent.

AMBIGUOUS, EQUIVOCAL.

AMBIGUOUS, in Latin *ambiguus*, from *ambigo*, compounded of *ambo* and *ago*, signifies acting both ways.

EQUIVOCAL, in French *equivoque*, Latin *equivocus*, composed of *aequus* and *vox*, signifies a word to be applied equally to two or more objects.

An *ambiguity* leaves the sense indeterminate; an *equivocation* admits of a double interpretation; an *ambiguity* leaves us in entire incertitude as to what is meant; an *equivocation* misleads us in the use of a term in the sense which we do not suspect.

An *ambiguity* may be unintentional, arising from the nature both of the words and

the things; or it may be employed to withhold information respecting our views; an *equivocation* is always intentional, and may be employed for the purposes of fraud. The histories of heathen nations are full of confusion and *ambiguity*; the heathen oracles were mostly veiled by some *equivocation*.

TO AMEND, CORRECT, REFORM, RECTIFY, EMEND, IMPROVE, MEND, BETTER.

AMEND, in Latin *emendo*, from *menda* the fault of a transcriber, signifies to remove any such fault.

CORRECT, in Latin *correctus*, participle of *corrigo*, compounded of *con* and *rego*, signifies to set in order, to set to rights.

REFORM, compounded of *re* and *form*, signifies to form afresh, or put into a new form.

RECTIFY, in Latin *rectifico*, compounded of *rectus* and *facio*, signifies to make or put right.

EMEND is the immediate derivative of the Latin *emendo*.

IMPROVE comes from the Latin *in* and *probo* to prove or try, signifying to make good, or better than it was, by trials or after experiments.

MEND is a contraction of *amend*.

BETTER is properly to *make better*.

To *amend*, *correct*, *rectify*, and *emend*, imply the lessening of evil; to *improve*, *reform*, and *better*, the increase of good. We *amend* our moral conduct, *correct* errors, *reform* our life, *rectify* mistakes, *emend* the readings of an author, *improve* our mind, *mend* or *better* our condition. What is *amended* is mostly that which is wrong in ourselves: what is *reformed* or *corrected* is that which is faulty in ourselves or in others: what is *rectified* is mostly wrong in that which has been done; that which is *improved* may relate either to an individual, or to indifferant objects.

To *mend* and *better* are common terms, employed only on familiar occasions, corresponding to the terms *amend* and *improve*. Whatever is wrong must be *amended*; whatever is faulty must be *corrected*; whatever is altogether insufficient for the purpose must be *reformed*; whatever error escapes by an oversight must be *rectified*: whatever is obscure or incorrect must be *amended*. What has been torn may be *mended*, and what admits of change may be *improved*, or *bettered*. When a person's conduct is any way culpable, it ought to be *amended*; when his habits and principles are vicious, his character ought to be *reformed*; when he has any particular faulty habit, it ought to be *corrected*; when he commits mistakes he

should not object to have them *rectified*; the *emendations* of critics frequently involve an author in still greater obscurity: whoever wishes to advance himself in life must endeavour to *improve* his time and talents.

AMIALE, LOVELY, BELOVED.

AMIALE, in Latin *amabilis*, from *amo* and *habilis*, signifies fit to be loved.

LOVELY, compounded of *love* and *ly* or *like*, signifies like that which we love.

BELOVED signifies having or receiving love.

The first two express the fitness of an object to awaken the sentiment of love; the latter expresses the state of being in actual possession of that love. The *amiable* designates that sentiment in its most spiritual form, as it is awakened by purely spiritual objects; the *lovely* applies to this sentiment as it is awakened by sensible objects. We are *amiable* according to the qualities of the heart; we are *lovely* according to the external figure and manners; we are *beloved* according to the circumstances that bring us into connexion with others: hence it is that things as well as persons may be *lovely* or *beloved*, but persons only are *amiable*.

An *amiable* disposition without a *lovely* person, will render a person *beloved*.

AMICABLE, FRIENDLY.

AMICABLE, from *amicus* a friend, signifies able or fit for a friend.

FRIENDLY signifies *like a friend*. The word *amicus* likewise comes from *amo* to love, and *friend*, in the Northern languages, from *fregan* to love.

Amicable and *friendly* therefore both denote the tender sentiment of good-will which all men ought to bear one to another; but *amicable* rather implies a negative sentiment, a freedom from discordance; and *friendly* a positive feeling of regard, the absence of indifference. We make an *amicable* accommodation, and a *friendly* visit. It is a happy thing when people who have been at variance can *amicably* adjust all their disputes. Nothing adds more to the charms of society than a *friendly* correspondence.

Amicable is always said of persons who have been in connexion with each other; *friendly* may be applied to those who are perfect strangers. Neighbours must always endeavour to live *amicably* with each other. Travellers should always endeavour to keep up a *friendly* intercourse with the inhabitants, wherever they come.

The abstract terms of the preceding qualities admit of no variation but in the signification of *friendship*, which marks an indi-

vidual feeling only. To live *amicably*, or in *amity* with all men, is a point of Christian duty, but we cannot live in *friendship* with all men; since *friendship* must be confined to a few.

AMOROUS, LOVING, FOND.

AMOROUS, from *amor* and the adjective termination *ous*, which designates abundance, signifies full of love.

LOVING signifies the act of *loving*, that is continually *loving*.

FOND, from the Saxon, *fundan*, and the German *finden*, which signify either to seek or find. Hence *fond* signifies longing for, or eagerly attached to.

These epithets are all used to mark the excess or distortion of a tender sentiment. *Amorous* is taken in a criminal sense, *loving* and *fond* in a contemptuous sense: an indiscriminate and dishonourable attachment to the fair sex characterizes the *amorous* man; an overweening and childish attachment to any object marks the *loving* and *fond* person.

Loving is less dishonourable than *fond*: men may be *loving*; children and brutes may be *fond*. Those who have not a well regulated affection for each other will be *loving* by fits and starts; children and animals who have no control over their appetites will be apt to be *fond* of those who indulge them. An *amorous* temper should be suppressed; a *loving* temper should be regulated; a *fond* temper should be checked.

AMPLE, SPACIOUS, CAPACIOUS.

AMPLE, in French *ample*, Latin *amplus*, probably comes from the Greek *αναπλεως* full.

SPACIOUS, in French *spacieux*, Latin *spaciosus*, comes from *spatium* a space, implying the quality of having *space*.

CAPACIOUS, in Latin *capax*, from *capio* to hold, signifies the quality of being able to hold.

These epithets convey the analogous ideas of extent in quantity, and extent in space. *Ample* is figuratively employed for whatever is extended in quantity; *spacious* is literally used for whatever is extended in *space*; *capacious* is literally and figuratively employed to express extension in both quantity and *space*. Stores are *ample*, room is *ample*, an allowance is *ample*: a room, a house, or a garden is *spacious*: a vessel or bellow of any kind is *capacious*; the soul, the mind, and the heart are *capacious*.

Ample is opposed to scanty, *spacious* to narrow, *capacious* to small. What is *ample* suffices and satisfies; it imposes no constraint: what is *spacious* is free and open, it does

not confine: what is *capacious* readily receives and contains; it is *spacious*, liberal and generous. Although sciences, arts, philosophy, and languages, afford to the mass of mankind *ample* scope for the exercise of their mental powers without recurring to mysterious or fanciful researches, yet this world is hardly *spacious* enough for the range of the intellectual faculties: the *capacious* minds of some are no less capable of containing than they are disposed for receiving whatever spiritual food is offered them.

TO AMUSE, DIVERT, ENTERTAIN.

To AMUSE is to occupy the mind lightly, from the Latin *musa* a song, signifying to allure the attention by any thing as light and airy as a song.

DIVERT, in French *divertir*, Latin *diverto*, is compounded of *di* and *verto* to turn aside, signifying to turn the mind aside from an object.

ENTERTAIN, in French *entretenir*, compounded of *entre*, *inter*, and *tenir*, *teneo* to keep, signifies to keep the mind fixed on a thing.

We *amuse* or *entertain* by engaging the attention on some present occupation; we *divert* by drawing the attention from a present object. Whatever *amuses* serves to kill time, to lull the faculties, and banish reflection; it may be solitary, sedentary, and lifeless: whatever *diverts* causes mirth, and provokes laughter; it will be active, lively, and tumultuous: whatever *entertains* acts on the senses, and awakens the understanding; it must be rational, and is mostly social. The bare act of walking and changing place may *amuse*; the tricks of animals *divert*; conversation or reading *entertains*.

TO AMUSE, BEGUILE.

AMUSE, *v.* To *amuse*, *divert*.

BEGUILE is compounded of *be* and *guile*, signifying to overreach with *guile*.

As *amuse* denotes the occupation of the mind, so *beguile* expresses an effect or consequence of *amusement*.

When *amuse* and *beguile* express any species of deception, the former indicates what is effected by persons, and the latter that which is effected by things. The first is a fraud upon the understanding; the second is a fraud upon the memory and consciousness. We are *amused* by a false story; our misfortunes are *beguiled* by the charms of fine music or fine scenery. To suffer one's self to be *amused* is an act of weakness; to be *beguiled* is a relief and a privilege. Credulous people are easily *amused* by any idle tale, and thus prevented from penetrating

the designs of the artful; weary travellers beguile the tedium of the journey by lively conversation.

AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, DIVERSION, SPORT, RECREATION, PASTIME.

AMUSEMENT signifies here that which serves to *amuse* (v. *To amuse, divert*).

ENTERTAINMENT, that which serves to *entertain* (v. *To amuse*).

DIVERSION, that which serves to *divert* (v. *To amuse, divert*).

SPORT, that which serves to give *sport*,
RECREATION, that which serves to *recreate*, from *recreatus*, participle of *recreo* or *re* and *creo* to create or make alive again.

PASTIME, that which serves to *pass time*.

The first four of these terms are either applied to objects which specifically serve the purposes of pleasure, or to such objects as may accidentally serve this purpose; the last two terms are employed only in the latter sense.

The distinction between the first three terms are very similar in this as in the preceding case. *Amusement* is a general term, which comprehends little more than the common idea of pleasure, whether small or great; *entertainment* is a species of *amusement* which is always more or less of an intellectual nature; *diversions* and *sports* are a species of *amusements* more adapted to the young and the active, particularly the latter: the theatre or the concert is an *entertainment*; fairs and public exhibitions are *diversions*; games of racing or cricket, hunting, shooting, and the like, are *sports*.

Recreation and *pastime* are terms of relative import; the former is of use for those who labour; the latter for those who are idle. A *recreation* must partake more or less of the nature of an *amusement*, but it is an occupation which owes its pleasure to the relaxation of the mind from severe exertion: in this manner gardening may be a *recreation* to one who studies; company is a *recreation* to a man of business: the *pastime* is the *amusement* of the leisure hour; it may be alternately a *diversion*, a *sport*, or a simple *amusement*, as circumstances require.

ANECDOTE, STORY.

ANECDOTE, v. *Anecdotes*.

STORY, like history, comes from the Greek *ιστορειν* to relate.

An *anecdote* has but little incident, and no plot; a story may have many incidents, and an important catastrophe annexed to it: there are many *anecdotes* related of Dr. Johnson, some of which are of a trifling nature, and others characteristic; *stories* are

generally told to young people of ghosts and visions, which are calculated to act on their fears.

An *anecdote* is pleasing and pretty; a story is frightful or melancholy: an *anecdote* always consists of some matter of fact; a story is founded on that which is real. *Anecdotes* serve to amuse men, *stories* to amuse children.

ANECDOTES, MEMOIRS, CHRONICLES, ANNALS.

ANECDOTE, from the Greek *ανεδωτος*, signifies what is communicated in a private way.

MEMOIRS, in French *memoires*, from the word *memory*, signifies what serves to help the memory.

CHRONICLE, in French *chronicle*, from the Greek *χρονοσ* time, signifies an account of the times.

ANNALS, from the French *Annales*, from the Latin *annus*: signifies a detail of what passes in the year.

All these terms mark a species of narrative more or less connected, that may serve as materials for a regular history.

Anecdotes consist of personal or detached circumstances of a public or private nature, involving one subject or more. *Anecdotes* may be either moral or political, literary or biographical; they may serve as characteristics of any individual, or of any particular nation or age.

Memoirs may include *anecdotes*, as far as they are connected with the leading subject on which they treat: *memoirs* are rather connected than complete; they are a partial narrative respecting an individual, and comprehending matter of a public or private nature; they serve as *memorials* of what ought not to be forgotten, and lay the foundation either for a history or a life.

Chronicle and *annals* are altogether of a public nature; and approach the nearest to regular history. *Chronicles* register the events as they pass; *annals* digest them into order, as they occur in the course of successive years. *Chronicles* are minute as to the exact point of time; *annals* only preserve a general order within the period of a year.

Chronicles detail the events of small as well as large communities, as of particular districts and cities; *annals* detail only the events of nations. *Chronicles* include domestic incidents, or such things as concern individuals; the word *annals*, in its proper sense, relates only to such things as affect the great body of the public, but it is frequently employed in an improper sense.

Chronicles may be confined to simple matter of fact; *annals* may enter into the causes and consequences of events.

Anecdotes require point and vivacity, as they seem rather to *amuse* than instruct; the grave historian will always use them with caution; *memoirs* require authenticity; *chronicles* require accuracy; *annals* require clearness of narration, method in the disposition, impartiality in the representation, with almost every requisite that constitutes the true historian.

Anecdotes and *memoirs* are of more modern use: *chronicles* and *annals* were frequent in former ages; * they were the first historic monuments which were stamped with the impression of the simple, frank, and rude manners of early times. The *chronicles* of our present times are principally to be found in newspapers and magazines; the *annals* in annual registers or retrospects.

ANGER, RESENTMENT, WRATH IRE, INDIGNATION.

ANGER comes from the Latin *angor* vexation, *ango* to vex, compounded of *an* or *ad* against, and *ago* to act.

RESENTMENT, in French *ressentiment* from *ressentir*, is compounded of *re* and *sentir*, signifying to feel again, over and over or for a continuance.

WRATH and IRE are derived from the same source, namely, *wrath*, in Saxon *wrath* and *ire*, in Latin *ira* anger, Greek *εἰς* contention, all which spring from the Hebrew *herah*, or *cherah* heat or anger.

INDIGNATION, in French *indignation*, in Latin *indignatio*, from *indignor* to think or feel unworthy, marks the strong feeling which base conduct awakens in the mind.

An impatient agitation against any one who acts contrary to our inclinations or opinions is the characteristic of all these terms. *Resentment* is less vivid than *anger*, and *anger* than *wrath*, *ire*, or *indignation*. *Anger* is a sudden sentiment of displeasure; *resentment* is a continued *anger*; *wrath* is a heightened sentiment of *anger*, which is poetically expressed by the word *ire*.

Anger may be either a selfish or a disinterested passion; it may be provoked by injuries done to ourselves, or injustice done to others. *Resentment* is a brooding sentiment altogether arising from a sense of personal injury; it is associated with a dislike of the offender, as much as the offence; in its rise, progress, and effects, it is alike opposed to the Christian spirit. *Wrath* and *ire* are the sentiment of a superior towards

an inferior, and when provoked by personal injuries discovers itself by haughtiness and a vindictive temper: as a sentiment of displeasure, *wrath* is unjustifiable between man and man; but the *wrath* of God may be provoked by the persevering impenitence of sinners. *Indignation* is a sentiment awakened by the unworthy and atrocious conduct of others; as it is exempt from personality, it is not irreconcilable with the temper of a Christian. A warmth of constitution sometimes gives rise to sallies of *anger*; depravity of heart breeds *resentment*; unbending pride is a great source of *wrath*; *indignation* flows from a high sense of honour and virtue.

ANGER, CHOLER, RAGE, FURY.

ANGER, v. *Anger*, *resentment*.

CHOLER, in French *colere*, Latin *cholera*, Greek *χολερός*, comes from *χολη* bile, because the overflowing of the bile is both the cause and consequence of *choler*.

RAGE, in French *rage*, Latin *rabies* madness, and *rabio* to rave like a madman, comes from the Hebrew *ragaz* to tremble or shake with a violent madness.

FURY, in French *furie*, Latin *furor*, comes probably from *fero* to carry away, because one is carried or hurried by the emotions of *fury*.

These words have a progressive force in their signification. *Choler* expresses something more sudden and virulent than *anger*; *rage* is a vehement ebullition of *anger*; and *fury* is an excess of *rage*. *Anger* may be so stifled as not to discover itself by any outward symptoms; *choler* is discoverable by the paleness of the visage; *rage* breaks forth into extravagant expressions and violent distortions; *fury* takes away the use of the understanding.

ANGRY, PASSIONATE, HASTY.

ANGRY, signifies either having *anger*, or prone to *anger*.

PASSIONATE signifies prone to *passion*.

HASTY signifies prone to excess of *haste* from intemperate feeling.

Angry denotes a particular state or emotion of the mind; *passionate* and *hasty* express habits of the mind. An *angry* man is in a state of *anger*; a *passionate* or *hasty* man is habitually prone to be *passionate* or *hasty*. The *angry* has less that is vehement and impetuous in it than the *passionate*; the *hasty* has something less vehement, but more sudden and abrupt in it than either.

The *angry* man is not always easily provoked, nor ready to retaliate; but he often retains his *anger* until the cause is removed:

* Vide Roubaud „Histoire, fastes, chroniques, annales, memoires, &c.”

the *passionate* man is quickly roused, eager to repay the offence, and speedily appeased by the infliction of pain of which he afterwards probably repents: the *hasty* man is very soon offended, but not ready to offend in return; his *angry* sentiment spends itself in *angry* words.

ANIMADVERSION, CRITICISM, STRICTURE.

ANIMADVERSION, in Latin *animadversio*, from *animadvertere*, that is, *vertere animum ad*, signifies to turn the mind to a thing.

CRITICISM, in French *critique*, Latin *criticus*, Greek *κριτικός*, from *κρίνω* to judge, signifies by distinction a judgment in literary matters.

STRICTURE, in Latin *strictura* a glance at any thing, comes from *stringo* to touch upon lightly or in few words.

Animadversion includes censure and reproof; *criticism* implies scrutiny and judgment, whether for or against; and *stricture* comprehends a partial investigation mingled with censure. We *animadvert* on a person's opinions by contradicting or correcting them; we *criticise* a person's works by minutely and rationally exposing their imperfections and beauties; we pass *strictures* on public measures by descanting on them cursorily, and censuring them partially.

ANIMAL, BRUTE, BEAST.

ANIMAL, in French *animal*, Latin *animal*, from *anima* life, signifies the thing having life.

BRUTE is in French *brute*, Latin *brutus* dull, Greek *βῆρυνς*, Chaldee *barout*, foolishness.

BEAST, in French *bête*, Latin *bestia* changed from *bostirma*, Greek *βοσκημα* a beast of burden, and *βοσχω* to feed, signifies properly the thing that feeds.

Animal is the generic, *brute* and *beast* are the specific terms. The *animal* is the thing that lives and moves. If *animal* be considered as thinking, willing, reflecting, and acting, it is confined in its signification to the human species; if it be regarded as limited in all the functions which mark intelligence and will, if it be divested of speech and reason, it belongs to the *brute*; if *animal* be considered, moreover as to the appetites independent of reason, of its destination, and consequent dependance on its mental powers; it descends to the *beast*.

TO ANIMATE, INSPIRE, ENLIVEN, CHEER, EXHILARATE.

ANIMATE, in Latin *animatus*, from *ani-*

mus the mind, and *anima* the soul or vital principle, signifies in the proper sense to give life, and in the moral sense to give spirit.

INSPIRE, in French *inspirer*, Latin *inspiro*, compounded of *in* and *spiro*, signifies to breathe life or spirit into any one.

ENLIVEN, from *en* or *in* and *liven*, has the same sense.

CHEER, in French *chère*, Flemish *cière* the countenance, Greek *χαρά* joy, signifies the giving joy or spirit.

EXHILARATE, in Latin *exhilaratus*, participle of *exhilaro*, from *hilaris*, Greek *ἰλαρός* joyful, Hebrew *oilen* to exult or leap for joy, signifies to make glad.

Animate and *inspire* imply the communication of the vital or mental spark; *enliven*, *cheer*, and *exhilarate*, signify actions on the mind or body. To be *animated* in its physical sense is simply to receive the first spark of animal life in however small a degree; for there are *animated* beings in the world possessing the vital power in an infinite variety of degrees and forms: to be *animated* in the moral sense is to receive the smallest portion of the sentiment or thinking faculty; which is equally varied in thinking beings; *animation* therefore never conveys the idea of receiving any strong degree of either physical or moral feeling. To *inspire*, on the contrary, expresses the communication of a strong moral sentiment or passion: hence to *animate* with courage is a less forcible expression than to *inspire* with courage: we likewise speak of *inspiring* with emulation or a thirst for knowledge; not of *animating* with emulation or a thirst for knowledge. To *enliven* respects the mind; *cheer* relates to the heart; *exhilarate* regards the spirits, both animal and mental; they all denote an action on the frame by the communication of pleasurable emotions: the mind is *enlivened* by contemplating the scenes of nature; the imagination is *enlivened* by reading poetry; the benevolent heart is *cheered* by witnessing the happiness of others, the spirits are *exhilarated* by the convivialities of social life: conversation *enlivens* society; the conversation of a kind and considerate friend *cheers* the drooping spirits in the moments of trouble: unexpected good news is apt to *exhilarate* the spirits.

ANIMATION, LIFE, VIVACITY, SPIRIT.

ANIMATION and LIFE do not differ either in sense or application, but the latter is more in familiar use. They express either the particular or general state of the mind.

VIVACITY and SPIRIT express only the habitual nature and state of the feelings.

A person of no *animation* is divested of the distinguishing characteristic of his nature, which is mind: a person of no *vivacity* is a dull companion: a person of no *spirit* is unfit to associate with others.

A person with *animation* takes an interest in every thing: a *vivacious* man catches at every thing that is pleasant and interesting. a *spirited* man enters into plans, makes great exertions, and disregards difficulties.

TO ANNOUNCE, PROCLAIM, PUBLISH.

ANNOUNCE, in Latin *annuncio*, is compounded of *an* or *ad* and *nuncio* to tell to any one.

PROCLAIM, in Latin *proclamo*, is compounded of *pro* and *clamo* to cry before, or cry aloud.

PUBLISH, in Latin *publico*, from *publicus* and *populus*, signifies to make public or known to people at large.

The characteristic sense of these words is the making a thing known to several individuals: a thing is *announced* to an individual or small community; it is *proclaimed* to a neighbourhood, and *published* to the world. We *announce* an event that is expected and just at hand: we *proclaim* an event that requires to be known by all the parties interested; we *publish* what is supposed likely to interest all who know it.

Announcements are made verbally, or by some well known signal; *proclamations* are made verbally, and accompanied by some appointed signal; *publications* are ordinarily made through the press, or by oral communication from one individual to another. The arrival of a distinguished individual is *announced* by the ringing of the bells; the *proclamation* of peace by a herald is accompanied with certain ceremonies calculated to excite notice; the *publication* of news is the office of the journalist.

ANSWER, REPLY, REJOINDER, RESPONSE.

ANSWER, in Saxon *andswaren* and *svaran*, Goth. *award* and *ward*, German *antwort*, compounded of *ant* or *anti* against, and *wort* a word, signifies a word used against or in return for another.

REPLY comes from the French *repliquer*, Latin *replico* to unfold, signifying to unfold or enlarge upon by way of explanation.

REJOIN is compounded of *re* and *join*, signifying to join or add in return.

RESPONSE, in Latin *responsus*, participle of *respondeo*, compounded of *re* and *spondeo*, signifies to declare or give a sanction to in return.

Under all these terms is included the idea of using words in return for other words. An *answer* is given to a question; a *reply* is made to an assertion; a *rejoinder* is made to a *reply*; a *response* is made in accordance with the words of another.

We *answer* either for the purpose of affirmation, information, or contradiction; we *reply*, or *rejoin*, in order to explain or confute: *responses* are made by way of assent or confirmation.

An *answer* may be either spoken or written: *reply* and *rejoinder* are used in personal discourse only: a *response* may be said or sung.

ANSWERABLE, RESPONSIBLE, ACCOUNTABLE, AMENABLE.

ANSWERABLE from *answer*, signifies ready or able to *answer* for.

RESPONSIBLE, from *respondeo* to *answer*, has a similar meaning in its original sense.

ACCOUNTABLE, from *account*, signifies able or ready to give an *account*.

AMENABLE, from the French *amener* to lead, signifies liable to be led.

We are *answerable* for a demand; *responsible* for a trust; *accountable* for our proceedings; and *amenable* to the laws. When a man's credit is firmly established he will have occasions to be *answerable* for those in less flourishing circumstances: every one becomes *responsible* more or less in proportion to the confidence which is reposed in his judgment and integrity: we are all *accountable* beings, either to one another, or at least to the great Judge of all; when a man sincerely wishes to do right, he will have no objection to be *amenable* to the laws of his country.

ANTECEDENT, PRECEDING, FOREGOING, PREVIOUS, ANTERIOR, PRIOR, FORMER.

ANTECEDENT, in Latin *antecedens*, that is *ante* and *cedens* going before.

PRECEDING, in Latin *praecedens*, going before.

FOREGOING, literally going before.

PREVIOUS, in Latin *praevious*, that is *prae* and *via* making a way before.

ANTERIOR, the comparative of the Latin *ante* before.

PRIOR, in Latin *prior*, comparative of *primus* first.

FORMER in English the comparative of first.

Antecedent, *preceding*, *foregoing*, *previous*, are employed for what goes or happens before; *anterior*, *prior*, *former*, for what is, or exists before.

* *Antecedent* marks priority of order, place, and position, with this peculiar circumstance, that it denotes the relation of influence, dependance, and connexion established between two objects: thus, in logic the premises are called the *antecedent*, and the conclusion the consequent; in theology or politics the *antecedent* is any decree or resolution which influences another decree or action; in mathematics, it is that term from which any induction can be drawn to another; in grammar, the *antecedent* is that which requires a particular regimen from its subsequent.

Antecedent and *preceding* both denote priority of time, or the order of events; but the former in a more vague and indeterminate manner than the latter. A *preceding* event is that which happens immediately before the one of which we are speaking; whereas *antecedent* may have events or circumstances intervening. An *antecedent* proposition may be separated from its consequent by other propositions; but a *preceding* proposition is closely followed by another. In this sense *antecedent* is opposed to *posterior*; *preceding* to *succeeding*.

Preceding respects simply the succession of times and things: but *previous* denotes the succession of actions and events, with the collateral idea of their connexion with and influence upon each other: we speak of the *preceding* day, or the *preceding* chapter, merely as the day or chapter that goes before; but when we speak of a *previous* engagement or a *previous* inquiry, it supposes an engagement or inquiry preparatory to something that is to follow; *previous* is opposed to subsequent: *foregoing* is employed to mark the order of things narrated or stated; as when we speak of the *foregoing* statement, the *foregoing* objections, or the *foregoing* calculation, etc.: *foregoing* is opposed to following.

Anterior, *prior*, and *former*, have all a relative sense, and are used for things that are more before than others: *anterior* is a technical term to denote forwardness of position, as in anatomy; the *anterior* or fore part of the skull, in contradistinction to the hind part; so likewise the *anterior* or fore front of a building, in opposition to the back front: *prior* is used in the sense of *previous* when speaking of comparatively two or more things, when it implies anticipation: a *prior* claim invalidates the one that is set up; a *prior* engagement prevents the forming of another that is proposed; *former* is employed either with regard to times, as *former* times,

in contradistinction to later periods, or with regard to propositions, when the *former* or first thing mentioned is opposed to the latter or last mentioned.

TO APOLOGIZE, DEFEND, JUSTIFY, EXCULPATE, EXCUSE, PLEAD.

APOLOGIZE: from the French *apologie*, Greek *απολογία*, and *απολογεομαι*, compounded of *απο* from or away, and *λεγω* to speak, signifies to do away by speaking.

DEFEND, in French *defendre*, Latin *defensus*, participle of *defendo*, is compounded of *de* and *fendo*, signifying to keep or ward off.

JUSTIFY, in French *justifier*, Latin *justifico*, is compounded of *justus* and *facio*, signifying to do justice, or to put right,

EXCULPATE, in Latin *exculpatus*, participle of *exculpo*, compounded of *ex* and *culpa*, signifies to get out of a fault.

EXCUSE, in French *excuser*, Latin *excuso*, compounded of *ex* and *causa*, signifies to get out of any cause or affair.

PLEAD, in French *plaider*, may either come from *placitum* or *placendum*, or be contracted from *appellatum*.

There is always some * imperfection supposed or real which gives rise to an *apology*; with regard to persons it presupposes a consciousness of impropriety, if not guilt; we *apologize* for an error by acknowledging ourselves guilty of it: a *defence* presupposes a consciousness of innocence more or less; we *defend* ourselves against a charge by proving its fallacy: a *justification* is founded on the conviction not only of entire innocence, but of strict propriety; we *justify* our conduct against any imputation by proving that it was blameless; *exculpation* rests on the conviction of innocence with regard to the fact; we *exculpate* ourselves from all blame by proving that we took no part in the transaction: *excuse* and *plea* are not grounded on any idea of innocence; they are rather appeals for favour resting on some collateral circumstance which serves to extenuate; a *plea* is frequently an idle or unfounded *excuse*, a frivolous attempt to lessen displeasure: we *excuse* ourselves for a neglect by alleging indisposition; we *plead* for forgiveness by solicitation and entreaty.

* According to the vulgar acceptance of the term, this imperfection is always presumed to be real in the thing for which we apologize; but the Bishop of Llandaff did not use the term in this sense when he wrote his „*Apology* for the Bible;“ by which, bearing in mind the original meaning of the word, he wished to imply an attempt to do away the alleged imperfections of the Bible, or to do away the objections made to it. Whether the learned Prelate might not have used a less classical, but more intelligible expression for such a work is a question which happily for mankind it is not necessary now to decide.

* Vide Roubaud: „Antérieur, antécédent, précédent.“

Excuse and *plea*, which are mostly employed in an unfavourable sense, are to *apology*, *defence*, and *exculpation*, as the means to an end: an *apology* is lame when, instead of an honest confession of an unintentional error, an idle attempt is made at *justification*: a *defence* is poor when it does not contain sufficient to invalidate the charge: a *justification* is nugatory when it applies to conduct altogether wrong: an *excuse* or a *plea* is frivolous or idle, which turns upon some falsehood, misrepresentation, or irrelevant point.

APPAREL, ATTIRE, ARRAY.

APPAREL, in French *appareil*, like the word *apparatus*, comes from the Latin *apparatus* or *adparatus*, signifying the thing fitted or adapted for another.

ATTIRE, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tire*, in French *tirer*, Latin *traho* to draw, signifies the thing drawn or put on.

ARRAY is compounded of *ar* or *ad* and *ray* or *row*, signifying the state of being in a row or being in order.

These terms are all applicable to dress or exterior decoration. *Apparel* is the dress of every one; *attire* is the dress of the great; *array* is the dress of particular persons on particular occasions: it is the first object of every man to provide himself with *apparel* suitable to his station: but the desire of shining forth in gaudy *attire* is the property of little minds; on festivals and solemn occasions, it may be proper for those who are to be conspicuous to set themselves out with a comely *array*.

Apparel and *attire* respect the quality and fashion of the thing; but *array* has regard to the disposition of the things with their neatness and decorum: *apparel* may be costly or mean; *attire* may be gay or shabby; but *array* will never be otherwise than neat or comely.

APPARENT, VISIBLE, CLEAR, PLAIN, OBVIOUS, EVIDENT, MANIFEST.

APPARENT, in Latin *apparens*, participle of *appareo* to appear, signifies the quality of appearing.

VISIBLE, in Latin *visibilis*, from *visus*, participle of *video*, to see, signifies capable of being seen.

CLEAR, in French, *clair* German, Swedish, etc., *klar*, Latin *clarus*, Greek *γλαυρός*, comes from *γλαύσσω* to shine.

PLAIN, in Latin *planus* even, signifies what is so smooth and unencumbered that it can be seen.

OBVIOUS, in Latin *obvius*, compounded of *ob* and *via*, signifies the quality of lying in one's way, or before one's eyes.

EVIDENT, in French *evident*, Latin *evidens*, from *video*, Greek *εἶδω*, Hebrew *ido*, to know, signifies as good as certain or known.

MANIFEST, in French *manifeste*, Latin *manifestus*, compounded of *manus* the hand and *festus*, participle of *fendo* to fall in, signifies the quality of being so near that it can be laid hold of by the hand.

These words agree in expressing various degrees in the capability of seeing; but *visible* is the only one used purely in a physical sense; *apparent*, *clear*, *plain* and *obvious*, are used physically and morally; *evident* and *manifest* solely in a moral acceptation. That which is simply an object of sight is *visible*; that of which we see only the surface is *apparent*: the stars themselves are *visible* to us; but their size is *apparent*: the rest of these terms denote not only what is to be seen, but what is easily to be seen: they are all applied as epithets to objects of mental discernment.

What is *apparent* appears but imperfectly to view; it is opposed to that which is real: what is *clear* is to be seen in all its bearings; it is opposed to that which is obscure: what is *plain* is seen by a plain understanding; it requires no deep reflection nor severe study; it is opposed to what is intricate: what is *obvious* presents itself readily to the mind of every one; it is seen at the first glance and is opposed to that which is abstruse: what is *evident* is seen forcibly, and leaves no hesitation on the mind; it is opposed to that which is dubious: *manifest* is a greater degree of the *evident*; it strikes on the understanding and forces conviction; it is opposed to that which is dark.

A contradiction may be *apparent*; on closer observation it may be found not to be one: a case is *clear*; it is decided on immediately: a truth is *plain*; it is involved in no perplexity; it is not multifarious in its bearings: a falsehood is *plain*; it admits of no question: a reason is *obvious*; it flows out of the nature of the case: a proof is *evident*; it requires no discussion, there is nothing in it that clashes or contradicts: the guilt or innocence of a person is *evident* when every thing serves to strengthen the conclusion: a contradiction or absurdity is *manifest*, which is felt by all as soon as it is perceived.

APPEARANCE, AIR, ASPECT.

APPEARANCE signifies the thing that appears.

AIR, v. *Air, manner.*

ASPECT, in Latin *aspectus*, from *aspicio* to look upon, signifies the thing that is looked upon or seen.

Appearance is the generic, the rest specific terms. The whole external form, figure, or colour, whatever is visible to the eye, is the *appearance*: *air* is a particular *appearance* of any object as far as it is indicative of its quality or condition; an *air* of wretchedness or poverty: *aspect* is the partial *appearance* of a body as it presents one of its sides to view; a gloomy or cheerful *aspect*.

It is not safe to judge of any person or thing altogether by *appearances*; the *appearance* and reality are often at variance: there are particular towns, habitations, or rooms which have always an *air* of comfort, or the contrary: politicians of a certain stamp are always busy in judging for the future from the *aspect* of affairs; but their predictions, like those of astrologers who judge from the *aspect* of the heavens, turn out to the discredit of the prophet.

APPEASE, CALM, PACIFY, QUIET, STILL.

APPEASE, v. *To allay.*

CALM, in French *calmer*, from *almus* bright, signifies to make bright.

PACIFY, in Latin *pacifico*, compounded of *pax* and *facio*, signifies to make peace or peaceable.

QUIET, in French *quiet*, Latin *quietus*, from *quies* rest, signifies to put to rest.

STILL, signifies to make *still*.

To *appease* is to remove great agitation; to *calm* is to bring into a tranquil state. * The wind is *appeased*; the sea is *calmed*. With regard to persons it is necessary to *appease* those who are in transports of passion, and to *calm* those who are in trouble, anxiety, or apprehension.

Appease respects matters of force or violence, *calm* those of inquietude and distress; one is *appeased* by a submissive behaviour, and *calmed* by the removal of danger. *Pacify* corresponds to *appease*, and *quiet* to *calm*; in sense they are the same, but in application they differ: *appease* and *calm* are used only in reference to objects of importance; *pacify* and *quiet* to those of a more familiar nature: the uneasy humours of a child are *pacified*, or its groundless fears are *quieted*.

Still is a loftier expression than any of the former terms; serving mostly for the grave or poetic style; it is an onomatopoeia for restraining or putting to silence that which is noisy and boisterous.

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Appaiser, calmer.“

APPLAUSE, ACCLAMATION.

APPLAUSE, from the Latin *applaudo*, signifies literally to clap or stamp the feet to a thing.

ACCLAMATION, from *acclamo*, signifies a crying out to a thing.

These terms express a public demonstration; the former by means of a noise with the hands or feet; the latter by means of shouts and cries: the former being employed as a testimony of approbation; the latter as a sanction, or an indication of respect. An actor looks for *applause*; a speaker looks for *acclamation*.

What a man does calls forth *applause*, but the person himself is mostly received with *acclamations*. At the hustings popular speeches meet with *applause*, and favourite members are greeted with loud *acclamations*.

TO APPOINT, ORDER, PRESCRIBE, ORDAIN.

APPOINT, v. *To allot*

ORDER, in French *ordre*, Latin *ordino*, to arrange, dispose, *ordo* order, Greek *ορμος* a row of trees, which is the symbol of order.

PRESCRIBE, in Latin *prescribo*, compounded of *prae* before, and *scribo* to write signifies to draw a line for a person.

ORDAIN is a variation of order.

To *appoint* is either the act of an equal or superior: we *appoint* a meeting with any one at a given time and place; a king *appoints* his ministers. To *order* is the act of one invested with a partial authority: a customer *orders* a commodity from his tradesman: a master gives his *orders* to his servant. To *prescribe* is the act of one who is superior by virtue of his knowledge; a physician *prescribes* to his patient. To *ordain* is an act emanating from the highest authority: kings and councils *ordain*; but their *ordinances* must be conformable to what is *ordained* by the Divine being.

Appointments are made for the convenience of individuals or communities; but they may be altered or annulled at the pleasure of the contracting parties. *Orders* are dictated by the superior only, but they presuppose a discretionary obligation on the part of the individual to whom they are given. *Prescriptions* are binding on none but such as voluntarily admit their authority; but *ordinances* leave no choice to those on whom they are imposed to accept or reject them: the *ordinances* of man are not less binding than those of God, so long as they do not expressly contradict the divine law.

Appointments are kept, *orders* executed or obeyed, *prescriptions* followed, *ordinances* submitted to.

TO APPRAISE, APPRECIATE, ESTIMATE, ESTEEM.

APPRAISE, APPRECIATE. from *apprecio* and *appreciatus*, participle of *apprecio*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *pretium* a price, signifies to set a price or value on a thing.

ESTIMATE comes from *estimatus*, participle of *estimo* to value.

To ESTEEM is a variation of *estimate*.

Appraise and *appreciate* are used in precisely the same sense for setting a value on any thing according to relative circumstances; but the one is used in the proper, and the other in the figurative sense: a sworn *appraiser* *appraises* goods according to the condition of the articles, and their saleable property; the characters of men are *appreciated* by others when their good and bad qualities are justly put in a balance. To *estimate* a thing is to fix the sum of its value by calculation; to *esteem* any thing is to judge its actual and intrinsic value.

Estimate is used either in a proper or a figurative acceptation; *esteem* only in a moral sense: the expense of an undertaking, losses by fire, gains by trade, are *estimated* at a certain sum; an *estimate* may be too low: the moral worth of men is often *estimated* above or below the reality according to the particular bias of the *estimator*; but there are individuals of such unquestionable worth that they need only be known in order to be *esteemed*.

TO APPREHEND, FEAR, DREAD.

APPREHEND, in French *appréhender*, Latin *apprehendo*, compounded of *ap* and *prehendo* to lay hold of; in a moral sense it signifies to seize with the understanding.

FEAR comes in all probability through the medium of the Latin *pavor* and *vereor*, from the Greek *φοβος* to feel a shuddering.

DREAD, in Latin *territo*, comes from *ταρασσω* to trouble, signifying to fear with exceeding trouble.

These words rise progressively in their import; they mark a sentiment of pain at the prospect of evil: but the sentiment of *apprehension* is simply that of uneasiness; that of *fear* is anxiety; that of *dread* is wretchedness.

We *apprehend* an unpleasant occurrence; we *fear* a misfortune; we *dread* a calamity. What is possible is *apprehended*; what is probable is *feared*; the symptom or prognostic of an evil is *dreaded* as if the evil itself were present. *Apprehend* respects

things only; *fear* and *dread* relate to persons as well as things: we *fear* the person who has the power of inflicting pain or disgrace; we *dread* him who has no less the will than the power.

TO APPROACH, APPROXIMATE.

APPROACH, in French *approcher*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *proche* or *prope*, signifies to come near.

APPROXIMATE, compounded of *ap* and *proximus* to come nearest or next, signifies either to draw near or bring near.

To *approach* is commonly intransitive only. To *approximate* is both transitive and intransitive.

To *approach* denotes simply the moving of an object towards another, but to *approximate* denotes the gradual moving of two objects towards each other: that which *approaches* may come into immediate conjunction; but bodies may *approximate* for some time before they form a junction, or may never form a junction.

An equivocation *approaches* to a lie. Minds *approximate* by long intercourse.

TO APPROPRIATE, USURP, ARROGATE. ASSUME, ASCRIBE.

APPROPRIATE, in French *appropriier*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *propriatus*, participle of *proprio* an old verb, from *proprius*, proper or own, signifies to make one's own.

USURP, in French *usurper*, Latin *usurpo*, from *usus* use, is a frequentative of *utor*, signifying to make use of as if it were one's own.

ARROGATE, in Latin *arrogatus*, participle of *arrogo*, signifies to ask or lay claim to for one's self.

ASSUME, in French *assumer*, Latin *assumo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sumo* to take, signifies to take to one's self.

ASCRIBE, in Latin *ascribo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *scribo* to write, signifies here to write down to one's own account.

The idea of taking something to one's self, by an act of one's own, is common to all these terms.

Appropriate respects natural objects: we *appropriate* the money, goods, or lands of another to ourselves when we enjoy the fruit of them. *Usurp* respects power and authority: one *usurps* a government, when one exercises the functions of a ruler without a legitimate sanction. *Appropriation* is generally an act of injustice: *usurpation* is always an act of violence.

Arrogate, *assume*, and *ascribe*, denote

the taking to one's self, but do not, like *appropriate* and *usurp*, imply taking from another. *Arrogate* is a more violent action than *assume*, and *assume* than *ascribe*. *Arrogate* and *assume* are employed either in the proper or figurative sense, *ascribe* only in the figurative sense. We *arrogate* distinctions, honours, and titles; we *assume* names, rights, privileges.

In the moral sense we *arrogate* preeminence, *assume* importance, *ascribe* merit. To *arrogate* is a species of moral *usurpation*; it is always accompanied with haughtiness and contempt for others: that is *arrogated* to one's self to which one has not the smallest title: an *arrogant* temper is one of the most odious features in the human character; it is a compound of folly and insolence. To *assume* is a species of moral *appropriation*; its objects are of a less serious nature than those of *arrogating*; the act of assuming does less violence to moral propriety: we may *assume* in trifles, we *arrogate* only in important matters. To *ascribe* is oftener an act of vanity than of injustice: many men are entitled to the merit which they *ascribe* to themselves; but by this very act they lessen the merit of their best actions.

Arrogating as an action, or *arrogance* as a disposition, is always taken in a bad sense: the former dictated by the most preposterous pride; the latter is associated with every unworthy quality. *Assumption* as an action varies, in its character according to circumstances; it may be either good, bad, or indifferent: it is justifiable in certain exigencies to *assume* a command where there is no one else able to direct; it is often a matter of indifference what name a person *assumes* who does so only in conformity to the will of another; but it is always bad to *assume* a name as a mask to impose upon others.

As a disposition *assumption* is always bad, but still not to the same degree as *arrogance*. An *arrogant* man renders himself intolerable to society; an *assuming* man makes himself offensive: *arrogance* is the characteristic of men; *assumption* is peculiar to youths: an *arrogant* man can be humbled only by silent contempt; an *assuming* youth must be checked by the voice of authority.

ARCHITECT, BUILDER.

ARCHITECT, in Latin *architectus*, from *architectara*, Greek *αρχιτεκτονικη*, compounded of *αρχος* the chief, and *τεχνη* art or contrivance, signifies the chief planner of a building.

BUILDER, from the verb to *build*, denotes the person concerned in buildings, who causes the structure of houses, either by his money or his personal service,

An *architect* is an artist, employed only to form the plans for large buildings; a *builder* is a simple tradesman, or even workman, who *builds* common dwelling houses.

ARDUOUS, DIFFICULT.

ARDUOUS, in Latin *arduus*, lofty, from *ardeo* to burn or be on fire, because like the flame of any thing it tends upwards.

DIFFICULT, in French *difficile*, in Latin *difficilis*, compounded of the privative *dis* and *facilis*, easy or ductile, from *facio*, signifies not to be done without labour.

Arduous denotes a high degree of *difficulty*. What is *difficult* requires the efforts of ordinary powers to surmount; but what is *arduous* is set above the reach of common intellect and demands the utmost stretch of power both physical and mental. A child may have a *difficult* exercise which he cannot perform without labour or attention: the man who strives to remove the *difficulties* of learners, undertakes an *arduous* task. It is *difficult* to conquer our own passions: it is *arduous* to control the unruly and contending wills of others.

TO ARGUE, DISPUTE, DEBATE.

ARGUE, in Latin *arguo*, from Greek *αργος* clear, manifest, signifies to make clear, that is, by adducing reasons or proofs.

DISPUTE, in French *disputer*, Latin *disputo*, compounded of *dis* and *puto*, signifies to think differently; in an extended sense, to assert a different opinion.

DEBATE, in French *debattre*, compounded of the intensive syllable *de* and *battre* to beat or fight, signifies to contend for and against.

To *argue* is to defend one's self; *dispute* to oppose another: to *debate* to dispute in a formal manner. To *argue* on a subject is to explain the reasons or proofs in support of an assertion; to *argue* with a person is to defend a position against him: to *dispute* a thing is to advance objections against a position; to *dispute* with a person is to start objections against his positions, to attempt to refute them: a *debate* is a disputation held by many. To *argue* does not necessarily suppose a conviction on the part of the *arguer* that what he defends is true; nor a real difference of opinion in his opponent; for some men have such an itching propensity for an *argument*, that they will attempt to prove what nobody denies:

to *dispute* always supposes an opposition to some person, but not a sincere opposition to the thing; for we may *dispute* that which we do not deny, for the sake of holding a *dispute* with one who is of different sentiments: to *debate* presupposes a multitude of clashing or opposing opinions. Men of many words *argue* for the sake of talking; men of ready tongues *dispute* for the sake of victory; in parliament men often *debate* for the sake of opposing the ruling party, or from any other motive than the love of truth.

TO ARGUE, EVINCE, PROVE.

ARGUE, *v.* To *Argue*, *dispute*.

EVINCE, in Latin *evinco*, is compounded of *vinco* to *prove* or *make out*, and *e* forth, signifies to bring to light, to make to appear clear.

PROVE, in French *prouver*, in Latin *probo*, from *probus* good, signifies to make good, or make to appear good.

These terms in general convey the idea of *evidence*, but with gradations: *argue* denotes the smallest, and *prove* the highest degree. To *argue* is to serve as an indication amounting to probability; to *evince* denotes an indication so clear as to remove doubt; to *prove* marks an *evidence* so positive as to produce conviction.

It *argues* a want of candour in any man to conceal circumstances in his statement which are any ways calculated to affect the subject in question: the tenour of a person's conversation may *evince* the refinement of his mind and the purity of his taste: when we see men sacrificing their peace of mind and even their integrity of character to ambition, it *proves* to us how important it is to check this natural and in some measure laudable, but still insinuating and dangerous passion.

ARGUMENT, REASON, PROOF.

ARGUMENT, from *argue* (*v.* To *argue*), signifies either the thing that *argues*, or that which is brought forward in *arguing*.

REASON, in French *raison*, Latin *ratio*, from *ratus*, participle of *reor* to think, signifies the thing thought or believed in support of some other thing.

PROOF, from to *prove* (*v.* To *argue*), signifies the thing that *proves*.

An *argument* serves for defence; a *reason* for justification; a *proof* for conviction. *Arguments* are adduced in support of an hypothesis or proposition; *reasons* are assigned in matters of belief and practice; *proofs* are collected to ascertain a fact.

Arguments are either strong or weak;

reasons solid or futile; *proofs* clear and positive, or vague and indefinite. We confute an *argument*, overpower a *reason*, and invalidate a *proof*.

TO ARISE, OR RISE, MOUNT, ASCEND, CLIMB, SCALE.

ARISE, in Saxon *arisan*, Gothic *reisen*, etc. is possibly connected with the Latin *orior*, to rise, Greek *aiqo* to lift up, *ogoc*, a mountain, and the Hebrew *har* a mountain, with many others.

ASCEND, in Latin *ascendo*, compounded of *ad* and *scando*, signifies to climb up towards a point.

CLIMB, in German *klimmen*, which is probably connected with *klammar* a hook, signifying to rise by a hook.

SCALE, in French *escalader*, Italian *scalare*, Latin *scala*, a ladder, signifies to rise by a ladder.

The idea of going upwards is common to all these terms; *arise* is used only in the sense of simply getting up, but *rise* is employed to express a continued motion upward: a person *arises* from his seat or his bed; a bird *rises* in the air; the mercury of the barometer *rises*. The first three of these terms convey a gradation in their sense; to *arise* or *rise* denotes a motion to a less elevated height than to *mount*, and to *mount* that which is less elevated than *ascend*: a person *rises* from his seat, *mounts* a hill, and *ascends* a mountain.

Arise and *rise* are intransitive only; the rest are likewise transitive; we *rise* from a point, we *mount* and *ascend* to a point, or we *mount* and *ascend* something: an air balloon *rises* when it first leaves the ground; it *mounts* higher and higher until it is out of sight; but if it *ascends* too high it endangers the life of the aerial adventurer.

Climb and *scale* express a species of *rising*: to *climb* is to *rise* step by step, by clinging to a certain body; to *scale* is to rise by an escalade, or species of ladder, employed in *mounting* the walls of fortified towns: trees and mountains are *climbed*; walls are *scaled*.

TO ARISE, PROCEED, ISSUE, SPRING, FLOW, EMANATE.

ARISE (*v.* To *arise*).

PROCEED, in Latin *procedo*, that is *pro* and *cedo* to go, signifies to go forth.

ISSUE, in French *issue*, comes from the Latin *isse* or *ivisse*, infinitive of *eo* to go, and the Hebrew *itza* to go out.

SPRING, in German *springen*, comes from *rinnen* to run like water, and is connected with the Greek *βρχειν* to pour out.

FLOW, in Saxon *fleowan*, low German *flogan*, high German *fliessen*, Latin *fluo*, etc. all from the Greek *βλῦω* or *βλῦζω*, which is an onomatopœia expressing the murmur of waters.

EMANATE, in Latin *emanatus*, participle of *emano*, compounded of *mano* to flow, from the Hebrew *mim* and Chaldee *min* waters, expressing the motion of waters.

The idea of one object coming out of another is expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the circumstances of the action. What comes up out of a body and rises into existence is said to *arise*, as the mist which *arises* out of the sea: what comes forth as it were gradually into observation is said to *proceed*; thus the light *proceeds* from a certain quarter of the heavens, or from a certain part of a house: what comes out from a small aperture is said to *issue*; thus perspiration *issues* through the pores of the skin; water *issues* sometimes from the sides of rocks: what comes out in a sudden or quick manner, or comes from some remote source, is said to *spring*; thus blood *springs* from an artery which is pricked; water *springs* up out of the earth: what comes out in quantities or in a stream is said to *flow*; thus blood *flows* from a wound: to *emanate* is a species of *flowing* by a natural operation, when bodies send forth, particles of their own composition from themselves; thus light *emanates* from the sun.

This distinction in the signification of these terms is kept up in their moral acceptation, where the idea of one thing originating from another is common to them all; but in this case *arise* is a general term, which simply implies the coming into existence; but *proceed* conveys also the idea of a progressive movement into existence. Every object therefore may be said to *arise* out of whatever produces it; but it *proceeds* from it only when it is gradually produced: evils are continually *arising* in human society for which there is no specific remedy; in complicated disorders it is not always possible to say precisely from what the complaint of the patient *proceeds*. *Issue* is seldom used but in application to sensible objects; yet we may say, in conformity to the original meaning, that words *issue* from the mouth: the idea of the distant source or origin is kept up in the moral application of the term *spring*, when we say that actions *spring* from a generous or corrupt principle: the idea of a quantity and a stream is preserved in the moral use of the terms *flow* and *emanate*; but the former may be said of that which is not inherent

in the body; the latter respects that only which forms a component part of the body: God is the *spring* whence all our blessings *flow*: all authority *emanates* from God, who is the supreme source of all things.

ARMS, WEAPONS.

ARMS from the Latin *arma*, is now properly used for instruments of offence, and never otherwise except by a poetic license of *arms* for armour; but *weapons* from the German *waffen*, may be used either for an instrument of offence or defence. We say *fire arms*, but not *fire weapons*; and *weapons* offensive or defensive, not *arms* offensive or defensive. *Arms* likewise, agreeably to its origin, is employed for whatever is intentionally made as an instrument of offence; *weapon*, according to its extended and indefinite application, is employed for whatever may be accidentally used for this purpose: guns and swords are always *arms*; stones, and brickbats, and pitchforks, may be occasionally *weapons*.

ARMY, HOST.

An ARMY is an organized body of *armed* men; a HOST, from *hostis* an enemy, is properly a body of *hostile* men.

An *army* is a limited body; a *host* may be unlimited, and is therefore generally considered a very large body.

The word *army* applies only to that which has been formed by the rules of art for purposes of war: *host* has been extended in its application not only to bodies, whether of men or angels, but also in the figurative sense to whatever rises up to assail; life is surrounded with a *host* of ills.

ARROGANCE, PRESUMPTION.

ARROGANT, in French *arrogance*, Latin *arrogantia*, signifies the disposition to *arrogate* (v. *To appropriate*).

PRESUMPTION, from *presume*, Latin *praesumo*, compounded of *prae* before and *sumo* to take or put, signifies the disposition to put one's self forward.

Arrogance is the act of the great; *presumption* that of the little: the *arrogant* man takes upon himself to be above others; the *presumptuous* man strives to be on a level with those who are above him. *Arrogance* is commonly coupled with haughtiness; *presumption* with meanness: men *arrogantly* demand as a right the homage which has perhaps before been voluntarily granted; the creature *presumptuously* arraigns the conduct of the Creator, and murmurs against the dispensations of his providence.

ART, CUNNING, DECEIT.

ART, in Latin *ars*, probably comes from the Greek *αρω* to fit or dispose, Hebrew *haresh* to contrive, in which action the mental exercise of *art* principally consists.

CUNNING is in Saxon *cuning*, German *kennend* knowing, in which sense the English word was formerly used.

DECEIT, in Latin *deceptum*, participle of *decipio* or *de* and *capio*, signifies to take by surprise or unawares

Art implies a disposition of the mind, to use circumvention or artifice means to attain an end: *cunning* marks the disposition to practise disguise in the prosecution of a plan: *deceit* leads to the practice of dissimulation and gross falsehood, for the sake of gratifying a desire. *Art* is the property of a lively mind; *cunning* of a thoughtful and knowing mind; *deceit* of an ignorant, low, and weak mind.

Art is practised often in self-defence; as a practice therefore it is even sometimes justifiable, although not as a disposition: *cunning* has always self in view; the *cunning* man seeks his gratification without regard to others: *deceit* is often practised to the express injury of another; the *deceitful* man adopts base means for base ends. Animals practise *art* when opposed to their superiors in strength; but they are not *artful*, as they have not that versatility of power which they can habitually exercise to their own advantage like human beings; animals may be *cunning* in as much as they can by contrivance and concealment seek to obtain the object of their desire, but no animal is *deceitful* except man: the wickedest and stupidest of men have the power and will of *deceiving* and practising falsehood upon others, which is unknown to brutes.

ARTFUL, ARTIFICIAL, FICTITIOUS.

ARTFUL, compounded of *art* and *ful*, marks the quality of being full of *art* (v. *Art*).

ARTIFICIAL, in Latin *artificialis*, from *ars* and *facio* to do, signifies done with *art*.

FICTITIOUS, in Latin *fictitius*, from *finco* to feign, signifies the quality of being feigned.

Artful respects what is done with art or design; *artificial* what is done by the exercise of workmanship; *fictitious* what is made out of the mind. *Artful* and *artificial* are used either for natural or moral objects; *fictitious* always for those that are moral: *artful* is opposed to what is *artless*, *artificial* to what is natural, *fictitious*

to what is real: the ringlets of a lady's hair are disposed in an *artful* manner; the hair itself may be *artificial*: a tale is *artful* which is told in a way to gain credit; manners are *artificial* which do not seem to suit the person adopting them; a story is *fictitious* which has no foundation whatever in truth, and is the invention of the narrator.

ARTICLE, CONDITION, TERM.

ARTICLE, in French *article*, Latin *articulus* a joint or a part of a member.

CONDITION, in French *condition*, Latin *conditio*, from *condo* to build or form, signifies properly the thing framed.

TERM, in French *terme*, Latin *terminus* a boundary, signifies the point to which one is fixed.

These words agree in their application to matters of compact, or understanding between man and man. *Article* and *condition* are used in both numbers; *terms* only in the plural in this sense: the former may be used for any point individually; the latter for all the points collectively: *article* is employed for all matters which are drawn out in specific *articles* or *points*; as the *articles* of an indenture, of a capitulation, or an agreement. *Condition* respects any point that is admitted as a ground of obligation or engagement: it is used for the general transactions of men, in which they reciprocally bind themselves to return certain equivalents. The word *terms* is employed in regard to mercantile transactions; as the *terms* of any bargain, the *terms* of any agreement, the *terms* on which any thing is bought or sold.

Articles are mostly voluntary; they are admitted by mutual agreement: *conditions* are frequently compulsory, sometimes hard; they are submitted to from policy or necessity: *terms* are dictated by interest or equity; they are fair, or unfair, according to the temper of the parties; they are submitted or agreed to. *Articles* are drawn up between parties who have to co-operate; men undertake particular offices on *condition* of receiving a stipulated remuneration: they enter into dealings with each other on definite and precise *terms*.

ARTIFICE, TRICK, FINESSE, STRATAGEM.

ARTIFICE, in French *artifice*, Latin *artifex* an artificer, and *artem facio* to execute an art, signifies the performance of an art.

TRICK, in French *tricher*, German *trügen* to deceive.

FINESSE, a word directly imported from France with all the meaning attached to it, which is characteristic of the nation itself, means properly fineness; the word *fin* fine, signifying in French, as well as in the northern languages from which it is taken, subtlety or mental acumen.

STRATAGEM, in French *stratagème*, from the Greek *στρατηγικὴ* and *στρατηγέω* to lead an army, signifies by distinction to head them in carrying on any scheme.

All these terms denote the exercise of an art calculated to mislead others. *Artifice* is the generic term; the rest specific; the former has likewise a particular use and acceptance distinct from the others: it expresses a ready display of art for the purpose of extricating one's self from a difficulty, or securing to one's self an advantage. *Trick* includes in it more of design to gain something for one's self, or to act secretly to the inconvenience of others: * it is rather a cheat on the senses than the understanding. *Finesse* is a species of *artifice* in which art and cunning are combined in the management of a cause: it is a mixture of invention, falsehood, and concealment. *Stratagem* is a display of art in plotting and contriving, a disguised mode of obtaining an end.

Females who are not guarded by fixed principles of virtue and uprightness are apt to practise *artifices* upon their husbands. Men without honour, or an honourable means of living, are apt to practise various *tricks* to impose upon others to their own advantage; every trade therefore is said to have its *tricks*; and professions are not entirely clear from the stigma, which has been brought upon them by unworthy members. Diplomatic persons have most frequent recourse to *finesse*, in which no people are more skilful practitioners than those who have coined the word. Military operations are sometimes considerably forwarded by well concerted and well timed *stratagems* to surprise the enemy.

ARTIST, ARTISAN, ARTIFICER, MECHANIC.

ARTIST is a practiser of the fine arts.

ARTISAN is a practiser of the vulgar arts.

ARTIFICER, from *ars* and *facio*, is one who does or makes according to art.

MECHANIC is an *artisan* in the *mechanic* arts,

The *artist* ranks higher than the *artisan*: the former requires intellectual refinement

in the exercise of his art; the latter requires nothing but to know the general rules of his art. The musician, painter, and sculptor, are *artists*; the carpenter, the sign painter, and the blacksmith, are *artisans*. The *artificer* is an intermediate term betwixt the *artist* and the *artisan*: manufacturers are *artificers*; and South, in his sermons, calls the author of the universe the great *Artificer*. The *mechanic* is that species of artisan who works at arts purely *mechanical*, in distinction from those which contribute to the completion and embellishment of any objects; on this ground a shoemaker is a *mechanic*, but a common painter is a simple *artisan*.

TO ASCRIBE, ATTRIBUTE, IMPUTE.

ASCRIBE, *v.* To appropriate.

ATTRIBUTE, in Latin *attributus*, participle of *attribuo*, compounded of *ad* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow upon, or attach to a thing what belongs to it.

IMPUTE, compounded of *im* or *in* and *pute*, Latin *puto* to think, signifies to think or judge what is in a thing.

To *ascribe* is to assign any thing to a person as his property, his possession, or the fruit of his labour; to *attribute* is to assign things to others as their causes; to *impute* is to assign qualities to persons. Milton *ascribes* the first use of artillery to the rebel angels; the loss of a vessel is *attributed* to the violence of the storm; the conduct of the captain is *imputed* to the want of firmness.

Ascribe is mostly used in a favourable or indifferent sense; *impute* is either favourable or unfavourable.

TO ASK, BEG, REQUEST.

ASK is in Saxon *ascian*, low German *esken*, *eschen*, German *heischen*, Danish *adske*, Swedish *aeska*; these in general signify to wish for, and come from the Greek *αξιω* to think worthy.

BEG is contracted from the word *beggar*, and the German *begehren* to desire vehemently.

REQUEST, in Latin *requisitus*, participle of *requiro*, is compounded of *re* and *quaero* to seek or look after with indications of desire to possess.

The expression of a wish to some one to have something is the common idea comprehended in these terms. As this is the simple signification of *ask*, it is the generic term; the other two are specific: we *ask* in *begging* and *requesting*, but not *vice versa*.

* Trusler: „Cunning, finesse, device, artifice, trick, stratagem.“

Asking is peculiar to no rank or station; in consequence of our mutual dependance on each other, it is requisite for every man to *ask* something of another: the master *asks* of the servant, the servant *asks* of the master; the parent *asks* of the child, the child of the parent. *Begging* marks a degree of dependance which is peculiar to inferiors in station: we *ask* for matters of indifference; we *beg* that which we think is of importance: a child *asks* a favour of its parent; a poor man *begs* the assistance of one who is able to afford it: that is *asked* for which is easily granted; that is *begged* which is with difficulty obtained. To *ask* therefore requires no effort; but to *beg* is to *ask* with importunity: those who by merely *asking* find themselves unable to obtain what they wish will have recourse to *begging*.

As *ask* sometimes implies a demand, and *beg* a vehemence of desire, or strong degree of necessity; politeness has adopted another phrase which conveys neither the imperiousness of the one, nor the urgency of the other; this is the word *request*. *Asking* carries with it an air of superiority; *begging* that of submission; *requesting* has the air of independence and equality. *Asking* borders too nearly on an infringement of personal liberty; *begging* imposes a constraint by making an appeal to the feelings; *request* leaves the liberty of granting or refusing unencumbered. Impertinent people *ask* without considering the circumstances and situation of the person *asked*; selfish and greedy people *beg* with importunity, and in a tone that admits of no refusal: men of good breeding tender their *requests* with moderation and discretion; they *request* nothing but what they are certain can be conveniently complied with.

Ask is altogether exploded from polite life, although *beg* is not. We may *beg* a person's acceptance of any thing; we may *beg* him to favour or honour us with his company; but we can never talk of *asking* a person's acceptance, or *asking* him to do us an honour. *Beg* in such cases indicates a condescension which is sometimes not unbecoming, but on ordinary occasions *request* is with more propriety substituted in its place.

TO ASK, OR ASK FOR, CLAIM, DEMAND.

ASK, v. *To ask, beg.*

CLAIM, in French *claimer*, Latin *clamo* to cry after, signifies to express an imperious wish for.

DEMAND, in French *demandeur*, Latin *demando*, compounded of *de* and *man-*

do to order, signifies to call for imperatively.

Ask, in the sense of *beg*, is confined to the expression of a wish on the part of the *asker*, without involving any obligation on the part of the person *asked*; all granted in this case is voluntary, or complied with as a favour: but *ask for* in the sense here taken is involuntary, and springs from the forms and distinctions of society. *Ask* is here, as before, generic or specific; *claim* and *demand* are specific: in its specific sense it conveys a less peremptory sense than either *claim* or *demand*. To *ask for* denotes simply the expressed wish to have what is considered as due; to *claim* is to assert a right, or to make it known; to *demand* is to insist on having without the liberty of a refusal.

Asking respects obligation in general, great or small; *claim* respects obligations of importance. *Asking for* supposes a right, not questionable; *claim* supposes a right hitherto unacknowledged; *demand* supposes either a disputed right, or the absence of all right, and the simple determination to have: a tradesman *asks for* what is owed to him as circumstances may require; a person *claims* the property he has lost; people are sometimes pleased to make *demands*, the legality of which cannot be proved. What is lent must be *asked for* when it is wanted; whatever has been lost and is found must be recovered by a *claim*; whatever a selfish person wants, he strives to obtain by a *demand*, whether just or unjust.

TO ASK, INQUIRE, QUESTION, INTERROGATE.

ASK, v. *To ask, beg.*

INQUIRE, Latin *inquiero*, compounded of *in* and *quaero*, signifies to search after.

QUESTION, in French *questionner*, signifies to put a question, from the Latin *quaestio* and *quaero* to seek or search, to look into.

INTERROGATE, Latin *interrogatus*, participle of *interrogo*, compounded of *inter* and *rogo*, signifies to *ask* alternately, or an asking between different persons.

We perform all these actions in order to get information; but we *ask* for general purposes of convenience; we *inquire* from motives of curiosity; we *question* and *interrogate* from motives of discretion. To *ask* respects simply one thing; to *inquire* respects one or many subjects; to *question* and *interrogate* is to *ask* repeatedly, and

in the latter case more authoritatively than in the former.

Indifferent people *ask* of each other whatever they wish to know: learners *inquire* the reasons of things which are new to them: masters *question* their servants, or parents their children, when they wish to ascertain the real state of any case: magistrates *interrogate* criminals when they are brought before them.

TO ASPERSE, DETRACT, DEFAME,
SLANDER, CALUMNIATE,

ASPERSE, in Latin *aspersus*, participle of *aspergo*, to sprinkle, signifies in a moral sense to stain with spots.

DETRACT, in Latin *detractus*, participle of *detraho*, compounded of *de* and *traho*, signifies to draw from.

DEFAME, in Latin *defamo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *famo* or *fama* fame, signifies to deprive of reputation.

SLANDER is doubtless connected with the words *slur*, *sully*, and *soil*, signifying to stain with some spot.

CALUMNIATE, from the Latin *calumnia*, and the Hebrew *calameh* infamy, signifies to load with infamy.

All these terms denote an effort made to injure the character by some representation.

Asperse and *detract* mark an indirect representation; *defame*, *slander*, and *calumniate*, a positive assertion.

To *asperse* is to fix a moral stain on a character; to *detract* is to lessen its merits and excellences. *Aspersions* always imply something bad, real or supposed; *detractions* are always founded on some supposed good in the object that is *detracted*; to *defame* is openly to advance some serious charge against the character: to *slander* is to expose the faults of another in his absence: to *calumniate* is to communicate secretly, or otherwise, circumstances to the injury of another.

Aspersions and *detractions* are never positive falsehoods, as they never amount to more than insinuations: *defamation* is the public communication of facts, whether true or false: *slander* involves the discussion of moral qualities, and is consequently the declaration of an opinion as well as the communication of a fact: *calumny*, on the other hand is a positive communication of circumstances known by the narrator at the time to be false.

If I speak slightly of my neighbour, and insinuate any thing against the purity of his principles, or the rectitude of his conduct, I *asperse* him: if he be a charitable man, and I ascribe his charities to

a selfish motive, or otherwise take away from the merit of his conduct, I am guilty of *detraction*: if I publish any thing openly that injures his reputation, I am a *defamer*: if I communicate to others the reports that are in circulation to his disadvantage, I am a *slanderer*: if I fabricate any thing myself and spread it abroad, I am a *calumniator*.

TO ASSEMBLE, MUSTER, COLLECT.

ASSEMBLE, in French *assemble*, Latin *adsimulare*, or *assimulare*, from *similis* like and *simul* together, signifies to make alike or bring together.

MUSTER, in German *mustern* to set out for inspection, in Latin *monstror* to show or display.

COLLECT, in Latin *collectus*, participle of *colligo*, compounded of *col* or *con* and *lego* to bind, signifies to bring together, or into one point.

Assemble is said of persons only; *muster* and *collect* of persons or things. To *assemble* is to bring together by a call or invitation; to *muster* is to bring together by an act of authority, into one point of view, at one time, and from one quarter; to *collect* is to bring together at different times, and from different quarters: the Parliament is *assembled*; soldiers are *mustered* every day in order to ascertain their numbers; an army is *collected* in preparation for war: a king *assembles* his council in order to consult with them on public measures; a general *musters* his forces before he undertakes an expedition, and *collects* more troops if he finds himself too weak.

Collect is used for every thing which can be brought together in numbers; *muster* is used figuratively for bringing together, for an immediate purpose, whatever is in one's possession: books, coins, curiosities, and the like, are *collected*; a person's resources, his strength, courage, resolution, etc. are *mustered*: some persons have a pleasure in *collecting* all the pieces of antiquity which fall in their way; on a trying occasion it is necessary to *muster* all the fortitude of which we are master.

TO ASSEMBLE, CONVENE, CONVOKE.

ASSEMBLE, v. To *assemble*, *muster*,
CONVENE, in Latin *convenio*, signifies to come or bring together.

CONVOKE, in Latin *convoco*, signifies to call together.

The idea of collecting many persons into one place, for a specific purpose, is common to all these terms. *Assemble* conveys this sense without any addition; *convene*

and *convoke* include likewise some collateral idea: people are *assembled*, therefore, whenever they are *convened* or *convoked*, but not *vice versa*. *Assembling* is mostly by the wish of one; *convening* by that of several: a crowd is *assembled* by an individual in the streets; a meeting is *convened* at the desire of a certain number of persons: people are *assembled* either on public or private business; they are always *convened* on a public occasion,

There is nothing imperative on the part of those that *assemble* or *convene*, and nothing binding on those *assembled* or *convened*: one *assembles* or *convenes* by invitation or request; one attends to the notice or not at pleasure. *Convoke*, on the other hand, is an act of authority; it is the call of one who has the authority to give the call; it is heeded by those who feel themselves bound to attend. *Assembling* and *convening* are mostly for domestic or civil purposes; *convoking* is always employed in spiritual matters: a dying man *assembles* his friends round his death-bed; a meeting is *convened* in order to present an address; the dignitaries in the church are *convoked* by the supreme authority.

ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLAGE, GROUP, COLLECTION.

ASSEMBLY, ASSEMBLAGE, are collective terms derived from the verb *assemble*.

GROUP comes from the Italian *gruppo*, which among painters signifies an assemblage of figures in one place.

COLLECTION expresses the act of *collecting*, or the body *collected* (v. *To assemble, muster*).

Assembly respects persons only; *assemblage*, things only; *group* and *collection*, persons or things: an *assembly* is any number either brought together, or come together of themselves; an *assemblage* is any number of things standing together; a *group* is brought together by accident, or put together by design; a *collection* is mostly put or brought together by design.

A general alarm will cause an *assembly* to disperse: an agreeable *assemblage* of rural objects, whether in nature or in representation, constitutes a landscape: a painting will sometimes consist only of a *group* of figures, but if they be well chosen, it will sometimes produce a wonderful effect: a *collection* of evil-minded persons ought to be immediately dispersed by the authority of the magistrate. In a large *assembly* you may sometimes observe a singular *assemblage* of characters, countenances

and figures: when people come together in great numbers on any occasion, they will form themselves into distinct groups: the collection of scarce books and curious editions has become a passion, which is justly ridiculed under the title of Bibliomania.

ASSEMBLY, COMPANY, MEETING, CONGREGATION, PARLIAMENT, DIET, CONGRESS, CONVENTION, SYNOD, CONVOCATION, COUNCIL.

An ASSEMBLY (v. *To assemble, muster*) is simply the *assembling* together of any number of persons: this idea is common to all the rest of these terms, which differ in the object, mode, and other collateral circumstances of the action.

COMPANY, a body linked together (v. *To accompany*), is an *assembly* for purposes of amusement,

MEETING, a body met together, is an *assembly* for general purposes of business.

CONGREGATION, a body flocked or gathered together, from the Latin *grex* a flock, is an *assembly* brought together from congeniality of sentiment, and community of purpose.

PARLIAMENT, in French *parlement*, from *parler* to speak, signifies an *assembly* for speaking or debating on important matters.

DIET, from the Greek *διαίτω* to govern, is an *assembly* for governing or regulating affairs of state.

CONGRESS, from the Latin *congregior* to march in a body, is an *assembly* coming together in a formal manner from distant parts for special purposes.

CONVENTION, from the Latin *convenio* to come together, is an *assembly* coming together in an informal and promiscuous manner from a neighbouring quarter.

SYNOD, in Greek *συνδοχος*, compounded of *συν* and *δοχος*, signifies literally going the same road, and has been employed to signify an *assembly* for consultation on matters of religion.

CONVOCATION is an *assembly convoked* for an especial purpose.

COUNCIL is an *assembly* for consultation either on civil or ecclesiastical affairs.

An *assembly* is, in its restricted sense, public, and under certain regulations: a *company* is private, and confined to friends and acquaintances: a *meeting* is either public or private: a *congregation* is always public. *Meetings* are held by all who have any common concern to arrange: *congregations* consist of those who follow the same form of doctrine and discipline: all these different kinds of *assemblies* are formed by

individuals in their private capacity; the other terms designate *assemblies* that come together for national purposes, with the exception of the word *convention*, which may be either domestic or political.

A *parliament* and *diet* are popular *assemblies* under a monarchical form of government; *congress* and *convention* are *assemblies* under a republican government: of the first description are the *parliaments* of England and France, the *diets* of Germany and Poland, which consisted of subjects *assembled* by the monarch, to deliberate on the affairs of the nation. Of the latter description is the *congress* of the United states of America; and such was the national *convention* of France: but there is this difference observable between a *congress* and a *convention*, that the former consists of deputies or delegates from higher authorities, that is, from independent governments already established; but a *convention* is a self-constituted *assembly*, which has no power but what it assumes to itself.

A *synod* and *convocation* are in religious matters what a *diet* and *convention* are in civil matters: the former exists only under an episcopal form of government; the latter may exist under any form of church discipline, even where the authority lies in the whole body of the ministry.

A *council* is more important than all other species of *assembly*; it consists of persons invested with the highest authority, who, in their consultations, do not so much transact ordinary concerns, as arrange the forms and fashions of things. Religious *councils* used to determine matters of faith and discipline; political *councils* frame laws, and determine the fate of empires.

ASSENT. CONSENT, APPROBATION.
CONCURRENCE.

ASSENT, in Latin *assentio*, is compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sentio* to think, signifying to bring one's mind or judgment to a thing.

CONSENT, *v.* To accede.

APPROBATION, in Latin *approbatio*, is compounded of *ad* and *probo* to prove, signifying to make a thing out good.

CONCURRENCE, *v.* To agree.

Assent respects the judgment; *consent* respects the will. We *assent* to what we think true; we *consent* to the wish of another by agreeing to it and allowing it. Some men give their hasty *assent* to propositions which they do not fully understand; and their hasty *consent* to measures which are very injudicious. It is the part of the true believer not merely to *as-*

sent to the Christian doctrines, but to make them the rule of his life: those who *consent* to a bad action are partakers in the guilt of it.

Approbation is a species of *assent*; *concurrence* of *consent*. To *approve* is not merely to *assent* to a thing that is right, but to feel it positively, to have the will and judgment in accordance: *concurrence* is the *consent* of many. *Approbation* respects the practical conduct of men in their intercourse with each other: *assent* is given to speculative truths, abstract propositions, or direct assertions.

Concurrence respects matters of general concern, as *consent* respects those of individual interest. No bill in the house of parliament can pass for a second reading without the *concurrence* of a majority: no parent should be induced by persuasion to give his *consent* to what his judgment disapproves. *Assent* is opposed to contradiction or denial; *consent* to refusal; *approbation* to dislike or blame; *concurrence* to opposition: but we may sometimes seem to give our *assent* to what we do not expressly contradict, or seem to *approve* what we do not blame; and we are supposed to *consent* to a request when we do not positively refuse it. We may *approve* or disapprove of a thing without giving an intimation either of our *approbation* or the contrary: but *concurrence* cannot be altogether a negative action; it must be signified by some sign, although that need not necessarily be a word.

TO ASSERT, MAINTAIN, VINDICATE.

TO ASSERT, *v.* To affirm, assert.

MAINTAIN, in French *maintenir*, from the Latin *manus* and *teneo*, signifies to hold by the hand, that is closely and firmly.

VINDICATE, in Latin *vindicatus*. participle of *vindico*, compounded of *vim* and *dico*, signifies to pronounce a violent or positive sentence.

To *assert* is to declare a thing as our own; to *maintain* is to abide by what we have so declared; to *vindicate* is to stand up for that which concerns ourselves or others. We *assert* any thing to be true; we *maintain* it by adducing proofs, facts, or arguments; we *vindicate* our own conduct or that of another when it is called in question. We *assert* boldly or impudently; we *maintain* steadily or obstinately; we *vindicate* resolutely or insolently.

A right or claim is *asserted*, which is avowed to belong to any one; it is *maintained* when attempts are made to prove its

justice, or regain its possession; the cause of the *asserter* or *maintainer* is *vindicated* by another. Innocence is *asserted* by a positive declaration; it is *maintained* by repeated *assertions* and the support of testimony; it is *vindicated* through the interference of another.

ASSOCIATE, COMPANION.

ASSOCIATE, in Latin *associatus*, participle of *associo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *socio* to ally, signifies one united with a person.

COMPANION, from company, signifies one that bears company (*v. To accompany*).

Associates are habitually together: *companions* are only occasionally in company.

As our habits are formed from our *associates*, we ought to be particular in our choice of them: as our *companions* contribute much to our enjoyments, we ought to choose such as are suitable to ourselves.

Many men may be admitted as *companions*, who would not altogether be fit as *associates*.

An *associate* may take part with us in some business, and share with us in the labour: a *companion* takes part with us in some concern, and shares with us in the pleasure or the pain.

ASSOCIATION, SOCIETY, COMPANY, PARTNERSHIP.

All these terms denote a union of several persons into one body.

ASSOCIATION (*v. To associate*) is general, the rest specific. Whenever we habitually or frequently meet together for some common object it is an *association*. *Associations* are therefore political, religious, commercial, and literary.

A SOCIETY is an *association* for some specific purpose, moral or religious, civil or political.

A COMPANY is an *association* of many for the purpose of trade.

A PARTNERSHIP is an *association* of a few for the same object.

Whenever *association* is used in distinction from the others, it denotes that which is partial in its object and temporary in its duration. It is founded on unity of sentiment as well as unity of object; but it is mostly unorganized and kept together only by the spirit which gives rise to it.

A *society* requires nothing but unity of object, which is permanent in its nature; it is well organized, and commonly set on foot to promote the cause of humanity, literature, or religion. No country can boast such numerous and excellent *societies*, whether of

a charitable, a religious, or a literary description, as England.

Companies are brought together for the purposes of interest, and are dissolved when that object ceases to exist: their duration depends on the contingencies of profit and loss. The South-sea company, which was founded on an idle speculation, was formed for the ruin of many, and dispersed almost as soon as it was formed. The East India company on the other hand, which is one of the grandest that ever was raised, promises as much permanency as is commonly allotted to human transactions.

Partnerships are altogether of an individual and private nature. Their duration depends not only on the chances of trade, but the compatibility of individuals to co-operate in a close point of union.

ASSOCIATION. COMBINATION.

ASSOCIATION, *v. Associate*.

COMBINATION, from the Latin *combino*, or *con* and *binus*, signifies tying two into one.

An *association* is something less binding than a *combination*; *associations* are formed for purposes of convenience; *combinations* are formed to serve either the interests or passions of men. The word *association* is therefore always taken in a good or an indifferent sense; *combination* in an indifferent or bad sense. An *association* is public; it embraces all classes of men: a *combination* is often private, and includes only a particular description of persons. *Associations* are formed for some general purpose; *combinations* are frequently formed for purposes, which respect the interest of the few, to the injury of many. *Associations* are formed by good citizens; *combinations* by discontented mechanics, or low persons in general.

When used for things *association* is a natural action; *combination* an arbitrary action. Things *associate* of themselves, but *combinations* are formed either by design or accident. Nothing will *associate* but what harmonises; things the most opposite in their nature are *combined* together. We *associate* persons with places, or events with names; discordant properties are *combined* in the same body. With the name of one's birth-place are *associated* pleasurable recollections; virtue and vice are so *combined* in the same character as to form a contrast. The *association* of ideas is a remarkable phenomenon of the human mind; the *combination* of letters forms syllables, and that of syllables forms words.

ASSURANCE, CONFIDENCE.

ASSURANCE implies either the act of

making another sure (vide *To affirm*), or of being sure one's self.

CONFIDENCE implies simply the act of the mind in *confiding*, which is equivalent to a feeling.

Assurance, as an action, is to *confidence* as the means to the end. We give a person an *assurance* in order to inspire him with *confidence*.

Assurance and *confidence*, as a sentiment in ourselves, may respect either that which is external of us, or that which belongs to ourselves; in the first case they are both taken in an indifferent sense: but the feeling of *assurance* is much stronger than that of *confidence*, and applies to objects that interest the feelings; whereas *confidence* applies only to such objects as exercise the understanding; thus we have an *assurance* of a life to come; an *assurance* of a blessed immortality; we have a *confidence* in a person's integrity. As respects ourselves exclusively, *assurance* is employed to designate either an occasional feeling, or a habit of the mind; *confidence*, an occasional feeling mostly; *assurance*, therefore, in this sense, may be used indifferently, but in general it has a bad acceptation; but *confidence* has an indifferent or a good sense.

Assurance is a self-possession of the mind, arising from the conviction that all in ourselves is right; *confidence* is that self-possession only in particular cases, and grounded on the reliance we have in our abilities or our character.

The man of *assurance* never loses himself under any circumstances, however trying; he is calm and easy when another is abashed and confounded: the man who has *confidence* will generally have it in cases that warrant him to trust to himself.

A liar utters his falsehoods with an air of *assurance*, in order the more effectually to gain belief; conscious innocence enables a person to speak with *confidence* when interrogated.

Assurance shows itself in the behaviour, *confidence* in the conduct. Young people are apt to assert every thing with a tone of *assurance*; no man should undertake any thing without a *confidence* in himself.

ASSURANCE, IMPUDENCE.

ASSURANCE, *v.* Assurance, confidence.

IMPUDENCE literally implies shamelessness. They are so closely allied to each other, that *assurance* is distinguished from *impudence* more in the manner than the spirit; for *impudence* has grossness attached to it which does not belong to *assurance*.

Vulgar people are *impudent* because they

have *assurance* to break through all the forms of society; but those who are more cultivated will have their *assurance* controlled by its decencies and refinements.

ASTRONOMY, ASTROLOGY.

ASTRONOMY is compounded of the Greek *αστρο* and *νομος*, and signifies the laws of the stars, or a knowledge of their laws.

ASTROLOGY, from *αστρο* and *λογος*, signifies a reasoning on the stars.

The *astronomer* studies the course and movement of the stars; the *astrologer* reasons on their influence.

The former observes the state of the heavens, marks the order of time, the eclipses and the revolutions which arise out of the established laws of motion in the immense universe; the latter predicts events, draws horoscopes, and announces all the vicissitudes of rain and snow, heat and cold, &c. The *astronomer* calculates and seldom errs, as his calculations are built on fixed rules and actual observations; the *astrologer* deals in conjectures, and his imagination often deceives him. The *astronomer* explains what he knows, and merits the esteem of the learned; the *astrologer* hazards what he thinks, and seeks to please.

A thirst for knowledge leads to the study of *astronomy*: an inquietude about the future has given rise to *astrology*. Many important results for the arts of navigation, agriculture, and of civil society in general, have been drawn from *astronomical* researches: many serious and mischievous effects have been produced on the minds of the ignorant, from their faith in the dreams of the *astrologer*.

ASYLUM, REFUGE, SHELTER, RETREAT.

ASYLUM, in Latin *asylum*, in Greek *ασυλον* compounded of a privative and *συλη* plunder, signifies a place exempt from plunder.

REFUGE, in Latin *refugium*, from *refugio* to fly away, signifies the place one may fly away to.

SHELTER comes from *shell*, in high German *schalen*, Saxon *eceala*, &c. from the Hebrew *cala* to hide, signifying a cover or hiding-place.

RETREAT, in French *retraite*, Latin *retractus*, from *retraho*, or *re* and *traho* to draw back, signifies the place to which one withdraws.

Asylum, *refuge*, and *shelter*, all denote a place of safety; but the former is fixed, the two latter are occasional; a *retreat* is a place of tranquillity rather than of safety. An *asylum* is chosen by him who has no home;

* Abbé Girard: „Astronomie, astrologue.“

a *refuge* by him who is apprehensive of danger: the French emigrants found a *refuge* in England, but very few will make it an *asylum*. The inclemencies of the weather make us seek a *shelter*. The fatigues and toils of life make us seek a *retreat*.

TO ATONE FOR, EXPIATE.

ATONE, or at one, signifies to be at peace or good friends.

EXPIATE, in Latin *expiatus*, participle of *expio*, compounded of *ex* and *pio*, signifies to put out or make clear by an act of piety.

Both these terms express a satisfaction for an offence; but *atone* is general, *expiate* is particular. We may *atone* for a fault by any species of suffering; we *expiate* a crime only by suffering a legal punishment. A female often sufficiently *atones* for her violation of chastity by the misery she entails on herself; there are too many unfortunate wretches in England who *expiate* their crimes on the gallows.

Neither *atonement* nor *expiation* always necessarily require punishment or even suffering from the offender. The nature of the *atonement* depends on the will of the individual who is offended; *expiations* are frequently made by means of performing certain religious rites or acts of piety. Offences between man and man are sometimes *atoned* for by an acknowledgment of error; but offences towards God require an *expiatory* sacrifice, which our Saviour has been pleased to make of himself, that we, through Him, might become partakers of eternal life. *Expiation*, therefore, in the religious sense, is to *atonement* as the means to the end: *atonement* is often obtained by an *expiation*, but there may be *expiations* where there is no *atonement*.

Atonement replaces in a state of favour; *expiation* produces only a real or supposed exemption from sin and its consequences. Among the Jews and heathens there was *expiation*, but no *atonement*; under the Christian dispensation there is *atonement* as well as *expiation*.

ATTACHMENT, AFFECTION, INCLINATION.

ATTACHMENT (*v. To adhere*) respects persons and things: AFFECTION (*v. Affection*) regards persons only: INCLINATION has respect to things mostly.

Attachment, as it regards persons, is not so powerful or solid as *affection*.

Children are *attached* to those who will minister to their gratifications; they have an

affection for their nearest and dearest relatives.

Attachment is sometimes a tender sentiment between the persons of different sexes: *affection* is an affair of the heart without distinction of sex.

The passing *attachments* of young people are seldom entitled to serious notice; although sometimes they may ripen by long intercourse into a laudable and steady *affection*. Nothing is so delightful as to see *affection* among brothers and sisters.

Attachment, as it respects things, is more powerful than *inclination*; the latter is a rising sentiment, the forerunner of *attachment*, which is positive and fixed.

We strive to obtain that to which we are *attached*; but an *inclination* seldom leads to any effort for possession.

Attachments are formed; *inclinations* arise of themselves.

Interest, similarity of character, or habit, give rise to *attachment*; a natural warmth of temper gives birth to various *inclinations*.

Suppress the first *inclination* to gaming, lest it grow into an *attachment*.

TO ATTACK, ASSAIL, ASSAULT, ENCOUNTER.

ATTACK, in French *attaquer*, changed from *attacher*, in Latin *attactum*, participle of *attingo*, signifies to bring into close contact.

ASSAIL, ASSAULT, in French *assailir*, Latin *assilio*, *assaltum*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *salio*, signifies to leap upon.

ENCOUNTER, in French *rencontre*, compounded of *en* or *in* and *contre*, in Latin *contra* against, signifies to run or come against.

Attack is the generic, the rest are specific terms. To *attack* is to make an approach in order to do some violence to the person; to *assail* or *assault* is to make a sudden and vehement *attack*; to *encounter* is to meet the *attack* of another. One *attacks* by simply offering violence without necessarily producing an effect; one *assails* by means of missile weapons; one *assaults* by direct personal violence; one *encounters* by opposing violence to violence.

Men and animals *attack* or *encounter*; men only, in the literal sense, *assail* or *assault*. Animals *attack* each other with the weapons nature has bestowed upon them: those who provoke a multitude may expect to have their houses or windows *assailed* with stones, and their persons *assaulted*: it is ridiculous to attempt to *encounter* those who are superior in strength and prowess.

They are all used figuratively. Men *attack*

with reproaches or censures; they *assail* with abuse: they are *assaulted* by temptations; they *encounter* opposition and difficulties. A fever *attacks*; horrid shrieks *assail* the ear; dangers are *encountered*.

ATTACK, ASSAULT, ENCOUNTER, ONSET, CHARGE.

ATTACK, ASSAULT, ENCOUNTER (v. *To attack*), denote the act of *attacking*, *assaulting*, *encountering*.

ONSET signifies a setting on or to, a commencing.

CHARGE (v. *To accuse*) signifies pressing upon.

An *attack* and *assault* may be made upon an unresisting object: *encounter*, *onset*, and *charge*, require at least two opposing parties. An *attack* may be slight or indirect; an *assault* must always be direct and mostly vigorous. An *attack* upon a town need not be attended with any injury to the walls or inhabitants; but an *assault* is commonly conducted so as to effect its capture. *Attacks* are made by robbers upon the person or property of another; *assaults* upon the person only.

An *encounter* generally respects an informal casual meeting between single individuals; *onset* and *charge* a regular *attack* between contending armies; *onset* is employed for the commencement of the battle; *charge* for an *attack* from a particular quarter. When knight-errantry was in vogue, *encounters* were perpetually taking place between the knights and their antagonists: these *encounters* were sometimes fierce and bloody, when neither party would yield to the other while he had the power of resistance. The French are said to make impetuous *onsets*, but not to withstand a continued *attack* with the same perseverance and steadiness as the English. A furious and well-directed *charge* from the cavalry will sometimes decide the fortune of the day.

ATTEMPT, TRIAL, ENDEAVOUR, ESSAY, EFFORT.

ATTEMPT, in French *attenter*, Latin *attento*, from *at* or *ad* and *tento*, signifies to *try* a thing.

TRIAL, from *try*, in French *tenter*, Hebrew *tur* to stretch, signifies to stretch the power.

ENDEAVOUR, compounded of *en* and the French *devoir* to owe, signifies to try according to one's duty.

ESSAY, in French *essayer*, comes probably from the German *ersuchen*, compounded of *er* and *suchen* to seek, written in old German *suahhen*, and is doubtless connected

with *sehen* to see or look after, signifying to aspire after, to look up to.

EFFORT, in French *effort*, from the Latin *effert*, present tense of *effero*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *fero*, signifies a bringing out or calling forth the strength.

To *attempt* is to set about a thing with a view of effecting it; to *try* is to set about a thing with a view of seeing the result. An *attempt* respects the action with its object; a *trial* is the exercise of power. We always act when we *attempt*; we use the senses and the understanding when we *try*. We *attempt* by *trying*, but we may *try* without *attempting*: when a thief *attempts* to break into a house he first *tries* the locks and fastenings to see where he can most easily gain admittance.

Men *attempt* to remove evils; they *try* experiments. *Attempts* are perpetually made by quacks, whether in medicine, politics, or religion, to recommend some scheme of their own to the notice of the public; which are often nothing more than *trials* of skill to see who can most effectually impose on the credulity of mankind. Spirited people make *attempts*; persevering people make *trials*; players *attempt* to perform different parts; and *try* to gain applause.

An *endeavour* is a continued *attempt*. *Attempts* may be fruitless; *trials* may be vain; *endeavours*, though unavailing, may be well meant. People *attempt* to write books; they *try* various methods; and *endeavour* to obtain a livelihood.

Essay is sometimes used in the proper sense for an *attempt* or *endeavour*; but for the most part this word is now employed for an intellectual exercise. A modest writer apologizes for his feeble *essay* to contribute to the general stock of knowledge and cultivation: hence short treatises which serve as *attempts* to illustrate any point in morals are termed *essays*, among which are the finest productions in our language from the pen of Addison, Steele, and their successors. An *effort* is to an *attempt* as a means to an end; it is the very act of calling forth those powers which are employed in an *attempt*. In *attempting* to make an escape, a person is sometimes obliged to make desperate *efforts*.

Attempts at imitation expose the imitator to ridicule when not executed with peculiar exactness. *Trials* of strength are often foolhardy; in some cases attended with mischievous consequences to the *trier*. Honest *endeavours* to please are to be distinguished from idle *attempts* to catch applause. The first *essays* of youth ought to meet with indulgence, in order to afford encouragement to rising talents. Great *attempts*, which

require extraordinary efforts either of body or mind, always meet with an adequate share of public applause.

ATTEMPT, UNDERTAKING, ENTERPRISE.

ATTEMPT (*v. To attempt*) signifies the thing attempted.

UNDERTAKING, from *undertake*, or take in hand, signifies the thing taken in hand.

ENTERPRISE, from the French *enterpris*, participle of *entreprendre* to undertake, has the same original sense.

The idea of something set about to be completed is common to all these terms. An *attempt* is less complicated than an *undertaking*; and that less arduous than an *enterprise*. *Attempts* are the common exertions of power for obtaining an object: an *undertaking* involves in it many parts and particulars which require thought and judgment: an *enterprise* has more that is hazardous and dangerous in it; it requires resolution. *Attempts* are frequently made on the lives and property of individuals; *undertakings* are formed for private purposes; *enterprises* are commenced for some great national object.

The present age has been fruitful in *attempts* to bring premature genius into notice: literary *undertakings* have of late degenerated too much into mere commercial speculations: a state of war gives birth to naval and military *enterprises*; a state of peace is most favourable to those of a scientific nature.

TO ATTEND TO, MIND, REGARD, HEED, NOTICE.

ATTEND, in French *attendre*, Latin *at-tendo*, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tendo* to stretch, signifies to stretch or bend the mind to a thing.

MIND, from the noun *mind*, signifies to have in the mind.

REGARD, in French *regarder*, compounded of *re* and *garder*, comes from the German *wahren* to see or look at, signifying to look upon again or with attention.

HEED, in German *hüthen*, in all probability comes from *vito*, and the Latin *video* to see or pay attention to.

NOTICE, from the Latin *notitia* knowledge, signifies to get the knowledge of or have in one's mind.

The idea of fixing the mind on an object is common to all these terms. As this is the characteristic of *attention*, *attend* is the generic; the rest are specific terms. We *attend* in *mind*ing, *regard*ing, *heed*ing, and

noticing, and also in many cases in which these words are not employed. To *mind* is to *attend* to a thing, so that it may not be forgotten; to *regard* is to look on a thing as of importance; to *heed* is to *attend* to a thing from a principle of caution; to *notice* is to think on that which strikes the senses.

We *attend* to a speaker when we hear and understand his words; we *mind* what is said when we bear it in mind; we *regard* what is said by dwelling and reflecting on it; *heed* is given to whatever awakens a sense of danger; *notice* is taken of what passes outwardly. Children should always *attend* when spoken to, and *mind* what is said to them; they should *regard* the counsels of their parents, so as to make them the rule of their conduct, and *heed* their warnings so as to avoid the evil; they should *notice* what passes before them so as to apply it to some useful purpose.

TO ATTEND, WAIT ON.

ATTEND (*v. To attend to*) is here employed in the improper sense for the devotion of the person to an object. To *WAIT* on is the same as to wait for or expect the wishes of another.

Attendance is an act of obligation; *waiting on*, that of choice. A physician *attends* his patient; a member *attends* in parliament; one gentleman *waits on* another. We *attend* a person at the time and place appointed; we *wait on* those with whom we wish to speak. Those who dance *attendance* on the great must expect every mortification; it is wiser therefore only to *wait on* those by whom we can be received upon terms of equality.

Attend and *wait on* are likewise used for being about the person of any one: to *attend* is to bear company or be in readiness to serve; to *wait on* is actually to perform some service. A nurse *attends* a patient in order to afford him assistance as occasion requires; the servant *waits on* him to perform the menial duties. *Attendants* about the great are always near the person; but men and women in *waiting* are always at call. People of rank and fashion have a crowd of *attendants*; those of the middle classes have only those who *wait on* them.

TO ATTEND, HEARKEN, LISTEN.

ATTEND, *v. To attend to*.

HEARKEN, in German *hören*, is an intensive of *hören* to hear.

LISTEN probably comes from the German *lústen* to lust after, because *listening* springs from an eager desire to hear.

Attend is a mental action; *hearken* both corporeal and mental; *listen* simply corporeal. To *attend* is to have the mind engag-

ed on what we hear; to *hearken* and *listen* are to strive to hear. People *attend* when they are addressed; they *hearken* to what is said by others; they *listen* to what passes between others.

Listen is sometimes used figuratively for *hearing*, so as to *attend*: it is necessary at all times to *listen* to the dictates of reason. It is of great importance for a learner to *attend* to the rules that are laid down: it is essential for young people in general to *hearken* to the counsels of their elders; and to *listen* to the admonitions of conscience.

ATTENTION, APPLICATION, STUDY.

These terms indicate a direction of the thoughts to an object, but differing in the degree of steadiness and force.

ATTENTION (*v. To attend to*) marks the simple bending of the mind.

APPLICATION (*v. To address*) marks an envelopment or engagement of the powers; a bringing them into a state of close contact.

STUDY, from the Latin *studeo* to desire eagerly, marks a degree of *application* that arises from a strong desire of attaining the object.

Attention is the first requisite for making a progress in the acquirement of knowledge; it may be given in various degrees, and it rewards according to the proportion in which it is given; a divided *attention* is however more hurtful than otherwise; it retards the progress of the learner while it injures his mind by improper exercise. *Application* is requisite for the attainment of perfection in any pursuit; it cannot be partial or variable, like *attention*; it must be the constant exercise of power or the regular and uniform use of means for the attainment of an end: youth is the period for *application*, when the powers of body and mind are in full vigour; no degree of it in after life will supply its deficiency in younger years. *Study* is that species of *application* which is most purely intellectual in its nature; it is the exercise of the mind for itself and in itself, its native effort to arrive at maturity; it embraces both *attention* and *application*. The student *attends* to all he hears and sees; *applies* what he has learnt to the acquirement of what he wishes to learn, and digests the whole by the exercise of reflection; as nothing is thoroughly understood or properly reduced to practice without *study*, the professional man must choose this road in order to reach the summit of excellence.

ATTENTIVE, CAREFUL.

ATTENTIVE marks a readiness to attend (*v. To attend to*).

CAREFUL signifies full of care (*v. Care, solicitude*).

These epithets denote a fixedness of mind: we are *attentive* in order to understand and improve: we are *careful* to avoid mistakes. An *attentive* scholar profits by what is told him in learning his task: a *careful* scholar performs his exercises correctly.

Attention respects matters of judgment; *care* relates to mechanical action: we listen *attentively*; we read or write *carefully*. A servant must be *attentive* to the orders that are given him, and *careful* not to injure his master's property. A translator must be *attentive*; a transcriber *careful*.

TO ATTRACT, ALLURE, INVITE, ENGAGE.

ATTRACT, in Latin *attractum*, participle of *attraho*, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *traho*, signifies to draw towards.

ALLURE, *v. To allure*.

INVITE, in French *inviter*, Latin *invito*, compounded of *in* privative and *vito* to avoid, signifies the contrary of avoiding, that is, to seek or ask.

ENGAGE, compounded of *en* or *in* and the French *gage* a pledge, signifies to bind as by a pledge.

That is *attractive* which draws the thoughts towards itself; that is *alluring* which awakens desire; that is *inviting* which offers persuasion; that is *engaging* which takes possession of the mind. The attention is *attracted*; the senses are *allured*; the understanding is *invited*; the whole mind is *engaged*. A particular sound *attracts* the ear; the prospect of gratification *allures*; we are *invited* by the advantages which offer; we are *engaged* by those which already accrue.

The person of a female is *attractive*; female beauty involuntary draws all eyes towards itself; it awakens admiration: the pleasures of society are *alluring*; they create in the receiver an eager desire for still farther enjoyment: fine weather is *inviting*; it seems to persuade the reluctant to partake of its refreshments: the manners of a person are *engaging*; they not only occupy the attention, but they lay hold of the affections.

ATTRACTIONS, ALLUREMENTS, CHARMS.

ATTRACTION (*v. To attract*) signifies the thing that attracts.

ALLUREMENT (*v. To allure*) signifies the thing that *allures*.

CHARM, from the Latin *carmen* a verse,

signifies whatever acts by an irresistible influence, like poetry.

* Besides the synonymous idea which distinguishes these words, they are remarkable for the common property of being used only in the plural when denoting the thing that *attracts*, *allures*, and *charms*, as applied to female endowments, or the influence of person on the heart: it seems that in *attractions* there is something natural; in *allurements* something artificial: in *charms* something moral and intellectual.

Attractions lead or draw; *allurements* win or entice; *charms* seduce or captivate. The human heart is always exposed to the power of female *attractions*; it is guarded with difficulty against the *allurements* of a coquette; it is incapable of resisting the united *charms* of body and mind.

Females are indebted for their *attractions* and *charms* to a happy conformation of features and figure; but they sometimes borrow their *allurements* from their toilet. *Attractions* consist of those ordinary graces which nature bestows on women with more or less liberality; they are the common property of the sex: *allurements*, of those cultivated graces formed by the aid of a faithful looking-glass and the skilful hand of one anxious to please: *charms*, of those singular graces of nature which are granted as a rare and precious gift; they are the peculiar property of the individual possessor.

When applied, as these terms may be, to other objects besides the personal endowments of the female sex, *attractions* and *charms* express whatever is very amiable in itself; *allurements* on the contrary are taken in a bad sense. A courtesan who was never possessed of *charms*, and has lost all personal *attractions*, may by the *allurements* of dress and manners, aided by a thousand meretricious arts, still retain the wretched power of doing incalculable mischief.

An *attraction* springs from something remarkable and striking; it lies in the exterior aspect, and awakens an interest towards itself; a *charm* acts by a secret, all-powerful, and irresistible impulse on the soul; it springs from an accordance of the object with the affections of the heart; it takes hold of the imagination, and awakens an enthusiasm peculiar to itself; an *allurement* acts on the senses; it flatters the passions; it enslaves the imagination. A musical society has *attractions* for one who is musically inclined; for music has *charms* to soothe the troubled soul: fashionable society

* Vide Abbé Girard, and Rouband; „Attrait, appas, charmes.”

has too many *allurements* for youth, which are not easily withstood.

AVAIL, USE, SERVICE.

AVAIL, compounded of *a* or *ad*, and the French *valoir*, Latin *valeo*, to be strong, that is, to be strong for a purpose.

USE, in Latin *usus*, participle of *utor* to use, signifies the capacity to be used.

SERVICE, in French *service*, Latin *servitium*, from *servio*, signifies the property or act of serving.

These terms are, properly speaking, epithets applied to things to characterize their fitness for being employed to advantage. Words are of no *avail* when they do not influence the person addressed; endeavours are of no *use* which do not effect the thing proposed; people are of no *service* who do not contribute their portion of assistance. When entreaties are found to be of no *avail*, females sometimes try the force of tears: prudence forbids us to destroy any thing that can be turned to a *use*; economy enjoins that we should not throw aside a thing so long as it is fit for *service*.

The intercession of a friend may be *available* to avert the resentment of one who is offended: *useful* lessons of experience may be drawn from all the events of life; whatever is of the best quality will be found most *serviceable*.

AVARICIOUS, MISERLY, PARSIMONIOUS, NIGGARDLY.

AVARICIOUS, from the Latin *aveo*, to desire, signifies in general longing for, but by distinction longing for money.

MISERLY signifies like a *miser* or *miserable man*, for none are so miserable as the lovers of money.

PARSIMONIOUS, from the Latin *parco* to spare or save, signifies literally saving.

NIGGARDLY is a frequentative of *nigh* or *close*, and signifies very *nigh*.

The *avaricious* man and the *miser* are one and the same character, with this exception, that the *miser* carries his passion for money to a still greater excess. An *avaricious* man shows his love of money in his ordinary dealings; but the *miser* lives upon it, and suffers every deprivation rather than part with it. An *avaricious* man may sometimes be indulgent to himself, and generous to others; the *miser* is dead to every thing but the treasure which he has amassed.

Parsimonious and *niggardly* are the subordinate characteristics of *avarice*. The *avaricious* man indulges his passion for money by *parsimony*, that is, by saving, out of his own, or by *niggardly* ways in his deal-

ings with others. He who spends a farthing on himself, where others with the same means spend a shilling, does it from *parsimony*; he who looks to every farthing in the bargains he makes, gets the name of a *niggard*.

AUDACITY, EFFRONTERY, HARDIHOOD, OR HARDINESS, BOLDNESS.

AUDACITY, from *audacious*, in French *audacieux*, Latin *audax*, from *audeo* to dare, signifies literally the quality of daring.

EFFRONTERY, compounded of *ef*, *en*, or *in*, and *frons*, a face, signifies the standing face to face.

HARDIHOOD or **HARDINESS**, from *hardy* or *hard* signifies a capacity to endure or stand the brunt of difficulties, opposition, or shame.

BOLDNESS, from *bold*, in Saxon *bald*, is in all probability changed from *bald*, that is, uncovered, open-fronted, without disguise, which are the characteristics of *boldness*.

The idea of disregarding what others regard is common to all these terms. *Audacity* expresses more than *effrontery*: the first has something of vehemence or defiance in it; the latter that of cool unconcern: *hardihood* expresses less than *boldness*; the first has more of determination, and the second more of spirit and enterprise. *Audacity* and *effrontery* are always taken in a bad sense; *hardihood* in an indifferent, if not a bad sense; *boldness* in a good, bad, or indifferent sense.

* *Audacity* marks haughtiness and temerity; *effrontery* the want of all modesty, a total shamelessness; *hardihood* indicates a firm resolution to meet consequences; *boldness* a spirit and courage to commence action. An *audacious* man speaks with a lofty tone, without respect and without reflection; his haughty demeanour makes him forget what is due to his superiors. *Effrontery* discovers itself by an insolent air; a total unconcern for the opinions of those present, and a disregard of all the forms of civil society. A *hardy* man speaks with a resolute tone, which seems to brave the utmost evil that can result from what he says. A *bold* man speaks without reserve, undaunted by the quality, rank, or haughtiness of those whom he addresses.

It requires *audacity* to assert false claims, or vindicate a lawless conduct in the presence of accusers and judges; it requires *effrontery* to ask a favour of the man whom one has basely injured, or to assume a placid unconcerned air in the presence of those by whom one has been convicted of flagrant

atrocities; it requires *hardihood* to assert as a positive fact what is dubious or suspected to be false; it requires *boldness* to maintain the truth in spite of every danger with which one is threatened.

TO AVENGE, REVENGE, VINDICATE.

AVENGE, REVENGE, and **VINDICATE**, all spring from the same source, namely, the Latin *vindico*, the Greek *ενδικεω*, compounded of *εν* in and *δικη* justice, signifying to pronounce justice or put justice in force.

The idea common to these terms is that of taking up some one's cause.

To *avenge* is to punish in behalf of another; to *revenge* is to punish for one's self; to *vindicate* is to defend another.

The wrongs of a person are *avenged* or *revenged*; his rights are *vindicated*.

AVERSE, UNWILLING, BACKWARD, LOATH, RELUCTANT.

AVERSE, in Latin *aversus*, participle of *averto*, compounded of *verto*, to turn, and *a* from, signifies the state of having the mind turned from a thing.

UNWILLING literally signifies not willing.

BACKWARD signifies having the will in a backward direction.

LOATH, from *to loath*, denotes the quality of loathing.

RELUCTANT, from the Latin *re* and *lucto*, to struggle, signifies struggling with the will against a thing.

Averse is positive, it marks an actual sentiment of dislike; *unwilling* is negative, it marks the absence of the will; *backward* is a sentiment betwixt the two, it marks a leaning of the will against a thing; *loath* and *reluctant* mark strong feelings of *aversion*. *Aversion* is an habitual sentiment; *unwillingness* and *backwardness* are mostly occasional; *loath* and *reluctant* always occasional.

Aversion must be conquered; *unwillingness* must be removed; *backwardness* must be counteracted, or urged forward; *loathing* and *reluctance* must be overpowered. One who is *averse* to study will never have recourse to books; but a child may be *unwilling* or *backward* to attend to his lessons from partial motives, which the authority of the parent or master may correct; he who is *loath* to receive instruction will always remain ignorant; he who is *reluctant* in doing his duty will always do it as a task.

A miser is *averse* to nothing so much as to parting with his money; he is even *unwilling* to provide himself with necessaries, but he is not *backward* in disposing of his money when he has the prospect of getting more: friends are *loath* to part who have had many

* Vide Girard: „Hardiesse, audace, effronterie.“

years' enjoyment in each other's society; we are *reluctant* to give up a favourite pursuit.

**AVERSION, ANTIPATHY, DISLIKE,
HATRED, REPUGNANCE.**

AVERSION denotes the quality of being averse (v. *Averse*).

ANTIPATHY, in French *antipathie*, Latin *antipathia*, Greek *αντιπαθεια*, compounded of *αντι* against and *παθεια* feeling, signifies a feeling against.

DISLIKE, compounded of the privative *dis* and *like*, signifies not to like or be attached to.

HATRED, in German *hass*, is supposed by Adelung to be connected with *heiss* hot, signifying heat of temper.

REPUGNANCE, in French *repugnance*, Latin *repugnantia* and *repugno*, compounded of *re* and *pugno*, signifies the resistance of the feelings to an object.

Aversion is in its most general sense the generic term to these and many other similar expressions, in which case it is opposed to attachment; the former denoting an alienation of the mind from an object; the latter a knitting or binding of the mind to objects; it has, however, more commonly a partial acceptation, in which it is justly comparable with the above words, *Aversion* and *antipathy* apply more properly to things; *dislike* and *hatred* to persons; *repugnance* to actions, that is, such actions as one is called upon to perform.

Aversion and *antipathy* seem to be less dependant on the will, and to have their origin in the temperament or natural taste, particularly the latter, which springs from causes that are not always visible; it lies in the physical organization. *Antipathy* is in fact a natural *aversion* opposed to sympathy; *dislike* and *hatred* are on the contrary voluntary, and seem to have their root in the angry passions of the heart; the former is less deep-rooted than the latter, and is commonly awakened by slighter causes: *repugnance* is not an habitual and lasting sentiment, like the rest; it is a transitory but strong *dislike* to what one is obliged to do.

An unfitness in the temper to harmonize with an object produces *aversion*: a contrariety in the nature of particular persons and things occasions *antipathies*, although some pretend that there are no such mysterious incongruities in nature, and that all *antipathies* are but *aversions* early engendered by the influence of fear and the workings of imagination: a difference in the character, habits, and manners, produces *dislike*: injuries, quarrels, or more commonly the influence of malignant passions, occasion

hatred: a contrariety to one's moral sense, or one's humours, awakens *repugnance*.

People of a quiet temper have an *aversion* to disputing or argumentation; those of a gloomy temper have an *aversion* to society; *antipathies* mostly discover themselves in early life, and as soon as the object comes within the view of the person affected: men of different sentiments in religion or politics, if not of amiable temper, are apt to contract *dislikes* to each other by frequent irritation in discourse: when men of malignant tempers come in collision, nothing but a deadly *hatred* can ensue from their repeated and complicated aggressions towards each other: any one who is under the influence of a misplaced pride is apt to feel a *repugnance* to acknowledge himself in an error.

Aversions produce an anxious desire for the removal of the object *disliked*: *antipathies* produce the most violent physical revulsion of the frame, and vehement recoiling from the object; persons have not unfrequently been known to faint away at the sight of insects for which this *antipathy* has been conceived: *dislikes* too often betray themselves by distant and uncourteous behaviour: *hatred* assumes every form which is black and horrid: *repugnance* does not make its appearance until called forth by the necessity of the occasion.

Aversions are applicable to animals as well as men: dogs have a particular *aversion* to beggars, most probably from their suspicious appearance; in certain cases likewise we may speak of their *antipathies*, as in the instance of the dog and the cat: according to the schoolmen there existed also *antipathies* between certain plants and vegetables; but these are not borne out by facts sufficiently strong to warrant a belief of their existence. *Dislike* and *hatred* are sometimes applied to things, but in a sense less exceptionable than in the former case: *dislike* does not express so much as *aversion*, and *aversion* not so much as *hatred*: we ought to have a *hatred* for vice and sin, an *aversion* to gossiping and idle talking, and a *dislike* to the frivolities of fashionable life.

**TO AUGUR, PRESAGE, FOREBODE,
BETOKEN, PORTEND.**

AUGUR, in French *augurer*, Latin *augurium*, comes from *avis* a bird, as an *augury* was originally, and at all times principally drawn from the song, the flight, or other actions of birds.

PRESAGE, in French *presage*, from the Latin *prae* and *sagio* to be instinctively wise, signifies to be thus wise about what is to come.

FOREBODE is compounded of *fore* and the Saxon *bodian* to declare, signifying to pronounce on futurity.

BETOKEN signifies to serve as a token.

PORTEND, in Latin *portendo*, compounded of *por* for *pro* and *tendo*, signifies to set or show forth.

Augur signifies either to serve or make use of as an *augury*; to *forebode*, and *presage* is to form a conclusion in one's own mind: to *betoken* or *portend* is to serve as a sign. Persons or things *augur*; persons only *forebode* or *presage*; things only *betoken* or *portend*. *Auguring* is a calculation of some future event, in which the imagination seems to be as much concerned as the understanding: *presaging* is rather a conclusion or deduction of what may be from what is; it lies in the understanding more than in the imagination; *foreboding* lies altogether in the imagination. Things are said to *betoken*, which present natural signs; those are said to *portend*, which present extraordinary or supernatural signs.

It *augurs* ill for the prosperity of a country or a state when its wealth has increased so as to take away the ordinary stimulus of industry, and to introduce an inordinate love of pleasure. We *presage* the future greatness of a man from the indications which he gives of possessing an elevated character. A distempered mind is apt to *forebode* every ill from the most trivial circumstances. We see with pleasure those actions in a child which *betoken* an ingenuous temper: a mariner sees with pain the darkness of the sky which *portends* a storm.

AVIDITY, GREEDINESS, EAGERNESS.

Are epithets expressive of a strong desire.

AVIDITY. in Latin *aviditas*, from *aveo* to desire, expresses very strong desire.

GREEDINESS, from the German *gierig*, and *begehren* to desire, signifies the same.

EAGERNESS, from *eager*, and the Latin *acer* sharp, signifies acuteness of feeling.

Avidity is in mental desires what *greediness* is in animal appetites: *eagerness* is not so vehement, but more impatient than *avidity* or *greediness*. *Avidity* and *greediness* respect simply the desire of possessing; *eagerness* the general desire of obtaining an object. An opportunity is seized with *avidity*: the miser grasps at money with *greediness*, or the glutton devours with *greediness*: a person runs with *eagerness* in order to get to the place of destination: a soldier fights with *eagerness* in order to conquer: a lover looks with *eager* impatience for a letter from the object of his affection.

Avidity is employed in an adverbial form

to qualify an action; we seize with *avidity*: *greediness* marks the abstract quality or habit of the mind; *greediness* is the characteristic of low and brutal minds: *eagerness* denotes the transitory state of feeling; a person discovers his *eagerness* in his looks.

TO AVOID, ESCHEW, SHUN, ELUDE.

AVOID, in French *eviter*, Latin *evito*, compounded of *e* and *vito*, probably from *viduus* void, signifies to make one's self void or free from a thing.

ESCHEW and **SHUN** both come from the German *scheuen*, Swedish, *sky*, &c, when it signifies to fly.

ELUDE, in French *eluder*, Latin *eludo*, compounded of *e* and *ludo*, signifies to get one's self out of a thing by a trick.

Avoid is both generic and specific; we *avoid* in *eschewing* or *shunning*, or we *avoid* without *eschewing* or *shunning*. Various contrivances are requisite for *avoiding*; *eschewing* and *shunning*, consist only of going out of the way, of not coming in contact; *eluding*, as its derivation denotes, has more of artifice in it than any of the former. We *avoid* a troublesome visitor under real or feigned pretences of ill-health, prior engagement, and the like; we *eschew* evil company by not going into any but what we know to be good; we *shun* the sight of an offensive object by turning into another road; we *elude* a punishment by getting out of the way of those who have the power of inflicting it.

We speak of *avoiding* a danger, and *shunning* a danger: but to *avoid* it is in general not to fall into it; to *shun* it is with care to keep out of the way of it.

AUSPICIOUS, PROPITIOUS.

AUSPICIOUS, from *auspice*, in Latin *auspiciu* and *auspex*, compounded of *avis* and *spicio* to behold signifies favourable according to the inspection of birds.

PROPITIOUS, in Latin *propitius*, probably from *prope* near, because the heathens always solicited their deities to be near or present to give their aid in favour of their designs; hence *propitious* is figuratively applied in the sense of favourable.

Auspicious is said only of things; *propitious* is said only of persons or things personified. Those things are *auspicious* which are casual, or only indicative of good; persons are *propitious* to the wishes of another who listen to their request and contribute to their satisfaction. A journey is undertaken under *auspicious* circumstances, where every thing incidental, as weather, society, and the like, bid fair to afford pleasure; it is

undertaken under *propitious* circumstances when every thing favours the attainment of the object for which it was begun. Whoever has any request to make ought to seize the *auspicious* moment when the person of whom it is asked is in a pleasant frame of mind; a poet in his invocation requests the muse to be *propitious* to him, or the lover conjures his beloved to be *propitious* to his vows.

AUSTERE, RIGID, SEVERE, RIGOROUS.
STERN.

AUSTERE, in Latin *austerus* sour or rough, from the Greek *avw* to dry, signifies rough or harsh, from drought.

RIGID and RIGOROUS, from *rigeo*, Greek *qiyew*, Hebrew *reg* to be stiff, signifies stiffness or unbendingness.

SEVERE, in Latin *severus*, comes from *saevus* cruel.

STERN, in Saxon *sterne*, German *streng* strong, has the sense of strictness.

Austere applies to ourselves as well as to others; *rigid* applies to ourselves only; *severe*, *rigorous*, *stern*, apply to others only. We are *austere* in our manner of living; *rigid* in our mode of thinking; *austere*, *severe*, *rigorous*, and *stern*, in our mode of dealing with others. Effeminacy is opposed to *austerity*, pliability to *rigidity*.

The *austere* man mortifies himself; the *rigid* man binds himself to a rule; the *austerities* formerly practised among the Roman Catholics were in many instances the consequence of *rigid* piety: the manners of a man are *austere* when he refuses to take part in any social enjoyments; his probity is *rigid*, that is, inaccessible to the allurements of gain, or the urgency of necessity.

Austere, when taken with relation to others, is said of the behaviour; *severe* of the conduct: a parent is *austere* in his looks, his manner, and his words to his child; he is *severe* in the restraints he imposes, and the punishments he inflicts: an *austere* master speaks but to command, and commands so as to be obeyed; a *severe* master punishes every fault, and punishes in an undue measure: a judge should be a *rigid* administrator of justice between man and man, and *severe* in the punishment of offences as occasion requires; but never *austere* towards those who appear before him; *austerity* of manner would ill become him who sits as a protector of either the innocent or the injured.

Rigour is a species of great *severity*, namely, in the infliction of punishment; towards enormous offenders, or on particular occasions where an example is requisite, *rigour* may

be adopted, but otherwise it marks a cruel temper. A man is *austere* in his manners, *severe* in his remarks, and *rigorous* in his discipline.

Austerity, *rigidity*, and *severity*, may be habitual; *rigour* and *sternness* are occasional. *Sternness* is a species of severity, more in manner than in direct action; a commander may issue his commands *sternly*, or a despot may issue his *stern* decrees.

TO AWAIT, WAIT FOR, LOOK FOR.
EXPECT.

AWAIT and WAIT, in German *warten*, comes from *währen* to see or look after.

EXPECT, in Latin *expecto* or *exspecto*, compounded of *ex* and *specto*, signifies to look out after.

All these terms have a reference to futurity, and our actions with regard to it.

Await, *wait for*, and *look for*, mark a calculation of consequences and a preparation for them; and *expect* simply a calculation: we often *expect* without *awaiting*, *waiting*, or *looking for*, but never the reverse.

Await is said of serious things; *wait* and *look for* are terms in familiar use; *expect* is employed either seriously or otherwise. A person *expects* to die, or *awaits* the hour of his dissolution; he *expects* a letter, *waits* for its coming, and *looks for* it when the post is arrived.

Await indicates the disposition of the mind; *wait for*, the regulation of the outward conduct as well as that of the mind; *look for* is a species of *waiting* drawn from the physical action of the eye, and may be figuratively applied to the mind's eye, in which latter sense it is the same as *expect*. It is our duty, as well as our interest, to *await* the severest trials without a murmur: prudence requires us to *wait* patiently for a suitable opportunity, rather than be premature in our attempts to obtain any object: when children are too much indulged and caressed, they are apt to *look for* a repetition of caresses at inconvenient seasons: it is in vain to *look for* or *expect* happiness from the conjugal state, which is not founded on a cordial and mutual regard.

TO AWAKEN, EXCITE, PROVOKE,
ROUSE, STIR UP.

TO AWAKEN is to make *awake* or alive.

EXCITE, in Latin *excito*, compounded of the intensive syllables *ex* and *cito*, in Hebrew *sut* to move, signifies to move out of a state of rest.

PROVOKE, *v.* To aggravate.

To ROUSE is to cause to rise.

STIR, in German *stören* to move, signifies to make to move upwards.

To *excite* and *provoke* convey the idea of producing something; *rouse* and *stir up* that of only calling into action that which previously exists; to *awaken* is used in either sense.

To *awaken* is a gentler action than to *excite*, and this is gentler than to *provoke*. We *awaken* by a simple effort; we *excite* by repeated efforts or forcible means; we *provoke* by words, looks, or actions. The tender feelings are *awakened*; affections or the passions in general are *excited*; the angry passions are commonly *provoked*. Objects of distress *awaken* a sentiment of pity; competition among scholars *excites* a spirit of emulation; taunting words *provoke* anger.

Awaken is applied only to the individual and what passes within him; *excite* is applicable to the outward circumstances of one or many; *provoke* is applicable to the conduct or temper of one or many. The attention is *awakened* by interesting sounds that strike upon the ear; the conscience is *awakened* by the voice of the preacher, or by passing events: commotion, a tumult, or a rebellion, is *excited* among the people by the active efforts of individuals; laughter or contempt is *provoked* by preposterous conduct.

To *awaken* is in the moral, as in the physical sense, to call into *consciousness* from a state of *unconsciousness*; to *rouse* is forcibly to bring into action that which is in a state of inaction: and *stir up* is to bring into a state of agitation or commotion. We are *awakened* from an ordinary state by ordinary means; we are *roused* from an extraordinary state by extraordinary means; we are *stirred up* from an ordinary to an extraordinary state. The mind of a child is *awakened* by the action on its senses as soon as it is born; there are some persons who are not *roused* from the stupor in which they were, by any thing but the most awful events; and there are others whose passions, particularly of anger, are *stirred up* by trifling circumstances.

AWARE, ON ONE'S GUARD, APPRIZED, CONSCIOUS.

AWARE, compounded of *a* or *on* and *ware*, signifies to be on the look out, from the Saxon *waerd*, German, &c. *währen*, Greek *οἶαω* to see.

GUARD, in French *garder*, is connected with *ward*, in Saxon *waerd*, German &c. *gewährt*, participle of *währen* to see, as above.

APPRIZED, in French *appris*, from *apprendre* to apprehend, learn, or understand.

CONSCIOUS, in Latin *consciūs*, of *con* and *scio* to know, signifies knowing within one's self.

The idea of having the expectation or knowledge of a thing is common to all these terms. We are *aware* of a thing when we calculate upon it; we are *on our guard* against it when we are prepared for it; we are *apprized* of that of which we have had an intimation, and are *conscious* of that in which we have ourselves been concerned.

To be *aware*, and *on one's guard*, respect the future: to be *apprized*, either the past or present; to be *conscious*, only the past. Experience enables a man to be *aware* of consequences; prudence and caution dictate to him the necessity of being *on his guard* against evils. Whoever is fully *aware* of the precarious tenure by which he holds all his goods in this world, will be *on his guard* to prevent any calamities, as far as depends upon the use of means in his control.

We are *apprized* of events, or what passes outwardly, through the medium of external circumstances; we are *conscious* only through the medium of ourselves, of what passes within. We are *apprized* of what has happened from indications that attract our notice; we are *conscious* of our guilt from the recollection of what we have done. A commander who is not *aware* of all the contingencies that influence the fate of a battle, who is not *on his guard* against the stratagems of the enemy, who is not fully *apprized* of their intentions, and *conscious* of his own strength to frustrate them, has no grounds to expect a victory; the chances of defeat are greatly against him.

AWE, REVERENCE, DREAD.

AWE, probably from the German *achten*, conveys the idea of regarding.

REVERENCE, in French *reverence*, Latin *reverentia*. comes from *revereor* to fear strongly.

DREAD, in Saxon *dread*, comes from the Latin *terrere* to frighten and Greek *ταρασσω* to trouble.

Awe and *reverence* both denote a strong sentiment of respect, mingled with some emotions of fear; but the former marks the much stronger sentiment of the two: *dread* is an unmingled sentiment of fear for one's personal security. *Awe* may be awakened by the help of the senses and understanding; *reverence* by that of the understanding only; and *dread* principally by that of the imagination.

Sublime, sacred, and solemn objects awaken *awe*; they cause the beholder to stop and consider whether he is worthy to approach

them any nearer: exalted and noble objects produce *reverence*; they lead to every outward mark of obeisance and humiliation which it is possible for him to express: terrific objects excite *dread*; they cause a shuddering of the animal frame, and a revulsion of the mind which is attended with nothing but pain.

AWKWARD. CLUMSY.

AWKWARD, in Saxon *aewerd*, compounded of *ae* or *a* adversative, and *ward*, from the Teutonic *währen* to see or look, that is, looking the opposite way, or being in an opposite direction, as *toward* signifies looking the same way, or being in the same direction.

CLUMSY, from the same source as *clum* and *lump*, in German *lumpisch*, denotes the quality of heaviness and unseemliness.

These epithets denote what is contrary to rule and order, in form or manner. *Awkward* respects outward deportment; *clumsy* the shape and make of the object; a person has an *awkward* gait, is *clumsy* in his whole person.

Awkwardness is the consequence of bad education; *clumsiness* is mostly a natural defect. Young recruits are *awkward* in marching, and *clumsy* in their manual labour.

They may both be employed figuratively in the same sense, and sometimes in relation to the same objects: when speaking of *awkward* contrivances, or *clumsy* contrivances, the latter expresses the idea more strongly than the former.

AWKWARD. CROSS. UNTOWARD. CROOKED. FORWARD. PERVERSE.

AWKWARD, *v.* *Awkward*.

CROSS, from the noun *cross*, implies the quality of being like a *cross*.

UNTOWARD signifies the reverse of *toward* (*v.* *Awkward*).

CROOKED signifies the quality of resembling a *crook*.

FROWARD, that is, *from ward*, signifies running a contrary direction.

PERVERSE, Latin *perversus*, participle of *perverto*, compounded of *per* and *verto*, signifies turned aside.

Awkward, *cross*, *untoward*, and *crooked*, are used as epithets in relation to the events of life or the disposition of the mind; *froward* and *perverse* respect only the disposition of the mind. *Awkward* circumstances are apt to embarrass; *cross* circumstances to pain; *crooked* and *untoward* circumstances to defeat. What is *crooked* springs from a *perverted* judgment: what is *untoward* is inde-

pendent of human control. In our intercourse with the world there are always little *awkward* incidents arising, which a person's good sense and good nature will enable him to pass over without disturbing the harmony of society. It is the lot of every one in his passage through life to meet with *cross* accidents that are calculated to ruffle the temper. A *crooked* policy obstructs the prosperity of individuals, as well as of states. Many men are destined to meet with severe trials in the frustration of their dearest hopes, by numberless *untoward* events which call for the exercise of patience.

When used with regard to the disposition of the mind, *awkward* expresses less than *froward*, and *froward* less than *perverse*. *Awkwardness* is either an habitual or a temporary frailty of temper; it includes certain weaknesses and particularities, pertinaciously adhered to: *crossness* is a partial irritation resulting from the state of the humours, physical, and mental. *Frowardness* and *perversity* lie in the will: a *froward* temper is capricious; it wills or wills not to please itself without regard to others. *Perversity* lies deeper; taking root in the heart, it assumes the shape of malignity: a *perverse* temper is really wicked; it likes or dislikes by the rule of contradiction to another's will. *Untowardness* lies in the principles; it runs counter to the wishes and counsels of another.

An *awkward* temper is connected with self-sufficiency. *Crossness* and *frowardness* are peculiar to children. *Perversity* is, but too commonly the result of a vicious habit, which embitters the happiness of all who have the misfortune to come in collision with it. *Untowardness* is also another fruit of evil temper. A *froward* child becomes an *untoward* youth, who turns a deaf ear to all the admonitions of an afflicted parent.

AXIOM. MAXIM. APHORISM. APOPTHEGM. SAYING. ADAGE. PROVERB. BYE-WORD. SAW.

AXIOM, in French *axiome*, Latin *axioma*, comes from the Greek *αξιωμα* to think worthy, signifying the thing valued.

MAXIM, in French *maxime*, in Latin *maximus* the greatest, signifies that which is most important.

APHORISM, from the Greek *αποροισμος* a short sentence, and *αποριζω* to distinguish, signifies that which is set apart.

APOPTHEGM, in Greek *αποφθεγμα* from *αποφθεγγομαι* to speak pointedly, signifies a pointed saying.

SAYING signifies literally what is said, that is, said habitually.

ADAGE, in Latin *adagium*, probably

compounded of *ad* and *ago*, signifies that which is fit to be acted upon.

PROVERB, in French *proverbe*, Latin *proverbium*, compounded of *pro* and *verbum*, signifies that expression which stands for something particular.

BYE-WORD signifies a word by the bye, or by the way, in the course of conversation.

SAW is but a variation of say, put for saying.

A given sentiment conveyed in a specific sentence, or form of expression, is the common idea included in the signification of these terms. The *axiom* is a truth of the first value; a self-evident proposition which is the basis of other truths. A *maxim* is a truth of the first moral importance for all practical purposes. An *aphorism* is a truth set apart for its pointedness and excellence. *Apophthegm* is, in respect to the ancients, what *saying* is in regard to the moderns: it is a pointed sentiment pronounced by an individual, and adopted by others. *Adage* and *proverb* are vulgar sayings, the former among the ancients, the latter among the moderns. The *bye-word* is a casual saying, originating in some local circumstance. The *saw*, which is a barbarous corruption of *saying*, is the *saying* formerly current among the ignorant.

Axioms are in science what *maxims* are in morals; self-evidence is an essential characteristic in both; the *axiom* presents itself in so simple and undeniable a form to the understanding as to exclude doubt, and the necessity for reasoning. The *maxim*, though not so definite in its expression as the *axiom*, is at the same time equally parallel to the mind of man, and of such general application, that it is acknowledged by all moral agents who are susceptible of moral truth; it comes home to the common sense of all mankind.* „Things that are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other,“ — „Two bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time,“ are *axioms* in mathematics and metaphysics. „Virtue is the true source of happiness,“ — „The happiness of man is the end of civil government,“ are *axioms* in ethics and politics. „To err is human, to forgive divine,“ — „When our vices leave us, we flatter ourselves that we leave them,“ are among the number of *maxims*. Betwixt *axioms* and *maxims* there is this obvious difference to be observed; that the former are unchangeable both in matter and manner, and admit of little or no increase in number; but the latter may vary with the circum-

stances of human life, and admit of considerable extension.

An *Aphorism* is a speculative principle, either in science or morals, which is presented in a few words to the understanding; it is the substance of a doctrine, and many *aphorisms* may contain the abstract of a science. Of this description are the *aphorisms* of Hippocrates, and those of Lavater in physiognomy.

Sayings and *apophthegms* differ from the preceding, in as much as they always carry the mind back to the person speaking; there is always one who says when there is a *saying* or an *apophthegm*, and both acquire a value as much from the person who utters them, as from the thing that is uttered: when Leonidas was asked why brave men prefer honour to life, his answer became an *apophthegm*; namely, that they hold life by fortune, and honour by virtue: of this description are the *apophthegms* comprised by Plutarch, the *sayings* of Franklin's Old Richard, or those of Dr. Johnson: they are happy effusions of the mind which men are fond of treasuring. The *adage* and *proverb* are habitual, as well as general *sayings*, not repeated as the *sayings* of one, but of all; not adopted for the sake of the person, but for the sake of the thing; and they have been used in all ages for the purpose of conveying the sense of mankind on ordinary subjects.

The *adage* of former times is the *proverb* of the present times; if there be any difference between them, it lies in this, that the former are the fruit of knowledge and long experience, the latter of vulgar observations; the *adage* is therefore more refined than the *proverb*. Adversity is our best teacher, according to the Greek *adage*, „What hurts us instructs us.“ — „Old birds are not to be caught with chaff,“ is a vulgar *proverb*.

Bye-words rarely contain any important sentiment; they mostly consist of familiar similes, nick-names, and the like, as the Cambridge *bye-word* of 'Hobson's choice,'* signifying 'that or none:' the name of Nazarine was a *bye-word* among the Jews, for a Christian. A *saw* is vulgar in form, and vulgar in matter; it is the partial *saying* of particular neighbourhoods, originating in ignorance and superstition; of this description are the *sayings* which attribute particular properties to animals or to plants, termed old women's *sayings*.

* Vide Roubaud: „Axiome, maxime, apophthegme, aphorisme.“

* Hobson a famous carrier of Cambridge, who used to let horses to the students; but never permitted them to choose, always allotting each man the horse he thought most proper for his manner of riding and treatment.

B.

TO BABBLE, CHATTER, CHAT, PRATTLE, PRATE.

BABBLE, in French *babiller*, probably receives its origin from the tower of *Babel*, when the confusion of tongues took place, and men talked unintelligibly to each other.

CHATTER, CHAT, is in French *caquet*, low German *tatern*, high German *schnattern*, Latin *blatero*, Hebrew *bata*.

PRATTLE, PRATE, in low German *praten*, is probably connected with the Greek *πρᾶζω* to speak.

All these terms mark a superfluous or improper use of speech: *babble* and *chatter* are onomatopoeias drawn from the noise or action of speaking; *babbling* denotes rapidity of speech, which renders it unintelligible; hence the term is applied to all who make use of many words to no purpose; *chatter* is an imitation of the noise of speech properly applied to magpies or parrots, and figuratively to a corresponding vicious mode of speech in human beings. The vice of *babbling* is most commonly attached to men, that of *chattering* to women: the *babbler* talks much to impress others with his self-importance; the *chatterer* is actuated by self-conceit, and a desire to display her volubility; the former cares not whether he is understood; the latter cares not if she be but heard.

Chatting is harmless, if not respectable: the winter's fire-side invites neighbours to assemble and *chat* away many an hour which might otherwise hang heavy on hand, or be spent less inoffensively: *chatting* is the practice of adults; *prattling* and *prating* that of children, the one innocently, the other impertinently: the *prattling* of babes has an interest for every feeling mind, but for parents it is one of their highest enjoyments; *prating*, on the contrary, is the consequence of ignorance and childish assumption: a *prattler* has all the unaffected gaiety of an uncontaminated mind; a *prater* is forward, obtrusive, and ridiculous.

BACK. BACKWARD, BEHIND.

BACK and BACKWARD are used only as adverbs: BEHIND either as an adverb or a preposition. To go *back* or *backward*, to go *behind* or *behind* the wall.

Back denotes the situation of being, and the direction of going; *backward*, simply the manner of going: a person stands *back*, who does not wish to be in the way; he goes *backward*, when he does not wish to turn his *back* to an object.

Back marks simply the situation of a place,

behind the situation of one object with regard to another: a person stands *back*, who stands in the *back* part of any place; he stands *behind*, who has any one in the front of him: *back* is opposed to the front, *behind* to before.

BAD, WICKED, EVIL.

BAD, in Saxon *bad*, *baed*, in German *bös*, probably connected with the Latin *pejus* worse, and the Hebrew *bosch*,

WICKED is probably changed from *witched* or *bewitched*, that is, possessed with an evil spirit.

Bad respects moral and physical qualities in general; *wicked* only moral qualities.

EVIL, in German *übel*, from the Hebrew *chebel* pain, signifies that which is the prime cause of pain; *evil* therefore, in its full extent, comprehends both *badness* and *wickedness*.

Whatever offends the taste and sentiments of a rational being is *bad*: food is *bad* when it disagrees with the constitution; the air is *bad* which has any thing in it disagreeable to the senses or hurtful to the body; books are *bad* which only inflame the imagination or the passions. Whatever is wicked offends the moral principles of a rational agent; any violation of the law is *wicked*, as law is the support of human society; an act of injustice or cruelty is *wicked*, as it opposes the will of God and the feelings of humanity. *Evil* is either moral or natural, and may be applied to every object that is contrary to good; but the term is employed only for that which is in the highest degree *bad* or *wicked*.

When used in relation to persons, both refer to the morals, but *bad* is more general than *wicked*: a *bad* man is one who is generally wanting in the performance of his duty; a *wicked* man is one who is chargeable with actual violations of the law, human or Divine; such an one has an *evil* mind. A *bad* character is the consequence of immoral conduct; but no man has the character of being *wicked* who has not been guilty of some known and flagrant vices; the inclinations of the best are *evil* at certain times.

BADLY, ILL.

BADLY, in the manner of *bad* (v. *Bad*).

ILL, in Swedish *ill*, Icelandic *illur*, Danish *ill*, &c. is supposed by Adelung, and with some degree of justice, not to be a contraction of evil, but to spring from the Greek *ουλος* destructive and *ολλυω* to destroy.

These terms are both employed to modify the actions or qualities of things, but *badly* is always annexed to the action, and *ill* to the quality: as to do any thing *badly*, the

thing is *badly* done; an *ill*-judged scheme, an *ill*-contrived measure, an *ill*-disposed person.

TO BAFFLE, DEFEAT, DISCONCERT, CONFOUND.

BAFFLE, in French *baffler*, from *buffle* an ox, signifies to lead by the nose as an ox, that is, to amuse or disappoint.

DEFEAT, in French *defait*, participle of *defaire*, is compounded of the private *de* and *faire* to do, signifying to undo.

DISCONCERT is compounded of the privative *dis* and *concert*. signifying to throw out of concert or harmony, to put into disorder.

CONFOUND, in French *confondre*, is compounded of *con* and *fondre* to melt or mix together in general disorder.

When applied to the derangement of the mind or rational faculties, *baffle* and *defeat* respect the powers of argument, *disconcert* and *confound* the thoughts and feelings: *baffle* expresses less than *defeat*; *disconcert* less than *confound*: a person is *baffled* in argument who is for the time discomposed and silenced by the superior address of his opponent: he is *defeated* in argument if his opponent has altogether the advantage of him in strength of reasoning and justness of sentiment: a person is *disconcerted* who loses his presence of mind for a moment, or has his feelings any way discomposed; he is *confounded* when the powers of thought and consciousness become torpid or vanish.

When applied to the derangement of plans, *baffle* expresses less than *defeat*; *defeat* less than *confound*; and *disconcert* less than all. Obstinacy, perseverance, skill, or art, *baffles*; force or violence *defeats*; awkward circumstances *disconcert*; the visitation of God *confounds*. It frequently happens even in the common transactions of life that the best schemes are *disconcerted* by the trivial casualties of wind and weather. The obstinacy of a disorder may *baffle* the skill of the physician; the imprudence of the patient may *defeat* the object of his prescriptions. The miraculous destruction of his army *confounded* the project of the King of Assyria.

BAND, COMPANY, CREW, GANG.

BAND, in French *bande*, in German &c. *band*, from *binden* to bind, signifies the thing bound.

COMPANY, v. *To accompany*.

CREW, from the French *cru*, participle of *croître*, and the Latin *cresco* to grow or gather, signifies the thing grown or formed into a mass.

GANG, in Saxon, German, &c. *gang* a

walk, from *gehen* to go, signifies a body going the same way.

All these terms denote a small association for a particular object; a *band* is an association where men are bound together by some strong obligation, whether taken in a good or bad sense, as a *band* of soldiers, a *band* of robbers. A *company* marks an association for convenience without any particular obligation, as a *company* of travellers, a *company* of strolling players. *Crew* marks an association collected together by some external power, or by coincidence of plan and motive; in the former case it is used for a ship's *crew*; in the latter and bad sense of the word it is employed for any number of evil-minded persons met together from different quarters, and co-operating for some bad purpose.

Gang is always used in a bad sense for an association of thieves, murderers, and depredators in general; for such an association is rather a casual meeting from the similarity of pursuits, than an organized body under any leader; it is more in common use than *band*: the robbers in Germany used to form themselves into *bands* that set the government of the country at defiance; house-breakers and pickpockets commonly associate now in *gangs*.

BANE. PEST. RUIN

BANE, in its proper sense, is the name of a poisonous plant.

PEST, in French *peste*, Latin *pestis* a plague, from *pastum* participle of *pasco* to feed upon or consume.

RUIN, in French *ruine*, Latin *ruina*, from *ruo* to rush, signifies the falling into a ruin, or the cause of ruin.

These terms borrow their figurative signification from three of the greatest evils in the world; namely, poison, plague, and destruction. *Bane* is said of things only; *pest* of persons only: whatever produces a deadly corruption is the *bane*; whoever is as obnoxious as the plague is a *pest*: luxury is the *bane* of all youth; sycophants are the *pests* of society.

Bane when compared with *ruin* does not convey so strong a meaning; the former in its positive sense is that which tends to mischief; ruin is that which actually causes ruin: a love of pleasure is the *bane* of all young men whose fortune depends on the exercise of their talents; drinking is the *ruin* of all who indulge themselves in it to excess.

TO BANISH, EXILE, EXPEL.

BANISH, in French *bannir*, German *bannen*, signified to put out of a community

by a ban or civil interdict, which was formerly either ecclesiastical or civil.

EXILE, in French *exiler*, from the Latin *exilium* banishment, and *exul* an exile, compounded of *extra* and *solum* the soil, signifies to put away from one's native soil or country.

EXPEL, in Latin *expello*, compounded of *ex* and *pello* to drive, signifies to drive out.

The idea of exclusion, or of a coercive removal from a place, is common to these terms: *banishment* includes the removal from any place, or the prohibition of access to any place, where one has been, or whither one is in the habits of going; *exile* signifies the removal from one's home: to *exile*, therefore, is to *banish*, but to *banish*, is not always to *exile*:* the Tarquins were *banished* from Rome; Coriolanus was *exiled*.

Banishment follows from a decree of justice; *exile* either by the necessity of circumstances or an order of authority: *banishment* is a disgraceful punishment inflicted by tribunals upon delinquents; *exile* is a disgrace incurred without dishonour: *exile* removes us from our country; *banishment* drives us from it ignominiously: it is the custom in Russia to *banish* offenders to Siberia; Ovid was *exiled* by an order of Augustus.

Banishment is an action, a compulsory exercise of power over another, which must be submitted to; *exile* is a state into which we may go voluntarily: many Romans chose to go into *exile* rather than await the judgment of the people, by whom they might have been *banished*. *Banishment* and *expulsion* both mark a disgraceful and coercive exclusion, but *banishment* is authoritative; it is a public act of government: *expulsion* is simply coercive; it is the act of a private individual, or a small community. *Banishment* always supposes a removal to a distant spot, to another land; *expulsion* never reaches beyond a particular house or society: *expulsion* from the university, or any public school, is the necessary consequence of discovering a refractory temper, or a propensity to insubordination.

Banishment and *expulsion* are likewise used in a figurative sense, although *exile* is not: in this sense, *banishment* marks a distant and entire removal; *expulsion* a violent removal: we *banish* that which it is not prudent to retain; we *expel* that which is noxious. Hopes are *banished* from the mind when every prospect of success has disappeared; fears are *banished* when they are

altogether groundless; envy, hatred, and every evil passion, should be *expelled* from the mind as disturbers of its peace.

BARE, NAKED, UNCOVERED.

BARE, in Saxon *bare*, German *bar*, Hebrew *parah* to lay bare, and *bar* pure.

NAKED, in Saxon *naced*, German *nacket* or *nakt*, low German *naakt*, Swedish *nakot*, Danish *nogen*, &c. comes from the Latin *nudus*, compounded of *ne* not and *dutus* or *indutus* clothed, and the Greek *δύω* to clothe.

Bare marks the condition of being without some necessary appendage; *naked* simply the absence of an external covering; *bare* is therefore often substituted for *naked*, although not *vice versa*; we speak of *bare-headed*, *barefoot*, to expose the *bare* arm; but a figure is *naked*, or the body is *naked*.

When applied to other objects, *bare* conveys the idea of want in general; *naked* simply the want of something exterior: when we speak of sitting upon the *bare* ground, of laying any place *bare*, of *bare* walls, a *bare* house, the idea of want in essentials is strongly conveyed; but *naked* walls, *naked* fields, a *naked* appearance, all denote something wanting to the eye: *bare* in this sense is frequently followed by the object that is wanted; *naked* is mostly employed as an adjunct; a tree is *bare* of leaves; this constitutes it a *naked* tree.

They preserve the same analogy in their figurative application: a *bare* sufficiency is that which scarcely suffices; the *naked* truth is that which has nothing about it to intercept the view of it from the mind.

Naked and *uncovered* bear a strong resemblance to each other; to be *naked* is in fact to have the body *uncovered*, but many things are *uncovered* which are not *naked*: nothing is said to be *naked* but what in the nature of things, or according to the usages of men, ought to be covered; every thing is *uncovered* from which the covering is removed. According to our natural sentiments of decency, or our acquired sentiments of propriety, we expect to see the *naked* body covered with clothing, the *naked* tree covered with leaves, the *naked* walls covered with paper or paint, and the *naked* country covered with verdure or habitations; on the other hand, plants are left *uncovered* to receive the benefit of the sun or rain, furniture or articles of use or necessity are left *uncovered* to suit the convenience of the user; or a person may be *uncovered*, in the sense of *bare-headed*, on certain occasions.

* Vide Roubaud: „Exiler, bannir.“

BARE, SCANTY, DESTITUTE.

BARE, *v.* Bare, naked.

SCANTY, from to *scant*, signifies the quality of *scanting*: *scant* is most probably changed from the Latin *scindo* to clip or cut.

DESTITUTE, in Latin *destitutus*, participle of *destituere*, compounded of *de* privative and *statuo* to appoint or provide for, signifies unprovided for or wanting.

All these terms denote the absence or deprivation of some necessary. *Bare* and *scanty* have a relative sense: *bare* respects what serves for ourselves; *scanty* that which is provided by others. A subsistence is *bare*; a supply is *scanty*. An imprudent person will estimate as a *bare* competence what would supply an economist with superfluities. A hungry person will consider as a *scanty* allowance what would more than suffice for a moderate eater.

Bare is said of those things which belong to our corporeal sustenance; *destitute* is said of one's outward circumstances in general. A person is *bare* of clothes or money; he is *destitute* of friends, of resources, or of comforts.

BARE, MERE.

BARE, *v.* Bare, naked.

MERE, in Latin *merus* mere, properly *solus* alone, from the Greek *μεῖω* to divide, signifies separated from others.

Bare is used in a positive sense: *mere*, negatively. The *bare* recital of some events brings tears. The *mere* circumstance of receiving favours ought not to bind any person to the opinions of another.

The *bare* idea of being in the company of a murderer is apt to awaken horror in the mind. The *mere* attendance at a place of worship is the smallest part of a Christian's duty.

BASE, VILE, MEAN.

BASE, in French *bas* low, from the Latin *basis* the foundation or lowest part.

VILE, in French *vil*, Latin *vilis*, Greek *φάυλος*, worthless, of no account.

MEAN and MIDDLE both come from the Latin *medius*, which signifies moderate, not elevated, of little value.

Base is a stronger term than *vile*, and *vile* than *mean*. *Base* marks a high degree of moral turpitude: *vile* and *mean* denote in different degrees the want of all value or esteem. What is *base* excites our abhorrence, what is *vile* provokes disgust, what is *mean* awakens contempt. *Base* is opposed to magnanimous; *vile* to noble; *mean* to generous. Ingratitude is *base*; it does vio-

lence to the best affections of our nature: flattery is *vile*; it violates truth in the grossest manner for the lowest purposes of gain; compliances are *mean* which are derogatory to the rank or dignity of the individual.

The *base* character violates the strongest moral obligations; the *vile* character blends low and despicable arts with his vices; the *mean* character acts inconsistently with his honour or respectability. Depravity of mind dictates *base* conduct; lowness of sentiment or disposition leads to *vileness*; a selfish temper engenders *meanness*.

BATTLE, COMBAT, ENGAGEMENT.

BATTLE, in French *bataille*, comes from the Latin *batuo*, Hebrew *abat* to beat, signifying a beating.

COMBAT, signifies literally a *battle* one with the other.

ENGAGEMENT signifies the act of being engaged or occupied in contest.

* *Battle* is a general action requiring some preparation: *combat* is only particular, and sometimes unexpected. Thus the action which took place between the Carthaginians and the Romans, or Caesar and Pompey, were *battles*; but the action in which the Horatii and Curiatii, decided the fate of Rome, as also many of the actions in which Hercules was engaged, were *combats*. The *battle* of Almanza was a decisive action between Philip of France and Charles of Austria, in their contest for the throne of Spain; in the *combat* between Menelaus and Paris, Homer very artfully describes the seasonable interference of Venus to save her favourite from destruction.

The word *combat* has more relation to the act of fighting than that of *battle*, which is used with more propriety simply to denominate action. In the *battle* between the Romans and Pyrrhus, King of Epire, the *combat* was obstinate and bloody; the Romans seven times repulsed the enemy, and were as often repulsed in their turn. In this latter sense *engagement* and *combat* are analogous, but the former has a specific relation to the agents and parties *engaged*, which is not implied in the latter term. We speak of a person being present in an *engagement*; wounded in an *engagement*; or having fought desperately in an *engagement*: on the other hand we say, to *engage* in a *combat*; to challenge to single *combat*: *combats* are sometimes begun by the accidental meeting of avowed opponents; in such *engagements* nothing is thought of but the gratification of revenge.

* Girard: „Bataille, combat.“

Battles are fought between armies only; they are gained or lost: *combats* are entered into between individuals, whether of the brute or human species, in which they seek to destroy or excel: *engagements* are confined to no particular number, only to such as are *engaged*: a general *engagement* is said of an army when the whole body is *engaged*; partial *engagements* respect only such as are fought by small parties or companies of an army. History is mostly occupied with the details of *battles*: in the history of the Greeks and Romans, we have likewise an account of the *combats* between men or wild beasts, which formed their principal amusement. It is reported of the German women, that whenever their husbands went to *battle* they used to go into the thickest of the *combat* to carry them provisions, or dress their wounds; and that sometimes they would take part in the *engagement*.

The word *combat* is sometimes used in the moral application.

TO BE, EXIST, SUBSIST.

BE, with its inflections, is to be traced through the northern and Oriental languages to the Hebrew *hovah*.

EXIST, in French *exister*, Latin *existo*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *sisto*, signifies to place or stand by itself or of itself. From this derivation of the latter verb arises the distinction in the use of the two words. The former is applicable either to the accidents of things, or to the substances or things themselves; the latter only to substances or things that stand or exist of themselves.

* We say of qualities, of forms, of actions, of arrangement, of movement, and of every different relation, whether real, ideal, or qualificative, that they *are*; we say of matter, of spirit, of body, and of all substances, that they *exist*. Man *is* man, and will *be* man under all circumstances and changes of life: he *exists* under every known climate and variety of heat or cold in the atmosphere.

Being and *existence* as nouns have this farther distinction, that the former is employed not only to designate the abstract action of *being*, but is metaphorically employed for the sensible object that *is*; the latter is confined altogether to the abstract sense. Hence we speak of human *beings*; *beings* animate or inanimate; the Supreme *Being*; but the *existence* of a God; *existence* of innumerable worlds; the *existence* of evil. *Being* may in some cases be indifferently employed for *existence*, particularly in the grave style;

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Etre, exister, subsister.“

when speaking of animate objects, as the *being* of a God; our frail *being*; and when qualified in a compound form is preferable, as our *well-being*.

SUBSIST is properly a species of *existing*; from the Latin prepositive *sub*, signifying for a time, it denotes temporary or partial *existence*. Every thing *exists* by the creative and preservative power of the Almighty; that which *subsists* depends for its *existence* upon the chances and changes of this mortal life. To *exist* therefore designates simply the event of *being* or *existing*; to *subsist* conveys the accessory ideas of the mode and duration of *existing*. Man *exists* while the vital or spiritual part of him remains; he *subsists* by what he obtains to support life. Friendship *exists* in the world, notwithstanding the prevalence of selfishness; but it cannot *subsist* for any length of time between individuals in whom this base temper prevails.

TO BE, BECOME, GROW.

BE, *v.* To be, exist.

BECOME signifies to come to be, that is, to be in course of time.

GROW is in all probability changed from the Latin *crevi*, perfect of *cresco* to increase or grow.

Be is positive; *become* is relative; a person *is* what he *is* without regard to what he *was*; he *becomes* that which he *was* not before. We judge of a man by what he *is*, but we cannot judge of him by what he will *become*: this year he *is* immoral and irreligious, but by the force of reflection on himself he may *become* the contrary in another year.

To *become* includes no idea of the mode or circumstance of its *becoming*; to *grow* is to *become* by a gradual process: a man may *become* a good man from a vicious one, in consequence of a sudden action on his mind; but he *grows* in wisdom and virtue by means of an increase in knowledge and experience.

TO BEAR, YIELD.

BEAR, in Saxon *baran*, old German *beran*, Latin *pario*, and Hebrew *bara* to create.

YIELD, *v.* To afford.

Bear conveys the idea of creating within itself; *yield* that of giving from itself. Animals *bear* their young; inanimate objects *yield* their produce. An apple-tree *bears* apples; the earth *yields* fruits.

Bear marks properly the natural power of bringing forth something of its own kind; *yield* is said of the result or quantum brought forth: shrubs *bear* leaves, flowers, or ber-

ries, according to their natural properties; flowers *yield* seed plentifully or otherwise as they are favoured by circumstances.

TO BEAR, CARRY, CONVEY,
TRANSPORT.

BEAR, from the sense of generating (v. *To bear, yield*), has derived that of retaining.

CARRY, in French *charier*, probably from the Latin *currus*, Greek *καίρω* or *τρέχω* to run, or *κυνω*, in Hebrew *kerah* to meet, signifies to move a thing from one place to another.

CONVEY, in Latin *conveho*, is probably compounded of *con* and *veho* to carry with one.

TRANSPORT, in French *transporter*, Latin *transporto*, compounded of *trans* over, and *porto* to carry, signifies to carry to a distance.

To bear is simply to take the weight of any substance upon one's self; to *carry* is to remove that weight from the spot where it was: we always *bear* in *carrying*, but we do not always *carry* when we *bear*. Both may be applied to things as well as persons: whatever receives the weight of any thing *bears* it; whatever is caused to move with any thing *carries* it. That which cannot be easily *borne* must be burdensome to *carry*: in extremely hot weather it is sometimes irksome to *bear* the weight even of one's clothing; Virgil praises Aeneas for having *carried* his father on his shoulders in order to save him from the sacking of Troy. Weak people or weak things are not fit to *bear* heavy burdens: lazy people prefer to be *carried* rather than to *carry* any thing.

Since *bear* is confined to personal service it may be used in the sense of *carry*, when the latter implies the removal of any thing by means of any other body. The *bearer* of any letter or parcel is he who *carries* it in his hand; the *carrier* of parcels is he who employs a *conveyance*. Hence the word *bear* is often very appropriately substituted for *carry*, as Virgil praises Aeneas for *bearing* his father on his shoulders. *Convey* and *transport* are species of *carrying*.

Carry in its particular sense is employed either for personal exertions or actions performed by the help of other means; *convey* and *transport* are employed for such actions as are performed not by immediate personal intervention or exertion: a porter *carries* goods on his knot: goods are *conveyed* in a waggon or a cart; they are *transported* in a vessel.

Convey expresses simply the mode of removing; *transport* annexes to this the idea

of the place and the distance. Merchants get *conveyed* into their warehouses the goods which they have had *transported* from distant countries. Pedestrians take no more with them than what they can conveniently *carry*: could armies do the same, one of the greatest obstacles to the indulgence of human ambition would be removed; for many an incursion into a peaceful country is defeated for the want of means to *convey* provisions sufficient for such numbers; and when mountains or deserts are to be traversed, another great difficulty presents itself in the *transportation* of artillery.

TO BEAT, STRIKE, HIT.

BEAT, in French *battre*, Latin *batuo*, comes from the Hebrew *habat* to beat.

STRIKE, in Saxon *strican*, Danish *stricker*, &c. from *strictum*, participle of *stringo* to bind.

HIT, in Latin *ictus*, participle of *ico*, comes from the Hebrew *necat* to strike.

To beat is to redouble blows; to *strike* is to give one single blow; but the bare touching in consequence of an effort constitutes *hitting*. We never *beat* but with design, nor *hit* without an aim, but we may *strike* by accident.

Notwithstanding the declamations of philosophers as they please to style themselves, the practice of *beating* cannot altogether be discarded from the military or scholastic discipline. The master who *strikes* his pupil hastily is oftener impelled by the force of passion than of conviction. *Hitting* is the object and delight of the marksman; it is the utmost exertion of his skill to *hit* the exact point at which he aims.

TO BEAT, DEFEAT, OVERPOWER,
ROUT, OVERTHROW.

BEAT is here figuratively employed in the sense of the former section.

DEFEAT, from the French *defaire*, implies to undo; and OVERPOWER to have the power over any one.

To ROUT from the French *mettre en dérouté* is to turn from one's route, and OVERTHROW to throw over or upside down.

Beat respects personal contests between individuals or parties; *defeat*, *rout*, *overpower*, and *overthrow*, are employed mostly for contests between numbers. A general is *beaten* in important engagements; he is *defeated* and may be *routed* in partial attacks; he is *overpowered* by numbers, and *overthrown* in set engagements. The English pride themselves on *beating* their enemies by land as well as by sea, whenever they

come to fair engagements, but the English are sometimes *defeated* when they make too desperate attempts, and sometimes they are in danger of being *overpowered*: they are very seldom *routed* or *overthrown*.

To *beat* is an indefinite term expressive of no particular degree: the being *beaten* may be attended with greater or less damage. To be *defeated* is a specific disadvantage, it is a failure in a particular object of more or less importance. To be *overpowered* is a positive loss; it is a loss of the power of acting which may be of longer or shorter duration: to be *routed* is a temporary disadvantage; a *rout* alters the *route* or course of proceeding, but does not disable: to be *overthrown* is the greatest of all mischiefs, and is applicable only to great armies and great concerns: an *overthrow* commonly decides a contest.

Beat is a term which reflects more or less dishonour on the general or the army, or on both: *defeat* is an indifferent term; the best generals may sometimes be *defeated* by circumstances which are above human control: *overpowering* is coupled with no particular honour to the winner, nor disgrace to the loser; superior power is oftener the result of good fortune than of skill. The bravest and finest troops may be *overpowered* in cases which exceed human power: a *rout* is always disgraceful, particularly to the army; it always arises from want of firmness: an *overthrow* is fatal rather than dishonourable; it excites pity rather than contempt.

*BEATIFICATION, CANONIZATION.

These are two acts emanating from the pontifical authority, by which the Pope declares a person, whose life has been exemplary and accompanied with miracles, as entitled to enjoy eternal happiness after his death, and determines in consequence the sort of worship which should be paid to him.

In the act of BEATIFICATION the Pope pronounces only as a private person, and uses his own authority only in granting to certain persons, or to a religious order, the privilege of paying a particular worship to a *beatified* object.

In the act of CANONIZATION, the Pope speaks as a judge after a judicial examination on the state, and decides the sort of worship which ought to be paid by the whole church.

BEAUTIFUL, FINE, HANDSOME, PRETTY.

BEAUTIFUL, or full of *beauty*, in French

beauté, comes from *beau, belle*, in Latin *bel-lus* fair, and *bonus* or *bonus* good.

FINE, in French *fin*, German *fein*, &c. not improbably comes from the Greek *φαι-ρος* bright, splendid, and *φαίρω* to appear, because what is *fine* is by distinction clear.

HANDSOME, from the word *hand*, denotes a species of *beauty* in the body, as *handy* denotes its agility and skill.

PRETTY, in Saxon *præte* adorned, German *prächtigt*, Swedish *pråktigt* splendid, which is connected with our words, *parade* and *pride*.

Of these epithets, which denote what is pleasing to the eye, *beautiful* conveys the strongest meaning; it marks the possession of that in its fullest extent, of which the other terms denote the possession in part only. *Fineness*, *handsomeness*, and *prettiness*, are to *beauty* as parts to a whole. When taken in relation to persons, a woman is *beautiful* who in feature and complexion possesses a grand assemblage of graces; a woman is *fine*, who with a striking figure unites shape and symmetry; a woman is *handsome*, who has good features, and *pretty* if symmetry of feature is united with delicacy.

The *beautiful* is determined by fixed rules; it admits of no excess or defect; it comprehends regularity, proportion, and a due distribution of colour, and every particular which can engage attention: the *fine* must be coupled with grandeur, majesty, and strength of figure; it is incompatible with that which is small; a little woman can never be *fine*: the *handsome* is a general assemblage of what is agreeable; it is marked by no particular characteristic, but the absence of all deformity: *prettiness* is always coupled with simplicity, it is incompatible with that which is large; a tall woman with masculine features cannot be *pretty*.

Neither the *beautiful*, nor the *fine* woman has in general those durable attractions which belong to the *handsome*, who with a less inimitable tint of complexion, a less unerring proportion in the limbs, a less precise symmetry of feature, is frequently possessed of a sweetness of countenance, a vivacity, in the eye, and a grace in the manner, that win the beholder and inspire affection.

Beauty is peculiarly a female perfection, in the male sex it is rather a defect: a *beautiful* man will not be respected, because he cannot be respectable; the possession of beauty deprives him of his manly characteristics, boldness and energy of mind, strength and robustness of limb: but though a man may not be *beautiful* or *pretty*, he may be *fine* or *handsome*.

* Girard: „Beatification, canonization.“

This distinction does not apply to the brute creation.

When relating to other objects, *beautiful*, *fine*, *pretty*, have a strong analogy. With respect to the objects of nature, the *beautiful* is displayed in the works of creation, and wherever it appears it is marked by elegance, variety, harmony, proportion; but above all, that softness which is peculiar to female *beauty*: the *fine*, on the contrary, is associated with the grand, and the *pretty* with the simple. The sky presents either a *beautiful* aspect, or a *fine* aspect; but not a *pretty* aspect. A rural scene is *beautiful* when it unites richness and diversity of natural objects with superior cultivation; it is *fine* when it presents the bolder and more impressive features of nature, consisting of rocks and mountains; it is *pretty* when divested of all that is extraordinary, it presents a smiling view of nature in the gay attire of shrubs, and many-coloured flowers, and verdant meadows, and luxuriant fields.

Beautiful sentiments have much in them to interest the affections, as well as the understanding; they make a vivid impression; *fine* sentiments mark an elevated mind and a loftiness of conception; they occupy the understanding, and afford scope for reflection; they make a strong impression: *pretty* ideas are but pleasing associations or combinations that only amuse for the time being, without producing any lasting impression. We may speak of a *beautiful* poem, although not a *beautiful* tragedy; but a *fine* tragedy, and a *pretty* comedy. Imagery may be *beautiful* and *fine*, but seldom *pretty*.

The celestial bodies revolving with so much regularity in their orbits, and displaying so much brilliancy of light, are *beautiful* objects. The display of an army drawn up in battle array; the neatness of the men; the order, complexity, and variety of their movements, and the precision in their discipline, afford a *fine* spectacle. An assemblage of children imitating in their amusements the system and regularity of more serious employments, and preserving at the same time the playfulness of childhood, is a *pretty* sight.

Beautiful, *fine*, and *pretty* are indifferently applied to works of nature and art; *handsome* to works of art only, as a *beautiful* picture, a *fine* drawing, and a *pretty* cap, *handsome* furniture; but in such cases *handsome* has mostly a reference to the make or construction of a thing: but *beautiful*, *fine*, and *pretty*, simply denote the impression which the appearance of things makes on the observer. Hence it is that

handsome is applied to moral actions, which reflect credit on the agent; and hence the proverb of „*handsome* is, that *handsome* does.“

BECOMING, DECENT, FIT, SUITABLE,

BECOMING, from *become*, compounded of *be* and *come*, signifies coming in its place.

DECENT, in French *decent*, in Latin *decens*, participle of *deceo*, from the Greek *δοξει*, and the Chaldee *deca* to beseem, signifies the quality of beseeming and befitting.

FIT, in French *fait*, Latin *factum*, participle of *facio* to do, signifies done as it ought to be.

SUITABLE, from *to suit*, signifies able to *suit*; and, in French *suite*, Latin *secutus*, comes from *sequor* to follow, signifying to follow as it ought.

What is *becoming* respects the manner of being in society, such as it ought, as to person, time, and place. *Decency* regards the manner of displaying one's self, so as to be approved and respected. *Fitness* and *suitableness* relate to the disposition, arrangement, and order of either being or doing, according to persons, things, or circumstances.

The *becoming* consists of an exterior that is pleasing to the view: *decency* involves moral propriety; it is regulated by the fixed rules of good breeding: *fitness* is regulated by local circumstances, and *suitableness* by the established customs and usages of society. The dress of a woman is *becoming* that renders her person more agreeable to the eye; it is *decent* if it in no wise offend modesty; it is *fit* if it be what the occasion requires; it is *suitable* if it be according to the rank and character of the wearer. What is *becoming* varies for every individual; the age, the complexion, the stature, and the habits of the person must be consulted in order to obtain the appearance which is *becoming*; what *becomes* a young female, or one of fair complexion, may not *become* one who is farther advanced in life, or who has dark features: *decency* is one and the same for all; all civilized nations have drawn the exact line between the *decent* and the *indecent*, although fashion may sometimes draw females aside from this line: *fitness* varies with the seasons, or the circumstances of persons; what is *fit* for the winter is *unfit* for the summer, or what is *fit* for dry weather is *unfit* for the wet: what is *fit* for town is not *fit* for the country: what is *fit* for a healthy person is not *fit* for one that is infirm: *suitableness*

accommodates itself to the external circumstances and conditions of persons; the house, the furniture, the equipage of a prince, must be *suitable* to his rank; the retinue of an ambassador must be *suitable* to the character which he has to maintain, and to the wealth, dignity, and importance of the nation, whose monarch he represents.

BECOMING, COMELY, GRACEFUL,

BECOMING, *v.* *Becoming, decent.*

COMELY or *come like*, signifies coming or appearing as one would have it.

GRACEFUL signifies full of *grace*.

These epithets are employed to mark in general what is agreeable to the eye. *Becoming* denotes less than *comely*, and this less than *graceful*: nothing can be *comely* or *graceful* which is *unbecoming*; although many things are *becoming* which are neither *comely* or *graceful*.

Becoming respects the decorations of the person, and the exterior deportment; *comely* respects natural embellishments; *graceful* natural or artificial accomplishments: manner is *becoming*; figure is *comely*; air, figure, or attitude, is *graceful*.

Becoming is relative: it depends on taste and opinion; on accordance with the prevailing sentiments or particular circumstances of society: *comely* and *graceful* are absolute; they are qualities felt and acknowledged by all.

What is *becoming* is confined to no rank; the highest and the lowest have, alike, the opportunity of doing or being that which *becomes* their station: what is *comely* is seldom associated with great refinement and culture; what is *graceful* is rarely to be discovered apart from high rank, noble birth, or elevation of character.

TO BEG, DESIRE.

BEG, *To ask, beg.*

DESIRE, in French *desirer*, Latin *desidero*, comes from *desido* to fix the mind on an object.

To *beg*, marks the wish; to *desire*, the will and determination.

Beg is the act of an inferior, or one in a subordinate condition; *desire* is the act of a superior: we *beg* a thing as a favour; we *desire* it as a right: children *beg* their parents to grant them an indulgence; parents *desire* their children to attend to their business.

TO BEG, BESEECH, SOLICIT, ENTREAT, SUPPLICATE, IMPLORE, CRAVE.

BEG, *v.* *To ask, beg.*

BESEECH, compounded of *be* and *seech*, or *seek* is an intensive verb, signifying to seek strongly.

SOLICIT, in French *soliciter*, Latin *solicito*, is probably compounded of *solum* or *totum*, and *cito* to cite, summon, appeal to, signifying to rouse altogether.

ENTREAT, compounded of *en* or *in* and *treat*, in French *traiter*, Latin *tracto* to manage, signifies to act upon.

SUPPLICATE, in Latin *supplicatus*, participle of *supplico*, compounded of *sup* or *sub* and *plico* to fold, signifies to bend the body down in token of submission or distress, in order to awaken notice.

IMPLORE, in French *implorer*, Latin *imploro*, compounded of *im* or *in* and *ploro* to weep or lament, signifies to act upon by weeping.

CRAVE, in Saxon *cravian*, signifies to long for earnestly.

All these terms denote a species of asking (*v.* *To ask, beg*), varied as to the person, the object, and the manner; the first four do not mark such a state of dependence in the agent as the last three: to *beg* denotes a state of want; to *beseech*, *entreat*, and *solicit*, a state of urgent necessity; *supplicate* and *implore* a state of abject distress; *crave*, the lowest state of physical want: one *begs* with importunity; *beseeches* with earnestness; *entreats* by the force of reasoning and strong representation; one *solicits* by virtue of one's interest; *supplicates* by an humble address; *implores* by every mark of dejection and humiliation.

Begging is the act of the poor when they need assistance: *beseeking* and *entreating* are resorted to by friends and equals, when they want to influence or persuade, but *beseeking* is more urgent; *entreating* more argumentative: *solicitations* are employed to obtain favours, which have more respect to the circumstances than the rank of the solicitor: *supplicating* and *imploping* are resorted to by sufferers for the relief of their misery, and are addressed to those who have the power of averting or increasing the calamity: *craving* is the consequence of longing; it marks an earnestness of *supplication*; an abject state of suffering dependence.

Those who are too idle to work commonly have recourse to *begging*: a kind parent will sometimes rather *beseech* an undutiful child to lay aside his wicked courses, than plunge him deeper into guilt by an ill-timed exercise of authority: when we are *entreated* to do an act of civility, it is a mark of unkindness to be heedless to the wishes of

our friends: gentlemen in office are perpetually exposed to the *solicitations* of their friends, to procure for themselves, or their connexions, places of trust and emolument: a slave *supplicates* his master for pardon, when he has offended, and *implores* his mercy to mitigate, if not to remit the punishment: a poor wretch, suffering with hunger, *craves* a morsel of bread.

TO BEGIN, COMMENCE, ENTER UPON.

BEGIN, in German *beginnen*, is compounded of *be* and *ginnen*, probably a frequentative of *gehen* to go, signifying to go first to a thing.

COMMENCE, in French *commencer*, is not improbably derived from the Latin *commendo*, signifying to betake one's self to a thing.

ENTER, in Latin *intro* within, signifies with the preposition UPON, to go into a thing.

Begin and *commence* are so strictly allied in signification, that it is not easy to discover the difference in their application; although a minute difference does exist. To *begin* respects the order of time; to *commence*, the exertion of setting about a thing: whoever *begins* a dispute is termed the aggressor; no one should *commence* a dispute unless he can calculate consequences, and as this is impracticable, it is better never to *commence* disputes, particularly such as are to be decided by law. *Begin* is opposed to end; *commence* to complete: a person *begins* a thing with a view of ending it; he *commences* a thing with a view of completing it.

To *begin* is either transitive or intransitive; to *commence* is mostly transitive: a speaker *begins* by apologizing; he *commences* his speech with an apology: happiness frequently ends where prosperity *begins*; whoever *commences* any undertaking, without estimating his own power, must not expect to succeed.

To *begin* is used either for things or persons; to *commence* for persons only: all things have their *beginning*; in order to effect any thing, we must make a *commencement*: a word *begins* with a particular letter, or a line *begins* with a particular word; a person *commences* his career. Lastly, *begin* is more colloquial than *commence*: thus we say, to *begin* the work; to *commence* the operation: to *begin* one's play; to *commence* the pursuit: to *begin* to write; to *commence* the letter.

To *commence* and *enter upon* are as closely allied in sense as the former words; they differ principally in application: to

commence seems rather to denote the making an experiment; to *enter upon*, that of first doing what has not been tried before: we *commence* an undertaking; we *enter upon* an employment: speculating people are very ready to *commence* schemes; considerate people are always averse to *entering upon* any office, until they feel themselves fully adequate to discharge its duties.

BEHAVIOUR, CONDUCT, CARRIAGE, DEPARTMENT, DEMEANOUR.

BEHAVIOUR comes from *behave*, compounded of *be* and *have*, signifying to have one's self, or have self-possession.

CONDUCT, in Latin *conductus*, participle of *conduco*, compounded of *con* or *cum* and *duco* to lead along, signifies leading one's self along.

CARRIAGE, the abstract of *carry* (v. *To bear. carry*), signifies the act of carrying one's body, or one's self.

DEPARTMENT, from the Latin *deporto* to carry; and DEMEANOUR, from the French *demener* to lead, have the same original sense as the preceding.

Behaviour respects corporeal or mental actions; *conduct*, mental actions; *carriage*, *department*, and *demeanour*, are different species of behaviour. *Behaviour* respects all actions exposed to the notice of others; *conduct* the general line of a person's moral proceedings: we speak of a person's *behaviour* at table, or in company, in a ball-room, in the street, or in public; of his *conduct* in the management of his private concerns, in the direction of his family, or in his different relations with his fellow-creatures. *Behaviour* applies to the minor morals of society; *conduct* to those of the first moment: in our intercourse with others we may adopt a civil or polite, a rude or boisterous, *behaviour*; in our serious transactions we may adopt a peaceable, discreet, or prudent, a rash, dangerous, or mischievous *conduct*. Our *behaviour* is good or bad; our *conduct* is wise or foolish: by our *behaviour* we may render ourselves agreeable, or otherwise; by our *conduct* we may command esteem, or provoke contempt.

Carriage respects simply the manner of carrying the body; *department* includes both the action and the *carriage* of the body in performing the action; *demeanour* respects only the moral character or tendency of the action: *department* is said only of those exterior actions that have an immediate reference to others; *demeanour*, of the general *behaviour* as it relates to the circumstances and situation of the indivi-

dual; *carriage* is that part of *behaviour*, which it is of the first importance to attend to in young persons. *Carriage* should neither be haughty nor servile; to be graceful, it ought to have a due mixture of dignity and condescension: the *deportment* of a man should be suited to his station; a humble *deportment* is becoming in inferiors; a stately and forbidding *deportment* is very unbecoming in superiors: the *demeanour* of a man should be suited to his situation; the suitable *demeanour* of a judge on the bench, or of a clergyman in the pulpit, adds much to the dignity and solemnity of the office itself,

The *carriage* marks the birth and education: an awkward *carriage* stamps a man as vulgar; a graceful *carriage* evinces refinement and culture. The *deportment* marks the existing temper of the mind: females should guard against a light *deportment*, as highly prejudicial to their reputation; the *demeanour* marks the habitual temper of the mind, or in fact, the real character; we are often led to judge favourably of an individual from the first glance, whose *demeanour* on close examination does not leave such favourable impressions.

BELIEF, CREDIT, TRUST, FAITH.

BELIEF, from *believe*, in Saxon *gelyfan*, *geleavan*, in German *glauben*, comes, in all probability, from *lief*, in German, *belieben* to please, and the Latin *libet* it pleaseth, signifying the pleasure or assent of the mind.

CREDIT, in French *credit*, Latin *creditus*, participle of *credo*, compounded of *cor* the heart, and *do* to give, signifies also giving the heart.

TRUST is connected with the old word *trou*, in Saxon *treowian*, German *trauen*, old German *thravahn*, *thruven*, &c. to hold true, and probably from the Greek *ᾠαρεω* to have confidence, signifying to depend upon as true.

FAITH, in Latin *fides*, from *fido* to confide, signifies also dependance upon as true.

Belief is the generic term, the others specific; we *believe* when we *credit* and *trust*, but not always *vice versa*. *Belief* rests on no particular person or thing: but *credit* and *trust* rest on the authority of one or more individuals. Every thing is the subject of *belief* which produces one's assent: the events of human life are *credited* upon the authority of the narrator: the words, promises, or the integrity of individuals are

trusted: the power of persons and the virtue of things are objects of *faith*.

Belief and *credit* are particular actions, or sentiments: *trust* and *faith* are permanent dispositions of the mind. Things are entitled to our *belief*; persons are entitled to our *credit*: but people repose a *trust* in others; or have a *faith* in others.

Our *belief* or *unbelief* is not always regulated by our reasoning faculties or the truth of things: we often *believe*, from prejudice and ignorance, things to be true which are very false. With the bulk of mankind, assurance goes further than any thing else in obtaining *credit*: gross falsehoods, pronounced with confidence, will be *credited* sooner than plain truths told in an unvarnished style. There are no disappointments more severe than those which we feel on finding that we have *trusted* to men of base principles. Ignorant people have commonly a more implicit *faith* in any nostrum recommended to them by persons of their own class, than in the prescriptions of professional men regularly educated.

Belief, *trust*, and *faith*, have a religious application, which *credit* has not. *Belief* is simply an act of the understanding *trust* and *faith* are active moving principles of the mind in which the heart is concerned. *Belief* does not extend beyond an assent of the mind to any given proposition; *trust* and *faith* are lively sentiments which impel to action. *Belief* is to *trust* and *faith* as cause to effect: there may be *belief* without either *trust* or *faith*; but there can be no *trust* or *faith* without *belief*: we *believe* that there is a God, who is the creator and preserver of all his creatures; we therefore *trust* in him for his protection of ourselves: we *believe* that Jesus Christ died for the sins of men; we have therefore *faith* in his redeeming grace to save us from our sins.

Belief is common to all religions: *trust* is peculiar to the *believers* in Divine revelation; *faith* is employed by distinction for the Christian *faith*. *Belief* is purely speculative; and *trust* and *faith* are operative: the former operates on the mind; the latter on the outward conduct. *Trust* in God serves to dispel all anxious concern about the future. „*Faith*,“ says the Apostle, „is dead without works.“

BEND, BENT.

Both abstract nouns from the verb to *bend*: the one to express its proper, and the other its moral, application: a stick has a BEND; the mind has a BENT.

A *bend* in any thing that should be straight is a defect; a *bent* of the inclina-

tion that is not sanctioned by religion is detrimental to a person's moral character and peace of mind. For a vicious *bend* in a natural body there are various remedies; but nothing will cure a corrupt *bent* of the will except religion.

BENEFACTION, DONATION.

BENEFACTION, from the Latin *benefacio*, signifies the thing well done, or done for the good of others.

DONATION, from *dono* to give or present, signifies the sum presented.

Both these terms denote an act of charity, but the former comprehends more than the latter: a *benefaction* comprehends acts of personal service in general towards the indigent: *donation* respects simply the act of giving and the thing given. *Benefactions* are for private use: *donations* are for public service. A *benefactor* to the poor does not confine himself to the distribution of money; he enters into all their necessities, consults their individual cases, and suits his *benefactions* to their exigencies; his influence, his counsel, his purse, and his property, are employed for their good: his *donations* form the smallest part of the good which he does.

BENEFICENT, BOUNTIFUL, OR BOUNTY, MUNIFICENT, GENEROUS LIBERAL.

BENEFICENT, from *benefacio* (v. *Benefaction*).

BOUNTIFUL signifies full of *bounty* or goodness, from the French *bonté*, Latin *bonitas*.

MUNIFICENT, in Latin *munificus*, from *munus* and *facio*, signifies the quality of making presents.

GENEROUS, in French *genereux*, Latin *generosus*, of high blood, noble extraction, and consequently of a noble character.

LIBERAL, in French *liberal*, Latin *liberalis* from *liber* free, signifies the quality of being like a free man in distinction from a bondman, and by a natural association being of a free disposition, ready to communicate.

Beneficent respects every thing done for the good of others: *bounty*, *munificence*, and *generosity*, are species of *beneficence*: *liberality* is a qualification of all. The first two denote modes of action: the latter three either modes of action or modes of sentiment. The sincere well-wisher to his fellow-creatures is *beneficent* according to his means; he is *bountiful* in providing for the comfort and happiness of others; he is *munificent* in dispensing favours; he is ge-

nerous in imparting his property; he is *liberal* in all he does.

Beneficence and *bounty* are characteristics of the Deity as well as of his creatures: *munificence*, *generosity*, and *liberality* are mere human qualities. *Beneficence* and *bounty* are the peculiar characteristics of the Deity: with him the will and the act of doing good are commensurate only with the power: he was *beneficent* to us as our Creator, and continues his *beneficence* to us by his daily preservation and protection; to some, however, he has been more *bountiful* than to others, by providing them with an unequal share of the good things of this life. The *beneficence* of man is regulated by the *bounty* of Providence: to whom much is given, from him much will be required.

Princes are *munificent*, friends are *generous*, patrons *liberal*. *Munificence* is measured by the quality and quantity of the thing bestowed; *generosity* by the extent of the sacrifice made; *liberality* by the warmth of the spirit discovered. A monarch displays his *munificence* in the presents which he sends by his ambassadors to another monarch. A *generous* man will wave his claims, however powerful they may be, when the accommodation or relief of another is in question. A *liberal* spirit does not stop to inquire the reason for giving, but gives when the occasion offers.

Munificence may spring either from ostentation or a becoming sense of dignity; *generosity* may spring either from a generous temper, or an easy unconcern about property; *liberality* of conduct is dictated by nothing but a warm heart and an expanded mind. *Munificence* is confined simply to giving, but we may be *generous* in assisting, and *liberal* in rewarding.

BENEFIT, FAVOUR, KINDNESS. CIVILITY.

BENEFIT signifies here that which benefits (v. *Advantage*, *benefit*).

FAVOUR, in French *faveur*, Latin *favor* and *faveo* to bear good will, signifies the act flowing from good will.

KINDNESS signifies an action that is kind (v. *Affectionate*).

CIVILITY signifies that which is civil (v. *Civil*).

The idea of an action gratuitously performed for the advantage of another is common to these terms.

Benefits and *favours* are granted by superiors; *kindnesses* and *civilities* pass between equals,

Benefits serve to relieve actual wants;

the power of conferring and the necessity of receiving them, constitute the relative difference in station between the giver and the receiver: *favours* tend to promote the interest or convenience; the power of giving and the advantage of receiving are dependent on local circumstances, more than on difference of station. *Kindnesses* and *civilities* serve to afford mutual accommodation by a reciprocity of kind offices on the many and various occasions which offer in human life: they are not so important as either *benefits* or *favours*, but they carry a charm with them which is not possessed by the former. *Kindnesses* are more endearing than *civilities*, and pass mostly between those who are known to each other: *civilities* may pass between strangers.

Dependance affords an opportunity for conferring *benefits*; partiality gives rise to *favours*: *kindnesses* are the result of personal regard; *civilities*, of general benevolence. A master confers his *benefits* on such of his domestics as are entitled to encouragement for their fidelity. Men in power distribute their *favours* so as to increase their influence. Friends, in their intercourse with each other, are perpetually called upon to perform *kindnesses* for each other. There is no man so mean that he may not have it in his power to show *civilities* to those who are above him.

BENEFIT, SERVICE, GOOD OFFICE.

BENEFIT, *v.* *Benefit*, *favour*.

SERVICE, *v.* *Advantage*, *benefit*.

OFFICE, in French *office*, Latin *officium* duty, from *officio*, or *ob* and *facio*, signifies the thing done on another's account.

These terms, like the former (*v.* *Benefit*, *favour*), agree in denoting some action performed for the good of another, but they differ in the principle on which the action is performed.

A *benefit* is perfectly gratuitous, it produces an obligation: a *service* is not altogether gratuitous; it is that at least which may be expected, though it cannot be demanded: a *good office* is between the two; it is in part gratuitous, and in part such as one may reasonably expect.

Benefits flow from superiors, and *services* from inferiors or equals; but *good offices* are performed by equals only.

Princes confer *benefits* on their subjects; subjects perform *services* for their princes: neighbours do *good offices* for each other.

Benefits are sometimes the reward of *services*: *good offices* produce a return from the receiver.

Benefits consist of such things as serve to relieve the difficulties, or advance the interests, of the receiver: *services* consist in those acts which tend to lessen the trouble, or increase the ease and convenience, of the person served: *good offices* consist in the employing of one's credit, influence, and mediation for the advantage of another; it is a species of voluntary service.

Humanity leads to *benefits*; the zeal of devotion or friendship renders *services*; general good-will dictates *good offices*.

It is a great *benefit* to assist an embarrassed tradesman out of his difficulty: it is a great *service* for a soldier to save the life of his commander, or for a friend to open the eyes of another to see his danger: it is a *good office* for any one to interpose his mediation to settle disputes, and heal divisions.

BENEVOLENCE, BENEFICENCE.

BENEVOLENCE is literally well willing. BENEFICENCE is literally well doing. The former consists of intention, the latter of action: the former is the cause, the latter the result. *Benevolence* may exist without *beneficence*; but *beneficence* always supposes *benevolence*: a man is not said to be *beneficent* who does good from any sinister views. The *benevolent* man enjoys but half his happiness if he cannot be *beneficent*; yet there will still remain to him an ample store of enjoyment in the contemplation of other's happiness: that man who is gratified only with that happiness of which he himself is the instrument of producing, is not entitled to the name of *benevolent*.

As *benevolence* is an affair of the heart, and *beneficence* of the outward conduct, the former is confined to no station, no rank, no degree of education or power: the poor may be *benevolent* as well as the rich, the unlearned as the learned, the weak as well as the strong: the latter on the contrary is controlled by outward circumstances, and is therefore principally confined to the rich, the powerful, the wise, and the learned.

BENEVOLENCE, BENIGNITY, HUMANITY, KINDNESS, TENDERNESS.

BENEVOLENCE, *v.* *Benevolence*.

BENIGNITY, in Latin *benignitas*, from *bene* and *gigno*, signifies the quality or disposition for producing good.

HUMANITY, in French *humanité*, Latin *humanitas* from *humanus* and *homo*, signifies the quality of belonging to a man, or having what is common to man.

KINDNESS from *kind* (*v.* *Affectionate*).

TENDERNESS, from *tender*, is in Latin *tener*, Greek *τενερ*.

Benevolence and *benignity* lie in the will; *humanity* lies in the heart; *kindness* and *tenderness* in the affections: *benevolence* indicates a general good-will to all mankind; *benignity* a particular good-will flowing out of certain relations; *humanity* is a general tone of feeling; *kindness* and *tenderness* are particular modes of feeling.

Benevolence consists in the wish or intention to do good; it is confined to no station or object: the *benevolent* man may be rich or poor, and his *benevolence* will be exerted wherever there is an opportunity of doing good; *benignity* is always associated with power, and accompanied with condescension.

Benevolence in its fullest sense is the sum of moral excellence, and comprehends every other virtue; when taken in this acceptation, *benignity*, *humanity*, *kindness* and *tenderness*, are but modes of *benevolence*.

Benevolence and *benignity* tend to the communicating of happiness: *humanity* is concerned in the removal of evil. *Benevolence* is common to the Creator and his creatures; it differs only in degree; the former has the knowledge and power as well as the will to do good; man often has the will to do good without having the power to carry it into effect. *Benignity* is ascribed to the stars, to heaven, or to princes; ignorant and superstitious people are apt to ascribe their good fortune to the *benign* influence of the stars rather than to the gracious dispensations of Providence. *Humanity* belongs to man only; it is his peculiar characteristic, and ought at all times to be his boast; when he throws off this his distinguishing badge, he loses every thing valuable in him; it is a virtue that is indispensable in his present suffering condition: *humanity* is as universal in its application as *benevolence*; wherever there is distress, *humanity* flies to its relief. *Kindness* and *tenderness* are partial modes of affection, confined to those who know or are related to each other; we are kind to friends and acquaintances, *tender* towards those who are near and dear: *kindness* is a mode of affection most fitted for social beings; it is what every one can show, and every one is pleased to receive; *tenderness* is a state of feeling that is occasionally acceptable: the young and the weak demand *tenderness* from those who stand in the closest connexion with them, but this feeling may be carried to an excess so as to injure the object on which it is fixed.

There are no circumstances or situation

in life which preclude the exercise of *benevolence*: next to the pleasure of making others happy, the *benevolent* man rejoices in seeing them so: the *benign* influence of a *benevolent* monarch extends to the remotest corner of his dominions: the multiplied misfortunes to which men are exposed afford ample scope for the exercise of *humanity*: *kindness* is always an amiable feeling, and in a grateful mind always begets *kindness*; but it is sometimes ill bestowed upon selfish people who requite it by making fresh exactions: *tenderness* is frequently little better than an amiable weakness, when directed to a wrong end; the false tenderness of parents has often been the ruin of children.

BENT, CURVED, CROOKED, AWRY.

BENT, from *bend*, in Saxon *bendan*, is a variation of *wind*, in the sea phraseology *wend*, in German *wenden*, &c. from the Hebrew *onad* to wind or turn,

CURVED is in Latin *curvus*: in Greek *κορτος*, Aeolice *κυρτος*.

CROOKED, v. *Awkward*.

AWRY is a variation of *writhed*, v. *To turn*.

Bent is here the generic term, all the rest are but modes of the *bent*: what is *bent* is opposed to that which is straight; things may therefore be *bent* to any degree, but when *curved* they are *bent* only to a small degree; when *crooked* they are *bent* to a great degree: a stick is *bent* any way; it is *curved* by being *bent* one specific way; it is *crooked* by being *bent* different ways.

Things may be *bent* by accident or design; they are *curved* by design, or according to some rule; they are *crooked* by accident or in violation of some rule: a stick is *bent* by the force of the hand; a line is *curved* so as to make a mathematical figure; it is *crooked* so as to lose all figure: *awry* marks a species of *crookedness*, but *crooked* is applied as an epithet, and *awry* is employed to characterize the action; hence we speak of a *crooked* thing, and of sitting or standing *awry*.

BENT, BIAS, INCLINATION, PREPOSESSION.

BENT, v. *Bend*, *bent*.

BIAS, in French *biais*, signifies a weight fixed on one side of a bowl in order to turn its course that way towards which the *bias* leans, from the Greek *βια* force.

INCLINATION, in French *inclination*, Latin *inclinatio*, from *inclino*, Greek *κλινω*, signifies a leaning towards.

PREPOSESSION, compounded of *pre*

and *possession*, signifies the taking *possession* of the mind previously, or beforehand.

All these terms denote a preponderating influence on the mind. *Bent* is applied to the will, affection, and power in general; *bias* solely to the judgment; *inclination* and *prepossession* to the state of the feelings. The *bent* includes the general state of the mind, and the object on which it fixes a regard; *bias*, the particular influential power which sways the judging faculty: the one is absolutely considered with regard to itself; the other relatively to its results and the object it acts upon,

Bent is sometimes with regard to *bias*, as cause is to effect; we may frequently trace in the particular *bent* of a person's likes and dislikes the principal *bias* which determines his opinions. *Inclination* is a faint kind of *bent*: *prepossession* is a weak species of *bias*: an *inclination* is a state of something, namely, a state of the feelings: *prepossession* is an actual something, namely, the thing that *prepossesses*,

We may discover the *bent* of a person's mind in his gay or serious moments; in his occupations, and in his pleasures: in all disputed matters the support of a party will operate more or less to *bias* the minds of men for or against particular men, or particular measures; when we are attached to the party that espouses the cause of religion and good order, this *bias* is in some measure commendable and salutary: a mind without *inclination* would be a blank, and where *inclination* is, there is the groundwork for *prepossession*: the mind that has virtuous *inclinations* will be *prepossessed* in favour of every thing that leans to virtue's side; it were well for mankind were this the only *prepossession*.

TO BEREAVE, DEPRIVE, STRIP.

BEREAVE, in Saxon *bereafian*, German *berauben*, &c. is compounded of *be* and *reave* or *rob*, Saxon *reafian*, German *rauben*, low German *roofen*, etc. Latin *rapina* and *rapio* to catch or seize, signifying to take away contrary to one's wishes.

DEPRIVE, compounded of *de* and *prive*, French *priver*, Latin *privo*, from *privus* private, signifies to make that one's own which was another's

STRIP is in German *streifen*, low German *streipen*, *stroeden*, Swedish *ströfva*, probably changed from the Latin *surrupio* to snatch by stealth.

To *bereave* expresses more than *deprive*, but less than *strip*, which in this sense is figurative, and denotes a total *bereavement*:

one is *bereaved* of children, *deprived* of pleasures, and *stripped* of property: we are *bereaved* of that on which we set most value; the act of *bereaving* does violence to our inclination: we are *deprived* of the ordinary comforts and conveniences of life; they cease to be ours: we are *stripped* of the things which we most want; we are thereby rendered as it were naked.

We are *bereaved* of our dearest hopes and enjoyments by the dispensations of Providence: casualties *deprive* us of many little advantages or gratifications which fall in our way: men are active in *stripping* each other of their just rights and privileges.

BESIDES, MOREOVER.

BESIDES, that is, by the *side*, next to, marks simply the connexion which subsists between what goes before and what follows,

MOREOVER, that is, more than all else, marks the addition of something particular to what has already been said.

Thus in enumerating the good qualities of an individual, we may say, „he is *besides* of a peaceable disposition.“ On concluding any subject of question we may introduce a further clause by a *moreover*: „*Moreover* we must not forget the claims of those who will suffer by such a change.“

BESIDES, EXCEPT.

BESIDES (v. *Moreover*), which is here taken as a preposition, expresses the idea of addition. **EXCEPT** expresses that of exclusion.

There were many there *besides* ourselves; no one *except* ourselves will be admitted.

TO BEWAIL, BEMOAN, LAMENT.

BEWAIL is compounded of *be* and *wail*, which is probably connected with the word *woe*, signifying to express sorrow.

BEMOAN, compounded of *be* and *moan*, signifies to indicate grief with *moans*.

LAMENT, in French *lamenteur*, Latin *lamentor* or *lamentum*, probably from the Greek *κλαύμα* and *κλαίω* to cry out with grief,

All these terms mark an expression of pain by some external sign. *Bewail* is not so strong as *bemoan*, but stronger than *lament*; *bewail* and *bemoan* are expressions of unrestrained grief or anguish: a wretched mother *bewails* the loss of her child: a person in deep distress *bemoans* his hard fate: *lamentation* may arise from simple sorrow or even imaginary grievances: a sensualist *laments* the disappointment of some expected gratification.

BIAS, PREPOSSESSION, PREJUDICE.

BIAS, *v. Bent, bias.*PREPOSSESSION, *v. Bent, bias.*

PREJUDICE, in French *prejudice*, Latin *præjudicium*, compounded of *præ* before, and *judicium* judgment, signifies a judgment beforehand, that is, before examination.

Bias marks the state of the mind: *prepossession* applies either to the general or particular state of the feelings; *prejudice* is employed only for opinions. Children may receive an early *bias* that influences their future character and destiny: *prepossessions* spring from casualties; they do not exist in young minds: *prejudices* are the fruits of a contracted education. Physical infirmities often give a strong *bias* to serious pursuits: *prepossessions* created by outward appearances are not always fallacious: it is at present the fashion to brand every thing with the name of *prejudice*, which does not coincide with the lax notions of the age. A *bias* may be overpowered, a *prepossession* overcome, and a *prejudice* corrected or removed.

We may be *biassed* for or against; we are always *prepossessed* in favour, and mostly *prejudiced* against.

TO BIND, TIE.

BIND, in Saxon *binden*, German, etc. *binden*, comes from Latin *vincio*, Greek *σφινγω*, and is connected with the word *wind*.

TIE, in Saxon *tian*, is very probably connected with the low German *tehen*, high German *ziehen* to draw, the English *tug* or *tow*, and the Latin *duco* to draw.

The species of fastening denoted by these two words differs both in manner and degree. *Binding* is performed by circumvolution round a body; *tying*, by involution within itself. Some bodies are *bound* without being *tied*; others are *tied* without being *bound*: a wounded leg is *bound* but not *tied*; a string is *tied* but not *bound*; a riband may sometimes be *bound* round the head, and *tied* under the chin. *Binding* therefore serves to keep several things in a compact form together; *tying* may serve to prevent one single body separating from another; a criminal is *bound* hand and foot; he is *tied* to a stake.

Binding and *tying* likewise differ in degree; *binding* serves to produce adhesion in all the parts of a body; *tying* only to produce contact in a single part: thus when the hair is *bound*, it is almost inclosed in

an envelope: when it is *tied* with a string, the ends are left to hang loose.

A similar distinction is preserved in the figurative use of the terms. A *bond* of union is applicable to a large body with many component parts; a *tie* of affection marks an adhesion between individual minds.

TO BIND, OBLIGE, ENGAGE.

BIND, *v. To bind, tie.*

OBLIGE, in French *obliger*. Latin *obligo*, compounded of *ob* and *ligo*, signifies to tie up.

ENGAGE, in French *engager*, compounded of *en* or *in* and *gage* a pledge, signifies to *bind* by means of a pledge.

Bind is more forcible and coercive than *oblige*; *oblige* than *engage*. We are *bound* by an oath, *obliged* by circumstances, and *engaged* by promises.

Conscience *binds*, prudence or necessity *obliges*, honour and principle *engage*. A parent is *bound* no less by the law of his conscience, than by those of the community to which he belongs, to provide for his helpless offspring. Politeness *obliges* men of the world to preserve a friendly exterior towards those for whom they have no regard. When we are *engaged* in the service of our king and country, we cannot shrink from our duty without exposing ourselves to the infamy of all the world.

We *bind* a man by a fear of what may befall him; we *oblige* him by some immediately urgent motive; we *engage* him by alluring offers, and the prospect of gain. A debtor is *bound* to pay by virtue of a written instrument in law; he is *obliged* to pay in consequence of the importunate demands of the creditor; he is *engaged* to pay in consequence of a promise given. A *bond* is the strictest deed in law; an *obligation* binds under pain of a pecuniary loss; an *engagement* is mostly verbal, and rests on the rectitude of the parties.

BISHOPRIC, DIOCESE.

BISHOPRIC, compounded of *bishop* and *rick* or *reich* empire, signifies the empire or government of a bishop.

DIOCESE, in Greek *διοχαις*, compounded of *δια* and *οικεω*, signifies an administration throughout.

Both these words describe the extent of an episcopal jurisdiction; the first with relation to the person who officiates, the second with relation to the charge. There may, therefore, be a *bishopric*, either where there are many *dioceses* or no *diocese*; but according to the import of the term, there is properly no *diocese* where there is no

bishopric. When the jurisdiction is merely titular, as in countries where the catholic religion is not recognised, it is a *bishopric*, but not a *diocese*. On the other hand, the *bishopric* of Rome or that of an archbishop comprehends all the *dioceses* of the subordinate bishops. Hence it arises that when we speak of the ecclesiastical distribution of a country, we term the divisions *bishoprics*; but when we speak of the actual office, we term it a *diocese*. England is divided into a certain number of *bishoprics*, not *dioceses*. Every bishop visits his *diocese*, not his *bishopric*, at stated intervals.

TO BLAME, REPROVE, REPROACH,
UPBRAID, CENSURE, CONDEMN.

BLAME, in French *blamer*, probably from the Greek *βεβλαμμαι*, perfect of the verb *βλαπτω* to hurt, signifying to deal harshly with.

REPROVE, comes from the Latin *reprobo*, which signifies the contrary of *probo* to approve.

REPROACH, in French *reprocher*, compounded of *re* and *proche*, *proximus* near, signifies to bring near or cast back upon a person.

UPBRAID, compounded of *up* or *upon* and *braid*, or *breed*, signifies to hatch against one.

CENSURE, *v.* To accuse, *censure*.

CONDEMN, in French *condamner*, Latin *condemno*, compounded of *con* and *damno*, from *damnum* a loss or penalty, signifies to sentence to some penalty.

The expression of one's disapprobation of a person, or of that which he has done, is the common idea in the signification of these terms; but to blame expresses less than to reprove. We simply charge with a fault in *blaming*; but in *reproving* severity is mixed with the charge. *Reproach* expresses more than either; it is to *blame* acrimoniously. We need not hesitate to *blame* as occasion may require; but it is proper to be cautious how we deal out *reproof* where the necessity of the case does not fully warrant it, and it is highly culpable to *reproach* without the most substantial reason.

To *blame* and *reprove* are the acts of a superior; to *reproach*, *upbraid*, that of an equal: to *censure* and *condemn* leave the relative condition of the agent and the sufferer undefined. Masters *blame* or *reprove* their servants; parents, their children; friends and acquaintances *reproach* and *upbraid* each other; persons of all conditions may *censure* or be *censured*, *con-*

demn or be *condemned*, according to circumstances.

Blame and *reproof* are dealt out on every ordinary occasion; *reproach* and *upbraid* respect personal matters, and always that which affects the moral character; *censure* and *condemnation* are provoked by faults and misconduct of different descriptions. Every fault, however trivial, may expose a person to *blame*. Intentional errors, however small, seem necessarily to call for *reproof*, and yet it is a mark of an imperious temper to substitute *reproof* in the place of admonition, when the latter might possibly answer the purpose. There is nothing which provokes a *reproach* sooner than ingratitude. Mutual *upbraidings* commonly follow between those who have mutually contributed to their misfortunes. The defective execution of a work is calculated to draw down *censure* upon its author, particularly if he betrays a want of modesty. The mistakes of a general, or a minister of state, will provoke *condemnation*, particularly if his integrity be called in question.

Blame, *reproof*, and *upbraiding*, are always addressed directly to the individual in person; *reproach*, *censure*, and *condemnation*, are sometimes conveyed through an indirect channel, or not addressed at all to the party who is the object of them. When a master *blames* his servant, or a parent *reproves* his child, or one friend *upbraids* another, he directs his discourse to him to express his disapprobation. A man will always be *reproached* by his neighbours for the vices he commits, however he may fancy himself screened from their observation: writers *censure* each other in their publications; the conduct of individuals is sometimes *condemned* by the public at large.

Blame, *reproach*, *upbraid*, and *condemn*, may be applied to ourselves; *reproof* and *censure* are applied to others: we *blame* ourselves for acts of imprudence; our consciences *reproach* us for our weaknesses, and *upbraid* or *condemn* us for our sins.

BLAMELESS, IRREPROACHABLE, UNBLEMISHED, UNSPOTTED, OR SPOTLESS.

BLAMELESS signifies literally void of *blame* (*v.* To blame).

IRREPROACHABLE, what is not able to be *reproached* (*v.* To blame).

UNBLEMISHED, what is without *blemish* (*v.* Blemish).

UNSPOTTED, what is without *spot* (*v.* Blemish).

Blameless is less than *irreproachable*; what is *blameless* is simply free from *blame*, but that which is *irreproachable* cannot be

blamed, or have any *reproach* attached to it. It is good to say of a man that he leads a *blameless* life, but it is a high encomium to say, that he leads an *irreproachable* life: the former is but the negative praise of one who is known only for his harmlessness; the latter is the positive commendation of a man who is well known for his integrity in the different relations of society.

Unblemished and *unspotted* are applicable to many objects, besides that of personal conduct; and when applied to this, their original meaning sufficiently points out their use in distinction from the two former. We may say of a man that he has an *irreproachable* or an *unblemished* reputation, and *unspotted* or *spotless* purity of life.

BLEMISH, STAIN, SPOT, SPECK, FLAW.

BLEMISH comes from the French *blémir* to grow pale.

STAIN, in French *teindre*, old French *desteindre*, Latin *tingo* to die.

SPOT, not improbably connected with the word *spit*, Latin *sputum*, and the Hebrew *spad* to adhere as something extraneous.

SPECK, in Saxon *specce*, Hebrew *sapach* to unite, or to adhere as a tetter on the skin.

FLAW, in Saxon *floh*, *flice*, German *fleck*, low German *flak* or *pakke* a spot or a fragment, a piece, most probably from the Latin *plaga*, Greek *πληγή* a strip of land, or a stripe, a wound in the body,

In the proper sense *blemish* is the generic, the rest specific: a *stain*, a *spot*, *speck*, and *flaw*, are *blemishes*, but there are likewise many *blemishes*, which are neither *stains*, *spots*, *specks*, nor *flaws*.

Whatever takes off from the seemliness of appearance is a *blemish*. In works of art the slightest dimness of colour, or want of proportion, is a *blemish*. A *stain* and *spot* sufficiently characterize themselves, as that which is superfluous and out of its place. A *speck* is a small *spot*; and a *flaw*, which is confined to hard substances, mostly consists of a faulty indenture on the outer surface. A *blemish* tarnishes; a *stain* spoils; a *spot*, *speck*, *flaw*, disfigures. A *blemish* is rectified, a *stain* wiped out, a *spot* or *speck* removed.

Blemish, *stain*, and *spot*, are employed figuratively. Even an imputation of what is improper in our moral conduct is a *blemish* in our reputation: the failings of a good man are so many *spots* in the bright hemisphere of his virtue: there are some vices which affix a *stain* on the character of nations, as well as of the individuals who

are guilty of them. A *blemish* or a *spot* may be removed by a course of good conduct, but a *stain* is mostly indelible: it is as great a privilege to have an *unblemished* reputation, or a *spotless* character, as it is a misfortune to have the *stain* of bad actions affixed to our name.

BLEMISH, DEFECT, FAULT.

BLEMISH, *v.* *Blemish*, *stain*.

DEFECT, in Latin *defectus*, participle of *deficio* to fall short, signifies the thing falling short.

FAULT, from *fail*, in French *faute*, from *faillir*, in German *gefehlt*, participle of *fehlen*, probably comes from the Latin *falsus* false, *fallo* to deceive or be wanting, and the Hebrew *repal* to fall or decay, signifying what is wanting to truth or propriety.

Blemish respects the exterior of an object; *defect* consists in the want of some specific propriety in an object: *fault* conveys the idea not only of something wrong, but also of relation to the author. There is a *blemish* in fine china; a *defect* in the springs of a clock; and a *fault* in the contrivance. An accident may cause a *blemish* in a fine painting; the course of nature may occasion a *defect* in a person's speech; but the carelessness of the workman is evinced by the *faults* in the workmanship. A *blemish* may be easier remedied than a *defect* is corrected, or a *fault* repaired.

TO BLOT OUT, EXPUNGE, RASE OR ERASE, EFFACE. CANCEL, OBLITERATE.

BLOT is in all probability a variation of *spot*, and signifies to cover over with a *blot*.

EXPUNGE, in Latin *expungo*, compounded of *ex* and *pungo* to prick, signifies to put out by pricking with the pen.

ERASE, in Latin *erasus*, participle of *erado*, that is, *e* and *rado*, to scratch out.

EFFACE, in French *effacer*, compounded of the Latin *e* and *facio* to make, signifies literally to make or put out.

CANCEL, in French *canceller*, Latin *cancello*, from *cancelli* lattice-work, signifies to strike out with cross lines.

OBLITERATE, in Latin *obliteratus*, participle of *oblitero*, compounded of *ob* and *litera*, signifies to cover over letters.

All these terms obviously refer to characters that are impressed on bodies; the first three apply in the proper sense only to that which is written with the hand, and bespeak the manner in which the action is performed. Letters are *blotted out*, so that they cannot be seen again; they are

expunged, so as to signify that they cannot stand for any thing; they are *erased*, so that the space may be re-occupied with writing. The last three are extended in their application to other characters formed on other substances; *efface* is general, and does not designate either the manner or the object: inscriptions on stone may be *effaced*, which are rubbed off so as not to be visible: *cancel* is principally confined to written or printed characters; they are *cancelled* by striking through them with the pen: in this manner leaves or pages of a book are *cancelled* which are no longer to be reckoned: *obliterate* is said of all characters, but without defining the mode in which they are put out; letters are *obliterated*, which are in any way made illegible.

Efface applies to images, or the representations of things; in this manner the likeness of a person may be *effaced* from a statue; *cancel* respects the subject which is written or printed; *obliterate* respects the single letters which constitute words.

Efface is the consequence of some direct action on the thing which is *effaced*; in this manner writing may be *effaced* from a wall by the action of the elements: *cancel* is the act of a person, and always the fruit of design: *obliterate* is the fruit of accident and circumstances in general; time itself may *obliterate* characters on a wall or on paper.

The metaphorical use of these terms is easily deducible from the preceding explanation; what is figuratively described as written in a book may be said to be *blotted out*; thus our sins are *blotted out* of the book by the atoning blood of Christ: when the contents of a book are in part rejected, they are aptly described as being *expunged*; in this manner, the free-thinking sects *expunge* from their creed what does not humour their passions. When the memory is represented as having characters impressed, they are said to be *erased*, when they are, as it were, directly taken out and occupied by others; in this manner, the recollection of what a child has learned is easily *erased* by play; and with equal propriety sorrows may be said to *efface* the recollection of a person's image from the mind. From the idea of striking out or *cancelling* a debt in an account-book, a debt of gratitude, or an obligation, is said to be *cancelled*. As the lineaments of the face correspond to written characters, we may say that all traces of his former greatness are *obliterated*.

BLOW, STROKE.

BLOW probably derives the meaning in which it is here taken from the action of the wind, which it resembles when it is violent.

STROKE, from the word *strike*, denotes the act of striking.

Blow is used abstractedly to denote the effect of violence; *stroke* is employed relatively to the person producing that effect. A *blow* may be received by the carelessness of the receiver, or by a pure accident; but *strokes* are dealt out according to the design of the giver. Children are always in the way of getting *blows* in the course of their play; and of receiving *strokes* by way of chastisement.

A *blow* may be given with the hand, or with any flat substance; a *stroke* is rather a long drawn *blow* given with a long instrument, like a stick. *Blows* may be given with the flat part of a sword, and *strokes* with a stick.

BODY, CORPSE, CARCASE.

BODY is here taken in the improper sense for a dead *body*.

CORPSE, from the Latin *corpus*, a body, has also been turned from its derivation, to signify a dead body.

CARCASE, in French *carcasse*, is compounded of *caro* and *cassa vita*, signifying flesh without life.

Body is applicable to either men or brutes, *corpse* to men only, and *carcase* to brutes only, unless when taken in a contemptuous sense. When speaking of any particular person who is deceased, we should use the simple term *body*; the *body* was suffered to lie too long unburied: when designating its condition as lifeless, the term *corpse* is preferable; he was taken up as a *corpse*: when designating the *body* as a lifeless lump separated from the soul, it may be characterized (though contemptuously) as a *carcase*; the fowls devour the *carcase*.

BOLD, FEARLESS, INTREPID, UNDAUNTED.

BOLD, *v. Audacity*.

FEARLESS signifies without fear (*v. To apprehend*).

INTREPID, compounded of *in* privative and *trepidus* trembling, marks the total absence of fear.

UNDAUNTED, of *un* privative and *daunted*, from the Latin *domitatus*, participle of *domitare* to impress with fear signifies unimpressed or unmoved at the prospect of danger.

Boldness is positive: *fearlessness* is negative; we may therefore be *fearless* without being *bold*, or *fearless* through *boldness*: *fearlessness* is a temporary state; we may be *fearless* of danger at this, or at that time; *fearless* of loss, and the like: *boldness* is a characteristic; it is associated with constant *fearlessness*. *Intrepidity* and *undauntedness* denote a still higher degree of *fearlessness* than *boldness*: *boldness* is confident, forgets the consequences; *intrepidity* is collected, it sees the danger, and faces it with composure; *undauntedness* is associated with unconquerable firmness and resolution; it is awed by nothing: the *bold* man proceeds on his enterprise with spirit and vivacity; the *intrepid* man calmly advances to the scene of death and destruction; the *undaunted* man keeps his countenance in the season of trial, in the midst of the most terrifying and overwhelming circumstances.

BOOTY. SPOIL, PREY.

These words mark a species of capture.

BOOTY, in French *butin*, Danish *bytte*, Dutch *buylt*, German *beute*, probably comes from the Teutonic *bat* a useful thing, denoting the thing taken for its use.

SPOIL, in French *dépouillé*. Latin *spolium*, in Greek *σπυλον*, signifying the things stripped off from the dead, from *σπυλαω*, Hebrew *salal* to spoil.

PREY, in French *proie*, Latin *praeda*, is not improbably changed from *praendo*, *prendo*, or *prehendo* to lay hold of, signifying the thing seized.

The first two are used as military terms or in attacks on an enemy, the latter in cases of particular violence. The soldier gets his *booty*; the combatant his *spoils*; the carnivorous animal his *prey*. *Booty* respects what is of personal service to the captor; *spoils* whatever serves to designate his triumph; *prey* includes whatever gratifies the appetite and is to be consumed. When a town is taken, soldiers are too busy in the work of destruction and mischief to carry away much *booty*; in every battle the arms and personal property of the slain enemy are the lawful *spoils* of the victor; among cannibals the prisoners of war are the *prey* of the conquerors.

Booty and *prey* are often used in an extended and figurative sense. Plunderers obtain a rich *booty*; the diligent bee returns loaded with its *booty*.^{*} It is necessary that animals should become a *prey* to man, in order that he may not become a *prey* to them; every thing in nature be-

comes a *prey* to another thing, which in its turn falls a *prey* to something else. All is change but order. Man is a *prey* to the diseases of his body or his mind, and after death to the worms.

BORDER. EDGE, RIM OR BRIM, BRINK, MARGIN, VERGE.

BORDER, in French *bord* or *bordure*, Teutonic *bord*, is probably connected with *bret*, and the English *board*, from *brytan*, in Greek *πριζειν* to saw or split.

EDGE, in Saxon *ege*, low German *egge*, high German *ecke* a point, Latin *acies*, Greek *ακη* sharpness, signifies a sharp point.

RIM, in Saxon *rima*, high German *rahmen* a frame, *riemen* a thong, Greek *ρυμα* a tract, from *ρυνω* to draw, signifies a line drawn round.

BRIM, **BRINK**, are but variations of *rim*.

MARGIN, in French *margin*, Latin *margo*, probably comes from *mare* the sea, as it is mostly connected with water.

VERGE, from the Latin *virga*, signifies a rod, but is here used in the improper sense for the extremity of an object.

Of these terms *border* is the least definite point, *edge* the most so; *rim* and *brink* are species of *edge*; *margin* and *verge* are species of *border*. A *border* is a stripe, an *edge* is a line. The *border* lies at a certain distance from the *edge*; the *edge* is the exterior termination of the surface of any substance. Whatever is wide enough to admit of any space round its circumference may have a *border*; whatever comes to a narrow extended surface has an *edge*. Many things may have both a *border* and an *edge*; of this description are caps, gowns, carpets, and the like; others have a *border* but no *edge*, as lands; and others have an *edge*, but no *border*, as a knife or a table.

A *rim* is the *edge* of any vessel; the *brim* is the exterior edge of a cup; a *brink* is the *edge* of any precipice or deep place; a *margin* is the *border* of a book or a piece of water; a *verge* is the extreme *border* of a place.

BORDER. BOUNDARY. FRONTIER, CON-FINE. PRECINCT.

BORDER, v. *Border*, *edge*.

BOUNDARY, from to *bound* (v. *To bound*), expresses what *bounds*, *binds*, or *confines*.

FRONTIER, French *frontière*, from the Latin *frons* a forehead, signifies the *forepart*, or the commencement of the country.

^{*} Vide Roubaud: „Proie. butin“

CONFINE, in Latin *confinis*, compounded of *con* or *cum* and *finis* an end, signifies an end next to an end.

PRECINCT, in Latin *praecinctum*, participle of *praecingo*, that is, *prae* and *cingo* to enclose, signifies any enclosed place.

All these terms are applied to land, except the latter, which may apply to space in general. *Border* marks the extremities of one country in relation to another, as the *borders* of Scotland: *boundary* respects the prescribed limits of any place, as the *boundaries* of a village; *frontiers* denote the commencement of a country, as the *frontiers* of Germany or France; and *confines* those parts adjoining, or lying contiguous to any given place or district.

Borders and *frontiers* are said of a country only; *boundary* and *confines* of any smaller political division. The inhabitants who lived on the *borders* of England and Scotland were formerly distinguished for their mutual broils and animosities; the *boundaries* of kingdoms, countries, and provinces, are distinguished on general maps: it is common on the *frontiers* of continental kingdoms to require a pass from every one who wishes to enter the country: we may speak of the *confines* between Germany and Holland, but with more propriety of the *confines* between the different states of Germany, as also in former times of the *confines* betwixt the Sabines, the Aequi, Volsci, and other small communities which existed in Italy previous to the establishment of the Roman empire.

TO BOUND, LIMIT, CONFINE, CIRCUMSCRIBE, RESTRICT.

BOUND comes from the verb *bind*, signifying that which *binds* fast, or close to an object.

LIMIT, from the Latin *limes* a landmark, signifies to draw a line which is to be the exterior line or limit.

CONFINE signifies to bring within confines (*v. Border*).

CIRCUMSCRIBE, in Latin *circumscribo*, is compounded of *circum* and *scribo* to write round, that is, to describe a line round.

RESTRICT, in Latin *restrictum*, participle of *restringo*, compounded of *re* and *stringo*, signifies to keep fast back.

The first four of these terms are employed in the proper sense of parting off certain spaces.

Bound applies to the natural or political divisions of the earth: countries are *bounded* by mountains and seas; kingdoms are often *bounded* by each other; Spain is *bounded* on one side by Portugal, on the other

side by the Mediterranean, and on a third side by the Pyrenees. *Limit* applies to any artificial boundary: landmarks in fields serve to show the *limits* of one man's ground from another; so may walls, palings, hedges, or any other visible sign, be converted into a *limit*, to distinguish one spot from another, and in this manner a field is said to be *limited*, because it has *limits* assigned to it. To *confine* is to bring the *limits* close together; to part off one space absolutely from another: in this manner we *confine* a garden by means of walls. To *circumscribe* is literally to surround: in this manner a circle may *circumscribe* a square: there is this difference however between *confine* and *circumscribe*, that the former may not only show the *limits*, but may also prevent egress and ingress; whereas the latter, which is only a line, is but a simple mark that *limits*.

From the proper acceptation of these terms we may easily perceive the ground on which their improper acceptation rests: to *bound* is an action suited to the nature of things, or to some given rule; in this manner our views are *bounded* by the objects which intercept our sight: we *bound* our desires according to principles of propriety. To *limit*, *confine*, *circumscribe*, all convey the idea of control which is more or less exercised. To *limit*, whether it be said of persons *limiting* things, or persons being *limited* by things, is an affair of discretion or necessity; we *limit* our expenses because we are *limited* by circumstances. *Confine* conveys the same idea to a still stronger degree: what is *confined* is not only brought within a *limit* but is kept to that *limit*, which it cannot pass; in this manner a person *confines* himself to a diet which he finds absolutely necessary for his health, or he is *confined* in the size of his house, in the choice of his situation, or in other circumstances equally uncontrollable; hence the term *confined* expresses also the idea of the *limits* being made narrow as well as impassable or unchangeable. To *circumscribe* is figuratively to draw a line round; in this manner we are *circumscribed* in our pecuniary circumstances by the want of riches. In as much as all these terms convey the idea of being acted upon involuntarily they become allied to the term *restrict*, which simply expresses the exercise of control on the will; we use *restriction* when we *limit* and *confine*, but we may *restrict* without *limiting* or *confining*: to *limit* and *confine* are the acts of things upon persons, or persons upon things; but to *restrict* is only the act of persons upon persons: we are

limited or *confined* only to a certain degree, but we may be *restricted* to an indefinite degree: the *limiting* and *confining* depend often on ourselves; the *restriction* depends upon the will of others: a person *limits* himself to so many hours' work in a day; an author *confines* himself to a particular branch of a subject; a person is *restricted* by his physician to a certain portion of food in the day: to be *confined* to a certain spot is irksome to one who has always had his liberty; but to be *restricted* in all his actions would be intolerable.

Our greatest happiness consists in *bounding* our desires to our condition: it is prudent to *limit* our exertions, when we find them prejudicial to our health: it is necessary to *confine* our attention to one object at a time: it is unfortunate to be *circumscribed* in our means of doing good: it is painful to be *restricted* in the enjoyment of innocent pleasure.

Bounded is opposed to *unbounded*, *limited* to *extended*, *confined* expanded, *circumscribed* to *ample*, *restricted* to *free*, or specifically *unrestricted*.

BOUNDLESS, UNBOUNDED, UNLIMITED, INFINITE.

BOUNDLESS, or without *bounds*, is applied to infinite objects which admit of no *bounds* to be made or conceived by us.

UNBOUNDED, or not *bounded*, is applied to that which might be *bounded*.

UNLIMITED, or not *limited*, applies to that which might be *limited*.

INFINITE, or not *finite*, applies to that which in its nature admits of no *bounds*.

The ocean is a *boundless* object so long as no *bounds* to it have been discovered; desires which ought always to be *bounded* are often *unbounded*; and power which is always better *limited* is sometimes *unlimited*; nothing is *infinite* but that Being from whom all *finite* beings proceed.

BOUNDS, BOUNDARY.

BOUNDS and **BOUNDARY**, from the verb *bound* (v. *bound*), signify the line which sets a *bound*, or marks the extent to which any spot of ground reaches.

Bounds is employed to designate the whole space including the outer line that *confines*: *boundary* comprehends only this outer line. *Bounds* are made for a local purpose; *boundary* for a political purpose: the master of a school prescribes the *bounds* beyond which the scholar is not to go; the parishes throughout England have their *boundaries*, which are distinguished by marks: fields have likewise their *boundaries*,

which are commonly marked out by a hedge or a ditch.

Bounds are temporary and changeable; *boundaries* permanent and fixed: whoever has the authority of prescribing *bounds* for others, may in like manner contract or extend them at pleasure; the *boundaries* of places are seldom altered, but in consequence of great political changes.

In the figurative sense *bound* or *bounds* is even more frequently used than *boundary*: we speak of setting *bounds* to our ambition or enlarging the boundaries of knowledge.

BRAVE, GALLANT.

BRAVE, through the medium of the northern languages, comes from the Greek *βραβειον* the reward of victory, denoting the ardour which a prospect of such rewards inspires.

GALLANT, in French *galant*, comes from the Greek *γαλλω* to adorn, signifying distinguished either by splendid dress or splendid qualities.

These epithets, whether applied to the person or the action, are alike honourable; but the latter is a much stronger expression than the former. *Gallantry* is extraordinary *bravery*, or *bravery* on extraordinary occasions: the *brave* man goes willingly where he is commanded; the *gallant* man leads on with vigour to the attack. *Bravery* is common to vast numbers and whole nations; *gallantry* is peculiar to individuals or particular bodies: the *brave* man *bravely* defends the post assigned him; the *gallant* man volunteers his services in cases of peculiar danger: a man may feel ashamed in not being considered *brave*; he feels a pride in being looked upon as *gallant*. To call a hero *brave* adds little or nothing to his character; but to entitle him *gallant* adds a lustre to the glory he has acquired.

We cannot speak of a British tar without thinking of *bravery*; or of his exploits without thinking of *gallantry*.

TO BRAVE, DEFY, DARE, CHALLENGE.

BRAVE, from the epithet *brave* (v. *Brave*), signifies to act the *brave*.

DEFY, in French *defier*, probably changed from *defaire* to *undo*, to make nothing, or set at naught.

DARE, in Saxon *dearran*, *dyrran*, Franconian, et. *codurren*, *thorren*, Greek *θαρσεω*, to be bold, or have the confidence to do.

CHALLENGE, is probably changed from the Greek *καλεω* to call.

We *brave* things: we *dare* and *challenge* persons; we *defy* persons or their actions: the sailor *braves* the tempestuous ocean, and very often *braves* death itself in its most terrific form; he *dares* the enemy whom he meets to the engagement; he *defies* all his boastings and vain threats.

Brave is sometimes used in a bad sense; *defy* and *dare* commonly so. There is much idle contempt and affected indifference in *braving*; much insolent resistance in *defying*; much provocation and affront in *daring*: a bad man *braves* the scorn and reproach of all the world; he *defies* the threats of his superiors to punish him; he *dares* them to exert their power over him.

Brave and *defy* are dispositions of mind which display themselves in the conduct; *dare* and *challenge* are modes of action: we *brave* a storm by meeting its violence: we *defy* the malice of our enemies by pursuing that line of conduct which is most calculated to increase its bitterness. To *brave* conveys the idea of a direct and personal application of force to force; *defying* is carried on by a more indirect and circuitous mode of procedure: men *brave* the dangers which threaten them with evil; they *defy* the angry will which opposes them.

To *dare* and *challenge* are both direct and personal; but the former consists either of actions, words, or looks; the latter of words only. We *dare* a number of persons indefinitely; we *challenge* an individual, and very frequently by name.

Daring arises from our contempt of others; *challenging* arises from a high opinion of ourselves: the former is mostly accompanied with unbecoming expressions of disrespect as well as aggravation: the latter is mostly divested of all angry personality. Metius the Tuscan *dared* Titus Manlius Torquatus, the son of the Roman consul, to engage with him in contradiction to his father's commands: Paris was persuaded to *challenge* Menelaus in order to terminate the Grecian war.

We *dare* only to acts of violence; we *challenge* to any kind of contest in which the skill or the power of the parties are to be tried. It is folly to *dare* one of superior strength if we are not prepared to meet with the just reward of our impertinence: whoever has a confidence in the justice of his cause, needs not fear to *challenge* his opponent to a trial of their respective merits.

BRAVERY, COURAGE, VALOUR.

BRAVERY denotes the abstract quality of *brave* (v. *Brave*).

COURAGE, in French *courage*, comes from *coeur*, in Latin *cor* the heart, which is the seat of *courage*.

VALOUR, in French *valeur*, Latin *valor*, from *valeo* to be strong, signifies by distinction strength of mind.

Bravery lies in the blood; *courage* lies in the mind: the latter depends on the reason; the former on the physical temperament: the first is a species of instinct; the second is a virtue: a man is *brave* in proportion as he is without thought; he has *courage* in proportion as he reasons or reflects,

Bravery seems to be something involuntary, a mechanical movement that does not depend on one's self; *courage* requires conviction, and gathers strength by delay; it is a noble and lofty sentiment: the force of example, the charms of music, the fury and tumult of battle, the desperation of the conflict, will make cowards *brave*; the *courageous* man wants no other incentives than what his own mind suggests.

Bravery is of utility only in the hour of attack or contest; *courage* is of service at all times and under all circumstances: *bravery* is of avail in overcoming the obstacle of the moment; *courage* seeks to avert the distant evil that may possibly arrive. *Bravery* is a thing of the moment that is or is not, as circumstances may favour; it varies with the time and season: *courage* exists at all times and on all occasions. The *brave* man who fearlessly rushes to the mouth of the cannon may tremble at his own shadow as he passes through a churchyard, or turn pale at the sight of blood: the *courageous* man smiles at imaginary dangers, and prepares to meet those that are real.

It is as possible for a man to have *courage* without *bravery*, as to have *bravery* without *courage*: Cicero betrayed his want of *bravery* when he sought to shelter himself against the attacks of Catiline; he displayed his *courage* when he laid open the treasonable purposes of this conspirator to the whole senate, and charged him to his face with the crimes of which he knew him to be guilty.

Valour is a higher quality than either *bravery* or *courage*, and seems to partake of the grand characteristics of both: it combines the fire of *bravery* with the determination and firmness of *courage*: *bravery* is most fitted for the soldier and all who receive orders; *courage* is most adapted for the general and all who give commands; *valour* for the leader and framer of enterprises, and all who carry great projects into execution: *bravery* requires to be guided;

courage is equally fitted to command or obey; *valour* directs and executes.

BREACH, BREAK, GAP, CHASM.

BREACH and BREAK are both derived from the same verb *break* (v. *To break*), to denote what arises from being broken, in the figurative sense of the verb itself.

GAP, from the English *gape*, signifies the thing that *gapes* or stands open.

CHASM, in Greek *χασμα* from *χαίρω*, and the Hebrew *gahah* to be open, signifies the thing that has opened itself.

The idea of an opening is common to these terms, but they differ in the nature of the opening. A *breach* and a *gap* are the consequence of a violent removal, which destroys the connexion; a *break* and a *chasm* may arise from the absence of that which would form a connexion. A *breach* in a wall is made by means of cannon; *gaps* in fences are commonly the effect of some violent effort to pass through; a *break* is made in a page of printing by leaving off in the middle of a line; a *chasm* is left in writing when any words in the sentence are omitted.

A *breach* and a *chasm* always imply a larger opening than a *break* or *gap*. A *gap* may be made in a knife; a *breach* is always made in the walls of a building or fortification: the clouds sometimes separate so as to leave small *breaks*; the ground is sometimes so convulsed by earthquakes as to leave frightful *chasms*.

Breach and *chasm* are used morally; *break* and *gap* seldom otherwise than in application to natural objects. Trifling circumstances often occasion wide *breaches* in families. The death of relatives often produces a sad *chasm* in our enjoyments.

TO BREAK, RACK, REND, TEAR.

BREAK, in Saxon *brecan*, Danish and Low German *breken*, High German *brechen*, Latin *frango*, Greek *βοννυμι*, *βοννυω*, Chaldee *perak* to separate.

RACK comes from the same source as *break*; it is properly the root of this word, and an onomatopoeia, conveying a sound correspondent with what is made by *breaking*; *rak* in Swedish, and *racco* in Icelandic signifies a breaking of the ice.

REND in Saxon *hrendan*, *breddan* Low German *ritan*, high German *reissen* to split, Greek *ρησσω*, Hebrew *rangnah* to break in pieces.

TEAR in Saxon *taeran*, low German *tieren*, high German *zerren*, is an intensive verb from *ziehen* to pull, Greek *τερω*, *τειρω* to bruise, Hebrew *tor* to split, divide, or cleave.

The forcible division of any substance is the common characteristic of these terms.

Break is the generic term, the rest are specific: every thing *racked*, *rent*, or *torn*, is broken, but not *vice versa*. *Break* has however a specific meaning, in which it is comparable with the others. *Breaking* requires less violence than either of the others; brittle things may be *broken* with the slightest touch, but nothing can be *racked* without intentional violence of an extraordinary kind. Glass is quickly *broken*; a table is *racked*. Hard substances only are *broken* or *racked*; but every thing of a soft texture and composition may be *rent* or *torn*.

Breaking is performed by means of a blow; *racking* by that of a violent concussion; but *rending* and *tearing* are the consequences of a pull. Any thing of wood or stone is *broken*; any thing of a complicated structure, with hinges and joints, is *racked*; cloth is *rent*, paper is *torn*. *Rend* is sometimes used for what is done by design; a *tear* is always faulty. Cloth is sometimes *rent* rather than cut when it is wanted to be divided; but when it is *torn* it is injured.

TO BREAK, BRUISE, SQUEEZE, POUND, CRUSH.

BREAK, v. *To break, rack.*

BRUISE, in French *briser*, Saxon *bryser*, not improbably from the same source as *press*.

SQUEEZE, in Saxon *cwysin*, low German *quietsen*, *quoesen*, Swedish *quaesa*, Latin *quatio* to shake, or produce a concussion.

POUND, in Saxon *punian*, is not improbably derived by a change of letters from the Latin *tundo* to bruise.

CRUSH, in French *ecraser* is most probably only a variation of the word *squeeze*, like *crack*, or *squash*.

Break always implies the separation of the component parts of a body; *bruise* denotes simply the destroying the continuity of the parts. Hard brittle substances, as glass, are *broken*; soft pulpy substances, as flesh or fruits, are *bruised*.

The operation of *bruising* is performed either by a violent blow or by pressure; that of *squeezing* by compression only. Metals, particularly lead and silver, may be *bruised*; fruits may be either *bruised* or *squeezed*. In this latter sense *bruise* applies to the harder substances, or indicates a violent compression; *squeeze* is used for soft substances or a gentle compression. The kernels of nuts are *bruised*; oranges or apples are *squeezed*. To *pound* is properly to *bruise* in a mortar so as to produce a separation of parts; to *crush* is the most violent and destructive of all operations, which amounts to the total dispersion of all the parts of a body.

What is *broken* may be made whole again;

what is *bruised* or *squeezed* may be restored to its former tone and consistency; what is *pounded* is only reduced to smaller parts for convenience; but what is *crushed* is destroyed. When the wheel of a carriage passes over any body that yields to its weight, it *crushes* it to powder; thus in the figurative sense it marks a total annihilation: if a conspiracy be not *crushed* in the bud, it will prove fatal to the power which has suffered it to grow.

TO BREAK, BURST, CRACK, SPLIT.

BREAK, *v.* To break, rack.

BURST, in Saxon *beorstan*, *bersten*, *byrsten*, low German *baisten*, *basten*, high German *bersten*, old German *bresten*, Swedish *brysta*, is but a variation of *break*.

CRACK is in Saxon *cearcian*, French *cracquer*, high German *kracken*, low German *kraken*, Danish *krakke*, Greek *κρηκειν*, which are in all probability but variations of *break*, &c.

SPLIT, in Dutch *split*, Danish *splitten*, low German *splieten*, high German *spalten*, old German *spilten*, Swedish *splita*, which are all connected with the German *platzen* to burst, from the Greek *σπαλυσσομαι* to tear or split, and the Hebrew *pelah* to separate, *palect* or *palety* to cut in pieces.

Break denotes a forcible separation of the constituent parts of a body. *Burst* and *crack* are onomatopœias or imitations of the sound which are made in *bursting* and *cracking*. *Splitting* is a species of *cracking* that takes place in some bodies in a similar manner without being accompanied with the noise.

Breaking is generally the consequence of some external violence; every thing that is exposed to violence may without distinction be *broken*. *Bursting* arises mostly from an extreme tension: hollow bodies, when over filled, *burst*. *Cracking* is caused by the application of excessive heat, or the defective texture of the substance: glass *cracks*; the earth *cracks*; leather *cracks*. *Splitting* may arise from a combination of external and internal causes: wood in particular is liable to *split*. A thing may be *broken* in any shape, form, and degree: *bursting* leaves a wide gap; *cracking* and *splitting* leave a long aperture; the latter of which is commonly wider than that of the former.

TO BREED, ENGENDER.

BREED, in Saxon *bredan*, Teutonic *breetan*, is probably connected with *braten* to roast, being an operation principally performed by fire or heat.

ENGENDER, compounded of *en* and *gender*, from *genitus* participle of *gigno*, signifies to lay or communicate the seeds for production.

These terms are figuratively employed for the act of procreation.

To *breed* is to bring into existence by a slow operation: to *engender* is to be the author or prime cause of existence. So in the metaphorical sense, frequent quarrels are apt to *breed* hatred and animosity: the levelling and inconsistent conduct of the higher classes in the present age serves to *engender* a spirit of insubordination and assumption in the inferior order.

Whatever *breeds* acts gradually; whatever *engenders* produces immediately as cause and effect. Uncleanliness *breeds* diseases of the body; want of occupation *breeds* those of the mind: playing at chance games *engenders* a love of money.

BREEZE, GALE, BLAST, GUST, STORM, TEMPEST, HURRICANE.

All these words express the action of the wind, in different degrees and under different circumstances.

BREEZE, in Italian *brezza*, is in all probability an onomatopœia for that kind of wind peculiar to southern climates.

GALE is probably connected with *call* and *yell*, denoting a sonorous wind.

BLAST, in German *geblaset*, participle of *blasen*, signifies properly the act of blowing, but by distinction it is employed for any strong effort of blowing.

GUST is immediately of Icelandic origin, and expresses the phenomena which are characteristic of the Northern climates; but in all probability it is a variation of *gush*, signifying a violent stream of wind.

STORM, in German *sturm*, from *stören* to put in commotion, like *gust*, describes the phenomenon of Northern climates.

TEMPEST, in Latin *tempestas*, or *tempus* a time or season, describes that season or sort of weather which is most remarkable, but at the same time most frequent, in Southern climates.

HURRICANE has been introduced by the Spaniards into European languages from the Caribbee Islands; where it describes that species of *tempestuous* wind most frequent in tropical climates.

A *breeze* is gentle; a *gale* is brisk, but steady: we have *breezes* in a calm summer's day; the mariner has favourable *gales* which keep the sails on the stretch.

A *blast* is impetuous: the exhalations of a trumpet, the breath of bellows, the sweep of a violent wind, are *blasts*. A *gust* is sud-

den and vehement; *gusts* of wind are sometimes so violent as to sweep every thing before them while they last.

Storm, *tempest*, and *hurricane*, include other particulars besides wind.

A *storm* throws the whole atmosphere into commotion; it is a war of the elements, in which wind, rain, hail, and the like, conspire to disturb the heavens. *Tempest* is a species of *storm* which has also thunder and lightning to add to the confusion. *Hurricane* is a species of *storm* which exceeds all the rest in violence and duration.

Gust, *storm*, and *tempest*, which are applied figuratively, preserve their distinction in this sense. The passions are exposed to *gusts* and *storms*, to sudden bursts, or violent continued agitations; the soul is exposed to *tempests* when agitated with violent and contending emotions.

BRIGHTNESS, LUSTRE, SPLENDOUR, BRILLIANCY.

BRIGHTNESS, from the English *bright*, Saxon *breorht*, probably comes like the German *pracht* splendour, from the Hebrew *berak* to shine or glitter.

LUSTRE, in French *lustre*, Latin *lustrum* a purgation, or cleansing, that is, to make clean or pure.

SPLENDOUR, in French *splendeur*, Latin *splendor*, from *splendo* to shine, comes either from the Greek *σπληδος* embers, or *σπινθηρ* a spark.

BRILLIANCY from *brilliant*, and *briller* to shine, comes from the German *brille* spectacles, and the Latin of the middle ages *beryllus* a crystal.

Brightness is the generic, the rest are specific terms: there cannot be *lustre*, *splendour*, and *brilliance*, without *brightness*; but there may be *brightness* where these do not exist. These terms rise in sense; *lustre* rises on *brightness*, *splendour* on *lustre*, and *brilliance* on *splendour*.

Brightness and *lustre* are applied properly to natural lights; *splendour* and *brilliance* have been more commonly applied to that which is artificial: there is always more or less *brightness* in the sun or moon; there is an occasional *lustre* in all the heavenly bodies when they shine in their unclouded *brightness*; there is *splendour* in the eruptions of flame from a volcano or an immense conflagration; there is *brilliance* in a collection of diamonds. There may be both *splendour* and *brilliance* in an illumination: the *splendour* arises from the mass and richness of light; the *brilliance* from the variety and *brightness* of the lights and colours. *Bright-*

ness may be obscured, *lustre* may be tarnished, *splendour* and *brilliance* diminished.

The analogy is closely preserved in the figurative application. *Brightness* attaches to the moral character of men in ordinary cases, *lustre* attaches to extraordinary instances of virtue and greatness, *splendour* and *brilliance* attach to the achievements of men.

Our Saviour is strikingly represented to us as the *brightness* of his Father's glory, and the express image of his person. The humanity of the English in the hour of conquest adds a *lustre* to their victories which are either *splendid* or *brilliant*, according to the number and nature of the circumstances which render them remarkable.

TO BRING, FETCH, CARRY, TAKE.

BRING, in Saxon *bringan*, Teutonic, &c. *bringen*, old German *briggan*, *pringan*, *bibringen*, is most probably contracted from *beringin*, which from the simple *ringen* or *regen* to move, signifies to put in motion, or remove.

FETCH, in Saxon *feccian*, is not improbably connected with the word *search*, in French *chercher*, German *suchen*, Greek *ζητεω*, Hebrew *zangnack* to send for or go after.

CARRY, *v*, To bear, carry.

TAKE in all probability comes from the Latin *tactum* participle of *tango* to touch.

To *bring* is simply to take with one's self from the place where one is; to *fetch* is to go first to a place and then *bring* it; to *fetch* therefore is a species of *bringing*: whatever is near at hand is *brought*; whatever is at a distance must be *fetch*ed: the porter at an inn *brings* a parcel, a servant who is sent for it, *fetches* it.

Bring always respects motion towards the place in which the speaker resides; *fetch*, a motion both to and from; *carry*, always a motion directly from the place or at a distance from the place. A servant *brings* the parcel home which his master has sent him to *fetch*; he *carries* a parcel from home. A *carrier* *carries* parcels to and from a place, but he does not *bring* parcels to and from any place.

Bring is an action performed at the option of the agent; *fetch* and *carry* are mostly done at the command of another.

Take in this sense has the signification of *carry* and is usually applied to small objects; *take* the letter to the post office and *bring* back the change for a sovereign.

TO BUILD, ERECT, CONSTRUCT.

BUILD, in Saxon *bytlian*, French *batir*,

German *bauen*, Gothic *boa*, *bua*, *byggja*, to erect houses, from the Hebrew *bajith* a habitation.

ERECT, in French *eriger*, Latin *erectus*, participle of *erigo*, compounded of *e* and *rego*, from the Greek *ορεγω* to stretch or extend.

CONSTRUCT, in Latin *constructus*, participle of *construo*, compounded of *con* together, and *struo* to put, in Greek *στροβνμι*, *στροβω* to strew, in Hebrew *ohrah* to dispose or put in order, signifies to form together into a mass.

The word *build* by distinction expresses the purpose of the action; *erect* indicates the mode of the action; *construct* indicates contrivance in the action. What is *built* is employed for the purpose of receiving, retaining, or confining; what is *erected* is placed in an elevated situation; what is *constructed* is put together with ingenuity.

All that is *built* may be said to be *erected* or *constructed*; but all that is *erected* or *constructed* is not said to be *built*; likewise what is *erected* is mostly *constructed*, though not *vice versa*. We *build* from necessity; we *erect* for ornament; we *construct* for utility and convenience. Houses are *built*, monuments *erected*, machines are *constructed*.

BULKY, MASSIVE.

BULKY denoting having *bulk*, which is connected with our words, belly, body, bilge, bugle, &c. and the German *balg*.

MASSIVE, in French *massif* from *mass*, signifies having a *mass* or being like a *mass*, which through the German *masse*, Latin *massa*, Greek *μαζα* dough, comes from *μασσω* to knead, signifying made into a solid substance.

Whatever is *bulky* has a prominence of figure; what is *massive* has compactness of matter. The *bulky* therefore though larger in size, is not so weighty as the *massive*.

Hollow bodies commonly have a *bulk*; none but solid bodies can be *massive*.

A vessel is *bulky* in its form; lead, silver, and gold, *massive*.

BURIAL, INTERMENT, SEPULTURE.

BURIAL from *bury*, in Saxon *birian*, *birigan*, German *bergen*, signifies in the original sense to conceal.

INTERMENT from *inter*, compounded of *in* and *terra*, signifies the putting into the ground.

SEPULTURE, in French *sepulture*, Latin *sepultura*, from *sepultus*, participle of *sepelio* to bury, comes from *sepes* a hedge, signifying an enclosure, and probably likewise

from the Hebrew *sabat* to put to rest, or in a state of privacy.

Under *burial* is comprehended simply the purpose of the action; under *interment* and *sepulture*, the manner as well as the motive of the action. We *bury* in order to conceal; *interment* and *sepulture* are accompanied with religious ceremonies.

* *Bury* is confined to no object or place; we *bury* whatever we deposit in the earth, and wherever we please; but *interment* and *sepulture* respect only the bodies of the deceased when deposited in a sacred place.

Burial requires that the object be concealed under ground; *interment* may be used for depositing in vaults.

Burial is a term in familiar use; *interment* serves frequently as a more elegant expression; *sepulture* is an abstract term confined to particular cases, as in speaking of the rights and privileges of *sepulture*.

Interment and *sepulture* never depart from their religious import; *bury* is used figuratively for other objects and purposes. A man is said to *bury* himself alive who shuts himself out from the world; he is said to *bury* the talent of which he makes no use, or to *bury* in oblivion what he does not wish to call to mind.

BUSINESS, OCCUPATION, EMPLOYMENT, ENGAGEMENT, AVOCATION.

BUSINESS signifies what makes *busy* (v. *Active, busy*).

OCCUPATION from *occupy*, in French *occuper*, Latin *occupo*, that is, *ob* and *capio*, signifies that which serves or takes possession of a person or thing to the exclusion of other things.

EMPLOYMENT from *employ*, in French *emploi*, Latin *implico*, Greek *εμπλεω*, signifies that which engages or fixes a person,

ENGAGEMENT, v. *To attract*.

AVOCATION, in Latin *avocatio*, from *a* and *voco*, signifies the thing that calls off from another thing.

Business occupies all a person's thoughts as well as his time and powers; *occupation* and *employment* occupy only his time and strength: the first is mostly regular, it is the object of our choice; the second is casual, it depends on the will of another. *Engagement* is a partial *employment*, *avocation* a particular *engagement*: an *engagement* prevents us from doing any thing else; an *avocation* calls off or prevents us from doing what we wish.

Every tradesman has a *business*, on the diligent prosecution of which depends his suc-

* Vide Trusler: „To bury, inter.“

cess in life; every mechanic has his daily *occupation*, by which he maintains his family; every labourer has an *employment* which is fixed for him.

Business and *occupation* always suppose a serious object. *Business* is something more urgent and important than *occupation*: a man of independent fortune has no occasion to pursue *business*, but as a rational agent he will not be contented to be without an *occupation*.

Employment, *engagement*, and *avocation*, leave the object undefined. An *employment* may be a mere diversion of the thoughts, and a wasting of the hours in some idle pursuit; a child may have its *employment*, which may be its play in distinction from its *business*: an *engagement* may have no higher object than that of pleasure; the idlest people have often the most *engagements*. *Avocations* have seldom a direct trifling object, although it may sometimes be of a subordinate nature, and generally irrelevant: numerous *avocations* are not desirable; every man should have a regular pursuit, the *business* of his life, to which the principal part of his time should be devoted.

A person who is *busy* has much to attend to, and attends to it closely: a person who is *occupied* has a full share of *business* without any pressure; he is opposed to one who is idle: a person who is *employed* has the present moment filled up; he is not in a state of inaction: the person who is *engaged* is not at liberty to be otherwise *employed*; his time is not his own; he is opposed to one at leisure.

BUSINESS, TRADE, PROFESSION, ART.

BUSINESS, *v. Business, occupation.*

TRADE signifies that which employs the time by way of *trade*.

PROFESSION signifies that which one professes to do.

ART signifies that which is followed in the way of the *arts*.

These words are synonymous in the sense of a calling, for the purpose of a livelihood: *business* is general, *trade* and *profession* are particular; all *trade* is *business*, but all *business* is not *trade*.

Buying and selling of merchandise is inseparable from *trade*; but the exercise of one's knowledge and experience, for purposes of gain, constitutes a *business*; when learning or particular skill is required, it is a *profession*: and when there is a peculiar exercise of *art*, it is an *art*: every shopkeeper and retail dealer carries on a *trade*; brokers, manufacturers, bankers, and others,

carry on *business*; clergymen, medical, or military men, follow a *profession*; musicians and painters follow an *art*.

BUSINESS, OFFICE, DUTY.

BUSINESS, *v. Business, occupation.*

OFFICE, *v. Benefit, service.*

DUTY signifies what is due or owing to one, from the Latin *debitum*, participle of *debeo* to owe.

Business is what one prescribes to one's self; *office* is prescribed by another; *duty* is prescribed or enjoined by a fixed rule of propriety: mercantile concerns are the *business* which a man takes upon himself; the management of parish concerns is an *office*, imposed upon him often much against his inclination; the maintenance of his family is a *duty* which his conscience enjoins him to perform.

Business and *duty* are public or private; *office* is mostly of a public nature: a minister of state, by virtue of his *office*, has always public *business* to perform; but men in general have only private *business* to transact: a minister of religion has public *duties* to perform in his ministerial capacity; every other man has personal or relative *duties*, which he is called upon to discharge according to his station.

BUSTLE, TUMULT, UPROAR.

BUSTLE is probably a frequentative of *busy*.

TUMULT, in French *tumulte*, Latin *tumultus*, or *tumor multus*, much swelling or perturbation.

UPROAR, compounded of *up* and *roar*, marks the act of setting up a roar or clamour, or the state of its being so set up.

Bustle has most of hurry in it; *tumult* most of disorder and confusion; *uproar* most of noise: the hurried movements of one, or many, cause a *bustle*; disorderly struggles of many constitute a *tumult*; the loud elevation of many opposing voices produces an *uproar*. *Bustle* is frequently not the effect of design, but the natural consequence of many persons coming together; *tumult* commonly arises from a general effervescence in the minds of a multitude; *uproar* is the consequence either of general anger or mirth. A crowded street will always be in a *bustle*: contested elections are always accompanied with a great *tumult*: drinking parties make a considerable *uproar* in the indulgence of their intemperate mirth.

TO BUY, PURCHASE, BARGAIN, CHEAPEN.

BUY, in Saxon *byegean*, is in all probability connected with *bargain*.

PURCHASE, in French *purchaser*, like the word pursue, *poursuivre*, comes from the Latin *persequor*, signifying to obtain by a particular effort.

BARGAIN, in Welsh *bargen*, is most probably connected with the German *borgen* to borrow, and *bürge* a surety.

CHEAPEN is in Saxon *ceapan*, German *kaufen*, Dutch *koopen* to buy.

Buy and *purchase* have a strong resemblance to each other, both in sense and application; but the latter is a term of more refinement than the former: *buy* may always be substituted for *purchase* without impropriety; but *purchase* would be sometimes ridiculous in the familiar application of *buy*: the necessities of life are *bought*; luxuries are *purchased*.

The characteristic idea of *buying* is that of expending money according to a certain rule, and for a particular purpose; that of *purchasing* is the procuring the thing: the propensity of *buying* whatever comes in one's way is very injurious to the circumstances of some people; what it is not convenient to procure for ourselves, we may commission another to *purchase* for us.

Buying implies simply the exchange of one's money for a commodity; *bargaining* and *cheapening* have likewise respect to the price: to *bargain* is to make a specific agreement as to the price; to *cheapen* is not only to lower the price asked, but to deal in such things as are *cheap*: trade is supported by *buyers*; *bargainers* and *cheapeners* are not acceptable customers; mean people are prone to *bargaining*; poor people are obliged to *cheapen*.

C.

CALAMITY, DISASTER, MISFORTUNE, MISCHANCE, MISHAP.

CALAMITY, in French *calamité*, Latin *calamitas*, from *calamus* a stalk; because hail or whatever injured the stalks of corn was termed a calamity.

DISASTER, in French *désastre*, is compounded of the privative *des* or *dis* and *astre*, in Latin *astrum* a star, signifying what comes from the adverse influence of the stars.

MISFORTUNE, **MISCHANCE** and **MISHAP**, naturally express what comes amiss.

The idea of a painful event is common to all these terms, but they differ in the degree of importance.

A *calamity* is a great disaster or *misfortune*; a *misfortune* a great *mischance* or *mishap*: whatever is attended with destruction is a *calamity*; whatever occasions

mischief to the person, defeats or interrupts plans, is a *disaster*; whatever is accompanied with a loss of property, or the deprivation of health, is a *misfortune*; whatever diminishes the beauty or utility of objects is a *mischance* or *mishap*: the devastation of a country by hurricanes or earthquakes, or the desolation of its inhabitants by famine or plague, are great *calamities*; the overturning of a carriage, or the fracture of a limb, are *disasters*; losses in trade are *misfortunes*; the spoiling of a book is, to a greater or less extent, a *mischance* or *mishap*.

A *calamity* seldom arises from the direct agency of man; the elements, or the natural course of things, are mostly concerned in producing this source of misery to men; the rest may be ascribed to chance, as distinguished from design: *disasters* mostly arise from some specific known cause, either the carelessness of persons, or the unfitness of things for their use; as they generally serve to derange some preconceived scheme or undertaking, they seem as if they were produced by some secret influence: *misfortune* is frequently assignable to no specific cause, it is the bad fortune of an individual; a link in the chain of his destiny; an evil independent of himself, as distinguished from a fault: *mischance* and *mishap* are *misfortunes* of comparatively so trivial a nature, that it would not be worth while to inquire into their cause, or to dwell upon their consequences. A *calamity* is dreadful; a *disaster* melancholy; a *misfortune* grievous or heavy; a *mischance* or *mishap* slight or trivial.

A *calamity* is either public or private, but more frequently the former: a *disaster* is rather particular than private; it affects things rather than persons; journeys, expeditions, and military movements, are commonly attended with *disasters*: *misfortunes* are altogether personal; they immediately affect the interests of the individual: *mischances* and *mishaps* are altogether domestic. We speak of a *calamitous* period, a *disastrous* expedition, an *unfortunate* person, little *mischances* or *mishaps*.

TO CALCULATE, COMPUTE, RECKON, COUNT,

CALCULATE, in Latin *calculatus*, participle of *calculo*, comes from *calculus*, Greek *καλῖς* a pebble; because the Greeks gave their votes, and the Romans made out their accounts, by little stones; hence it denotes the action itself of *reckoning*.

COMPUTE, in French *computer*, Latin

computo, compounded of *com* and *puto*, signifies to put together in one's mind.

RECKON, in Saxon *reccan*, Dutch *rekenen*, German *rechnen*, is not improbably derived from *row*, in Dutch *reck*, because stringing of things in a row was formerly, as it is now sometimes, the ordinary mode of *reckoning*.

COUNT, in French *compter*, is but a contraction of *computer*.

These words indicate the means by which we arrive at a certain result, in regard to quantity.

To calculate is the generic term, the rest are specific: * *computation* and *reckoning* are branches of *calculation*, or an application of those operations to the objects of which a result is sought: to *calculate* comprehends arithmetical operations in general, or particular applications of the science of numbers, in order to obtain a certain point of knowledge: to *compute* is to combine certain given numbers in order to learn the grand result: to *reckon* is to enumerate and set down things in the detail: to *count* is to add up the individual items contained in many different parts, in order to determine the quantity.

Calculation particularly respects the operation itself; *compute* and *count* respect the gross sums; *reckon* refers to the details. To *calculate* denotes any numerical operation in general, but in its limited sense; it is the abstract science of figures used by mathematicians and philosophers: *computation* is a numerical estimate, a simple species of *calculation* used by historians, chronologists, and financial speculators, in drawing great results from complex sources: *reckon* and *count* are still simpler species of *calculation*, applicable to the ordinary business of life, and employed by tradesmen, mechanics, and people in general; *reckoning* and *counting* were the first efforts made by men in acquiring a knowledge of number, quantity, or degree.

The astronomer *calculates* the return of the stars; the geometrician makes algebraic *calculations*. The Banians, Indian merchants, make prodigious *calculations* in an instant on their thumb-nails, doubtless after the manner of algebra, by signs, which the *calculator* employs as he pleases. The chronologist *computes* the times of particular events, by comparing them with those of other known events. Financiers *compute* the produce of a tax according to the measure and circumstances of its imposition. At every new consulate the Romans used to drive a nail into

the wall of the capitol, by which they *reckoned* the length of time that their state had been erected: tradesmen *reckon* their profits and losses. Children begin by *counting* on their fingers, one, two three.

An almanack is made by *calculation*, *computation*, and *reckoning*. The rising and setting of the heavenly bodies are *calculated*; from given astronomical tables is *computed* the moment on which any celestial phenomenon may return; and by *reckoning* are determined the days on which holidays, or other periodical events fall.

Calculate and *reckon* are employed in a figurative sense; *compute* and *count* in an extended application of the same sense.

Calculate, *reckon*, and *count*, respect mostly the future; *compute* the past.

Calculate is rather a conjectural deduction from what is, as to what may be; *computation* is a rational estimate of what has been, from what is; *reckoning* is a conclusive conviction, a complacent assurance that a thing will happen: *counting* indicates an expectation. We *calculate* on a gain; *compute* any loss sustained, or the amount of any mischief done; we *reckon* on a promised pleasure; we *count* the hours and minutes until the time of enjoyment arrives.

Those who have experienced the instability of affairs, will never *calculate* on an hour's enjoyment beyond the moment of existence. It is difficult to *compute* the loss which an army sustains upon being defeated, especially if it be obliged to make a long retreat. Those who know the human heart will never *reckon* on the assistance of professed friends in the hour of adversity. Admiration and applause are by no means to be *counted* among the necessities of life.

CALENDAR, ALMANACK, EPHEMERIS.

CALENDAR comes from *calendae*, the Roman name for the first days of every month.

ALMANACK, that is *al* and *mana*, signifies properly the reckoning or the reckoned, from the Arabic *mana* and Hebrew *manach* to reckon.

EPHEMERIS, in Greek *εφεμερίς* from *ἐπι* and *ἡμέρα* the day, implies that which happens by the day.

These terms denote a date-book, but the *calendar* is a book which registers events under every month: the *almanack* is a book which registers times, or the divisions of the year: and an *ephemeris* is a book which registers the planetary movements every day. An *almanack* may be a *calendar*, and an *ephemeris* may be both an *almanack* and a *calendar*; but every *almanack* is not a *ca-*

* Vide Roubaud: „Calculer, supposer, compter.“

alendar, nor every calendar an almanack. The Gardener's calendar is not an almanack, and the sheet almanacks are seldom calendars: likewise the nautical ephemeris may serve as an almanack, although not as a calendar.

TO CALL, BID, SUMMON, INVITE.

CALL, in its abstract and original sense, signifies simply to give an expression of the voice, in which it agrees with the German *schall*, Swedish *skalla* a sound, Greek *καλέω* to call, Hebrew *kol* the voice.

BID, in Saxon *beodan* or *bidden* to offer, old German *buden*, low German *bedan*, German *biethen*, &c., Latin *vito* or *invito*, which comes from *in* and *viam* the way, signifies to call into the way or measure of another.

SUMMON, in French *sommer*, changed from *summoner*, Latin *submoneo*, signifies to give special notice.

The idea of signifying one's wish to another to do any thing is included in all these terms.

To call is not confined to any particular sound; we may call by simply raising the voice: to invite is not even confined to sounds: we may invite by looks, or signs, or even by writing: to bid and summons require the express use of words. The actions of calling and inviting are common to animals as well as men: sheep call their young when they bleat, and oxen their companions when they low; cats and other females among the brutes invite their young to come out from their bed when it is proper for them to begin to walk: to bid and summon are altogether confined to human beings.

Call and bid are direct addresses: to invite and summon may pass through the medium of a second person. I call or bid the person whom I wish to come, but I send him a summons or invitation.

Calling of itself expresses no more than the simple desire; but according to circumstances it may be made to express a command or entreaty. When equals call each other it amounts simply to a wish; when the dam calls her young it amounts to supplicating entreaty; but when a father calls his son it is equivalent to a command. To bid expresses either a command or an entreaty: when superiors bid it is a positive command; when equals bid it is an act of civility. To summon is always imperative; to invite always in the spirit of kindness and courtesy. Persons in all stations of life have occasion to call each other; but it is an action most befitting the superior: to bid and invite are alike the actions of superiors

and equals: to summon is the act of a superior only.

Calling is always for the purpose of drawing the object to one's person. Bidding, as a command, may be employed for what we wish to be done; but bidding in the sense of an invitation is employed for drawing the object to our place of residence. Inviting is employed for either purpose. Summoning is an act of authority, by which a person is obliged to make his appearance at a given place.

CALM, COMPOSED, COLLECTED.

CALM, *v.* To appease.

COMPOSED, from the verb *compose*, marks the state of being composed; and **COLLECTED**, from *collect*, the state of being collected.

These terms agree in expressing a state of mind; but calm respects the state of the feelings, composed the state of the thoughts and feelings, and collected the state of the thoughts more particularly.

Calmness is peculiarly requisite in seasons of distress, and amidst scenes of horror: composure, in moments of trial, disorder, and tumult: collectedness, in moments of danger. Calmness is the companion of fortitude; no one whose spirits are easily disturbed can have strength to bear misfortune: composure is an attendant upon clearness of understanding; no one can express himself with perspicuity whose thoughts are any way deranged: collectedness is requisite for a determined promptitude of action; no one can be expected to act promptly who cannot think fixedly.

CALM, PLACID, SERENE.

CALM, *v.* To appease.

PLACID, in Latin *placidus*, from *placeo* to please, signifies the state of being pleased, or free from uneasiness.

SERENE, Latin *serenus*, comes most probably from the Greek *εἰρήνη* peace, signifying a state of peace.

Calm and serene are applied to the elements; placid only to the mind. Calmness respects only the state of the winds, serenity that of the air and heavens: the weather is calm when it is free from agitation: it is serene when free from noise and vapour. Calm respects the total absence of all perturbation; placid the ease and contentment of the mind; serene clearness and composure of the mind.

As in the natural world a particular agitation of the wind is succeeded by a calm, so in the mind of man, when an unusual effervescence has been produced, it commonly

subsides into a *calm*: *placidity* and *serenity* have more that is even and regular in them. *Calm* is a temporary state of the feelings; *placid* and *serene* are habits of the mind. We speak of a *calm* state; but a *placid* and *serene* temper. *Placidity* is more of a natural gift; *serenity* is acquired: people with not very ardent desires or warmth of feeling will evince *placidity*; they are pleased with all that passes inwardly or outwardly: nothing contributes so much to *serenity* of mind as a pervading sense of God's good providence, which checks all impatience, softens down every asperity of humour, and gives a steady current to the feelings.

CAN, MAY.

CAN, in the Northern languages *können*, &c., is derived most probably from *kennen* to know, from the natural intimacy which subsists between knowledge and power.

MAY is in German *mögen*, to may or wish, Greek *μαίω* to desire, from the connexion between wishing and complying with a wish.

Can denotes possibility; *may* liberty and probability: he who has sound limbs *can* walk; but he *may* not walk in places which are prohibited.

CANDID, OPEN, SINCERE.

CANDID, in French *candide*, Latin *candidus*, from *candeo* to shine, signifies to be pure, as truth itself.

OPEN is in Saxon *open*, French *ouvert*, German *offen*, from the preposition *up*, German *auf*, Dutch *op*, &c., because erectness is a characteristic of truth and openness.

SINCERE, French *sincère*, Latin *sincerus*, probably from the Greek *οὐρ* and *κηρ* the heart, that is, with the heart, signifying dictated by or going with the heart.

Candour arises from a conscious purity of intention: *openness* from a warmth of feeling and love of communication: *sincerity* from a love of truth.

Candour obliges us to acknowledge whatever may make against ourselves; it is disinterested: *openness* impels us to utter whatever passes in the mind; it is unguarded: *sincerity* prevents us from speaking what we do not think; it is positive. A *candid* man will have no reserve when *openness* is necessary; an *open* man cannot maintain a reserve at any time; a *sincere* man will maintain a reserve only as far as it is consistent with truth.

CAPACITY, CAPACIOUSNESS.

CAPACITY, *v. Ability*.

CAPACIOUSNESS, *v. Ample*.

Capacity is the abstract of *capax*, receiving or apt to hold; it is therefore applied to the contents of hollow bodies: *capaciousness* is the abstract of *capacious*, and is therefore applied to the plane surface comprehended within a given space. Hence we speak of the *capacity* of a vessel; and the *capaciousness* of a room.

Capacity is an indefinite term simply designating fitness to hold or receive; but *capaciousness* denotes something specifically large. Measuring the *capacity* of vessels belongs to the science of mensuration: the *capaciousness* of rooms is to be observed by the eye. They are marked by the same distinction in their moral application: men are born with various *capacities*; some are remarkable for the *capaciousness* of their minds.

CAPTIOUS, CROSS, PEEVISH, PETULANT, FRETFUL.

CAPTIOUS, in Latin *captiosus*, from *capio*, signifies taking or treating in an offensive manner.

CROSS, after the noun *cross*, marks the temper which resembles a *cross*.

PEEVISH, probably changed from *beeish*, signifies easily provoked, and ready to sting like a bee.

FRETFUL, from the word *fret*, signifies full of *fretting*: *fret*, which is in Saxon *freetan*, comes from the Latin *fricatus*, participle of *frico* to wear away with rubbing.

PETULANT, in Latin *petulans*, from *peto* to seek, signifies seeking or catching up.

All these terms indicate an unamiable working and expression of temper. *Captious* marks a readiness to be offended: *cross* indicates a readiness to offend: *peevish* expresses a strong degree of *crossness*: *fretful* a complaining impatience; *petulant* a quick or sudden impatience. *Captiousness* is the consequence of misplaced pride; *crossness* of ill-humour; *peevishness* and *fretfulness* of a painful irritability; *petulance* is either the result of a naturally hasty temper or of a sudden irritability; adults are most prone to be *captious*; they have frequently a self-importance which is in perpetual danger of being offended: an undisciplined temper, will manifest itself on certain occasions by *cross* looks and words towards those with whom they come in connexion; spoiled children are most apt to be *peevish*; sickly children are most liable to *fretfulness*; the young and ignorant are most apt to be *petulant* when contradicted.

CAPTURE, SEIZURE, PRIZE.

CAPTURE, in French *capture*, Latin

captura, from *captus*, participle of *capio* to take, signifies either the act of taking, or the thing taken, but mostly the former.

SEIZURE, from *seize*, in French *saisir*, signifies only the act of seizing.

PRIZE, in French *prise*, from *pris* participle of *prendre* to take, signifies only the thing taken.

Capture and *seizure* differ in the mode: a *capture* is made by force of arms; a *seizure* by direct and personal violence. The *capture* of a town or an island requires an army; the *seizure* of property is effected by the exertions of an individual. A *seizure* always requires some force, which a *capture* does not. A *capture* may be made of an unresisting object; it is merely the taking into possession: a *seizure* supposes much eagerness for possession on the one hand, and reluctance to yield on the other. Merchant vessels are *captured*, which are not in a state to make resistance; contraband goods are *seized* by the police officers.

A *capture* has always something legitimate in it; it is a public measure flowing from authority. A *seizure* is a private measure, frequently as unlawful and unjust as it is violent; it frequently depends on the will of the individual.

A *capture* is general it respects the act of taking: a *prize* is particular, it regards the object taken, and its value to the captor: many *captures* are made by sea which never become *prizes*.

CARE, SOLICITUDE, ANXIETY.

CARE, in Latin *cura*, comes probably from the Greek *ζυγος* power, because whoever has power has a weight of *care*.

SOLICITUDE, in French *solicitude*, Latin *sollicitudo*, from *sollicito* to disquiet, compounded of *solum* and *cito* to put altogether in commotion, signifies a complete state of restless commotion.

ANXIETY, in French *anxiété*, Latin *anxietas*, from *anxius* and *ango*, Greek *αγχο*, Hebrew *hanak* to hang, suffocate, torment, signifies a state of extreme suffering.

These terms express mental pain in different degrees; *care* less than *solicitude*, and this less than *anxiety*. *Care* consists of thought and feeling; *solicitude* and *anxiety* of feeling only. *Care* respects the past, present, and future; *solicitude* and *anxiety* regard the present and future. *Care* is directed towards the present and absent, near or at a distance; *solicitude* and *anxiety* are employed about that which is absent and at a certain distance.

We are *careful* about the means; *soli-*

citous and *anxious* about the end; we are *solicitous* to obtain a good; we are *anxious* to avoid an evil. The *cares* of a parent exceed every other in their weight. He has an unceasing *solicitude* for the welfare of his children, and experiences many an *anxious* thought lest all his *care* should be lost upon them.

CARE, CONCERN, REGARD.

CARE, v. *Care*, *solicitude*.

CONCERN, v. *Affair*.

REGARD, in French *regarder*, is compounded of *re* and *garder* to look at again or attentively.

Care and *concern* consist both of thought and feeling, but the latter has less of thought than feeling: *regard* consists of thought only. We *care* for a thing which is the object of our exertions; we *concern* ourselves about a thing when it engages our attention; we have *regard* for a thing on which we set some value and bestow some reflection.

Care is altogether an active principle: the *careful* man leaves no means untried in the pursuit of his object; *care* actuates him to personal endeavours; it is opposed to negligence. *Concern* is not so active in its nature: the person who is *concerned* will be contented to see exertions made by others; it is opposed to indifference. *Regard* is only a sentiment of the mind; it may lead to action, but of itself extends no farther than reflection.

The business of life is the subject of *care*: religion is the grand object of *concern*: the esteem of others is an object of *regard*.

CARE, CHARGE, MANAGEMENT.

CARE, v. *Care*, *solicitude*.

CHARGE, in French *charge* a burden, in Armoric and Breton *carg*, which is probably connected with *cargo* and *carry*. It is figuratively employed in the sense of a burden.

MANAGEMENT, in French *ménagement*, from *ménager* and *mener* to lead, and the Latin *manus* a hand, signifies direction.

Care will include both *charge* and *management*; but, in the strict sense, it comprehends personal labour: *charge* involves responsibility: *management* includes regulation and order.

A gardener has the *care* of a garden; a nurse has the *charge* of children; a steward has the *management* of a farm: we must always act in order to take *care*; we must look in order to take *charge*: we must always think in order to *manage*.

Care may be employed in menial as well as higher occupations; *charge* in matters of trust and confidence; *management* in mat-

ters of business and experience: the servant has the *care* of the cattle; an instructor has the *charge* of youth; a clerk has the *management* of a business.

CAREFUL, CAUTIOUS, PROVIDENT.

CAREFUL, signifies full of *care* (v. *Care*, *solicitude*).

CAUTIOUS, is in Latin *cautus*, participle of *caveo*, which comes from *cavus* hollow, or *cavum* a cave, which was originally a place of security; hence the epithet *cautious* in the sense of seeking security.

PROVIDENT, in Latin *providens*, signifies foreseeing or looking to beforehand, from *pro* and *video*.

We are *careful* to avoid mistakes; *cautious* to avoid danger; *provident* to avoid straits and difficulties: *care* is exercised in saving and retaining what we have; *caution* must be used in guarding against the evils that may be; *providence* must be employed in supplying the good, or guarding against the *contingent* evils of the future.

Care consists in the use of means, in the exercise of the faculties for the attainment of an end; a *careful* person omits nothing: *caution* consists rather in abstaining from action; a *cautious* person will not act where he ought not; *providence* respects the use of things; *care* and *caution* are both required in the management of property; a *provident* person acts for the future by abstaining for the present.

TO CARESS, FONDLE.

Both these terms mark a species of endearment.

CARESS, like *cherish*, comes from the French *chérir*, and *chère*, Latin *carus* dear, signifying the expression of a tender sentiment.

FONDLE, from *fond*, is a frequentative verb, signifying to become *fond* of, or express one's *fondness*.

We *caress* by words or actions; we *fondle* by actions only: *caresses* are not always unsuitable; but *fondling*, which is the extreme of *caressing*, is, unless in the case of a mother with her helpless offspring, generally taken in a bad sense.

CARNAGE, SLAUGHTER, MASSACRE, BUTCHERY.

CARNAGE, from the Latin *caro*, *carnis* flesh, implies properly a collection of dead flesh, that is, the reducing to the state of dead flesh.

SLAUGHTER, from *slay*, is the act of taking away life.

MASSACRE, in French *massacre*, comes

from the Latin *mactare* to kill for sacrifice.

BUTCHERY, from *butcher*, signifies the act of *butchering*; in French *boucherie*, from *bouche* the mouth, signifies the killing for food.

Carnage respects the number of dead bodies made; it may be said either of men or animals, but more commonly of the former: *slaughter* respects the act of taking away life, and the circumstances of the agent: *massacre* and *butchery* respect the circumstances of the objects who are the sufferers of the action; the latter three are said of human beings only.

Carnage is the consequence of any impetuous attack from a powerful enemy; soldiers who get into a besieged town, or a wolf who breaks into a sheepfold, commonly make a dreadful *carnage*: *slaughter* is the consequence of warfare; in battles the *slaughter* will be very considerable where both parties defend themselves pertinaciously: a *massacre* is the consequence of secret and personal resentment between bodies of people; it is always a stain upon the nation by whom it is practised, as it cannot be effected without a violent breach of confidence, and a direct act of treachery; of this description was the *massacre* of the Danes by the original Britons, and the *massacre* of the Huguenots in France: *butchery* is the general accompaniment of a *massacre*; defenceless women and children are commonly *butchered* by the savage furies who are most active in this work of blood.

CARRIAGE, GAIT, WALK.

CARRIAGE, from the verb to *carry* (v. *To bear, carry*) signifies the act of *carrying* in general, but here that of *carrying* the body.

GAIT, from *go*, signifies the manner of going.

WALK signifies the manner of *walking*.

Carriage is here the most general term; it respects the manner of *carrying* the body, whether in a state of motion or rest: *gait* is the mode of *carrying* the limbs and body whenever we move: *walk* is the manner of *carrying* the body when we move forward to *walk*.

A person's *carriage* is somewhat natural to him; it is often an indication of character, but admits of great change by education; we may often distinguish a man as high or low, either in mind or station, by his *carriage*. *Gait* is artificial; we may contract a certain *gait* by habit; the *gait* is therefore often taken for a bad habit of going, as when a person has a limping *gait*, or an un-

steady gait. *Walk* is less definite than either, as it is applicable to the ordinary movements of men; there is a good, a bad, or an indifferent *walk*; but it is not a matter of indifference which of these kinds of *walk* we have; it is the great art of the dancing-master to give a good *walk*.

CASE, CAUSE.

CASE, in Latin *casus*. from *cado* to fall, chance, happen, signifies the thing falling out.

CAUSE, in French *cause*, Latin *causa*, is probably changed from *case*, and the Latin *casus*.

The *case* is matter of fact; the *cause* is matter of question: a *case* involves circumstances and consequences; a *cause* involves reasons and arguments: a *case* is something to be learned; a *cause* is something to be decided.

A *case* needs only to be stated; a *cause* must be defended: a *cause* may include cases, but not *vice versa*: in all causes that are to be tried, there are many legal cases that must be cited: whoever is interested in the *cause* of humanity will not be heedless of those cases of distress which are perpetually presenting themselves.

TO CAST, THROW, HURL.

CAST probably comes from *casus*, participle of *cado* to fall, signifying to make or let fall.

THROW, in Saxon *throwan*, is most probably a variation of *thrust*, in Latin *trudo*, Chaldee *terad* to thrust repeatedly.

HURL, like the word *whirl*, comes from the Saxon *hirfiven*, *hiveorfan*, German, &c. *wirbel*, Teutonic *wirvel*, Danish *hvirvel*, *hvirvler*, Latin *verto*, *gyro*, which are all derived from the Hebrew *orgal* round, signifying to turn round.

Cast conveys simply the idea of laying aside, or putting from one's self; *throw* and *hurl* designate more specifically the mode of the action: *cast* is an indifferent action, whether it respects ourselves or others; *throw* always marks a direct motive of dislike or contempt. What is not wanted is *cast* off; clothes which are no longer worn are *cast* off: what is worthless or hurtful is *thrown* away; the dross is separated from the wheat and *thrown* away; bad habits cannot be *thrown* off too soon.

Cast, as it respects others, is divested of all personalities; but nothing is *thrown* at any one without an intention of offending or hurting: a glance is *cast* at a person, or things are *cast* before him; but insinuations

are *thrown* out against a person; things are *thrown* at him with the view of striking.

Cast requires no particular effort; it amounts in general to no more than let fall or go: *throw* is frequently accompanied with violence. Money is *cast* into a bag; stones are *thrown* from a great distance: animals *cast* their young; the horse *throws* his rider; a lawless man *throws* off constraint.

Hurl is a violent species of *throwing* employed only on extraordinary occasions, expressive of an unusual degree of vehemence in the agent, and an excessive provocation on the part of the sufferer: the *hurler*, the thing *hurled*, and the cause of *hurling*, correspond in magnitude; a mighty potentate is *hurled* from his throne by some power superior to his own; Milton represents the devils as *hurled* from Heaven by the word of the Almighty; the heathen poets have feigned a similar story of the giants who made war against Heaven, and were *hurled* by the thunderbolts of Jupiter down to the earth.

CAST, TURN, DESCRIPTION.

CAST, from the verb to *cast* (v. *To cast*), signifies that which is *cast*, and here by an extension of the sense, the form in which it is *cast*.

TURN, from the verb to *turn*, signifies also the act of *turning*, or the manner of *turning*.

DESCRIPTION signifies the act of *describing*, or the thing which is to be *described*.

What is *cast* is artificial; what *turns* is natural: the former is the act of some foreign agent; the latter is the act of the subject itself: hence the *cast*, as applicable to persons, respects that which they are made by circumstances; the *turn*, that which they are by themselves: thus there are religious *casts* in India, that is, men *cast* in a certain form of religion, and men of a particular moral *cast*, that is, such as are *cast* in a particular mould as respects their thinking and acting; so in like manner men of a particular *turn*, that is, as respects their inclinations and tastes.

Description is a term less definite than either of the two former; it respects all that may be said of a person, but particularly that which distinguishes a man from others, either in his mode of thinking or acting, in his habits, in his manners, in his language, or his taste.

The *cast* is that which marks a man to others; the *turn* is that which may be known only to a man's self; the *description* is that by which he is *described* or made known to others.

The *cast* is that which is fixed and unchangeable; the *turn* is that which may be again turned; and the *description* is that which varies with the circumstances.

CAUSE, REASON, MOTIVE.

CAUSE (v. *Case*) is supposed to signify originally the same as *case*; it means however now, by distinction, the case or thing happening before another as its *cause*.

REASON, in French *raison*, Latin *ratio*, from *ratus*, participle of *reor* to think, signifies the thing thought, estimated, or valued in the mind.

MOTIVE, in French *motif*, from the Latin *motus*, participle of *moveo* to move, signifies the thing that brings into action.

Cause respects the order and connexion of things; *reason* the movements and operations of the mind; *motives* the movements of the mind and body. *Cause* is properly the generic term; *reason* and *motive* are specific; every *reason* or *motive* is a *cause*, but every *cause* is not a *reason* or *motive*.

Cause is said of all inanimate objects; *reason* and *motive* of rational agents; whatever happens in the world, happens from some *cause* mediate or immediate; the primary or first *cause* of all is God: whatever opinions men hold, they ought to be able to assign a substantial *reason* for them, and for whatever they do they ought to have a sufficient *motive*.

As the *cause* gives birth to the effect, so does the *reason* give birth to the conclusion, and the *motive* gives birth to the action. Between *cause* and effect there is a necessary connexion: whatever in the natural world is capable of giving birth to another thing is an adequate *cause*; but in the moral world there is not a necessary connexion between *reasons* and their results, or *motives* and their actions. The *causes* of our diseases often lie as hidden as the *reasons* of our opinions, and the *motives* for our actions.

TO CAUSE, OCCASION. CREATE.

TO CAUSE, from the substantive *cause* (v. *Case*), naturally signifies to be the *cause* of.

OCCASION, from the noun *occasion*, signifies to be the *occasion* of.

CREATE, in Latin *creatus*, participle of *creo*, comes from the Greek *κρᾶω* to command, and *κρᾶνω* to perform.

What is *caused* seems to follow naturally; what is *occasioned* follows incidentally; what is *created* receives its existence arbitrarily. A wound *causes* pain; accidents *occasion* delay; busy-bodies *create* mischief.

The misfortunes of children *cause* great affliction to their parents; business *occasions* a person's late attendance at a place; disputes and misunderstandings *create* animosity and ill will.

CAUTIOUS, WARY, CIRCUMSPECT.

CAUTIOUS, v. *Careful*.

WARY, from the same as *aware* (v. *To be aware of*), signifies ready to look out.

CIRCUMSPECT, in Latin *circumspectus*, participle of *circumspicio* to look about, signifies ready to look on all sides.

These epithets denote a peculiar care to avoid evil; but *cautious* expresses less than the other two; it is necessary to be *cautious* at all times; to be *wary* in cases of peculiar danger; to be *circumspect* in matters of peculiar delicacy and difficulty.

Caution is the effect of fear; *wariness* of danger; *circumspection* of experience and reflection. The *cautious* man reckons on contingencies, he guards against the evil that may be, by pausing before he acts: the *wary* man looks for the danger which he suspects to be impending, and seeks to avoid it; the *circumspect* man weighs and deliberates; he looks around and calculates on possibilities and probabilities; he seeks to obtain his end by the safest means. A tradesman must be *cautious* in his dealings with all men; he must be *wary* in his intercourse with designing men; he must be *circumspect* when transacting business of particular importance and intricacy.

A person ought to be *cautious* not to give offence; he ought to be *wary* not to entangle himself in ruinous litigations; he ought to be *circumspect* not to engage in what is above his abilities to complete.

TO CEASE, LEAVE OFF, DISCONTINUE.

CEASE, in French *cesser*, Latin *cesso*, from *cessi*, perfect of *cedo* to yield, signifies to give up, or put an end to.

LEAVE is in Saxon *helifan* to remain, in Swedish *lifwa*, low German *leven*, Latin *linquo*, *liqui*, Greek *λειπω* to leave.

DISCONTINUE, with the privative *dis*, expresses the opposite of *continue*.

To cease is neuter; *to leave off* and *discontinue* are active: we *cease* from doing a thing; we *leave off* or *discontinue* a thing. *Cease* is used either for particular actions or general habits; *leave off* more usually and properly for particular actions; *discontinue* for general habits. A restless spoiled child never *ceases* crying until it has obtained what it wants; a labourer *leaves off* his work at any given hour; a delicate person *discon-*

tinues his visits when they are found not to be agreeable.

It should be our first endeavour to *cease* to do evil. It is never good to *leave off* working while there is any thing to do, and time to do it in. The *discontinuing* a good practice without adequate grounds evinces great instability of character.

TO CELEBRATE, COMMEMORATE.

CELEBRATE, in Latin *celebratus*, participle of *celebro*, from *celebris*, signifies to make celebrated.

COMMEMORATE, in Latin *commemoratus*, participle of *commemoro*, compounded of *com* or *cum* and *memoro* to keep in mind, signifies to keep in the memory of a number. *Commemorate* is a species of *celebrating*; we always *commemorate* when we *celebrate*, but not *vice versa*.

Every thing is *celebrated* which is distinguished by any marks of attention, without regard to the time of the event, whether present or past; but nothing is *commemorated* but what has been past. A marriage or a birth-day is *celebrated*; the anniversary of any national event is *commemorated*.

Celebrating is not limited to any species of events or circumstances; whatever interests any number of persons is *celebrated*: *commemorating* is confined to whatever is thought of sufficient importance to be borne in mind, whether of a public or private nature. The election of a favourite member is *celebrated* by those who have contributed to his success: a remarkable preservation, whether national or individual, sometimes demands some signal act of *commemoration*.

Celebrating is a festive as well as social act; it may be sometimes serious, but it is mostly mingled with more or less of gaiety and mirth: *commemorating* is a solemn act; it may be sometimes festive and social, but it is always mingled with what is serious, and may be altogether solitary; it is suited to the occasion, and calculated to revive in the mind suitable impressions of what is past. The birthday of a sovereign is *celebrated* by his people, with such marks of honour and congratulation, as are due from subjects to a prince: the providential escape of our nation from destruction by the gunpowder-plot is annually *commemorated* by a public act of devotion, as also by popular demonstrations of joy.

CELESTIAL, HEAVENLY.

CELESTIAL and HEAVENLY derive their difference in signification from their different origin; they both literally imply belonging to heaven; but the former, from

the Latin *caelum*, signifies belonging to the heaven of heathens; the latter, which has its origin among believers in the true God, has acquired a superior sense in regard to heaven as the habitation of the Almighty. This distinction is pretty faithfully observed in their application: *celestial* is applied mostly in the natural sense of the heavens; *heavenly* is employed more commonly in a spiritual sense.

Hence we speak of the *celestial* globe as distinguished from the terrestrial, of the *celestial* bodies, of Olympus as the *celestial* abode of Jupiter, of the *celestial* deities: but on the other hand, of the *heavenly* habitation, of *heavenly* joys or bliss, of *heavenly* spirits and the like.

There are doubtless many cases in which *celestial* may be used for heavenly in the moral sense, but there are cases in which *heavenly* cannot so properly be substituted for *celestial*.

TO CENSURE, ANIMADVERT, CRITICISE,

CENSURE, *v.* To accuse.

ANIMADVERT, *v.* Animadversion.

CRITICISE, *v.* Animadversion.

To *censure* expresses less than to *animadvert* or *criticise*; one may always *censure* when one *animadvert*s or *criticises*.

To *censure* and *animadvert* are both personal, the one direct, the other indirect; *criticism* is directed to things, and not to persons only.

Censuring consists in finding some fault real or supposed; it refers mostly to the conduct of individuals. *Animadvert* consists in suggesting some error or impropriety; it refers mostly to matters of opinion and dispute; *criticism* consists in minutely examining the intrinsic characteristics and appreciating the merits of each individually or the whole collectively; it refers to matters of science and learning.

To *censure* requires no more than simple assertion; its justice or propriety often rests on the authority of the individual: *animadversions* require to be accompanied with reasons; those who *animadvert* on the proceedings or opinions of others must state some grounds for the objections.

Criticism is altogether argumentative and illustrative; it takes nothing for granted, it analyses and decomposes, it compares and combines, it asserts and supports the assertions. The office of the *censurer* is the easiest and least honourable of the three; it may be assumed by ignorance and impertinence, it may be performed for the purpose of indulging an angry or imperious temper.

The task of *animadverting* is delicate; it may be resorted to for the indulgence of an overweening self-conceit. The office of a *critic* is both arduous and honourable; it cannot be filled by any one incompetent for the charge without exposing his arrogance and folly to merited contempt.

TO CENSURE, CARP, CAVIL.

CENSURE, *v*, To accuse.

CARP, in Latin *carpo*, signifies to pluck.

CAVIL, in French *caviller*, Latin *cavillor*, from *cavilla* a taunt, and *cavus* hollow, signifies to be unsound or unsubstantial in speech.

To *censure* respects positive errors; to *carp* and *cavil* have regard to what is trivial or imaginary: the former is employed for errors in persons; the latter for supposed defects in things. *Censures* are frequently necessary from those who have the authority to use them; a good father will *censure* his children when their conduct is *censurable*. *Carping* and *cavilling* are resorted to only to indulge ill-nature or self-conceit: party politicians *carp* at the measures of administration; infidels *cavil* at the evidences of Christianity, because they are determined to disbelieve.

CERTAIN, SURE, SECURE.

CERTAIN, in French *certain*, Latin *certus*, comes from *cerno* to perceive, because what we see or perceive is supposed to be put beyond doubt.

SURE and SECURE are variations of the same word, in French *sur*, German *sicher*, low German *seker*, &c. Latin *securus*, which is compounded of *se* (*sine*) apart, and *cura*, signifying without care, requiring no care.

Certain respects matters of fact or belief; *sare* and *secure* the quality or condition of things. A fact is *certain*, a person's step is *sure*, a house is *secure*. *Certain* is opposed to dubious, *sure* to wavering, *secure* to dangerous. A person is *certain* who has no doubt remaining in his mind; he is *sure* when his conviction is steady and unchangeable; he is *secure* when the prospect of danger is removed.

When applied to things, *certain* is opposed to what is varying and irregular; *sure* to what is unerring; *secure* is used only in its natural sense. It is a defect in the English language, that there are at present no *certain* rules for its orthography or pronunciation; the learner, therefore, is at a loss for a *sure* guide. Amidst opposing statements it is difficult to *ascertain* the real state of the case. No one can *ensure* his life for a moment, or *secure* his property from the

contingencies to which all sublunary things are exposed.

CESSATION, STOP, REST, INTERMISSION.

CESSATION, from the verb to *cease*, marks the condition of leaving off.

STOP, from to *stop*, marks that of being *stopped* or prevented from going on.

REST, from to *rest*, marks the state of being quiet: and INTERMISSION from *intermit*, marks that of *ceasing* occasionally.

To *cease* respects the course of things; whatever does not go on has *ceased*; things *cease* of themselves; *stop* respects some external action or influence: nothing *stops* but what is supposed to be *stopped* or hindered by another: *rest* is a species of *cessation* that regards labour or exertion; whatever does not move or exert itself is a *rest*: *intermission* is a species of *cessation* only for a time or at certain intervals.

That which *ceases* or *stops* is supposed to be at an end; *rest* or *intermission* supposes a renewal. A *cessation* of hostilities is at all times desirable: to put a *stop* to evil practices is sometimes the most difficult and dangerous of all undertakings: *rest* after fatigue is indispensable, for labour without *intermission* exhausts the frame. The rain *ceases*, a person or a ball *stops* running, the labourer *rests* from his toil, a fever is *intermittent*.

CHAIN, FETTER, BAND, SHACKLE.

CHAIN, in French *chaîne*, Latin *catena*, probably contracted from *captena* and *capio*, signifies that which takes or holds.

FETTER, in German *fessel*, comes from *fassen* to lay hold of.

BAND, from *bind*, signifies that which binds.

SHACKLE, in Saxon *scacul* signifies that which makes a creature shake or move irregularly by confining the legs.

All these terms designate the instrument by which animals or men are confined. *Chain* is general and indefinite; all the rest are *chains*: but there are many *chains* which do not come under the other names; a *chain* is indefinite as to its make; it is made generally of iron rings, but of different sizes and shapes: *fetters* are larger, they consist of many stout *chains*: *bands* are in general any thing which confines the body or the limbs; they may be either *chains* or even cords: *shackle* is that species of *chain* which goes on the legs to confine them; malefactors of the worst order have *fetters* on different parts of their bodies, and *shackles* on their legs.

These terms may all be used figuratively. The substantive *chain* is applied to whatever hangs together like a *chain*, as a *chain* of events; but the verb to *chain* signifies to confine as with a *chain*: thus the mind is *chained* to rules, or *fettered* by systems. *Band* in the figurative sense is applied, particularly in poetry to every thing which is supposed to serve the purpose of a *band*; thus love is said to have its silken *bands*. *Shackle*, whether as a substantive or a verb, retains the idea of controlling the movements of the person, not in his body only, but also in his mind and in his moral conduct; thus a man who commences life with a borrowed capital is *shackled* in his commercial concerns, by the interest he has to pay, and the obligations he has to discharge.

CHANCE, FORTUNE, FATE.

CHANCE (*v. Accident*) is here considered as the cause of what falls out.

FORTUNE, in French *fortune*, Latin *fortuna*, from *fors* chance, in Hebrew *gar*.

FATE, in Latin *fatum*, from *fatum* participle of *for* to speak or decree, signifies that which is decreed, or the power of decreeing.

In the ordinary sense *chance* is the generic, *fortune* and *fate* are specific terms: *chance* applies to all things, personal or otherwise; *fortune* and *fate* are mostly said of that which is personal.

Chance neither forms orders or designs: neither knowledge or intention is attributed to it; its events are uncertain and variable: *fortune* forms plans and designs, but without choice; we attribute to it an intention without discernment; it is said to be blind: *fate* forms plans and chains of causes; intention, knowledge, and power are attributed to it; its views are fixed, its results decisive. A person goes as *chance* directs him when he has no express object to determine his choice one way or other; his *fortune* favours him, if without any expectation he gets the thing he wishes; his *fate* wills it, if he reaches the desired point contrary to what he intended.

Men's success in their undertakings depends oftener on *chance* than on their ability: we are ever ready to ascribe to ourselves what we owe to our good *fortune*; it is the *fate* of some men to fail in every thing they undertake.

If I suffer my horse to direct me in the road I take to London, I may fairly attribute it to *chance* if I take the right instead of the left; and if in consequence I meet with an agreeable companion by the way I shall not hesitate to call it my good *fortune*; and if in

spite of any previous intention to the contrary, I should be led to take the same road repeatedly, and as often to meet with an agreeable companion, I shall immediately say that it is my *fate* to meet with an agreeable companion whenever I go to London.

CHANCE, PROBABILITY.

CHANCE, *v. Accident, chance*.

PROBABILITY, in French *probabilité*, Latin *probabilitas*, from *probabilis* and *probo* to prove, signifies the quality of being able to be proved or made good.

These terms are both employed in forming an estimate of future events; but the *chance* is either for or against, the *probability* is always for a thing. *Chance* is but a degree of *probability*; there may in this latter case be a *chance* where there is no *probability*. A *chance* affords a possibility; many *chances* are requisite to constitute a *probability*.

What has been once may under similar circumstances be again; for that there is a *chance*; what has fallen to one man may fall to another; so far he has a *chance* in his favour; but in all the *chances* of life there will be no *probability* of success, where a man does not unite industry with integrity. *Chance* cannot be calculated upon; it is apt to produce disappointment: *probability* justifies hope; it is sanctioned by experience.

CHANCE, HAZARD.

CHANCE, *v. Accident, chance*.

HAZARD comes from the oriental *zar* and *tzar*, signifying any thing bearing an impression, particularly the dice used in *chance* games, which is called by the Italians *zara*, and by the Spaniards *azar*.

Both these terms are employed to mark the course of future events, which is not discernible by the human eye. With the Deity there is neither *chance* nor *hazard*; his plans are the result of omniscience: but the designs and actions of men are all dependant on *chance* or *hazard*.

Chance may be favourable or unfavourable, more commonly the former; *hazard* is always unfavourable; it is properly a species of *chance*. There is a *chance* either of gaining or losing; there is a *hazard* of losing.

In most speculations the *chance* of succeeding scarcely outweighs the *hazard* of losing.

TO CHANGE, ALTER, VARY,

CHANGE, in French *changer*, is probably derived from the middle Latin *cambio* to exchange, signifying to take one thing for another.

ALTER, from the Latin *alter* another, signifies to make a thing otherwise.

VARY, in Latin *vario* to make various, comes in all probability from *varus* a spot or speckle, which destroys uniformity of appearance in any surface.

We *change* a thing by putting another in its place; we *alter* a thing by making it different from what it was before; we *vary* it by *altering* it in different manners and at different times. We *change* our clothes whenever we put on others: the tailor *alters* clothes which are found not to fit; and he *varies* the fashion of making them whenever he makes new. A man *changes* his habits, *alters* his conduct, and *varies* his manner of speaking and thinking, according to circumstances.

A thing is *changed* without *altering* its kind; it is *altered* without destroying its identity; and it is *varied* without destroying the similarity. We *change* our habitation, but it still remains a habitation; we *alter* our house, but it still remains the same house; we *vary* the manner of painting and decoration, but it may strongly resemble the manner in which it has been before executed.

TO CHANGE, EXCHANGE, BARTER, SUBSTITUTE.

CHANGE, *v.* To change, alter.

EXCHANGE is compounded of *e* or *ex* and *change*, signifying to *change* in the place of another.

BARTER is supposed to come from the French *barater*, a sea term for indemnification, and also for circumvention; hence it has derived the meaning of a mercenary exchange.

SUBSTITUTE, in French *substitut*, Latin *substitutus*, from *sub* and *statuo*, signifies to place one thing in the room of another.

The idea of putting one thing in the place of another is common to all these terms, which varies in the manner and the object. *Change* is the generic, the rest are specific terms: whatever is *exchanged*, *bartered*, or *substituted*, is *changed*; but not *vice versa*. *Change* is applied in general to things of the same kind, or of different kinds; *exchange* to articles of property or possession; *barter* to all articles of merchandize; *substitute* to all matters of service and office.

Things rather than persons are the proper objects for *changing* and *exchanging*, although whatever one has a control over may be *changed* or *exchanged*; a king may *change* his ministers; governments *exchange* prisoners of war. Things only are the pro-

per objects for *barter*; but, to the shame of humanity, there are to be found people who will *barter* their countrymen, and even their relatives, for a paltry trinket.

Substituting may either have persons or things for an object; one man may be *substituted* for another, or one word *substituted* for another.

The act of *changing* or *substituting* requires but one person for an agent; that of *exchanging* and *bartering* requires two: a person *changes* his things or *substitutes* one for another; but one person *exchanges* or *barters* with another.

Change is used likewise intransitively, the others always transitively; things *change* of themselves, but persons always *exchange*, *barter*, or *substitute* things. *Changing* is not advisable, it is seldom advantageous; there is a greater chance of *changing* for the worse, than for the better; it is set on foot by caprice oftener than by prudence and necessity. *Exchanging* is convenient; it is founded not so much on the intrinsic value of things, as their relative utility to the parties concerned; its end is mutual accommodation. *Bartering* is profitable; it proceeds upon a principle of mercantile calculation; the productiveness, and not the worth of the thing is considered; its main object is gain. *Substituting* is a matter of necessity; it springs from the necessity of supplying a deficiency by some equivalent; it serves for the accommodation of the party whose place is filled up.

In the figurative application these terms bear the same analogy to each other. A person *changes* his opinions: but a proneness to such *changes* evinces a want of firmness in the character. The good king at his death *exchanges* a temporal for an eternal crown. The mercenary trader *barters* his conscience for paltry pelf. Men of dogmatical tempers *substitute* assertion for proof, and abuse for argument.

CHANGE, VARIATION, VICISSITUDE.

CHANGE, *v.* To change, alter.

VARIATION, *v.* To change, alter.

VICISSITUDE, in French *vicissitude*, Latin *vicissitudo*, from *vicissim* by turns, signifies changing alternately.

Change is both to *vicissitude* and *variation* as the genus to the species. Every *variation* or *vicissitude* is a *change*, but every *change* is not a *variation* or *vicissitude*.

Change consists simply in ceasing to be the same: *variation* consists in being different at different times; *vicissitude* in being alternately or reciprocally different and the

same. All created things are liable to *change*; old things pass away, new things become old; the humours of men, like the elements are exposed to perpetual *variations*: human affairs, like the seasons, are subject to frequent *vicissitudes*.

CHANGEABLE, MUTABLE, VARIABLE, INCONSTANT, FICKLE, VERSATILE.

CHANGEABLE, *v.* To change, alter.

MUTABLE, from the Latin *muto* to change, is the same as changeable.

VARIABLE, *v.* To change.

INCONSTANT, compounded of the privative *in* and *constant*, in Latin *constans* or *con* and *sto* to stand together or remain the same, signifies an incapacity to remain the same for any long continuance.

FICKLE is most probably changed from the Latin *facilis* easy.

VERSATILE, in Latin *versatilis*, from *verto* to turn, signifies easy to be turned.

Changeable is said of persons or things; *mutable* is said of things only: human beings are *changeable*, human affairs are *mutable*. *Changeable* respects the sentiments and opinions of the mind; *variable*, the state of the feelings; *inconstant*, the affections; *fickle*, the inclinations and attachments; *versatile*, the application of the talents. A *changeable* person rejects what he has once embraced in order to take up something new; a *variable* person likes and dislikes alternately the same thing; an *inconstant* person likes many things successively or at the same time; a *versatile* person has a talent for whatever he likes.

Changeableness arises from a want of fixed principles; *variableness* from a predominance of humour; *inconstancy* from a selfish and unfeeling temper; *fickleness* from a lightness of mind; *versatility* from a flexibility of mind. Men are the most *changeable* and *inconstant*; women are the most *variable* and *fickle*: the former offend from an indifference for objects in general, or a diminished attachment for any object in particular; the latter from an excessive warmth of feeling that is easily biassed and ready to seize new objects. People who are *changeable* in their views and plans are particularly unfit for the government of a state; those who are *variable* in their humours are unsuitable as masters; people of an *inconstant* character ought to be shunned as lovers; those of a *fickle* disposition ought not to be chosen as friends.

Changeable, *variable*, *inconstant*, and *fickle*, as applied to persons, are taken in the bad sense; but *versatility* is a natural gift, which may be employed advantageously.

CHARACTER, LETTER.

CHARACTER comes from the Greek *χαρακτηρ*, signifying an impression or mark, from *χαράσσω* to imprint or stamp.

LETTER, in French *lettre*, Latin *litera*, is probably contracted from *legitera*, signifying what is legible.

Character is to *letter* as the genus to the species: every *letter* is a *character*; but every *character* is not a *letter*. *Character* is any printed mark that serves to designate something; a *letter* is a species of *character* which is the constituent part of a word. Short-hand and hieroglyphics consist of *characters*, but not of *letters*.

Character is employed figuratively, but *letter* is not. A grateful person has the favours which are conferred upon him written in indelible *characters* upon his heart.

CHARACTER, REPUTATION.

From the natural sense of a stamp or mark (*v.* *Character*, *letter*), this word is figuratively employed for the moral mark which distinguishes one man from another.

REPUTATION, from the French *reputer*, Latin *reputo*, to think, signifies what is thought of a person.

CHARACTER lies in man; it is the mark of what he is; it shows itself on all occasions: *reputation* depends upon others; it is what they think of him.

A *character* is given particularly: a *reputation* is formed generally. Individuals give a *character* of another from personal knowledge: public opinion constitutes the *reputation*. *Character* has always some foundation; it is a positive description of something: *reputation* has more of conjecture in it, its source is hearsay.

It is possible for a man to have a fair *reputation* who has not in reality a good *character*; although men of really good *character* are not likely to have a bad *reputation*.

TO CHARM, ENCHANT, FASCINATE, ENRAPTURE, CAPTIVATE.

CHARM, *v.* Attractions.

ENCHANT is compounded of *en* and *chant*, signifying to act upon as by the power of *chanting* or music.

FASCINATE, in Latin *fascino*, Greek *βασκανω*, signified originally among the ancients a species of witchcraft, performed by the eyes or the tongue.

ENRAPTURE, compounded of *en* and *rapture*, signifies to put into a *rapture*: and *rapture*, from the Latin *rapio* to seize or carry away, signifies the state of being

carried away; whence to *enrapture* signifies to put into that state.

CAPTIVATE, in Latin *captivatus*, participle of *captivo*, from *capio* to take, signifies to take, as it were, prisoner.

The idea of an irresistible influence is common to these terms.

Charm expresses a less powerful effect than *enchant*; a *charm* is simply a magical verse used by magicians and sorcerers: *incantation* or *enchantment* is the use not only of verses but of any mysterious ceremonies, to produce a given effect.

To *charm* and *enchant* in this sense denote an operation by means of words or motions; to *fascinate* denotes an operation by means of the eyes or tongue; a person is *charmed* and *enchanted* voluntarily; he is *fascinated* involuntarily.

Charms and enchantments are performed by persons: *fascinations* are also performed by animals: the former have always some supposed good in view; the latter have always a mischievous tendency: there are persons who pretend to *charm* away the tooth-ache, or other pains of the body; some serpents are said to have a *fascinating* power in their eyes, by which they can kill animals on whom they have fixed them.

Fascinate, as well as the others, is taken in the improper sense: *charm*, *enchant*, and *fascinate*, are employed to describe moral as well as natural operations: *enrapture* and *captivate* describe effects on the mind only: to *charm*, *enchant*, *fascinate*, and *enrapture*, designate the effects produced by physical and moral objects; *captivate* designates those produced by physical objects only: we may be *charmed*, or *enchanted*, or *enraptured*, with what we see, hear, and learn; we may be *fascinated* with what we see or learn; we are *captivated* only with what we see: a fine voice, a fine prospect, or a fine sentiment, *charms*, *enchants*, or *enraptures*; a fine person *fascinates*, or the conversation of a person is *fascinating*; beauty, with all its accompaniments, *captivates*. When applied to the same objects, *charm*, *enchant*, and *enrapture*, rise in sense: what *charms* produces sweet but not tumultuous emotions; in this sense music in general *charms* a musical ear: what *enchants* rouses the feelings to a high pitch of tumultuous delight; in this manner the musician is *enchanted* with the finest compositions of Handel when performed by the best masters; or a lover of the country is *enchanted* with Swiss scenery: to *enrapture* is to absorb all the affections of the soul; it is of

too violent a nature to be either lasting or frequent: it is a term applicable only to persons of an enthusiastic character.

What *charms*, *enchants*, and *enraptures*, only affords pleasure for the time; what *fascinates* and *captivates*, rivets the mind to the object: the former three convey the idea of voluntary movement of the mind, as in the proper sense; the two latter imply a species of forcible action on the mind, which deprives a person of his free agency; the passions, as well as the affections, are called into play whilst the understanding is passive, which, with regard to *fascinate*, may be to the injury of the subject; a loose woman may have it in her power to *fascinate*, and a modest woman to *captivate*.

TO CHASTEN, TO CHASTISE.

CHASTEN, CHASTISE, both come through the French *châtier*, from the Latin *castigo*, which is compounded, of *castus* and *ago* to make pure,

Chasten has most regard to the end, *chastise* to the means; the former is an act of the Deity, the latter a human action; God *chastens* his faithful people to cleanse them from their transgressions; parents *chastise* their children to prevent the repetition of faults: afflictions are the means which he adopts for *chastening* those whom he wishes to make more obedient to his will; stripes are the means by which offenders are *chastised*.

CHASTITY. CONTINENCE.

CHASTITY, in French *chastité*, Latin *castitas*, comes from *castus* pure, and the Hebrew *kedish* sacred.

CONTINENCE, in French *continence*, Latin *continentia*. from *continens* and *contineo*, signifies the act of keeping one's self within bounds.

These two terms are equally employed in relation to the pleasures of sense: both are virtues, but sufficiently distinct in their characteristics.

* *Chastity* prescribes rules for the indulgence of these pleasures; *continence* altogether interdicts their use. *Chastity* extends its views to whatever may bear the smallest relation to the object which it proposes to regulate; it controls the thoughts, words, looks, attitudes, food, dress, company, and in short the whole mode of living: *continence* simply confines itself to the privation of the pleasures themselves: it is possible, therefore, to be *chaste* without being *continent*, and *continent* without being *chaste*.

* Beauzô: „Chastité, continence.“

Chastity is suited to all times, ages, and conditions; *continence* belongs only to a state of celibacy: the Christian religion enjoins *chastity*, as a positive duty on all its followers; the Romish religion enjoins *continence* on its clerical members: old age renders men *continent*, although it seldom makes them *chaste*.

TO CHEAT, DEFRAUD, TRICK

CHEAT, in Saxon *cetta*, in all probability comes from *captum* and *capió*, as deceit comes from *decipio*.

DEFRAUD, compounded of *de* and *fraud*, signifies to practise *fraud*, or to obtain by fraud.

TRICK, in French *tricher*, German *trügen*, signifies simply to deceive, or get the better of any one.

The idea of deception which is common to these terms varies in degree and circumstances.

One *cheats* by a gross falsehood; one *defrauds* by a settled plan; one *tricks* by a sudden invention: *cheating* is as low in its ends, as it is base in its means; *cheats* are contented to gain by any means; *defrauding* is a serious measure; its consequences are serious, both to the perpetrator and the sufferer. A person *cheats* at play; he *defrauds* those who place confidence in him. *Cheating* is not punishable by laws: it involves no other consequence than the loss of character; *frauds* are punished in every form, even with death, when the occasion requires; they strike at the root of all confidence, and affect the public security: *tricking* is a species of dexterous *cheating*; the means and the end are alike trifling. Dishonest people *cheat*; villains *defraud*; cunning people *trick*.

TO CHECK, CURB, CONTROL

All these terms express a species of restraining.

CHECK and **CURB** are figurative expressions borrowed from natural objects. *Check*, in French *échec*, German *schach*, *chess*, is the name in those languages for the king in the game of chess, whence it signifies as a verb to exert a restrictive power; *curb*, from the thing *curb*, by which horses are kept in, signifies in like manner, a coercive restraining.

CONTROL is probably contracted from *counter-role*, that is, to turn against an object, to act against it.

To *check* is to throw obstacles in the way to impede the course; to *curb*, is to bear down by the direct exercise of force, to prevent from action; to *control* is to direct

and turn the course: the actions of men are *checked*: their feelings are *curbed*, their actions or feelings are *controlled*.

External means are employed in *checking* or *controlling*; external or internal means are employed in *curbing*: men *check* and *control* others; they *curb* themselves or others: young people ought always to be *checked* whenever they discover a too forward temper in the presence of their superiors or elders; it is necessary to *curb* those who are of an impetuous temper, and to keep youth under *control*, until they have within themselves the restrictive power of judgment to *curb* their passions, and *control* their inordinate appetites.

TO CHECK, CHIDE, REPRIMAND, REPROVE, REBUKE.

CHECK, v. To *check*, *curb*.

CHIDE, is in Saxon *cidan*, probably connected with *cyldan* to scold.

REPRIMAND is compounded of the privative *repri* for *retro*, backwards, and *mando* to approve, i. e. the contrary of approving.

REPROVE, in French *reprover*, Latin *reprobo*, is compounded of the privative syllable *re* and *probo*, signifying to find the contrary of good, that is, to find bad, to blame.

REBUKE is compounded of *re* and *buke*, in French *bouche* the mouth, signifying to stop the mouth.

The idea of expressing one's disapprobation of a person's conduct is common to all these terms.

A person is *checked* that he may not continue to do what is offensive; he is *chidden* for what he has done that he may not repeat it: impertinent and forward people require to be *checked*; that they may not become intolerable; thoughtless people are *chidden* when they give hurtful proofs of their carelessness.

People are *checked* by actions and looks, as well as words; they are *chidden* by words only: a timid person is easily *checked*; the want even of due encouragement will serve to damp his resolution: the young are perpetually falling into irregularities which require to be *chidden*.

To *chide* marks a stronger degree of displeasure than *reprimand*, and *reprimand* than *reprove* or *rebuke*; a person may *chide* or *reprimand* in anger, he *reproves* and *rebukes* with coolness: great offences call forth *chidings*; omissions or mistakes occasion or require a *reprimand*; irregularities of conduct give rise to *reproof*; and improprieties of behaviour demand *rebuke*. *Chiding* and *reprimanding* are employed

for offences against the individual, and in cases where the greatest disparity exists in the station of the parties; a child is *chid* by his parent; a servant is *reprimanded* by his master.

Reproving and *rebuking* have less to do with the relation or station of the parties, than with the nature of the offence: wisdom, age, and experience, or a spiritual mission, give authority to *reprove* or *rebuke* those whose conduct has violated any law, human or divine: the prophet Nathan *reproved* king David for his heinous offences against his Maker; our Saviour *rebuked* Peter for his presumptuous mode of speech.

TO CHECK, STOP.

CHECK, *v.* To check, curb.

STOP, *v.* Cessation.

To *check* is to cause to move slowly; to *stop* is to cause not to move at all: the growth of a plant is *checked* when it does not grow so fast as usual; its growth is *stopped* when it ceases altogether to grow: the water of a river is *stopped* by a dam; the rapidity of its course is *checked* by the intervention of rocks and sands.

When applied to persons, to *check* is always contrary to the will of the sufferer; but to *stop* is often a matter of indifference, if not directly serviceable: one is *checked* in his career of success by some untoward event; one is *stopped* on a journey by the meeting of a friend.

In a moral application these terms bear a similar analogy; *check* has the import of diminishing; *stop* that of destroying or causing to cease: many evils may be easily *checked*, to which it would not be easy to put an effectual *stop*.

TO CHEER, ENCOURAGE, COMFORT.

CHEER, *v.* To animate.

ENCOURAGE, compounded of *en* and *courage*, signifies to inspire with courage.

COMFORT is compounded of *com* or *cum*, and *fortis* strong, signifying to invigorate or strengthen.

To *cheer* regards the spirits; to *encourage* the resolution: the sad require to be *cheered*; the timid to be *encouraged*. Mirthful company is suited to *cheer* those who labour under any depression; the prospect of success *encourages* those who have any object to obtain.

To *cheer* and *comfort* have both regard to the spirits, but the latter differs in degree and manner: to *cheer* expresses more than to *comfort*; the former signifying to produce a lively sentiment, the latter to lessen or remove a painful one: we are

cheered in the moments of despondency, whether from real or imaginary causes; we are *comforted* in the hour of distress.

Cheering is mostly effected by the discourse of others: *comforting* is effected by the actions, as well as the words, of others. Nothing tends more to *cheer* the drooping soul than endearing expressions of tenderness from those we love; the most effectual means of *comforting* the poor and afflicted, is by relieving their wants. The voice of the benevolent man is *cheering* to the aching heart: his looks *encourage* the sufferer to disclose his griefs; his hand is open to administer relief and *comfort*.

CHEERFUL, MERRY, SPRIGHTLY, GAY.

CHEERFUL signifies full of *cheer*, or of that which *cheers* (*v.* To animate).

MERRY, in Saxon *merig*, is probably connected with the word *mare*, and the Latin *meretrix* a strumpet.

SPRIGHTLY is contracted from *spiritedly*.

GAY is connected with *joy* and *jocund*, from the Latin *jocus*.

Cheerful marks an unruffled flow of spirits; with *mirth* there is more of tumult and noise; with *sprightliness* there is more buoyancy; *gaiety* comprehends *mirth* and indulgence. A *cheerful* person smiles; a *merry* person laughs: a *sprightly* person dances; a *gay* person takes his pleasure.

Cheerfulness is an habitual state of mind; *mirth* is an occasional elevation of the spirits; *sprightliness* lies in the temperature and flow of the blood; *gaiety* depends altogether on external circumstances. Religion is the best promoter of *cheerfulness*; it makes its possessor pleased with himself and all around him; company and wine are but too often the only promoters of *mirth*; youth and health will naturally be attended with *sprightliness*; a succession of pleasures, an exemption from care, and the banishment of thought, will keep *gaiety* alive.

Sprightliness and *mirth* are seldom employed but in the proper sense as respects persons: but *cheerful* and *gay* are extended to different objects; as a *cheerful* prospect, a *cheerful* room, *gay* attire, a *gay* scene, *gay* colours &c.

CHIEF, PRINCIPAL, MAIN.

CHIEF, in French *chef*, from the Latin *caput* the head, signifies belonging to the uppermost part.

PRINCIPAL, in French *principal*, Latin *principalis*, comes from *princeps* a chief or prince, signifying belonging to a prince.

MAIN, from the Latin *magnus*, signifies to a great degree.

Chief respects order and rank; *principal* has regard to importance and respectability; *main* to degree or quantity. We speak of a *chief* clerk; a commander in *chief*; the *chief* person in a city: but the *principal* people in a city; the *principal* circumstances in a narrative, and the *main* object.

CHIEF, LEADER, CHIEFTAIN, HEAD.

CHIEF and CHIEFTAIN signify him who is *chief* (v. *Chief*).

LEADER, from to *lead*, and HEAD from the *head*, sufficiently designate their own signification.

Chief respects precedency in civil matters; *leader* regards the direction of enterprises: *chieftain* is employed for the superior in military rank; and *head* for the superior in general concerns.

Among savages the *chief* of every tribe is a despotic prince within his own district. Factions and parties in a state, like savage tribes, must have their *leaders*, to whom they are blindly devoted, and by whom they are instigated to every desperate proceeding. Robbers have their *chieftains*, who plan and direct every thing, having an unlimited power over the band. The *heads* of families were, in the primitive ages, the *chiefs*, who in conjunction regulated the affairs of state.

Chiefs have a permanent power, which may descend by inheritance, to branches of the same families: *leaders* and *chieftains* have a deputed power with which they are invested, as the time and occasion require: *heads* have a natural power springing out of the nature of their birth, rank, talents, and situation; it is not hereditary, but successive.

CHILDISH, INFANTINE.

CHILDISH is in the manner of a *child*.

INFANTINE is in the manner of an *infant*.

What *children* do is frequently simple or foolish; what *infants* do is commonly pretty and engaging; therefore *childish* is taken in the bad, and *infantine* in the good sense. *Childish* manners are very offensive in those who have ceased according to their years to be children; the *infantine* actions of some children evince a simplicity of character.

CHILL, COLD.

CHILL and COLD are but variations of the same word, in German *kalt*, &c.

Chill expresses less than *cold*, that is to say, it expresses a degree of *cold*. The

weather is often *chilly* in summer; but it is *cold* in winter.

We speak of taking the *chill* off water when the *cold* is in part removed; and of a *chill* running through the frame when the *cold* begins to penetrate the frame that is in a state of warmth.

TO CHOOSE, PREFER.

CHOOSE, in French *choisir*, German *kiesen*, from the French *cher*, Celtic *choe* dear or good, signifies to hold good.

PREFER, in French *preferer*, Latin *praefero*, compounded of *prae* and *fero* to take before, signifies to take one thing rather than another.

* To *choose* is to *prefer* as the genus to the species: we always *choose* in *preferring*, but we do not always *prefer* in *choosing*. To *choose* is to take one thing from among others; to *prefer* is to take one thing before or rather than another. We sometimes *choose* from the bare necessity of *choosing*; but we never *prefer* without making a positive and voluntary *choice*.

When we *choose* from a specific motive, the acts of *choosing* and *preferring* differ in the nature of the motive. The former is absolute, the latter relative. We *choose* a thing for what it is, or what we esteem it to be of itself; we *prefer* a thing for what it has, or what we suppose it has, superior to another.

Utility or convenience are grounds for *choosing*; comparative merit occasions the *preference*: we *choose* something that is good, and are contented with it until we see something better which we *prefer*.

We calculate and pause in *choosing*; we decide in *preferring*; the judgment determines in making the *choice*; the will determines in giving the *preference*. We *choose* things from an estimate of their merits or their fitness for the purpose proposed; we *prefer* them from their accordance with our tastes, habits, and pursuits. Books are *chosen* by those who wish to read; romances and works of fiction are *preferred* by general readers; learned works by the scholar.

One who wants instruction *chooses* a master, but he will mostly *prefer* one whom he knows to be a good teacher. Our *choice* is good or bad according to our knowledge; our *preference* is just or unjust, according as it is sanctioned by reason.

* The Abbé Girard, under the article *choisir*, *preferer*, has reversed this rule: but as I conceive, from a confusion of thought, which pervades the whole of his illustration on these words. The Abbé Roubaud has controverted his positions with some degree of accuracy. I have, however, given my own view of the matter in distinction from either.

Our *choice* may be directed by our own experience or that of others; our *preference* must be guided by our own feelings. We make our *choice*; we give our *preference*: the first is the settled purpose of the mind, it fixes on the object; the latter is the inclining of the will, it yields to the object.

Choosing must be employed in all the important concerns of life; *preferring* is admissible in subordinate matters only. There is but one thing that is right, and that ought to be *chosen* when it is discovered: there are many indifferent things that may suit our tastes and inclinations; these we are at liberty to *prefer*. But to *prefer* what we ought not to *choose* is to make our reason bend to our will. The path of life should be *chosen*; but the path to be taken in a walk may be *preferred*. It is advisable for a youth in the *choice* of a profession to consult what he *prefers*, as he has the greatest chance of succeeding when he can combine his pleasure with his duty. A friend should be *chosen*: a companion may be *preferred*. A wise prince is careful in the *choice* of his ministers; but a weak prince has mostly favourites whom he *prefers*.

TO CHOOSE, PICK, SELECT.

CHOOSE, v. *To choose, prefer.*

PICK, in German *picken*, or *bicken*, French *bicquer*, Dutch *becken*, Icelandic *picka*, Swedish *piacka*, comes very probably from the old German *bag*, *bich*, to stick, corresponding to the Latin *figo* to fix.

SELECT, Latin *selectus*, participle of *seligo*, that is *lego* to gather or put, and *se* apart.

Choose is, as in the former case, the generic; the others are specific terms: *pick* and *select* are expressly different modes of *choosing*. We always *choose* when we *pick* and *select*; but we do not always *pick* and *select* when we *choose*.

To *choose* may be applied to two or more things; to *pick* and *select* can be used only for several things. We may *choose* one book out of two, but we *pick* and *select* out of a library or a parcel; *pick* may be said of one or many; *select* only of many.

To *choose* does not always spring from any particular design or preference; to *pick* and *select* signify to *choose* with care. What is *picked* and *selected* is always the best of its kind, but the former is commonly something of a physical nature; the latter of a moral or intellectual description. Soldiers are sometimes *picked* to form a particular regiment; pieces are *selected* in prose or verse for general purposes.

TO CHOOSE, ELECT.

CHOOSE, v. *To choose, prefer.*

ELECT, in Latin *electus*, participle of *eligo*, is compounded of *e* and *lego*, signifying to gather or take out from.

Both these terms are employed in regard to persons appointed to an office; the former in a general, the latter in a particular sense.

Choosing is the act either of one man or of many; *election* is always that of a number; it is performed by the concurrence of many voices.

A prince *chooses* his ministers; the constituents *elect* their members of parliament. A person is *chosen* to serve the office of sheriff; he is *elected* by the corporation to be mayor.

Choosing is an act of authority; it binds the person *chosen*: *election* is a voluntary act; the *elected* has the power of refusal. People are obliged to serve in some offices when they are *chosen*, although they would gladly be exempt. The circumstance of being *elected* is an honour after which they eagerly aspire; and for the attainment of which they risk their property, and use the most strenuous exertions.

CIRCLE, SPHERE, ORB, GLOBE.

CIRCLE, in Latin *circulus*, Greek *κυκλος*, in all probability comes from the Hebrew *chooga* a circle.

SPHERE, in Latin *sphaera*, Greek *σφαῖρα*, from *σπειρα* a line, signifies that which is contained within a prescribed line.

ORB, in Latin *orbis*, from *orbo* to circumscribe with a circle, signifies the thing that is circumscribed.

GLOBE, in Latin *globus*, in all probability comes from the Hebrew *gal* a rolled heap.

Rotundity of figure is the common idea expressed by these terms; but the *circle* is that figure which is represented on a plane superficies; the others are figures represented by solids. We draw a *circle* by means of compasses: the *sphere* is a round body, conceived to be formed according to the rules of geometry by the circumvolution of a *circle* round about its diameter; hence the whole frame of the world is denominated a *sphere*. An *orb* is any body which describes a *circle*; hence the heavenly bodies are termed *orbs*: a *globe* is any solid body, the surface of which is in every part equidistant from the centre; of this description is the terrestrial *globe*.

A *circle* may be applied in the improper sense to any round figure, which is formed

or supposed to be formed by circumscribing a space; simple rotundity constituting a *circle*: in this manner a *circle* may be formed by real objects, as persons, or by moral objects, as pleasures. To the idea of *circle* is annexed that of extent around, in the signification of a *sphere*, as a *sphere* of activity, whether applied in the philosophical sense to natural bodies, or in the moral sense to men. Hollowness, as well as rotundity, belongs to an *orb*; hence we speak of the *orb* of a wheel. Of a *globe*, solidity is the peculiar characteristic; hence any ball, like the ball of the earth, may be represented as a *globe*.

CIRCUIT, TOUR, ROUND.

CIRCUIT, in French *circuit*, Latin *circuitus*, participle of *circumeo*, signifies either the act of going round, or the extent gone.

TOUR is from the French *tour*, a turn, from the verb *tourner*, to turn.

ROUND marks the track *round*, or the space gone *round*.

A *circuit* is made for a specific end of a serious kind; a *tour* is always made for pleasure; a *round*, like *circuit*, is employed in matters of business, but of a more familiar and ordinary kind. A judge goes his *circuit* at particular periods of time: gentlemen, in times of peace, consider it as an essential part of their education to make what is termed the grand *tour*: tradesmen have certain *rounds* which they take on certain days.

We speak of making the *circuit* of a place; of taking a *tour* in a given county; or going a particular *round*. A *circuit* is wide or narrow; a *tour* and a *round* is great or little. A *circuit* is prescribed as to extent; a *tour* is optional; a *round* is prescribed or otherwise. *Circuit* is seldom used but in a specific sense: *tour* is seldom employed but in regard to travelling; *round* may be taken figuratively, as when we speak of going one's *round* of pleasure.

TO CIRCUMSCRIBE, INCLOSE.

CIRCUMSCRIBE, from the Latin *circum* about, and *scribo* to write, marks simply the surrounding with a line.

INCLOSE, from the Latin *inclusus*, participle of *inclaudo*, compounded of *in* and *claudo* to shut, marks a species of confinement.

The extent of any place is drawn out to the eye by a *circumscription*; its extent is limited to a given point by an *inclosure*. A garden is *circumscribed* by any ditch, line, or posts, that serve as its bounda-

ries; it is *inclosed* by a wall or fence. An *inclosure* may serve to *circumscribe*, but that which barely *circumscribes* will seldom serve to *inclose*.

CIRCUMSTANCE, SITUATION.

CIRCUMSTANCE, in Latin *circumstantia*, from *circum* and *sto*, signifies what stands about a thing, or belongs to it as its accident.

SITUATION, in French *situation*, comes from the Latin *situs*, and the Hebrew *sot* to place, signifying what is placed in a certain manner.

Circumstance is to *situation* as a part to a whole; many *circumstances* constitute a *situation*; a *situation* is an aggregate of *circumstances*. A person is said to be in *circumstances* of affluence who has an abundance of every thing essential for his comfort: he is in an easy *situation* when nothing exists to create uneasiness.

Circumstance respects that which externally affects us; *situation* is employed both for the outward *circumstances* and the inward feelings. The success of any undertaking depends greatly on the *circumstances* under which it is begun; the particular *situation* of a person's mind will give a cast to his words or actions. *Circumstances* are critical, a *situation* is dangerous.

CIRCUMSTANCE, INCIDENT, FACT.

CIRCUMSTANCE, v. *Circumstance*, *situation*.

INCIDENT, in Latin *incidens*, participle of *incido*, or *in* and *cado* to fall, signifies what falls upon or to another thing.

FACT, in Latin *factus*, participle of *facio* to do, signifies the thing done.

Circumstance is a general term; *incident* and *fact* are species of *circumstances*. *Incident* is what happens; *fact* is what is done; *circumstance* is not only what happens and is done, but whatever is or belongs to a thing. To every thing are annexed *circumstances* either of time, place, age, colour, or other collateral appendages which change its nature. Every thing that moves and operates is exposed to *incidents*, effects are produced, results follow, and changes are brought about; these are *incidents*: whatever moves and operates does, and what it produces is done or is the *fact*: when the artificer performs any work of art, it depends not only on his skill, but on the excellence of his tools, the time he employs, the particular frame of his mind, the place where he works, with a variety of other *circumstances*, whether he will succeed in producing any thing masterly. Newspapers

abound with the various *incidents* which occur in the animal or the vegetable world, some of which are surprising and singular; they likewise contain a number of *facts* which serve to present a melancholy picture of human depravity.

Circumstance is as often employed with regard to the operations as the properties of things, in which case it is most analogous to *incident* and *fact*: it may then be employed for the whole affair, or any part of it whatever, that can be distinctly considered. *Incidents* and *facts* either are *circumstances*, or have *circumstances* belonging to them. A remarkably abundant crop in any particular part of a field is for the agriculturist a singular *circumstance* or *incident*. A robbery may either be a fact or a *circumstance*; its atrocity may be aggravated by the murder of the injured parties; the savageness of the perpetrators, and a variety of *circumstances*.

Circumstance comprehends in its signification whatever may be said or thought of any thing; *incident* carries with it the idea of whatever may befall or be said to befall any thing; *fact* includes in it nothing but what really is or is done. A novel therefore may contain many *circumstances* and *incidents* without any *fact*; history should contain nothing but *facts*, as authenticity is its chief merit.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL, PARTICULAR, MINUTE.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL, from *circumstance*, signifies consisting of *circumstances*.

PARTICULAR, in French *particulier*, from the word *particle*, signifies consisting of particles.

MINUTE, in French *minute*, Latin *minutus*, participle of *minuo* to diminish, signifies diminished or reduced to a very small point.

Circumstantial expresses less than *particular*, and that less than *minute*. A *circumstantial* account contains all leading events; a *particular* account includes every event and movement however trivial; a *minute* account omits nothing as to person, time, place, figure, form, and every other trivial *circumstance* connected with the events. A narrative may be *circumstantial*, *particular*, or *minute*; an inquiry, investigation, or description may be *particular* or *minute*; a detail may be *minute*.

An event or occurrence may be *particular*; a *circumstance* or *particular* may be *minute*. We may be generally satisfied with a *circumstantial* account of ordinary events; but whatever interests the feelings cannot

be detailed with too much *particularity* or *minuteness*.

TO CITE, QUOTE.

CITE and QUOTE are both derived from the same Latin verb *cito* to move, and the Hebrew *sat* to stir up, signifying to put into action.

To *cite* is employed for persons or things; to *quote* for things only: authors are *cited*, passages from their works are *quoted*: we *cite* only for authority; we *quote* for general purposes of convenience. Historians ought to *cite* their authority in order to strengthen their evidence and inspire confidence; controversialists must *quote* the objectionable passages in those works which they wish to confute.

TO CITE, SUMMON.

CITE, v. To cite, quote.

SUMMON, v. To call.

The idea of calling a person authoritatively to appear is common to these terms. *Cite* is used in a general sense, *summon* in a particular and technical sense: a person may be *cited* to appear before his superior: he is *summoned* to appear before a court: the situation of the individual gives authority to the act of *citing*; the law itself gives authority to that of *summoning*.

When *cite* is used in a legal sense, it is mostly employed for witnesses, and *summon* for every occasion: a person is *cited* to give evidence, he is *summoned* to answer a charge. *Cite* is seldom used in the legal sense than in that of calling by name, in which general acceptance it is employed with regard to authors, as specified in the preceding article: the legal is the ordinary sense of *summon*; it may however be extended in its application to a military *summons* of a fortified town, or to any call for which there may be occasion; as when we speak of the *summons* which is given to attend the death-bed of a friend, or figuratively, death is said to *summon* mortals from this world.

CIVIL, POLITE.

CIVIL, in French *civile*, Latin *civilis* from *civis* a citizen, signifies belonging to or becoming a citizen.

POLITE, in French *poli*, Latin *politus* participle of *polio* to polish.

These two epithets are employed to denote different modes of acting in social intercourse; *polite* expresses more than *civil*; it is possible to be *civil* without being *polite*: *politeness* supposes *civility* and something in addition.

Civility is confined to no rank, age, condition, or country; all have an opportunity with equal propriety of being *civil*, but not so with *politeness*, that requires a certain degree of equality, at least the equality of education; it would be contradictory for masters and servants, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, to be *polite* to each other. *Civility* is a christian duty; there are times when all men ought to be *civil* to their neighbours: *politeness* is rather a voluntary devotion of ourselves to others: among the inferior orders *civility* is indispensable: among the higher orders *politeness* is often a substitute; and where the form and spirit are combined, it supersedes the necessity of *civility*.

Civility is contented with pleasing when the occasion offers: *politeness* seeks the opportunity to please, it prevents the necessity of asking by anticipating the wishes; it is full of delicate attentions, and is an active benevolence in the minor concerns of life.

Civility is anxious not to offend, but it often gives pain from ignorance or error: *politeness* studies all the circumstances and situations of men; it enters into their characters, suits itself to their humours, and even yields indulgently to their weaknesses; its object is no less to avoid giving pain than to study to afford pleasure.

Civility is dictated by the desire of serving, *politeness* by that of pleasing: *civility* often confines itself to the bare intention of serving; *politeness* looks to the action and its consequences: when a peasant is *civil* he often does the reverse of what would be desired of him; he takes no heed of the wants and necessities of others; *politeness* considers what is due to others and from others; it does nothing superfluously; men of good breeding think before they speak, and move before they act. It is necessary to be *civil* without being troublesome, and *polite* without being affected.

Civility is always the same; whatever is once *civil* is always so, and acknowledged as such by all persons: *politeness* varies with the fashions and times; what is *polite* in one age or in one country may be *unpolite* in another.

CIVIL, OBLIGING, COMPLAISANT.

CIVIL, v. *civil*, *polite*.

OBLIGING, from *oblige*, signifies either doing what *oblige*s, or being ready to *oblige*.

COMPLAISANT, in French *complaisant*, comes from *complaire* to please, signifying ready to please.

Civil is more general than *obliging*; one is always *civil* when one is *obliging*, but one is not always *obliging* when one is *civil*: *complaisance* is more than either, it refines upon both; it is a branch of *politeness* (v. *Civil*, *polite*).

Civil regards the manner as well as the action, *obliging* respects the action, *complaisant* includes all the circumstances of the action: to be *civil* is to please by any word or action: to be *obliging* is to perform some actual service; to be *complaisant* is to do that service in the time and manner that is most suitable and agreeable: *civility* requires no effort; to be *obliging* always costs the agent some trouble; *complaisance* requires attention and observation: a person is *civil* in his reply, *obliging* in lending assistance, *complaisant* in his attentions to his friends.

One is habitually *civil*; *obliging* from disposition: *complaisant* from education and disposition: it is necessary to be *civil* without being free, to be *obliging* without being officious, to be *complaisant* without being servile.

CLANDESTINE. SECRET.

CLANDESTINE, in Latin *clandestinus*, comes from *clàm* secretly.

SECRET, in French *secrete*, Latin *secretus*, participle of *secerno* to separate, signifies remote from observation.

Clandestine expresses more than *secret*.

To do a thing *clandestinely* is to elude observation; to do a thing *secretly* is to do it without the knowledge of any one: what is *clandestine* is unallowed, which is not necessarily the case with what is *secret*.

With the *clandestine* must be a mixture of art; with *secrecy*, caution and management are requisite: a *clandestine* marriage is effected by a studied plan to escape notice; a *secret* marriage is conducted by the forbearance of all communication: conspirators have many *clandestine* proceedings and *secret* meetings: an unfaithful servant *clandestinely* conveys away his master's property from his premises; a thief *secretly* takes a purse from the pocket of the bystanders.

TO CLASP, HUG, EMBRACE.

To CLASP, from the noun *clasp*, signifies to lay hold of like a *clasp*.

HUG, in Saxon *hogan*, comes from the German *hâgen*, which signifies to enclose with a hedge, and figuratively to cherish or take special care of.

EMBRACE, in French *embrasser*, is

compounded of *en* or *im* and *bras* the arm, signifying to take or lock in one's arms.

All these terms are employed to express the act of enclosing another in one's arms: *clasp* marks this action when it is performed with the warmth of true affection; *hug* is a ludicrous sort of *clasping*, which is the consequence of ignorance and extravagant feeling; *embrace* is simply a mode of ordinary salutation: a parent will *clasp* his long-lost child in his arms on their re-meeting; a peasant in the excess of his raptures would throw his body, as well as his arms, over the object of his joy. and stifle with *hugging* him whom he meant to *embrace*; in the continental parts of Europe *embracing* between males, as well as females, is universal on meeting after a long absence, or on taking leave for a length of time; *embraces* are sometimes given in England between near relatives, but in no other case.

CLASS, ORDER, RANK, DEGREE.

CLASS, in French *classe*, Latin *classis*, very probably from the Greek *κλασσις*, a fraction, division, or class.

ORDER, in French *ordre*, Latin *ordo*, comes from the Greek *ορδος* a row, which is a species of order.

RANK is in German *rang*, connected with *row*, &c.

DEGREE, in French *degré*, comes from the Latin *gradus* a step.

Class is more general than *order*; *degree* is more specific than *rank*.

Class and *order* are said of the body who are distinguished; *rank* and *degree* of the distinction itself: men belong to a certain *class* and *order*; they hold a certain *rank*; they are of a certain *degree*: among the Romans all the citizens were distinctly divided into *classes* according to their property: but in the modern constitution of society, *classes* are distinguished from each other on general, moral, or civil grounds: there are reputable or disreputable *classes*; the labouring *class*, the *class* of merchants, mechanics, &c.: *order* has a more particular signification; it is founded upon some positive civil privilege or distinction; the general *orders* are divided into higher, lower, or middle, arising from the unequal distribution of wealth and power; the particular *orders* are those of the nobility, of the clergy, of freemasonry, and the like; *rank* distinguishes one individual from another; it is peculiarly applied to the nobility and the gentry, although, every man in the community holds a certain *rank* in relation to those who are above or below him: *degree*, like *rank*, is applicable to

the individual, but only in particular cases: literary and scientific *degrees* are conferred upon superior merit in different departments of science; there are likewise *degrees* in the same *rank*, whence we speak of men of high and low *degree*. During the French revolution the most worthless *class*, from all *orders*, obtained the supremacy only to sacrifice such as possessed any wealth, power, *rank*, or *degree*.

TO CLASS, ARRANGE, RANGE.

To **CLASS**, from the noun *class*, signifies to put in a *class*.

ARRANGE and **RANGE** are both derived from *rank* and *row*, signifying to place in a certain order.

The general qualities and attributes of things are to be considered in *classing*; their fitness to stand by each other must be considered in *arranging*; their capacity for forming a line is the only thing to be attended to in *ranging*.

Classification serves the purposes of science; *arrangement* those of decoration and ornament; *ranging* those of general convenience: men are *classed* into different bodies according to some certain standard of property, power, education, occupation, etc.: furniture is *arranged* in a room, according as it answers either in colour, shade, convenience of situation, etc.; men are *ranged* in order whenever they make a procession: *classification* is concerned with mental objects; *arrangement* with either physical or mental objects; *ranging* altogether with physical objects: knowledge, experience, and judgment, are requisite in *classing*; taste and practice are indispensable in *arranging*; care only is wanted in *ranging*. When applied to intellectual objects, *arrangement* is the ordinary operation of the mind, requiring only methodical habits: *classification* is a branch of philosophy which is not attainable by art only; it requires a mind peculiarly methodical by nature, that is capable of distinguishing things by their generic and specific differences: books are *classed* in a catalogue according to their contents; they are *arranged* in a shop according to their size or price; they are *ranged* on a counter for convenience: ideas are *classed* by the logician into simple and complex, abstract and concrete: they are *arranged* by the power of reflexion in the mind of the thinker: words are *classed* by the grammarian into different parts of speech: they are suitably *arranged* by the writer in different parts of a sentence.

CLEAN, CLEANLY, PURE.

CLEAN and CLEANLY is in Saxon *claene*.

PURE, in French *pur*, Latin *purus*.

Clean expresses a freedom from dirt or soil; *cleanly* the disposition or habit of being *clean*.

A person who keeps himself *clean* is *cleanly*; a *cleanly* servant takes care to keep other things *clean*.

Clean is employed in the proper sense only; *pure* mostly in the moral sense: the hands should be *clean*; the heart should be *pure*.

CLEAN, LUCID, BRIGHT, VIVID.

CLEAR, v. *To absolve*.

LUCID, in Latin *lucidus*, from *luceo* to shine, and *lux* light, signifies having light.

BRIGHT, v. *Brightness*.

VIVID, Latin *vividus*, from *vivo* to live, signifies being in a state of life.

These epithets mark a gradation in their sense; the idea of light is common to them, but *clear* expresses less than *lucid*, *lucid* than *bright*, and *bright* less than *vivid*: a mere freedom from stain or dulness constitutes *clearness*; the return of light, and consequent removal of darkness, constitutes *lucidity*; *brightness* supposes a certain strength of light; *vividness* a freshness combined with strength, and even a degree of brilliancy: a sky is *clear* that is divested of clouds; the atmosphere is *lucid* in the day, and not in the night; the sun shines *bright* when it is unobstructed by any thing in the atmosphere; lightning sometimes presents a *vivid* redness, and sometimes a *vivid* paleness: the light of the stars may be *clear*, and sometimes *bright*, but seldom *vivid*; the light of the sun is rather *bright*, than *clear* or *vivid*; the light of the moon is either *clear*, *bright*, or *vivid*.

These epithets may with equal propriety be applied to colour, as well as to light: a *clear* colour is unmixed with any other; a *bright* colour has something striking and strong in it; a *vivid* colour something lively and fresh in it.

In their moral application they preserve a similar distinction: a conscience is said to be *clear* when it is free from every stain or spot; a deranged understanding may have *lucid* intervals; a *bright* intellect throws light on every thing around it; a *vivid* imagination glows with every image that nature presents.

CLEARLY, DISTINCTLY.

That is seen CLEARLY of which one has

a general view; that is seen DISTINCTLY which is seen so as to distinguish the several parts.

We see the moon *clearly* whenever it shines; but we cannot see the spots in the moon *distinctly* without the help of glasses.

What we see *distinctly* must be seen *clearly*, but a thing may be seen *clearly* without being seen *distinctly*.

A want of light, or the intervention of other objects, prevents us from seeing *clearly*; distance, or a defect in the sight, prevents us from seeing *distinctly*.

* Old men often see *clearly* but not *distinctly*; they perceive large or luminous objects at a distance, but they cannot distinguish such small objects as the characters of a book without the help of convex glasses; short-sighted persons, on the contrary, see near objects *distinctly*, but they have no *clear* vision of distant ones, unless they are viewed through concave glasses.

CLEARNESS, PERSPICUITY.

CLEARNESS, from *clear* (v. *Clear*, *lucid*), is here used figuratively, to mark the degree of light by which one sees things distinctly.

PERSPICUITY, in French *perspicuité*, Latin *perspicuitas*, from *perspicuus* and *perspicio* to look through, signifies the quality of being able to be seen through.

These epithets denote qualities equally requisite to render a discourse intelligible, but each has its peculiar character. * *Clearness* respects our ideas, and springs from the distinction of the things themselves that are discussed: *perspicuity* respects the mode of expressing the ideas, and springs from the good qualities of style. It requires a *clear* head to be able to see a subject in all its bearings and relations: to distinguish all the niceties and shades of difference between things that bear a strong resemblance, and to separate it from all irrelevant objects that intermingle themselves with it. But whatever may be our *clearness* of conception, it is requisite if we would communicate our conceptions to others, that we should observe a purity in our mode of diction, that we should be particular in the choice of our terms, careful in the disposition of them, and accurate in the construction of our sentences; that is *perspicuity*, which as it is the first, so, according to Quintilian, it is the most important part of composition.

* Vide Trusler: „Clearly, distinctly.“

** Vide Abbé Girard: „Clarté, perspicuité.“

Clearness of intellect is a natural gift; *perspicuity* is an acquired art: although intimately connected with each other, yet it is possible to have *clearness* without *perspicuity*, and *perspicuity* without *clearness*. People of quick capacities will have *clear* ideas on the subjects that offer themselves to their notice, but for want of education they may often use improper or ambiguous phrases; or by errors of construction render their phraseology the reverse of *perspicuous*: on the other hand, it is in the power of some to express themselves *perspicuously* on subjects far above their comprehension, from a certain facility which they acquire of catching up suitable modes of expression.

The study of the classics and mathematics are most fitted for the improvement of *clearness*; the study of grammar, and the observance of good models, will serve most effectually for the acquirement of *perspicuity*.

CLEMENCY, LENITY, MERCY.

CLEMENCY is in Latin *clementia*, signifying mildness.

LENITY, in Latin *lenitas*, from *lenis* soft, or *laevis* smooth, and the Greek *λειος* mild.

MERCY, in Latin *miserericordia*, compounded of *miseria* and *cordis*, i. e. affliction of the heart, signifying the pain produced by observing the pain of others.

Clemency and *lenity* are employed only towards offenders; *mercy* towards all who are in trouble, whether from their own fault, or any other cause.

Clemency lies in the disposition; *lenity* and *mercy* in the act; the former as respects superiors in general, the latter in regard to those who are invested with civil power: a monarch displays his *clemency* by showing *mercy*; a master shows *lenity* by not inflicting punishment where it is deserved.

Clemency is arbitrary on the part of the dispenser, flowing from his will independent of the object on whom it is bestowed; *lenity* and *mercy* are discretionary, they always have regard to the object and the nature of the offence, or misfortune; *lenity* therefore often serves the purposes of discipline, and *mercy* those of justice by forgiveness, instead of punishment; but *clemency* defeats its end by forbearing to punish where it is needful.

A mild master who shows *clemency* to a faithless servant by not bringing him to justice, often throws a worthless wretch upon the public to commit more atrocious depredations. A well-timed *lenity* sometimes recalls an offender to himself, and brings him back to good order. Upon this principle,

the English constitution has wisely left in the hands of the monarch the discretionary power of showing *mercy* in all cases that do not demand the utmost rigour of the law.

CLERGYMAN, PARSON, PRIEST, MINISTER.

CLERGYMAN, altered from *clerk*, *clericus*, signified any one holding a regular office, and by distinction one who held the holy office.

PARSON is either changed from *person*, that is, by distinction the person who spiritually presides over a parish, or contracted from *parochianus*.

PRIEST, in German, &c. *priester*, comes from the Greek *πρεσβυτερος*, signifying an elder who holds the sacerdotal office.

MINISTER, in Latin *minister* a servant, from *minor* less or inferior, signifies literally one who performs a subordinate office, and has been extended in its meaning, to signify generally one who officiates or performs an office.

The word *clergyman* applies to such as are regularly bred according to the forms of the national religion, and applied to none else. In this sense we speak of the English, the French, and Scotch *clergy* without distinction. A *parson* is a species of *clergyman*, who ranks the highest in the three orders of inferior *clergy*; that is, *parson*, vicar, and curate; the *parson*, being a technical term for the rector, or he who holds the living: in its technical sense it has now acquired a definite use; but in general conversation it is become almost a nickname. The word *clergyman* is always substituted for *parson* in polite society. When *priest* respects the Christian religion it is a species of *clergyman*, that is, one who is ordained to officiate at the altar in distinction from the deacon, who is only an assistant to the *priest*. But the term *priest* has likewise an extended meaning in reference to such as hold the sacerdotal character in any form of religion, as the *priests* of the Jews, or those of the Greeks, Romans, Indians, and the like. A *minister* is one who actually or habitually officiates. *Clergymen* are therefore not always strictly *ministers*; nor are all *ministers* *clergymen*. If a *clergyman* delegates his functions altogether he is not a *minister*: nor is he who presides over a dissenting congregation a *clergyman*. In the former case, however, it would be invidious to deprive the *clergyman* of the name of *minister* of the gospel, but in the latter case it is a misuse of the term *clergyman* to apply it to any *minister* who does not officiate

according to the form of an established religion.

CLEVER SKILFUL, EXPERT, DEXTEROUS, ADROIT.

CLEVER, in French *legère*, Latin *levis* light.

SKILFUL signifies full of *skill*; and *skill* probably comes from the Latin *scio* to know.

EXPERT, in French *experte*, Latin *expertus*, participle of *experior* to search or try, signifies searched and tried.

DEXTEROUS, in Latin *dexter*, in Greek *δεξιτερος*, comparative of *δεξιος*, clever, and *δεξια* the right hand, because that is the most fitted for action, signifies the quality of doing rightly, as with the right hand.

ADROIT, in French *adroit*, Latin *ad rectus* or *rectus* right or straight.

Clever and *skilful* are qualities of the mind; *expert*, *dexterous*, and *adroit*, refer to modes of physical action. *Cleverness* regards in general the readiness to comprehend; *skill* the maturity of the judgment; *expertness* a facility in the use of things; *dexterity* a mechanical facility in the performance of any work; *adroitness* the suitable movements of the body. A person is *clever* at drawing who shows a taste for it, and executes it well without much instruction; he is *skilful* in drawing if he understands it both in theory and practice; he is *expert* in the use of the bow if he can use it with expedition and effect; he is *dexterous* at any game when he goes through the manoeuvres with celerity and an unerring hand; he is *adroit* if, by a quick, sudden, and well-directed movement of his body, he effects the object he has in view.

Cleverness is mental power employed in the ordinary concerns of life: a person is *clever* in business. *Skill* is both a mental and corporeal power, exerted in mechanical operations and practical sciences: a physician, a lawyer, and an artist, is *skilful*: one may have a *skill* in divination, or a *skill* in painting. *Expertness* and *dexterity* require more corporeal than mental power exerted in minor arts and amusements: one is *expert* at throwing the quoit; *dexterous* in the management of horses. *Adroitness* is altogether a corporeal talent, employed only as occasion may require: one is *adroit* at eluding the blows aimed by an adversary.

Cleverness is rather a natural gift; *skill* is *cleverness* improved by practice and extended knowledge; *expertness* is the effect of long practice; *dexterity* arises from habit combined with agility; *adroitness* is a species of *dexterity* arising from a natural agility.

CLOAK, MASK, BLIND, VEIL.

These are figurative terms, expressive of different modes of intentionally keeping something from the view of others. They are borrowed from those familiar objects which serve similar purposes in common life. **CLOAK** and **MASK** express figuratively and properly more than **BLIND** or **VEIL**. The two former keep the whole object out of sight; the two latter only partially intercept the view. In this figurative sense they are all employed for a bad purpose.

The *cloak*, the *mask*, and the *blind*, serve to deceive others; the *veil* serves to deceive one's self.

The whole or any part of a character may be concealed by a *blind*; a part, though not the whole, may be concealed by a *mask*. A *blind* is not only employed to conceal the character but the conduct or proceedings. We carry a *cloak* and a *mask* about with us; but a *blind* is something external.

The *cloak*, as the external garment, is the most convenient of all coverings for entirely keeping concealed what we do not wish to be seen; a good outward deportment serves as a *cloak* to conceal a bad character. A *mask* only hides the face; a *mask* therefore serves to conceal only as much as words and looks can effect. A *blind* is intended to shut out the light and prevent observation; whatever, therefore, conceals the real truth, and prevents suspicion by a false exterior, is a *blind*. A *veil* prevents a person from seeing as well as being seen; whatever, therefore, obscures the mental sight acts as a *veil* to the mind's eye.

People under the cloak of religion often conceal the worst of purposes and the worst of characters. False friends always wear a *mask*; they cover a malignant heart under smiles and endearments of friendship. Illicit traders mostly make use of some *blind* to facilitate the carrying on their nefarious practices. Prejudice and passion are the ordinary *veils* which obscure the judgment, and prevent it from distinguishing the truth.

TO CLOG, LOAD, ENCUMBER.

CLOG is probably changed from *clot* or *clod*, signifying to put a heavy lump in the way.

LOAD, from *to load*, in Saxon *laden*, Dutch, &c. *laden*, signifies to burden with a load.

ENCUMBER, compounded of *en* or *in* and *cumber*, in German *kummer* sorrow, signifies to burden with trouble.

Clog is figuratively employed for whatever impedes the motion or action of a thing,

drawn from the familiar object which is used to impede the motion of animals: *load* is used for whatever occasions an excess of weight, or materials. A wheel is *clogged*, or a machine is *clogged*: a fire may be *loaded* with coals, or a picture with colouring. The stomach and memory may be either *clogged* or *loaded*: in the former case by the introduction of improper food; and in the second case by the introduction of an improper quantity. A memory that is *clogged* becomes confused, and confounds one thing with another; that which is *loaded* loses the impression of one object by the introduction of another.

Clog and *encumber* have the common signification of interrupting or troubling by means of something irrelevant. Whatever is *clogged* has scarcely the liberty of moving at all; whatever is *encumbered* moves and acts, but with difficulty. When the roots of plants are *clogged* with mould, or any improper substance, their growth is almost stopped: weeds and noxious plants are *encumbrances* in the ground where flowers should grow: the commands or prohibitions of parents sometimes very fortunately *clog* those whose sanguine tempers would lead them into imprudence: no one can expect to proceed with ease to himself in any transaction, who is *encumbered* with a variety of concerns at the same time.

CLOISTER, CONVENT, MONASTERY.

CLOISTER, in French * *cloître*, from the word *clos* close, signifies a certain close in a *convent*, or an enclosure of houses for canons, or in general a religious house.

CONVENT, from the Latin *conventus* a meeting, and *convenio* to come together, signifies a religious assembly.

MONASTERY, in French *monastère*, signifies an habitation for monks, from the Greek *μονος* alone.

The proper idea of *cloister* is that of seclusion; the proper idea of *convent* is that of community; the proper idea of a *monastery* is that of solitude. One is shut up in a *cloister*, put into a *convent*, and retires to a *monastery*.

Whoever wishes to take an absolute leave of the world, shuts himself up in a *cloister*; whoever wishes to attach himself to a community that has renounced all commerce with the world, goes into a *convent*; whoever wishes to shun all human intercourse retires to a *monastery*.

In the *cloister* our liberty is sacrificed: in the *convent* our worldly habits are re-

nounced, and those of a regular religious community being adopted, we submit to the yoke of established orders: in a *monastery* we impose a sort of voluntary exile upon ourselves; we live with the view of living only to God.

In the ancient and true *monasteries*, the members divided their time between contemplation and labour; but as population increased, and towns multiplied, *monasteries* were, properly speaking, succeeded by *convents*.

In ordinary discourse, *cloister* is employed in an absolute and indefinite manner: we speak of the *cloister* to designate a *monastic* state; as entering a *cloister*; burying one's self in a *cloister*; penances and mortifications are practised in a *cloister*.

It is not the same thing when we speak of the *cloister* of the Benedictines and of their *monastery*; or the *cloister* of the Capuchins and their *convent*.

CLOSE, COMPACT.

CLOSE, is from the French *clos*, and Latin *clausus*, the participle of *claudo* to shut.

COMPACT, in Latin *compactus*, participle of *compingo* to fix or join in, signifies jointed close together.

Proximity is expressed by both these terms; the former in a general and the latter in a restricted sense. Two bodies may be *close* to each other, but a body is *compact* with regard to itself.

Contact is not essential to constitute *closeness*; but a perfect adhesion of all the parts of a body is essential to produce *compactness*. Lines are *close* to each other that are separated but by a small space; things are rolled together in a *compact* form that are brought within the smallest possible space.

CLOSE, NEAR, NIGH.

CLOSE, *v.* *Close*, *compact*.

NEAR and **NIGH**, is in Saxon *near*, *neah*, German, &c. *nah*.

Close is more definite than *near*: houses stand *close* to each other which are almost joined; men stand *close* when they touch each other; objects are *near* which are within sight; persons are *near* each other when they can converse together. *Near* and *nigh*, which are but variations of each other, in etymology, admit of little or no difference in their use; the former however is the most general. People live *near* each other who are in the same street; they live *close* to each other when their houses are adjoining.

Close is annexed as an adjective; *near* is employed only as an adverb or preposition.

* Vide Abbé Roubaud: „Cloître, convent, monastère.“

We speak of *close* ranks or *close* lines; but not of *near* ranks or *near* lines.

TO CLOSE, SHUT.

CLOSE, v. *Close, compact.*

SHUT, is in Saxon *scuttan*, Dutch *schutten*, Hebrew *satem*.

Closing is to *shutting* frequently as the means to the end.

To *close* signifies simply to put together; to *shut* signifies to put together so *close* that no opening is left. The eyes are *shut* by *closing* the eye-lids; the mouth is *shut* by *closing* the lips. The idea of bringing near or joining is prominent in the signification of *close*; that of fastening, or preventing admittance in the word *shut*. By the figure of metonymy, *close* may be often substituted for *shut*; as we may speak of *closing* the eyes or the mouth; *closing* a book or a door in the sense of *shutting*; but they are, notwithstanding, very distinct.

Many things are *closed* which are not to be *shut*, and are *shut* which cannot be *closed*. Nothing can be *closed* but what consists of more than one part; nothing can be *shut* but what has or is supposed to have a cavity. A wound is *closed*, but cannot be *shut*; a window or a box is *shut*, but not *closed*.

When both are applied to hollow bodies, *close* implies a stopping up of the whole, *shut* an occasional stoppage at the entrance. What is *closed* remains *closed*; what is *shut* may be opened. A hole in a wall, or a passage through any place, is *closed*; a gate, a window, or a door, is *shut*.

TO CLOSE, FINISH, CONCLUDE.

CLOSE, v. *To close, shut.*

FINISH, in French *finir*, Latin *finio*, comes from *finis* an end.

CONCLUDE, in Latin *concludo*, is compounded of *con* and *cludo* or *claudo* to shut, signifying to shut up or together.

To *close* is to bring to an end: to *finish* is to make an end: we *close* a thing by ceasing to have any thing more to do with it; we *finish* it by really having no more to do with it. We *close* an account with a person with whom we mean to have no farther transactions; we *finish* the business which we have begun.

It is sometimes necessary to *close* without *finishing*, but we cannot *finish* without *closing*. The want of time will compel a person to *close* his letter before he has *finished* saying all he wishes. It is a laudable desire in every one to wish to *close* his career in life honourably, and to *finish* whatever he undertakes to the satisfaction of himself and others.

To *conclude* is a species of *finishing*, that is to say, *finishing* in a certain manner; we always *finish* when we *conclude*, but we do not always *conclude* when we *finish*. A history is *closed* at a certain reign; it is *finished* when brought to the period proposed; it is *concluded* with a recapitulation of the leading events.

Close and *finish* are employed generally, and in the ordinary transactions of life; the former in speaking of times, seasons, periods, &c.; the latter with regard to occupations and pursuits; *conclusion* is used particularly on moral and intellectual operations. A reign, an entertainment, an age, a year, may have its *close*; a drawing, an exercise, a piece of work, may be *finished*; a discourse, a story, an affair, a negotiation, may be *concluded*. The *close* of Alfred's reign was more peaceful than the commencement: those who are careful as to what they begin will be careful to *finish* what they have begun: some preachers seldom awaken attention in their hearers until they come to the *conclusion* of their discourse.

COADJUTOR, ASSISTANT.

COADJUTOR, compounded of *co* or *con* and *adjutor* a helper, signifies a fellow labourer.

ASSISTANT signifies properly one that *assists* or takes a part.

A *coadjutor* is more noble than an *assistant*: the latter is mostly in a subordinate station, but the former is an equal; the latter performs menial offices in the minor concerns of life, and a subordinate part at all times; the former labours conjointly in some concern of common interest and great importance. An *assistant* is engaged for a compensation; a *coadjutor* is a voluntary fellow-labourer. In every public concern where the purposes of charity or religion are to be promoted, *coadjutors* often effect more than the original promoters: in the medical and scholastic professions *assistants* are indispensable to relieve the pressure of business. *Coadjutors* ought to be zealous and unanimous; *assistants* ought to be assiduous and faithful.

COARSE, ROUGH, RUDE.

COARSE, probably from the Gothic *kau-rids* heavy, answering to our word *gross*, and the Latin *gravis*.

ROUGH, in Saxon *hruh*, German *rauh*, *roh*, &c.

RUDE, in Latin *rudis*, changed from *raudis*, comes from *ραβδος* a twig, signifying unpeeled.

These epithets are equally applied to

what is not polished by art. In the proper sense *coarse* refers to the composition and materials of bodies, as *coarse* bread, *coarse* meat, *coarse* cloth; *rough* respects the surface of bodies, as *rough* wood and *rough* skin; *rude* respects the make or fashion of things, as a *rude* bark, a *rude* utensil.

Coarse is opposed to fine, *rough* to smooth, *rude* to polished.

In the figurative application they are distinguished in a similar manner: *coarse* language is used by persons of naturally *coarse* feeling; *rough* language by those whose tempers are either naturally or occasionally *rough*; *rude* language by those who are ignorant of any better.

TO COAX, WHEEDLE, CAJOLE, FAWN.

COAX probably comes from *coke* a simpleton, signifying to treat as a simpleton.

WHEEDLE is perhaps a frequentative of *wheel*, signifying to come round a person with smooth art; or more probably, derived from the German *wedeln* to wag with the tail, signifying to use the arts of a spaniel.

CAJOLE is in French *cajoler*.

To FAWN, from the noun *fawn*, signifies to act or move like a *fawn*.

The idea of using mean arts to turn people to one's selfish purposes is common to all these terms: *coax* has something childish in it; *wheedle* and *cajole* that which is knavish; *fawn* that which is servile.

The act of *coaxing* consists of urgent entreaty and whining supplication; the act of *wheedling* consists of smooth and winning entreaty; *cajoling* consists mostly of trickery and stratagem, disguised under a soft address and insinuating manners; the act of *fawning* consists of supplicant grimace and antics, such as characterise the animal from which it derives its name: children *coax* their parents in order to obtain their wishes; the greedy and covetous *wheedle* those of an easy temper; knaves *cajole* the simple and unsuspecting; parasites *fawn* upon those who have the power to contribute to their gratifications.

TO COERCE, RESTRAIN.

COERCE, in Latin *coerceo*, that is *con* and *arceo*, signifies to drive into conformity.

RESTRAIN is a variation of *restrict* (v. *To bind*).

Coercion is a species of *restraint*; we always *restrain* or intend to *restrain* when we *coerce*; but we do not always *coerce* when we *restrain*: *coercion* always comprehends the idea of force, *restrain* that of simply keeping under or back: *coercion* is always an

external application; *restraint* either external or internal: a person is *coerced* by others only; he may be *restrained* by himself as well as others.

Coercion acts by a direct application, it opposes force to resistance; *restraint* acts indirectly to the prevention of an act: the law *restrains* all men in their actions more or less; it *coerces* those who attempt to violate it; the unruly will is *coerced*; the improper will is *restrained*: *coercion* is exercised; *restraint* is imposed: punishment, threats, or any actual exercise of authority, *coerces*; fear, shame, or a remonstrance from others, *restrains*.

COEVAL, COTEMPORARY.

COEVAL, from the Latin *aeuum* an age, signifies of the same age.

COTEMPORARY, from *tempus*, signifies of the same time.

An age is a specifically long space of time; a time is indefinite; hence the application of the terms to things in the first case and to persons in the second: the dispersion of mankind and the confusion of languages were *coeval* with the building of the tower of Babel; Addison was *cotemporary* with Swift and Pope.

COGENT, FORCIBLE, STRONG.

COGENT, from the Latin *cogo* to compel; and FORCIBLE, from the verb *to force*, have equally the sense of acting by force.

STRONG is here figuratively employed for that species of strength which is connected with the mind.

Cogency applies to reasons individually considered; *force* and *strength* to modes of reasoning or expression: *cogent* reasons impel to decisive conduct; *strong* conviction is produced by *forcible* reasoning conveyed in *strong* language: changes of any kind are so seldom attended with benefit to society, that a legislator will be cautious not to adopt them without the most *cogent* reasons; the important truths of Christianity cannot be presented from the pulpit too *forcibly* to the minds of men. Those who accustom themselves to *strong* language are not very scrupulous about the correctness of their assertions.

TO COINCIDE, CONCUR.

COINCIDE, v. *To agree, coincide.*

CONCUR, v. *To agree, coincide.*

These words are here considered only in their application to things; in which case *coincide* implies simply meeting at a point; *concur* running towards a point; the former seems to exclude the idea of design, the lat-

ter that of change: two sides of different triangles *coincide* when they are applied to each other so as to fall on the same points; two powers *concur* when they both act so as to produce the same result.

A *coincidence* of circumstances is sometimes so striking and singular that it can hardly be attributed to pure accident; a *concurrence* of circumstances, which seemed all to be formed to combine, is sometimes notwithstanding purely casual.

COLLEAGUE, PARTNER.

COLLEAGUE, in French *collègue*, Latin *collega*, compounded of *col* or *con* and *legatus* sent, signifies sent or employed upon the same business.

PARTNER, from the word *part*, signifies one having a *part* or share.

Colleague is more noble than *partner*: men in the highest offices are *colleagues*; tradesmen, mechanics, and subordinate persons, are *partners*: every Roman consul had a *colleague*; every workman has commonly a *partner*.

Colleague is used only with regard to community of office; *partner* is generally used with regard to community of interest: whenever two persons are employed to act together on the same business they stand in the relation of *colleagues* to each other; whenever two persons unite their endeavours either in trade or in games they are denominated *partners*: ministers, judges, commissioners, and plenipotentiaries, are *colleagues*: bankers, merchants, card-players, and the like, have *partners*.

TO COLOUR, DYE, TINGE, STAIN.

COLOUR, in Latin *color*, probably from *colo* to adorn.

DYE, in Saxon *deagen*, is a variation of *tinge*.

TINGE is in Latin *tingo*, from the Greek *τεινω* to sprinkle.

STAIN, like the French *desteindre*, is but a variation of *tinge*.

To *colour* is to put *colour* on; to *dye* is to dip in any *colour*; to *tinge* is to touch lightly with a *colour*; to *stain* is to put on a bad *colour* or in a bad manner: we *colour* a drawing, we *dye* clothes of any *colour*, we *tinge* a painting with blue by way of intermixture, we *stain* a painting when we put blue instead of red.

They are taken in a moral acceptance with a similar distinction: we *colour* a description by the introduction of strong figures, strong facts, and strong expressions; a person is represented as *dyeing* his hands in blood, who is so engaged in the shedding of

blood as that he may change the *colour* of his skin; a person's mind is *tinged* with melancholy or enthusiasm; his character is *stained* with crimes.

COLOUR, HUE, TINT.

COLOUR, *v.* To *colour*.

HUE, in Saxon *heye*, probably connected with *eye* or *view*.

TINT, from *tinge*, *v.* To *colour*.

Colour is here the generic term; *hue* and *tint* are but modes of *colour*; the former of which expresses a faint or blended *colour*; the latter a shade of *colour*. Betwixt the *colours* of black and brown, as of all other leading *colours*, there are various *hues* and *tints*, by the due intermixture of which natural objects are rendered beautiful.

COLOURABLE, SPECIOUS, OSTENSIBLE, PLAUSIBLE, FEASIBLE.

COLOURABLE, from to *colour* or *tinge*, expresses the quality of being able to give a fair appearance.

SPECIOUS, from the Latin *specio* to see, signifies the quality of looking as it ought.

OSTENSIBLE, from the Latin *ostendo* to show, signifies the quality of being able or fit to be shown or seen.

PLAUSIBLE, from *plaudo* to clap or make a noise, signifies the quality of sounding as it ought.

FEASIBLE, from the French *faire*, and Latin *facio* to do, signifies literally *doable*; but here it denotes seemingly practicable.

The first three of these are figures of speech drawn from what naturally pleases the eye: *plausible* is drawn from what pleases the ear: *feasible* takes its signification from what meets the judgment or conviction.

What is *colourable* has an aspect or face upon it that lulls suspicion and affords satisfaction: what is *specious* has a fair outside when contrasted with that which it may possibly conceal; what is *ostensible* is that which presents such an appearance as may serve for an indication of something real: what is *plausible* is that which meets the understanding merely through the ear; that which is *feasible* recommends itself from its intrinsic value rather than from any representation given of it.

A pretence is *colourable* when it has the *colour* of truth impressed upon it; it is *specious* when its fallacy is easily discernible through the thin guise it wears; a motive is *ostensible* which is the one soonest to be discovered; an excuse is *plausible* when the well-connected narrative of the maker impresses a belief of its justice; an account is

feasible which contains nothing improbable or singular.

TO COMBAT, OPPOSE.

COMBAT, from the French *combattre* to fight together, is used figuratively in the same sense with regard to matters of opinion.

OPPOSE, in French *opposer*, Latin *opposui*, perfect of *oppono* to oppose, compounded of *ob* and *pono* to place one's self in the way, signifies to set one's self against another.

Combat is properly a species of *opposing*; one always *opposes* in *combating*, though not *vice versa*. To *combat* is used in regard to speculative matters; *oppose* in regard to private and personal concerns. A person's positions are *combated*, his interests or his measures are *opposed*. The Christian *combats* the erroneous doctrines of the infidel with no other weapon than that of argument; the sophist *opposes* Christianity with ridicule and misrepresentation.

COMBATANT, CHAMPION.

COMBATANT, from to *combat*, marks any one that engages in a *combat*.

CHAMPION, French *champion*, Saxon *cempe*, German *kaempfer*, signifies originally a soldier or fighter, from the Latin *campus* a field of battle.

A *combatant* fights for himself and for victory; a *champion* fights either for another, or in another's cause. The word *combatant* has always relation to some actual engagement; *champion* may be employed for one ready to be engaged, or in the habits of being engaged. The *combatants* in the Olympic games used to contend for a prize; the Roman gladiators were *combatants* who fought for their lives: when knight-errantry was in fashion there were *champions* in behalf of distressed females, *champions* in behalf of the injured and oppressed, or *champions* in behalf of aggrieved princes.

The mere act of fighting constitutes a *combatant*; the act of standing up in another's defence at a personal risk, constitutes the *champion*. Animals have their *combats*, and consequently are *combatants*; but they are seldom *champions*. In the present day there are fewer *combatants* than *champions* among men. We have *champions* for liberty, who mostly contend for a shadow, and court persecution, in order to serve their own purposes of ambition.

COMBINATION, CABAL, PLOT, CONSPIRACY.

COMBINATION, *v.* Association, combination.

CABAL, in French *cabale*, comes from the Hebrew *kabala*, signifying a secret science pretended to by the Jewish Rabbi, whence it is applied to any association that has a pretended secret.

PLOT, in French *complot*, is derived like the word *complicate*, from the Latin *plico* to entangle, signifying any intricate or dark concern.

CONSPIRACY, in French *conspiration*, from *con* and *spiro* to breathe together, signifies the having one spirit.

An association for a bad purpose is the idea common to all these terms, and peculiar to *combination*. A *combination* may be either secret or open, but secrecy forms a necessary part in the signification of the other terms; a *cabal* is secret as to its end; a *plot* and *conspiracy* are secret, both as to the means and the end.

Combination is the close adherence of many for their mutual defence in obtaining their demands, or resisting the claims of others, * A *cabal* is the intrigue of a party or faction, formed by cunning practices in order to give a turn to the course of things to its own advantage: the natural and ruling idea in *cabal* is that of assembling a number, and manoeuvring secretly with address. A *plot* is a clandestine union of some persons for the purpose of mischief: the ruling idea in a *plot* is that of a complicated enterprise formed in secret, by two or more persons. A *conspiracy* is a general intelligence among persons united to effect some serious change: the ruling and natural idea in this word is that of unanimity and concert in the prosecution of a plan.

A *combination* is seldom of so serious a nature as a *cabal*, or a *plot*, though always objectionable. A *combination* may have many or few; a *cabal* requires a number of persons sufficient to form a party, it gains strength by numbers; a *plot* is generally confined to a few, it diminishes its security by numbers; a *conspiracy* mostly requires many for the fulfilment of its purposes, although it is thereby the more exposed to discovery.

Selfishness, insubordination, and laxity of morals, give rise to *combinations*; they are peculiar to mechanics and the lower orders of society. Restless, jealous, ambitious, and little minds, are ever forming *cabals*; they are peculiar to courtiers: malignity, revenge, and every foul passion, is concerned in forming *plots*: disaffected subjects and bad citizens form *conspiracies*, which are frequently set on foot by disappointed ambition.

* Vide Roubaud: „Cabale, complot, conspiration, conjuration.

TO COME, ARRIVE.

COME is general; ARRIVE is particular.

Persons or things *come*; persons only, or what is personified, *arrive*.

To *come* specifies neither time nor manner: *arrival* is employed with regard to some particular period or circumstances. The *coming* of our Saviour was predicted by the prophets; the *arrival* of a messenger is expected at a certain hour. We know that evils must *come*, but we do wisely not to meet them by anticipation; the *arrival* of a vessel in the haven, after a long and dangerous voyage, is a circumstance of general interest in the neighbourhood where it happens.

COMFORT, PLEASURE.

COMFORT, *v.* To cheer, encourage.

PLEASURE, from to *please*, signifies what *pleases*.

Comfort, that genuine English word, describes what England only affords: we may find *pleasure* in every country; but *comfort* is to be found in our own country only: the grand feature in *comfort* is substantiality; in that of *pleasure* it is warmth. *Pleasure* is quickly succeeded by pain; it is the lot of humanity that to every *pleasure* there should be an alloy: *comfort* is that portion of *pleasure* which seems to lie exempt from this disadvantage; it is the most durable sort of *pleasure*.

Comfort must be sought for at home; *pleasure* is pursued abroad: *comfort* depends upon a thousand nameless trifles which daily arise; it is the relief of a pain, the heightening of a gratification, the supply of a want, or the removal of an inconvenience. *Pleasure* is the companion of luxury and abundance: it dwells in the palaces of the rich and the abodes of the voluptuary: but *comfort* is within the reach of the poor, and is the portion of those who know how to husband their means, and to adapt their enjoyments to their habits and circumstances in life. *Comfort* is less than *pleasure* in the detail: it is more than *pleasure* in the aggregate.

COMMAND, ORDER, INJUNCTION, PRECEPT.

COMMAND is compounded of *com* and *mando*, *manudo*, or *dare in manus* to give into the hand, signifying to give or appoint as a task.

ORDER, in the extended sense of regularity, implies what is done in the way of *order*, or for the sake of regularity.

INJUNCTION, in French *injunction*, comes from *in* and *jungo*, which signifies

literally to join or bring close to; figuratively to impress on the mind.

PRECEPT, in French *precepte*, Latin *praeceptum*, participle of *praecipio*, compounded of *prae* and *capio* to put or lay before, signifies the thing proposed to the mind.

A *command* is imperative; it is the strongest exercise of authority: *order* is instructive; it is an expression of the wishes: an *injunction* is decisive; it is a greater exercise of authority than *order*, and less than *command*: a *precept* is a moral law; it is binding on the conscience. The three former of these are personal in their application; the latter is general: a *command*, an *order*, and an *injunction*, must be addressed to some particular individual; a *precept* is addressed to all.

Command and *order* flow exclusively from the will of the speaker in the ordinary concerns of life; *injunction* has more regard to the conduct of the person addressed; *precept* is altogether founded on the moral objections of men to each other. A *command* is just or unjust: an *order* is prudent or imprudent; an *injunction* is mild or severe; a *precept* is general or particular.

Command and *order* are affirmative; *injunction* or *precept* are either affirmative or negative: a *command* and an *order* oblige us to do a thing; an *injunction* and *precept* oblige us to do it, or leave it undone. A sovereign issues his *commands*, which the well-being of society requires to be instantly obeyed: a master gives his *orders*, which it is the duty of the servant to execute; a father lays an *injunction* on his children, which they with filial regard ought to endeavour to follow: the moralist lays down his *precepts*, which every rational creature is called upon to practise.

COMMANDING, IMPERATIVE, IMPERIOUS, AUTHORITATIVE.

COMMANDING signifies having the force of a *command* (*v.* To *command*).

IMPERATIVE, from *impero*, signifies in the imperative mood.

IMPERIOUS, from *impero*, signifies in the way of, or like a *command*.

AUTHORITATIVE signifies having authority, or in the way of *authority*.

Commanding is either good or bad according to circumstances; a *commanding* voice is necessary for one who has to command; but a *commanding* air is offensive when it is affected: *imperative* is applied to things, and used in an indifferent sense: *imperious* is used for persons or things in the bad sense: any direction is *imperative* which comes in

the shape of a command, and circumstances are likewise *imperative* which act with the force of a *command*; persons are *imperious* who exercise their power oppressively: in this manner underlings in office are *imperious*; necessity is *imperious* when it leaves us no choice in our conduct. *Authoritative* is mostly applied to persons or things personal in the good sense only; magistrates are called upon to assume an *authoritative* air when they meet with any resistance.

TO COMMISSION, AUTHORIZE,
EMPOWER.

COMMISSION, from *commit*, signifies the act of *committing*, or putting into the hands of another.

To AUTHORIZE signifies to give *authority*; to EMPOWER, to put in possession of *power*.

The idea of transferring some business to another is common to these terms; the circumstances under which this is performed constitute the difference. We *commission* in ordinary cases; we *authorize* and *empower* in extraordinary cases. We *commission* in matters where our own will and convenience are concerned; we *authorize* in matters where our personal *authority* is requisite; and we *empower* in matters where the *authority* of the law is required. A *commission* is given by the bare communication of one's wishes; we *authorize* by a positive and formal declaration to that intent; we *empower* by the transfer of some legal document. A person is *commissioned* to make a purchase; he is *authorized* to communicate what has been confided to him; he is *empowered* to receive money.

Commissioning passes mostly between equals; the performance of *commissions* is an act of civility; *authorizing* and *empowering* are as often directed to inferiors; they are frequently acts of justice and necessity. Friends give each other *commissions*; servants and subordinate persons are sometimes *authorized* to act in the name of their employers; magistrates *empower* the officers of justice to apprehend individuals or enter houses. We are *commissioned* by persons only; we are *authorized* sometimes by circumstances; we are *empowered* by law.

COMMODIOUS, CONVENIENT.

COMMODIOUS, from the Latin *commodus*, or *con* and *modus*, according to the measure and degree required.

CONVENIENT, from the Latin *conveniens*, participle of *con* and *venio* to come together, signifies that which comes together with something else as it ought.

Both these terms convey the idea of what is calculated for the pleasure of a person. *Commodious* regards the physical condition, and *convenience* circumstances or mental feelings. That is *commodious* which suits one's bodily ease; that is *convenient* which suits one's purpose. A house, or a chair, is *commodious*; a time, an opportunity, a season, or the arrival of any person, is *convenient*. A noise *incommodes*; the staying or going of a person may *inconvenience*. A person wishes to sit *commodiously*, and to be *conveniently* situated for witnessing any spectacle.

COMMODITY, GOODS, MERCHANDIZE,
WARE.

These terms agree in expressing articles of trade under various circumstances.

COMMODITY, in Latin *commoditas*, signifies in its abstract sense *convenience*, and in an extended application any thing that is *convenient* or fit for use, which being also saleable, the word has been employed for things that are sold.

GOODS, which denotes the thing that is good, has derived its use from the same analogy in its sense as in the former case.

MERCHANDIZE, in French *marchandise*, Latin *mercatura* or *merx*, Hebrew *macar*, signifies saleable things.

WARE, in Saxon *ware*, German, &c. *ware*, signifies properly any thing manufactured, and, by an extension of the sense, an article for sale.

Commodity is employed only for articles of the first necessity; it is the source of comfort and object of industry: *goods* is applied to every thing belonging to tradesmen, for which there is a stipulated value; *merchandize* applies to what belongs to merchants; it is the object of commerce: *wares* are manufactured, and may be either *goods* or *merchandize*: a country has its *commodities*; a shopkeeper his *goods*; a merchant his *merchandize*; a manufacturer his *wares*.

COMMON, VULGAR, ORDINARY, MEAN.

COMMON, in French *commun*, Latin *communis*, from *con* and *munus* the joint office or property of many, has regard to the multitude of objects.

VULGAR, in French *vulgaire*, Latin *vulgaris*, from *vulgus* the people, has regard to the number and quality of the persons.

ORDINARY, in French *ordinaire*, Latin *ordinarius*, from *ordo* the order or regular practice, has regard to the repetition or disposition of things.

MEAN expresses the same as *medium* or moderate, from which it is derived.

Familiar use renders things *common*, *vulgar*, and *ordinary*; but what is *mean* is so of itself: the *common*, *vulgar*, and *ordinary*, are therefore frequently, though not always, *mean*; and on the contrary what is *mean* is not always *common*, *vulgar*, or *ordinary*; consequently, in the primitive sense of these words, the first three are not strictly synonymous with the last: monsters are *common* in Africa; *vulgar* reports are little to be relied on; it is an *ordinary* practice for men to make light of their word.

Common is unlimited in its application; it includes both *vulgar* and *ordinary*; the latter are said in reference to persons only, *common* with regard to persons or things: an opinion is either *common* or *vulgar*; an employment is either *common* or *ordinary*: it was long a *vulgarly* received notion, that the sun turned round the earth; it is the *ordinary* pursuit of astronomers to observe the motions of the heavenly bodies: disputes on religion have rendered many facts *vulgar* or *common*, which were formerly known only to the learned; on that account it is now become an *ordinary* or a *common* practice for men to dispute about religion, and even to frame a new set of doctrines for themselves.

In the figurative sense, in which they convey the idea of low value, they are synonymous with *mean*: what is to be seen, heard, and enjoyed by every body is *common*, and naturally of little value, since the worth of objects frequently depends upon their scarcity and the difficulty of obtaining them. What is peculiar to *common* people is *vulgar*, and consequently worse than *common*; it is supposed to belong to those who are ignorant and depraved in taste as well as in morals: what is done and seen *ordinarily* may be done and seen easily; it requires no abilities or mental acquirements; it has nothing striking in it, it excites no interest: what is *mean* is even below that which is *ordinary*; there is something defective in it.

Common is opposed to rare and refined; *vulgar* to polite and cultivated; *ordinary* to the distinguished; *mean* to the noble: a *common* mind busies itself with *common* objects; *vulgar* habits are easily contracted from a slight intercourse with *vulgar* people; an *ordinary* person is seldom associated with elevation of character; and a *mean* appearance is a mark of a degraded condition, if not of a degraded mind.

COMMONLY, GENERALLY, FREQUENTLY, USUALLY.

COMMONLY, in the form of *common* (*v. Common*).

GENERALLY, from *general*, and the Latin *genus* the kind, respects a whole body in distinction from an individual.

FREQUENTLY, from *frequent*, in French *frequent*, Latin *frequens*, from *frago*, in Greek *φραγω* and *φραγνυμι* to go about, signifies properly a crowding.

USUALLY, from *usual* and *use*, signifies according to *use* or custom.

What is *commonly* done is an action *common* to all; what is *generally* done is the action of the greatest part; what is *frequently* done is either the action of many, or an action many times repeated by the same person; what is *usually* done is done regularly by one or many.

Commonly is opposed to rarely; *generally* and *frequently* to occasionally or seldom; *usually* to casually: men *commonly* judge of others by themselves; those who judge by the mere exterior are *generally* deceived; notwithstanding every precaution, one is *frequently* exposed to gross frauds; a man of business *usually* repairs to his counting-house every day at a certain hour.

COMMOTION, DISTURBANCE.

COMMOTION, compounded of *com* or *cum* and *motion*, expresses naturally a *motion* of several together.

DISTURBANCE signifies the state of *disturbing* or being *disturbed* (*v. To trouble*).

There is mostly a *commotion* where there is a *disturbance*; but there is frequently no *disturbance* where there is a *commotion*: *commotion* respects the physical movement; *disturbance* the mental agitation. *Commotion* is said only of large bodies of men, and is occasioned only by something extraordinary; *disturbance* may be said of a few, or even of a single individual: whatever occasions a bustle, awakens general inquiry, and sets people or things in motion, excites a *commotion*; whatever interrupts the peace and quiet of one or many produces a *disturbance*: any wonderful phenomenon, or unusually interesting intelligence, may throw the public into a *commotion*: drunkenness is a common cause of *disturbances* in the streets or in families: civil *commotions* are above all others the most to be dreaded; they are attended with *disturbances* general and partial.

TO COMMUNICATE, IMPART.

COMMUNICATE, in Latin *communicatus*, participle of *communico*, contracted from *communifico*, signifies to make common property with another.

IMPART, compounded of *in* and *part*, signifies to give in part to another.

Imparting is a species of *communicating*; one always *communicates* in *imparting*, but not *vice versa*.

Whatever can be enjoyed in common with others is *communicated*; whatever can be shared by another is *imparted*: what one knows or thinks is *communicated*, or made commonly known; what one feels is *imparted* and participated in: intelligence is *communicated*; secrets or sorrows are *imparted*.

A person may *communicate* what belongs to another, as well as that which is his own; but he *imparts* that only which concerns or belongs to himself: an openness of temper leads some men to *communicate* their intentions as soon as they are formed; a desire for sympathy leads others to *impart* their sentiments. There is a great pleasure in *communicating* good intelligence, and in *imparting* good advice.

COMMUNICATIVE, FREE.

Are epithets that convey no respectful sentiment of the object to which they are applied: a person is COMMUNICATIVE, who is ready to tell all he knows; he is FREE, when he is ready to say all he thinks: the *communicative* person has no regard for himself; the *free* person has no regard for others.

A *communicative* temper leads to the breach of all confidence; a *free* temper leads to violation of all decency: *communicativeness* of disposition produces much mischief; *freedom* of speech and behaviour occasions much offence. *Communicativeness* is the excess of sincerity; it offends by revealing what it ought to conceal: *freedom* is the abuse of sincerity; it offends by speaking what it ought not to think.

These terms are sometimes taken in a good sense; when a person is *communicating* for the instruction or amusement of others, and is *free* in imparting to others whatever he can of his enjoyments.

COMMUNION, CONVERSE.

COMMUNION, from *commune* and *communis* common (v. *Common*), signifies the act of making common.

CONVERSE, from the Latin *convert* to convert or translate, signifies a transferring.

Both these terms imply a communication between minds; but the former may take place without corporeal agency, the latter never does; spirits hold *communion* with each other; people hold *converse*.

For the same reason a man may hold *communion* with himself; he holds *converse* always with another.

COMMUNITY, SOCIETY.

Both these terms are employed for a body of rational beings.

COMMUNITY, from *communitas* and *communis* common (v. *Common*), signifies abstractedly the state of being *common*, and in an extended sense those who are in a state of common possession.

SOCIETY, in Latin *societas*, from *socius* a companion, signifies the state of being companions, or those who are in that state.

Community is any number of persons having a common interest; *society* a number of persons seeking a common object: a common language, a common government, a common interest is the basis of that *community* which is formed by any number of individuals; communities are therefore divisible into large or small; the former may be states, the latter families; *societies* are either public or private, according to the purpose for which they meet together: friends form *societies* for the purpose of pleasure; indifferent persons form *societies* for the purpose of business.

The great *community* of mankind is necessarily broken into smaller independent *societies*.

Community refers to spiritual as well as corporeal agents; *society* mostly to human beings only: the angels, the saints, and the spirits of just men made perfect, constitute a *community*; with them there is more communion than association.

COMPARISON, CONTRAST.

COMPARISON, from *compare*, and the Latin *comparo* or *com* and *par* equal, signifies the putting together of equals.

CONTRAST, in French *contraster*, Latin *contrast* or *contra* and *sto* to stand against, signifies the placing one thing opposite to another.

Likeness in the quality and difference in the degree are requisite for a *comparison*; likeness in the degree and opposition in the quality are requisite for a *contrast*: things of the same colour are *compared*; those of an opposite colour are *contrasted*: a *comparison* is made between two shades of red; a *contrast* between black and white.

Comparison is of a practical utility, it serves to ascertain the true relation of objects; *contrast* is of utility among poets, it serves to heighten the effect of opposite qualities; things are large or small by *comparison*; they are magnified or diminished by *contrast*: the value of a coin is best learned by *comparing* it with another of the same metal; the generosity of one person is

most strongly felt when *contrasted* with the meanness of another.

COMPATIBLE, CONSISTENT.

COMPATIBLE, compounded of *com* or *cum* with, and *pator* to suffer, signifies a fitness to be suffered together.

CONSISTENT. in Latin *consistens*, participle of *consisto*, compounded of *con* and *sisto* to place, signifies the fitness to be placed together.

Compatibility has a principal reference to plans and measures; *consistency* to character, conduct, and station. Every thing is *compatible* with a plan which does not interrupt its prosecution; every thing is *consistent* with a person's station by which it is neither degraded nor elevated. It is not *compatible* with the good discipline of a school to allow of foreign interference; it is not *consistent* with the elevated and dignified character of a clergyman to engage in the ordinary pursuits of other men.

TO COMPEL, FORCE, OBLIGE, NECESSITATE.

COMPEL, Latin *compello* or *pello* to drive, signifies to drive for a specific purpose or to a point.

FORCE, in French *force*, comes from the Latin *fortis* strong; *force* being nothing but the exertion of strength.

OBLIGE, in French *obliger*, Latin *obligo*, compounded of *ob* and *ligo*, signifies to bind down. These three terms mark an external action on the will, but *compel* expresses more than *oblige*, and less than *force*. NECESSITATE is to make necessary.

Compulsion and *force* act much more directly and positively than *oblige* or *necessitate*; and the latter indicates more of physical strength than the former. We are *compelled* by outward or inward motives; we are *obliged* more by motives than any thing else; we are *forced* sometimes by circumstances, though oftener by plain strength; we are *necessitated* solely by circumstances. An adversary is *compelled* to yield who resigns from despair of victory; he is *forced* to yield if he stand in fear of his life; he is *obliged* to yield if he cannot withstand the entreaties of his friends; he is *necessitated* to yield if he want the strength to continue.

Pecuniary want *compels* men to do many things inconsistent with their station. Honour and religion *oblige* men scrupulously to observe their word one to another. Hunger *forces* men to eat that which is most loathsome to the palate. The fear of a loss *necessitates* a man to give up a favourite project.

COMPENSATION, SATISFACTION, AMENDS, REMUNERATION, RECOMPENSE, REQUITAL, REWARD.

The first three of these terms are employed to express a return for some evil; *remuneration*, *recompense*, and *requit*, a return for some good; *reward*, a return for either good or evil.

COMPENSATION, Latin *compensatio*, compounded of *com* and *pensatio*, *pensus* and *pendo* to pay, signifies the paying what has become due.

SATISFACTION, from *satisfy*, signifies the thing that satisfies, or makes up in return.

AMENDS, from the verb to *amend*, signifies the thing that makes good what has been bad.

REMUNERATION, from *remunerate*, Latin *remuneratus* or *remunero*, compounded of *re* and *munus* an office, or service, signifies what is given in return for a service.

RECOMPENSE, compounded of *re* and *compense*, signifies the thing paid back as an equivalent.

REQUITAL, compounded of *re* and *quital*, or *quittal* from *quit*, signifies the making one's self clear by a return.

REWARD is probably connected with regard, implying to take cognizance of the deserts of any one.

A *compensation* is something real; it is made for some positive injury sustained; justice requires that it should be equal in value, if not in like kind, to that which is lost or injured: a *satisfaction* may be imaginary, both as to the injury and the return; it is given for personal injuries, and depends on the disposition of the person to be *satisfied*: *amends* is real, but not always made so much for injuries done to others, as for offences committed by ourselves. Sufferers ought to have a *compensation* for the injuries they have sustained, but there are injuries, particularly those which wound the feelings, for which there can be no *compensation*: tenacious and quarrelsome people demand *satisfaction*; their offended pride is not *satisfied* without the humiliation of their adversary: an *amends* is honourable which serves to repair a fault; the best *amends* which an offending person can make is to acknowledge his error, and avoid a repetition.

Compensation often denotes a return for services done, in which sense it approaches still nearer to *remuneration*, *recompense*, and *requit*; but the first two are obligatory; the latter are gratuitous. *Compensation* is an act of justice; the service perform-

ed involves a debt; the omission of paying it becomes an injury to the performer. The labourer is worthy of his hire; the time and strength of a poor man ought not to be employed without his receiving a *compensation*. *Remuneration* is a higher species of *compensation*; it is a matter of equity dependant upon a principle of honour in those who make it; it differs from the ordinary *compensation*, both in the nature of the service, and of the return. *Compensation* is made for bodily labour and menial offices: *remuneration* for mental exertions, for literary, civil, or political offices: *compensation* is made to inferiors, or subordinate persons; *remuneration* to equals, and even superiors in education and birth, though not in wealth: a *compensation* is prescribed by a certain ratio; *remuneration* depends on collateral circumstances. A *recompense* is voluntary, both as to the service and the return; it is an act of generosity; it is not founded on the value of the service so much as on the intention of the server; it is not received so much as a matter of right, as of courtesy: there are a thousand acts of civility performed by others which are entitled to some *recompense*, though not to any specific *compensation*. *Requital* is a return for a kindness; the making it is an act of gratitude; the omission of it wounds the feelings: it sometimes happens that the only *requital* which a kind action obtains, is the animosity of the person served.

Reward conveys no idea of obligation; whoever *rewards* acts altogether optionally; the conduct of the agent produces *reward*. In this sense, it is comparable with *compensation*, *amends*, and *recompense*; but not with *satisfaction*, *remuneration*, or *requital*: things, as well as persons, may *compensate*, make *amends*, *recompense*, and *reward*; but persons only can give *satisfaction*, *remuneration*, and *requital*.

Reward respects the merit of the action; but *compensate* and the other words simply refer to the connexion between the actions and their results: what accrues to a man as the just consequence of his conduct, be it good or bad, is a *reward*. *Compensation* and *amends* serve to supply the loss or absence of any thing; *recompense* and *reward* follow from particular exertions. It is but a poor *compensation* for the loss of peace and health to have one's coffers filled with gold: a social intercourse by letter will make *amends* for the absence of those who are dear. It is a mark of folly to do any thing, however trifling, without the prospect of a *recompense*, and yet we see this daily realized in persons who give themselves much trouble

to no purpose. The *reward* of industry is ease and content: when a deceiver is caught in his own snare, he meets with the *reward* which should always attend deceit.

What can *compensate* for the loss of honour? What can make *amends* to a frivolous mind for the want of company? What *recompense* so sweet as the consciousness of having served a friend? What *reward* equals the *reward* of a good conscience?

COMPETENT, FITTED, QUALIFIED.

COMPETENT, in Latin *competens*, participle of *competo* to agree or suit, signifies suitable.

FITTED, from *fit* (v. *Becoming*).

QUALIFIED, participle of *qualify*, from the Latin *qualis* and *facio*, signifies made as it ought to be.

Competency mostly respects the mental endowments and attainments; *fitness* the disposition and character; *qualification* the artificial acquirements. A person is *competent* to undertake an office; *fitted* or *qualified* to fill a situation.

Familiarity with any subject aided by strong mental endowments gives *competency*: suitable habits and temper constitute the *fitness*: acquaintance with the business to be done, and expertness in the mode of performing it, constitute the *qualification*. Many are *qualified* for managing the concerns of others, who would not be *competent* to manage a concern for themselves. Many who are *fitted* from their turn of mind for any particular charge, may be unfortunately *incompetent* for want of the requisite *qualifications*.

COMPETITION, EMULATION, RIVALRY.

COMPETITION, from the Latin *competo*, compounded of *com* and *peto*, signifies to sue or seek together, to seek for the same object.

EMULATION, in Latin *emulatio*, from *aemulor*, and the Greek *αμιλλα* a contest, signifies the spirit of contending.

RIVALRY, from the Latin *rivus* the bank of a stream, signifies the divided or common enjoyment of any stream, which is a natural source of discord.

Competition expresses the relation of a competitor, or the act of seeking the same object; *emulation* expresses a disposition of the mind towards particular objects; *rivalry* expresses both the relation and the disposition of a rival. *Emulation* is to *competition* as the motive to the action; *emulation* produces *competitors*, but it may exist without it: they have the same marks to distinguish them from *rivalry*.

Competition and *emulation* have honour for their basis; *rivalry* is but a desire for selfish gratification. A *competitor* strives to surpass by honest means; he cannot succeed so well by any other; a *rival* is not bound by any principle; he seeks to supplant by whatever means seem to promise success. An unfair *competitor* and a generous *rival* are equally unusual and inconsistent.

Competition animates to exertion; *rivalry* provokes hatred: * *competition* seeks to merit success; *rivalry* is contented with obtaining it.

Competitors may sometimes become *rivals* in spirit, although *rivals* will never become *competitors*. It is further to be remarked, that *competition* supposes some actual effort for the attainment of a specific object set in view: *rivalry* may consist of a continued wishing for and aiming at the same general end without necessarily comprehending the idea of close action. *Competitors* are in the same line with each other; *rivals* may work toward the same point at a great distance from each other. Literary prizes are the objects of *competition* among scholars; the affections of a female are the objects of *rivals*. William the Conqueror and Harold were *competitors* for the crown of England; Aeneas and Turnus were *rivals* for the hand of Lavinia.

TO COMPLAIN, LAMENT, REGRET.

COMPLAIN, in French *complandre* or *plandre*, Latin *plango* to beat the breast as a sign of grief, in Greek *πληγω* to strike.

LAMENT, *v.* To bewail.

REGRET, compounded of *re* private and *gratus* grateful, signifies to have a feeling the reverse of pleasant.

Complaint marks most of dissatisfaction; *lamentation* most of grief; *regret* most of pain. *Complaint* is expressed verbally; *lamentation* either by words or signs; *regret* may be felt without being expressed. *Complaint* is made of personal grievances; *lamentation* and *regret* may be made on account of others as well as ourselves. We *complain* of our ill health, of our inconveniences, or of troublesome circumstances; we *lament* our inability to serve another; we *regret* the absence of one whom we love. Selfish people have the most to *complain* of, as they demand most of others, and are most liable to be disappointed; anxious people are the most liable to *lament*, as they feel every thing strongly; the best-regulated mind may have occasion to *regret* some circumstances which give pain to the tender affections of the heart.

* Vide Abbé Roubaud: „Emulation, rivalité.“

TO COMPLAIN, MURMUR, REPINE.

COMPLAIN, *v.* To complain.

MURMUR, in German *murmeln*, conveys both in sound and sense the idea of dissatisfaction.

REPINE is compounded of *re* and *pine*, from the English *pain*, Latin *poena* punishment, and the Greek *πεινα* hunger, signifying to convert into pain.

The idea of expressing displeasure or dissatisfaction is common to these terms. *Murmuring* is not so loud as *complaint*, but more so than *repining*.

We *complain* or *murmur* by some audible method; we may *repine* secretly. *Complaints* are always addressed to some one; *murmurs* and *repinings* are often addressed only to one's self. *Complaints* are made of whatever creates uneasiness, without regard to the source from which they flow; *murmurings* are a species of *complaints* made only of that which is done by others for our inconvenience; when used in relation to persons, *complaint* is the act of a superior; *murmuring* that of an inferior; *repining* is always used in relation to the general disposition of things. When the conduct of another offends, it calls for *complaint*; when a superior aggrieves by the imposition of what is burdensome, it occasions *murmuring* on the part of the aggrieved; when disappointments arrive, or ambition is thwarted, men *repine* at their destiny.

COMPLAINT, ACCUSATION.

COMPLAINT, *v.* To complain.

ACCUSATION, *v.* To accuse.

Both these terms are employed in regard to the conduct of others, but a *complaint* is mostly made in matters that personally affect the complainant; an *accusation* is made of matters in general, but especially those of a moral nature. A *complaint* is made for the sake of obtaining redress; an *accusation* is made for the sake of ascertaining a fact or bringing to punishment. A *complaint* may be frivolous; an *accusation* false. People in subordinate stations should be careful to give no cause for *complaint*: the most guarded conduct will not protect a person from the unjust *accusations* of the malevolent.

COMPLAISANCE, DEFERENCE, CONDESCENSION.

COMPLAISANCE, from *com* and *plaire* to please, signifies the act of complying with, or pleasing others.

DEFERENCE, in French *déference*, from the Latin *defero* to bear down, marks the

inclination to defer, or acquiesce in the sentiments of another in preference to one's own.

CONDESCENSION marks the act of *condescending* from one's own height to yield to the satisfaction of others, rather than rigorously to exact one's rights.

The necessities, the conveniences, the accommodations and allurements of society, of familiarity, and of intimacy, lead to *complaisance*; it makes sacrifices to the wishes, tastes, comforts, enjoyments, and personal feelings of others. Age, rank, dignity, and personal merit call for *deference*: it enjoins compliance with respect to our opinions, judgments, pretensions, and designs. The infirmities, the wants, the defects, and foibles of others call for *condescension*: it relaxes the rigour of authority, and removes the distinction of rank or station.

Complaisance is the act of an equal; *deference* that of an inferior; *condescension* that of a superior. *Complaisance* is due from one well-bred person to another; *deference* is due to all superiors in age, knowledge, or station, whom one approaches; *condescension* is due from all superiors to such as are dependant on them for comfort and enjoyment.

COMPLETE, PERFECT, FINISHED.

COMPLETE, in French *complet*, Latin *complexus*, participle of *compleo* to fill up, signifies the quality of being filled, or having all that is necessary.

PERFECT, in Latin *perfectus*, participle of *perficio* to perform or do thoroughly, signifies the state of being done thoroughly.

FINISHED, from *finish* (v. *To close*), marks, the state of being *finished*.

That is *complete* which has no deficiency; that is *perfect* which has positive excellence; and that is *finished* which has no omission in it.

That to which any thing can be added is *incomplete*; when it can be improved it is *imperfect*; when more labour ought to be bestowed upon it it is *unfinished*. A thing is *complete* in all its parts; *perfect* as to the beauty and design of the construction; and *finished* as it comes from the hand of the workman and answers his intention. A set of books is not *complete* when a volume is wanting: there is nothing in the proper sense *perfect* which is the work of man; but the term is used relatively for whatever makes the greatest approach to *perfection*: a *finished* performance evinces care and diligence on the part of the workman.

A thing may be *complete* or *finished* without being *perfect*; and it may be *perfect*

without being either *complete* or *finished*. The works of the ancients are, as they have been handed down to us, *incomplete*, and some probably *unfinished*; and yet the greater part are *perfect* in their way: the works of the moderns are mostly *complete* and *finished*; yet but a small part have any claims even to human *perfection*.

TO COMPLETE, FINISH, TERMINATE:

COMPLETE is to make complete (v. *Complete*).

FINISH, v. *To close*.

TERMINATE, Latin *terminatus*, from *terminus* a term or boundary, signifies to make a boundary.

We *complete** what is undertaken by continuing to labour at it; we *finish* what is in a state of forwardness by putting the last hand to it; we *terminate* what ought not to last by bringing it to a close. So that the characteristic idea of *completing* is the conducting a thing to its final period; that of *finishing*, the arrival at that period; and that of *terminating*, the cessation of a thing.

Completing has properly relation to permanent works only, whether mechanical or intellectual; we desire a thing to be *completed* from a curiosity to see it in its entire state. To *finish* is employed for passing occupations; we wish a thing *finished* from an anxiety to proceed to something else, or a dislike to the thing in which we are engaged. *Terminating* respects discussions, differences, and disputes. Light minds undertake many things without *completing* any. Children and unsteady people set about many things without *finishing* any. Litigious people *terminate* one dispute only to commence another.

COMPLEXITY, COMPLICATION, INTRICACY.

COMPLEXITY and COMPLICATION, in French *complication*, Latin *complicatio* and *complico*, compounded of *com* and *plico*, signifies a folding one thing within another.

INTRICACY, Latin *intricatio* and *intrico*, compounded of *in* and *trico* or *trices*, small hairs which are used to ensnare birds, signifies a state of entanglement by means of many involutions.

Complexity expresses the abstract quality or state; *complication* the act: they both convey less than *intricacy*; *intricate* is that which is very *complicated*.

Complexity arises from a multitude of

* Vide Girard: „Achever, finir, terminer.“

objects, and the nature of these objects; *complication* from an involvement of objects; and *intricacy* from a winding and confused involution. What is *complex* must be decomposed; what is *complicated* must be developed; what is *intricate* must be unravelled. A proposition is *complex*; affairs are *complicated*; the law is *intricate*.

Complexity puzzles; *complication* confounds; *intricacy* bewilders. A clear head is requisite for understanding that which is *complex*; keenness and penetration are required to lay open that which is *complicated*; a comprehensive mind, coupled with coolness and perseverance of research, are essential to disentangle that which is *intricate*. The *complexity* of a subject often deters young persons from application to their business. There is nothing embarrasses a physician more than a *complication* of disorders, where the remedy for one impedes the cure for the other. Some affairs are involved in such a degree of *intricacy*, as to exhaust the patience and perseverance of the most laborious.

TO COMPLY, CONFORM, YIELD, SUBMIT.

COMPLY, *v.* To accede.

CONFORM, compounded of *con* and *form*, signifies to put into the same form.

YIELD, *v.* To accede.

SUBMIT, in Latin *submitto*, compounded of *sub* and *mitto*, signifies to put under, that is to say, to put one's self under another person.

Compliance and *conformity* are voluntary; *yielding* and *submission* are involuntary.

Compliance is an act of the inclination; *conformity* an act of the judgment: *compliance* is altogether optional; we *comply* with a thing or not, at pleasure; *conformity* is binding on the conscience; it relates to matters in which there is a right and a wrong. *Compliance* and *conformity* are produced by no external action on the mind; they flow spontaneously from the will and understanding: *yielding* is altogether the result of foreign agency. We *comply* with a wish as soon as it is known; it accords with our feelings so to do; we *yield* to the entreaties of others; it is the effect of persuasion, a constraint upon or at least a direction of the inclination. We *conform* to the regulations of a community, it is a matter of discretion: we *yield* to the superior judgment of another, we have no choice or alternative. We *comply* cheerfully; we *conform* willingly; we *yield* reluctantly.

To *yield* is to give way to another, either with one's will, judgment, or outward conduct: *submission* is the giving up of one's

self altogether: it is the substitution of another's will for one's own. *Yielding* is partial; we may *yield* in one case or in one action though not in another: *submission* is general; it includes a system of conduct.

We *yield* when we do not resist; this may sometimes be the act of a superior; we *submit* only by adopting the measures and conduct proposed to us; this is always the act of an inferior. *Yielding* may be produced by means more or less gentle, by enticing or insinuating arts, or by the force of argument; *submission* is made only to power or positive force: one *yields* after a struggle; one *submits* without resistance: we *yield* to ourselves or others; we *submit* to others only: it is a weakness to *yield* either to the suggestions of others or our own inclinations to do that which our judgments condemn; it is a folly to *submit* to the caprice of any one where there is not a moral obligation.

COMPLIANT, YIELDING, SUBMISSION.

As epithets from the preceding verbs serve to designate a propensity to the respective actions mostly in an excessive or improper degree.

A COMPLIANT temper *complies* with every wish of another, good or bad; a YIELDING temper leans to every opinion right or wrong; a SUBMISSIVE temper *submits* to every demand, just or unjust.

A *compliant* person wants command of feeling; a *yielding* person wants fixedness of principle; a *submissive* person wants resolution: a *compliant* disposition will be imposed upon by the selfish and unreasonable; a *yielding* disposition is most unfit for commanding; a *submissive* disposition exposes a person to the exactions of tyranny,

TO COMPOSE, SETTLE.

COMPOSE, from the Latin *composui*, perfect of *compono* to put together, signifies to put in due order.

SETTLE is a frequentative of *set*.

We *compose* that which has been disjointed and separated, by bringing it together again; we *settle* that which has been disturbed and put in motion, by making it rest: we *compose* our thoughts when they have been deranged and thrown into confusion; we *settle* our mind when it has been fluctuating and distracted by contending desires; the mind must be *composed* before we can think justly; it must be *settled* before we can act consistently.

We *compose* the differences of others: we *settle* our own differences with others: it is difficult to *compose* the quarrels of an-

gry opponents, or to settle the disputes of obstinate partisans.

COMPOSED, SEDATE.

COMPOSED expresses the state of being composed (v. *To compose*).

SEDATE, in Latin *sedatus* participle of *sedo* to settle, signifies the quality of being settled.

Composed respects the air and looks externally, and the spirits internally; *sedate* relates to the deportment or carriage externally, and the fixedness of the purpose internally: *composed* is opposed to ruffled or hurried, *sedate* to buoyant or volatile.

Composure is a particular state of the mind; *sedateness* is an habitual frame of mind; a part of the character: a *composed* mien is very becoming in the season of devotion; a *sedate* carriage is becoming in youth who are engaged in serious concerns.

COMPOUND, COMPLEX.

COMPOUND comes from the present of *compono* to compound, from the preterite of which, *composui*, is formed the verb *compose* (v. *To compose*).

COMPLEX, v. *Complexity*.

The *compound* consists of similar and whole bodies put together; the *complex* consists of various parts linked together: adhesion is sufficient to constitute a *compound*; involution is requisite for the *complex*; we distinguish the whole that forms the *compound*; we separate the parts that form the *complex*: what is *compound* may consist only of two; what is *complex* consists always of several.

Compound and *complex* are both commonly opposed to the simple; but the former may be opposed to the single, and the latter to the simple: words are *compound*, sentences are *complex*.

TO COMPOUND, COMPOSE.

COMPOUND and COMPOSE, v. *To compose*.

Compound is used in the physical sense only; *compose* in the proper or the moral sense: words are *compounded* by making two or more into one; sentences are *composed* by putting words together so as to make sense; a medicine is *compounded* of many ingredients; society is *composed* of various classes.

COMPREHENSIVE, EXTENSIVE.

COMPREHENSIVE, from *comprehend*, in Latin *comprehendo* or *com* and *prehendo* to take, signifies the quality of putting up together or including.

EXTENSIVE from *extend*, in Latin *extendo*, or *ex* and *tendo* to stretch out, signifies the quality of reaching to a distance.

Comprehensive respects quantity, *extensive* regards space: that is *comprehensive* that *comprehends* much; that is *extensive* that *extends* into a wide field: a *comprehensive* view of a subject includes all branches of it; an *extensive* view of a subject enters into minute details: the *comprehensive* is associated with the concise; the *extensive* with the diffuse: it requires a capacious mind to take a *comprehensive* survey of any subject: it is possible for a superficial thinker to enter very *extensively* into some parts, while he passes over others.

Comprehensive is employed only with regard to intellectual objects; *extensive* is used both in the proper or the improper sense: the signification of a word is *comprehensive*, or the powers of the mind are *comprehensive*: a plain is *extensive*, or a field of inquiry is *extensive*.

TO COMPRISE, COMPREHEND, EMBRACE, CONTAIN, INCLUDE.

COMPRISE, through the French *compris*, participle of *comprendre*, comes from the same source as *comprehend* (v. *Comprehensive*).

EMBRACE, v. *To clasp*.

CONTAIN, in French *contenir*, Latin *contineo*, compounded of *con* and *teneo* signifies to hold together within one place.

INCLUDE, in Latin *includo*, compounded of *in* and *cludo* or *claudio*, signifies to shut in or within a given space.

Persons or things *comprise* or *include*; things only *comprehend*, *embrace*, and *contain*: a person *comprises* a certain quantity of matter within a given space; he *includes* one thing within another: an author *comprises* his work within a certain number of volumes, and *includes* in it a variety of particulars.

When things are spoken of, *comprise*, *comprehend*, and *embrace*, have regard to the aggregate value, quantity, or extent; *include*, to the individual things which form the whole; *contain*, either to the aggregate or to the individual, being in fact a term of more ordinary application than any of the others. *Comprise* and *contain* are used either in the proper or the figurative sense; *comprehend*, *embrace*, and *include*, in the figurative sense only: a stock *comprises* a variety of articles; a library *comprises* a variety of books; the whole is *comprised* within a certain compass: rules *comprehend* a number of particulars; laws *comprehend* a number of cases; countries *comprehend*

a certain number of districts or divisions; terms comprehend a certain meaning: a discourse *embraces* a variety of topics; a plan, project, scheme, or system, *embraces* a variety of objects: a house *contains* one, two, or more persons; a city *contains* a number of houses; a book *contains* much useful matter; a society *contains* very many individuals; it *includes* none but of a certain class; or it *includes* some of every class.

Their arms and fishing tackle *comprise* the personal effects of most savages; all the moral law of a Christian is *comprised* under the word charity: Sweden *comprehends* Finland and Lapland: London is said to *contain* above a million of inhabitants: a calculator of expenses will always fall short of his estimate who does not *include* the minor contingencies which usually attach to every undertaking.

TO CONCEAL, DISSEMBLE, DISGUISE.

CONCEAL is compounded of *con* and *ceal*, in French *celer*, Latin *celo*, Hebrew *cala* to have privately.

DISSEMBLE, in French *dissimuler* compounded of *dis* and *simulo* or *similis*, signifies to make a thing appear unlike what it is.

DISGUISE, in French *disguiser*, compounded of the privative *dis* or *de* and *guise*, in German *weise*, a manner or fashion, signifies to take a form opposite to the reality.

To *conceal* is simply to abstain from making known what we wish to keep secret; to *dissemble* and *disguise* signify to *conceal*, by assuming some false appearance: we *conceal* facts; *dissemble* feelings; we *disguise* sentiments.

* Caution only is requisite in *concealing*; it may be effected by simple silence: art and address must be employed in *dissembling*; it mingles falsehood with all its proceedings: labour and cunning are requisite in *disguising*; it has nothing but falsehood in all its movements.

The *concealer* watches over himself that he may may not be betrayed into any indiscreet communication; the *dissembler* has an eye to others so as to prevent them from discovering the state of his heart; *disguise* assumes altogether a different face from reality, and rests secure under this shelter.

TO CONCEAL, HIDE, SECRETE.

CONCEAL, v. To *conceal*.

HIDE, from the German *hüthen* to guard against, and the old German *hedan* to con-

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Cacher, dissimuler, déguiser.“

ceal, and the Greek *κευθειν* to cover or put out of sight.

SECRETE, in Latin *secretus*, participle of *secerno*, or *se* and *cerno*, to see or know by one's self, signifies to put in a place known only to one's self.

Concealing has simply the idea of not letting come to observation; *hiding* that of putting under cover; *secreting* that of setting at a distance or in unfrequented places: whatever is not seen is *concealed*, but whatever is *hidden* or *secreted* is intentionally put out of sight: a person *conceals* himself behind a hedge; he *hides* his treasures in the earth; he *secretes* what he has stolen under his cloak.

Conceal is more general than either *hide* or *secrete*: all things are *concealed* which are *hidden* or *secreted*, but are not always *hidden* or *secreted* when they are *concealed*: both mental and corporeal objects are *concealed*; corporeal objects mostly, and sometimes mental ones, are *hidden*; corporeal objects only are *secreted*; we *conceal* in the mind whatever we do not make known: that is *hidden* which may not be discovered or cannot be discerned; that is *secreted* which may not be seen.

Facts are *concealed*, truths are *hidden*, goods are *secreted*.

Children should never attempt to *conceal* from their parents or teachers any error they have committed, when called upon for an acknowledgment; we are told in Scripture, for our consolation, that nothing is *hidden* which shall not be revealed; people seldom wish to *secrete* any thing but with the intention of *concealing* it from those who have a right to demand it back.

CONCEALMENT, SECRECY.

CONCEALMENT (v. To *conceal*) is itself an action; SECRECY, from *secret*, is the quality of an action: *concealment* may respect the state of things: *secrecy* the conduct of persons: things may be *concealed* so as to be known to no one; but *secrecy* supposes some person to whom the thing *concealed* is known.

Concealment has to do with what concerns others; *secrecy* with that which concerns ourselves: what is *concealed* is kept from the observation of others; what is *secret* is known only to ourselves: there may frequently be *concealment* without *secrecy*, although there cannot be *secrecy* without *concealment*: *concealment* is frequently practised to the detriment of others: *secrecy* is always adopted for our own advantage or gratification: *concealment* is serviceable in the commission of crimes; *secrecy* in the

execution of schemes: many crimes are committed with impunity when the perpetrators are protected by *concealment*; the best concerted plans are often frustrated for want of observing *secrecy*.

CONCEIT, FANCY.

CONCEIT comes immediately from the Latin *conceptus*, participle of *concupio* to conceive or form in the mind.

FANCY, in French *phantasie*, Latin *phantasia*, Greek *φαντασιη*, from *φανταζω* to make appear, and *φαινω* to appear.

These terms equally express the working of the imagination in its distorted state; but *conceit* denotes a much greater degree of distortion than *fancy*: our *conceits* are preposterous; what we *fancy* is unreal, or only apparent. *Conceit* applies only to internal objects; it is mental in the operation and the result; it is a species of intervention: *fancy* is applied to external objects, or whatever acts on the senses: nervous people are subject to strange *conceits*; timid people *fancy* they hear sounds, or see objects in the dark which awaken terror.

Those who are apt to *conceit* oftener *conceit* that which is painful than otherwise; *conceiting* either that they are always in danger of dying, or that all the world is their enemy. Those who are apt to *fancy* seldom *fancy* any thing to please themselves; they *fancy* that things are too long or too short, too thick or too thin, too cold or too hot, with a thousand other *fancies*, equally trivial in their nature; thereby proving that the slightest aberration of the mind is a serious evil, and productive of evil.

When taken in reference to intellectual objects, *conceit* is always in a bad sense; but *fancy* may be employed in a good sense.

TO CONCEIVE, APPREHEND, SUPPOSE, IMAGINE.

CONCEIVE, v. *Conceit*.

APPREHEND, v. *To apprehend*.

SUPPOSE, in French *supposer*, Latin *supposui*, perfect of *suppono*, or *sub* and *pono* to put one thing in the place of another, signifies to have one thing in one's mind in lieu of another.

IMAGINE, in French *imaginer*, Latin *imagino*, from *imago* an image, signifies to reflect as an image or phantom in the mind.

Conceive, in the strict sense of the word, is the generic, the others the specific terms: since in *apprehending*, *imagining*, and *supposing*, we always *conceive* or form an idea, but not *vice versa*; the difference consists in the mode and object of the ac-

tion: we *conceive* of things as proper or improper, and just or unjust, right or wrong, good or bad, this is an act of the judgment; we *apprehend* the meaning of another, this is by the power of simple perception, or of combination and reflection; we *suppose* and *imagine* that which has happened or may happen, these are both acts of the *imagination*; but the former rests commonly on some ground of reality; the latter may be the mere offspring of the brain.

What is *conceived* is conclusive; what is *apprehended* is rather dubious; both refer to matters of deduction, in distinction from *suppose* and *imagine*, which relate to matters of fact.

To *conceive* is an ordinary operation of the mind; it must precede every other; we cannot either think or act without *conceiving*: *apprehend* is employed in cases where certainty cannot be had, where no determinate conclusion can be formed; we shall never *apprehend* where we can see distinctly before us: *suppose* is used in opposition to positive knowledge; no person *supposes* that of which he is positively informed: *imagine* is employed for that which in all probability does not exist: we do not *imagine* what is evident and undeniable.

TO CONCEIVE, UNDERSTAND, COMPREHEND.

CONCEIVE, in French *concevoir*, Latin *concupio*, compounded of *con* and *capio*, signifies to take or put together in the mind.

UNDERSTAND signifies to stand under or near to the mind.

COMPREHEND, in Latin *comprehendo*, compounded of *com* and *prehendo*, signifies to seize or embrace within the mind.

These terms indicate the intellectual operations of forming ideas, that is, ideas of the complex kind in distinction from the simple ideas formed by the act of perception.

Conception is the simplest operation of the three; when we *conceive* we may have but one idea, when we *understand* or *comprehend* we have all the ideas which the subject is capable of presenting. We cannot *understand* or *comprehend* without *conceiving*; but we may often *conceive* that which we neither *understand* nor *comprehend*.

That which we cannot *conceive* is to us nothing; but the *conception* of a thing gives it an existence, at least in our minds; but *understanding* and *comprehending* is not essential to the belief of a thing's existence. So long as we have reasons sufficient to *conceive* a thing as possible or probable, it

is not necessary either to *understand* or *comprehend* them in order to authorize our belief. The mysteries of our holy religion are objects of *conception*, but not of *comprehension*. We *conceive* that a thing may be done without *understanding* how it is done: we *conceive* that a thing may exist without *comprehending* the nature of its existence. We *conceive* clearly, *understand* fully, *comprehend* minutely.

Conception is a species of invention; it is the fruit of the mind's operation within itself. *Understanding* and *comprehension* are employed solely on external objects; we *understand* and *comprehend* that which actually exists before us, and presents itself to our observation. *Conceiving* is the office of the imagination, as well as the judgment; *understanding* and *comprehension* are the office of the reasoning faculties exclusively.

* *Conceiving* is employed with regard to matters of taste, to arrangements, designs, and projects; *understanding* is employed on familiar objects which present themselves in the ordinary discourse and business of men; *comprehending* respects principles, lessons, and speculative knowledge in general. The artist *conceives* a design, and he who will execute it must *understand* it; the poet *conceives* that which is grand and sublime, and he who will enjoy the perusal of his *conceptions* must have refinement of mind, and capacity to *comprehend* the grand and sublime. The builder *conceives* plans, the scholar *understands* languages, the metaphysician *comprehends* subtle questions.

CONCEPTION, NOTION.

CONCEPTION, from *conceive* (v. *To conceive*), signifies the thing *conceived*.

NOTION, in French *notion*, Latin *notio*, from *notus*, the participle of *nosco* to know, signifies the thing known.

Conception is the mind's own work, what it pictures to itself from the exercise of its own powers; *notion* is the representation of objects as they are drawn from observation. *Conceptions* are the fruit of the imagination; *notions* are the result of reflection and experience. *Conceptions* are formed; *notions* are entertained. *Conceptions* are either grand or mean, gross or sublime, either clear or indistinct, crude or distinct; *notions* are either true or false, just or absurd. Intellectual culture serves to elevate the *conception*; the extension of know-

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Entendre, comprendre, concevoir.“

ledge serves to correct and refine men's *notions*.

The unenlightened express their gross and crude *conceptions* of a Supreme Being by some material and visible objects: the vulgar *notion* of ghosts and spirits is not entirely banished from the most cultivated parts of England.

TO CONCERT, CONTRIVE, MANAGE.

CONCERT is either a variation of *con-sort* a companion, or from the Latin *concerto* to debate together.

CONTRIVE, from *contrivi*, perfect of *contero* to bruise together, signifies to pound or put together in the mind so as to form a composition.

MANAGE, in French *menager*, compounded of the Latin *manus* and *ago*, signifies to lead by the hand.

There is a secret understanding in *concerting*; invention in *contriving*; execution in *managing*. There is mostly *contrivance* and *management* in *concerting*; but there is not always *concerting* in *contrivance* or *management*. Measures are *concerted*; schemes are *contrived*; affairs are *managed*.

Two parties at least are requisite in *concerting*, one is sufficient for *contriving* and *managing*. *Concerting* is always employed in all secret transactions; *contrivance* and *management* are used indifferently.

Robbers who have determined on any scheme of plunder *concert* together the means of carrying their project into execution; they *contrive* various devices to elude the vigilance of the police; they *manage* every thing in the dark.

TO CONCILIATE. RECONCILE.

CONCILIATE, in Latin *conciliatus*, participle of *concilio*, and RECONCILE, in Latin *reconcilio*: both come from *concilium* a council, denoting unity and harmony.

Conciliate and *reconcile* are both employed in the sense of uniting men's affections, but under different circumstances.

The *conciliator* gets the good-will and affections for himself; the *reconciler* unites the affections of two persons to each other. The *conciliator* may either gain new affections, or regain those which are lost; the *reconciler* always either renews affections which have been once lost, or fixes them where they ought to be fixed. The best means of *conciliating* esteem is by *reconciling* all that are at variance.

Conciliate is mostly employed for men in public stations; *reconcile* is indifferently

employed for those in public or private stations. Men in power have sometimes the happy opportunity of *conciliating* the good-will of those who are most averse to their authority, and thus *reconciling* them to measures which would otherwise be odious.

Kindness and condescension serve to *conciliate*; a friendly influence, or a well timed exercise of authority, is often successfully exerted in *reconciling*.

CONCLUSION, INFERENCE, DEDUCTION.

CONCLUSION, from *conclude*, signifies the winding up of all arguments and reasoning.

INFERENCE, from *infer*, in Latin *infero*, signifies what is brought in.

DEDUCTION, from *deduct*, in Latin *deductus*, and *deduco* to bring out, signifies the bringing or drawing one thing from another.

A *conclusion* is full and decisive; an *inference* is partial and indecisive: a *conclusion* leaves the mind in no doubt or hesitation; it puts a stop to all farther reasoning: *inferences* are special *conclusions* from particular circumstances; they serve as links in the chain of reasoning. *Conclusions* are drawn from real facts; *inferences* are drawn from the appearances of things; *deductions* only from arguments or assertions.

Conclusions are practical; *inferences* ratiocinative; *deductions* are final. We *conclude* from a person's conduct or declarations what he intends to do, or leave undone; we *infer* from the appearance of the clouds, or the thickness of the atmosphere, that there will be a heavy fall of rain or snow: we *deduce* from a combination of facts, *inferences*, and assertions, that a story is fabricated.

CONCLUSIVE, DECISIVE, CONVINCING.

CONCLUSIVE applies either to practical or argumentative matters; **DECISIVE** to what is practical only; **CONVINCING** to what is argumentative only.

It is necessary to be *conclusive* when we deliberate, and *decisive* when we command. What is *conclusive* puts an end to all discussion, and determines the judgment: what is *decisive* puts an end to all wavering and determines the will. Negotiators have sometimes an interest in not speaking *conclusively*; commanders can never retain their authority without speaking *decisively*: *conclusive* when compared to *convincing* is general; the latter is particular: an argument is *convincing*; a chain of reasoning *conclusive*. There may be much that is

convincing, where there is nothing *conclusive*: a proof may be *convincing* of a particular circumstance; but *conclusive* evidence will bear upon the main question.

CONCORD, HARMONY.

CONCORD, in French *concorde*, Latin *concordia*, from *con* and *cors*, having the same heart and mind.

HARMONY, in French *harmonie*, Latin *harmonia*, Greek *αρμογια* from *αγω* to fit or suit, signifies the state of fitting or suiting.

The idea of union is common to both these terms, but under different circumstances. *Concord* is generally employed for the union of wills and affections; *harmony* respects the aptitude of minds to coalesce. There may be *concord* without *harmony*, and *harmony* without *concord*. Persons may live in *concord* who are at a distance from each other; but *harmony* is mostly employed for those who are in close connexion, and obliged to co-operate. *Concord* should never be broken by relations under any circumstances; *harmony* is indispensable in all members of a family that dwell together. Interest will sometimes stand in the way of brotherly *concord*; a love of rule, and a dogmatical temper, will sometimes disturb the *harmony* of a family. *Concord* is as essential to domestic happiness, as *harmony* is to the peace of society, and the uninterrupted prosecution of business. What *concord* can there be between kindred who despise each other? what *harmony* between the rash and the discreet?

CONDITION, STATION.

CONDITION, in French *condition*, Latin *conditio*, from *condo* to build or form, signifies properly the thing formed; and in an extended sense, the manner and circumstances under which a thing is formed.

STATION, in French *station*, Latin *statio*, from *sto* to stand, signifies a standing place or point.

Condition has most relation to the circumstances, education, birth, and the like; *station* refers rather to the rank, occupation, or mode of life which one pursues. Riches suddenly acquired are calculated to make a man forget his original *condition*; and to render him negligent of the duties of his *station*.

TO CONDUCE, CONTRIBUTE.

CONDUCE, Latin *conduco*, compounded of *con* and *duco*, signifies to bring together for one end

CONTRIBUTE, in Latin *contributus*,

participle of *contribuo*, compounded of *con* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow for the same end.

To *conduce* signifies to serve the full purpose; to *contribute* signifies only to be a subordinate instrument: the former is always taken in a good sense, the latter in a bad or good sense. Exercise *conduces* to the health; it *contributes* to give vigour to the frame.

Schemes of ambition never *conduce* to tranquillity of mind. A single failure may *contribute* sometimes to involve a person in perpetual trouble.

TO CONDUCT, MANAGE, DIRECT.

CONDUCT, in Latin *conductus*, participle of *conduco*, signifies to carry with a person, or make a thing go according to one's will.

MANAGE, *v. Care, charge.*

DIRECT, in Latin *directus*, participle of *dirigo*, compounded of *di* and *rego* to regulate distinctly, signifies to put every thing in its right place.

Conducting requires most wisdom and knowledge; *managing* most action; *direction* most authority. A lawyer *conducts* the cause intrusted to him; a steward *manages* the mercantile concerns for his employer; a superintendent *directs* the movements of all the subordinate agents.

Conducting is always applied to affairs of the first importance; *management* is a term of familiar use to characterize a familiar employment: *direction* makes up in authority what it wants in importance; it falls but little short of the word *conduct*. A *conductor* conceives and plans; a *manager* acts or executes; a *director* commands. It is necessary to *conduct* with wisdom; to *manage* with diligence and attention; to *direct* with promptitude, precision, and clearness. A minister of state requires peculiar talents to *conduct* with success the various and complicated concerns which are connected with his office: he must exercise much skill in *managing* the various characters and clashing interests with which he becomes connected: and possess much influence to *direct* the multiplied operations by which the grand machine of government is kept in motion.

CONFEDERATE, ACCOMPLICE.

CONFEDERATE, *v. Ally.*

ACCOMPLICE, *v. Abettor.*

Both these terms imply a partner in some proceeding, but they differ as to the nature of the proceeding: in the former case it may be lawful or unlawful; in the latter unlawful only. In this latter sense a *con-*

federate is a partner in a plot or secret association: an *accomplice* is a partner in some active violation of the laws. Guy Fawkes retained his resolution, till the last extremity, not to reveal the names of his *confederates*: it is the common refuge of all robbers and desperate characters to betray their *accomplices* in order to screen themselves from punishment.

TO CONFER, BESTOW.

CONFER, in French *conferer*, Latin *confero*, compounded of *con* and *fero*, signifies to bring something towards a person or place it upon him.

BESTOW, is compounded of *be* and *stow*, which, like the vulgar word *stroke*, comes from the German *stauen* and *stauchen*, and is an onomatopœia, or representative of the action intended to be expressed, namely, that of disposing in a place.

Conferring is an act of authority; *bestowing* that of charity or generosity. Princes and men in power *confer*; people in a private station *bestow*. Honours, dignities, privileges, and rank, are the things *conferred*; favours, kindnesses, and pecuniary relief, are the things *bestowed*.

Merit, favour, interest, caprice, or intrigue, give rise to *conferring*; necessity, solicitation, and private affection, lead to *bestowing*. England affords more than one instance in which the highest honours of the state have been *conferred* on persons of distinguished merit, though not of elevated birth: it is the characteristic of Christianity, that it inspires its followers with a desire of *bestowing* their goods on the poor and necessitous.

It is not easy to *confer* a favour on the unthankful: the value of a kindness is greatly enhanced by the manner in which it is *bestowed*.

TO CONFIDE, TRUST.

CONFIDE, in Latin *confido*, compounded of *con* and *fido* signifies to place a trust in a person.

TRUST, *v. Belief.*

Both these verbs express a reliance on the fidelity of another, but *confide* is to *trust* as the species to the genus; we always *trust* when we *confide*, but not *vice versa*. We *confide* to a person that which is of the greatest importance to ourselves; we *trust* to him whenever we rest on his word for any thing. We need rely only on a person's integrity when we *trust* to him, but we rely also on his abilities and mental qualifications when we place *confidence*; it is an extraordinary *trust*, founded on a powerful conviction in a person's favour.

Confidence frequently supposes something secret as well as personal; *trust* respects only the personal interest. A king *confides* in his ministers and generals for the due execution of his plans, and the administration of the laws; one friend *confides* in another when he discloses to him all his private concerns: a merchant *trusts* to his clerks when he employs them in his business; individuals *trust* each other with portions of their property.

A breach of *trust* evinces a want of that common principle which keeps human society together; but a breach of *confidence* betrays a more than ordinary share of baseness and depravity.

CONFIDENT, DOGMATICAL, POSITIVE.

CONFIDENT, from *confide* (v. *To confide*), marks the temper of *confiding* in one's self.

DOGMATICAL, from *dogma* a maxim or assertion, signifies the temper of dealing in unqualified assertions.

POSITIVE, in Latin *positivus*, from *positus*, signifies fixed to a point.

The first two of these words denote an habitual or permanent state of mind; the latter either a partial or an habitual temper. There is much of *confidence* in *dogmatism* and *positiveness*, but it expresses more than either. *Confidence* implies a general reliance on one's abilities in whatever we undertake; *dogmatism* implies a reliance on the truth of our opinions; *positivity* a reliance on the truth of our assertions. A *confident* man is always ready to act, as he is sure of succeeding; a *dogmatical* man is always ready to speak, as he is sure of being heard; a *positive* man is determined to maintain what he has asserted, as he is convinced that he has made no mistake.

Confidence is opposed to diffidence; *dogmatism* to scepticism; *positiveness* to hesitation. A *confident* man mostly fails for want of using the necessary means to ensure success; a *dogmatical* man is mostly in error, because he substitutes his own partial opinions for such as are established; a *positive* man is mostly deceived, because he trusts more to his own senses and memory than he ought.

CONFINEMENT, IMPRISONMENT, CAPTIVITY.

CONFINEMENT, v. *To bound, limit.*

IMPRISONMENT, compounded of *im* and *prison*, French *prison*, from *pris* participle of *prendre*, Latin *prehendo* to take, signifies the act or state of being taken or laid hold of.

CAPTIVITY, in French *captivité*, Latin *captivitas* from *capio*, to take, signifies likewise the state of being, or being kept in possession by another.

Confinement is the generic, the other two specific terms. *Confinement* and *imprisonment* both imply the abridgment of one's personal freedom, but the former specifies no cause, which the latter does. We may be *confined* in a room by ill health, or *confined* in any place by way of punishment; but we are never *imprisoned* but in some specific place appointed for the *confinement* of offenders, and always on some supposed offence. We are *captives* by the rights of war, when we fall into the hands of the enemy.

Confinement does not specify the degree or manner as the other terms do; it may even extend to the restricting the body of its free movements; while *imprisonment* simply *confines* the person within a certain extent of ground, or the walls of a *prison*; and *captivity* leaves a person at liberty to range within a whole country or district.

Confinement is so general a term, as to be applied to even inanimate objects; *imprisonment* and *captivity* are applied in the proper sense to persons only, but they admit of a figurative application. The *confinement* of plants within too narrow a space will stop their growth for want of air. There is many a poor *captive* in a cage who, like Sterne's starling, would say, if it could, "I want to get out."

TO CONFIRM, CORROBORATE.

CONFIRM, in French *confirmer*, Latin *confirmo*, which is compounded of *con* and *firmitas* or *firmitas*, signifying to make additionally *firm*.

CORROBORATE, in Latin *corroboratus*, participle of *corroboro*, compounded of *cor* or *con* and *roboro* to strengthen, signifies to add to the strength.

The idea of strengthening is common to these terms, but under different circumstances: *confirm* is used generally; *corroborate* only in particular instances.

What *confirms* serves to *confirm* the minds of others; what *corroborates* strengthens one's-self: a testimony may be *confirmed* or *corroborated*; but the thing *confirms*, the person *corroborates*: when the truth of a person's assertions are called in question, it is fortunate for him when circumstances present themselves that *confirm* the truth of what he has said, or if he have respectable friends to *corroborate* his testimony.

TO CONFIRM, ESTABLISH.

CONFIRM, *v.* To confirm, corroborate.

ESTABLISH, from the word *stable*, signifies to make stable or able to stand.

The idea of strengthening is common to these as to the former terms, but with a different application; *confirm* respects the state of a person's mind, and whatever acts upon the mind; *establish* is employed with regard to whatever is external: a report is *confirmed*; a reputation is *established*; a person is *confirmed* in the persuasion or belief of any truth or circumstance; a thing is *established* in the public estimation.

The mind seeks its own means of *confirming* itself; things are *established* either by time or authority: no person should be hasty in giving credit to reports that are not fully *confirmed*, nor in giving support to measures that are not *established* upon the surest grounds: a reciprocity of good offices serves to *confirm* an alliance, between nations; interests or reciprocal affection serves to *establish* an intercourse between individuals.

CONFLICT, COMBAT, CONTEST.

CONFLICT, in Latin *conflictus*, participle of *confligo*, compounded of *con* and *fligo*, in Greek *φλιγω*, Aeolic for *φλιβω* to flip or strike, signifies to strike against each other.

COMBAT, *v.* Battle.

CONTEST, in French *contester*, Latin *contestor*, compounded of *con* and *testor*, signifies to call or set witness against witness.

A striving for the superiority is the common characteristic of these terms, which is varied both in the manner and spirit of the action.

A *conflict* has more of violence in it than a *combat*, and a *combat* than a *contest*.

A *conflict* and *combat*, in the proper sense are always attended with a personal attack; *contest* consists mostly of a striving for some common object.

A *conflict* is mostly sanguinary and desperate, it arises from the undisciplined operations of the bad passions, animosity, and brutal rage; it seldom ends in any thing but destruction: a *combat* is often a matter of art and a trial of skill; it may be obstinate and lasting, though not arising from any personal resentment, and mostly terminates with the triumph of one party and the defeat of the other: a *contest* is interested and personal; it may often give rise to angry and even malignant sentiments, but is not necessarily associated with any bad passion: it ends in the advancement of one to the injury of the other.

The lion, the tiger, and other beasts

of the forest, have dreadful *conflicts* whenever they meet; which seldom terminate but in the death of one if not both of the antagonists: it would be well if the use of the word were confined to the irrational part of the creation; but there have been wars and party-broils among men, which have occasioned *conflicts* the most horrible and destructive that can be conceived.

That *combats* have been mere trials of skill is evinced by the *combats* in the ancient games of the Greeks and Romans, as also in the justs and tournaments of later date: but in the ordinary application of the term, it implies a set engagement between two or more particular individuals.

Contests are as various as the pursuits and wishes of men: whatever is an object of desire for two parties becomes the ground of a *contest*; ambition, interest, and party zeal are always busy in furnishing men with objects for a *contest*.

In a figurative sense these terms are applied to the movements of the mind, the elements or whatever seems to oppose itself to another thing, in which sense they preserve the same analogy: violent passions have their *conflicts*; ordinary desires their *combats*; motives their *contests*.

CONFORMABLE, AGREEABLE, SUITABLE.

CONFORMABLE signifies able to *conform* (*v.* To comply), that is, having a sameness of form.

AGREEABLE signifies the quality of being able to *agree* (*v.* To agree).

SUITABLE signifies able to *suit* (*v.* To agree).

Conformable is employed for matters of obligation; *agreeable* for matters of choice; *suitable* for matters of propriety and discretion. What is *conformable* accords with some prescribed form or rule of others: what is *agreeable* accords with the feelings, tempers, or judgments of ourselves or others: what is *suitable* accords with outward circumstances.

It is the business of those who act for others to act *conformably* to their directions; it is the part of a friend to act *agreeably* to the wishes of a friend; it is the part of every man to act *suitably* to his station.

The decisions of a judge must be strictly *conformable* to the letter of the law: he is seldom at liberty to consult his views of equity: the decision of a partisan is always *agreeable* to the temper of his party: the style of a writer should be *suitable* to his subject.

Conformable is oftenest employed for matters of temporary moment; *agreeable* and

suitable are mostly said of things which are of constant value: we make things *conformable* by an act of discretion; they are *agreeable* or *suitable* by their own nature; a treaty of peace is made *conformable* to the preliminaries; a legislator must take care to frame laws *agreeably* to the Divine law; it is of no small importance for every man to act *suitably* to the character he has assumed.

TO CONFOUND, TO CONFUSE.

CONFOUND and CONFUSE are both derived from different parts of the same verb, namely, *confundo* and its participle *confusus*, signifying to pour or mix together without design that which ought to be distinct.

Confound has an active sense; *confuse* a neuter or reflective sense; a person *confounds* one thing with another; objects become *confused*, or a person *confuses* himself: it is a common error among ignorant people to *confound* names, and among children to have their ideas *confused* on commencing a new study.

TO CONFRONT, FACE.

CONFRONT, from the Latin *frons* a forehead, implies to set *face to face*; and FACE, from the noun *face*, signifies to set the *face* towards any object.

The former of these terms is always employed for two or more persons with regard to each other: the latter for a single individual with regard to objects in general.

Witnesses are *confronted*; a person *faces* danger, or *faces* an enemy: when people give contrary evidence it is sometimes necessary, in extra-judicial matters, to *confront* them, in order to arrive at the truth; the best test which a man can give of his courage, is to evince his readiness for *facing* his enemy whenever the occasion requires.

CONFUSION, DISORDER.

CONFUSION signifies the state of being *confounded* or *confused* (v. *To confound*).

DISORDER, compounded of the privative *dis* and *order*, signifies the reverse of order.

Confusion is to *disorder* as the species to the genus: *confusion* supposes the absence of all order; *disorder* the derangement of order: there is always *disorder* in *confusion*, but not always *confusion* in *disorder*: a routed army, or a tumultuous mob, will be in *confusion* and will create *confusion*; a whisper or an ill-timed motion of an individual constitutes *disorder* in a school, or in an army that is drawn up.

TO CONFUTE, REFUTE, DISPROVE, OPPUGN.

CONFUTE and REFUTE, in Latin *confuto* and *refuto*, are compounded of *con* against, *re* privative, and *futo* obsolete for *arguo*, signifying to argue against or to argue the contrary.

DISPROVE, compounded of *dis* privative and *prove*, signifies to prove the contrary.

OPPUGN, in Latin *oppugno*, that is, to fight in order to remove or overthrow.

To *confute* respects what is argumentative; *refute* what is personal; *disprove* whatever is represented or related; *oppugn* what is held or maintained.

An argument is *confuted* by proving its fallacy; a charge is *refuted* by proving one's innocence; an assertion is *disproved* by proving that it is false; a doctrine is *oppugned* by a course of reasoning.

Paradoxes may be easily *confuted*; calumnies may be easily *refuted*; the marvellous and incredible stories of travellers may be easily *disproved*; heresies and sceptical notions ought to be *oppugned*.

CONJECTURE, SUPPOSITION, SURMISE.

CONJECTURE, in French *conjecture*, Latin *conjectura*, from *conjicio* or *con* and *jacio*, signifies the thing put together or framed in the mind without design or foundation.

SUPPOSITION, in French *supposition*, from *suppono*, compounded of *sub* and *pono*, signifies to put one's thoughts in the place of reality.

SURMISE, compounded of *sur* or *sub* and *mise*, Latin *missus*, participle of *mitto* to send or put forth, has the same original meaning as the former.

All these terms convey an idea of something in the mind independent of the reality; but *conjecture* is founded less on rational inference than *supposition*; and *surmise* less than either: any circumstance, however trivial, may give rise to a *conjecture*; some reasons are requisite to produce a *supposition*; a particular state of feeling or train of thinking may of itself create a *surmise*.

Although the same epithets are generally applicable to all these terms, yet we may with propriety say that a *conjecture* is idle; a *supposition* false; a *surmise* fanciful.

Conjectures are employed on events, their causes, consequences, and contingencies; *supposition* on speculative points; *surmise* on personal concerns. The secret measures of government give rise to various *conjectures*: all the *suppositions* which are formed

respecting comets seem at present to fall short of the truth: the behaviour of a person will often occasion a surmise respecting his intentions and proceedings, let them be ever so disguised.

CONJUNCTURE, CRISIS.

CONJUNCTURE, in Latin *conjunctura* and *conjungo* to join together, signifies the joining together of circumstances.

CRISIS, in Latin *crisis*, Greek *κρίσις* a judgment, signifies in an extended sense whatever decides or turns the scale.

Both these terms are employed to express a period of time marked by the state of affairs. A *conjuncture* is a joining or combination of corresponding circumstances tending towards the same end; a *crisis* is the high-wrought state of any affair which immediately precedes a change; a *conjuncture* may be favourable, a *crisis* alarming.

An able statesman seizes the *conjuncture* which promises to suit his purpose, for the introduction of a favourite measure: the abilities, firmness, and perseverance of Alfred the Great, at one important *crisis* of his reign saved England from destruction.

TO CONNECT, COMBINE, UNITE.

CONNECT, Latin *connecto*, compounded of *con* and *necto*, signifies to knit together.

COMBINE, *v. Association, combination.*

UNITE, *v. To add, join.*

The idea of being put together is common to these terms, but with different degrees of proximity. *Connected* is more remote than *combined*, and this than *united*. What is *connected* and *combined* remains distinct, but what is *united* loses all individuality. Things the most dissimilar may be *connected* or *combined*; things of the same kind only can be *united*.

Things or persons are *connected* more or less remotely by some common property or circumstance that serves as a tie; they are *combined* by a species of juncture; they are *united* by a coalition; houses are *connected* by means of a common passage; the armies of two nations are *combined*; two armies of the same nation are *united*.

Trade, marriage, or general intercourse, create a *connexion* between individuals; co-operation or similarity of tendency are grounds for *combination*; entire accordance leads to a *union*.

CONNECTED, RELATED.

CONNECTED, *v. To connect.*

RELATED, from *relate*, in Latin *relatus*, participle of *refero* to bring back signifies brought back to the same point.

These terms are employed in the moral sense, to express an affinity between subjects or matters of thought.

Connexion marks affinity in an indefinite manner; *relation* in a specific manner. A *connexion* may be either close or remote; a relation direct or indirect. What is *connected* has some common principle on which it depends; what is *related* has some likeness with the object to which it is *related*, it is a part of some whole.

TO CONQUER, VANQUISH, SUBDUE, OVERCOME, SURMOUNT.

CONQUER, in French *conquerir*, Latin *conquiro*, compounded of *con* and *quaero*, signifies to seek or try to gain an object.

VANQUISH is in French *vaincre*, Latin *vinco*, Greek (*per metathesis*) *νικω*, Hebrew *natzach*.

SUBDUE, Latin *subdo*, signifies to give or put under.

OVERCOME, compounded of *over* and *come*, signifies to come over or get the mastery over one.

SURMOUNT, in French *surmonter*, compounded of *sur* over and *monter* to mount, signifies to rise above any one.

Persons or things are *conquered* or *subdued*: persons only are *vanquished*. An enemy or a country is *conquered*; a foe is *vanquished*; people are *subdued*.

We *conquer* an enemy or a country by whatever means we gain the mastery.

The idea of something gained is most predominant. We *vanquish* an enemy, when by force we make him yield. We *subdue* an enemy by whatever means we check or destroy in him the spirit of resistance.

A Christian tries to *conquer* his enemies by kindness and generosity; a warrior tries to *vanquish* them in the field; a prudent monarch tries to *subdue* his rebellious subjects by a due mixture of clemency and rigour.

One may be *vanquished* in a single battle; one is *subdued* only by the most violent and persevering measures. William the First *conquered* England by *vanquishing* his rival Harold; after which he completely *subdued* the English.

Alexander having *vanquished* all the enemies that opposed him, and *subdued* all the nations with whom he warred, fancied that he had *conquered* the whole world, and is said to have wept at the idea that there were no more worlds to *conquer*. He himself was at last *vanquished* by the deadliest of foes; namely, drunkenness.

In an extended and moral application these terms are nearly allied to *overcome* and *sur-*

mount. That is *conquered* and *subdued* which is in the mind; that *overcome* and *surmounted* which is either internal or external. We *conquer* and *overcome* what makes no great resistance; we *subdue* and *surmount* what is violent and strong in its opposition: dislikes, attachments, and feelings in general, for or against, are *conquered*; unruly and tumultuous passions are to be *subdued*.

One *conquers* by ordinary means and efforts; one *subdues* by extraordinary means. Antipathies when cherished in early life, are not easily *conquered* in riper years: nothing but a prevailing sense of religion, and a perpetual fear of God, can ever *subdue* the rebellious wills and propensities of mankind.

It requires determination and force to *conquer* and *overcome*; patience and perseverance to *subdue* and *surmount*. Prejudices and prepossessions are *overcome*; obstacles and difficulties are *surmounted*: it too frequently happens that those who are eager to *overcome* their prejudices, in order to dispose themselves for the reception of new opinions, fall into greater errors than those they have abandoned. It is the characteristic of genius to *surmount* every difficulty: Alexander conceived that he could *overcome* nature herself, and Hannibal succeeded in this very point; there were scarcely any obstacles which he opposed to him that he did not *surmount* by prowess and perseverance.

Whoever aims at Christian perfection must strive, with God's assistance, to *conquer* avarice, pride, and every inordinate propensity; to *subdue* wrath, anger, lust, and every carnal appetite; to *overcome* temptations, and to *surmount* trials and impediments which obstruct his course.

To *conquer* and *overcome* may sometimes be indifferently applied to the same objects; but the former has always a reference to the thing gained, the latter to the resistance which is opposed; hence we talk of *conquering* a prejudice as far as we bring it under the power of the understanding; we *overcome* it as far as we successfully oppose its influence.

To *vanquish* in the moral application bears the same meaning as in the proper application, signifying to *overcome* in a struggle or combat: thus a person may be said to be *vanquished* by any ruling passion which gets the better of his conscience.

CONQUEROR, VICTOR.

These terms, though derived from the preceding verbs (*v. To conquer, vanquish*),

have, notwithstanding, characteristics peculiar to themselves.

A *conqueror* is always supposed to add something to his possessions; a *victor* gains nothing but the superiority: there is no *conquest* where there is not something gotten; there is no *victory* where there is no contest: all *conquerors* are not *victors*, nor all *victors* *conquerors*: those who take possession of other men's lands by force of arms make a *conquest*; those who excel in any trial of skill are the *victors*.

Monarchs when they wage a successful war are mostly *conquerors*; combatants who compel their adversaries to yield are *victors*.

CONSCIENTIOUS, SCRUPULOUS.

CONSCIENTIOUS, from *conscience*, marks the quality of having a nice conscience.

SCRUPULOUS, from *scruple*, signifies the quality of having scruples. *Scruple*, in Latin *scrupulus* a little hard stone, which in walking gives pain.

Conscientious is to *scrupulous* as a whole to a part. A *conscientious* man is so altogether; a *scrupulous* man may have only particular *scruples*: the one is therefore always taken in a good sense; and the other at least in an indifferent, if not a bad sense.

A *conscientious* man does nothing to offend his *conscience*; but a *scrupulous* man has often his *scruples* on trifling or minor points, the Pharisees were *scrupulous* without being *conscientious*: we must therefore strive to be *conscientious* without being over *scrupulous*.

TO CONSENT, PERMIT, ALLOW.

CONSENT, *v. To accede.*

PERMIT, in French *permettre*, Latin *permitto*, compounded of *per* and *mitto*, signifies to send or let go past.

ALLOW, *v. To admit, allow.*

The idea of determining the conduct of others by some authorized act of one's own is common to these terms, but under various circumstances. They express either the act of an equal or a superior.

As the act of an equal we *consent* to that in which we have an interest; we *permit* or *allow* what is for the accommodation of others: we *allow* by abstaining to oppose; we *permit* by a direct expression of our will; contracts are formed by the *consent* of the parties who are interested. The proprietor of an estate *permits* his friends to sport on his grounds; he *allows* of a passage through his premises. It is sometimes

prudent to *consent*; complaisant to *permit*; good-natured or weak to *allow*.

When applied to superiors, *consent* is an act of private authority; *permit* and *allow* are acts of private or public authority: in the first case, *consent* respects matters of serious importance; *permit* and *allow* regard those of an indifferent nature: a parent *consents* to the establishment of his children; he *permits* them to read certain books; he *allows* them to converse with him familiarly. The law *permits* or *allows*; or the person who is authorized *permits* or *allows*. *Permit* in this case retains its positive sense; *allow* its negative sense, as before. Government *permits* individuals to fit out privateers in time of war: when magistrates are not vigilant, many things will be done which are not *allowed*.

CONSEQUENCE, RESULT.

CONSEQUENCE, in French *consequence*, Latin *consequentia*, from *consequor* to follow, signifies that which follows in connexion with something else.

RESULT, in French *resulte*, Latin *resulto*, or *resultus* and *resilio* to rebound, signifies that which springs or bounds back from another thing.

Consequences flow of themselves from the nature of things: *results* are drawn. *Consequences* proceed from actions in general; *results* proceed from particular efforts and attempts. *Consequences* are good or bad; *results* are successful or unsuccessful.

We endeavour to avert *consequences* which threaten to be bad; we endeavour to produce *results* that are according to our wishes. Not to foresee the *consequences* which are foreseen by others, evinces a more than ordinary share of indiscretion and infatuation. To calculate on a favourable *result* from an ill-judged and ill-executed enterprise, only proves a consistent blindness in the projector.

TO CONSIDER, TO REFLECT.

CONSIDER, in French *considerer*, Latin *considero*, a factative, from *consido* to sit down, signifies to make to settle.

REFLECT, in Latin *reflecto*, compounded of *re* and *flecto* signifies to turn back or upon itself.

The operation of thought is expressed by these two words, but it varies in the circumstances of the action.

Consideration is employed for practical purposes; *reflection* for matters of speculation or moral improvement. Common objects call for *consideration*; the workings of the mind itself, or objects purely spiritual, occupy *reflection*. It is necessary to

consider what is proper to be done, before we take any step; it is consistent with our natures, as rational beings, to *reflect* on what we are, what we ought to be, and what we shall be.

Without *consideration* we shall naturally commit the most flagrant errors; without *reflection* we shall never understand our duty to our Maker, our neighbour, and ourselves.

TO CONSIDER, REGARD.

CONSIDER, v. *To consider, reflect.*

REGARD, v. *Care, concern.*

There is most caution in *considering*; most attention in *regarding*.

Circumstances, situation, advantages, disadvantages, and the like, are objects of *consideration*; personal character, abilities, and qualities, are objects of *regard*. A want of *consideration* leads a person to form a very unfair judgment of others; a want of *regard* makes him *regardless* of their comfort, convenience, and respectability. We ought to have a *consideration* for all who are in our service, not to demand more of them than what we may reasonably expect; we ought at all times to have a *regard* for our own credit and respectability, among those who are witnesses of our conduct.

CONSIDERATION, REASON.

CONSIDERATION, signifies the thing considered (v. *To consider, reflect*).

REASON, v. *Cause, reason.*

Considerations influence actions; they are a species of motives; *reason* determines our belief or our conduct. *Considerations* are restrictive or negative; *reasons* are positive. We may have powerful *considerations* for forbearing to act, and powerful *reasons* for adopting one line of conduct in preference to another.

Considerations are almost always personal, affecting either our own interest or that of others; *reasons* are general, and vary according to the nature of the subject. No *consideration* of profit or advantage should induce a person to forfeit his word. The *reasons* which men assign for their conduct are often as absurd as they are false.

TO CONSIGN, COMMIT, ENTRUST.

CONSIGN, in French *consigner*, Latin *consigno*, compounded of *con* and *signo*, signifies to seal for a specific purpose, also to deposit.

COMMIT, in French *commettre*, Latin *committo*, compounded of *com* and *mitto* to put together, signifies to put into a person's hands.

ENTRUST, compounded of *en* and *trust*, signifies to put in trust.

The idea of transferring from one's self to the care of another is common to these terms. What is *consigned* is either given absolutely away from one's self, or only conditionally for one's own purpose; what is *committed* or *entrusted* is given conditionally. A person *consigns* his property over to another by a deed in law; a merchant *consigns* his goods to another, to dispose of them for his advantage; he *commits* the management of his business to his clerks, and *entrusts* them with the care of his property.

Consign expresses a more positive measure than *commit*, and *commit* than *entrust*. A parent does most wisely to *consign* the whole management of his child's education to one individual, in whom he can confide; if he *commit* it in part only to any one's care, the deficiency in the charge is likely to remain unsupplied; in infancy children must be more or less *entrusted* to the care of servants, but prudent parents will diminish the frequency of these occasions as much as possible.

Papers are *consigned* to an editor of a work for his selection and arrangement. The inspection of any public work is *committed* to proper officers. A person is *entrusted* with a secret.

Consign and *commit* are used in a figurative sense. A thing is *consigned* to destruction, or *committed* to the flames. Death *consigns* many to an untimely grave; a writer *commits* his thoughts to paper.

TO CONSOLE, SOLACE, COMFORT.

CONSOLE and SOLACE are derived from the same source, in French *consoler*, Latin *consolor* and *solatium*, possibly from *solum* the ground, which nourishes all things.

COMFORT, *v.* Comfort.

Console and *solace* denote the relieving of pain; *comfort* marks the communication of positive pleasure. We *console* others with words; we *console* or *solace* ourselves with reflections; we *comfort* by words or deeds. *Console* is used on more important occasions than *solace*. We *console* our friends when they meet with afflictions; we *solace* ourselves when we meet with disasters; we *comfort* those who stand in need of comfort.

The greatest consolation which we can enjoy on the death of our friends is derived from the hope that they have exchanged a state of imperfection and sorrow for one that is full of pure and unmixed felicity. It is no small *solace* to us in the midst of all our

troubles, to consider that they might have been worse. The *comforts* which a person enjoys may be considerably enhanced by the comparison with what he has formerly suffered.

CONSONANT, ACCORDANT, CONSISTENT.

CONSONANT, from the Latin *consonans*, participle of *con* and *sono* to sound together, signifies to sound, or be, in unison or harmony.

ACCORDANT, from *accord* (*v.* To agree), signifies the quality of according.

CONSISTENT, from the Latin *consistens*, participle of *consisto*, or *con* and *sisto* to place together, signifies the quality of being able to stand in unison together.

Consonant is employed in matters of representation; *accordant* in matters of opinion or sentiment; *consistent* in matters of conduct. A particular passage is *consonant* with the whole tenor of the Scriptures; a particular account is *accordant* with all one hears and sees on a subject: a person's conduct is not always *consistent* with his station.

Consonant is opposed to *dissonant*; *accordant* to *discordant*; *consistent* to *inconsistent*. *Consonance* is not so positive a thing as either *accordance* or *consistency*, which respect real events, circumstances, and actions. *Consonance* mostly serves to prove the truth of any thing, but *dissonance* does not prove its falsehood until it amounts to direct *discordance* or *inconsistency*. There is a *dissonance* in the accounts given by the four Evangelists of our Saviour, which serves to prove the absence of all collusion and imposture, since there is neither *discordance* nor *inconsistency* in what they have related or omitted.

CONSTANCY, STABILITY, STEADINESS, FIRMNESS.

CONSTANCY, in French *constance*, Latin *constantia*, from *constans* and *consto*, compounded of *con* and *sto* to stand by or close to a thing, signifies the quality of adhering to the thing that has been once chosen.

STABILITY, in French *stabilité*, Latin *stabilitas*, from *stabilis* and *sto* to stand, signifies the quality of being able to stand.

STEADINESS: from *steady* or *staid*, Saxon *stetig*, high German *stätig*. Greek *σταθός*, *σταθεῖς*, and *ιστημι* to stand, signifies a capacity for standing.

FIRMNESS, from *firme*, in French *ferme*, Latin *firmus*, comes from *fero* to bear, signifying the quality of bearing, upholding, or keeping.

Constancy respects the affections; *stability* the opinions; *steadiness* the action or the motives of action; *firmness* the purpose or resolution.

Without *constancy* there is neither love, friendship, nor virtue in the world. With God there is no variableness, with man there is no *stability*. Virtue and vice divide the empire of his mind, and wisdom and folly alternately rule him. A manly *steadiness* of conduct is the object we should always keep in view. A corrupted and guilty man can possess no true *firmness* of heart.

Constancy is opposed to fickleness; *stability* to changeableness; *steadiness* to flightiness; *firmness* to pliancy.

TO CONSTITUTE, APPOINT, DEPUTE.

CONSTITUTE, in Latin *constitutus*, participle of *constituo*, that is *con* and *statuo* to place together, signifies here to put or place for a specific purpose.

APPOINT, v. *To appoint*.

DEPUTE, in French *deputer*, Latin *deputo*, compounded of *de* and *puto* to esteem or assign, signifies to assign a certain office to a person.

The act of choosing some person or persons, for an office, is comprehended under all these terms: *constitute* is a more solemn act than *appoint*, and this than *depute*: to *constitute* is the act of a body; to *appoint* and *depute*, either of a body or an individual: a community *constitutes* any one their leader; a monarch *appoints* his ministers; an assembly *deputes* some of its members.

To *constitute* implies the act of making as well as choosing; the office as well as the person is new: in *appointing*, the person but not the office is new. A person may be *constituted* arbiter or judge as circumstances may require; a successor is *appointed* but not *constituted*.

Whoever is *constituted* is invested with supreme authority derived from the highest sources of human power, common consent; whoever is *appointed* derives his authority from the authority of others, and has consequently but limited power: no individual can *appoint* another with authority equal to his own: whoever is *deputed* has private and not public authority; his office is partial, often confined to the particular transaction of an individual, or a body of individuals. According to the Romish religion, the Pope is *constituted* supreme head of the Christian church throughout the whole world; governors are *appointed* to distant provinces; persons are *deputed* to present petitions or make representations to government.

CONSTRAINT, COMPULSION.

CONSTRAINT, from *constrain*, Latin *constringo*, compounded of *con* and *stringo*, signifies the act of straining or tying together.

COMPULSION signifies the act of compelling (v. *To compel*).

There is much of binding in *constraint*; of violence in *compulsion*: *constraint* prevents from acting agreeably to the will; *compulsion* forces to act contrary to the will: a soldier in the ranks moves with much *constraint*, and is often subject to much *compulsion* to make him move as is desired. *Constraint* may arise from outward circumstances; *compulsion* is always produced by some active agent: the forms of civil society lay a proper *constraint* upon the behaviour of men so as to render them agreeable to each other; the arm of the civil power must ever be ready to *compel* those who will not submit without *compulsion*: in the moments of relaxation, the actions of children should be as free from *constraint* as possible, which is one means of lessening the necessity for *compulsion* when they are called to the performance of their duty.

CONSTRAINT, RESTRAINT.

CONSTRAINT, v. *Constraint*, *compulsion*.

RESTRAINT, v. *To coerce*, *restrain*.

Constraint respects the movements of the body only; *restraint* those of the mind, and the outward actions: when they both refer to the outward actions, we say a person's behaviour is *constrained*; his feelings are *restrained*: he is *constrained* to act or not to act, or to act in a certain manner; he is *restrained* from acting at all, if not from feeling: the conduct is *constrained* by certain prescribed rules, by discipline and order; it is *restrained* by particular motives: whoever learns a mechanical exercise is *constrained* to move his body in a certain direction; the fear of detection often *restrains* persons from the commission of vices more than any sense of their enormity.

TO CONSULT, DELIBERATE.

CONSULT, in French *consulter*, Latin *consulto*, is a frequentative of *consulo*, signifying to counsel together (v. *Advice*, *counsel*).

DELIBERATE, in French *deliberer*, Latin *delibero*, compounded of *de* and *libro* or *libra* a balance, signifies to weigh as in a balance.

Consultations always require two persons

at least; *deliberations* require many, or only a man's self: an individual may *consult* with one or many; assemblies commonly *deliberate*: advice and information are given and received in *consultations*; doubts, difficulties, and objections, are started and removed in *deliberations*.

We communicate and hear when we *consult*; we pause and hesitate when we *deliberate*: those who have to co-operate must frequently *consult* together; those who have serious measures to decide upon must coolly *deliberate*.

TO CONSUME, DESTROY, WASTE.

CONSUME, in French *consumer*, Latin *consumo*, compounded of *con* and *sumo*, signifies to take away altogether.

DESTROY, in Latin *destruo*, compounded of *de* privative and *struo* to build, signifies to undo or scatter that which has been raised.

WASTE, from the adjective *waste* or *desert*, signifies to make waste or naked.

The idea of bringing that to nothing which has been something is common to all these terms.

What is *consumed* is lost for any future purpose; what is *destroyed* is rendered unfit for any purpose whatever: *consume* may therefore be to *destroy* as the means to the end; things are often *destroyed* by being *consumed*: when food is *consumed* it serves the intended purpose; but when it is *destroyed* it serves no purpose, and is likewise unfit for any.

When iron is *consumed* by rust, or the body by disease, or a house by the flames, the things in these cases are literally *destroyed* by *consumption*: on the other hand when life or health is taken away, and when things are either worn or torn so as to be useless, they are *destroyed*.

In the figurative signification *consume* is synonymous with *waste*: the former implies a reducing to nothing; the latter conveys also the idea of misuse: to *waste* is to *consume* uselessly: much time is *consumed* in complaining, which might be employed in remedying the evils complained of; idlers *waste* their time because they do not properly estimate its value.

CONSUMMATION, COMPLETION.

CONSUMMATION, Latin *consummatio*, compounded of *con* and *summa* the sum, signifies the summing or winding up of the whole—the putting a final period to any concern.

COMPLETION signifies either the act

of completing or the state of being completed (v. *To complete*).

The arrival at a conclusion is comprehended in both these terms, but they differ principally in application; wishes are *consummated*; plans are *completed*: we often flatter ourselves that the *completion* of all our plans will be the *consummation* of all our wishes, and thus expose ourselves to grievous disappointments: the *consummation* of the nuptial ceremony is not always the *consummation* of hopes and joys; it is frequently the beginning of misery and disappointment.

As epithets, *consummate* is employed only in a bad sense, and *complete* either in a good or bad sense: those who are regarded as *complete* fools are not unfrequently *consummate* knaves: the theatre is not the only place for witnessing a farce; human life affords many of various descriptions; among the number of which we may reckon those as *complete* in their kind, which are acted at elections, where *consummate* folly and *consummate* hypocrisy are practised by turns.

CONTACT, TOUCH.

CONTACT, in Latin *contactus*, participle of *contingo*, compounded of *con* and *tango*, to touch together, is distinguished from the simple word TOUCH, not so much in sense as in grammatical construction; the former expressing a state, and referring to two bodies actually in that state; the latter on the other hand implying the abstract act of *touching*: we speak of things coming or being in *contact*, but not of the *contact* instead of the *touch* of a thing: the poison which comes from the poison-tree is so powerful in its nature, that it is not necessary to come in *contact* with it in order, to feel its baneful influence; some insects are armed with stings so inconceivably sharp, that the smallest *touch* is sufficient to penetrate into the flesh.

CONTAGION, INFECTION.

Both these terms imply the power of communicating something bad, but CONTAGION, from the Latin verb *contingo* to come in contact, proceeds from a simple touch; and INFECTION, from the Latin verb *inficio* or *in* and *facio* to put in, proceeds by receiving something inwardly, or having it infused.

Some things act more properly by *contagion*, others by *infection*: the more powerful diseases, as the plague or yellow fever, are communicated by *contagion*, they are therefore denominated *contagious*; the

less virulent disorders, as fevers, consumptions, and the like, are termed *infectious*, as they are communicated by the less rapid process of *infection*: the air is *contagious* or *infectious* according to the same rule of distinction: when heavily overcharged with noxious vapours and deadly diseases, it is justly entitled *contagious*, but in ordinary cases *infectious*. In the figurative sense, vice is for the same obvious reason termed *contagious*; and bad principles are denominated *infectious*: some young people, who are fortunate enough to shun the *contagion* of bad society, are, perhaps, caught by the *infection* of bad principles, acting as a slow poison on the moral constitution.

CONTAGIOUS, EPIDEMICAL, PESTILENTIAL.

CONTAGIOUS signifies having *contagion* (v. *Contagion*).

EPIDEMICAL, in Latin *epidemicus*, Greek *ἐπιδημικός*, that is *ἐπι* and *δημος*, among the people, signifies universally spread.

PESTILENTIAL, from the Latin *pestis* the plague, signifies having the plague, or a similar disorder.

Contagious applies to that which is capable of being caught, and ought not, therefore to be touched; *epidemic* to that which is already caught or circulated, and requires, therefore, to be stopped; *pestilential* to that which may breed an evil, and is, therefore, to be removed: diseases are *contagious* or *epidemic*; the air or breath is *pestilential*.

They may all be applied morally or figuratively in the same sense.

We endeavour to shun a *contagious* disorder, that it may not come near us; we endeavour to purify a *pestilential* air, that it may not be inhaled to our injury; we endeavour to provide against *epidemic* disorders, that they may not spread any farther.

Vicious example is *contagious*; certain follies or vices of fashion are *epidemic* in almost every age; the breath of infidelity is *pestilential*.

TO CONTAIN, HOLD.

CONTAIN, v. *To comprise*.

HOLD, in Saxon *healdan*, low German *holden*, *holle*, Danish *holde*, German *halten*, which is most probably connected with *haben* to have.

These terms agree in sense, but differ in application; the former is by comparison noble, the latter is ignoble in its use: *hold* is employed only for the material contents of hollow bodies; *contain* is employed for moral or spiritual contents; in familiar dis-

course a cask is said to *hold*, but in more polished language it is said to *contain* a certain number of gallons.

A coach *holds* or *contains* a given number of persons; a room *holds* a given quantity of furniture; a house or city *contains* its inhabitants.

TO CONTAMINATE, DEFILE, POLLUTE, TAINT, CORRUPT.

CONTAMINATE, in Latin *contaminatus*, participle of *contamino*, comes from the Hebrew *tamah* to pollute.

DEFILE, compounded of *de* and *file* or *vile*, signifies to make vile.

POLLUTE, in Latin *pollutus*, participle of *polluo*, compounded of *per* and *luo* or *lavo* to wash or dye, signifies to infuse thoroughly.

TAINT, in French *teint*, participle of *teindre*, in Latin *tingo* to dye or stain.

CORRUPT, in Latin *corruptus*, participle of *corrumpo*, compounded of *con* and *rumpo*, signifies to break to pieces.

Contaminate is not so strong an expression as *defile* or *pollute*; but it is stronger than *taint*; these terms are used in the sense of injuring purity: *corrupt* has the idea of destroying it. Whatever is impure *contaminates*; what is gross and vile in the natural sense *defiles*, and in the moral sense *pollutes*; what is contagious or infectious *corrupts*; and what is *corrupted* may *taint* other things. Improper conversation or reading *contaminates* the mind of youth; lewdness and obscenity *defile* the body and *pollute* the mind; loose company *corrupts* the morals; the coming in contact with a *corrupted* body is sufficient to give a *taint*.

TO CONTEMN, DESPISE, SCORN, DISDAIN.

CONTEMN, in Latin *contemno*, compounded of *con* and *temno*, is probably changed from *tamino*, and the Hebrew *tamah* to pollute or render worthless, which is the cause of *contempt*.

DESPISE, in Latin *despicio*, compounded of *de* and *specio*, signifies to look down upon, which is a strong mark of *contempt*.

SCORN, varied from our word *shorn*, signifies stripped of all honours and exposed to derision, which situation is the cause of *scorn*.

DISDAIN, compounded of *dis* privative and *dain* or *deign* to think worthy, signifies to hold altogether unworthy.

The above elucidations sufficiently evince the feeling towards others which gives birth to all those actions. But the feeling of *contempt* is not quite so strong as that of *de-*

spising, nor that of *despising* so strong as those of *scorning* and *disdaining*; the latter of which expresses the strongest sentiment of all. Persons are *contemned* for their moral qualities; they are *despised* on account of their outward circumstances, their characters, or their endowments. Superiors may be *contemned*; inferiors only, real or supposed, are *despised*. Persons are not *scorned* or *disdained*, but they may be treated with *scorn* or *disdain*; they are both improper expressions of *contempt* or *despise*; *scorn* marks the sentiment of a little vain mind; *disdain* of a haughty and perverted one. A beautiful woman looks with *scorn* on her whom she *despises* for the want of this natural gift. The wealthy man treats with *disdain* him whom he *despises* for his poverty. There is nothing excites the *contempt* of mankind so powerfully as a mixture of pride and meanness; a moment's reflection will teach us the folly and wickedness of *despising* another for that to which by the will of Providence we may the next moment be exposed ourselves; there are silly persons who will *scorn* to be seen in the company of such as have not an equal share of finery; and there are weak upstarts of fortune, who *disdain* to look at those who cannot measure purses with themselves.

In speaking of things independently of others, or as immediately connected with ourselves, all these terms may be sometimes employed in a good or an indifferent sense.

When we *contemn* a mean action, and *scorn* to conceal by falsehood what we are called upon to acknowledge, we act the part of the gentleman as well as the Christian: there are many who affect to *despise* small favours as not reaching their fancied deserts, and others who *disdain* to receive any favour at all, from mistaken ideas of dependance and obligation.

TO CONTEMPLATE, MEDITATE, MUSE.

CONTEMPLATE, in Latin *contemplatus*, participle of *contemplor*, probably comes from *templum* a temple, as a place most fitted for contemplation.

MEDITATE, in Latin *meditatus*, participle of *meditor*, is probably changed from *melitor*, in Greek *μελιταω* to modulate or attune the thoughts, as sounds are harmonised.

MUSE is derived from *musa*, owing to the connexion between the harmony of a song and the harmony of the thoughts in *musings*.

Different species of reflection are marked by these terms.

We *contemplate* what is present or before

our eyes: we *meditate* on what is past or absent.

The heavens and all the works of the Creator are objects of *contemplation*; the ways of Providence are fit subjects for *meditation*. One *muses* on events or circumstances which have been just passing.

We may *contemplate* and *meditate* for the future, but never *muse*. In this case the two former terms have the sense of contriving or purposing: what is *contemplated* to be done is thought of more indistinctly than when it is *meditated* to be done; many things are had in *contemplation* which are never seriously *meditated* upon: between *contemplating* and *meditating* there is oftener a greater distance than between *meditating* and *executing*.

Contemplating may be a temporary action directed to a single object. *Meditating* is a permanent and serious action; it is a religious duty, and cannot be neglected without injury to a person's spiritual improvement. *Musing* is partial and unimportant; it is a temporary employment of the mind on the ordinary concerns of life, as they happen to excite an interest for the time.

Contemplative and *musings*, as epithets, have a strong analogy to each other.

Contemplative is a habit of the mind; *musings* is a particular state of the mind. A person may have a *contemplative* turn, or be in a *musings* mood.

CONTEMPTIBLE, CONTEMPTUOUS.

These terms are very frequently, though very erroneously, confounded in common discourse.

CONTEMPTIBLE is applied to the thing deserving *contempt*; CONTEMPTUOUS to that which is expressive of *contempt*. Persons, or what is done by persons, may be either *contemptible* or *contemptuous*; but other things only *contemptible*.

A production is *contemptible*; a sneer or look is *contemptuous*.

CONTEMPTIBLE, DESPICABLE, PITIFUL.

CONTEMPTIBLE is not so strong as DESPICABLE or PITIFUL.

A person may be *contemptible* for his vanity or weakness; but he is *despicable* for his servility and baseness of character; he is *pitiful* for his want of manliness and becoming spirit. A lie is at all times *contemptible*; it is *despicable* when it is told for purposes of gain or private interest; it is *pitiful* when accompanied with indications of unmanly fear. It is *contemptible* for a man in a superior station to borrow of his infe-

riors; it is *despicable* in him to forfeit his word; it is *pitiful* in him to attempt to conceal any thing by artifice.

CONTEMPTUOUS, SCORNFUL, DISDAINFUL.

These epithets rise in sense by a regular gradation.

CONTEMPTUOUS is general, and applied to whatever can express *contempt*: SCORNFUL and DISDAINFUL are particular; they apply only to outward marks: one is *contemptuous* who is *scornful* or *disdainful*, but not *vice versa*.

Words, actions, and looks are *contemptuous*; looks, sneers, and gestures are *scornful* and *disdainful*.

Contemptuous expressions are always unjustifiable; whatever may be the *contempt* which a person's conduct deserves, it is unbecoming in another to give him any indications of the sentiment he feels. *Scornful* and *disdainful* smiles are resorted to by the weakest or the worst of mankind.

TO CONTEND, STRIVE, VIE.

CONTEND, in Latin *contendo*, compounded of *con* or *contra* and *tendo*, to bend one's steps, signifies to exert one's self against any thing.

STRIVE is in Dutch *streven*, low German *strevan*, high German *streben*, and probably a frequentative of the Latin *strepo* to make a bustle.

VIE is probably changed from *view*, signifying to look at with the desire of excelling.

Contending requires two parties; *strive* either one or two. There is no *contending* where there is not an opposition; but a person may *strive* by himself.

Contend and *strive* differ in the object as well as the mode: we *contend* for a prize: we *strive* for the mastery: we may *contend* verbally; but we never *strive* without an actual effort, and labour more or less severe. We may *contend* with a person at a distance; but *striving* requires the opponent, when there is one, to be present. Opponents in matters of opinion *contend* for what they conceive to be the truth; sometimes they *contend* for trifles; combatants *strive* to overcome their adversaries, either by dint of superior skill or strength.

Contend is frequently used in a figurative sense, in application to things: *strive* very seldom. We *contend* with difficulties; and in a spiritual meaning, we may be said to *strive* with the spirit.

Vie has more of *striving* than *contending* in it; we *strive* to excel when we *vie*,

but we do not *strive* with any one; there is no personal collision or opposition: those we *vie* with may be as ignorant of our persons as our intentions. *Vying* is an act of no moment, but *contending* and *striving* are always serious actions: neighbours often *vie* with each other in the finery and grandeur of their house, dress, and equipage.

TO CONTEND, CONTEST, DISPUTE.

CONTEND, *v.* To contend, strive.

CONTEST, *v.* Combat, conflict.

DISPUTE, in Latin *disputo*, compounded of *dis* and *puto*, signifies to think different ways.

Contend is to *contest* as the genus to the species. To *contest* is a species of *contending*; we cannot *contest* without *contending*, although we may *contend* without *contesting*. To *contend* is frequently confined to the idea of setting one's-self up against another; *contest* and *dispute* must include some object *contested* or *disputed*. *Contend* is applied to all matters, either of personal interest or speculative opinion; *contest* always to the former; *dispute* mostly to the latter. Individuals or distinct bodies *contend*; nations *contest*. During the late long and eventful *contest* between England and France, the English *contended* with their enemies as successfully by land as by sea. Trifling matters may give rise to *contending*; serious points only are *contested*. *Contentions* are always conducted personally, and in general verbally: *contests* are carried on in different manners according to the nature of the object. The parties themselves mostly decide *contentions*; but *contested* matters mostly depend upon others to decide.

For want of an accommodating temper, men are frequently *contending* with each other about little points of convenience, advantage, or privilege, which they ought by mutual consent to share, or voluntarily to resign; when seats in parliament or other posts of honour are to be obtained by suffrages, rival candidates *contest* their claims to public approbation.

When we assert the right, and support this assertion with reasons, we *contend* for it; but we do not *contest* until we take serious measures to obtain what we *contend* for.

Contend is to *dispute* as a part to the whole: two parties *dispute* conjointly; they *contend* individually. Each *contends* for his own opinion, which constitutes the *dispute*. Theological *disputants* often *contend* with more warmth than discretion for their favourite hypothesis. With regard to claims, it is possible to *dispute* the claim of another without *contending* for it for ourselves.

Prizes may be either *contended* for or *disputed*, but the latter is the higher expression suited to poetry.

CONTENTION, STRIFE.

Though derived from the preceding verbs (*v. To contend, strive*), have a distinct meaning in which they are analogous. The idea common to them is that of opposing one's self to another with an angry humour.

CONTENTION is mostly occasioned by the desire of seeking one's own. STRIFE springs from a quarrelsome temper. Greedy and envious people deal in *contention*, the former because they are fearful lest they should not get enough; the latter because they are fearful lest others should get too much. Where bad tempers that are under no control come in frequent collision, perpetual *strife* will be the consequence.

CONTENTMENT, SATISFACTION.

CONTENTMENT, in French *contentment*, from *content*, in Latin *contentus*, participle of *contineo* to contain or hold, signifies the keeping one's self to a thing.

SATISFACTION, in Latin *satisfactio*, compounded of *satis* and *facio*, signifies the making or having enough.

Contentment lies in ourselves: *satisfaction* is derived from external objects.

One is *contented* when one wishes for no more; one is *satisfied* when one has obtained what one wishes.

The *contented* man has always enough; the *satisfied* man receives enough.

The *contented* man will not be *dissatisfied*; but he who looks for *satisfaction* will never be *contented*. *Contentment* is the absence of pain; *satisfaction* is positive pleasure. *Contentment* is accompanied with the enjoyment of what one has; *satisfaction* is often quickly followed with the alloy of wanting more. A *contented* man can never be miserable; a *satisfied* man can scarcely be long happy. *Contentment* is a permanent and habitual state of mind; it is the restriction of all our thoughts, views, and desires, within the compass of present possession and enjoyment: *satisfaction* is a partial and turbulent state of the feelings, which awakens rather than deadens desire. Our duty bids us be *contented*; our desires ask to be *satisfied*; but our duty is associated with our happiness; our desires are the sources of our misery.

CONTINUAL, PERPETUAL, CONSTANT.

CONTINUAL, in French *continuel*, La-

tin *continuus*, from *contineo* to hold or keep together, signifies keeping together without intermission.

PERPETUAL, in French *perpetuel*, Latin *perpetualis*, from *perpeto*, compounded of *per* and *peto* to seek thoroughly, signifies going on every where and at all times.

CONSTANT, *v. Constancy*.

What is *continual* admits of no interruption: what is *perpetual* admits of no termination. There may be an end to that which is *continual*, and there may be intervals in that which is *perpetual*. Rains are *continual* in the tropical climates at certain seasons; complaints among the lower orders are *perpetual*, but they are frequently without foundation. There is a *continual* passing and repassing in the streets of the metropolis during the day; the world, and all that it contains, are subject to *perpetual* change.

Constant, like *continual*, admits of no interruption; but it may cease altogether. *Continual* respects the outward circumstances and events; *constant* the temper of mind. To an intelligent parent it is a *continual* source of pleasure to watch the progress of his child in the acquirement of knowledge, and the developement of his faculties; it will likewise be his *constant* endeavour to train him up in principles of religion and virtue, while he is cultivating his talents, and storing his mind with science.

CONTINUAL, CONTINUED.

CONTINUAL, CONTINUED, *v. Continual*.

Both these terms mark length of duration, but the former admits of a certain degree of interruption, which the latter does not. What is *continual* may have frequent pauses; what is *continued* ceases only to terminate. Rains are *continual*; noises in a tumultuous street are *continued*: the bass in music is said to be *continued*; the mirth of a drunken party is one *continued* noise. *Continual* interruptions abate the vigour of application and create disgust: * in countries situated near the poles, there is one *continued* darkness for the space of five or six months; during which time the inhabitants are obliged to leave the place.

Continual respects the duration of actions only; *continued* is likewise applied to the extent or course of things: rumours are *continual*; talking, walking, running, and the like, is *continued*; but a line, a series, a scene, or a stream of water, is *continued*.

* Vide Trusler: „Continual, continued.“

CONTINUANCE, CONTINUATION,
DURATION.

CONTINUANCE is said only of the time that a thing *continues* (v. *To continue*).

CONTINUATION expresses the act of *continuing* what has been begun. The *continuance* of any particular practice may be attended with serious consequences. The *continuation* of a work depends on the abilities and will of the workman.

Continuance and *duration* are both employed for time; things may be of long *continuance*, or of long *duration*: but *continuance* is used only with regard to the conduct of men; *duration* with regard to the existence of every thing. Whatever is occasionally done, and soon to be ended, is not for a *continuance*; whatever is made, and soon destroyed, is not of long *duration*; there are many excellent institutions in England which promise to be of no less *continuance* than of utility. *Duration* is with us a relative term; things are of long or short *duration*: by comparison, the *duration* of the world and all sublunary objects is nothing in regard to eternity.

CONTINUATION, CONTINUITY.

CONTINUATION, as may be seen above (v. *Continuance*), is the act of *continuing*; *continuity* is the quality of *continuing*: the former is employed in the figurative sense for the duration of events and actions; the latter in the physical sense for the adhesion of the component parts of bodies. The *continuation* of a history up to the existing period of the writer is the work of every age, if not of every year: there are bodies of so little *continuity* that they will crumble to pieces on the slightest touch.

TO CONTINUE, REMAIN, STAY.

CONTINUE, v. *Continual, perpetual*.

REMAIN, in Latin *remaneo*, is compounded of *re* and *maneo*, Greek *μενω*, Hebrew *omad* to tarry. *Maneo* signifies literally to tarry in a place during the night, whence the Latins call places *mansiones* where travellers passed a night.

Remaneo signified literally to tarry behind.

STAY is but a variation of the word stand.

The idea of confining one's self to something is common to all these terms; but *continue* applies often to the sameness of action, and *remain* to the sameness of place or situation; the former has most of the active sense in it, and expresses a state of action; the latter is altogether neuter, and expresses a state of rest. We speak of *continuing* a certain course, of *continuing* to

do, or *continuing* to be any thing: but of *remaining* in a position, in a house, in a town, in a condition, and the like.

There is more of will in *continuing*; more of necessity and circumstances in *remaining*. A person *continues* in office as long as he can perform it with satisfaction to himself, and his employer. A sentinel *remains* at his post or station.

Continue is opposed to cease; *remain* is opposed to go. Things *continue* in motion; they *remain* stationary. The females among the brutes will sometimes *continue* to feed their young, long after they are able to provide for themselves; many persons are restored to life after having *remained* several hours in a state of suspended animation.

Remain and *stay* are both perfectly neuter in their sense, but *remain* is employed for either persons or things; *stay* in this sense for persons only. It is necessary for some species of wood to *remain* long in the water in order to be seasoned. Some persons are of so restless a temper, that they cannot *stay* long in a place without showing symptoms of uneasiness.

When *remain* is employed for persons, it is often involuntary, if not compulsory; *stay* is altogether voluntary. Soldiers must *remain* where they are stationed. Friends *stay* at each other's houses as visitors. Former times afford many instances of servants *continuing* faithful to their employ, even in the season of adversity; but so much are times altered, that at present, domestics never *remain* long enough in their places to create any bond of attachment between master and servant. Their time of *stay* is now limited to weeks and months, instead of being extended to years.

TO CONTINUE, PERSEVERE, PERSIST,
PURSUE, PROSECUTE.

To CONTINUE, signifies the same as in the preceding article,

To PERSEVERE, in French *persevé rer*. Latin *perseverare*, compounded of *per* and *severus* strict and steady, signifies to be steady throughout or to the end.

PERSIST, in French *persister*, Latin *persisto*, compounded of *per* and *sisto* or *sto*, signifies to stand by or to a thing.

PURSUE and PROSECUTE, in French *poursuivre*, come from the Latin *sequor* to follow, that is, *prosequor* and its participle *prosecutus*, corresponding with *prosequor*, signifying to follow after or keep on with.

The idea of not laying aside is common to these terms, which is the sense of *continue* without any other addition; the other terms, which are all species of *continuing*

include likewise some collateral idea which distinguishes them from the first, as well as from each other. *Continue* is comparable with *persevere* and *persist* in the neuter sense, with *pursue* and *prosecute* in the active sense. To *continue* is simply to do as one has done hitherto.

To PERSEVERE is to *continue* without wishing to change, or from a positive desire to attain an object. To *persist* is to *continue* from a determination or will not to cease. The act of *continuing*, therefore, specifies no characteristic of the agent; that of *persevering* or *persisting* marks a direct temper of mind; the former is always used in a good sense, the latter in an indifferent or bad sense.

The Latins have not observed this last distinction between *perseverare* and *persistere*, for they say,

In errore perseverare. Cicero.

In eadem impudentiâ persistere. Livy.

And probably in imitation of them, examples are to be found in English authors of *persevere* in a bad sense, and *persist* in a good sense; but modern writers have uniformly observed the distinction. We *continue* from habit or casualty; we *persevere* from reflection and the exercise of one's judgment; we *persist* from attachment.

Persevere is employed only in matters of some moment, in things of sufficient importance to demand a steady purpose of the mind; *persist* is employed in the ordinary business of life, as well as on more important occasions; a learner *perseveres* in his studies, in order to arrive at the necessary degree of improvement: a child *persist*s in making a request, until he has obtained the object of his desire.

There is always wisdom in *perseverance*, even though unsuccessful; there is mostly folly, caprice, or obstinacy, in *persistance*: how different the man who *perseveres* in the cultivation of his talents, from him who only *persist*s in maintaining falsehoods or supporting errors!

Continue, when compared with *persevere* or *persist*, is always coupled with modes of action; but in comparison with *pursue* or *prosecute*, it is always followed by some object: we *continue* to do, *persevere*, or *persist* in doing something: but we *continue*, *pursue*, or *prosecute* some object which we wish to bring to perfection by additional labour.

Continue is here equally indefinite, as in the former case; *pursue* and *prosecute* both comprehend collateral ideas respecting the disposition of the agent, and the nature of the object: to *continue* is to go on with a thing as it has been begun; to *pursue* and

prosecute is to *continue* by some prescribed rule, or in some particular manner: a work is *continued*; a plan, measure, or line of conduct is *pursued*; an undertaking or a design is *prosecuted*: we may *continue* the work of another in order to supply a deficiency; we may *pursue* a plan that emanates either from ourselves or another; we *prosecute* our own work only in order to obtain some peculiar object: *continue*, therefore, expresses less than *pursue*, and this less than *prosecute*: the history of England has been *continued* down to the present period by different writers; Smollett has *pursued* the same plan as Hume, in the *continuation* of his history; Captain Cook *prosecuted* his work of discovery in three several voyages.

We *continue* the conversation which has been interrupted; we *pursue* a journey after a certain length of stay; we *prosecute* any particular journey which is important either on account of its difficulties or its object.

To *continue* is in itself altogether an indifferent action; to *pursue* is always a commendable action; to *prosecute* rises still higher in value: it is a mark of great instability not to *continue* any thing that we begin; it betrays a great want of prudence and discernment not to *pursue* some plan on every occasion which requires method; it is the characteristic of a *persevering* mind to *prosecute* whatever it has deemed worthy to enter upon.

CONTRACTED. CONFINED, NARROW.

CONTRACTED, from the verb *contract*, in Latin *contractus*, participle of *contraho* to draw or come close together, signifies either the state or quality of being shrunk up, lessened in size, or brought within a smaller compass.

CONFINED marks the state of being *confined* (v. *To bound*).

NARROW is a variation of *near*, signifying the quality of being near, close, or not extended.

Contraction arises from the inherent state of the object; *confined* is produced by some external agent: a limb is *contracted* from disease; it is *confined* by a chain: we speak morally of the *contracted* span of a man's life, and the *confined* view which he takes of a subject.

Contracted and *confined* respect the operations of things; *narrow* their qualities or accidents: whatever is *contracted* or *confined* is more or less *narrow*; but many things are *narrow* which have never been *contracted* or *confined*; what is *narrow* is therefore more positively so than either *contracted* or *confined*: a *contracted* mind has

but few objects on which it dwells to the exclusion of others; a *confined* education is *confined* to few points of knowledge or information; a *narrow* soul is hemmed in by a single selfish passion.

TO CONTRADICT, OPPOSE, DENY.

CONTRADICT, from the Latin *contra* and *dictum*, signifies a speech against a speech.

OPPOSE, in French *opposer*, Latin *opposui*, perfect of *oppono*, from *op* or *ob* and *pono*, signifies to throw in the way or against a thing.

DENY, in French *denier*, Latin *denego*, is compounded of *de*, *ne*, and *ago* or *dico*, signifying to say *no*.

To *contradict*, as the origin of the word sufficiently denotes, is to set up assertion against assertion, and is, therefore, a mode of opposition, whether used in a general or a particular application. Logicians call those propositions *contradictory* which, in all their terms, are most completely *opposed* to each other; as 'All men are liars;' 'No men are liars.' A *contradiction* necessarily supposes a verbal, though not necessarily a personal, opposition; a person may unintentionally *contradict* himself; as is frequently the case with liars; and two persons may *contradict* each other without knowing what either has asserted. But although *contradicting* must be more or less verbal, yet, in an extended application of the term, the *contradiction* may be implied in the action rather than in direct words, as when a person by his good conduct *contradicts* the slanders of his enemies.

In this application, *contradict* and *oppose* are clearly distinguished from each other. So likewise, in personal disputes, *contradiction* implies *opposition* only as far as relates to the words; *opposing*, on the other hand, comprehends not only the spirit of the action, but also a great diversity in the mode; we may *contradict* from necessity, or in self-defence; we *oppose* from conviction, or a less honourable nature; we *contradict* by a direct negative; we *oppose* by means of argument or otherwise. It is a breach of politeness to *contradict* flatly; it is a violation of the moral law to *oppose* without the most substantial grounds.

To *contradict* and to *deny* may be both considered as modes of verbal opposition, but one *contradicts* an assertion, and *denies* a fact; *contradiction* implies the setting up one person's authority or opinion against that of another; *denial* implies maintaining a person's veracity in opposition to the charges or insinuations of others. *Contradicting*

is commonly employed in speculative matters; *denying* in matters of personal interest.

Denying may, however, be employed as well as *contradicting* in the course of argument; but we *deny* the general truth of the position by *contradicting* the particular assertions of the individuals.

When *contradict* respects other than persons, it is frequently a mode of *opposition*, as we may most effectually *oppose* a person by *contradicting* what he asserts; but *contradiction* does not necessarily imply *opposition*; the former is simply a mode of action; the latter comprehends both action and the spirit with which it is dictated: we *contradict* from necessity or in self defence; we *oppose* from conviction or some personal feeling of a less honourable nature. When we hear a friend unjustly charged of an offence, it is but reasonable to *contradict* the charge; objectionable measures may call for *opposition*, but it is sometimes prudent to abstain from *opposing* what we cannot prevent.

Contradict is likewise used in *denying* what is laid to one's charge; but we may *deny* without *contradicting*, in answer to a question: *contradiction* respects indifferent matters: *denying* is always used in matters of immediate interest.

Contradiction is employed for correcting others; *denying* is used to clear one's-self.

TO CONTRIVE, DEVISE, INVENT.

CONTRIVE, in French *controuver*, compounded of *con* and *trouver*, signifies to find out by putting together.

DEVISE, compounded of *de* and *vise*, in Latin *visus* seen, signifies to show or present to the mind,

INVENT, in Latin *inventus*, participle of *invenio*, compounded of *in* and *venio*, signifies to come or bring into the mind.

To *contrive* and *devise* do not express so much as to *invent*: we *contrive* and *devise* in small matters; we *invent* in those of greater moment. *Contriving* and *devising* respect the manner of doing things: *inventing* comprehends the action and the thing itself; the former are but the new fashioning of things that already exist; the latter is, as it were, the creation of something new: to *contrive* and *devise* are intentional actions, the result of a specific effort; *invention* naturally arises from the exertion of an inherent power: we require thought and combination to *contrive* or *devise*; ingenuity is the faculty which is exerted in *inventing*.

Contriving requires even less exercise of the thoughts than *devising*: we *contrive* on familiar and common occasions; we *devise*

in seasons of difficulty and trial. A *contrivance* is simple and obvious to a plain understanding; a *device* is complex and far-fetched; it requires a ready conception and a degree of art.

Contrivances serve to supply a deficiency, or increase a convenience; *devices* are employed to extricate from danger, to remove an evil, or forward a scheme: the history of Robinson Crusoe derives considerable interest from the relation of the various *contrivances* by which he provided himself with the first articles of necessity and comfort; the history of robbers and adventurers is full of the various *devices* by which they endeavour to carry on their projects of plunder, or elude the vigilance of their pursuers; the history of civilized society contains an account of the various *inventions* which have contributed to the enjoyment or improvement of mankind.

TO CONTROVERT, DISPUTE.

CONTROVERT, compounded of the Latin *contra* and *verto*, signifies to turn against another in discourse, or direct one's-self against another.

DISPUTE, *v.* To argue, debate.

To *controvert* has regard to speculative points: to *dispute* respects matters of fact: there is more of opposition in *controversy*; more of doubt in *disputing*: a sophist *controverts*; a sceptic *disputes*: the plainest and sublimest truths of the Gospel have been all *controverted* in their turn by the self-sufficient inquirer: the authenticity of the Bible itself has been *disputed* by some few individuals; the existence of a God by still fewer.

Controversy is worse than an unprofitable task; instead of eliciting truth, it does but expose the failings of the parties engaged: *disputing* is not so personal, and, consequently, not so objectionable: we never *controvert* any point without seriously and decidedly intending to oppose the notions of another; we may sometimes *dispute* a point for the sake of friendly argument, or the desire of information: theologians and politicians are the greatest *controversialists*; it is the business of men in general to *dispute* whatever ought not to be taken for granted.

CONTUMACY, REBELLION.

CONTUMACY, from the Latin *contumax* compounded of *contra* and *tumeo* to swell, signifies the swelling one's-self up by way of resistance.

REBELLION, in Latin *rebellio*, from *re-bello* or *re* and *bello* to war in return, signifies carrying on war against those to whom

we owe, and have before paid, a lawful subjection.

Resistance to lawful authority is the common idea included in both the significations of these terms, but *contumacy* does not express so much as *rebellion*: the *contumacious* resist only occasionally; the *rebel* resists systematically: the *contumacious* stand only on certain points, and oppose the individual; the *rebel* sets himself up against the authority itself: the *contumacious* thwart and contradict, they never resort to open violence; the *rebel* acts only by main force: *contumacy* shelters itself under the plea of equity and justice; *rebellion* sets all law and order at defiance.

CONVENIENT, SUITABLE.

CONVENIENT, *v.* Commodious.

SUITABLE, *v.* Conformable.

Convenient regards the circumstances of the individual; *suitable* respects the established opinions of mankind, and is closely connected with moral propriety: nothing is *convenient* which does not favour one's purpose: nothing is *suitable* which does not suit the person, place, and thing: whoever has any thing to ask of another must take a *convenient* opportunity in order to ensure success; his address on such an occasion would be very *unsuitable*, if he affected to claim as a right what he ought to solicit as a favour.

CONVERSANT, FAMILIAR.

CONVERSANT, from *converse*, signifies turning over and over, consequently, becoming acquainted.

FAMILIAR, from the Latin *familiaris* to be of the same family, signifies the closest connexion.

An acquaintance with things is implied in both these terms, but the latter expresses something more particular than the former.

A person is *conversant* in matters that come frequently before his notice; he is *familiar* with such as form the daily routine of his business: one who is not a professed lawyer may be *conversant* with the questions of law which occur on ordinary occasions; but one who is skilled in his profession will be *familiar* with all cases which may possibly be employed in support of a cause: it is advisable to be *conversant* with the ways of the world; but to be *familiar* with the greater part of them would not redound to one's credit or advantage.

CONVERSATION, DIALOGUE. CONFERENCE, COLLOQUY.

CONVERSATION, denotes the act of holding *converse* (*v.* Communion).

DIALOGUE, in French *dialogue*, Latin *dialogus*, Greek *διαλογος* compounded of *dis* and *λογος*, signifies a speech between two.

CONFERENCE, from the Latin *con* and *fero* to put together, signifies consulting together on subjects.

COLLOQUY, in Latin *colloquium*, from *col* or *con* and *loquor* to speak, signifies the act of talking together.

A *conversation* is always something actually held between two or more persons; a *dialogue* is mostly fictitious, and written as if spoken: any number of persons may take part in a *conversation*; but a *dialogue* always refers to the two persons who are expressly engaged: a *conversation* may be desultory, in which each takes his part at pleasure; a *dialogue* is formal, in which there will always be reply and rejoinder: a *conversation* may be carried on by any signs besides words, which are addressed personally to the individual present; a *dialogue* must always consist of express words: a prince holds frequent *conversations* with his ministers on affairs of state; Cicero wrote *dialogues* on the nature of the gods, and many later writers have adopted the *dialogue* form as a vehicle for conveying their sentiments: a *conference* is a species of *conversation*; a *colloquy* is a species of *dialogue*; a *conversation* is indefinite as to the subject, or the parties engaged in it; a *conference* is confined to particular subjects and descriptions of persons: a *conversation* is mostly occasional; a *conference* is always specifically appointed: a *conversation* is mostly on indifferent matters; a *conference* is mostly on national or public concerns.

The *dialogue* naturally limits the number to two; the *colloquy* is indefinite as to number: there may be *dialogues* therefore which are not *colloquia*; but every *colloquy* may be denominated a *dialogue*.

CONVERT. PROSELYTE.

CONVERT, from the Latin *converto*, signifies changed to something in conformity with the views of another.

PROSELYTE, from the Greek *προσηλυτος* and *προσερχομαι*, signifies come over to the side of another.

Convert is more extensive in its sense and application than *proselyte*; *convert* in its full sense, includes every change of opinion, without respect to the subject; *proselyte*, in its strict sense, refers only to changes from one religious belief to another: there are many *converts* to particular doctrines of Christianity, and *proselytes* from the Pagan, Jewish, or Mahomedan, to the Christian

faith: there are political as well as religious *converts*, who could not with the same strict propriety be termed *proselytes*.

Conversion is a more voluntary act than *proselytism*; it emanates entirely from the mind of the agent, independently of foreign influence; it extends not merely to the abstract or speculative opinions of the individual, but to the whole current of his feelings and spring of his actions: it is the *conversion* of the heart and soul. *Proselytism* is an outward act, which needs not extend beyond the conformity of one's words and actions to a certain rule: *convert* is, therefore, always taken in a good sense; it bears on the face of it the stamp of sincerity: *proselyte* is a term of more ambiguous meaning; the *proselyte* is often the creature and the tool of a party; there may be many *proselytes* where there are no *converts*.

TO CONVICT, DETECT.

CONVICT, from the Latin *convictus*, participle of *convinco* to make manifest, signifies to make guilt clear.

DETECT, from the Latin *detectus*, participle of *detego*, compound of the privative *de* and *tego* to cover, signifies to uncover or lay open guilt.

A person is *convicted* by means of evidence; he is *detected* by means of ocular demonstration. One is *convicted* of having been the perpetrator of some evil deed; one is *detected* in the very act of committing the deed. One is *convicted* of crimes in a court of judicature; one is *detected* in various misdemeanors by different casualties: punishment necessarily follows *conviction*; but in the case of *detection*, it rests in the breast of the individual against whom the offence is committed.

CONVICTION. PERSUASION.

CONVICTION, from *convince* (v. *Conclusive*), denotes either the act of *convincing* or the state of being *convinced*.

PERSUASION, from *persuade*, expresses likewise either the act of *persuading* or the state of being *persuaded*. *Persuade*, in Latin *persuadeo*, from the Greek *ηδω* to delight, signifies to make thoroughly agreeable to the taste.

What *convinces* binds; what *persuades* attracts. We are *convinced* by arguments; it is the understanding which determines: we are *persuaded* by entreaties and personal influence; it is the imagination or will which decides. Our *conviction* respects solely matters of belief or faith; our *persuasion* respects matters of belief or practice: we are *convinced* that a thing is true or

false; we are *persuaded* that it is either right or wrong, advantageous or the contrary. A person will have half effected a thing who is *convinced* that it is in his power to affect it; he will be easily *persuaded* to do that which favours his own interests.

Conviction respects our most important duties; *persuasion* is applied to matters of indifference. The first step to true repentance is a thorough *conviction* of the enormity of sin. The cure of people's maladies is sometimes promoted to a surprising degree by their *persuasion* of the efficacy of the remedy.

As *conviction* is the effect of substantial evidence, it is solid and permanent in its nature; it cannot be so easily changed and deceived: *persuasion*, depending on our feelings, is influenced by external objects, and exposed to various changes; it may vary both in the degree and in the object. *Conviction* answers in our minds to positive certainty; *persuasion* answers to probability.

The practical truths of Christianity demand our deepest *conviction*; of its speculative truths we ought to have a rational *persuasion*.

The *conviction* of the truth or falsehood of that which we have been accustomed to condemn or admire cannot be effected without powerful means; but we may be *persuaded* of the propriety of a thing to-day, which to-morrow we shall regard with indifference.

CONVIVIAL, SOCIAL.

CONVIVIAL, in Latin *convivialis*, from *convivo* to live together, signifies being entertained together.

SOCIAL, from *socius* a companion, signifies pertaining to company.

The prominent idea in *convivial* is that of sensual indulgence; the prominent idea in *social* is that of enjoyment from an intercourse with society. *Convivial* is a species of the *social*; it is the *social* in matters of festivity. What is *convivial* is *social*, but what is *social* is something more; the former is excelled by the mind. We speak of *convivial* meetings, *convivial* enjoyments, or the *convivial* board; but *social* intercourse, *social* amusements, and the like.

COOL, COLD, FRIGID.

In the natural sense, COOL is simply the absence of warmth; COLD and FRIGID are positively contrary to warmth, the former in regard to objects in general, the latter to moral objects: in the physical sense the analogy is strictly preserved. *Cool* is used as it respects the passions and the affections;

cold only with regard to the affections; *frigid* only in regard to the inclinations.

With regard to the passions, *cool* designates a freedom from agitation, which is a desirable quality. *Coolness* in a time of danger, and *coolness* in an argument, are alike commendable.

As *cool* and *cold* respect the affections, the *cool* is opposed to the friendly, the *cold* to the warm-hearted, the *frigid* to the animated; the former is but a degree of the latter. A reception is said to be *cool*; an embrace to be *cold*; a sentiment *frigid*. *Coolness* is an enemy to social enjoyments; *coldness* is an enemy to every moral virtue; *frigidity* destroys all force of character. *Coolness* is engendered by circumstances; it supposes the previous existence of warmth; *coldness* lies often in the temperament, or is engendered by habit; it is always something vicious; *frigidity* is occasional, and is always a defect. Trifling differences produce *coolness* sometimes between the best friends: trade sometimes engenders a *cold* calculating temper in some minds: those who are remarkable for apathy will often express themselves with *frigid* indifference on the most important subjects.

TO COPY, TRANSCRIBE.

COPY is probably changed from the Latin *cipio* to take, because we take that from an object which we *copy*.

TRANSCRIBE, in Latin *transcribo*, that is, *trans* over, and *scribo* to write, signifies literally to write over from something else, to make to pass over in writing from one to the other.

To *copy* respects the matter; to *transcribe* respects simply the act of writing. What is *copied* must be taken immediately from the original, with which it must exactly correspond; what is *transcribed* may be taken from the *copy*, but not necessarily in an entire state. Things are *copied* for the sake of getting the contents; they are often *transcribed* for the sake of clearness and fair writing. A *copier* should be very exact; a *transcriber* should be a good writer. Lawyers *copy* deeds, and have them afterwards frequently *transcribed* as occasion requires.

COPY, MODEL, PATTERN, SPECIMEN.

COPY, from the verb to *copy* (v. *To copy*), marks either the thing from which we *copy* or the thing *copied*.

MODEL in French *modèle*, Latin *modulus* a little mode or measure, signifies the thing that serves as a measure, or that is made after a measure.

PATTERN, which is a variation of *patron*

from the French *patron*, Latin *patronus*, signifies the thing that directs.

SPECIMEN, in Latin *specimen*, from *specio* to behold, signifies what is looked at for the purpose of forming our judgment by it.

* A *copy* and a *model* may be both employed either as an original work or as a work formed after an original.

In the former sense, *copy* is used in relation to impressions, manuscripts, or writings, which are made to be *copied* by the printer, the writer, or the engraver: *model* is used in every other case, whether in morality or the arts: the proof will seldom be faulty when the *copy* is clear and correct. There can be no good writing formed after a bad *copy*. In an extended application of the terms, the poet or the artist may be said to *copy* after nature. No human being has ever presented us with a perfect *model* of virtue; the classic writers of antiquity ought to be carefully perused by all who wish to acquire a pure style, of which they contain unquestionably the best *models*.

Respecting these words, however, it is here farther to be observed, that a *copy* requires the closest imitation possible in every particular, but a *model* ought only to serve as a general rule: the former must be literally retraced by a mechanical process in all its lines and figures; it leaves nothing to be supplied by the judgment or will of the executor. A *model* often consists of little more than the outlines and proportions, whilst the dimensions and decorations are left to the choice of the workman. One who is anxious to acquire a fine hand will in the first instance rather imitate the errors of his *copy* than attempt any improvement of his own. A man of genius will not suffer himself to be cramped by a slavish adherence to any *model* however perfect.

In the second sense *copy* is used for painting, and *model* for relief. A *copy* ought to be faithful, a *model* ought to be just; the former should delineate exactly what is delineated by the original; the latter should adhere to the precise rules of proportion observed in the original. The pictures of Raphael do not lose their attractions even in bad *copies*: the simple *models* of antiquity often equal in value originals of modern conception.

Pattern and *specimen* approach nearest to *model* in signification: the idea of guidance or direction is prominent in them. The *model* always serves to guide in the execution of a work; the *pattern* serves either to re-

gulate the work, or simply to determine the choice; the *specimen* helps only to form the opinion. The architect builds according to a certain *model*; the mechanic makes any thing according to a *pattern*, or a person fixes on having a thing according to the *pattern* offered him; the nature and value of things are estimated by the *specimens* shown of them.

A *model* is always some whole complete in itself; a *pattern* may be either a whole or the part of a whole; a *specimen* is always a part. *Models* of ships, bridges, or other pieces of mechanism are sometimes constructed for the purpose of explaining more effectually the nature and design of the invention: whenever the make, colour, or materials of any article, either of convenience or luxury, is an object of consideration, it cannot be so rightly determined as by producing a similar article to serve as a *pattern*: a single sentence in a book may be a sufficient *specimen* of the whole performance.

In the moral sense *pattern* respects the whole conduct or behaviour; *specimen* only individual actions. The female who devotes her time and attention to the management of her family and the education of her offspring is a *pattern* to those of her sex who depute the whole concern to the care of others: a person gives but an unfortunate *specimen* of his boasted sincerity, who is found guilty of an evasion.

COQUETTE, JILT.

There are many JILTS who become so from COQUETTES, but one may be a *coquette* without being a *jilt*. *Coquetry* is contented with employing little arts to excite notice; *jilting* extends to the violation of truth and honour, in order to awaken a passion which it afterwards disappoints. Vanity is the main spring by which *coquettes* and *jilts* are impelled to action; but the former indulges her propensity mostly at her own expense only, while the latter does no less injury to the peace of others than she does to her own reputation. The *coquette* makes a traffic of her own charms by seeking a multitude of admirers; the *jilt* sports with the sacred passion of love, and barter it for the gratification of any selfish propensity. *Coquetry* is a fault which should be guarded against by every female as a snare to her own happiness; *jilting* is a vice which cannot be practised without some depravity of the heart.

CORNER, ANGLE,

CORNER answers to the French *coin*,

* Vide Girard: „Copie, modèle.“

and Greek *γωνία*, which signifies either a corner or a hidden place.

ANGLE, in Latin *angulus*, comes in all probability from *αγκών* the elbow.

The vulgar use of *corner* in the ordinary concerns of life, and the technical use of *angle* in the science of mathematics, is not the only distinction between these terms.

Corner properly implies the outer extreme point of any solid body; *angle*, on the contrary the inner extremity produced by the meeting of two right lines. When speaking therefore of solid bodies, *corner* and *angle* may be both employed; but in regard to simple right lines, the word *angle* only is applicable: in the former case a *corner* is produced by the meeting of the different parts of a body whether inwardly or outwardly; but an *angle* is produced by the meeting of two bodies; one house has many *corners*; two houses, or two walls at least, are requisite to make an *angle*.

We likewise speak of making an *angle* by the direction that is taken in going either by land or sea, because such a course is equivalent to a right line; in that case the word *corner* could not be substituted: on the other hand the word *corner* is often used for a place of secrecy or obscurity, agreeable to the derivation of the term.

CORPORAL, CORPOREAL, BODILY.

CORPORAL, CORPOREAL, and BODILY, as their origin bespeaks, have all relation to the same object, the *body*; but the two former are employed to signify relating or appertaining to the *body*; the latter to denote containing or forming part of the *body*. Hence we say, *corporal* punishment, *bodily* vigour or strength, *corporeal* substances; the *corporeal* frame, *bodily* exertion.

Corporal is only employed for the animal frame in its proper sense; *corporeal* is used for animal substance in an extended sense; hence we speak of *corporal* sufferance and *corporeal* agents. *Corporeal* is distinguished from spiritual; *bodily* from mental. It is impossible to represent spiritual beings any other way than under a *corporeal* form; *bodily* pains, however severe, are frequently overpowered by mental pleasures.

CORPOREAL, MATERIAL.

CORPOREAL is properly a species of *material*; whatever is *corporeal* is *material*, but not *vice versâ*. *Corporeal* respects animate bodies; *material* is used for every thing which can act on the senses, animate or inanimate. The world contains *corporeal* beings, and consists of *material* substances.

CORPULENT, STOUT, LUSTY.

CORPULENT, from *corpus* the body, signifies having fulness of body.

STOUT, in Dutch *stott*, is no doubt a variation of the German *stätig* steady, signifying able to stand, solid, firm.

LUSTY, in German, &c. *lustig* merry, cheerful, implies here a vigorous state of body.

Corpulent respects the fleshy state of the body; *stout* respects also the state of the muscles and bones: *corpulence* is therefore an incidental property; *stoutness* is a natural property: *corpulence* may come upon us according to circumstances; *stoutness* is the natural make of the body which is born with us. *Corpulence* and *lustiness* are both occasioned by the state of the health; but the former may arise from disease; the latter is always the consequence of good health: *corpulence* consists of an undue proportion of fat; *lustiness* consists of a due and full proportion of all the solids in the body.

TO CORRECT, RECTIFY, REFORM.

CORRECT, v. *To amend.*

RECTIFY, compounded of the Latin *rectus* and *ficio* or *facio*, signifies literally to make right or as it should be.

REFORM, compounded of *re* and *form*, signifies to make into a new form.

Correct respects ourselves or others; *rectify* has regard to one's self only.

Correct is either an act of authority or discretion; *rectify* is an act of discretion only. What is *corrected* may vary in its magnitude or importance, and consequently may require more or less trouble; what is *rectified* is always of a nature to be altered without great injury or effort. Habitual or individual faults are *corrected*; individual mistakes are *rectified*. A person *corrects* himself or another of a bad habit in speaking or pronouncing; he *rectifies* any error in his accounts. Mistakes in writing must be *corrected* for the advantage of the scholar; mistakes in pecuniary transactions cannot be too soon *rectified* for the satisfaction of all parties.

Reform like *rectify* is used only for one's self when it respects personal actions; but *reform* and *correct* are likewise employed for matters of general interest. *Correct* in neither case amounts to the same as *reform*. A person *corrects* himself of particular habits; he *reforms* his whole life: what is *corrected* undergoes a change, more or less slight; what is *reformed* assumes a new form and becomes a new thing.

CORRECT, ACCURATE.

CORRECT is equivalent to *corrected* (v. *To amend*), or set to rights.

ACCURATE (v. *Accurate*) implies properly done with care, or by the application of care. *Correct* is negative in its sense; *accurate* is positive; it is sufficient to be free from fault to be *correct*; it must contain every minute particular to be *accurate*. Information is *correct* which contains nothing but facts; it is *accurate* when it contains a vast number of details.

What is *incorrect* is allied to falsehood; what is *inaccurate* is general and indefinite. According to the dialect of modern times, in which gross vices are varnished over with smooth names, a liar is said to speak *incorrectly*; this is however not only an *inaccurate* but an *incorrect* mode of speech, for a lie is a direct violation of truth, and the *incorrect* is only a deviation from it to a greater or less extent.

CORRECTION, DISCIPLINE, PUNISHMENT.

As **CORRECTION** and **DISCIPLINE** have commonly required **PUNISHMENT** to render them efficacious, custom has affixed to them a strong resemblance in their application, although they are distinguished from each other by obvious marks of difference. The prominent idea in *correction* (v. *To correct*), is that of making right what has been wrong: In *discipline*, from the Latin *disciplina* and *disco* to learn, the leading idea is that of instructing or regulating. In *punishment*, from the Latin *punio*, and the Greek *πεινῆ* pain, the leading idea is that of inflicting pain.

Children are the peculiar subjects of *correction*; *discipline* and *punishment* are confined to age. A wise parent *corrects* his child; a master maintains *discipline* in his school; a general preserves *discipline* in his army. Whoever commits a fault is liable to be punished by those who have authority over him; if he commits a crime he subjects himself to be *punished* by law.

Correction and *discipline* are mostly exercised by means of chastisement, for which they are often employed as a substitute; *punishment* is inflicted in any way that gives pain. *Correction* and *discipline* are both of them personal acts of authority exercised by superiors over inferiors, but the former is mostly employed by one individual over another; the latter has regard to a number who are the subjects of it directly or indirectly: *punishment* has no relation whatever to the agent by which the action is perform-

ed; it may proceed alike from persons or things. A parent who spares the due *correction* of his child, or a master who does not use a proper *discipline* in his school, will alike be *punished* by the insubordination and irregularities of those over whom they have a control.

CORRESPONDENT, ANSWERABLE, SUITABLE.

CORRESPONDENT, in French *correspondant*, from the Latin *cum* and *respondeo* to answer in unison or in uniformity.

ANSWERABLE and **SUITABLE**, from *answer* and *suit*, mark the quality or capacity of *answering* or *suiting*. *Correspondent* supposes a greater agreement than *answerable*, and *answerable* requires a greater agreement than *suitable*. Things that *correspond* must be alike in size, shape, colour, and every minute particular; those that *answer* must be fitted for the same purpose; those that *suit* must have nothing disproportionate or discordant. In the artificial disposition of furniture, or all matters of art and ornament, it is of considerable importance to have some things made to *correspond*, so that they be placed in *suitable* directions to *answer* to each other.

In the moral application, actions are said not to *correspond* with professions; the success of an undertaking does not *answer* the expectation; particular measures do not *suit* the purpose of individuals.

COST, EXPENSE, PRICE, CHARGE.

COST, in German, *kost* or *kosten*, from the Latin *gustare* to taste, signifies originally support, and by an extended sense what is given for support.

EXPENSE is compounded of *ex* and *pense*, in Latin *pensus*, participle of *pendo* to pay, signifying the thing paid or given out.

PRICE, from the Latin *pretium*, and the Greek *πρωτιον*, from *πρωσσω* to sell, signifies the thing given for what is bought.

CHARGE, from *to charge* (v. *To accuse*), signifies the thing laid on as a charge.

The *cost* is what a thing *costs* or occasions to be laid out; the *expense* is that which is actually laid out; the *price* is that which a thing may fetch or cause to be laid out; the *charge* is that which is required to be laid out. As a *cost* commonly comprehends an *expense*, the terms are on various occasions used indifferently for each other: we speak of counting the *cost* or counting the *expense* of doing any thing; at a great *cost* or at a great *expense*: on the other hand, of venturing to do a thing to

one's cost, of growing wise at other people's expense.

The *cost* and the *price* have respect to the thing and its supposed value; the *expense* and the *charge* depend on the option of the persons. The *cost* of a thing must *precede* the *price*, and the *expense* must succeed the *charge*; we can never set a *price* on any thing until we have ascertained what it has *cost* us; nor can we know or defray the *expense* until the *charge* be made. There may, however, frequently be a *price* where there is no *cost*, and *vice versa*; there may also be an *expense* where there is no *charge*; but there cannot be a *charge* without an *expense*. *Costs* in suit often exceed in value and amount the thing contended for: the *price* of things depends on their relative value in the eyes of others: what *costs* nothing sometimes fetches a high *price*; and other things cannot obtain a *price* equal to the first *cost*. *Expenses* vary with modes of living and men's desires; whoever wants much, will have many *expenses* to defray; when the *charges* are exorbitant the *expenses* must necessarily bear a proportion.

Between the epithets *costly* and *expensive* there is the same distinction. Whatever is *costly* is naturally *expensive*, but not *vice versa*. Articles of furniture, of luxury, or indulgence, are *costly*, either from their variety or their intrinsic value; every thing is *expensive* which is attended with much *expense*, whether of little or great value. Jewels are *costly*; travelling is *expensive*.

In the moral acceptation, the attainment of an object is said to *cost* much pains; a thing is persisted in at the *expense* of health, of honour, or of life.

TO COVER, HIDE.

COVER, in French *couvrir*, is contracted from *contra* and *ouvrir*, signifying to do the contrary of open, to put out of view.

HIDE, v. *To conceal*.

Cover is to *hide* as the means to the end: we commonly *hide* by *covering*; but we may easily *cover* without *hiding*, as also *hide* without *covering*. The ruling idea in the word *cover* is that of throwing or putting something over a body: in the word *hide* is that of keeping carefully to one's self, from the observation of others.

To *cover* is an indifferent action, springing from a variety of motives, of convenience, or comfort; to *hide* is an action that springs from one specific intent, from care and concern for the thing, and the fear of foreign intrusion. In most civilized countries it is common to *cover* the head: in the

Eastern countries females commonly wear veils to *hide* the face. There are many things which decency as well as health require to be *covered*; and others which from their very nature must always be *hidden*. Houses must be *covered* with roofs, and bodies with clothing; the earth contains many treasures, which in all probability will always be *hidden*.

COVER, SHELTER, SCREEN.

COVER properly denotes what serves as a cover, and in the literal sense of the verb from which it is derived (v. *To cover*).

SHELTER, like the word shield, comes from the German *schild*, old German *sche-len* to cover.

SCREEN, from the Latin *secerno*, signifies to keep off or apart.

Cover is literally applied to many particular things which are employed in *covering*; but in the general sense which makes it analogous to the other terms, it includes the idea of concealing: *shelter* comprehends that of protecting from some immediate or impending evil: *screen* includes that of warding off some trouble. A *cover* always supposes something which can extend over the whole surface of a body; a *shelter* or a *screen* may merely interpose to a sufficient extent to serve the intended purpose. Military operations are sometimes carried on under *cover* of night; a bay is a convenient *shelter* for vessels against the violence of the winds; a chair may be used as a *screen* to prevent the violent action of the heat, or the external air.

In the moral sense, a fair reputation is sometimes made the *cover* for the commission of gross irregularities in secret. When a person feels himself unable to withstand the attacks of his enemies, he seeks a *shelter* under the sanction and authority of a great name. Bad men sometimes use wealth and power to *screen* themselves from the punishment which is due to their offences.

COVETOUSNESS, CUPIDITY, AVARICE.

COVETOUSNESS from *covet*, and *cupio* to desire, signifies having a *desire*.

CUPIDITY is a more immediate derivative from the Latin, signifying the same thing.

AVARICE, v. *Avaricious*.

All these terms are employed to express an illicit desire after objects of gratification; but *covetousness* is applied to property in general; *cupidity* and *avarice* only to money or possessions. A child may display its

covetousness in regard to the playthings which fall in its way; a man shows his *cupidity* in regard to the gains that fall in his way. *Covetousness* is the natural disposition for having or getting; *cupidity* is the acquired disposition. As the love of appropriation is an innate characteristic in man, that of accumulating or wanting to accumulate, which constitutes *covetousness*, will show itself in some persons among the first indications of character: where the prospect of amassing great wealth is set before a man, as in the case of a governor of a distant province, it will evince great virtue in him, if his *cupidity* be not excited.

The *covetous* man seeks to add to what he has; the *avaricious* man only strives to retain what he has: the *covetous* man sacrifices others to indulge himself; the *avaricious* man will sometimes sacrifice himself to indulge others; for generosity, which is opposed to *covetousness*, is sometimes associated with *avarice*.

TO COUTENANCE, SANCTION, SUPPORT.

COUTENANCE, signifies to keep in countenance.

SANCTION, in French *sanction*, Latin *sanctio*, from *sanctus* sacred, signifies to ratify a decree or ordinance; in an extended sense to make any thing binding.

SUPPORT, in French *supporter*, Latin *supporto*, compounded of *sup* or *sub* and *porto* to bear, signifies to bear from underneath, to bear up.

Persons are *countenanced*; things are *sanctioned*; persons or things are *supported*: persons are *countenanced* in their proceedings by the apparent approbation of others; measures are *sanctioned* by the consent or approbation of others; measures or persons are *supported* by every means which may forward the object.

There is most of encouragement in *countenancing*; it consists of some outward demonstration of regard or good will towards the person; there is most of authority in *sanctioning*; it is the lending of a name, an authority, or an influence, in order to strengthen and confirm the thing: there is most of assistance and co-operation in *support*; it is the employment of means to an end. Superiors only can *countenance* or *sanction*; persons in all conditions may *support*: those who *countenance* evil-doers give a *sanction* to their evil deeds; those who *support* either an individual or a cause ought to be satisfied that they are entitled to *support*.

COUNTRYMAN, PEASANT, SWAIN, HIND, RUSTIC, CLOWN.

COUNTRYMAN, that is a man of the country, or one belonging to the country, is the general term applicable to all inhabiting the country, in distinction from a townsman.

PEASANT, in French *paisan* from *pays*, is employed in the same sense for any countryman among the inhabitants of the Continent, and is, in consequence, used in poetry or the grave style.

SWAIN, in the Saxon signified a labourer, but it has acquired, from its use in poetry, the higher signification of a shepherd.

HIND may, in all probability, signify one who is in the back ground, an inferior.

RUSTIC, from *rus* the country, signifies one born and bred in the country.

CLOWN, contracted from *colonus* a husbandman, signifies of course a menial in the country.

All these terms are employed as epithets to persons, and principally to such as live in the country: the terms *countryman* and *peasant* are taken in an indifferent sense, and may comprehend persons of different descriptions; they designate nothing more than habitual residence in the country: the other terms are employed for the lower orders of *countrymen*, but with collateral ideas favourable or unfavourable annexed to them: *swain*, *hind*, both convey the idea of innocence in a humble station, and are, therefore, always employed in poetry in a good sense: the *rustic* and *clown* both convey the idea of that uncouth rudeness and ignorance which is frequently found among the lowest orders of *countrymen*.

COUPLE, BRACE, PAIR.

COUPLE, in French *couple*, comes from the Latin *cepulo* to join or tie together, *copula*, in Hebrew *cabel* a rope or a shackle, signifying things tied together; and as two things are with most convenience bound together, it has by custom been confined to this number.

BRACE, from the French *bras* arm, signifies things locked together after the manner of the folded arms, which on that account are confined to the number of two,

PAIR, in French *paire*, Latin *par* equal, signifies things that are equal, which can with propriety be said only of two things with regard to each other.

From the above illustration of these terms, it is clear that the number of two, which is included in all of them, is, with regard to the first, entirely arbitrary; that with regard to the second, it arises from the nature of

the junction; and with regard to the third, it arises altogether from the nature of the objects: *couples* and *braces* are made by *coupling* and *bracing*; *pairs* are either so of themselves, or are made so by others: *couples* and *braces* always require a junction in order to make them complete; *pairs* require similarity only to make them what they are: *couples* are joined by a foreign tie; *braces* are produced by a peculiar mode of junction with the objects themselves.

Couple and *pair* are said of persons or things; *brace* in particular cases, only of animals or things, except in the burlesque style, where it may be applied to persons. When used for persons, the word *couple* has relation to the marriage tie; the word *pair* to the association or the moral union: the former term is therefore more appropriate when speaking of those who are soon to be married, or have just entered that state; the latter when speaking of those who are already fixed in that state: most *couples* that are joined together are equally happy in prospect, but not so in the completion of their wishes; it is the lot of comparatively very few to claim the title of the happy *pair*. When used for things, *couple* is promiscuously employed in familiar discourse for any two things put together: *brace* is used by sportsmen for birds which are shot, and supposed to be locked together; by sailors for a part of their tackling, which is folded crosswise; *pair* is of course restricted in its application to such objects only as are really *paired*.

COURAGE, FORTITUDE, RESOLUTION.

COURAGE, *v.* Bravery.

FORTITUDE, in French *fortitude*, Latin *fortitudo*, is the abstract noun from *fortis* strong.

RESOLUTION from the verb *resolve* marks the habit of *resolving*.

Courage respects action, *fortitude* respects passion: a man has *courage* to meet danger, and *fortitude* to endure pain.

Courage is that power of the mind which bears up against the evil that is in prospect; *fortitude* is that power which endures the pain that is felt: the man of *courage* goes with the same coolness to the mouth of the cannon, as the man of *fortitude* undergoes the amputation of a limb.

Horatius Cocles displayed his *courage* in defending a bridge against the whole army of the Etruscans: Caius Mucius displayed no less *fortitude* when he thrust his hand into the fire in the presence of King Porsenna, and awed him as much by his language as his action.

Courage seems to be more of a manly virtue; *fortitude* is more distinguishable as a feminine virtue: the former is at least most adapted to the male sex, who are called upon to act, and the latter to females, who are obliged to endure: a man without *courage* would be as ill prepared to discharge his duty in his intercourse with the world, as a woman without *fortitude* would be to support herself under the complicated trials of body and mind with which she is liable to be assailed.

Resolution is a minor species of *courage*; it is *courage* in the minor concerns of life: *courage* comprehends under it a spirit to advance; *resolution* simply marks the will not to recede: we require *courage* to bear down all the obstacles which oppose themselves to us; we require *resolution* not to yield to the first difficulties that offer: *courage* is an elevated feature in the human character which adorns the possessor; *resolution* is that common quality of the mind which is in perpetual request; the want of which degrades a man in the eyes of his fellow-creatures. *Courage* is displayed on the most trying occasions; *resolution* is never put to any severe test: *courage* always supposes some danger to be encountered; *resolution* may be exerted in merely encountering opposition and difficulty: we have need of *courage* in opposing a formidable enemy; we have need of *resolution* in the management of a stubborn will.

COURSE, RACE, PASSAGE.

COURSE, from *curro* to run, signifies either the act of running, or the space run over.

RACE, from *run*, signifies the same act.

PASSAGE, from *to pass*, signifies either the act of passing or the space passed over.

With regard to the act of going, *course* is taken absolutely and indefinitely; *race* relates to the object for which we run; *passage* relates to the place passed over: thus a person may be swift in the *course*, win a *race*, and have an easy *passage*.

We pursue whatever *course* we think proper; we run the *race* that is set before us. *Course* is taken absolutely by itself; *race* is considered in relation to others: a man pursues a certain *course* according to discretion; he runs a *race* with another by way of competition. *Course* has a more particular reference to the space that is gone over; *race* includes in it more particularly the idea of the mode of going: we speak of going in, or pursuing a particular *course*; but always of running a *race*.

Course is as often used in the proper, as

the improper sense; *race* is seldom used figuratively, except in a spiritual application: man's success and respectability in life depends much upon the *course* of moral conduct which he pursues; the Christian's *course* in this world is represented in Scripture as a *race* which is set before him.

Course may be used in connexion with the object passed over or not; *passage* is seldom employed but in the direct connexion: we speak of a person's *course* in a place, or simply of his *course*; but we always speak of a person's *passage* through a place. *Course* and *passage* are used for inanimate, as well as animate objects; *race* is used for those only which are animate: a river has its *course*, and sometimes it is a dangerous *passage* for vessels; the horse or man runs the *race*.

COURTEOUS, COMPLAISANT, COURTLY.

COURTEOUS, from *court*, denotes properly belonging to a *court*, and by a natural extension of the sense, suitable to a *court*.

COMPLAISANT, *v. Complaisance*.

Courteous in one respect comprehends in it more than *complaisant*: it includes the manner as well as the action; it is, properly speaking, polished *complaisance*: on the other hand, *complaisance* includes more of the disposition in it than *courteousness*; it has less of the polish, but more of the reality of kindness.

Courteousness displays itself in the address and the manners; *complaisance* in direct good offices: *courteousness* is most suitable for strangers; *complaisance* for friends or the nearest relatives: among well-bred men, and men of rank, it is an invariable rule to address each other *courteously* on all occasions whenever they meet, whether acquainted or otherwise; there is a degree of *complaisance* due between husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, and members of the same family, which cannot be neglected without endangering the harmony of their intercourse.

COURTLY, though derived from the same word as *courteous*, is in some degree opposed to it in point of sense; it denotes a likeness to a *court*, but not a likeness which is favourable: *courtly* is to *courteous* as the form to the reality; the *courtly* consists of the exterior only, the latter of the exterior combined with the spirit; the former therefore seems to convey the idea of insincerity when contrasted with the latter, which must necessarily suppose the contrary; a *courtly* demeanour, or a *courtier*-like demeanour may be suitable on certain occasions; but a *courteous* demeanour is always desirable.

Courtly may likewise be employed in relation to things; but *courteous* has always respect to persons: we may speak of a *courtly* style, or *courtly* grandeur; but we always speak of *courteous* behaviour, *courteous* language, and the like.

CREDIT, FAVOUR, INFLUENCE.

CREDIT, from the Latin *creditus*, participle of *credo* to believe or trust, marks the state of being believed or trusted.

FAVOUR, from the Latin *faveo*, and probably *favus* a honey-comb, marks an agreeable or pleasant state of feeling.

INFLUENCE, in French *influence*, Latin *influentia*, from *influo* to flow upon, marks the state or power of acting upon any object so as to direct or move it.

These terms mark the state we stand in with regard to others as flowing out of their sentiments towards ourselves: *credit* arises out of esteem; *favour* out of goodwill or affection; *influence* out of either *credit* or *favour*: *credit* depends altogether on personal merit; *favour* may depend on the caprice of him who bestows it.

The *credit* which we have with others is marked by their confidence in our judgment; by their disposition to submit to our decisions; by their reliance in our veracity, or assent to our opinions: the *favour* we have with others is marked by their readiness to comply with our wishes; their subserviency to our views; attachment to our society: men of talent are ambitious to gain *credit* with their sovereigns, by the superiority of their counsel: men of ordinary powers are contented with being the *favourites* of princes, and enjoying their patronage and protection.

Credit and *favour* are the gifts of others; *influence* is a possession which we derive from circumstances: there will always be *influence* where there is *credit* or *favour*: but it may exist independently of either; we have *credit* and *favour* for ourselves; we exert *influence* over others: *credit* and *favour* serve one's own purposes; *influence* is employed in directing others; weak people easily give their *credit*, or bestow their *favour*, by which an *influence* is gained over them to bend them to the will of others; the *influence* itself may be good or bad, according to the views of the person by whom it is exerted.

CRIME, VICE, SIN.

CRIME, in Latin *crimen*, Greek *ζῆλον*, signifies a judgment, sentence, or punishment; and also the cause of the sentence

or punishment, in which latter sense it is here taken.

VICE, in Latin *vitium*, from *vito* to avoid, signifies that which ought to be avoided.

SIN, in Saxon *synne*, Swedish *synd*, German *sünde*, old German *sunta*, *sunto*, &c. Latin *sontes*, Greek *συνης*, from *συνω* to hurt, signifies the thing that hurts; *sin* being of all things the most hurtful.

A *crime* is a social offence; a *vice* is a personal offence: every action which does injury to others, either individually or collectively, is a *crime*; that which does injury to ourselves is a *vice*.

Crime consists in a violation of human laws; *vice* in a violation of the moral law; *sin* in a violation of the Divine law: *sin*, therefore, comprehends both *crime* and *vice*; but there are many *sins* which are not *crimes* nor *vices*: *crimes* are tried before a human court, and punished agreeably to the sentence of the judge; *vices* and *sins* are brought before the tribunal of the conscience; the former are punished in this world, the latter will be punished in the world to come, by the sentence of the Almighty: treason is one of the most atrocious *crimes*; drunkenness one of the most dreadful *vices*; religious hypocrisy one of the most heinous *sins*.

Crimes are particular acts; *vices* are habitual acts of commission; *sins* are acts of commission or omission, habitual or particular: personal security, respect for the laws, and regard for one's moral character, operate to prevent the commission of *crimes* or *vices*; the fear of God deters from the commission of *sin*.

A *crime* always involves a violation of a law; a *vice*, whether in conduct or disposition, always diminishes moral excellence and involves guilt; a *sin* always supposes some perversity of will in an accountable agent. Children may commit *crimes*, but we may trust that in the divine mercy they will not all be imputed to them as *sins*. Of *vices*, however, as they are habitual, we have no right to suppose that any exception will be made in the account of our *sins*.

Crimes vary with times and countries; *vices* may be more or less pernicious; but *sin* is as unchangeable in its nature as the Being whom it offends. Smuggling and forgery are *crimes* in England, which in other countries are either not known or not regarded: the *vice* of gluttony is not so dreadful as that of drunkenness: every *sin*, as an offence against an infinitely good and wise Being, must always bear the same stamp of guilt and enormity.

CRIME, MISDEMEANOUR.

CRIME, *v.* *Crime*.

MISDEMEANOUR, signifies literally a wrong demeanour.

The former of these terms is to the latter as the genus to the species: a *misdemeanour* is in the technical sense a minor *crime*. House-breaking is under all circumstances a *crime*; but perjury amounts only to a *misdemeanour*.

By the affectation of some speakers in modern times the word *crime* has been used in the singular to denote in the abstract sense a course of criminal conduct, or a series of *crimes*, as the increase of *crime*, an innovation not warranted by necessity, as an increase of *crimes* expresses the sense more forcibly.

Corporeal punishments are most commonly annexed to *crimes*; pecuniary punishments frequently to *misdemeanours*. In the vulgar use of these terms, *misdemeanour* is moreover distinguished from *crime*, by not always signifying a violation of public law, but only of private morals; in which sense the former term implies what is done against the state, and the latter that which offends individuals or small communities.

CRIMINAL, GUILTY.

CRIMINAL, from *crime*, signifies belonging or relating to a *crime*.

GUILTY, from *guilt*, signifies having *guilt*: *guilt* comes from the German *gelten*, to pay, and *gelt* a fine, debt.

Criminal respects the character of the offence; *guilty* respects the fact of committing the offence. The *criminality* of a person is estimated by all the circumstances of his conduct which present themselves to observation; his *guilt* requires to be proved by evidence. The *criminality* is not a matter of question, but of judgment; the *guilt* is often doubtful, if not positively concealed. The higher the rank of a person, the greater his *criminality* if he does not observe an upright and irreproachable conduct: where a number of individuals are concerned in any unlawful proceeding, the difficulty of attaching the *guilt* to the real offender is greatly increased.

Criminality attaches to the aider, abettor, or encourager; but *guilt*, in the strict sense, only to the perpetrator of what is bad. A person may therefore sometimes be *criminal* without being *guilty*. He who conceals the offences of another may, under certain circumstances, be more *criminal* than the *guilty* person himself. On the other hand, we may be *guilty* without being *criminal*: the latter

designates something positively bad, but the former is qualified by the objects of the guilt. Those only are denominated *criminal* who offend seriously, either against public law or private morals; but a person may be said to be *guilty*, either of great or small offences. He who contradicts another abruptly in conversation is *guilty* of a breach of politeness, but he is not *criminal*.

Criminal is moreover applied as an epithet to the things done; *guilty* is mostly applied to the person doing. We commonly speak of actions, proceedings, intentions, and views, as *criminal*; but of the person, the mind, or the conscience, as *guilty*. It is very *criminal* to sow dissension among men; although there are too many who from a busy temper are *guilty* of this offence.

CRIMINAL, CULPRIT, MALEFACTOR, FELON, CONVICT.

All these terms are employed for a public offender; but the first conveys no more than this general idea; whilst the others comprehend some accessory idea in their signification.

CRIMINAL (*v. Criminal, guilty*) is a general term, and the rest are properly species of *criminals*.

CULPRIT, from the Latin *culpa*, and *prehensus* taken in a fault, signifies the *criminal* who is directly charged with his offence.

MALEFACTOR, compounded of the Latin terms *male* and *factor*, signifies an evil-doer, that is, one who does evil, in distinction from him who does good.

FELON, from *felony*, in Latin *felonia* a capital crime, comes from the Greek *φηλωσις* an imposture, because fraud and villany are the prominent features of every capital offence.

CONVICT, in Latin *convictus*, participle of *convinco* to convince or prove, signifies one proved or found guilty.

When we wish to speak in general of those who by offences against the laws or regulations of society have exposed themselves to punishment, we denominate them *criminals*: when we consider them as already brought before a tribunal, we call them *culprits*: when we consider them in regard to the moral turpitude of their character, as the promoters of evil, we entitle them *malefactors*; when we consider them as offending by the grosser violations of the law, they are termed *felons*; when we consider them as already under the sentence of the law, we denominate them *convicts*.

CRITERION, STANDARD.

CRITERION, in Greek *κριτηριον* from

κρίνω to judge, signifies the mark or rule by which one may judge.

STANDARD, from the verb to *stand*, signifies the point at which one must *stand*, or beyond which one must not go.

The term *criterion* is employed only in matters of judgment; *standard* is used in the ordinary concerns of life. The former serves for determining the characters and qualities of things; the latter for defining quantity and measure. The language and manners of a person are the best *criterion* for forming an estimate of his station and education. In order to produce a uniformity in the mercantile transactions of mankind one with another, it is the custom of government to fix a certain *standard* for the regulation of coins, weights, and measures.

The word *standard* may likewise be used figuratively in the same sense. The Bible is a *standard* of excellence both in morals and religion, which cannot be too closely followed. It is impossible to have the same *standard* in the arts and sciences, because all our performances fall short of perfection, and will admit of improvement.

CRUEL, INHUMAN, BARBAROUS, BRUTAL, SAVAGE.

CRUEL, from the Latin *crudelis* and *crudus* raw, rough, or untutored.

INHUMAN, compounded of the privative *in* and *human*, signifies not human.

BARBAROUS, from the Greek *βαρβαρος* rude or unsettled. They all mark a degree of bad feeling which is uncontrolled by culture or refinement.

BRUTAL, signifying like the *brute*; and SAVAGE, from the Latin *saevus* fierce, and the Hebrew *zaal* a wolf, mark a still stronger degree of this bad passion.

Cruel is the most familiar and the least powerful epithet of all these terms; it designates the ordinary propensity which is innate in man, and which, if not overpowered by a better principle, will invariably show itself by the desire of inflicting positive pain on others, or abridging their comfort: *inhuman* and *barbarous* are higher degrees of *cruelty*; *brutal* and *savage* rise so much in degree above the rest, as almost to partake of another nature. A child gives early symptoms of his natural *cruelty* by his ill-treatment of animals; but we do not speak of his *inhumanity*, because this is a term confined to men, and more properly to their treatment of their own species, although extended in its sense to their treatment of the *brutes*: *barbarity* is but too common among children and persons of riper years. A person is *cruel* who neglects the creature he

should protect and take care of: he is *inhuman* if he withhold from him the common marks of tenderness or kindness which are to be expected from one *human* being to another; he is *barbarous* if he find amusement in inflicting pain: he is *brutal* or *savage* according to the circumstances of aggravation which accompany the act of torturing.

Cruel is applied either to the disposition or the conduct; *inhuman* and *barbarous* mostly to the outward conduct: *brutal* and *savage* mostly to the disposition. Domitian was notorious for the *cruelty* of his disposition: the Romans indulged themselves in the *inhuman* practice of making their slaves and convicts fight with wild beasts; but the *barbarities* which have been practised on slaves in the colonies of European states, exceed every thing in atrocity that is related of ancient times; proving that, in spite of all the refinement which the religion of our blessed Saviour has introduced into the world, the possession of uncontrolled power will inevitably *brutalize* the mind and give a *savage* ferocity to the character.

TO CRY, WEEP.

CRY comes from the Greek *κραζειν*, and the Hebrew *kara* to cry or call.

WEEP, in low German *wapen*, is a variation of whine, in German *weinen*, which is an onomatopœia. An outward indication of pain is expressed by both these terms, but the former comprehends an audible expression accompanied or not with tears; the latter simply indicates the shedding of tears.

Crying arises from an impatience in suffering corporeal pains; children and weak people commonly *cry*: *weeping* is occasioned by mental grief; the wisest and best of men will not disdain sometimes to *weep*.

TO CRY, SCREAM, SHRIEK.

CRY, *v.* To cry, weep.

SCREAM and SHRIEK are variations of *cry*.

To *cry* indicates the utterance of an articulate or an inarticulate sound; *scream* is a species of *crying* in the first sense of the word; *shriek* is a species of *crying* in its latter sense.

Crying is an ordinary mode of loud utterance resorted to on common occasions; one *cries* in order to be heard; *screaming* is an intemperate mode of *crying*, resorted to from an impatient desire to be heard, or from a vehemence of feeling. People *scream* to deaf people from the mistaken idea of making themselves heard; whereas, a distinct articulation will always be more ef-

ficacious. *Shriek* may be compared with *cry* and *scream*, as expressions of pain; in this case to *shriek* is more than to *cry*, and less than to *scream*. They both signify to *cry* with a violent effort. We may *cry* from the slightest pain or inconvenience; but one *shrieks* or *screams* only on occasions of great agony, either corporeal or mental. A child *cries* when it has hurt its finger; it *shrieks* in the moment of terror, at the sight of a frightful object; or *screams* until some one comes to its assistance.

To *cry* is an action peculiar to no age or sex; to *scream* and to *shriek* are the common actions of women and children. Men *cry*, and children *scream* for assistance; excess of pain will sometimes compel a man to *cry* out, but it commonly makes a female *shriek*.

TO CRY, EXCLAIM, CALL.

All these terms express a loud mode of speaking; which is all that is implied in the sense of the word CRY, while in that of the two latter are comprehended accessory ideas.

TO EXCLAIM, from the Latin *exclamo* or *ex* and *clamo* to cry out or aloud, signifies to cry with an effort.

CALL comes from the Greek *καλεω*.

We *cry* from the simple desire of being heard at a distance; we *exclaim* from a sudden emotion or agitation of mind. A *cry* bespeaks distress and trouble; an *exclamation* bespeaks surprise, grief, or joy. We *cry* commonly in a large assembly or an open space, but we may *exclaim* in conversation with an individual.

To *cry* is louder and more urgent than to *call*. A man who is in danger of being drowned *cries* for help; he who wants to raise a load *calls* for assistance: a *cry* is a general or indirect address; a *call* is a particular and immediate address. We *cry* to all or any who may be within hearing; we *call* an individual by name, with a direct reference to him.

CULPABLE, FAULTY.

CULPABLE, in Latin *culpabilis*, comes from *culpa* a fault or blame, signifying worthy of blame, fit to be blamed.

FAULTY from *fault*, signifies having faults.

We are *culpable* from the commission of one fault; we are *faulty* from the number of faults: *culpable* is a relative term; *faulty* is absolute: we are *culpable* with regard to a superior whose intentions we have not fulfilled; we are *faulty* whenever we commit any faults. A master pronounces his ser-

vant *culpable* for not having attended to his commands; an indifferent person pronounces another as *faulty* whose faults have come under his notice. It is possible, therefore, to be *faulty* without being *culpable*, but not *vice versa*.

CULTIVATION, CULTURE, CIVILIZATION, REFINEMENT.

CULTIVATION, from the Latin *cultus*, denotes the act of *cultivating*, or state of being *cultivated*.

CULTURE from *cultus*, signifies the state only of being *cultivated*.

CIVILIZATION signifies the act of *civilizing*, or state of being *civilized*.

REFINEMENT denotes the act of *refining*, or the state of being *refined*.

Cultivation is with more propriety applied to the thing that grows; *culture* to that in which it grows. The *cultivation* of flowers will not repay the labour unless the soil be prepared by proper *culture*. In the same manner, when speaking figuratively, we say the *cultivation* of any art or science; the *cultivation* of one's taste or inclination, may be said to contribute to one's own skill or the perfection of the thing itself; but the mind requires *culture* previously to this particular exertion of the powers.

Civilization is the first stage of *cultivation*; *refinement* is the last: we *civilize* savages by divesting them of their rudeness, and giving them a knowledge of such arts as are requisite for *civil* society; we *cultivate* people in general by calling forth their powers into action and independent exertion; we *refine* them by the introduction of the liberal arts.

Cultivation is applied either to persons or things; *civilization* is applied to men collectively, *refinement* to men individually: we may *cultivate* the mind or any of its operations; or we may *cultivate* the ground or any thing that grows in the ground; we *civilize* nations; we *refine* the mind or the manners.

CULTIVATION, TILLAGE, HUSBANDRY.

CULTIVATION has a much more comprehensive meaning than either *tillage* or *husbandry*. **TILLAGE** is a mode of *cultivation* that extends no farther than the preparation of the ground for the reception of the seed; *cultivation* includes the whole process by which the produce of the earth is brought to maturity. We may *till* without *cultivating*; but we cannot *cultivate*, as far as respects the soil, without *tillage*. **HUSBANDRY** is more extensive in its meaning than *tillage*, but not so extensive as *cultivation*.

Tillage respects the act only of *tilling* the ground; *husbandry* is employed for the office of *cultivating* for domestic purposes. A *cultivator* is a general term, defined only by the object that is *cultivated*, as the *cultivator* of the grape, or the olive; a *tiller* is a labourer in the soil that performs the office for another: a *husbandman* is a humble species of *cultivator*, who himself performs the whole office of *cultivating* the ground for domestic purposes.

CUNNING, CRAFTY, SUBTLE, SLY, WILY.

CUNNING, v. *Art*.

CRAFTY signifies having *craft*, that is, according to the original meaning of the word, a knowledge of some trade or art; hence, figuratively applied to the character.

SUBTLE, in French *subtil*, and Latin *subtilis* thin, from *sub* and *tela* a thread drawn to be fine; hence, in the figurative sense in which it is here taken, fine or acute in thought.

SLY, German *schlau*, is, in all probability, connected with slow, and sleek, or smooth; deliberation and smoothness entering very much into the sense of *sly*.

WILY signifies disposed to *wiles* or stratagems.

All these epithets agree in expressing an aptitude to employ peculiar and secret means to the attainment of an end; they differ principally in the secrecy of the means, or the degree of circumvention that is employed. The *cunning* man shows his dexterity simply in concealing; this requires little more than reservedness and taciturnity: the *crafty* man goes farther; he shapes his words and actions so as to lull suspicion: hence it is that a child may be *cunning*, but an old man will be *crafty*: a *subtle* man has more acuteness of invention than either, and all his schemes are hidden by a veil that is impenetrable by common observation: the *cunning* man looks only to the concealment of an immediate object; the *crafty* and *subtle* man has a remote object to conceal: thus men are *cunning* in their ordinary concerns; politicians are *crafty* or *subtle*: but the former is more so as to the end, and the latter as to the means. A man is *cunning* and *crafty* by deeds; he is *subtle* mostly by means of words alone, or words and actions combined. *Slyness* is a vulgar kind of *cunning*; the *sly* man goes cautiously and silently to work. *Wiliness* is a species of *cunning* or *craft*, applicable only to cases of attack or defence.

TO CURE, HEAL, REMEDY.

CURE, in Latin *curo*, signifies to take care of, that is, by distinction, to take care of that which requires particular care, in order to remove an evil.

HEAL, in German *heilen*, comes from *heil* whole, signifying to make whole that which is unsound.

REMEDY, in Latin *remedium*, is compounded of *re* and *medeor* to cure or heal, which comes from the Greek *μηδομαι* and *Μηδία Media*, the country which contained the greatest number of healing plants. The particle *re* is here but an intensive.

To cure is employed for what is out of order; to heal for that which is broken: diseases are cured, wounds are healed; the former is a complex, the latter is a simple process. Whatever requires to be cured, is wrong in the system; it requires many and various applications internally and externally; whatever requires to be healed is occasioned externally by violence, and requires external applications. In a state of refinement men have the greatest number of disorders to be cured; in a savage state there is more occasion for the healing art.

Cure is used as properly in the moral as the natural sense; heal in the moral sense is altogether figurative. The disorders of the mind are cured with greater difficulty than those of the body. The breaches which have been made in the affections of relatives towards each other, can be healed by nothing but a Christian spirit of forbearance and forgiveness.

To remedy, in the sense of applying remedies, has a moral application, in which it accords most with cure. Evils are either cured or remedied, but the former are of a much more serious nature than the latter. The evils in society require to be cured; an omission, a deficiency, or a mischief, requires to be remedied.

CURE, REMEDY.

CURE (v. To cure) denotes either the act of curing, or the thing that cures. REMEDY is mostly employed for the thing that remedies. In the former sense the remedy is to the cure as the means to the end; a cure is performed by the application of a remedy. That is incurable for which no remedy can be found; but a cure is sometimes performed without the application of any specific remedy. The cure is complete when the evil is entirely removed; the remedy is sure which by proper application never fails of effecting the cure.

The cure of disorders depends upon the skill of the physician and the state of the patient; the efficacy of remedies depends upon their suitable choice and application: but a cure may be defeated or a remedy made of no avail by a variety of circumstances independent of either.

A cure is sometimes employed for the thing that cures, but only in the sense of what infallibly cures. Quacks always hold forth their nostrums as infallible cures not for one but for every sort of disorder; experience has however proved that the remedy in most cases is worse than the disease.

CURIOUS, INQUISITIVE, PRYING.

CURIOUS, in French *curieux*, Latin *curiosus*, from *cura* care, signifying full of care.

INQUISITIVE, in Latin *inquisitus*, from *inquiero* to inquire or search into, signifies a disposition to investigate thoroughly.

PRYING, from *pry*, changed from the French *preuver* to try, signifies the disposition to try or sift to the bottom.

The disposition to interest one's self in matters not of immediate concern is the idea common to all these terms. Curiosity is directed to all objects that can gratify the inclination, taste, or understanding; inquisitiveness to such things only as satisfy the understanding.

The curious person interests himself in all the works of nature and art; he is curious to try effects and examine causes: the inquisitive person endeavours to add to his store of knowledge. Curiosity employs every means which falls in its way in order to procure gratification; the curious man uses his own powers or those of others to serve his purpose: inquisitiveness is indulged only by means of verbal inquiry; the inquisitive person collects all from others.

A traveller is curious who examines every thing for himself; he is inquisitive when he minutely questions others. Inquisitiveness is therefore to curiosity as a part to the whole; whoever is curious will naturally be inquisitive, and he who is inquisitive is so from a species of curiosity.

Curious and inquisitive may be both used in a bad sense; prying is never used otherwise than in a bad sense. Inquisitive, as in the former case, is a mode of curiosity, and prying is a species of eager curiosity.

A curious person takes unallowed means of learning that which he ought not to wish to know; an inquisitive person puts many impertinent and troublesome questions; a prying temper is unceasing in its endeavours to get acquainted with the secrets of others.

Curiosity is a fault most frequent among females; *inquisitiveness* is most general among children; a *prying* temper belongs only to people of low character.

CURSORY, HASTY, SLIGHT, DESULTORY.

CURSORY, from the Latin *curro*, signifies run over or done in running.

HASTY signifies done in *haste*.

SLIGHT is a variation of light.

DESULTORY, from *desilio* to leap, signifies leaped over.

Cursory includes both *hasty* and *slight*; it includes *hasty* inasmuch as it expresses a quick motion; it includes *slight* inasmuch as it conveys the idea of a partial action: a view may be either *cursory* or *hasty*, as the former is taken by design, the latter from carelessness: a view may be either *cursory* or *slight*; but the former is not so imperfect as the latter: an author will take a *cursory* view of those points which are not necessarily connected with his subject; an author who takes a *hasty* view of a subject will mislead by his errors; he who takes a *slight* view will disappoint by the shallowness of his information. Between *cursory* and *desultory* there is the same difference as between running and leaping: we run in a line, but we leap from one part to another; so remarks that are *cursory* have more or less connexion, but remarks that are *desultory* are without any coherence.

CUSTOM, HABIT.

CUSTOM, in French *coutume*, probably contracted from the Latin *consuetum*, participle of *consuesco* to accustom.

HABIT, in French *habit*, Latin *habitus*, from *habeo* to have, marks the state of having or holding.

Custom is a frequent repetition of the same act: *habit* the effect of such repetition: the *custom* of rising early in the morning is conducive to the health, and may in a short time become such a *habit* as to render it no less agreeable than it is useful.

Custom supposes an act of the will; *habit* implies an involuntary movement: a *custom* is followed; a *habit* is acquired: whoever follows the *custom* of imitating the look, tone, or gesture of another, is liable to get the *habit* of doing the same himself: the drunkard is formed by the *custom* of drinking intemperately, until he becomes *habituated* to the use of spirituous liquors: the love of imitation is so powerful in the human breast, that it leads the major part of mankind to follow *custom* even in ridiculous things: Solomon refers to the power of *habit* when he says, „train up a child in

the way in which he should go; and when he is old he will not depart from it.“

Custom is applicable to many; *habit* is confined to the individual: every nation has *customs* peculiar to itself; and every individual has *habits* peculiar to his age, station, and circumstances.

Customary and *habitual*, the epithets derived from these words, admit of a similar distinction: a *customary* action is that which is repeated after the manner of a *custom*; an *habitual* action is that which is done by the force of *habit*.

CUSTOM, FASHION, MANNER, PRACTICE.

CUSTOMS, FASHIONS, and MANNERS, are all employed for communities of men: *custom* (v. *Custom*, *habit*) respects established and general modes of action; *fashion*, in French *façon*, from *facio* to do or make, regards partial and transitory modes of making or doing things: *manner*, in the limited sense in which it is here taken, signifies the *manner* or mode of men's living or behaving in their social intercourse.

Custom is authoritative; it stands in the place of law, and regulates the conduct of men in the most important concerns of life: *fashion* is arbitrary and capricious, it decides in matters of trifling import: *manners* are rational; they are the expressions of moral feelings. *Customs* are most prevalent in barbarous states of society; *fashions* rule most where luxury has made the greatest progress; *manners* are most distinguishable in a civilized state of society.

Customs are in their nature as unchangeable as *fashions* are variable; *manners* depend on cultivation and collateral circumstances: *customs* die away or are abolished; *fashions* pass away, and new ones take their place; *manners* are altered either for the better or the worse: endeavours have been successfully employed in several parts of India to abolish the *custom* of infanticide, and that of women sacrificing themselves on the funeral piles of their husbands; the votaries of *fashion* are not contented with giving the law for the cut of a coat or the shape of a bonnet, but they wish to intrude upon the sphere of the scholar or the artist, by prescribing in matters of literature and taste; the influence of public opinion on the *manners* of a people has never been so strikingly illustrated as in the instance of the French nation during and since the Revolution.

PRACTICE, derived from the Greek *πρακτική*, from *πρασσω* to do, signifies actually doing or the thing done, that is, by distinction, the regularly doing, or the

thing regularly done, in which sense it is most analogous to *custom*: but the former simply conveys the idea of actual performance; the latter includes also the accessory idea of repetition at stated periods: a *practice* must be defined as frequent or unfrequent, regular or irregular; but a *custom* does not require to be qualified by any such epithets: it may be the *practice* of a person to do acts of charity, as the occasion requires; but when he uniformly does a particular act of charity at any given period of the year, it is properly denominated his *custom*.

Both *practice* and *custom* are general or particular, but the former is absolute, the latter relative: a *practice* may be adopted by a number of persons without reference to each other; but a *custom* is always followed either by imitation or prescription: the *practice* of gaming has always been followed by the vicious part of society; but it is to be hoped for the honour of man that it will never become a *custom*.

D.

DAILY, DIURNAL.

DAILY, from *day* and *like*, signifies after the manner or in the time of the *day*,

DIURNAL, from *dies* day, signifies belonging to the *day*.

Daily is the colloquial term which is applicable to whatever passes in the *day* time; *diurnal* is the scientific term, which applies to what passes within or belongs to the astronomical *day*: a physician makes *daily* visits to his patients; the earth has a *diurnal* motion on its own axis.

DAINTY, DELICACY.

These terms, which are in vogue among epicures, have some shades of difference in their signification not altogether undeserving of notice.

DAINTY from *dain*, *deign*, and the Latin *dignus* worthy, is applied to that which is of worth or value,—of course only to such things as have a superior value in the estimation of epicures; and consequently conveys a more positive meaning than DELICACY: inasmuch as a *dainty* may be that which is extremely *delicate*; a *delicacy* is sometimes a species of *dainty*; but there are many *delicacies* which are altogether suited to the most *delicate* appetite, that are neither costly nor rare, two qualities which are almost inseparable from a *dainty*: those who indulge themselves freely in *dainties* and *delicacies* scarcely know what it is to eat with an appetite; but those who

are temperate in their use of the enjoyments of life will be enabled to derive pleasure from ordinary objects.

DANGER, PERIL, HAZARD.

DANGER, in French *danger*, comes from the Latin *damnum* a loss or damage, signifying the chance of a loss.

PERIL, in French *peril*, comes from *perreo*, which signifies either to go over, or to perish, and *periculum*, which signifies literally that which is undergone; designating a critical situation, a rude trial, which may terminate in one's ruin.

HAZARD, *v.* *Chance*, *hazard*.

The idea of chance or uncertainty is common to all these terms; but the former may sometimes be foreseen and calculated upon; the latter is purely contingent.

Danger and *peril* are applied to a positive evil; *hazard* may simply respect the loss of a good; risks are voluntarily run from the hope of good: there may be many *dangers* included in a *hazard*; and there cannot be a *hazard* without some *danger*.

A general *hazard* a battle, in order to disengage himself from a difficulty; he may by this step involve himself in *danger* of losing his honour or his life; but it is likewise possible that by his superior skill he may set both out of all *danger*: we are hourly exposed to *dangers* which no human foresight can guard against, and are frequently induced to engage in enterprises at the *hazard* of our lives, and of all that we hold dear.

Dangers are far and near, ordinary and extraordinary; they meet us if we do not go in search of them: *perils* are always distant and extraordinary; we must go out of our course to expose ourselves to them: in the quiet walk of life, as in the most busy and tumultuous, it is the lot of man to be surrounded by *danger*: the mariner and the traveller who go in search of unknown countries put themselves in the way of undergoing *perils* both by sea and land.

The same distinction exists between the epithets that are derived from these terms.

It is *dangerous* for a youth to act without the advice of his friends; it is *perilous* for a traveller to explore the wilds of Africa; it is *hazardous* for a merchant to speculate in time of war: experiments in matters of policy or government are always *dangerous*; a journey through deserts that are infested with beasts of prey is *perilous*; a military expedition conducted with inadequate means is *hazardous*.

DARING, BOLD.

DARING signifies having the spirit to dare.

BOLD, *v. Audacity.*

These terms may be both taken in a bad sense; but *daring* much oftener than *bold*; in either case *daring* expresses much more than *bold*: he who is *daring* provokes resistance, and courts *danger*; but the *bold* man is contented to overcome the resistance that is offered to him: a man may be *bold* in the use of words only; he must be *daring* in actions: he is *bold* in the defence of truth; he is *daring* in military enterprise.

DARK, OBSCURE, DIM, MYSTERIOUS.

DARK, in Saxon *deorc*, is doubtless connected with the German *dunkel* dark and *dunst* a vapour, which is a cause of darkness.

OBSCURE, in Latin *obscurus*, compounded of *ob* and *scurus*, Greek *σκιερός* and *σκια* a shadow, signifies literally interrupted by a shadow.

DIM is but a variation of *dark*, *dunkel*, &c.

Darkness expresses more than *obscurity*: the former denotes the total privation of light; the latter only the diminution of light.

Dark is opposed to light; *obscure* to bright: what is *dark* is altogether hidden; what is *obscure* is not to be seen distinctly, or without an effort.

Darkness may be used either in a natural or moral sense; *obscurity* only in the latter; in which case the former conveys a more unfavourable idea: *darkness* serves to cover that which ought not be hidden; *obscurity* intercepts our view of that which we would wish to see: the former is the consequence of design; the latter of neglect or accident: the letter sent by the conspirator in the gunpowder plot to his friend was *dark*; all passages in ancient writers which allude to circumstances no longer known, must necessarily be *obscure*: a corner may be said to be *dark* or *obscure*, but the former is used literally and the latter figuratively; the owl is obliged, from the weakness of its visual organs, to seek the *darkest* corners in the daytime; men of distorted minds often seek *obscure* corners, only from disappointed ambition.

Dim expresses a degree of *darkness*, but it is employed more in relation to the person seeing than to the object seen. The eyes are said to grow *dim*, or the sight *dim*. The light is said to be *dim*, by which things are but *dimly* seen.

MYSTERIOUS denotes a species of the *dark*, in relation to the actions of men; where a veil is intentionally thrown over any object so as to render it as incomprehensible as that which is sacred. *Dark* is an epithet taken always in the bad sense, but *mysterious* is always in an indifferent sense. We are told in the Sacred Writings, that men love *darkness* rather than light, because their deeds are evil. Whatever, therefore, is *dark* in the ways of men, is naturally presumed to be evil; but things may be *mysterious* in the events of human life, without the express intention of an individual to render them so. The speeches of an assassin and conspirator may be *dark*; any intricate affair which involves the characters and conduct of men may be *mysterious*.

The same distinction exists between these terms when applied to the ways of Providence, which are said to be sometimes *dark*, in as much as they present a cloudy aspect; and mostly *mysterious*, in as much as they are past finding out.

DEADLY, MORTAL, FATAL.

DEADLY or DEADLIKE signifies like death itself in its effects.

MORTAL, in Latin *mortalis*, signifies belonging to death.

FATAL, in Latin *fatalis*, signifies according to fate.

Deadly is applied to what is productive of death; *mortal* is applied to what terminates in or is liable to death: *fatal* applies not only to death, but every thing which may be of great mischief. A poison is *deadly*; a wound or a wounded part is *mortal*; a step in walking, or a step in one's conduct, may be *fatal*. Things only are *deadly*; creatures are *mortal*. There may be remedies sometimes to counteract that which is *deadly*; but that which is *mortal* is past all cure; and that which is *fatal* cannot be retrieved.

DEAL, QUANTITY, PORTION.

DEAL, in Saxon *dael*, Dutch *deel*, and German *theil*, from *daelen*, *theilen*, &c. to divide, signifies literally the thing divided or taken off.

QUANTITY, in Latin *quantitas*, comes from *quantus*, signifying how much.

PORTION, through the Latin *pars* and *portio*, comes from the Hebrew *parish* to divide, signifying, like the word *deal*, the thing taken off.

Deal always denotes something great, and cannot be coupled with any epithet that does not express much: *quantity* is a term

of relative import; it either marks indefinitely, so much of a thing, or may be defined by some epithet to express much or little: *portion* is of itself altogether indefinite, and admits of being qualified by any epithet to express much or little: *deal* is a term confined to familiar use, and sometimes substituted for *quantity*, and sometimes for *portion*. It is common to speak of a *deal* or a *quantity* of paper, a great *deal* or a great *quantity* of money; likewise of a great *deal* or great *portion* of pleasure, a great *deal* or a great *portion* of wealth: and in some cases *deal* is more usual than either *quantity* or *portion*, as a *deal* of heat, a *deal* of rain, a *deal* of frost, a *deal* of noise, and the like: but it is altogether inadmissible in the higher style of writing.

Portion is employed only for that which is detached from the whole; *quantity* may sometimes be employed for a number of wholes. We may speak of a large or a small *quantity* of books; a large or small *quantity* of plants or herbs: but a large or small *portion* of food, a large or small *portion* of colour. *Quantity* is used only in the natural sense: *portion* also in the moral application. Material substances, as wood, stone, metals, and liquids, are necessarily considered with regard to *quantity*; the qualities of the mind and the circumstances of human life are divided into *portions*. A builder estimates the *quantity* of materials which he will want for the completion of a house; the workman estimates the *portion* of labour which the work will require.

DEATH, DEPARTURE, DECEASE, DEMISE.

DEATH signifies the act of *dying*.

DEPARTURE signifies the act of *departing*.

DECEASE, from the Latin *decedo*, to fall off, signifies the act of falling away.

DEMISE, from *demitto* to lay down, signifies literally resigning possession.

Death is a general or a particular term; it marks in the abstract sense the extinction of life, and is applicable to men or animals; to one or many. *Departure*, *decease*, and *demise*, are particular expressions suited only to the condition of human beings. * *Departure* is a Christian term, which carries with it an idea of a passage from one life to another: *decease* is a technical term in law, which is introduced into common life to designate one's falling off from the number of the living; *demise* is substituted for *decease* sometimes in speaking of princes.

* Vide Dr. Trusler: „Departure, death, decease.“

Of *death* it has been said, that nothing is more certain than that it will come, and nothing more uncertain than when it will come. Knowing that we have here no resting place of abode, it is the part of wisdom to look forward to our *departure*. Property is in perpetual occupancy: at the *decease* of one possessor, it passes into the hands of another. So tender is the law of supposing even a possibility of the king's *death* that his natural dissolution is generally called his *demise*.

As an epithet, *dead* is used collectively; *departed* is used with a noun only; *deceased* generally without a noun, to denote one or more, according to the connexion.

There is a respect due to the *dead*, which cannot be violated without offence to the living. It is a pleasant reflection to conceive of *departed* spirits, as taking an interest in the concerns of those whom they have left. All the marks on the body of the *deceased* indicated that he had met with his death by some violence.

TO DEBATE, DELIBERATE.

DEBATE, v. *To argue, dispute.*

DELIBERATE, v. *To consult, deliberate.*

These terms equally mark the acts of pausing or withholding the decision, whether applicable to one or many. To *debate* supposes always a contrariety of opinion; to *deliberate* supposes simply the weighing or estimating the value of the opinion that is offered. Where many persons have the liberty of offering their opinions, it is natural to expect that there will be *debating*; when any subject offers that is complicated and questionable, it calls for mature *deliberation*.

DEBILITY, INFIRMITY, IMBECILITY.

DEBILITY, in Latin *debilitas*, from *debilis*, or *de* privative and *habilis*, signifies a deficiency, or not having.

INFIRMITY, in Latin *infirmitas*, from *infirmus*, or *in* privative and *firmus* strong, signifies the absence of strength.

IMBECILITY, in Latin *imbecillitas* from *imbecillis*, or *in* privative, and *becillis*, *bacillum*, or *baculus* a staff, signifies not having a staff: all these terms denote a species of weakness, but the two former, particularly the first, respects that which is physical, and the latter that which is either physical or mental. *Debility* is constitutional, or otherwise; *imbecility* is always constitutional; *infirmity* is accidental, and results from sickness, or a decay of the frame. *Debility* may be either general or local; in-

firmity is always local; *imbecility* is always general. *Debility* prevents the active performance of the ordinary functions of nature; it is a deficiency in the muscular power of the body; *infirmité* is a partial want of power, which interferes with, but does not necessarily destroy, the activity: *imbecility* lies in the whole frame, and renders it almost entirely powerless.

Young people are frequently troubled with *debilities* in their ankles or legs, of which they are never cured. Old age is most exposed to *infirmités*; but there is no age at which human beings are exempt from *infirmité* of some kind or another. The *imbecility* natural to youth, both in body and mind, would make them willing to rest on the strength of their elders, if they were not too often misled by a mischievous confidence in their own strength.

DEBT, DUE.

DEBT and DUE are both derived from the same verb. *Debt* comes from *debitus* participle of the Latin verb *debeo*: and *due*, in French *dû* participle of *devoir*, comes likewise from *debeo* to owe.

Debt is used always as a substantive; *due*, either as a substantive or an adjective. A person contracts *debts*, and receives his *due*. The *debt* is both obligatory and compulsory; it is a return for something equivalent in value, and cannot be dispensed with: what is *due* is obligatory, but not always compulsory. A *debtor* may be compelled to discharge his *debts*; but it is not always in the power of a man even to claim that which is his *due*. *Debt* is generally used in a mercantile sense; *due* either in a mercantile or moral sense. A *debt* is determined by law; what is *due* is fixed often by principles of equity and honour. He who receives the stipulated price of his goods receives his *debt*; he who receives praise and honour, as a reward of good actions, receives his *due*.

Debt may sometimes be used figuratively, as, to pay the *debt* of nature.

DECAY, DECLINE, CONSUMPTION.

DECAY, French *dechoir*, from the Latin *decado*, signifies literally to fall off or away.

DECLINE, from the Latin *declino*, or *de* and *clino*, signifies to turn away or lean aside.

The direction expressed by both these actions is very similar; it is a sideward movement, but *decay* expresses more than *decline*. What is *decayed* is fallen or gone;

what *declines* leans towards a fall or is going; when applied, therefore, to the same objects, a *decline* is properly the commencement of a *decay*. The health may experience a *decline* at any period of life from a variety of causes, but it naturally experiences a *decay* in old age.

CONSUMPTION (v. *To consume*) implies a rapid decay.

* By *decay* things lose their perfection, their greatness, and their consistency; by *decline* they lose their strength, their vigour, and their lustre; by *consumption* they lose their existence. *Decay* brings to ruin; *decline* leads to an end or expiration. There are somethings to which *decay* is peculiar, and some things to which *decline* is peculiar, and other things to which both *decay* and *decline* belong. The corruption to which material substances are particularly exposed is termed *decay*: the close of life, when health and strength begin to fall away, is termed the *decline*; the *decay* of states in the moral world takes place by the same process as the *decay* of fabrics in the natural world; the *decline* of empires, from their state of elevation and splendor, is a natural figure drawn from the *decline* of the setting sun. *Consumption* is seldom applied to any thing but animal bodies.

DECEIT, DECEPTION.

DECEIT (v. *To deceive*) marks the propensity to *deceive*, or the practice of *deceiving*; DECEPTION the act of *deceiving* (v. *To deceive*).

A *deceiver* is full of *deceit*: but a *deception* may be occasionally practised by one who has not this habit of *deceiving*. *Deceit* is a characteristic of so base a nature, that those who have it practise every species of *deception* in order to hide their characters from the observation of the world.

The practice of *deceit* springs altogether from design, and that of the worst kind; but a *deception* may be practised from indifferent, if not innocent motives, or may be occasioned even by intimate objects.

A person or a conduct is *deceitful*; an appearance is *deceptive*. A *deceitful* person has always guilt in his heart and on his tongue: jugglers practise various *deceptions* in the performance of their tricks for the entertainment of the populace.

DECEIT, DUPLICITY, DOUBLE-DEALING.

DECEIT (v. *Deceit, deception*).

DUPLICITY signifies *doubleness* in dealing, the same as DOUBLE-DEALING.

* Vide Trusler: „Decay, decline, decease.“

The former two may be applied either to habitual or particular actions, the latter only to particular actions. There may be much *deceit* or *duplicity* in a person's character or in his proceedings there is *double-dealing* only where dealing goes forward. The *deceit* may be more or less veiled; the *duplicity* lies very deep, and is always studied whenever it is put in practice. *Duplicity* in reference to actions is mostly employed for a course of conduct: *double-dealing* is but another term for *duplicity* on particular occasions. Children of reserved characters are frequently prone to *deceit*, which grows into consummate *duplicity* in riper years: the wealthy are often exposed to much *duplicity* when they choose their favourites among the low and ignorant: nothing gives rise to more *double-dealing* than the fabrication of wills.

DECEIT, FRAUD, GUILF.

DECEIT (*v. Deceit, deception*) is allied to FRAUD in reference to actions; to GUILF in reference to the character.

Deceit is here, as in the preceding article, indeterminate when compared with *fraud* which is a specific mode of deceiving; *deceit* is practised only in private transactions; *fraud* is practised towards bodies as well as individuals, in public as well as private: a child practises *deceit* towards its parents; *frauds* are practised upon government, on the public at large, or on tradesmen: *deceit* involves the violation of moral law, *fraud* that of the civil law. A servant may *deceive* his master as to the time of his coming or going, but he *defrauds* him of his property if he obtains it by any false means. *Deceit* as a characteristic is indefinite in magnitude: *guile* marks a strong degree of moral turpitude in the individual. The former is displayed in petty concerns; the latter, which contaminates the whole character, displays itself in inextricable windings and turnings that are suggested in a peculiar manner by the author of all evil. *Deceitful* is an epithet commonly and lightly applied to persons in general; but *guileless* is applied to characters which are the most diametrically opposed to that which is false.

TO DECEIVE, DELUDE, IMPOSE UPON.

DECEIVE. in French *decevoir*, Latin *decipio*, compounded of *de* privative, and *cipio* to take, signifies to take wrong.

DELUDE, in Latin *deludo*, compounded of *de* and *ludo*, signifies to play upon or to mislead by a trick.

IMPOSE, in Latin *imposui*, perfect of

impono, signifies literally to lay or put upon.

Falsehood is the leading feature in all these terms; they vary however in the circumstances of the action. To *deceive* is the most general of the three; it signifies simply to produce a false conviction: the other terms are properly species of *deceiving*, including accessory ideas. *Deception* may be practised in various degrees; *deluding* is always positive, and considerable in degree. Every false impression produced by external objects, whether in trifles or important matters, is a *deception*; but *delusion* is confined to errors in matters of opinion. We may be *deceived* in the colour or the distance of an object; we are *deluded* in what regards our principles or moral conduct.

A *deception* does not always suppose a fault on the part of a person *deceived*, but a *delusion* does. A person is sometimes *deceived* in cases where *deception* is unavoidable: he is *deluded* through a voluntary blindness of the understanding: artful people are sometimes capable of *deceiving* so as not even to excite suspicion; their plausible tales justify the credit that is given to them: when the ignorant enter into nice questions of politics or religion, it is their ordinary fate to be *deluded*.

Deception is practised by an individual on himself or others; a *delusion* is commonly practised on one's self; an *imposition* is always practised on another, Men *deceive* others from a variety of motives; they always *impose upon* them for purposes of gain, or the gratification of ambition. Men *deceive* themselves with false pretexts and false confidence; they *delude* themselves with vain hopes and wishes.

DECEIVER, IMPOSTOR.

DECEIVER and IMPOSTOR, the derivatives from *deceive* and *impose*, have a farther distinction worthy of notice.

Deceiver is a generic term; *impostor* specific: every *impostor* is a species of *deceiver*: the words have however a distinct use. The *deceiver* practises *deception* on individuals; the *impostor* only on the public at large. The false friend and the faithless lover are *deceivers*; the assumed nobleman who practises *frauds* under his disguise, and the pretended prince who lays claim to a crown to which he was never born, are *impostors*.

DECENCY, DECORUM.

Though DECENCY and DECORUM are both derived from the same word (*v. Be.*

coming), they have acquired a distinction in their sense and application. *Decency* respects a man's conduct; *decorum* his behaviour: a person conducts himself with *decency*; he behaves with *decorum*.

Indecency is a vice; it is the violation of public or private morals; *indecorum* is a fault; it offends the feelings of those who witness it. Nothing but a depraved mind can lead to *indecent* practices: indiscretion and thoughtlessness may sometimes give rise to that which is *indecorous*. *Decency* enjoins upon all relatives, according to the proximity of their relation-ship, to show certain marks of respect to the memory of the dead: regard for the feelings of others enjoins a certain outward *decorum* upon every one who attends a funeral.

TO DECIDE, DETERMINE, CONCLUDE UPON.

DECIDE, from the Latin *decido*, compounded of *de* and *caedo*, signifies to cut off or cut short a business.

DETERMINE, from the Latin *determino*, compounded of *de* and *terminus* a term or boundary, signifies to fix a boundary.

CONCLUDE, *v.* To close, finish.

The idea of bringing a thing to an end is common to the signification of all these words; but *decide* expresses more than *determine*, and *determine* more than *conclude*.

Decide and *determine* are both employed in matters relating to ourselves or others; *conclude* is employed in matters that respect the parties only who *conclude*. As it respects others, to *decide* is an act of greater authority than to *determine*: a parent *decides* for his child; a subordinate person may *determine* sometimes for those who are under him in the absence of his superiors. In all cases, to *decide* is an act of greater importance than to *determine*. The nature and character of a thing is *decided* upon: its limits or extent are *determined* on. A judge *decides* on the law and equity of the case; the jury *determine* as to the guilt or innocence of the person. An individual *decides* in his own mind on any measure, and the propriety of adopting it; he *determines* in his own mind as to how, when, and where it shall be commenced.

One *decides* in all matters of question or dispute: one *determines* in all matters of fact. We *decide* in order to have an opinion; we *determine* in order to act. In complicated cases, where arguments of apparently equal weight are offered by men of equal authority, it is difficult to *decide*; when equally feasible plans are offered for

our choice, we are often led to *determine* upon one of them from trifling motives.

To *determine* and *conclude* are equally practical: but *determine* seems to be more peculiarly the act of an individual; *conclude* may be the act of one or of many. We *determine* by an immediate act of the will; we *conclude* on a thing by inference and deduction. Caprice may often influence in *determining*; but nothing is *concluded* on without deliberation and judgment. Many things may be *determined* on which are either never put into execution, or remain long unexecuted: but that which is *concluded* on is mostly followed by immediate action. To *conclude* on is properly to come to a final *determination*.

DECIDED, DETERMINED, RESOLUTE.

A man who is DECIDED (*v.* To decide) remains in no doubt: he who is DETERMINED is uninfluenced by the doubts or questions of others; he who is RESOLUTE (*v.* determine, resolve) is uninfluenced by the consequences of his actions. A *decided* character is at all times essential for a prince or a minister, but particularly so in an unsettled period. A *determined* character is essential for a commander, or any one who has to exercise authority. A *resolute* character is essential for one who is engaged in dangerous enterprises. Pericles was a man of a *decided* temper which was well fitted to direct the affairs of government in a season of turbulence and disquietude: Titus Manlius Torquatus displayed himself to be a man of a *determined* character, when he put to death his victorious son for a breach of military discipline: Brutus, the murderer of Caesar, was a man of a *resolute* temper.

DECIDED, DECISIVE.

DECIDED marks that which is actually *decided*: DECISIVE that which appertains to *decision*.

Decided is employed for persons or things; *decisive* only for things. A person's aversion or attachment is *decided*; a sentence, a judgment, or a victory, is *decisive*. A man of a *decided* character always adopts *decisive* measures. It is right to be *decidedly* averse to every thing which is immoral: we should be cautious not to pronounce *decisively* on any point where we are not perfectly clear and wellgrounded in our opinion. In every popular commotion it is the duty of a good subject to take a *decided* part in favour of law and order: such is the na-

ture of law, that if it were not *decisive* it would be of no value.

DECISION, JUDGMENT, SENTENCE.

DECISION signifies literally the act of *deciding*; or the thing *decided* upon (*v. To decide*).

JUDGMENT signifies the act of *judging* or *determining* in general (*v. To decide*).

SENTENCE, in Latin *sententia*, signifies the opinion held or maintained.

These terms, though very different in their original meaning, are now employed so that the two latter are species of the former: a final conclusion of any business is comprehended in them all: but *decision* conveys none of the collateral ideas which is expressed by *judgment* and *sentence*: a *decision* has no respect to the agent; it may be said of one or many; it may be the decision of the court, of the nation, of the public, of a particular body of men, or of a private individual: but a *judgment* is given in a public court, or among private individuals: a *sentence* is passed in a court of law, or at the bar of the public.

A *decision* specifies none of the circumstances of the action: it may be a legal or an arbitrary *decision*; it may be a *decision* according to one's caprice, or after mature deliberation: a *judgment* is always passed either in a court of law, and consequently by virtue of authority; or it is passed by an individual by the authority of his own *judgment*: a *sentence* is always passed by the authority of law, or the will of the public.

A *decision* respects matters of dispute or litigation; it puts an end to all question: a *judgment* respects the guilt or innocence, the moral excellence or defects, of a person: a *sentence* respects the punishment or consequent fate of the object: some questions are of so complicated a nature, that it is not possible to bring them to a *decision*; men are forbidden by the Christian religion to be severe in their *judgments* on one another; the works of an author must sometimes await the *sentence* of impartial posterity before their value can be duly appreciated.

DECLAIM, INVEIGH.

DECLAIM, in Latin *declamo*, that is, *de* and *clamo*, signifies literally to cry aloud in a set form of words.

INVEIGH, *v. Abuse, invective*.

The sense in which these words agree is that of using the language of displeasure against any person or thing: *declaim* is used generally, *inveigh* particularly: public

men and public measures are subjects for the *declaimer*: private individuals afford subjects for *inveighing* against; the former is under the influence of particular opinions or prejudices: the latter is the fruit of personal resentment or displeasure. A *declaimer* is noisy: he is a man of words; he makes long and loud speeches: an *inveigher* is virulent and personal; he enters into private details, and often indulges his malignant feelings under an affected regard for morality.

TO DECLARE, PUBLISH, PROCLAIM.

DECLARE, in Latin *declaro*, compounded of *de* and *claro* to clear, signifies literally to make clear or show plainly to a person.

PUBLISH, *v. To announce*.

PROCLAIM, in Latin *proclamo*, compounded of *pro* and *clamo*, signifies to cry before or in the ears of others.

The idea of making known is common to all these terms; this is simply the signification of *declare*, but the other two include accessory ideas.

The word *declare* does not express any particular mode or circumstance of making known, as is implied by the others: we may *declare* publicly or privately; we *publish* and *proclaim* only in a public manner: we may *declare* by word of mouth, or by writing; we *publish* or *proclaim* by any means that will render the thing most generally known.

In *declaring*, the leading idea is that of speaking out that which passes in the mind; in *publishing*, the leading idea is that of crying aloud: we may, therefore, often *declare* by *publishing* and *proclaiming*; a *deklaration* is a personal act; it concerns the person *declaring*, or him to whom it is *declared*; its truth or falsehood depends upon the veracity of the speaker: a *publication* is of general interest; the truth or falsehood of it does not always rest with the *publisher*: a *proclamation* is altogether a public act, in which no one's veracity is implicated. Facts and opinions are *declared*; events and circumstances are *published*; whatever is *proclaimed* is supposed to be of sufficient importance to deserve the notice of all who may hear or read it.

In cases of war or peace princes are expected to *declare* themselves on one side or the other; in the political world intelligence is quickly *published* through the medium of the public papers; in private life domestic occurrences are *published* through the medium of tale-bearers; a *proclamation* is the ordinary mode by which a prince makes

known his wishes, and issues his commands to his subjects.

DECREE, EDICT, PROCLAMATION.

DECREE, in French *decret*, Latin *decretus*, from *decerno* to give judgment or pass sentence, signifies the sentence or resolution that is passed.

EDICT, in Latin *edictus*, from *edico* to say out, signifies the thing spoken out or sent forth.

PROCLAMATION, *v. To declare.*

A *decree* is a more solemn and deliberative act than an *edict*; on the other hand, an *edict* is more authoritative than a *decree*. A *decree* is the decision of one or many; an *edict* speaks the will of an individual: councils and senates, as well as princes, make *decrees*; despotic rulers issue *edicts*.

Decrees are passed for the regulation of public and private matters; they are made known as occasion requires, but are not always public: *edicts* and *proclamations* contain the commands of the sovereign authority, and are directly addressed by the prince to his people. An *edict* is peculiar to a despotic government; a *proclamation* is common to a monarchical and aristocratic form of government; the ukase in Russia is a species of *edict*, by which the emperor makes known his will to his people; the king of England communicates to his subjects the determinations of himself and his council by means of a *proclamation*.

TO DEDICATE, DEVOTE, CONSECRATE, HALLOW.

DEDICATE, in Latin *dedicatus*, participle from *de* and *dico*, signifies to set apart by a promise.

DEVOTE, in Latin *devotus*, participle from *devoveo*, signifies to vow for an express purpose.

CONSECRATE, in Latin, *consecratus*, from *consecro* or *con* and *sacro*, signifies to make sacred by a special act.

HALLOW from *holy*, or the German *heilig*, signifies to make holy.

There is something more positive in the act of *dedicating* than in that of *devoting*; but less so than in that of *consecrating*.

To *dedicate* and *devote* may be employed in both temporal and spiritual matters; to *consecrate* and *hallow* only in the spiritual sense: we may *dedicate* or *devote* any thing that is at our disposal to the service of some object; but the former is employed mostly in regard to superiors, and the latter to persons, without distinction of rank; we *dedicate* a house to the service of God; or we *devote* our time to the benefit of our

friends, or the relief of the poor; we may *dedicate* or *devote* ourselves to an object; but the former always implies a solemn setting apart, springing from a sense of duty; the latter, an entire application of one's self, from zeal and affection; in this manner, he who *dedicates* himself to God abstracts himself from every object which is not immediately connected with the service of God; he who *devotes* himself to the ministry, should pursue it as the first object of his attention and regard.

To *consecrate* is a species of formal *dedication* by virtue of a religious observance; it is applicable mostly to places and things connected with religious works: *hallow* is a species of informal *consecration* applied to the same objects; the church is *consecrated*: particular days are *hallowed*.

TO DEDUCT, SUBTRACT.

DEDUCT, from the Latin *deductus* participle of *deduco*, and SUBTRACT from *subtractum* participle of *subtraho*, have both the sense of taking from; but the former is used in a general, and the latter in a technical sense. He who makes an estimate is obliged to *deduct*; he who makes a calculation is obliged to *subtract*.

The tradesman *deducts* what has been paid from what remains due; the accountant *subtracts* small sums from the gross amount.

DEED, EXPLOIT, ACHIEVEMENT, FEAT.

DEED, from *do*, expresses the thing done.

EXPLOIT, in French *exploit*, most probably changed from *explicatus*, signifying the thing unfolded or displayed.

ACHIEVEMENT, from *achieve*, French *achever*, to finish, signifies what is accomplished or completed.

FEAT, in French *fait*, Latin *factum*, from *facio*, signifies the thing done.

The first three words rise progressively on each other: *deeds*, compared with the others, is employed for that which is ordinary or extraordinary; *exploit* and *achievement* are used only for the extraordinary; the latter in a higher sense than the former.

Deeds are characterized as good or bad, magnanimous or atrocious, and the like: *exploit* and *achievement* do not necessarily require such epithets; they are always taken in the proper sense for something great. *Exploit*, when compared with *achievement*, is a term used in plain prose; it designates not so much what is great as what is real: *achievement* is most adapted to poetry and romance; it soars above what the eye sees,

or the ear hears, and affords scope for the imagination. Martial *deeds* are as interesting to the reader as to the performer: the pages of modern history will be as crowded with the *exploits* of Englishmen both by sea and land, as those of ancient and fabulous history are with the *achievements* of their heroes and demi-gods. An *exploit* marks only personal bravery in action; an *achievement* denotes elevation of character in every respect, grandeur of design, promptitude in execution, and valour in action.

An *exploit* may be executed by the design and at the will of another; a common soldier or an army may perform *exploits*: an *achievement* is designed and executed by the *achiever*; Hercules is distinguished for his *achievements*; and in the same manner we speak of the *achievements* of knight-errants or of great commanders.

Feat approaches nearest to *exploit* in signification; the former marks skill, and the latter resolution. The *feats* of chivalry displayed in jousts and tournaments were in former times as much esteemed as warlike *exploits*. *Exploit* and *feat* are often used in derision, to mark the absence of skill or bravery in the actions of individuals. The soldier who affects to be foremost in situations where there is no danger cannot be more properly derided than by terming his action an *exploit*: he who prides himself on the display of skill in the performance of a paltry trick may be laughed at for having performed a *feat*.

TO DEFACE, DISFIGURE, DEFORM.

DEFACE, DISFIGURE, and DEFORM, signify literally to spoil the *face*, *figure*, and *form*.

Deface expresses more than either *deform* and *disfigure*. To *deface* is an act of destruction; it is the actual destruction of that which has before existed: to *disfigure* is either an act of destruction or an erroneous execution, which takes away the figure: to *deform* is altogether an imperfect execution, which renders the *form* what it should not be. A thing is *defaced* by design or accident; it is *deformed* either by an error or by the nature of the thing.

Persons only *deface*; persons or things *disfigure*; things are most commonly *deformed* of themselves. That may be *defaced*, the face or external surface of which may be injured or destroyed; that may be *disfigured* or *deformed*, the figure or form of which is imperfect or may be rendered imperfect. A fine painting or piece of writing is *defaced* which is torn or besmeared with dirt: a fine building is *dis-*

figured by any want of symmetry in its parts: a building is *deformed* that is made contrary to all form. A statue may be *defaced*, *disfigured* and *deformed*: it is *defaced* when any violence is done to the face or any outward part of the body; it is *disfigured* by the loss of a limb; it is *deformed* if made contrary to the perfect form of the person or thing to be represented.

Inanimate objects are mostly *defaced* or *disfigured*, but seldom *deformed*; animate objects are either *disfigured* or *deformed*, but not *defaced*. A person may *disfigure* himself by his dress; he is *deformed* by the hand of nature.

TO DEFEAT, FOIL, DISAPPOINT, FRUSTRATE.

DEFEAT, v. To beat, defeat.

FOIL may probably come from *fail* and the Latin *fallo* to deceive, signifying to make to fail.

FRUSTRATE, in Latin *frustratus*, from *frustra*, signifies to make vain.

DISAPPOINT, from the privative *dis* and the verb *appoint*, signifies literally to do away what has been appointed.

Defeat and *foil* are both applied to matters of enterprise; but that may be *defeated* which is only planned, and that is *foiled* which is in the act of being executed. What is rejected is *defeated*: what is aimed at or purposed is *frustrated*: what is calculated on is *disappointed*. The best-concerted schemes may sometimes be easily *defeated*: where art is employed against simplicity the latter may be easily *foiled*: when we aim at what is above our reach we must be *frustrated* in our endeavours: when our expectations are extravagant they will be *disappointed*.

Design or accident may tend to *defeat*, design only to *foil*, accident only to *frustrate* or *disappoint*. The superior force of the enemy, or a combination of untoward events, will serve to *defeat* the best-concerted plans of the best generals: men of upright minds can seldom *foil* the deep-laid schemes of knaves: when we see that the perversity of men is liable to *frustrate* the kind intentions of others in their behalf, it is wiser to leave them to their folly: the cross accidents of human life are a fruitful source of *disappointment* to those who suffer themselves to be affected by them.

DEFECTION, REVOLT.

DEFECTION, from the Latin *deficio*, signifies the act of falling off, or becoming *deficient* towards some object.

REVOLT, compounded of *re* and *volt*,

in French *voltiger* to bound, and in Latin *volo* to fly, signifies a bounding back from an object to which one has been attached.

Defection is a general, *revolt* a specific term, that is, it denotes a species of *defection*. *Defection* is applicable to any person or thing to which we are bound by any obligation; *revolt* is applicable only to the government to which one is bound.

There may be a *defection* from religion, or any cause that is held sacred; a *revolt* is only against a monarch, or the supreme authority.

Defection does not designate the mode of the action; it may be quietly made or otherwise: a *revolt* is an act of violence, and always attended with violence. *Defection* may be the act of one; a *revolt* is properly the act of many. A general may be guilty of a *defection* who leaves the party to which he has hitherto adhered; a nation or a community may commit an act of *revolt* by shaking off the authority under which they have lived. A *defection*, being mostly the act of an individual, or one part of a community against the whole, is mostly a culpable act; but a *revolt* may be a justifiable measure, when one nation *revolts* against another, under whose power it has been brought by force of arms: the Roman people were guilty of a *defection* when they left the senate and retired to mount Aventine: the Germans frequently attempted to recover their liberty by *revolting* against the Romans.

DEFECTIVE, DEFICIENT.

DEFECTIVE expresses the quality or property of having a *defect* (v. *Blemish*): DEFICIENT is employed with regard to the thing itself that is wanting. A book may be *defective*, in consequence of some leaves being *deficient*. A *deficiency* is therefore often what constitutes a *defect*. Many things however may be *defective* without having any *deficiency*, and *vice versa*. Whatever is mis-shapen, and fails either in beauty or utility, is *defective*; that which is wanted to make a thing complete is *deficient*. It is a *defect* in the eye when it is so constructed that things are not seen at their proper distances; there is a *deficiency* in a tradesman's accounts, when one side falls short of the other.

Things only are said to be *defective*; but persons may be termed *deficient* either in attention, in good breeding, in civility, or whatever else the occasion may require. That which is *defective* is most likely to be permanently so; but a *deficiency* may be only occasional and easily rectified.

TO DEFEND, PROTECT, VINDICATE.

DEFEND, v. *Apology*.

PROTECT, in Latin *protectum*, participle of *protego*, compounded of *pro* and *tego* signifies to put any thing before a person as a covering.

VINDICATE, v. *To assert*.

Defend is a general term; it defines nothing with regard to the degree and manner of the action; *protect* is a particular and positive term, expressing an action of some particular importance. Persons may *defend* others without distinction of rank or station: none but superiors *protect* their inferiors. *Defence* is an occasional action; *protection* is a permanent action. A person may be *defended* in any particular case of actual danger or difficulty; he is *protected* from what may happen as well as what does happen. *Defence* respects the evil that threatens; *protection* involves the supply of necessities and the affording comforts. *Defence* requires some active exertion either of body or mind; *protection* may consist only of the extension of power in behalf of any particular. A soldier *defends* his country; a counsellor *defends* his client: a prince *protects* his subjects.

In a figurative and extended sense, things may either *defend* or *protect* with a similar distinction: a coat *defends* us from the inclemencies of the weather; houses are a *protection* not only against the changes of the seasons, but also against the violence of men.

To *vindicate* is a species of *defence* only in the moral sense of the word. Acts of importance are *defended*: those of trifling import are commonly *vindicated*. Cicero *defended* Milo against the charge of murder, in which he was implicated by the death of Clodius; a child or a servant *vindicates* himself when any blame is attached to him. *Defence* is employed either in matters of opinion or conduct; *vindicate* only in matters of conduct. No absurdities are too great to want occasional *defenders* among the various advocates to free inquiry; he who *vindicates* the conduct of another should be fully satisfied of the person whom he *defends*.

DEFENDANT, DEFENDER.

The DEFENDANT defends himself (v. *To defend*): the DEFENDER defends another. We are *defendants* when any charge is brought against us which we wish to refute: we are *defenders* when we undertake to rebut or refute the charge brought against another.

DEFENDER, ADVOCATE, PLEADER.

A DEFENDER exerts himself in favour of one that wants support: an ADVOCATE, from the Latin *advoco* to call or speak for, signifies one who is called to the assistance of another; he exerts himself in favour of any cause that offers: a PLEADER, from *plea* or *excuse*, signifies him who exerts himself in favour of one that is in distress. A *defender* attempts to keep off a threatened injury by rebutting the attack of another: an *advocate* states that which is to the advantage of the person or thing *advocated*: a *pleader* throws in *pleas* and *extenuations*: he blends entreaty with argument. Oppressed or accused persons and disputed opinions require *defenders*; that which falls in with the humours of men will always have *advocates*; the unfortunate and the guilty require *pleaders*.

DEFENSIBLE, DEFENSIVE.

DEFENSIBLE is employed for the thing that is *defended*: DEFENSIVE for the thing that *defends*. An opinion or a line of conduct is *defensible*; a weapon or a military operation is *defensive*. The *defensible* is opposed to the *indefensible*; and the *defensive* to the *offensive*.

It is the height of folly to attempt to *defend* that which is *indefensible*; it is sometimes prudent to act on the *defensive*, when we are not in a condition to commence the *offensive*.

DEFINITE, POSITIVE.

DEFINITE in Latin *definitum*, participle of *definio*, compounded of *de* and *finis*, signifies that which is bounded by a line or limit.

POSITIVE, in Latin *positivus* from *pono* to place, signifies that which is placed or fixed.

The understanding and reasoning powers are connected with what is *definite*; the will with what is *positive*. A *definite* answer leaves nothing to be explained; a *positive* answer leaves no room for hesitation or question. It is necessary to be *definite* in giving instructions, and to be *positive* in giving commands. A person who is *definite* in his proceedings with another puts a stop to all unreasonable expectations; it is necessary for those who have to exercise authority to be *positive*, in order to enforce obedience from the self-willed and contumacious.

DEFINITION, EXPLANATION.

A DEFINITION is properly a species of

EXPLANATION. The former is used scientifically, the latter on ordinary occasions; the former is confined to words, the latter is employed for words or things.

A *definition* is correct or precise; an *explanation* is general or ample.

The *definition* of a word defines or limits the extent of its signification; it is the rule for the scholar in the use of any word: the *explanation* of a word may include both *definition* and *illustration*: the former admits of no more words than will include the leading features in the meaning of any term; the latter admits of an unlimited scope for diffuseness on the part of the explainer.

TO DEGRADE, DISGRACE.

DEGRADE, from the Latin *gradus* a step or degree, signifies to bring down, or a step lower,

DISGRACE, from the Latin *gratia*, favour, signifies to bring out of favour or esteem: an officer in the army is *degraded*; a minister of state or a courtier is *disgraced*.

In the general or moral application, *degrade* respects the external station or rank; *disgrace* refers to the moral estimation or character: one is often *disgraced* by a *degradation*, and likewise when there is no express *degradation*: whatever is low and mean is *degrading*; whatever is immoral is *disgraceful*: it is *degrading* for a nobleman to associate with prize-fighters and jockeys; it is *disgraceful* for him to countenance the violation of the laws which he is bound to protect: Domitian *degraded* himself by the meanness of the employment which he chose; he *disgraced* himself by the cruelty which he mixed with his meanness: King John of England *degraded* himself as much by his mean compliance when in the power of the barons, as he had *disgraced* himself before by his detestable tyranny and oppression.

The higher the rank of the individual, the greater his *degradation*: the higher his character, or the more sacred his office, the greater his *disgrace*, if he act inconsistently with its dignity: but the terms are not confined to the higher ranks of life; there is that which is *degrading* and *disgraceful* for every person, however low his station: when a man forfeits that which he owes to himself, and sacrifices his independence to his vices, he *degrades* himself below the scale of a rational agent. These terms mostly suppose some sort of demerit in those who suffer the *disgrace* or *degradation*: but not always so. A person may be *disgraced*, or lose the favour of those above him, or he may be *degraded*,

that is, be placed in a lower rank than he deserves, through caprice, envy, and a variety of motives.

These words are similarly distinguished when applied to things.

Men are very liable to err in their judgments of what is *degrading* and *disgraceful*: all who are anxious to uphold the station and character in which they have been placed, may safely observe this rule, that nothing can be so *degrading* as the violation of truth and sincerity, and nothing so *disgraceful* as a breach of moral rectitude or propriety.

DEITY, DIVINITY.

DEITY, from *deus* a god, signifies a divine person.

DIVINITY, from *divinus*, signifies the divine essence or power: the *deities* of the heathens had little of *divinity* in them; the *divinity* of our Saviour is a fundamental article in the Christian faith.

DEJECTION, DEPRESSION, MELANCHOLY.

DEJECTION, from *dejicio* to cast down, and DEPRESSION from *deprimo* to press or sink down, have both regard to the state of the animal spirits.

MELANCHOLY, from the Greek *μελαγχολία*, black bile, regards the state of the humours in general, or of the particular humour called the bile.

Dejection and *depression* are occasional, and depend on outward circumstances; *melancholy* is permanent, and lies in the constitution. *Depression* is but a degree of *dejection*: slight circumstances may occasion a *depression*; distressing events occasion a *dejection*: the death of a near and dear relative may be expected to produce *dejection* in persons of the greatest equanimity; lively tempers are most liable to *depressions*: *melancholy* is a disease which nothing but clear views of religion can possibly correct.

TO DELAY, DEFER, POSTPONE, PROCRASTINATE, PROLONG, PROTRACT, RETARD.

DELAY, compounded of *de* and *lay*, signifies to lay or keep back.

DEFER, compounded of *de* and *fer*, in Latin *fero*, signifies to put off.

POSTPONE, compounded of *post* and *pone*, from the Latin *pono* to place, signifies to place behind or after.

PROCRASTINATE, from *pro* for and *cras* to-morrow, signifies to take to-morrow instead of to-day.

PROLONG signifies to lengthen out the

time, and PROTRACT to draw out the time.

RETARD, from *re* intensive and *tardum* slow, to make a thing go slow.

To *delay* is simply not to commence action; to *defer* and *postpone* are to fix its commencement at a more distant period: we may *delay* a thing for days, hours, and minutes, we *defer* or *postpone* it for months or weeks. *Delays* mostly arise from faults in the person *delaying*; they are seldom reasonable or advantageous; *deferring* and *postponing* are discretionary acts, which are justified by the circumstances: indolent people are most prone to *delay*; when a plan is not maturely digested, it is prudent to *defer* its execution until every thing is in an entire state of preparation. *Procrastination* is culpable *delay* arising solely from the fault of the *procrastinator*; it is the part of a dilatory man to *procrastinate* that which it is both his interest and duty to perform.

To *defer* is used without regard to any particular time or object; to *postpone* has always relation to something else: it is properly to *defer* until the completion of some period or event; a person may *defer* his visit from month to month; he *postpones* his visit until the commencement of a new year: a tardy debtor *delays* the settlement of his accounts; a merchant *defers* the shipment of any goods in consequence of the receipt of fresh intelligence; he *postpones* the shipment until after the arrival of the expected fleet.

We *delay* the execution of a thing; we *prolong* or *protract* the continuation of a thing; we *retard* the termination of a thing: we may *delay* answering a letter, *prolong* a contest, *protract* a law-suit, and *retard* a publication.

DELEGATE, DEPUTY.

DELEGATE, in Latin *delegatus*, from *delego*, signifies one commissioned.

DEPUTY, in Latin *deputatus*, from *deputo*, signifies one to whom a business is assigned.

A *delegate* has a more active office than a *deputy*; he is appointed to execute some positive commission: a *deputy* may often serve only to supply the place or answer in the name of one who is absent: *delegates* are mostly appointed in public transactions; *deputies* are chosen either in public or private matters: *delegates* are chosen by particular bodies for purposes of negotiation, either in regard to civil or political affairs; *deputies* are chosen either by individuals or small communities to officiate on certain oc-

casions of a purely civil nature: the Hanse towns in Germany used formerly to send *delegates* to the Diet at Ratisbon; when Calais was going to surrender to Edward III. king of England, *deputies* were sent from the townsmen to implore his mercy.

DELIGHTFUL, CHARMING.

DELIGHTFUL, is applied either to material or spiritual objects; CHARMING mostly to objects of sense.

When they both denote the pleasure of the sense, *delightful* is not so strong an expression as *charming*: a prospect may be *delightful* or *charming*; but the latter rises to a degree that carries the senses away captive.

Of music we should rather say that it was *charming* than *delightful*, as it acts on the senses in so powerful a manner; on the other hand, we speak of a *delightful* employment to relieve distress, or a *delightful* spectacle to see a family living together in love and harmony.

TO DELINEATE, SKETCH.

DELINEATE, in Latin *delineatus*, participle of *delineo*, signifies literally to draw the lines which include the contents.

SKETCH, from the German *skizze*, Italian *schizzo*.

Both these terms are properly employed in the art of drawing and figuratively applied to moral subjects, to express a species of descriptions: a *delineation* expresses something more than a *sketch*; the former conveying not merely the general outlines or more prominent features, but also as much of the details as would serve to form a whole; the latter, however, seldom contains more than some broad touches, by which an imperfect idea of the subject is conveyed.

A *delineation*, therefore may be characterized as accurate, and a *sketch*, as hasty or imperfect: an attentive observer who has passed some years in a country, may be enabled to give an accurate *delineation* of the laws, customs, manners, and character of its inhabitants; a traveller, who merely passes through, can give a hasty *sketch* from what passes before his eyes.

TO DELIVER, RESCUE, SAVE.

DELIVER, in French *delivrer*, compounded of *de* and *livrer*, in Latin *libero* to make free.

RESCUE, connected with the French *secourir*, signifies by succour to get one out of a difficulty.

SAVE signifies literally to make *safe*.

The idea of taking or keeping from dan-

ger is common to these terms: but *deliver* and *rescue* signify rather to take from, *save* to keep from danger: we *deliver* and *rescue* from the evil that is; we *save* from evils that may be as well as those that are. *Deliver* and *rescue* do not convey any idea of the means by which the end is produced; *save* commonly includes the idea of some superior agency: a man may be *delivered* or *rescued* by any person, without distinction; he is commonly *saved* by a superior.

Deliver is an unqualified term, it is applicable to every mode of the action or species of evil; to *rescue* is a species of *delivering*, namely, *delivering* from the power of another; to *save* is applicable to the greatest possible evils; a person may be *delivered* from a burden, from an oppression, from disease, or from danger, by any means; a prisoner is *rescued* from the hands of an enemy; a person is *saved* from destruction.

DELIVERANCE, DELIVERY.

Are drawn from the same verb (*v. To deliver*), to express its different senses of taking from or giving to; the former denotes the taking something from one's self; the latter implies giving something to another.

To wish for DELIVERANCE from that which is hurtful or painful is, to a certain extent, justifiable: the careful DELIVERY of property into the hands of the owner will be the first object of concern with a faithful agent.

TO DEMAND, REQUIRE.

DEMAND, *v. To ask*.

REQUIRE, in Latin *requiro*, compounded of *re* and *quaero*, signifies to seek for, or to seek to get back.

We *demand* that which is owing and ought to be given; we *require* that which we wish and expect to have done. A *demand* is more positive than a *requisition*; the former admits of no question; the latter is liable to be both questioned and refused: the creditor makes a *demand* on the debtor; the master *requires* a certain portion of duty from his servant: it is unjust to *demand* of a person what he has no right to give; it is unreasonable to *require* of him what it is not in his power to do.

A thing is commonly *demand*ed in express words; it is *required* by implication: a person *demand*s admittance when it is not voluntarily granted; he *requires* respectful deportment from those who are subordinate to him.

In the figurative application the same sense is preserved: things of urgency and moment

demand immediate attention; difficult matters require a steady attention.

TO DEMOLISH, RAZE, DISMANTLE, DESTROY.

The throwing down what has been built up is the common idea included in all these terms.

DEMOLISH, from the Latin *demolior*, and *moles* a mass or structure, signifies to decompose what has been fabricated, into a mass.

RAZE, like *erase* (v. *To blot out*), signifies the making smooth or even with the ground.

DISMANTLE, in French *demanteler*, signifies to deprive a thing of its mantle or guard.

DESTROY, from the Latin *destruo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *struo* to build, signifies properly to pull down.

A fabric is *demolished* by scattering all its component parts; it is mostly an unlicensed act of caprice; it is *razed by way of punishment, as a mark of public vengeance; a fortress is *dismantled* from motives of prudence, in order to render it defenceless; places are *destroyed* by various means and from various motives, that they may not exist any longer.

Individuals may *demolish*; public authority causes an edifice to be *razed* with the ground; a general orders towers to be *dismantled* and fortifications to be *destroyed*.

TO DEMUR, HESITATE, PAUSE.

DEMUR, in French *demeurer*, Latin *demorari*, signifies to keep back.

HESITATE, in Latin *haesitatum*, participle of *haesito*, a frequentative from *haereo*, signifies to stick or remain a long time back.

PAUSE, in Latin *pausa*, from the Greek *παυω* to cease, signifies to make a stand.

The idea of stopping is common to these terms, to which signification is added some distinct collateral idea for each; we *demur* from doubt or difficulty; we *hesitate* from an undecided state of mind; we *pause* from circumstances. *Demurring* is the act of an equal: we *demur* in giving our assent: *hesitating* is often the act of a superior; we *hesitate* in giving our consent: when a proposition appears to be unjust we *demur* in supporting it, on the ground of its injustice; when a request of a dubious nature is made to us we *hesitate* in complying with it: prudent people are most apt to *demur*; but people of a wavering temper are apt to *he-*

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Demolir, raser, demanteler, détruire.“

sitate: *demurring* may be often unnecessary, but it is seldom injurious; *hesitating* is mostly injurious when it is not necessary: the former is employed in matters that admit of delay; the latter in cases where immediate decision is requisite.

Demurring and *hesitating* are both employed as acts of the mind; *pausing* is an external action: we *demur* and *hesitate* in determining; we *pause* in speaking or doing any thing.

DEMUR, DOUBT, HESITATION, OBJECTION.

DEMUR, v. *To demur*.

DOUBT, in Latin *dubito*, from *duo* and *ito*, or *eo go*, signifies to go two ways.

HESITATION, v. *To demur*.

OBJECTION, from *objicio* or *ob* and *ja-cio* to throw in the way, signifies what is thrown in the way so as to stop our progress.

Demurs often occur in matters of deliberation; *doubt* in regard to matters of fact; *hesitation* in matters of ordinary conduct; and *objections* in matters of common consideration. It is the business of a counsellor to make *demurs*; it is the business of an inquirer to suggest *doubts*; it is the business of all occasionally to use *hesitation* who are called upon to decide; it is the business of those to make *objections* whose opinion is consulted. Artabanus made many *demurs* to the proposed invasion of Greece by Xerxes; *doubts* have been suggested respecting the veracity of Herodotus as an historian: it is not proper to ask for that which cannot be granted without *hesitation*; and it is not the part of an amiable disposition to *hesitate* in complying with a reasonable request: there are but few things which we either attempt to do or recommend to others that is not liable to some kind of *objection*.

A *demur* stops the adjustment of any plan or the determination of any question; a *doubt* interrupts the progress of the mind in coming to a state of satisfaction and certainty: they are both applied to abstract questions, or such as are of general interest. *Hesitation* and *objection* are more individual and private in their nature.

Hesitation lies mostly in the state of the will; *objection* is rather the offspring of the understanding. An *hesitation* interferes with the action; an *objection* affects the measure or the mode of action.

TO DENOTE, SIGNIFY.

DENOTE, in Latin *denoto* or *noto*, from

notum, participle of *nosco*, signifies to cause to know.

SIGNIFY, from the Latin *signum* a sign, and *fio* to become, is to become or be made a sign, or guide for the understanding.

Denote is employed with regard to things and their characters; *signify* with regard to the thoughts or movements. A letter or character may be made to *denote* any number, as words are made to *signify* the intentions and wishes of the person. Among the ancient Egyptians hieroglyphics were very much employed to *denote* certain moral qualities; in many cases looks or actions will *signify* more than words. Devices and emblems of different descriptions, drawn either from fabulous history or the natural world, are likewise now employed to *denote* particular circumstances or qualities: the cornucopia *denotes* plenty; the beehive *denotes* industry; the dove *denotes* meekness, and the lamb gentleness: he who will not take the trouble to *signify* his wishes otherwise than by nods or signs must expect to be frequently misunderstood.

TO DENY, REFUSE.

DENY, in Latin *denego*, or *nego*, that is, *ne* or *non* and *ago*, signifies to say no to a thing.

REFUSE, in Latin *refusus*, from *re* and *fundo* to pour or cast, signifies to throw back that which is presented.

To *deny* respects matters of fact or knowledge; to *refuse*, matters of wish or request. We *deny* as to the past; we *refuse* as to the future; we *deny* our participation in that which has been; we *refuse* our participation in that which may be: to *deny* must always be expressly verbal; a *refusal* may sometimes be signified by actions or looks as well as words. A *denial* affects our veracity; a *refusal* affects our good-nature.

To *deny* is likewise sometimes used in regard to one's own gratifications as well as to one's knowledge, in which case it is still more analogous to *refuse*, which regards the gratifications of another. In this case we say we *deny* a person a thing, but we *refuse* his request, or *refuse* to do a thing. Instances are not rare of misers who have *denied* themselves the common necessities of life, and yet have never *refused* to relieve those who were in distress, or assist those who were in trouble.

Deny is sometimes the act of unconscious agents; *refuse* is always a personal and intentional act. We are sometimes *denied* by circumstances the consolation of seeing our friends before they die; when prisoners

want to see their friends for sinister purposes they must be *refused*.

TO DENY, DISOWN.

DENY (*v. To deny*) approaches nearest to the sense of *disown* when applied to persons; DISOWN, that is, not to own, on the other hand, bears a strong analogy to *deny* when applied to things.

In the first case *deny* is said with regard to one's knowledge of or connexion with a person; *disowning*, on the other hand, is a term of larger import, including the renunciation of all relationship or social ties: the former is said of those who are not related; the latter of such only as are related. Peter *denied* our Saviour; a parent can scarcely be justified in *disowning* his child let his vices be ever so enormous; a child can never *disown* its parent in any case without violating the most sacred duty.

In the second case *deny* is said in regard to things that concern others as well as ourselves; *disown* only in regard to what is done by one's self or that in which one is personally concerned. A person *denies* that there is any truth in the assertion of another; he *disowns* all participation in any affair. We may *deny* having seen a thing; we may *disown* that we did it ourselves. Our veracity is often the only thing implicated in a *denial*; our guilt, innocence, or honour are implicated in what we *disown*. A witness *denies* what is stated as a fact; the accused party *disowns* what is laid to his charge.

A *denial* is employed only for outward actions or events; that which can be related may be *denied*: *disowning* extends to whatever we can own or possess; we may *disown* our feelings, our name, our connexions, and the like.

DEPENDANCE, RELIANCE.

DEPENDANCE, from *depend* or *de* and *pend*, in Latin *pendo* to hang from, signifies literally to rest one's weight by hanging from that which is held.

RELY, compounded of *re* and *ly* or *lie*, signifies likewise to rest one's weight by lying or hanging back from the object held.

Dependance is the general term; *reliance* is a species of *dependance*: we *depend* either on persons or things; we *rely* on persons only: *dependance* serves for that which is immediate or remote; *reliance* serves for the future only. We *depend* upon a person for that which we are obliged to receive or led to expect from him: we *rely* upon a person for that which he has given us reason to expect from him.

Dependance is an outward condition or

the state of external circumstances; *reliance* is a state of the feelings with regard to others. We *depend* upon God for all that we have or shall have; we *rely* upon the word of man for that which he has promised to perform. We may *depend* upon a person's coming from a variety of causes; but we *rely* upon it only in reference to his avowed intention.

TO DEPLORE, LAMENT.

DEPLORE, in Latin *deploro*, that is, *de* and *ploro*, or *plango*, to give signs of distress with the face or mouth.

LAMENT, *v.* To bewail.

Deplore is a much stronger expression than *lament*; the former calls forth tears from the bitterness of the heart; the latter excites a cry from the warmth of feeling. * *Deplorable* indicates despair; to *lament* marks only pain or distress. Among the poor we have *deplorable* instances of poverty, ignorance, vice, and wretchedness combined: among the higher classes we have often *lamentable* instances of extravagance and consequent ruin. A field of battle or a city overthrown by an earthquake is a spectacle truly *deplorable*: it is *lamentable* to see beggars putting on all the disguises of wretchedness in order to obtain by deceit what they might earn by honest industry,

DEPONENT, EVIDENCE, WITNESS.

DEPONENT, from the Latin *depono*, is the laying down or open what one has heard or seen.

EVIDENCE, from *evident*, is one producing *evidence* or making *evident*.

WITNESS, from the Saxon *witan*, Teutonic *weissen*, Greek *εἶδα*, and Hebrew *ido* to know, is one who knows or makes known.

The *deponent* always declares upon oath; he serves to give information: the *evidence* is likewise generally bound by an oath; he serves to acquit or condemn; the *witness* is employed upon oath or otherwise; he serves to confirm or invalidate.

A *deponent* declares either in writing or by word of mouth; the *deposition* is preparatory to the trial: an *evidence* may give *evidence* either by words or actions; whatever serves to clear up, whether a person or an animal, the thing is used as an *evidence*; the *evidence* always comes forward on the trial: a *witness* is always a person in the proper sense, but may be applied figuratively to inanimate objects; he declares by word of mouth he personally knows. Every *witness* is an *evidence* at the moment of trial,

but every *evidence* is not a *witness*. When a dog is employed as an *evidence* he cannot be called a *witness*.

Evidence on the other hand is confined mostly to judicial matters; and *witness* extends to all the ordinary concerns of life. One person appears as an *evidence* against another on a criminal charge: a *witness* appears for or against; he corroborates the word of another, and is a security in all dealings or matters of question between man and man.

DEPOSIT, PLEDGE, SECURITY.

DEPOSIT is a general term from the Latin *depositus*, participle of *depono*, signifying to lay down, or put into the hands of another.

PLEDGE comes probably from *plico*, signifying what engages by a tie or envelope.

SECURITY signifies that which makes *secure*.

The term *deposit* has most regard to the confidence we place in another; *pledge* has most regard to the security we give for ourselves; *security* is a species of *pledge*. A *deposit* is always voluntarily placed in the hands of an indifferent person; a *pledge* and *security* are required from the parties who are interested. A person may make a *deposit* for purposes of charity or convenience; he gives a *pledge* or *security* for a temporary accommodation, or the relief of a necessity. Money is *deposited* in the hands of a friend in order to execute a commission: a *pledge* is given as an equivalent for that which has been received: a *security* is given by way of security for the performance of some agreement.

A *deposit* may often serve the purpose of a *security*; but it need not contain any thing so binding as either a *pledge* or a *security*; both of which involve a loss on the non-fulfilment of a certain contract. A *pledge* is given for matters purely personal; a *security* is given in behalf of another.

Deposits are always transportable articles, consisting either of money, papers, jewels, or other valuables; a *pledge* is seldom pecuniary, but it is always some article of positive value, as estates, furniture, and the like, given at the moment of forming the contract: a *security* is always pecuniary, but it often consists of a promise, and not of any immediate resignation of one's property. *Deposits* are made and *securities* given by the wealthy; *pledges* are commonly given by those who are in distress.

These words admit of a similar distinction in the moral or figurative application.

* Vide Trusler: „Lamentable, deplorable.“

DEPRAVITY, DEPRAVATION,
CORRUPTION.

DEPRAVITY, from the Latin *pravitas* and *pravius*, in Greek *γαῖβος*, and the Hebrew *ran* or *roo* crooked or not straight, marks the quality of being crooked.

DEPRAVATION, in Latin *depravatio*, signifies a making crooked or not as it should be.

CORRUPTION, in Latin *corruptio*, *corumpo*, from *rumpo* to break, marks the disunion and decomposition of the parts of any thing.

* All these terms are applied to objects which are contrary to the order of Providence; but the term *depravity* characterises the thing, as it is; the terms *depravation* and *corruption* designate the making or causing it to be so: *depravity* therefore excludes the idea of any cause; *depravation* always carries us to the cause or external agency: hence we may speak of *depravity* as natural, but we speak of *depravation* as the result of circumstances: there is a *depravity* in man which nothing but the grace of God can correct; the introduction of obscenity on the stage tends greatly to the *depravation* of morals; bad company tends to the *corruption* of a young man's morals.

Depravity or *depravation* implies crookedness, or a distortion from the regular course: *corruption* implies a dissolution as it were in the component parts of bodies.

Cicero says (2 *de Finibus*) that *depravity* is applicable only to the mind and heart; but we say a *depraved* taste, and *depraved* humours in regard to the body. A *depraved* taste loathes common food, and longs for that which is unnatural and hurtful. *Corruption* is the natural process by which material substances are disorganized.

In the figurative application of these terms they preserve the same signification. *Depravity* is characterized by being directly opposed to order, and an established system of things; *corruption* marks the vitiation or spoiling of things, and the ferment that leads to destruction. *Depravity* turns things out of their ordinary course; *corruption* destroys their essential qualities. *Depravity* is a vicious state of things, in which all is deranged and perverted, *corruption* is a vicious state of things, in which all is sullied and polluted. That which is *depraved* loses its proper manner of acting and existing; that which is *corrupted* loses its virtue and essence. The force of irregular propensities and distempered imaginations produces a *de-*

pravity of manners; the force of example and the dissemination of bad principles produce *corruption*. A judgment not sound or right is *depraved*; a judgment debased by that which is vicious is *corrupted*. What is *depraved* requires to be reformed: what is *corrupted* requires to be purified. *Depravity* has most regard to apparent and excessive disorders; *corruption* to internal and dissolute vices. „Manners,“ says Cicero, „are *corrupted* and *depraved* by the love of riches.“ Port Royal says that God has given up infidels to the wandering of a *corrupted* and *depraved* mind. These words are by no means a pleonasm or repetition, because they represent two distinct images; one indicates the state of a thing very much changed in its substance: the other the state of a thing very opposed to regularity. „Good God! (says Masillon the preacher), what a dreadful account will the rich and powerful have one day to give; since, besides their own sins, they will have to account before Thee for public disorder, *depravity* of morals, and the *corruption* of the age!“ *Depravity* is more or less open; it revolts the sober upright understanding; *corruption* is more or less disguised in its operations, but fatal in its effects: the former sweeps away every thing before it like a torrent; the latter infuses itself into the moral frame like a slow poison.

That is a *depraved* state of morals in which the gross vices are openly practised in defiance of all decorum: that is a *corrupt* state of society in which vice has secretly insinuated itself into all the principles and habits of men, and concealed its deformity under the fair semblance of virtue and honour. The manners of savages are most likely to be *depraved*; those of civilized nations to be *corrupt*, where luxury and refinement are risen to an excessive pitch. Cannibal nations present us with the picture of human *depravity*; the Roman nation during the time of the emperors affords us an example of almost universal *corruption*.

From the above observations, it is clear that *depravity* is best applied to those objects to which common usage has annexed the epithets of right, regular, fine, &c.; and *corruption* to those which may be characterized by the epithets of sound, pure, innocent, or good. Hence we prefer to say *depravity* of mind and *corruption* of heart; *depravity* of principle and *corruption* of sentiment or feeling: a *depraved* character; a *corrupt* example; a *corrupt* influence.

In reference to the arts or belles lettres we say either *depravity* or *corruption* of taste, because taste has its rules, is liable

* Vide Roubaud: „Depravation, corruption.“ — Trusler: „Depravity, corruption.“

to be disordered, is or is not conformable to natural order, is regular or irregular; and, on the other hand, it may be so intermingled with sentiments and feelings foreign to its own native purity as to give it justly the title of *corrupt*.

The last thing worthy of notice respecting the two words *depravity* and *corruption* is that the former is used for man in his moral capacity; but the latter for man in a political capacity: hence we speak of human *depravity*, but the *corruption* of government.

DEPREDATION, ROBBERY.

DEPREDATION, in Latin *depraedatio*, from *praedo* a prey, signifies the act of spoiling or laying waste, as well as taking away.

ROBBERY, on the other hand, signifies simply the removal or taking away from another by violence. Every *depredation*, therefore, includes a *robbery*, but not *vice versa*. A *depredation* is always attended with mischief to some one, though not always with advantage to the *depredator*; but the *robber* always calculates on getting something for himself. *Depredations* are often committed for the indulgence of private animosity; *robbery* is always committed from a thirst for gain.

Depredation is either the public act of a community, or the private act of individuals; *robbery* mostly the private act of individuals. *Depredations* are committed wherever the occasion offers; in open or covert places: *robberies* are committed either on the persons or houses of individuals. In former times neighbouring states used to commit frequent *depredations* on each other, even when not in a state of open hostility; *robberies* were, however, then less frequent than at present.

Depredation is used in the proper and bad sense, for animals as well as for men; *robbery* may be employed figuratively, and in an indifferent sense. Birds are great *depredators* in corn fields; bees may be said to plunder or *rob* flowers of their sweets.

TO DEPRIVE, DEBAR, ABRIDGE.

DEPRIVE, from *de* and *prive*, in Latin *privus*, one's own, signifies to make not one's own what one has, or expects to have.

DEBAR, from *de* and *bar*, signifies to prevent by means of a bar.

ABRIDGE, *v.* To *Abridge*.

Deprive conveys the idea of either taking away that which one has, or withholding that which one may have; *debar* conveys the idea only of withholding; *abridge* conveys that also of taking away. *Depriving* is a

coercive measure; *debar* and *abridge* are merely acts of authority. We are *deprived* of that which is of the first necessity; we are *debarred* of privileges, enjoyments, opportunities, &c.; we are *abridged* of comforts, pleasures, conveniences, &c. Criminals are *deprived* of their liberty; their friends are in extraordinary cases *debarred* the privilege of seeing them; thus men are often *abridged* of their comforts in consequence of their own faults.

Deprivation and *debarring* sometimes arise from things as well as persons; *abridging* is always the voluntary act of conscious agents. Misfortunes sometimes *deprive* a person of the means of living; the poor are often *debarred*, by their poverty, the opportunity to learn their duty; it may sometimes be necessary to *abridge* young people of their pleasures when they do not know how to make a good use of them.

When used as reflective verbs they preserve the same analogy in their signification. An extravagant person *deprives* himself of the power of doing good. A person may *debar* himself of any pleasure from particular motives of prudence. A miser *abridges* himself of every enjoyment in order to gratify his ruling passion.

DEPTH, PROFUNDITY.

DEPTH, from *deep*, *dip* or *dive*, the Greek *δυπτω*, and the Hebrew *tabang* to dive, signifies the point under water which is dived for.

PROFUNDITY, from *profound*, in Latin *profundus*, compounded of *pro* or *procul* far, and *fundus* the bottom, signifies remoteness from the surface of any thing.

These terms do not differ merely in their derivation; but *depth* is indefinite in its signification; and *profundity* is a positive and considerable degree of *depth*. Moreover the word *depth* is applied to objects in general; *profundity* is confined in its application to moral objects: thus we speak of the *depth* of the sea, or the *depth* of a person's learning; but his *profundity* of thought.

DERANGEMENT, INSANITY, LUNACY, MADNESS, MANIA.

DERANGEMENT, from the verb to *derange*, implies the first stage of disordered intellect. INSANITY, or unsoundness, implies positive disease, which is more or less permanent. LUNACY is a violent sort of insanity, which was supposed to be influenced by the moon. MADNESS and MANIA, from the Greek *μανομαι* to rage, implies *insanity* or *lunacy* in its most furious and confirmed stage. *Deranged* persons

may sometimes be perfectly sensible in every thing but particular subjects. *Insane* persons are sometimes entirely restored. *Lunatics* have their lucid intervals, and *maniacs* their intervals of repose.

Derangement may sometimes be applied to the temporary confusion of a disturbed mind, which is not in full possession of all its faculties: *madness* may sometimes be the result of violently inflamed passions: and *mania* may be applied to any vehement attachment which takes possession of the mind.

TO DERIDE, MOCK, RIDICULE, RALLY, BANTER.

DERIDE, compounded of *de* and the Latin *rideo*; and RIDICULE, from *rideo*, both signify to laugh at.

MOCK, in French *moquer*, Dutch *mocken*, Greek *μωκω*, signifies likewise to laugh at.

RALLY, in French *rallier*.

BANTER, possibly from the French *badiner* to jest.

Strong expressions of contempt are designated by all these terms.

Derision and *mockery* evince themselves by the outward actions in general; *ridicule* consists more in words than actions; *rallying* and *bantering* almost entirely in words. *Deride* is not so strong a term as *mock*, but much stronger than *ridicule*. There is always a mixture of hostility in *derision* and *mockery*; but *ridicule* is frequently unaccompanied with any personal feeling of displeasure. *Derision* is often deep, not loud; it discovers itself in suppressed laughter, contemptuous sneers or gesticulations, and cutting expressions; *mockery* is mostly noisy and outrageous: it breaks forth in insulting buffoonery, and is sometimes accompanied with personal violence: the former consists of real but contemptuous laughter; the latter often of affected laughter and grimace. *Derision* and *mockery* are always personal; *ridicule* may be directed to things as well as persons. *Derision* and *mockery* are a direct attack on the individual, the latter still more so than the former; *ridicule* is as often used in writing as in personal intercourse.

Derision and *mockery* are practised by persons in any station; *ridicule* is mostly used by equals. A person is *derided* and *mocked* for that which is offensive as well as apparently absurd or extravagant; he is *ridiculed* for what is apparently ridiculous. *Derision* may be provoked by ordinary circumstances; *mockery* by that which is extraordinary; both are altogether incompatible with the Christian temper: *ridicule* is justifiable in certain cases, particularly when

it is not personal. When a man renders himself an object of *derision*, it does not follow that any one is justified in *deriding* him; insults are not the means for correcting faults: *mockery* is very seldom used but for the gratification of a malignant disposition: although *ridicule* is not the test of truth, and ought not to be employed in the place of argument, yet there are some follies too absurd to deserve more serious treatment.

Rally and *banter*, like *derision* and *mockery*, are altogether personal acts, in which application they are very analogous to *ridicule*. *Ridicule* is the most general term of the three; we often *rally* and *banter* by *ridiculing*. There is more exposure in *ridiculing*; reproof in *rallying*; and provocation in *bantering*. A person may be *ridiculed* on account of his eccentricities; he is *rallied* for his defects; he is *bantered* for accidental circumstances.

TO DERIVE, TRACE, DEDUCE.

DERIVE, from the Latin *de* and *rivus* a river, signifies to drain after the manner of water from its source.

TRACE, in Italian *tracciare*, Greek *τρεχω* to run, Hebrew *darech* to go, signifies to go by a line drawn out, to follow the line.

DEDUCE, in Latin *deduco*, signifies to bring from.

The idea of drawing one thing from another is included in all the actions designated by these terms. The act of *deriving* is immediate and direct; that of *tracing* a gradual process; that of *deducing* by a ratiocinative process.

We discover causes and sources by *derivation*; we discover the course, progress, and commencement of things by *tracing*; we discover the grounds and reasons of things by *deduction*. A person *derives* his name from a given source; he *traces* his family up to a given period; principles or powers are *deduced* from circumstances or observations. The Trojans *derived* the name of their city from Tros, a king of Phrygia; they *traced* the line of their kings up to Dardanus; Copernicus *deduced* the principle of the earth's turning round from several simple observations, particularly from the apparent and contrary motion of bodies that are really at rest.

DESERT, MERIT, WORTH.

DESERT from *deserve*, in Latin *deservio*, signifies to do service or be serviceable.

MERIT, in Latin *meritus*, participle of *mereor*, comes from the Greek *μειrow* to share, because, he who *merits* any thing has a right to share in it.

WORTH, in German *werth*, is connected with *würde* dignity, and *bürde* a burden, because one bears *worth* as a thing attached to the person.

Desert is taken for that which is good or bad; *merit* for that which is good only. We *deserve* praise or blame: we *merit* a reward. *Desert* consists in the action, work, or service performed; *merit* has regard to the character of the agent or the nature of the action. A person does not *deserve* a recompense until he has performed some service; he does not *merit* approbation if he has not done his part well.

Deserve is a term of ordinary import: *merit* applies to objects of greater moment: the former includes matters of personal and physical gratification; the latter those altogether of an intellectual nature. Children are always acting so as to *deserve* either reproof or commendation, reward or punishment; candidates for public applause or honours conceive they have frequent occasion to complain that they are not treated according to their *merits*. Criminals cannot always be punished according to their *deserts*; a noble mind is not contented with barely obtaining, it seeks to *merit* what it obtains.

The idea of value, which is prominent in the signification of the term *merit*, renders it closely allied to that of *worth*. The man of *merit* looks to the advantages which shall accrue to himself; the man of *worth* is contented with the consciousness of what he possesses in himself; *merit* respects the attainments or qualifications of a man; *worth* respects his moral qualities only. It is possible therefore for a man to have great *merit* and little or no *worth*. He who has great powers and uses them for the advantage of himself or others is a man of *merit*; he only who does good from a good motive is a man of *worth*. We look for *merit* among men in the discharge of their several offices or duties; we look for *worth* in their social capacities.

From these words are derived the epithets *deserved* and *merited*, in relation to what we receive from others; and *deserving*, *meritorious*, *worthy*, and *worth*, in regard to what we possess in ourselves: a treatment is *deserved* or *undeserved*; reproofs are *merited* or *unmerited*: the harsh treatment of a master is easier to be borne when it is *undeserved* than when it is *deserved*; the reproaches of a friend are very severe when *unmerited*.

A labourer is *deserving* on account of his industry; an artist is *meritorious* on account of his professional abilities; a citizen is *worthy* on account of his benevolence and upright-

ness. The first person *deserves* to be well paid and encouraged; the second *merits* the applause which is bestowed on him; the third is *worthy* of confidence and esteem from all men. Betwixt *worthy* and *worth* there is this difference, that the former is said of intrinsic and moral qualities, the latter of extrinsic ones: a *worthy* man possesses that which calls for the esteem of others; but a man is *worth* the property which he can call his own: so in like manner a subject may be *worthy* the attention of a writer, or a thing may not be *worth* the while to consider.

TO DESIGN, PURPOSE, INTEND, MEAN.

DESIGN, from the Latin *designare*, signifies to mark out as with a pen or pencil.

PURPOSE, like *propose*, comes from the Latin *proposui*, perfect of *propono*, signifying to set before one's mind as an object of pursuit.

INTEND, in Latin *intendo* to bend towards, signifies the bending of the mind towards an object.

MEAN, in Saxon *maenen*, German &c. *meinen*, probably connected with the word mind signifying to have in the mind.

Design and *purpose* are terms of higher import than *intend* and *mean*, which are in familiar use; the latter still more so than the former. A *design* embraces many objects; a *purpose* consists of only one: the former supposes something studied and methodical, it requires resolution. A *design* is attainable; a *purpose* is steady. We speak of the *design* as it regards the thing conceived: we speak of the *purpose* as it regards the temper of the person. Men of a sanguine or aspiring character are apt to form *designs* which cannot be carried into execution; whoever wishes to keep true to his *purpose* must not listen to many counsellors.

A *purpose* is the thing proposed or set before the mind; an *intention* is the thing to which the mind bends or inclines: *purpose* and *intend* differ therefore both in the nature of the action and the object; we *purpose* seriously; we *intend* vaguely: we set about that which we *purpose*; we may delay that which we have only *intended*: the execution of one's *purpose* rests mostly on one's self; the fulfilment of an *intention* depends upon circumstances: a man of resolute temper is not to be diverted from his *purpose* by trifling objects; we may be disappointed in our *intentions* by a variety of unforeseen but uncontrollable events.

Mean, which is a term altogether of collo-

* Vide Trusler: „Intention, design.“

quial use, differs but little from *intend*, except that it is used for more familiar objects; to *mean* is simply to have in the mind; to *intend* is to lean with the mind towards any thing.

Purpose is always applied to some proximate or definite objects, *intend* and *mean* are applied to that which is general or remote; we *purpose* to set out at a certain time, or go a certain route; we *mean* to set out as soon as we can, and go the way that shall be found most agreeable; the moralist *designs* by his writings to effect a reformation in the manners of men: a writer *purposes* to treat on a given subject in some particular manner; it is ridiculous to lay down rules which are not *intended* to be kept; an honest man always *means* to satisfy his creditors.

Design and *purpose* are taken sometimes in the abstract sense; *intend* and *mean* always in connexion with the agent who *intends* or *means*: we see a *design* in the whole creation which leads us to reflect on the wisdom and goodness of the Creator; whenever we see any thing done we are led to inquire the *purpose* for which it is done; or are desirous of knowing the *intention* of the person in so doing: things are said to be done with a *design*, in opposition to that which happens by chance; they are said to be done for a *purpose*, in reference to the immediate *purpose* which is expected to result from them. *Design*, when not expressly qualified by a contrary epithet, is used in a bad sense in connexion with a particular agent: *purpose*, *intention*, and *meaning*, in an indifferent sense: a *designing* person is full of latent and interested *designs*; there is nothing so good that it may not be made to serve the *purposes* of those who are bad; the *intentions* of a man must always be taken into the account when we are forming an estimate of his actions; ignorant people frequently *mean* much better than they do.

DESIGN, PLAN, SCHEME, PROJECT.

DESIGN, *v.* To design.

PLAN, in French *plan*, comes from *plane* or *plain*, in Latin *planus* smooth or even, signifying in general any *plane* place, or in particular the even surface on which a building is raised: and by an extended application the sketch of the *plane* surface of any building or object.

SCHEME, in Latin *schema*, Greek *σχημα* a form or figure, signifies the thing drawn out in the mind.

PROJECT, in Latin *projectus*, from *pro-jicio*, compounded of *pro* and *jacio*, signi-

fies to cast or put forth, that is, the thing proposed.

Arrangement is the idea common to these terms: the *design* includes the thing that is to be brought about; the *plan* includes the means by which it is to be brought about: a *design* was formed in the time of James I. for overturning the government of the country; the *plan* by which this was to have been realized, consisted in placing gunpowder under the parliament-house and blowing up the assembly.

A *design* is to be estimated according to its intrinsic worth; a *plan* is to be estimated according to its relative value, or fitness for the *design*: a *design* is noble or wicked, a *plan* is practicable: every founder of a charitable institution may be supposed to have a good *design*; but he may adopt an erroneous *plan* for obtaining the end proposed.

Scheme and *project* respect both the end and the means, which makes them analogous to *design* and *plan*: the *design* stimulates to action; the *plan* determines the mode of action; the *scheme* and *project* consist most in speculation: the *design* and *plan* are equally practical, and suited to the ordinary and immediate circumstances of life; the *scheme* and *project* are contrived or conceived for extraordinary or rare occasions: no man takes any step without a *design*; a general forms the *plan* of his campaign; adventurous men are always forming *schemes* for gaining money; ambitious monarchs are full of *projects* for increasing their dominions.

Scheme and *project* differ principally in the magnitude of the objects to which they are applied; the former being much less vast and extensive than the latter: a *scheme* may be formed by individuals for attaining any trifling advantage; *projects* are mostly conceived in matters of state, or of public interest: the metropolis abounds with persons whose inventive faculties are busy in devising *schemes*, by which they purpose great advantages to the public; the *project* of universal conquest which entered into the wild speculations of Alexander the Great did not, unfortunately for the world, perish at his death.

TO DESIRE, WISH, LONG FOR, HANKER AFTER, COVET.

DESIRE in Latin *desidero*, comes from *desido* to rest or fix upon with the mind.

WISH, in German *wünschen*, comes from *wonne* pleasure, signifying to take pleasure in a thing.

LONG, from the German *langen* to reach after signifies to seek after with the mind.

HANKER, *hanger*, or *hang*, signifies to hang on an object with one's mind.

COVET, *v. Covetous*.

Desire is imperious, it demands gratification: *wish* is less vehement, it consists of a strong inclination; *longing* is an impatient and continued species of desire; *hankering* is a *desire* for that which belongs to another, or what it is in his power to grant: we *desire* or *long for* that which is near at hand, or within view: we *wish* for and *covet* that which is more remote, or less distinctly seen; we *hanker after* that which has been once enjoyed: a discontented person *wishes* for more than he has; he who is in a strange land *longs* to see his native country; vicious men *hanker after* the pleasures which are denied them: ambitious men *covet* honours, avaricious men *covet* riches.

Desire, as it regards others, is not less imperative than when it respects ourselves; it lays an obligation on the person to whom it is expressed: a *wish* is gentle and unassuming; it appeals to the good nature of another: we act by the *desire* of a superior, and according to the *wishes* of an equal: the *desire* of a parent will amount to a command in the mind of a dutiful child: his *wishes* will be anticipated by the warmth of affection.

TO DESIST. LEAVE OFF.

DESIST, from the Latin *desisto*, signifies to take one's self off.

Desist is applied to actions good, indifferent, or offensive to some person; **LEAVE OFF** to actions that are indifferent; the former is voluntary or involuntary, the latter voluntary: we are frequently obliged to *desist*; but we *leave off* at our option: it is prudent to *desist* from using our endeavours when we find them ineffectual; it is natural for a person to *leave off* when he sees no farther occasion to continue his labour: he who annoys another must be made to *desist*; he who does not wish to offend will *leave off* when requested.

DESPAIR, DESPERATION, DESPONDENCY.

DESPAIR, **DESPERATION**, from the French *desespoir*, compounded of the privative *de* and the Latin *spes* hope, signifies the absence or the annihilation of all hope.

DESPONDENCY, from *despond*, in Latin *despondeo*, compounded of the privative *de* and *spondeo* to promise, signifies literally to deprive in a solemn manner, or cut off from every gleam of hope.

Despair is a state of mind produced by the view of external circumstances; *despera-*

tion and *despondency* may be the fruit of the imagination; the former therefore always rests on some ground, the latter are sometimes ideal; *despair* lies mostly in reflection; *desperation* and *despondency* in the feelings; the former marks a state of vehement and impatient feeling, the latter that of fallen and mournful feeling. *Despair* is often the forerunner of *desperation* and *despondency*, but it is not necessarily accompanied with effects so powerful: the strongest mind may have occasion to *despair* when circumstances warrant the sentiment; men of an impetuous character are apt to run into a state of *desperation*; a weak mind full of morbid sensibility is most liable to fall into *despondency*.

Despair interrupts or checks exertion; *desperation* impels to greater exertions; *despondency* unfits for exertion: when a physician *despairs* of making a cure, he lays aside the application of remedies; when a soldier sees nothing but death or disgrace before him, he is driven to *desperation*, and redoubles his efforts; when a tradesman sees nothing before him but failure for the present, and want for the future, he may sink into *despondency*.

DESPERATE, HOPELESS.

DESPERATE (*v. Despair*) is applicable to persons or things; **HOPELESS** to things only: a person makes a *desperate* effort; he undertakes a *hopeless* task.

Desperate, when applied to things expresses more than *hopeless*; the latter marks the absence of hope as to the attainment of good, the former marks the absence of hope as to the removal of an evil: a person who is in a *desperate* condition is overwhelmed with actual trouble for the present, and the prospect of its continuance for the future; he whose case is *hopeless* is without the prospect of effecting the end he has in view: gamblers are frequently brought into *desperate* situations when bereft of every thing that might possibly serve to lighten the burdens of their misfortunes: it is a *hopeless* undertaking to endeavour to reclaim men who have plunged themselves deep into the labyrinths of vice.

DESTINY, FATE, LOT, DOOM.

DESTINY, from *destine* (*v. To appoint*) signifies either the power that *destines*, or the thing *destined*.

FATE, *v. Chance*.

LOT, in German *loos*, signifies a ticket, die, or any other thing by which the casual distribution of things is determined; and in

an extended sense, it expresses the portion thus assigned by chance.

DOOM, in Saxon *dome*, Danish *döm*, most probably, like the word *deem*, comes from the Hebrew *dan* to judge, signifying the thing judged, spoken, or decreed.

All these terms are employed with regard to human events which are not under one's control: among the heathens *destiny* and *fate* were considered as deities, who each in his way could direct human affairs, and were both superior even to Jupiter himself: the *Destinies*, or *Parcae* as they were termed, presided only over life and death; but *fate* was employed in ruling the general affairs of men. Since revelation has instructed mankind in the nature and attributes of the true God, these blind powers are now not acknowledged to exist in the over-ruling providence of an all-wise and an all-good Being; the terms *destiny* and *fate* therefore have now only a relative sense, as to what happens without the will or control of the individual who is the subject of it.

Destiny is used in regard to one's station and walk in life; *fate* in regard to what one suffers; *lot* in regard to what one gets or possesses; and *doom* is that portion of one's *destiny* or *fate* which depends upon the will of another: *destiny* is marked out; *fate* is fixed; a *lot* is assigned; a *doom* is passed.

It was the destiny of Julius Caesar to act a great part in the world, and to establish a new form of government at Rome; it was his *fate* at last to die by the hands of assassins, the chief of whom had been his avowed friends; had he been contented with a humbler *lot* than that of an empire, he might have enjoyed honours, riches, and a long life; his *doom* was sealed by the last step which he took in making himself emperor: it is not permitted for us to inquire into our future *destiny*; it is our duty to submit to our *fate*, to be contented with our *lot*, and prepared for our *doom*.

DESTINY, DESTINATION.

Both DESTINY and DESTINATION are used for the thing *destined*; but the former is said in relation to a man's important concerns, the latter only of particular circumstances; in which sense it may likewise be employed for the act of *destining*.

Destiny is the point or line marked out in the walk of life; *destination* is the place fixed upon in particular: as every man has his peculiar *destiny*, so every traveller has his particular *destination*. *Destiny* is altogether set above human control; no man can determine, though he may influence, the *destiny* of another: *destination* is, however,

the specific act of an individual, either for himself or another: we leave the *destiny* of a man to develop itself; but we may inquire about his own *destination*, or that of his children.

DESTRUCTION, RUIN.

DESTRUCTION, from *destroy* and the Latin *destruo*, signifies literally to unbuild that which is raised up.

RUIN, from the Latin *ruo* to fall, signifies that which is fallen into pieces.

Destruction is an act of immediate violence; *ruin* is a gradual process: a thing is *destroyed* by some external action upon it; a thing falls to *ruin* of itself: we witness *destruction* wherever war or the adverse elements rage; we witness *ruin* whenever the works of man are exposed to the effects of time: nevertheless if *destruction* be more forcible and rapid, *ruin* is, on the other hand, more sure and complete: what is *destroyed* may be rebuilt or replaced; but what is *ruined* is lost for ever, it is past recovery: when houses or towns are *destroyed*, fresh ones rise up in their place; but when commerce is *ruined*, it seldom returns to its old course.

Destruction admits of various degrees; *ruin* is something positive and general. The property of a man may be *destroyed* to a greater or less extent, without necessarily involving his *ruin*. The *ruin* of a whole family is oftentimes the consequence of *destruction* by fire. Health is *destroyed* by violent exercises, or some other active cause; it is *ruined* by a course of imprudent conduct. The happiness of a family is *destroyed* by broils and discord; the morals of a young man are *ruined* by a continued intercourse with vicious companions.

Destruction may be used either in the proper or the improper sense; *ruin* has mostly a moral application. The *destruction* of both body and soul is the consequence of sin; the *ruin* of a man, whether in his temporal or spiritual concerns, is inevitable, if he follow the dictates of misguided passion.

DESTRUCTIVE, RUINOUS, PERNICIOUS.

DESTRUCTIVE signifies producing *destruction* (v. *Destruction*).

RUINOUS signifies either having or causing *ruin* (v. *Destruction*).

PERNICIOUS, from the Latin *perniciēs* or *per* and *neco* to kill violently, signifies causing violent and total dissolution.

Destructive and *ruinous*, as the epithets of the preceding terms, have a similar dis-

inction in their sense and application; fire and sword are *destructive* things; a poison is *destructive*: consequences are *ruinous*; a condition or state is *ruinous*; intestine commotions are *ruinous* to the prosperity of a state.

Pernicious approaches nearer to *destructive* than to *ruinous*; both the former imply tendency to dissolution, which may be more or less gradual; but the latter refers us to the result itself, to the dissolution as already having taken place: hence we speak of the instrument or cause as being *destructive* or *pernicious*, and the action or event as *ruinous*: *destructive* is applied in the most extended sense to every object which has been created or supposed to be so; *pernicious* is applicable only to such objects as act only in a limited way; sin is equally *destructive* to both body and soul; certain food is *pernicious* to the body; certain books are *pernicious* to the mind.

TO DETECT, DISCOVER.

DETECT, from the Latin *de* private and *tēgo* to cover, and DISCOVER, from the privative *dis* and *cover*, both originally signify to deprive of a covering.

Detect is always taken in a bad sense: *discover* in an indifferent sense. A person is *detected* in what he wishes to conceal; a person or a thing is *discovered* that has unintentionally lain concealed. Thieves are *detected* in picking pockets; a lost child is *discovered* in a wood, or in some place of security. *Detection* is the act of the moment; it is effected by the aid of the senses: a *discovery* is the consequence of efforts, and is brought about by circuitous means, and the aid of the understanding. Nothing is *detected* but what is actually passing; many things are *discovered* which have long passed. Wicked men go on in their career of vice with the hope of escaping *detection*; the *discovery* of one villany often leads to that of many more.

TO DETER, DISCOURAGE, DISHEARTEN.

DETER, in Latin *deterreo*, compounded of *de* and *terreo*, signifies to frighten away from a thing.

DISCOURAGE and DISHEARTEN, by the privative *dis*, signify to deprive of courage or heart. One is *deterred* from commencing any thing, one is *discouraged* or *disheartened* from proceeding. A variety of motives may *deter* any one from undertaking; but a person is *discouraged* or *disheartened* mostly by the want of success or the hopelessness of the case. The wicked

are sometimes *deterred* from committing enormities by the fear of punishment; projectors are *discouraged* from entering into fresh speculations by observing the failure of others; there are few persons who would not be *disheartened* from renewing their endeavours, when they had experienced nothing but ill-success.

TO DETERMINE, RESOLVE.

DETERMINE, *v.* To decide.

RESOLVE, *v.* Courage.

To *determine* is more especially an act of the judgment; * to *resolve* is an act of the will: the former requires examination and choice; we *determine* how or what we shall do: the latter requires a firm spirit; we *resolve* that we will do what we have *determined* upon. Our *determinations* should be prudent, that they may not cause repentance; our *resolutions* should be fixed, in order to prevent variation.

In the ordinary concerns of life we have frequent occasion to *determine* without *resolving*; in the discharge of our moral duties, or the performance of any office, we have occasion to *resolve* without *determining*. A master *determines* to dismiss his servant; the servant *resolves* on becoming more diligent. Personal convenience or necessity gives rise to the *determination*; a sense of duty, honour, fidelity, and the like, gives birth to the *resolution*. A traveller *determines* to take a certain rout; a learner *resolves* to conquer every difficulty in the acquirement of learning. Humour or change of circumstances occasions a person to alter his *determination*; timidity, fear, or defect in principle, occasions the *resolution* to waver.

In matters of science, to *determine* is to fix the mind, or to cause it to rest in a certain opinion; to *resolve* is to lay open what is obscure, to clear the mind from doubt and hesitation. We *determine* points of question; we *resolve* difficulties. It is more difficult to *determine* in matters of rank or precedence than in cases where the solid and real interests of men are concerned: it is the business of the teacher to *resolve* the difficulties which are proposed by the scholar. Every point is not proved which is *determined*; nor is every difficulty *resolved* which is answered.

TO DEVIATE, WANDER, SWERVE, STRAY.

DEVIATE, from *devious*, and the Latin *de viâ*, signifies literally to turn out of the way.

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Decision, resolution.“

WANDER, in German *wandern*, or *wandeln*, probably connected with *wenden* to turn, and the Greek *βαινω* to go, signifies in general the act of going.

SWERVE, probably from the German *schweifen* to ramble, *schweben* to hover, fluctuate, &c., signifies to take an unsteady, wide, and indirect course.

STRAY is probably a change from *erro* to wander.

Deviate always supposes a direct path: *wander* includes no such idea. The act of *deviating* is commonly faulty, that of *wandering* is indifferent: they may frequently exchange significations; the former being justifiable by necessity; and the latter arising from an unsteadiness of mind. *Deviate* is mostly used in the moral acceptation; *wander* may be used in either sense. A person *deviates* from any plan or rule laid down; he *wanders* from the subject in which he is engaged.

To *swerve* is to *deviate* from that which one holds right; to *stray* is to *wander* in the same bad sense: men *swerve* from their duty to consult their interest; the young *stray* from the path of rectitude to seek that of pleasure.

DEVICE, CONTRIVANCE.

DEVICE, from *devise*, compounded of *de* and *visus*, or *video* to see, signifies to bring to light.

CONTRIVANCE, from *contrive* (v. *Contrive*).

There is an exercise of art displayed in both these actions; but the former has most of ingenuity, trick, or cunning; the latter more of deduction and plain judgment in it. A *device* always consists of some invention or something newly made; a *contrivance* mostly respects the mode, arrangement, or disposition of things. Artists are employed in conceiving *devices*; men in general use *contrivances* for their ordinary concerns.

A *device* is often employed for bad and fraudulent purposes; *contrivances* mostly serve for innocent purposes of domestic life. Beggars have various *devices* for giving themselves the appearance of wretchedness and exciting the compassion of the spectator: those who are reduced to the necessity of supplying their wants commonly succeed by forming *contrivances* of which they had not before any conception. *Devices* are the work of the human understanding only; *contrivances* are likewise formed by animals. Men employ *devices* with an intention either to deceive or to please others; animals have their *contrivances*, either to supply some want or to remove some evil.

DEVIL, DEMON.

DEVIL, in Saxon *deost*, Welsh *diafwl*, French *diable*, Italian *diavolo*, Dutch *duivel*, Greek *διαβολος* from *διαβαλλω* to traduce, signifies properly a calumniator, and is always taken in the bad sense, for the spirit which incites to evil, and tempts men through the medium of their evil passions.

DEMON, in Latin *daemon*, Greek *δαιμον* from *δαιω* to know, signifies one knowing, that is, having preternatural knowledge, and is taken either in a bad or good sense for the power that acts within us and controls our actions.

Since the *devil** is represented as the father of all wickedness, associations have been connected with the name that render its pronunciation in familiar discourse offensive to the chastened ear; while *demon* is a term of indifferent application, that is commonly substituted in its stead to designate either a good or an evil spirit.

Malice and fraud are the peculiar characteristics of the *devil*; rage is properly that of a *demon*. The *devil* is said, in proverbial discourse, to be in such things as go contrary to our wishes; the *demon* of jealousy is said to possess the mind that is altogether carried away with that passion. Men who wish to have credit for more goodness than they possess, and to throw the load of guilt off themselves, attribute to the *devil* a perpetual endeavour to draw them into the commission of crimes; wherever the *demon* of discord has got admittance there is a farewell to all the comforts of social life.

TO DEVISE, BEQUEATH.

DEVISE, compounded of *de* and *vise* or *visus*, participle of *video* to see or show, signifies to point out specifically.

BEQUEATH, compounded of *be* and *queath*, in Saxon *cuesan*, from the Latin *quaeso* to say, signifies to give over to a person by saying or by word of mouth.

To *devise* is a formal, to *bequeath* is an informal assignment of our property to another on our death. We *devise* therefore only by a legal testament; we may *bequeath* simply by word of mouth; or by any expression of our will: we can *devise* only that which is property in the eye of the law; we may *bequeath* in the moral sense any thing which we cause to pass over to another: a man *devises* his lands: he *bequeaths* his name or his glory to his children.

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Diable, demon.“

DEXTERITY. ADDRESS. ABILITY.

DEXTERITY, in Latin *dexteritas*, comes from *dexter* the right hand, because that is the one most fitted for action.

ADDRESS signifies properly the mode of *address* or of managing one's self (v. *Address*),

ABILITY (v. *Ability*) signifies the power of having or holding one's self.

Dexterity, says the Abbé Girard, * respects the manner of executing things: it is the mechanical facility of performing an office: *address* refers to the use of means in executing: *ability* to the discernment of the things themselves.

Dexterity and *address* are but, in fact, modes of *ability*: the former may be acquired; the latter is the gift of nature: we may have *ability* to any degree (v. *Ability*), but *dexterity* and *address* are positive degrees of *ability*. To form a good government there must be *ability* in the prince or his ministers; *address* in those to whom the detail of operations is entrusted; and *dexterity* in those to whom the execution of orders is entrusted. With little *ability* and long habit in transacting business, we may acquire a *dexterity* in dispatching it, and *address* in giving it whatever turn will best suit our purpose.

Dexterity lends an air of ease to every action; *address* supplies art and ingenuity in contrivance; *ability* enables us to act with intelligence and confidence.

TO DICTATE. PRESCRIBE.

DICTATE, from the Latin *dictatus* and *dictum* a word, signifies to make a word for another; and PRESCRIBE literally signifies to write down for another (v. *To appoint*), in which sense the former of these terms is used technically for a principal who gets his secretary to write down his words as he utters them; and the latter for a physician who writes down for his patient what he wishes him to take as a remedy.

They are used figuratively for a species of counsel given by a superior; to *dictate* is, however, a greater exercise of authority than to *prescribe*. To *dictate* amounts even to more than to command; it signifies commanding with a tone of unwarrantable authority, or, still oftener, a species of commanding by those who have no right to command; it is, therefore, mostly taken in a bad sense. To *prescribe* partakes altogether of the nature of counsel, and nothing of command; it serves as a rule to the person *prescribed*, and is justified by the superior wisdom, and

knowledge of the person *prescribing*; it is, therefore, always taken in an indifferent or a good sense. He who *dictates* speaks with an adventitious authority: he who *prescribes* has the sanction of reason.

DICTATE. SUGGESTION.

DICTATE signifies the thing *dictated*, and has an imperative sense as in the former case (v. *To dictate*).

SUGGESTION signifies the thing *suggested*, and conveys the idea of its being proposed secretly or in a gentle manner.

A *dictate* comes from the conscience, the reason, or the passions; *suggestions* spring from the mind, the will, or the desire. *Dictate* is taken either in a good or bad sense: *suggestion* mostly in a bad sense. It is the part of a Christian at all times to listen to the *dictates* of conscience: it is characteristic of a weak mind to follow the *suggestions* of envy. A man who yields to the *dictates* of passion renounces the character of a rational being: whoever does not resist the *suggestions* of his own evil mind is very far gone in corruption, and will never be able to bear up long against temptation.

Dictate is employed only for what passes inwardly; *suggestion* may be used for any action on the mind by external objects. No man will err essentially in the ordinary affairs of life who is guided by the *dictates* of plain sense. It is the lot of sinful mortals to be drawn to evil by the *suggestions* of Satan as well as their own evil inclinations.

DICTION, STYLE, PHRASE, PHRASEOLOGY.

DICTION, from the Latin *dictio*, saying, is put for the mode of expressing ourselves.

STYLE comes from the Latin *stylus* the bodkin with which they both wrote and corrected what they had written on their waxen tablets; whence the word has been used for the manner of writing in general.

PHRASE, in Greek *φρασις* from *φραζω* to speak; and PHRASEOLOGY from *φρασις* and *λογος*, both signify the manner of speaking.

Diction expresses much less than *style*: the former is applicable to the first efforts of learners in composition; the latter only to the original productions of a matured mind.

Errors in grammar, false construction, a confused disposition of words, or an improper application of them, constitutes bad *dictation*; but the niceties, the elegancies, the peculiarities, and the beauties of composition, which mark the genius and talent of the writer, are what is comprehended under

* Vide „Dexterité, adresse, habilité.“

the name of *style*. *Diction* is a general term, applicable alike to a single sentence or a connected composition; *style* is used in regard to a regular piece of composition.

As *diction* is a term of inferior import, it is, of course, mostly confined to ordinary subjects, and *style*, to the productions of authors. We should speak of a person's *diction* in his private correspondence, but of his *style*, in his literary works. *Diction* requires only to be pure and clear; *style* may likewise be polished, elegant, florid, and the like.

Diction is said mostly in regard to what is written; *phrase* and *phraseology* are said as often of what is spoken as what is written; as that a person has adopted a strange *phrase* or *phraseology*. The former respects single words; the latter comprehends a succession of *phrases*.

DICTIONARY, ENCYCLOPEDIA.

DICTIONARY, from the Latin *dictum*, a saying or word, is a register of words.

ENCYCLOPEDIA, from the Greek *εγκυκλοπαιδεια*, or *εν* in, *κυκλος* a circle, and *παιδεια* learning, signifies a register of things.

The definition of words, with their various changes, modifications, uses, acceptations and applications, are the proper subjects of a *dictionary*; the nature and property of things, with their construction, uses, powers, &c. &c. are the proper subjects of an *encyclopedia*. A general acquaintance with all arts and sciences, as far as respects the use of technical terms, and a perfect acquaintance with the classical writers in the language, are essential for the composition of a *dictionary*; an entire acquaintance with all the minutiae of every art and science is requisite for the composition of an *encyclopedia*. A single individual may qualify himself for the task of writing a *dictionary*; but the universality and diversity of knowledge contained in an *encyclopedia* render it necessarily the work of many.

The term *dictionary* has been extended in its application to any work alphabetically arranged, as biographical, medical, botanical *dictionaries*, and the like; but still preserving this distinction, that a *dictionary* always contains only a general or partial illustration of the subject proposed, whilst an *encyclopedia* embraces the whole circuit of science.

DICTIONARY, LEXICON, VOCABULARY, GLOSSARY, NOMENCLATURE.

DICTIONARY, *v.* *Dictionary*, is a general term; LEXICON from *λεγω* to say; VO-

CABULARY from *vox*, a word; GLOSSARY from *gloss*, to explain, from *γλωσσα* the tongue; and NOMENCLATURE from *nomen*, are all species of the *dictionary*.

Lexicon is a species of *dictionary* appropriately applied to the dead languages. A Greek or Hebrew *lexicon* is distinguished from a *dictionary* of the French or English language. A *vocabulary* is a partial kind of *dictionary*, which may comprehend a simple list of words, with or without explanation, arranged in order or otherwise. A *glossary* is an explanatory *vocabulary*, which commonly serves to explain the obsolete terms employed in any author. A *nomenclature* is literally a list of names, and in particular a reference to proper names.

TO DIE, EXPIRE.

DIE in Low German *doen*, Danish *doe*, from the Greek *θνεω* to kill, designates in general the extinction of being.

EXPIRE, from the Latin *e* or *ex* and *spiro* to breathe out, designates the last action of life in certain objects.

* There are beings, such as trees and plants, which are said to live, although they have not breath; these *die*, but do not *expire*: there are other beings which absorb and emit air, but do not live; such as the flame of a lamp, which does not *die*, but it *expires*. By a natural metaphor, the time of being is put for the life of objects; and hence we speak of the date *expiring*, the term *expiring*, and the like; and as life is applied figuratively to moral objects, so may death to objects not having physical life.

TO DIFFER, VARY, DISAGREE, DISSENT.

DIFFER, in Latin *differo*, or *dis* and *fero*, signifies to make into two.

VARY, *v.* To change, alter.

DISAGREE is literally not to agree.

DISSENT, in Latin *dissentio*, or *dis* and *sentio*, signifies to think or feel apart or differently.

Differ, *vary*, and *disagree*, are applicable either to persons or things; *dissent* to persons only. First, as to persons: to *differ* is the most general and indefinite term, the rest are but modes of *difference*: we may *differ* from any cause, or in any degree; we *vary* only in small matters; thus persons may *differ* or *vary* in their statements. There must be two at least to *differ*: or there may be an indefinite number: one may *vary*, or an indefinite number may *vary*; two or a specific number *disagree*: thus two or

* Trusler: „Die, expire.“

more may *differ* in an account which they give; one person may *vary* at different times in the account which he gives; and two particular individuals *disagree*: we may *differ* in matters of fact or speculation; we *vary* only in matters of fact; we *disagree* mostly in matters of speculation. Historians may *differ* in the representation of an affair, and authors may *differ* in their views of a particular subject; narrators *vary* in certain circumstances; two particular philosophers *disagree* in accounting for a phenomenon.

To *disagree* is the act of one man with another; to *dissent* is the act of one or more in relation to a community; thus two writers on the same subject may *disagree* in their conclusions, because they set out from *different* premises; men *dissent* from the established religion of their country according to their education and character.

When applied to the ordinary transactions of life, *differences* may exist merely in opinion, or with a mixture of more or less acrimonious and discordant feeling; *variances* arise from a collision of interests; *disagreements* from asperity of humour; *dissensions* from a clashing of opinions; *differences* may exist between nations, and may be settled by cool discussions; when *variances* arise between neighbours, their passions often interfere to prevent accommodations; when the members of a family consult interest or humour rather than affection, there will be necessarily *disagreements*; and when many members of a community have an equal liberty to express their opinions, there will necessarily be *dissensions*.

In regard to things, *differ* is said of two things with respect to each other; *vary* of one thing in respect to itself: thus two tempers *differ* from each other, and a person's temper *varies* from time to time. Things *differ* in their essences, they *vary* in their accidents; thus the genera and species of things *differ* from each other, and the individuals of each species *vary*: *differ* is said of every thing promiscuously, but *disagree* is only said of such things as might agree; thus two trees *differ* from each other by the course of things, but two numbers *disagree* which are intended to agree.

DIFFERENCE, VARIETY, DIVERSITY, MEDLEY.

DIFFERENCE signifies the cause or the act of differing.

VARIETY, from *various* or *vary*, in Latin *varius*, probably comes from *varus* a speck or speckle, because this is the best emblem of variety.

DIVERSITY, in Latin *diversitas*, comes

from *diverto*, compounded of *di* and *verto*, and signifies to turn aside.

MEDLEY comes from the word *meddle*, which is but a change from *mingle*, *mix*, &c.

Difference and *variety* seem to lie in the things themselves; *diversity* and *medley* are created either by accident or design: a *difference* may lie in two objects only; a *variety* cannot exist without an assemblage; a *difference* is discovered by means of a comparison which the mind forms of objects to prevent confusion; *variety* strikes on the mind, and pleases the imagination with many agreeable images; it is opposed to dull uniformity: the acute observer traces *differences*, however minute, in the objects of his research, and by this means is enabled to class them under their general or particular heads; * nature affords such an infinite *variety* in every thing which exists, that if we do not perceive it the fault is in ourselves; *diversity* arises from an assemblage of objects naturally contrasted; a *medley* is produced by an assemblage of objects so ill-suited as to produce a ludicrous effect: good taste may render a *diversity* of colour agreeable to the eye; caprice or bad taste will be apt to form a ridiculous *medley* of colours and ornaments.

DIFFERENCE, DISTINCTION.

DIFFERENCE, *v.* *Difference*, *variety*.

DISTINCTION, *v.* *To abstract*, *distinguish*.

Difference lies in the thing; *distinction* is the act of the person; the former is, therefore, to the latter as the cause to the effect; the *distinction* rests on the *difference*: those are equally bad logicians who make a *distinction* without a *difference*, or who make no *distinction* where there is a *difference*. Sometimes *distinction* is put for the ground of *distinction*, which brings it nearer in sense to *difference*, in which case the former is a species of the latter: a *difference* is either external or internal; a *distinction* is always external: we have *differences* in character, and *distinctions* in dress: the *difference* between profession and practice, though very considerable, is often lost sight of by the professors of Christianity; in the sight of God, there is no rank or *distinction* that will screen a man from the consequences of unrepented sins.

DIFFERENCE, DISPUTE, ALTERCATION, QUARREL.

DIFFERENCE, *v.* *To differ*.

DISPUTE, *v.* *To argue*.

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Difference, diversité, variété, bigarrure.“

ALTERCATION, in Latin *altercatio* from *alterum* and *cor* another mind, signifies the expressing another opinion.

QUARREL, in French *querelle*, from the Latin *queror* to complain, signifies having a complaint against another.

All these terms are here taken in the general sense of a *difference* on some personal question; the term *difference* is here as general and indefinite as in the former case (v. *To differ, vary*): a *difference*, as distinguished from the others, is generally of a less serious and personal kind; a *dispute* consists not only of angry words, but much ill blood and unkind offices; an *altercation* is a wordy *dispute*, in which *difference* of opinion is drawn out into a multitude of words on all sides; *quarrel* is the most serious of all *differences*, which leads to every species of violence: a *difference* may sometimes arise from a misunderstanding, which may be easily rectified; *differences* seldom grow to *disputes* but by the fault of both parties; *altercations* arise mostly from pertinacious adherence to, and an obstinate defence of one's opinions; *quarrels* mostly spring from injuries real or supposed: *differences* subsist between men in an individual or public capacity; they may be carried on in a direct or indirect manner; *disputes* and *altercations* are mostly conducted in a direct manner between individuals; *quarrels* may arise betwixt nations or individuals, and be carried on by acts of offence directly or indirectly.

DIFFERENT, DISTINCT, SEPARATE.

* DIFFERENT, v. *To differ, vary*.

DISTINCT, in Latin *distinctus*, principle of *distinguo* (v. *To abstract, separate*).

SEPARATE, v. *To abstract*.

Difference is opposed to similitude; there is no *difference* between objects absolutely alike: *distinctness* is opposed to identity; there can be no *distinction* where there is only one and the same being: *separation* is opposed to unity; there can be no *separation* between objects that coalesce or adhere: things may be *different* and not *distinct*, or *distinct* and not *different*: *different* is said altogether of the internal properties of things; *distinct* is said of things as objects of vision, or as they appear either to the eye or the mind: when two or more things are seen only as one, they may be *different*, but they are not *distinct*; but whatever is seen as two or more things, each complete in itself, is *distinct*, although

it may not be *different*: two roads are said to be *different* which run in *different* directions, but they may not be *distinct* when seen on a map: on the other hand, two roads are said to be *distinct* when they are observed as two roads to run in the same direction, but they need not in any particular to be *different*: two stars of *different* magnitudes may, in certain directions, appear as one, in which case they are *different*, but not *distinct*; two books on the same subject, and by the same author, but not written in continuation of each other, are *distinct* books, but not *different*.

What is *separate* must in its nature be generally *distinct*; but every thing is not *separate* which is *distinct*: when houses are *separate* they are obviously *distinct*; but they may frequently be *distinct* when they are not positively *separated*: the *distinct* is marked out by some external sign, which determines its beginning and its end; the *separate* is that which is set apart, and to be seen by itself: *distinct* is a term used only in determining the singularity or plurality of objects; the *separate* only in regard to their proximity or to distance from each other: we speak of having a *distinct* household, but of living in *separate* apartments; of dividing one's subject into *distinct* heads, or of making things into *separate* parcels: the body and soul are *different* properties; they are *distinct* in as much as they have marks by which they may be *distinguished*, and at death they will be *separate*.

DIFFERENT, SEVERAL, DIVERS, SUNDRY, VARIOUS.

All these terms are employed to mark a number (v. *To differ, vary*); but DIFFERENT is the most indefinite of all these terms, as its office is rather to define the quality than the number, and is equally applicable to few and many; it is opposed to singularity, but the other terms are employed positively to express many. SEVERAL, from *to sever*, signifies split or made into many: they may be either *different* or alike; there may be *several* different things, or *several* things alike; but there cannot be *several* divers things, for the word *divers* signifies properly many *different*. SUNDRY, from *asunder* or apart, signifies many things scattered or at a distance, whether as it regards time or space. VARIOUS expresses not only a greater number, but a greater *diversity* than all the rest.

The same thing often affects *different*

* Vide Bauzée: „Distinction, diversité, separation,“

persons *differently*: an individual may be affected *several* times in the same way; or particular persons may be affected at *sun-dry* times and in *divers* manners; the ways in which men are affected are so *various* as not to admit of enumeration.

DIFFERENT, UNLIKE.

DIFFERENT is positive, UNLIKE is negative: we look at what is *different*, and draw a comparison; but that which is *unlike* needs no comparison: a thing is said to be *different* from every other thing, or *unlike* to any thing seen before; which latter mode of expression obviously conveys less to the mind than the former.

DIFFICULTIES, EMBARRASSMENTS, TROUBLES.

These terms are all applicable to a person's concerns in life; but DIFFICULTIES relate to the *difficulty* (v. *Difficulty*) of conducting a business; EMBARRASSMENTS relate to the confusion attending a state of debt; and TROUBLES to the pain which is the natural consequence of not fulfilling engagements or answering demands. Of the three, the term *difficulties* expresses the least, and that of *troubles* the most. A young man on his entrance into the world will unavoidably experience *difficulties*, if not provided with ample means in the outset. But let his means be ever so ample, if he have not prudence and talents fitted for business, he will hardly keep himself free from *embarrassments*, which are the greatest *troubles* that can arise to disturb the peace of a man's mind.

DIFFICULTY, OBSTACLE, IMPEDIMENT.

DIFFICULTY, in Latin *difficultas* and *difficilis*, compounded of the privative *dis* and *facilis* easy, from *facio* to do, signifies not easy to be done.

OBSTACLE, in Latin *obstaculum* from *obsto* to stand in the way, signifies the thing that stands in the way between a person and the object he has in view.

IMPEDIMENT, in Latin *impedimentum* from *impedio* compounded of *in* and *pedes*, signifying something that entangles the feet.

All these terms include in their signification that which interferes either with the actions or views of men: the *difficulty* * lies most in the nature and circumstances of the thing itself; the *obstacle* and *impediment* consist of that which is external or foreign: a *difficulty* interferes with the completion of any work; an *obstacle* interferes

with the attainment of any end; an *impediment* interrupts the progress, and prevents the execution of one's wishes: a *difficulty* embarrasses, it suspends the powers of acting or deciding; an *obstacle* opposes itself, it is properly met in the way, and intervenes between us and our object; an *impediment* shackles and puts a stop to our proceedings: we speak of encountering a *difficulty*, surmounting an *obstacle*, and removing an *impediment*.

DIFFUSE, PROLIX.

Both mark defects of style opposed to brevity

DIFFUSE, in Latin *diffusus* participle of *diffundo* to pour out or spread wide, marks the quality of being extended in space.

PROLIX, in French *prolix*, changed from *prolaxus*, signifies to let loose in a wide space.

The *diffuse* is properly opposed to the precise; the *prolix* to the concise or laconic. A *diffuse* writer is fond of amplification, he abounds in epithets, tropes, figures, and illustrations; the *prolix* writer is fond of circumlocution, minute details, and trifling particulars. *Diffuseness* is a fault only in degree, and according to circumstances; *prolixity* is a positive fault at all times. The former leads to the use of words unnecessarily; the latter to the use of phrases, as well as words, that are altogether useless: the *diffuse* style has too much of repetition; the *prolix* style abounds in tautology. *Diffuseness* often arises from an exuberance of imagination; *prolixity* from the want of imagination; on the other hand, the former may be coupled with great superficiality, and the latter with great solidity.

Gibbon and other modern writers have fallen into the error of *diffuseness*. Lord Clarendon and many English writers preceding him are chargeable with *prolixity*.

TO DIGRESS, DEVIATE.

Both in the original and the accepted sense, these words express going out of the ordinary course; but DIGRESS is used only in particular, and DEVIATE in general cases. We *digress* only in a narrative whether written or spoken; we *deviate* in actions as well as words, in our conduct as well as in writings.

Digress is mostly taken in a good or indifferent sense; *deviate* in an indifferent or bad sense. Although frequent *digressions* are faulty, yet occasionally it is necessary to *digress* for the purposes of explanation;

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Difficulté, obstacle, empêchement.“

every *deviation* is bad, which is not sanctioned by the necessity of circumstances.

TO DILATE, EXPAND.

DILATE, in Latin *dilato*, from *di* apart and *latus* wide, that is, to make very wide.

EXPAND, in Latin *expando* compounded of *ex* and *pando* to spread, from the Greek *φαίω* to appear or show, signifying to set forth or lay open to view by spreading out.

The idea of drawing any thing out so as to occupy greater space is common to these terms in opposition to contracting. *Dilate* is an intransitive verb; *expand* is transitive or intransitive; the former marks the action of any body within itself; the latter an external action on any body. A bladder *dilates* on the admission of air, or the heart *dilates* with joy; knowledge expands the mind, or a person's views *expand* with circumstances.

DILIGENT, EXPEDITIOUS, PROMPT.

All these terms mark the quality of quickness in a commendable degree.

DILIGENT from *diligo* to love (v. Active, *diligent*) marks the interest one takes in doing something; he is * *diligent* who loses no time, who keeps close to the work.

EXPEDITIOUS, from the Latin *expedio* to dispatch, marks the desire one has to complete the thing begun. He who is *expeditious* applies himself to no other thing that offers; he finishes every thing in its turn.

PROMPT, from the Latin *promo* to draw out or make ready, marks one's desire to get ready; he is *prompt* who works with spirit so as to make things ready. Idleness, dilatoriness and slowness, are three defects opposed to these three qualities. The *diligent* man has no reluctance in commencing his labour; the *expeditious* man never leaves it; the *prompt* man brings it quickly to an end. It is necessary to be *diligent* in the concerns which belong to us, to be *expeditious* in any business that requires to be terminated, to be *prompt* in the execution of orders that are given to us.

TO DIRECT, REGULATE.

We DIRECT for the instruction of individuals. We REGULATE for the good order or convenience of many.

To *direct* is personal, it supposes authority; to *regulate* is general, it supposes superior information. An officer *directs*

the movement of his men in military operations; the steward or master of the ceremonies *regulates* the whole concerns of an entertainment; the *director* is often a man in power; the *regulator* is always the man of business; the latter is frequently employed to act under the former. The Bank of England has its *directors*, who only take part in the administration of the whole; the *regulation* of the subordinate part, and of the details of business, is entrusted to the superior clerks.

To *direct* is always used with regard to others; to *regulate*, frequently with regard to ourselves. One person *directs* another according to his better judgment; he *regulates* his own conduct by principles or circumstances.

DIRECTION, ADDRESS, SUPERSCRPTION.

DIRECTION (v. *To direct*), marks that which directs.

ADDRESS (v. *To address*) is that which addresses.

SUPERSCRPTION from *super* and *scribo*, signifies that which is written over.

Although these terms may be used promiscuously for each other, yet they have a peculiarity of signification by which their proper use is defined: a *direction* may serve to direct to places as well as to persons: an *address* is never used but in direct application to the person: a *superscription* has more respect to the thing than the person. A *direction* may be written or verbal; an *address* in this sense is always written; a *superscription* must not only be written, but either on or over some other thing: a *direction* is given to such as go in search of persons and places, it ought to be clear and particular: an *address* is put either on a card or a letter, or in a book; it ought to be suitable to the station and situation of the person *addressed*: a *superscription* is placed at the head of other writings or over tombs and pillars: it ought to be appropriate.

DIRECTION, ORDER.

DIRECTION, v. *To direct*.

ORDER, v. *To command*.

Direction contains most of instruction in it: *order* most of authority. *Directions* should be followed; *orders* obeyed. *Directions* extend to the moral conduct of others, as well as the ordinary concerns of life; *orders* are confined to the personal convenience of the individual. A parent *directs* a child as to his behaviour in company, or as to his conduct when he enters life; a

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Diligent, expeditif, prompt.“

teacher *directs* his pupil in the choice of books, or in the distribution of his studies: the master gives *orders* to his attendants to be in waiting for him at a certain hour; or he gives *orders* to his tradesmen to provide what is necessary.

DIRECTLY, IMMEDIATELY, INSTANTLY, INSTANTANEOUSLY.

DIRECTLY signifies in a *direct* or straight manner.

IMMEDIATELY signifies without any medium or intervention.

INSTANTLY and **INSTANTANEOUSLY**, from *instant*, signifies in an instant.

Directly is most applicable to the actions of men; *immediately* and *instantly* to either actions or events. *Directly* refers to the interruptions which may intentionally delay the commencement of any work: *immediately* in general refers to the space of time that intervenes. A diligent person goes *directly* to his work; he suffers nothing to draw him aside: good news is *immediately* spread abroad upon its arrival; nothing intervenes to retard it. *Immediately* and *instantly*, or *instantaneously*, both mark a quick succession of events, but the latter in a much stronger degree than the former. *Immediately* is negative; it expresses simply that nothing intervenes; *instantly* is positive, signifying the very existing moment in which the thing happens. A person who is of a willing disposition goes or runs *immediately* to the assistance of another; but the ardour of affection impels him to fly *instantly* to his relief, as he sees the danger. A surgeon does not proceed *directly* to dress a wound: he first examines it, in order to ascertain its nature: men of lively minds *immediately* see the source of their own errors: people of delicate feelings are *instantly* alive to the slightest breach of decorum. A course of proceeding is *direct*, the consequences are *immediate*, and the effects *instantaneous*.

DISADVANTAGE, INJURY, HURT, DETRIMENT, PREJUDICE.

DISADVANTAGE implies the absence of an *advantage* (v. *Advantage*).

INJURY, in Latin *injuria* from *jus*, properly signifies what is contrary to right or justice, but extends in its sense to every loss or deficiency which is occasioned.

HURT signifies in the northern languages beaten or wounded.

DETRIMENT, in Latin *detrimētum*, from *detritum* and *detertere* to wear away, signifies the effect of being worn out.

PREJUDICE, in the improper sense of

the word (v. *Bias*), implies the ill which is supposed to result from *prejudice*.

Disadvantage is rather the absence of a good; *injury* is a positive evil; the want of education may frequently be a *disadvantage* to a person by retarding his advancement; the ill word of another may be an *injury* by depriving him of friends. *Disadvantage*, therefore is applied to such things as are of an *adventitious* nature: the *injury* to that which is of essential importance. *Hurt*, *detriment*, and *prejudice*, are all species of *injuries*. *Injury*, in general, implies whatever ill befalls an object by the external action of other objects, whether taken in relation to physical or moral evil to persons, or to things; *hurt* is that species of *injury* which is produced by more direct violence; too close an application to study is *injurious* to the health; reading by an improper light is *hurtful* to the eyes: so in a moral sense, the light reading which a circulating library supplies is often *injurious* to the morals of young people; all violent affections are *hurtful* to the mind. *Detriment* and *prejudice* are species of *injury* which affect only the outward circumstances of a person; the former implying what may lessen the value of an object, the latter what may lower it in the esteem of others. Whatever affects the stability of a merchant's credit is highly *detrimental* to his interests: whatever is *prejudicial* to the character of a man should not be made the subject of indiscriminate conversation.

DISAFFECTION, DISLOYALTY.

DISAFFECTION is general: **DISLOYALTY** is particular; it is a species of *disaffection*.

Men are *disaffected* to the government; *disloyal* to their prince. *Disaffection* may be said with regard to any form of government; *disloyalty* only with regard to a monarchy. Although both terms are commonly employed in a bad sense, yet the former does not always convey the unfavourable meaning which is attached to the latter. A man may have reasons to think himself justified in *disaffection*; but he will never attempt to offer any thing in justification of *disloyalty*. Many were *disaffected* to the usurpation of Oliver Cromwell, because they would not be *disloyal* to their king.

TO DISAPPEAR, VANISH.

To **DISAPPEAR** signifies not to *appear* (v. *Air*).

VANISH, in French *evanuir*, Latin *evanescere* or *evanesco*, compounded of *e* and

vaneo, in Greek *φαίω* to appear, signifies to go out of sight.

To *disappear* comprehends no particular mode of action; to *vanish* includes in it the idea of a rapid motion. A thing *disappears* either gradually or suddenly; it *vanishes* on a sudden: it *disappears* in the ordinary course of things; it *vanishes* by an unusual effort, a supernatural or a magic power. Any object that recedes or moves away will soon *disappear*; in fairy tales things are made to *vanish* the instant they are beheld. To *disappear* is often a temporary action; to *vanish*, generally conveys the idea of being permanently lost to the sight. The stars *appear* and *disappear* in the firmament; lightning *vanishes* with a rapidity that is unequalled.

TO DISAPPROVE, DISLIKE.

To DISAPPROVE is not to approve, or to think not good.

To DISLIKE is not to like, or to find unlike or unsuitable to one's wishes.

Disapprove is an act of the judgment; *dislike* is an act of the will. To *approve* or *disapprove* is peculiarly the part of a superior, or one who determines the conduct of others; to *dislike* is altogether a personal act, in which the feelings of the individual are consulted. It is a misuse of the judgment to *disapprove* where we need only *dislike*; it is a perversion of the judgment to *disapprove*, because we *dislike*.

TO DISAVOW, DENY.

To DISAVOW is to *avow* that a thing is not: to DENY (*v. To deny*) is to assert that a thing is not.

A *disavowal* is a general declaration; a *denial* is a particular assertion; the former is made voluntarily and unasked for, the latter is always in direct answer to a charge: we *disavow* in matters of general interest where truth only is concerned: we *deny* in matters of personal interest where the character or feelings are implicated.

What is *disavowed* is generally in support of truth; what is *denied* may often be in direct violation of truth: an honest mind will always *disavow* whatever has been erroneously attributed to it; a timid person sometimes *denies* what he knows to be true from a fear of the consequences.

DISBELIEF, UNBELIEF.

DISBELIEF properly implies the *believing* that a thing is not, or refusing to *believe* that it is. UNBELIEF expresses properly a *believing* the contrary of what one has *believed* before: *disbelief* is most ap-

plicable to the ordinary events of life; *unbelief* to serious matters of opinion: our *disbelief* of the idle tales which are told by beggars, is justified by the frequent detection of their falsehood; our Saviour had compassion on Thomas for his *unbelief*, and gave him such evidences of his identity, as dissipated every doubt.

DISCERNMENT, PENETRATION, DISCRIMINATION, JUDGMENT.

DISCERNMENT expresses the judgment or power of *discerning* (*v. To perceive*).

PENETRATION denotes the act or power of *penetrating*, from *penetrate*, in Latin *penetratus* participle of *penetro* and *penitus* within, signifying to see into the interior.

DISCRIMINATION denotes the act or power of *discriminating*, from *discriminate*, in Latin *discriminatus* participle of *discrimino* to make a difference.

JUDGMENT denotes the power of *judging*, from *judge*, in Latin *judico*, compounded of *jus* and *dico*, signifying to pronounce right.

The first three of these terms do not express different powers, but different modes of the same power; namely, the power of seeing intellectually, or exerting the intellectual sight.

Discernment is not so powerful a mode of intellectual vision as *penetration*; the former is a common faculty, the latter is a higher degree of the same faculty; it is the power of seeing quickly, and seeing in spite of all that intercepts the sight, and keeps the object out of view: a man of common *discernment* discerns characters which are not concealed by any particular disguise; a man of *penetration* is not to be deceived by any artifice, however thoroughly cloaked or secured, even from suspicion.

Discernment and *penetration* serve for the discovery of individual things by their outward marks; *discrimination* is employed in the discovery of differences between two or more objects; the former consists of simple observation, the latter combines also comparison: *discernment* and *penetration* are great aids towards *discrimination*; he who can *discern* the springs of human action, or *penetrate* the views of men, will be most fitted for *discriminating* between the characters of different men.

Although *judgment* derives much assistance from the three former operations, it is a totally distinct power: the former only discovers the things that are, it acts on external objects by seeing them: the latter is creative; it produces by deduction from

that which passes inwardly.* The former are speculative; they are directed to that which is to be known, and are confined to present objects, they serve to discover truth and falsehood, perfections and defects, motives and pretexts: the latter is practical; it is directed to that which is to be done, and extends its views to the future; it marks the relations and connexions of things; it foresees their consequences and effects.

Of *discernment*, we say that it is clear; it serves to remove all obscurity and confusion: of *penetration*, we say that it is acute; it pierces every veil which falsehood draws before truth, and prevents us from being deceived: of *discrimination*, we say that it is nice: it renders our ideas accurate, and serves to prevent us from confounding objects: of *judgment*, we say that it is solid or sound; it renders the conduct prudent, prevents us from committing mistakes or involving one's self in embarrassments.

When the question is to estimate the real qualities of either persons or things, we exercise *discernment*; when it is required to lay open that which art or cunning has concealed, we must exercise *penetration*: when the question is to determine the proportions and degrees of qualities in persons or things, we must use *discrimination*; when called upon to take any step, or act any part, we must employ *judgment*.

TO DISCLAIM, DISOWN.

DISCLAIM and DISOWN are both personal acts respecting the individual who is the agent: to *disclaim* is to throw off a *claim*, to *disown* (*v. To acknowledge*) is not to admit as one's own; as *claim*, from the Latin *clamo*, signifies to declare with a loud tone what we want as our own; so to *disclaim* is with an equally loud or positive tone, to give up a *claim*: this is a more positive act than to *disown*, which may be performed by insinuation, or by the mere abstaining to own.

He who feels himself disgraced by the actions that are done by his nation, or his family, will be ready to *disclaim* the very name which he bears in common with the offending party; an absurd pride sometimes impels men to *disown* their relationship to those who are beneath them in external rank and condition: an honest mind will *disclaim* all right to praise which it feels not to belong to itself; the fear of ridicule sometimes makes a man *disown* that which would redound to his honour.

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Discernement. jugement.“

DISCORD, STRIFE.

DISCORD derives its signification from the harshness produced in music by the clashing of two strings which do not suit with each other; whence in the moral sense, the chords of the mind which come into an unsuitable collision produce a *discord*.

STRIFE comes from the word *strive*, to denote the action of *striving*, that is, in an angry manner (*v. To contend*): where there is *strife*, there must be *discord*; but there may be *discord* without *strife*: *discord* consists most in the feeling; *strife* consists most in the outward action. *Discord* evinces itself in various ways; by looks, words, or actions: *strife* displays itself in words or acts of violence. *Discord* is fatal to the happiness of families; *strife* is the greatest enemy to peace between neighbours: *discord* may arise from mere difference of opinion; *strife* is in general occasioned by some matter of personal interest; *discord* in the councils of a nation is the almost certain forerunner of its ruin; the common principles of politeness forbid *strife* among persons of good-breeding.

TO DISCOVER, MANIFEST, DECLARE.

DISCOVER signifies simply to take off the covering from any thing.

MANIFEST signifies to make *manifest* (*v. Apparent*).

DECLARE (*v. To declare*).

The idea of making known is conveyed by all these terms; but *discover* expresses less than *manifest*, and that than *declare*: we *discover* by indirect means or signs more or less doubtful; we *manifest* by unquestionable marks; we *declare* by express words: talents and dispositions *discover* themselves; particular feelings and sentiments *manifest* themselves; facts, opinions, and sentiments are *declared*: children early *discover* a turn for some particular art or science; a person *manifests* his regard for another by unequivocal proofs of kindness; a person of an open disposition is apt to *declare* his sentiments without disguise.

Things are said to *discover*, persons only *manifest* or *declare* in the proper sense: but they may be used figuratively.

DISCREDIT, DISGRACE, REPROACH, SCANDAL.

DISCREDIT signifies the loss of *credit*; DISGRACE, the loss of grace, favour or esteem: REPROACH stands for the thing that deserves to be *reproached*; and SCANDAL for the thing that gives *scandal* or offence.

The conduct of men in their various re-

lations with each other may give rise to the unfavourable sentiment which is expressed in common by these terms. Things are said to reflect *discredit* or *disgrace*, to bring *reproach* or *scandal*, on the individual. These terms seem to rise in sense one upon the other; *disgrace* is a stronger term than *discredit*; *reproach* than *disgrace*; and *scandal* than *reproach*.

Discredit interferes with a man's *credit* or respectability; *disgrace* marks him out as an object of unfavourable distinction; *reproach* makes him a subject of *reproachful* conversation; *scandal* makes him an object of offence or even abhorrence. As regularity in hours, regularity in habits or modes of living, regularity in payments, are a *credit* to a family; so is any deviation from this order to its *discredit*: as moral rectitude, kindness, charity, and benevolence, serve to ensure the good-will and esteem of men; so do instances of unfair dealing, cruelty, inhumanity, and an unfeeling temper, tend to the *disgrace* of the offender: as a life of distinguished virtue or particular instances of moral excellence may cause a man to be spoken of in strong terms of commendation; so will flagrant atrocities or a course of immorality cause his name and himself to be the general subject of *reproach*: as the profession of a Christian with a consistent practice is the greatest ornament which a man can put on; so is the profession with an inconsistent practice the greatest deformity that can be witnessed: it is calculated to bring a *scandal* on the religion itself in the eyes of those who do not know and feel its intrinsic excellences.

TO DISCUSS, EXAMINE.

DISCUSS, in Latin *discussus*, participle of *discutio* signifies to shake asunder or to separate thoroughly so as to see the whole composition.

EXAMINE, in Latin *examine* comes from *examen*, the middle beam or thread by which the poise of the balance is held, because the judgment holds the balance in examining.

The intellectual operation expressed by these terms is applied to objects that cannot be immediately discerned or understood, but they vary both in mode and degree. *Discussion* is altogether carried on by verbal and personal communication; *examination* proceeds by reading, reflection and observation; we often examine, therefore, by *discussion*, which is properly one mode of *examination*: a *discussion* is always carried on by two or more persons; an *exa-*

mination may be carried on by one only; politics are a frequent though not always a pleasant subject of *discussion* in social meetings: complicated questions cannot be too thoroughly *examined*; *discussion* serves for amusement rather than for any solid purpose; the cause of truth seldom derives any immediate benefit from it, although the minds of men may become invigorated by a collision of sentiment: *examination* is of great practical utility in the direction of our conduct: all decisions must be partial, unjust, or imprudent, which are made without previous *examination*.

TO DISENGAGE, DISENTANGLE, EXTRICATE.

DISENGAGE signifies to make free from an *engagement*.

DISENTANGLE is to get rid of an *entanglement*.

EXTRICATE, in Latin *extricatus*, from *ex* and *trica*, a hair, or noose, signifies to get as it were out of a noose. As to *engage* signifies simply to bind, and *entangle* signifies to bind in an involved manner, to *diseengage* is naturally applied to matters of greater difficulty and perplexity than to *disengage*: and as the term *extricate* includes the idea of that which would hold fast and keep within a tight involvement, it is employed with respect to matters of the greatest possible embarrassment and intricacy, we may be *diseengaged* from an oath; *diseentangled* from pecuniary difficulties; *extricated* from a suit at law: it is not right to expect to be *diseengaged* from all the duties which attach to men as members of society: he who enters into disputes about contested property, must not expect to be soon *diseentangled* from law: when a general has committed himself by coming into too close a contact with a very superior force, he may think himself fortunate if he can *extricate* himself from his awkward situation with the loss of a part of his army.

DISGUST, LOATHING, NAUSEA.

DISGUST, from *dis* and *gust*, in Latin *gustus*, the taste, denotes the aversion of the taste to an object.

LOATHING, *v. To abhor*.

NAUSEA, in Latin *nausea*, from the Greek *ναυς* a ship, properly denotes seasickness.

Disgust is less than *loathing*, and that than *nausea*. When applied to sensible objects, we are *disgusted* with dirt; we *loathe* the smell of food if we have a sickly appetite; we *nauseate* medicine: and when applied metaphorically, we are *disgusted* with

affectation; we *loathe* the endearments of those who are offensive; we *nauseate* all the enjoyments of life, after having made an intemperate use of them, and discovered their inanity.

DISHONEST, KNAVISH.

DISHONEST marks the contrary to *honest*: KNAVISH marks the likeness to a *knave*.

Dishonest characterizes simply the mode of action: *knaveish* characterizes the agent as well as the action: what is *dishonest* violates the established laws of man; what is *knaveish* supposes peculiar art and design in the accomplishment. It is *dishonest* to take any thing from another which does not belong to one; it is *knaveish* to get it by fraud or artifice, or by imposing on the confidence of another. We may prevent *dishonest* practices by ordinary means of security; we must not trust ourselves in the company of *knaveish* people if we do not wish to be overreached.

DISHONOUR, DISGRACE, SHAME.

DISHONOUR signifies what does away honour.

DISGRACE, *v.* To degrade.

SHAME signifies what produces shame.

Disgrace is more than *dishonour*, and less than *shame*. The *disgrace* is applicable to those who are not sensible of the *dishonour*, and the *shame* for those who are not sensible of the *disgrace*. The tender mind is alive to *dishonour*: those who yield to their passions or are hardened in their vicious courses, are alike insensible to *disgrace* or *shame*. *Dishonour* is seldom the consequence of any offence, or offered with any intention of punishing; it lies mostly in the consciousness of the individual. *Disgrace* and *shame* are the direct consequences of misconduct; but *disgrace* attaches to the punishment which lowers a person in his own eyes; *shame* to that which lowers him in the eyes of others; the former is not so degrading nor so exposed to notice as the latter: a citizen feels it a *dishonour* not to be chosen to those offices of trust and honour for which he considers himself eligible: it is a *disgrace* to a school-boy to be placed the lowest in his class, which is heightened into *shame* if it brings him into punishment.

As epithets they likewise rise in sense, and are distinguished by other characteristics: a *dishonourable* action is that which violates the principles of honour; a *disgraceful* action is that which reflects *disgrace*; a *shameful* action is that of which one ought

to be fully *ashamed*: it is *dishonourable* for a man not to keep his word; *disgraceful* for a gentleman to associate with those who are his inferiors in station and education; *shameful* for him to use his rank and influence over the lower orders only to mislead them from their duty. A person is likewise said to be *dishonourable* who is disposed to bring *dishonour* upon himself; but things only are *disgraceful* or *shameful*. Men of cultivation are alive to what is *dishonourable*; men of all stations are alive to that which is for them *disgraceful*, or to that which is in itself *shameful*. The sense of what is *dishonourable* is to the superior what the sense of the *disgraceful* is to the inferior; but the sense of what is *shameful* is independent of rank or station, and forms a part of that moral sense which is inherent in the breast of every rational creature. Whoever, therefore, cherishes in himself a lively sense of what is *dishonourable* or *disgraceful* is tolerably secure of never committing any thing that is *shameful*.

TO DISJOINT, DISMEMBER.

DISJOINT signifies to separate at the joint.

DISMEMBER signifies to separate the members.

The terms here spoken of derive their distinct meaning and application from the signification of the words *joint* and *member*. A limb of the body may be *disjointed* if it be so put out of the *joint* that it cannot act; but the body itself is *dismembered* when the different limbs or parts are separated from each other.

So in the metaphorical sense our ideas are said to be *disjointed* when they are so thrown out of their order that they do not fall in with one another: and kingdoms are said to be *dismembered* where any part or parts are separated from the rest.

DISLIKE, DISPLEASURE, DISSATISFACTION, DISTASTE, DISGUST.

DISLIKE, *v.* Aversion.

DISPLEASURE signifies the opposite to pleasure.

DISSATISFACTION is the opposite to satisfaction,

DISTASTE is the opposite to an agreeable taste.

Dislike and *dissatisfaction* denote the feeling or sentiment produced either by persons or things: *displeasure*, that produced by persons only: *distaste* and *disgust*, that produced by things only.

In regard to persons, *dislike* is the sentiment of equals and persons unconnected;

displeasure and *dissatisfaction*, of superiors, or such as stand in some sort of relation to us. Strangers may feel a *dislike* upon seeing each other: parents or masters may feel *displeasure* or *dissatisfaction*: the former sentiment is occasioned by their supposed faults in character; the latter by their supposed defective services. I *dislike* a person for his assumption or loquacity; I am *displeased* with him for his carelessness, and *dissatisfied* with his labour. *Displeasure* is awakened by whatever is done amiss: *dissatisfaction* is caused by what happens amiss or contrary to our expectation. Accordingly the word *dissatisfaction* is not confined to persons of a particular rank, but to the nature of the connexion which subsists between them. Whoever does not receive what he thinks himself entitled to from another is *dissatisfied*. A servant may be *dissatisfied* with the treatment he meets with from his master; and may be said therefore, to express *dissatisfaction*, though not *displeasure*.

In regard to things, *dislike* is a casual feeling, not arising from any specific cause. A *dissatisfaction* is connected with our desires and expectations: we *dislike* the performance of an actor from one or many causes, or from no apparent cause; but we are *dissatisfied* with his performance if it fall short of what we were led to expect.

Dislike, *distaste*, and *disgust*, rise on each other in their signification. *Distaste* expresses more than *dislike*: and *disgust* more than *distaste*. *Dislike* is a partial feeling, quickly produced and quickly subsiding; *distaste* is a settled feeling gradually produced, and permanent in its duration: *disgust* is either transitory or otherwise; momentarily or gradually produced, but stronger than either of the two others.

Caprice has a great share in our likes and dislikes: *distaste* depends upon the changes to which the constitution physically and mentally is exposed: *disgust* owes its origin to the nature of things and their natural operation on the minds of men. A child likes and dislikes his playthings, without any apparent cause for the change of sentiment: after a long illness a person will frequently take a *distaste* to the food or the amusements which before afforded him much pleasure: what is indecent or filthy is a natural object of *disgust* to every person whose mind is not depraved.

DISLIKE, DISINCLINATION.

DISLIKE, *v.* *Dislike*.

DISINCLINATION is the reverse of inclination (*v.* *Attachment*).

Dislike applies to what one has or does; *disinclination* only to what one does: we *dislike* the thing we have, or *dislike* to do a thing; but we are *disinclined* only to do a thing.

They express a similar feeling that differs in degree. *Disinclination* is but a small degree of *dislike*; *dislike* marks something contrary; *disinclination* does not amount to more than the absence of an inclination. None but a disobliging temper has a *dislike* to comply with reasonable requests; but the most obliging disposition may have an occasional *disinclination* to comply with a particular request.

TO DISMAY, DAUNT, APPAL.

DISMAY, in French *dismayer*, is probably changed from *desmouvoir*, signifying to move or pull down the spirit.

DAUNT, changed from the Latin *domitus*, conquered, signifies to bring down the spirit.

APPAL, compounded of the intensive *ap* or *ad*, and *palleo* to grow pale, signifies to make pale with fear.

The effect of fear on the spirit is strongly expressed by all these terms; but *dismay* expresses less than *daunt*, and this than *appal*. We are *dismayed* by alarming circumstances; we are *daunted* by terrifying; we are *appalled* by horrid circumstances. A severe defeat will *dismay* so as to lessen the force of resistance: the fiery glare from the eyes of a ferocious beast will *daunt* him who was venturing to approach: the sight of an apparition will *appal* the stoutest heart.

TO DISMISS, DISCHARGE, DISCARD.

DISMISS, in Latin *dimissus*, participle of *dimitto*, compounded of *di* and *mitto*, signifies to send asunder or away.

DISCHARGE signifies to release from a charge.

DISCARD, in Spanish *descartar*, compounded of *des* and *cartar*, signifies to lay cards out or aside, or cast them off.

The idea of removing to a distance is included in all these terms; but with various collateral circumstances. *Dismiss* is the general term; *discharge* and *discard* are modes of dismissing: *dismiss* is applicable to persons of all stations, but used more particularly for the higher orders: *discharge* on the other hand is confined to those in a subordinate station. A clerk is *dismissed*; a menial servant is *discharged*: an officer is *dismissed*; a soldier is *discharged*.

Neither *dismiss* nor *discharge* define the motive of the action; they are used indifferently for that which is voluntary, or the

contrary: *discard*, on the contrary, always marks a *dismissal* that is not agreeable to the party *discarded*. A person may request to be *dismissed* or *discharged*, but never to be *discarded*. The *dismissal* or *discharge* frees a person from the obligation or necessity of performing a certain duty, the *discarding* throws him out of a desirable rank or station.

They are all applied to things in the moral sense; we are said to *dismiss* our fears, to *discharge* a duty, and to *discard* a sentiment from the mind.

TO DISORDER, DERANGE, DISCONCERT, DISCOMPOSE.

DISORDER signifies to put out of order.

DERANGE, from *de* and *range* or *rank*, signifies to put out of the rank in which it was placed.

DISCONCERT signifies to put out of the concert or harmony.

DISCOMPOSE signifies to put out of a state of composure.

All these terms express the idea of putting out of order; but the three latter vary as to the mode or object of the action. The term *disorder* is used in a perfectly indefinite form, and may be applied to any object. As every thing may be in order, so may every thing be *disordered*; yet it is seldom used except in regard to such things as have been in a natural order. *Derange* and *disconcert* are employed in speaking of such things as have been put into an artificial order. To *derange* is to *disorder* that which has been systematically arranged, or put in a certain range; and to *disconcert* is to *disorder* that which has been put together by concert or contrivance: thus the body may be *disordered*; a man's affairs or papers *deranged*; a scheme *disconcerted*. To *discompose* is a species of *derangement* in regard to trivial matters: thus a tucker, a frill, or a cap, may be *discomposed*. The slightest change of diet will *disorder* people of tender constitutions: misfortunes are apt to *derange* the affairs of the most prosperous: the unexpected return of a master to his home *disconcerts* the schemes which have been formed by the domestics: those who are particular as to their appearance are careful not to have any part of their dress *discomposed*.

When applied to the mind *disorder* and *derange* are said of the intellect; *disconcert* and *discompose* of the ideas or spirits: the former denoting a permanent state; the latter a temporary or transient state. The mind is said to be *disordered* when the faculty of ratiocination is in any degree in-

terrupted; the intellect is said to be *deranged* when it is brought into a positive state of incapacity for action: persons are sometimes *disordered* in their minds for a time by particular occurrences, who do not become actually *deranged*; a person is said to be *disconcerted* who suddenly loses his collectedness of thinking; he is said to be *discomposed* who loses his regularity of feeling.

DISORDER, DISEASE, DISTEMPER, MALADY.

DISORDER signifies the state of being out of order.

DISEASE signifies the state of being ill at ease.

DISTEMPER signifies the state of being out of temper, or out of a due temperament.

MALADY, from the Latin *malus* evil, signifies an ill.

All these terms agree in their application to the state of the animal body. *Disorder* is, as before (v. *To disorder*), the general term, and the other specific. In this general sense *disorder* is altogether indefinite; but in its restricted sense it expresses less than all the rest: it is the mere commencement of a *disease*: *disease* is also more general than the other terms, for it comprehends every serious and permanent *disorder* in the animal economy, and is therefore of universal application. A *disorder* may lie in the extremities: a *disease* lies in the humors and the vital parts. Occasional headaches, colds, or what is merely cutaneous, are termed *disorders*; fevers, dropsies, and the like, are *diseases*. *Distemper* is used for such particular disorders as throw the animal frame completely out of its temper or course, and is consequently applied properly to virulent *disorders*, such as the small-pox. *Malady* has less of a technical sense than the other terms; it refers more to the suffering than to the state of the body. There may be many *maladies* where there is no *disease*; but *diseases* are themselves in general *maladies*. Our *maladies* are frequently born with us; but our *diseases* may come upon us at any time of life. Blindness is in itself a *malady*, and may be produced by a *disease* in the eye. Our *disorders* are frequently cured by abstaining from those things which caused them; the whole science of medicine consists in finding out suitable remedies for our *diseases*; our *maladies* may be lessened with patience, although they cannot always be alleviated or removed by art.

All these terms may be applied with a

similar distinction to the mind as well as the body. *Disorders* are either of a temporary or a permanent nature; but unless specified to the contrary, are understood to be temporary: *diseases* consist in vicious habits: our *distempers* arise from the violent operations of passion: our *maladies* lie in the injuries which the affections occasion. Any perturbation in the mind is a *disorder*; avarice is a *disease*: melancholy is a *distemper* as far as it throws the mind out of its bias; it is a *malady* as far as it occasions suffering.

TO DISPARAGE, DETRACT, TRADUCE, DEPRECIATE, DEGRADE, DECRY.

DISPARAGE, compounded of *dis* and *parage*, from *par* equal, signifies to make a thing unequal or below what it ought to be.

DETRACT, *v.* To asperse.

TRADUCE, in Latin *traduco* or *transduco*, signifies to carry from one to another that which is unfavourable.

DEPRECIATE, from the Latin *pretium* a price, signifies to bring down the price.

DEGRADE *v.* To abuse.

DECRY signifies literally to cry down.

The idea of lowering the value of an object is common to all these words, which differ in the circumstances and object of the action. *Disparagement* is the most indefinite in the manner: *detract* and *traduce* are specific in the forms by which an object is lowered: *disparagement* respects the mental endowments and qualifications: *detract* and *traduce* are said of the moral character; the former, however, in a less specific manner than the latter. We *disparage* a man's performance by speaking slightly of it: we *detract* from the merits of a person by ascribing his success to chance; we *traduce* him by handing about tales that are unfavourable to his reputation: thus authors are apt to *disparage* the writings of their rivals; or a soldier may *detract* from the skill of his commander; or he may *traduce* him by relating scandalous reports.

To *disparage*, *detract*, and *traduce*, can be applied only to persons, or that which is personal; *depreciate*, *degrade*, and *decry*, to whatever is an object of esteem; we *depreciate* and *degrade*, therefore, things as well as persons, and *decry* things: to *depreciate* is, however, not so strong a term as to *degrade*, for the language which is employed to *depreciate* will be mild compared with that used for *degrading*: we may *depreciate* an object by implication, or in indirect terms; but harsh and unseemly epithets are employed for *degrading*; thus

a man may be said to *depreciate* human nature who does not represent it as capable of its true elevation; he *degrades* it who sinks it below the scale of rationality. We may *depreciate* or *degrade* an individual, a language, and the like; we *decry* measures and principles: the former two are an act of an individual; the latter is properly the act of many.

TO DISPARAGE, DEROGATE, DEGRADE.

DISPARAGE, *v.* To disparage.

DEROGATE, in Latin *derogatus*, from *derogo*, to repeal in part, signifies to take from a thing.

DEGRADE, *v.* To abase.

Disparage is here employed, not as the act of persons, but of things, in which case it is allied to *derogate*, but retains its indefinite and general sense as before: circumstances may *disparage* the performances of a writer; or they may *derogate* from the honours and dignities of an individual: it would be a high *disparagement* to an author to have it known that he had been guilty of plagiarism; it *derogates* from the dignity of a magistrate to take part in popular measures. To *degrade* is here, as in the former case, a much stronger expression than the other two; whatever *disparages* or *derogates* does but take away a part from the value; but whatever *degrades* a thing sinks it many degrees in the estimation of those in whose eyes it is *degraded*; in this manner religion is *degraded* by the low arts of its enthusiastic professors: whatever tends to the *disparagement* of learning or knowledge does injury to the cause of truth; whatever *derogates* from the dignity of a man in any office is apt to *degrade* the office itself.

DISPARITY, INEQUALITY.

DISPARITY, from *dis* and *par*, in Greek *παρά* with or by, signifies an unfitness of objects to be by one another.

INEQUALITY, from the Latin *aequus*, even, signifies having no regularity.

Disparity applies to two objects which should meet or stand in coalition with each other; *inequality* is applicable to those that are compared with each other: the *disparity* of age, situation, and circumstances, is to be considered with regard to persons entering into a matrimonial connexion; the *inequality* in the portion of labour which is to be performed by two persons, is a ground for the *inequality* of their recompense: there is a great *inequality* in the chance of success, where there is a *disparity* of acquirements in rival candidates.

DISPASSIONATE, COOL.

DISPASSIONATE is taken negatively; it marks merely the absence of passion; COOL (*v. Cool*) is taken positively: it marks an entire freedom from passion.

Those who are prone to be passionate must learn to be *dispassionate*; those who are of a cool temperament will not suffer their passions to be roused. *Dispassionate* solely respects angry or irritable sentiments; *cool* respects any perturbed feeling: when we meet with an angry disputant it is necessary to be *dispassionate*, in order to avoid quarrels; in the moment of danger our safety often depends upon our *coolness*.

TO DISPEL, DISPERSE.

DISPEL, from the Latin *pello* to drive, signifies to drive away.

DISPERSE signifies merely to cause to come asunder.

Dispel is a more forcible action than to *disperse*: we destroy the existence of a thing by *dispelling* it; we merely destroy the junction or cohesion of a body by *dispersing* it: the sun *dispels* the clouds and darkness; the wind *disperses* the clouds, or a surgeon *disperses* a tumor.

Dispel is used figuratively; *disperse* only in the natural sense: gloom, ignorance, and the like, are *dispelled*; books, people, papers, and the like, are *dispersed*.

TO DISPENSE, DISTRIBUTE.

DISPENSE, from the Latin *pendo*, to pay or bestow, signifies to bestow in different directions; and DISTRIBUTE, from the Latin *tribuo*, to bestow, signifies the same thing.

Dispense is an indiscriminate action; *distribute* is a particularizing action: we *dispense* to all; we *distribute* to each individually: nature *dispenses* her gifts bountifully to all the inhabitants of the earth; a parent *distributes* among his children different tokens of his parental tenderness.

Dispense is an indirect action that has no immediate reference to the receiver; *distribute* is a direct and personal action communicated by the giver to the receiver: Providence *dispenses* its favours to those who put a sincere trust in it; a prince *distributes* marks of his favour and preference among his courtiers.

TO DISPLEASE, OFFEND, VEX.

DISPLEASE (*v. Dislike, displeasure*) naturally marks the contrary of pleasing.

OFFEND, from the Latin *offendo*, signifies to stumble in the way of.

VEX, in Latin *vexo*, is a frequentative of *veho*, signifying literally to toss up and down.

These words express the painful sentiment which is felt by the supposed impropriety of another's conduct.

Displease is not always applied to that which personally concerns ourselves; although *offend* and *vex*, have always more or less of what is personal in them: a superior may be *displeased* with one who is under his charge for improper behaviour towards persons in general; he will be *offended* with him for disrespectful behaviour towards himself: circumstances as well as actions serve to *displease*; a supposed intention or design is requisite in order to *offend*: we may be *displeased* with a person, or at a thing; one is mostly *offended* with the person; a child may be *displeased* at not having any particular liberty or indulgence granted to him; he may be *offended* with his play-fellow for an act of incivility or unkindness.

Displease respects mostly the inward state of feeling; *offend* and *vex* have most regard to the outward cause which provokes the feeling: a humoursome person may be *displeased* without any apparent cause; but a captious person will at least have some avowed trifle for which he is *offended*. *Vex* expresses more than *offend*; it marks in fact frequent efforts to *offend*, or the act of *offending* under aggravated circumstances: we often unintentionally *displease* or *offend*; but he who *vexes* has mostly that object in view in so doing: any instance of neglect *displeases*; any marked instance of neglect *offends*; any aggravated instance of neglect *vexes*. The feeling of *displeasure* is more perceptible and vivid than that of *offence*; but it is less durable; the feeling of *vexation* is as transitory as that of *displeasure*, but stronger than either. *Displeasure* and *vexation* betray themselves by an angry word or look; *offence* discovers itself in the whole conduct.

As epithets they admit of a similar distinction: it is *displeasing* to parents not to meet with respectful attention from children, when they give them counsel; when we meet with an *offensive* object, we do most wisely to turn away from it: when we are troubled with *vexatious* affairs, our best and only remedy is patience.

DISPLEASURE, ANGER, DISAPPROBATION.

DISPLEASURE, *v. Dislike*.

ANGER, *v. Anger*.

DISAPPROBATION is the reverse of *approbation* (*v. Assent*).

Between *displeasure* and *anger* there is a difference both in the degree, the cause, and the consequence, of the feeling; *displeasure* is always a softened and gentle feeling; *anger* is always a harsh feeling, and sometimes rises to vehemence and madness. *Displeasure* is always produced by some adequate cause, real or supposed; but *anger* may be provoked by every or any cause, according to the temper of the individual: *displeasure* is mostly satisfied with a simple verbal expression; but *anger*, unless kept down with great force, always seeks to return evil for evil.

Displeasure and *disapprobation* are to be compared inasmuch as they respect the conduct of those who are under the direction of others: *displeasure* is an act of the will, it is an angry sentiment; *disapprobation* is an act of the judgment, it is an opposite opinion. Any mark of self-will in a child is calculated to excite *displeasure*; a mistaken choice in matrimony may produce *disapprobation* in the parent.

Displeasure is produced by that which is already passed; *disapprobation* may be felt upon that which is to take place: a master feels *displeasure* at the carelessness of his servant; a parent expresses his *disapprobation* of his son's proposal to leave his situation.

DISPOSAL, DISPOSITION,

These words derive their different meanings from the verb to *dispose* (v. *To dispose*), to which they owe their common origin.

DISPOSAL is a personal act; it depends upon the will of the individual: DISPOSITION is an act of the judgment; it depends upon the nature of the things.

The removal of a thing from one's self is involved in a *disposal*; the good order of things is comprehended in their *disposition*. In the reign of Henry the Second, if a man died without wife or issue, the whole of his property was at his own *disposal*. In case a person make no *disposition* of such of his goods as are testable, he was and is said to die intestate.

TO DISPOSE, ARRANGE, DIGEST.

DISPOSE, in French *disposer*, Latin *disposui* preterite of *dispono* or *dis* and *pono*, signifies to place apart.

ARRANGE, v. *To class*.

DIGEST, in Latin *digestus* participle of *digero* or *dis* and *gero*, signifies to gather apart with design.

The idea of a systematic laying apart is common to all and proper to the word *dispose*.

We *dispose* when we arrange and *digest*; but we do not always arrange and *digest* when we *dispose*: they differ in the circumstances and object of the action. There is less thought employed in *disposing* than in *arranging* and *digesting*; we may *dispose* ordinary matters by simply assigning a place to each; in this manner trees are *disposed* in a row, but we *arrange* and *digest* by an intellectual effort; in the first case by putting those together which ought to go together; and in the latter case by both separating that which is dissimilar, and bringing together that which is similar; in this manner books are *arranged* in a library according to their size or their subject; the materials for a literary production are *digested*; or the laws of the land are *digested*.

In an extended and moral application of these words, we speak of a person's time, talent, and the like, being *disposed* to a good purpose; of a man's ideas being properly *arranged*, and of being *digested* into form. On the *disposition* of a man's time and property will depend in a great measure his success in life; on the *arrangement* of accounts greatly depends his facility in conducting business; on the habit of *digesting* our thoughts depends in a great measure correctness of thinking.

DISPOSITION, TEMPER.

DISPOSITION from *dispose* (v. *To dispose*), signifies here the state of being *disposed*.

TEMPER, like *temperament*, from the Latin *temperamentum*, and *tempero* to temper or manage, signifies the thing modelled or formed.

These terms are both applied to the mind and its bias; but *disposition* respects the whole frame and texture of the mind; *temper* respects only the bias or tone of the feelings. *Disposition* is permanent and settled; *temper* is transitory and fluctuating. The *disposition* comprehends the springs and motives of actions; the *temper* influences the actions for the time being: it is possible and not unfrequent to have a good *disposition* with a bad *temper*, and vice versa. A good *disposition* makes a man a useful member of society, but not always a good companion; a good *temper* renders him acceptable to all and peaceable with all, but essentially useful to none; a good *disposition* will go far towards correcting the errors of *temper*; but where there is a bad *disposition* there are no hopes of amendment.

DISPOSITION, INCLINATION.

DISPOSITION in the former section is taken for the general frame of the mind; in the present case for its particular frame.

INCLINATION, *v. Attachment.*

Disposition is more positive than *inclination*. We may always expect a man to do that which he is *disposed* to do: but we cannot always calculate upon his executing that to which he is merely *inclined*.

We indulge a *disposition*; we yield to an *inclination*. The *disposition* comprehends the whole state of the mind at the time; an *inclination* is particular, referring always to a particular object. After the performance of a serious duty, no one is expected to be in a *disposition* for laughter or merriment: it is becoming to suppress our *inclination* to laughter in the presence of those who wish to be serious.

TO DISREGARD, NEGLECT, SLIGHT.

DISREGARD signifies properly not to regard.

NEGLECT, in Latin *neglectus* participle of *negligo*, compounded of *nec* and *lego*, not to choose.

SLIGHT, from *light*, signifies to make light of or set light by.

We *disregard* the warnings, the words, or opinions of others; we *neglect* their injunctions or their precepts. To *disregard* results from the settled purpose of the mind; to *neglect* from a temporary forgetfulness or oversight. What is *disregarded* is seen and passed over; what is *neglected* is generally not thought of at the time required. What is *disregarded* does not strike the mind at all: what is *neglected* enters the mind only when it is before the eye: the former is an action employed on the present objects; the latter on that which is past; what we *disregard* is not esteemed; what we *neglect* is often esteemed, but not sufficiently to be remembered or practised: a child *disregards* the prudent counsels of a parent; he *neglects* to use the remedies which have been prescribed to him.

Disregard and *neglect* are frequently not personal acts; they respect the thing more than the person; *slight* is altogether an intentional act towards an individual.

We *disregard* or *neglect* things often from a heedlessness of temper; the consequence either of youth or habit: we *slight* a person from feelings of dislike or contempt. Young people should *disregard* nothing that is said to them by their superiors; nor *neglect* any thing which they are enjoined to do; nor *slight* any one to whom they owe personal attention.

DISSENSION, CONTENTION, DISCORD.

DISSENSION marks either the act or the state of *dissenting*.

CONTENTION marks the act of *contending* (*v. To contend*).

DISCORD, *v. Contention.*

A collision of opinions produces *dissension*; a collision of interests produces *contention*; a collision of humours produces *discord*.

A love of one's own opinion, combined with a disregard for the opinions of others, gives rise to *dissension*; selfishness is the main cause of *contention*; and an ungoverned temper that of *discord*.

Dissension is peculiar to bodies or communities of men; *contention* and *discord* to individuals. *Dissension* tends not only to alienate the minds of men from each other, but to dissolve the bonds of society; *contention* is accompanied by anger, ill-will, envy, and many evil passions; *discord* interrupts the progress of the kind affections, and bars all tender intercourse.

DISTANT, FAR, REMOTE.

DISTANT is employed as an adjunct or otherwise; FAR is used only as an adverb. We speak of *distant* objects, or objects being *distant*; but we speak of things only as being *far*.

Distant in Latin *distans* compounded of *di* and *stans* standing asunder, is employed only for bodies at rest; *far*, in German *fern*, most probably from *gefahren* participle of *fahren*, in Greek *πορεύω* to go, signifies gone or removed away, and is employed for bodies either stationary or otherwise; hence we say that a thing is *distant*, or it goes, runs, or flies *far*.

Distant is used to designate great space; *far* only that which is ordinary: the sun is ninety-four millions of miles *distant* from the earth; a person lives not very *far* off, or a person is *far* from the spot.

Distant is used absolutely to express an intervening space. REMOTE, in Latin *remotus* participle of *removeo* to remove, rather expresses the relative idea of being gone out of sight. A person is said to live in a *distant* country or in a *remote* corner of any country.

They bear a similar analogy in a figurative application; when we speak of a *remote* idea it designates that which is less liable to strike the mind than a *distant* idea. A *distant* relationship between individuals is never altogether lost sight of; when the connexion between objects is very *remote* it easily escapes observation.

TO DISTINGUISH, DISCRIMINATE.

DISTINGUISH, *v.* *To abstract.*DISCRIMINATE, *v.* *Discernment.*

To distinguish is the general; *to discriminate* is the particular term: the former is an indefinite, the latter a definite action. *To discriminate* is in fact *to distinguish* specifically; hence we speak of a *distinction* as true or false, but of a *discrimination* as nice.

We *distinguish* things as to their divisibility or unity: we *discriminate* them as to their inherent properties; we *distinguish* things that are alike or unlike, to separate or collect them; we *discriminate* those that are different, for the purpose of separating one from the other: we *distinguish* by means of the senses as well as the understanding; we *discriminate* by the understanding only; we *distinguish* things by their colour, or we *distinguish* moral objects by their truth or falsehood; we *discriminate* the characters of men, or we *discriminate* their merits according to circumstances.

DISTINGUISHED, CONSPICUOUS, NOTED, EMINENT, ILLUSTRIOUS.

DISTINGUISHED signifies having a mark of *distinction* by which a thing is to be *distinguished* (*v.* *To abstract*).

CONSPICUOUS, in Latin *conspicuus*, from *conspicio*, signifies easily to be seen.

NOTED, from *notus* known, signifies well known.

EMINENT, in Latin *eminens*, from *emineo* or *e* and *maneo*, signifies remaining or standing out above the rest.

ILLUSTRIOUS, in Latin *illustris*, from *lustrum* to shine, signifies shone upon.

The idea of an object having something attached to it to excite notice is common to all these terms. *Distinguished* in its general sense expresses little more than this idea; the rest are but modes of the *distinguished*. A thing is *distinguished* in proportion as it is distinct or separate from others; it is *conspicuous* in proportion as it is easily seen; it is *noted* in proportion as it is widely known. In this sense a rank is *distinguished*; a situation is *conspicuous*; a place is *noted*. Persons are *distinguished* by external marks or by characteristic qualities; persons or things are *conspicuous* mostly from some external mark; persons or things are *noted* mostly by collateral circumstances.

A man may be *distinguished* by his decorations, or he may be *distinguished* by his manly air, or by his intellectual or moral endowments. A person is *conspicuous*

by the gaudiness of his dress; a house is *conspicuous* that stands on a hill. A person is *noted* for having performed a wonderful cure; a place is *noted* for its fine waters.

We may be *distinguished* for things good, or indifferent: we may be *conspicuous* for our singularities or that which only attracts vulgar notice: we may be *noted* for that which is bad, and mostly for that which is the subject of vulgar discourse: we can be *eminent* and *illustrious* only for that which is really good and praiseworthy; the former applies however mostly to those things which set a man high in the circle of his acquaintance; the latter to that which makes him shine before the world. A man of *distinguished* talent will be apt to excite envy if he be not also *distinguished* for his private virtue; affectation is never better pleased than when it can place itself in such a *conspicuous* situation as to draw all eyes upon itself: lovers of fame are sometimes contented to render themselves *noted* for their vices or absurdities: nothing is more gratifying to a man than to render himself *eminent* for his professional skill: it is the lot of but few to be *illustrious*, and those few are very seldom to be envied.

In an extended and moral application, these terms may be employed to heighten the character of an object: a favour may be said to be *distinguished*, piety *eminent*, and a name *illustrious*.

DISTRESS, ANXIETY, ANGUISH, AGONY.

DISTRESS, *v.* *Adversity.*ANXIETY, in French *anxiété*.

ANGUISH, in French *angoisse*, both come from the Latin *ango*, *anxi* to strangle.

AGONY, in French *agonie*, Latin *agonia*, Greek *αγῶν*, from *αγωνίζω* to contend or strive, signifies a severe struggle with pain and suffering.

Distress is the pain felt when in a strait from which we see no means of extricating ourselves; *anxiety* is that pain which one feels on the prospect of an evil. *Distress* always depends upon some outward cause; *anxiety* often lies in the imagination. *Distress* is produced by the present, but not always immediate evil; *anxiety* respects that which is future; *anguish* arises from the reflection on the evil that is past; *agony* springs from witnessing that which is immediate or before the eye.

Distress is not peculiar to any age; where there is a consciousness of good and evil, pain and pleasure, *distress* will inevitably exist from some circumstance or another.

Anxiety, anguish, and agony, belong to riper years: infancy and childhood are deemed the happy periods of human existence; because they are exempt from the *anxieties* attendant on every one who has a station to fill, and duties to discharge. *Anguish* and *agony* are species of distress, of the severer kind, which spring altogether from the maturity of reflection, and the full consciousness of evil. A child is in *distress* when it loses its mother, and the mother is also in *distress* when she misses her child. The station of a parent is, productive, not only of *distress*, but *anxiety, anguish, and agony*: the mother has her peculiar *anxieties* for her child, whilst rearing it in its infant state: the father has his *anxiety* for its welfare on its entrance in the world: they both suffer the deepest *anguish* when their child disappoints their dearest hopes, by running a career of vice; not unfrequently they are doomed to suffer the *agony* of seeing a child encircled in flames from which he can not be snatched, or sinking into a watery grave from which he cannot be rescued.

TO DISTRESS. HARASS, PERPLEX.

DISTRESS, *v. Distress.*

HARASS, in French *harasser*, probably from the Greek *αγασσω* to beat.

PERPLEX, in Latin *perplexus*, participle of *perplector*, compounded of *per* and *plector*, to wind round and entangle.

A person is *distressed* either in his outward circumstances or his feelings; he is *harassed* mentally or corporeally; he is *perplexed* in his understanding, more than in his feelings.

A deprivation *distresses*; provocations and hostile measures *harass*; stratagems and ambiguous measures *perplex*: a besieged town is *distressed* by the cutting off its resources of water and provisions; the besieged are *harassed* by perpetual attacks, the besiegers are *perplexed* in all their manoeuvres and plans, by the counter-manoevres and contrivances of their opponents; a tale of woe *distresses*; continual alarms and incessant labour *harass*; unexpected obstacles and inextricable difficulties *perplex*.

We are *distressed* and *perplexed* by circumstances; we are *harassed* altogether by persons, or the intentional efforts of others: we may relieve another in *distress*, or may remove a *perplexity*; but the *harassing* ceases only with the cause which gave rise to it.

DISTRICT, REGION, TRACT, QUARTER.

DISTRICT, in Latin *districtus*, from *distringo* to bind separately, signifies a certain part marked off specifically.

REGION, in Latin *regio* from *rego* to rule, signifies a portion that is within rule.

TRACT, in Latin *tractus*, from *traho* to draw, signifies a part drawn out.

QUARTER signifies literally a fourth part.

These terms are all applied to country; the former two comprehending divisions marked out on political grounds: the latter a geographical or an indefinite division: *district* is smaller than a *region*; the former refers only in part to a country, the latter frequently applies to a whole country. A *quarter* is indefinite, and may be applied either to a *quarter* of the world or a particular neighbourhood: a *tract* is the smallest portion of all, and comprehends frequently no more than what may fall within the compass of the eye.

We consider a *district* only with relation to government: every magistrate acts within a certain *district*: we speak of a *region* when considering the circumstances of climate, or the natural properties which distinguish different parts of the earth, as the *regions* of heat and cold: we speak of the *quarter* simply to designate a point of the compass; as a person lives in a certain *quarter* of the town that is north, or south, east, or west, &c. and so also in an extended application, we say, to meet with opposition in an unexpected *quarter*: we speak of a *tract* to designate the land that runs on in a line, as a mountainous *tract*.

DISTRUSTFUL, SUSPICIOUS, DIFFIDENT.

DISTRUSTFUL signifies full of *distrust*, or not putting *trust* in (*v. Belief*).

SUSPICIOUS signifies having *suspicion*, from the Latin *suspicio*, or *sub* and *specio* to look at askance, or with a wry mind.

DIFFIDENT, from the Latin *diffido* or *disfido*, signifies having no faith.

Distrustful is said either of ourselves or others; *suspicious* is said only of others; *diffident* only of ourselves: to be *distrustful* of a person, is to impute no good to him; to be *suspicious* of a person, is to impute positive evil to him: he who is *distrustful* of another's honour or prudence, will abstain from giving him his confidence; he who is *suspicious* of another's honesty, will be cautious to have no dealings with him. *Distrustful* is a particular state of feeling; *suspicious* an habitual state of feeling; a person is *distrustful* of another, owing to particular circumstances; he is *suspicious* from his natural temper.

As applied to himself, a person is *distrustful* of his own powers to execute an

office assigned, or he is generally of a *diffident* disposition: there is nothing more criminal than a *distrust* in Providence; on the other hand, there is nothing better than a *distrust* in our own powers to withstand temptation: *suspicion* is justified more or less according to circumstances; but a too great proneness to *suspicion* is liable to lead us into many acts of injustice towards others: *diffidence* is becoming in youth, so long as it does not check their laudable exertions.

TO DISTURB, INTERRUPT.

DISTURB (*v. Commotion*).

INTERRUPT, from the Latin *inter* and *rumpo*, signifies to break in between so as to stop the progress.

We may be *disturbed* either inwardly or outwardly; we are *interrupted* only outwardly; our minds may be *disturbed* by disquieting reflections, or we may be *disturbed* in our rest or in our business by unseemly noises; but we can be *interrupted* only in our business or pursuits: the *disturbance* therefore depends upon the character of the person; what *disturbs* one man will not *disturb* another: an *interruption* is however something positive; what *interrupts* one person will *interrupt* another: the smallest noises may *disturb* one who is in bad health; illness or the visits of friends will *interrupt* a person in his business.

The same distinction exists between these words when applied to things as to persons: whatever is put out of its order or proper condition is *disturbed*; thus water which is put into motion from a state of rest is *disturbed*: whatever is stopped in the evenness or regularity of its course is *interrupted*; thus water which is turned out of its ordinary channel is *interrupted*.

TO DIVIDE, SEPARATE, PART.

DIVIDE, in Latin *divide*, compounded of *di* and *video*, signifies to make appear as *apart* or two, or to make really two.

SEPARATE, *v. Abstract*.

PART signifies to make into *parts*.

That is said to be *divided* which has been, or is conceived to be a whole; that is *separated* which might be joined: a river *divides* a town by running through it; mountains or seas *separate* countries: to *divide* does not necessarily include a *separation*; although a *separation* supposes a *division*: an army may be *divided* into larger or smaller portions, and yet remain united; but during a march, or an engagement, these companies are frequently *separated*.

Opinions, hearts, minds, &c. may be *divided*; corporeal bodies only are *separated*:

the minds of men are often most *divided*, when in person they are least *separated*; and those, on the contrary, who are *separated* at the greatest distance from each other may be the least *divided*.

To *part* approaches nearer to *separate* than to *divide*; the latter is applied to things only; the two former to persons, as well as things: a thing becomes smaller by being *divided*; it loses its junction with, or cohesion to, another thing, by being *parted*; a loaf of bread is *divided* by being cut into two; two loaves are *parted* which have been baked together.

Sometimes *part*, as well as *divide*, is used in the application of that which is given to several, in which case they bear the same analogy as before: several things are *parted*, one thing is *divided*: a man's personal effects may be *parted*, by common consent, among his children; but his estate, or the value of it, must be *divided*: whatever can be disjointed without losing its integrity is *parted*, otherwise it is *divided*: in this sense, our Saviour's garments are said to have been *parted*, because they were distinct things; but the vesture which was without seam must have been *divided* if they had not cast lots for it.

As disjunction is the common idea attached to both *separate* and *part*, they are frequently used in relation to the same objects: houses may be both *separated* and *parted*; they are *parted* by that which does not keep them at so great a distance, as when they are said to be *separated*: two houses are *parted* by a small opening between them; they are *separated* by an intervening garden: fields are with more propriety said to be *separated*: rooms are said more properly to be *parted*.

With regard to persons, *part* designates the actual leaving of the person; *separate* is used in general for that which lessens the society; the former is often casual, temporary, or partial; the latter is positive and serious: the *parting* is momentary; the *separation* may be longer or shorter: two friends *part* in the streets after a casual meeting; two persons *separate* on the road who had set out to travel together: men and their wives often *part* without coming to a positive *separation*: the moment of *parting* between friends is often more painful than the *separation* which afterwards ensues.

TO DIVIDE, DISTRIBUTE, SHARE.

DIVIDE, *v. To divide, separate*.

DISTRIBUTE, in Latin *distributus*, from *distribuo*, or *dis* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow a part.

SHARE, from the word *shear*, and the German *scheeren*, signifies simply to cut.

The act of *dividing* does not extend beyond the thing *divided*; that of *distributing* and *sharing* comprehends also the purpose of the action; we *divide* the thing; we *distribute* to the person: we may *divide* therefore without *distributing*; or we may *divide* in order to *distribute*: thus we *divide* our land into distinct fields for our private convenience; or we *divide* a sum of money into so many parts, in order to *distribute* it among a given number of persons: on the other hand, we may *distribute* without *dividing*; for money, books, fruit, and many other things may be *distributed*, which require no *division*.

To *share* is to make into parts the same as *divide*, and it is to give those parts to some persons, the same as *distribute*; but the person who *shares* takes a part himself; he who *distributes* gives it always to others: a loaf is *divided* in order to be eaten; bread is *distributed* in loaves among the poor; the loaf is *shared* by a poor man with his poorer neighbour, or the profits of a business are *shared* by the partners.

To *share* may imply either to give or receive; to *distribute* implies giving only: we *share* our own with another: or another *shares* what we have; but we *distribute* our own to others.

DOCILE, TRACTABLE, DUCTILE.

DOCILE, in Latin *docilis* from *doceo* to teach, is the Latin term for ready to be taught.

TRACTABLE, from the Latin *traho* to draw, signifies ready to be drawn.

DUCTILE, from *duco* to lead, signifies ready to be led.

The idea of submitting to the directions of another is comprehended in the signification of all these terms: *docile* marks the disposition to conform our actions in all particulars to the will of another, and lies altogether in the will; *tractability* and *ductility* are modes of *docility*, the former in regard to the conduct, the latter in regard to the principles and sentiments: *docility* is in general applied to the ordinary actions of life, where simply the will is concerned; *tractability* is applicable to points of conduct in which the judgment is concerned; *ductility* to matters in which the character is formed.

A child ought to be *docile* with its parents at all times; it ought to be *tractable* when acting under the direction of its superiors: it ought to be *ductile* to imbibe good principles; the want of *docility* may spring from a defect in the disposition; the want of *trac-*

tableness may spring either from a defect in the temper, or from self-conceit; the want of *ductility* lies altogether in a natural stubbornness of character: *docility*, being altogether independent of the judgment, is applicable to the brutes as well as to men; *tractableness* and *ductility* are applicable mostly to thinking and rational objects only, though sometimes extended to inanimate or moral objects: the ox is a *docile* animal; the humble are *tractable*; youth is *ductile*.

DOCTRINE, PRECEPT, PRINCIPLE.

DOCTRINE, in French *doctrine*, Latin *doctrina*, from *doceo* to teach, signifies the thing taught.

PRECEPT, from the Latin *praecipio*, signifies the thing laid down.

PRINCIPLE, in French *principe*, Latin *principium*, signifies the beginning of things, that is, their first or original component parts.

A *doctrine* requires a teacher; a *precept* requires a superior with authority; a *principle* requires only an illustrator. A *doctrine* is always framed by some one; a *precept* is enjoined or laid down by some one; a *principle* lies in the thing itself. A *doctrine* is composed of *principles*; a *precept* rests upon *principles* or *doctrines*. Pythagoras taught the *doctrine* of the metempsychosis, and enjoined many *precepts* on his disciples for the regulation of their conduct, particularly that they should abstain from eating animal food, and be only silent hearers for the first five years of their scholarship: the former of these rules depended upon the preceding doctrine of the soul's transmigration to the bodies of animals; the latter rested on that simple *principle* of education, the entire devotion of the scholar to the master.

We are said to believe in *doctrines*; to obey *precepts*; to imbibe or hold *principles*. *Doctrine* is that which constitutes our faith; *precepts* are that which directs the practice; both are the subjects of rational assent, and suited only to the matured understanding: *principles* are often admitted without examination; and imbibed as frequently from observation and circumstances, as from any direct personal efforts: children as well as men acquire *principles*.

DOCTRINE, DOGMA, TENET.

A DOCTRINE originates with an individual.

DOGMA from the Greek *δογμα* and *δοξω* to think, signifies something thought, admitted, or taken for granted; this lies with a body or number of individuals.

TENET, from the Latin *teneo* to hold or maintain, signifies the thing held or maintained, and is a species of principle (v. *Doctrine*) specifically maintained in matters of opinion by persons in general.

A *doctrine* rests on the authority of the individual by whom it is framed; the *dogma* on the authority of the body by whom it is maintained; a *tenet* rests on its own intrinsic merits. Many of the *doctrines* of our blessed Saviour are held by faith in him; they are subjects of persuasion by the exercise of our rational powers: the *dogmas* of the Romish church are admitted by none but such as admit its authority: the *tenets* of republicans, levellers, and freethinkers, have been unblushingly maintained both in public and private.

TO DOUBT, QUESTION.

DOUBT, in French *douter*, Latin *dubito* from *dubius*, which comes from *δύω* and *ἐν-δύαζω*, in the same manner as our frequentative double, signifying to have two opinions.

QUESTION, in Latin *quaestio*, from *quaero* to inquire, signifies to make a question.

Both these terms express the act of the mind in staying its decision. *Doubt* lies altogether in the mind; it is a less active feeling than *question*: by the former we merely suspend decision; by the latter we actually demand proofs in order to assist us in deciding. We may *doubt* in silence: we cannot *question* without expressing it directly or indirectly.

He who suggests *doubts* does it with caution: he who makes a *question* throws in difficulties with a degree of confidence. *Doubts* insinuate themselves into the mind oftentimes involuntarily on the part of the *doubter*; *questions* are always made with an express design. We *doubt* in matters of general interest, on abstruse as well as common subjects: we *question* mostly in ordinary matters that are of a personal interest: we *doubt* the truth of a position: we *question* the veracity of an author.

The *doubt* is frequently confined to the individual; the *question* frequently respects others. We *doubt* whether we shall be able to succeed; we *question* another's right to interfere: we *doubt* whether a thing will answer the end proposed; we *question* the utility of any one making the attempt.

There are many *doubtful* cases in medicine, where the physician is at a loss to decide; there are many *questionable* measures proposed by those who are in or out of power which demand consideration.

A disposition to *doubt* every thing is more inimical to the cause of truth, than the readiness to believe every thing; a disposition to *question* whatever is said or done by others, is much more calculated to give offence than to prevent deception.

DOUBT, SUSPENCE.

DOUBT respects that which we should believe; SUSPENSE that which we wish to know or ascertain. We are in *doubt* for the want of evidence; we are in *suspence* for the want of certainty. *Doubt* interrupts our progress in the attainment of truth; *suspence* impedes us in the attainment of our objects: the former is connected principally with the understanding; the latter acts altogether upon the hopes. We have our *doubts* about things that have no regard to time; we are in *suspence* about what is to happen in future. Those are the least inclined to *doubt* who have the most thorough knowledge of a subject; those are the least exposed to the unpleasant feeling of *suspence* who confine their wishes to the present.

DOUBTFUL, DUBIOUS, UNCERTAIN, PRECARIOUS.

The DOUBTFUL admits of doubt (v. *Doubt*, *suspence*): the DUBIOUS creates suspense. The *doubtful* is said of things in which we are required to have an opinion; the *dubious* respects events and things that must speak for themselves. In *doubtful* cases it is advisable for a judge to lean to the side of mercy; while the issue of a contest is *dubious*, all judgment of the parties, or of the case, must be carefully avoided.

Doubtful and *dubious* have always a relation to the person forming the opinion on the subject in question; UNCERTAIN and PRECARIOUS are epithets which designate the qualities of the things themselves. Whatever is *uncertain* may from that very circumstance be *doubtful* or *dubious* to those who attempt to determine upon them; but they may be designated for their *uncertainty* without any regard to the opinions which they may give rise to.

A person's coming may be *doubtful* or *uncertain*; the length of his stay is oftener described as *uncertain* than as *doubtful*. The *doubtful* is opposed to that on which we form a positive conclusion; the *uncertain* to that which is definite or prescribed. The efficacy of any medicine is *doubtful*: the manner of its operation may be *uncertain*. While our knowledge is limited, we must expect to meet with many things that are *doubtful*; as every thing in the world is

exposed to change, and all that is future is entirely above our control, we must naturally expect to find every thing *uncertain*, but what we see passing before us.

PRECARIOUS, from the Latin *precarius* and *precor* to pray, signifies granted to entreaty, depending on the will or humour of another, whence it is applicable to whatever is obtained from others. *Precarious* is the highest species of *uncertainty*, applied to such things as depend on future casualties in opposition to that which is fixed and determined by design. The weather is *uncertain*; the subsistence of a person who has no stated income or source of living must be *precarious*. It is *uncertain* what day a thing may take place until it is determined; there is nothing more *precarious* than what depends upon the favours of princes.

TO DRAW, DRAG, HAUL, OR HALE, PULL, PLUCK, TUG.

DRAW comes from the Latin *traho* to draw, and the Greek *δρασσω* to lay hold of.

DRAG, through the medium of the German *tragen* to carry, comes also from *traho* to draw.

HAUL or **HALE** comes from the Greek *ελκω* to draw.

PULL is in all probability changed from *pello* to drive or thrust.

PLUCK is in the German *plucken*, &c.

TUG comes from *ziehen* to pull.

Draw expresses here the idea common to the first three terms, namely of putting a body in motion from behind one's-self or towards one's-self; to *drag* is to *draw* a thing with violence, or to *draw* that which makes resistance; to *haul* is to *drag* it with still greater violence. We *draw* a cart; we *drag* a body along the ground; or *haul* a vessel to the shore. To *pull* signifies only an effort to *draw* without the idea of motion: horses *pull* very long sometimes before they can *draw* a heavily laden cart up hill. To *pluck* is to *pull* with a sudden twitch, in order to separate; thus feathers are *plucked* from animals. To *tug* is to *pull* with violence; thus men *tug* at the oar.

In the moral application of the words we may be said to be *drawn* by any thing which can act on the mind to bring us near to an object; we are *dragged* only by means of force; we *pull* a thing towards us by a direct effort. To *haul*, *pluck*, and *tug* are seldom used but in the physical application.

DREAM, REVERIE.

DREAM, in Dutch *drom*, &c. comes either from the Celtic *drem* a sight, or the Greek *δραμα* a fable, or as probably from

the word *roam*, signifying to wander, in Hebrew *rom* to be agitated.

REVERIE, in French *reverie*, like the English *rave*, comes from the Latin *rabies*, signifying that which is wandering or incoherent.

Dreams and *reveries* are alike opposed to the reality, and have their origin in the imagination; but the former commonly passes in sleep, and the latter when awake; the *dream* may and does commonly arise when the imagination is in a sound state; the *reverie* is the fruit of a heated imagination. *Dreams* come in the course of nature; *reveries* are the consequence of a peculiar ferment.

When the term *dream* is applied to the act of one that is awake, it admits of another distinction from *reverie*. They both designate what is confounded, but the *dream* is less extravagant than the *reverie*. Ambitious men please themselves with *dreams* of future greatness; enthusiasts debase the purity of the Christian religion by blending their own wild *reveries* with the doctrines of the Gospel. He who indulges himself in idle *dreams* lays up a store of disappointment for himself when he recovers his recollection, and finds that it is nothing but a *dream*: a love of singularity operating on an ardent mind, will too often lead men to indulge in strange *reveries*.

DREGS, SEDIMENT, DROSS, SCUM, REFUSE.

DREGS, from the German *dreck* dirt, signifies the dirty part which separates from a liquor.

SEDIMENT, from *sedeo* to sit, signifies that which settles at the bottom.

DROSS is probably but a variation of *dregs*.

SCUM, from the German *schaum*, signifies the same as foam or froth.

REFUSE, signifies literally that which is refused or thrown away.

All these terms designate the worthless part of any body; but *dregs* is taken in a worse sense than *sediment*: for the *dregs* is that which is altogether of no value; but the *sediment* may sometimes form a necessary part of the body. The *dregs* are mostly a *sediment* in liquors, but many things are a *sediment* which are not *dregs*. After the *dregs* are taken away, there will frequently remain a *sediment*; the *dregs* are commonly the corrupt part which separates from compound liquids, as wine or beer; the *sediment* consists of the heavy particles which belong to all simple liquids, not excepting water itself. The *dregs* and *sedi-*

ment separate of themselves, but the *scum* and *dross* are forced out by a process; the former from liquids, and the latter from solid bodies rendered liquid or otherwise.

Refuse, as its derivation implies, is always said of that which is intentionally separated to be thrown away, and agrees with the former terms only in as much as they express what is worthless.

Of these terms, *dregs*, *scum*, and *refuse*, admit likewise of a figurative application. The *dregs* and *scum* of the people are the most corrupt part of any society; and the *refuse* is that which is most worthless and unfit for a respectable community.

DULL, GLOOMY, SAD. DISMAL.

DULL may probably come from the Latin *dolor*, signifying generally that which takes off from the brightness or vivacity or perfection of any thing.

GLOOMY, from the German *glumm* muddy, signifies the same as tarnished.

SAD is probably connected with shade, to imply obscurity, which is most suitable to sorrow.

DISMAL, compounded of *dis* and *mal* or *malus*, signifies very evil.

When applied to natural objects they denote the want of necessary light: in this sense metals are more or less *dull* according as they are stained with dirt: the weather is either *dull* or *gloomy* in different degrees; that is, *dull* when the sun is obscured by clouds, and *gloomy* when the atmosphere is darkened by fogs or thick clouds. A room is *dull*, *gloomy*, or *dismal*, according to circumstances; it is *dull* if the usual quantity of light and sound be wanting; it is *gloomy* if the darkness and stillness be very considerable; it is *dismal* if it be deprived of every convenience that fits it for a habitation; in this sense a dungeon is a *dismal* abode. *Sad* is not applied so much to sensible as moral objects, in which sense the distressing events of human life, as the loss of a parent or a child, are justly denominated *sad*.

In regard to the frame of mind which is designated by these terms, it will be easily perceived from the above explanation. As slight circumstances produce *dulness*, any change, however small, in the usual flow of spirits, may be termed *dull*. *Gloom* weighs heavy on the mind, and gives a turn to the reflections and the imagination: desponding thoughts of futurity will spread a *gloom* over every other object. *Dismal* denotes a strong state of depression in the spirits. *Sad* indicates a wounded state of the heart; feelings of unmixed pain.

DURABLE, LASTING, PERMANENT.

Durable is said of things that are intended to remain a shorter time than that which is LASTING; and PERMANENT expresses less than *durable*.

Durable, from the Latin *durus* hard, respects the texture of bodies, and marks their capacity to hold out; *lasting*, from the verb to *last*, or the adjective *last*, signifies to remain the *last* or longest, and is applicable only to that which is supposed of the longest *duration*. *Permanent*, from the Latin *permaneo*, signifies remaining to the end.

Durable is naturally said of material substances, *lasting* of those which are spiritual; although in ordinary discourse sometimes they exchange offices: *permanent* applies more to the affairs of men.

That which perishes quickly is not *durable*: that which ceases quickly is not *lasting*; that which is only for a time is not *permanent*. Stone is more *durable* than iron, and iron than wood: in the feudal times animosities between families used to be *lasting*: a clerk has not a *permanent* situation in an office. However we may boast of our progress in the arts, we appear to have lost the art of making things as *durable* as they were made in former times: the writings of the moderns will many of them be as *lasting* monuments of human genius as those of the ancients; one who is of a contented or moderate disposition will generally prefer a *permanent* situation with small gains to one that is lucrative but temporary and precarious.

DURABLE, CONSTANT.

DURABILITY (v. *Durable*) lies in the thing.

CONSTANCY (v. *Constancy*) lies in the person.

What is *durable* is so from its inherent property; what is *constant* is so by the power of the mind. No *durable* connexions can be formed where avarice or lust prevails.

Some states have suddenly emerged, and even in the depths of their calamity have laid the foundation of a towering and *durable* greatness.

Since we cannot promise ourselves *constant* health, let us endeavour at such temper as may be our best support in the decay of it.

DURATION, TIME.

In the philosophical sense, according to Mr. Locke, TIME is that mode of DURA-

TION which is formed in the mind by its own power of observing and measuring the passing objects.

In the vulgar sense in which *duration* is synonymous with time, it stands for the time of *duration*, and is more particularly applicable to the objects which are said to last; *time* being employed in general for whatever passes in the world.

Duration comprehends the beginning and end of any portion of *time*, that is the how long of a thing; *time* is employed more frequently for the particular portion itself, namely, the *time* when: we mark the *duration* of a sound from the *time* of its commencement to the *time* that it ceases: the historian computes the *duration* of reigns and of events in order to determine the antiquity of a nation, he fixes the exact *time* when each person begins to reign and when he dies, in order to determine the number of years that each reigned.

DUTIFUL. OBEDIENT. RESPECTFUL.

DUTIFUL signifies full of a sense of duty or full of what belongs to duty.

OBEDIENT signifies ready to obey.

RESPECTFUL signifies literally full of respect.

The *obedient* and *respectful* are but modes of the *dutiful*: we may be *dutiful* without being either *obedient* or *respectful*; but we are so far *dutiful* as we are either *obedient* or *respectful*. *Duty* denotes what is due from one being to another; it is independent of all circumstances: *obedience* and *respect* are relative *duties* depending upon the character and station of individuals: as we owe to no one so much as to our parents, we are said to be *dutiful* to no earthly being besides; and in order to deserve the name of *dutiful*, a child during the period of his childhood ought to make a parent's will to be his law, and at no future period ought that will ever to be an object of indifference: we may be *obedient* and *respectful* to others besides our parents, although to them *obedience* and *respect* are in the highest degree and in the first case due; yet servants are enjoined to be *obedient* to their masters, wives to their husbands, and subjects to their king.

Respectful is a term of still greater latitude than either, for as the characters of men as much as their stations demand *respect*, there is a *respectful* deportment due towards every superior.

DUTY, OBLIGATION.

DUTY, as we see in the preceding sec-

tion, consists altogether of what is right or due from one being to another.

OBLIGATION, from the Latin *obligo* to bind, signifies the bond or necessity which lies in the thing.

All *duty* depends upon moral *obligation* which subsists between man and man, or man and his Maker; in this abstract sense, therefore, there can be no *duty* without a previous *obligation*, and where there is an *obligation* it involves a *duty*; but in the vulgar acceptation, *duty* is applicable to the conduct of men in their various relations; *obligation* only to particular circumstances or modes of action; we have *duties* to perform as parents and children, as husbands and wives, as rulers and subjects, as neighbours and citizens: the debtor is under an *obligation* to discharge a debt; and he who has promised is under an *obligation* to fulfil his promise: a conscientious man, therefore, never loses sight of the *obligations* which he has at different times to discharge.

The *duty* is not so peremptory as the *obligation*; the *obligation* is not so lasting as the *duty*: our affections impel us to the discharge of *duty*; interest or necessity impels us to the discharge of an *obligation*: it may therefore sometimes happen that the man whom a sense of *duty* cannot actuate to do that which is right, will not be able to withstand the *obligation* under which he has laid himself.

E.

EAGER. EARNEST. SERIOUS.

EAGER, *v. Avidity*

EARNEST most probably comes from the thing given in *earnest* (in Saxon *thornest* a pledge) of a person's real intentions, whence the word has been employed to qualify the state of any one's mind, as settled or fixed.

SERIOUS, in Latin *serius* or *sine risu*, signifies without laughter.

Eager is used to qualify the desires or passions; *earnest* to qualify the wishes or sentiments; the former has either a physical or moral application, the latter altogether a moral application: a child is *eager* to get a plaything; a hungry person is *eager* to get food; a covetous man is *eager* to seize whatever comes within his grasp: a person is *earnest* in solicitation; *earnest* in devotion.

Eagerness is mostly faulty; it cannot be too early restrained; we can seldom have any substantial reason to be *eager*: *earnestness* is always taken in a good sense; it denotes the inward conviction of the mind,

and the warmth of the heart when awakened by important objects.

A person is said to be *earnest*, or in *earnest*; a person or thing is said to be *serious*: the former characterizes the temper of the mind, the latter characterizes the object itself. In regard to persons, in which alone they are to be compared, *earnest* expresses more than *serious*; the former is opposed to lukewarmness, the latter to unconcernedness: we are *earnest* as to our wishes or our persuasions; we are *serious* as to our intentions: the *earnestness* with which we address another depends upon the force of our conviction; the *seriousness* with which we address them depends upon our sincerity, and the nature of the subject: the preacher *earnestly* exhorts his hearers to lay aside their sins; he *seriously* admonishes those who are guilty of irregularities.

EARNEST, PLEDGE.

In the proper sense, the EARNEST (*v. Eager*) is given as a token of our being in *earnest* in the promise we have made; the PLEDGE, in all probability from *plico* to fold or implicate, signifies a security by which we are engaged to indemnify for a loss.

The *earnest* has regard to the confidence inspired; the *pledge* has regard to the bond or tie produced: when a contract is only verbally formed, it is usual to give *earnest*; whenever money is advanced, it is common to give a *pledge*.

In the figurative application the terms bear the same analogy: a man of genius sometimes, though, not always, gives an *earnest* in youth of his future greatness; children are the dearest *pledges* of affection between parents.

EASE, QUIET, REST, REPOSE.

EASE comes immediately from the French *aisé* glad, and that from the Greek *αιζης* young, fresh.

QUIET, in Latin *quietus*, comes probably from the Greek *κειμαι* to lie down, signifying a lying posture.

REST, in German *rast*, comes from the Latin *resto* to stand still or make a halt.

REPOSE comes from the Latin *reposui*, perfect of *repono* to place back, signifying the state of placing one's self backward.

The idea of a motionless state is common to all these terms; *ease* and *quiet* respect action on the body; *rest* and *repose* respect the action of the body; we are *easy* or *quiet* when freed from any external agency that is painful; we have *rest* or *repose* when the body is no longer in motion.

Ease denotes an exemption from any painful agency in general; *quiet* denotes an exemption from that in particular, which noise, disturbance, or the violence of others, may cause: we are *easy*, or at *ease*, when the body is in a posture agreeable to itself or when no circumjacent object presses unequally upon it; we are *quiet* when there is an agreeable stillness around: our *ease* may be disturbed either by internal or external causes; our *quiet* is most commonly disturbed by external objects: we may have *ease* from pain, bodily or mental; we have *quiet* at the will of those around us: a sick person is often far from enjoying *ease*, although he may have the good fortune to enjoy the most perfect *quiet*: a man's mind is often *uneasy* from its own faulty constitution; it suffers frequent *disquietudes* from the vexatious tempers of others: wealth and contentment are the great promoters of *ease*; retirement is the most friendly to *quiet*.

Rest simply denotes the cessation of motion; *repose* is that species of *rest* which is agreeable after labour: we *rest* as circumstances require; in this sense our Creator is said to have *rested* from the work of creation: *repose* is a circumstance of necessity; the weary seek *repose*; there is no human being to whom it is not sometimes indispensable. We may *rest* in a standing posture; we can *repose* only in a lying position: the night is the time for *rest*; the pillow is the place for *repose*.

EASE, EASINESS, FACILITY, LIGHTNESS.

EASE (*v. Ease*) denotes either the abstract state of a person or quality of a thing; EASINESS, from *easy*, signifying having *ease*, denotes, simply an abstract quality which serves to characterize the thing: a person enjoys *ease*, or he has an *easiness* of disposition: *ease* is said of that which is borne, or that which is done; *easiness* and FACILITY, from the Latin *facilis* easy, most commonly of that which is done; the former in application to the thing as before, the latter either to the person or the thing: we speak of the *easiness* of the task, but of a person's *facility* in doing it: we judge of the *easiness* of a thing by comparing it with others more difficult; we judge of a person's *facility* by comparing him with others, who are less skilful.

Ease and LIGHTNESS are both said of what is to be borne; the former in a general; the latter in a particular sense. Whatever presses in any form is not *easy*; that which presses by excess of weight is not

light: a coat may be *easy* from its make; it can be *light* only from its texture.

The same distinction exists between their derivatives, to *ease*, *facilitate*, and *lighten*; to *ease* is to make *easy* or free from pain, as to *ease* a person of his labour; to *facilitate* is to render a thing more practicable or less difficult, as to *facilitate* a person's progress; to *lighten* is to take off an excessive weight, as to *lighten* a person's burdens.

EASY, READY.

EASY (*v. Ease, easiness*) signifies here a freedom from obstruction in ourselves.

READY, in German *bereit*, Latin *paratus*, signifies prepared.

Easy marks the freedom of being done; *ready* the disposition or willingness to do; the former refers mostly to the thing or the manner, the latter to the person: the thing is *easy* to be done; the person is *ready* to do it: it is *easy* to make professions of friendship in the ardour of the moment; but every one is not *ready* to act up to them, when it interferes with his convenience or interest.

As epithets, both are opposed to difficult, but agreeably to the above explanation of the terms; the former denotes a freedom from such difficulties or obstacles as lie in the nature of the thing itself; the latter an exemption from such as lie in the temper and character of the person; hence we say a person is *easy* of access whose situation, rank, employments, or circumstances, do not prevent him from admitting others to his presence; he is *ready* to hear when he himself throws no obstacles in the way, when he lends a willing ear to what is said. So likewise a task is said to be *easy*; a person's wit, or a person's reply, to be *ready*; a young man who has birth and fortune, wit and accomplishments, will find *easy* admittance into any circle: the very name of a favourite author will be a *ready* passport for the works to which it may be affixed.

When used adverbially, they bear the same relation to each other. A man is said to comprehend *easily*, who from whatever cause finds the thing *easy* to be comprehended; he pardons *readily* who has a temper ready to pardon.

EBULLITION, EFFERVESCENCE, FERMENTATION.

These technical terms have a strong resemblance in their signification, but they are not strictly synonymous; having strong characteristic differences.

EBULLITION, from the Latin *ebullitio* and *ebullio*; compounded of *e* and *bullio* to

boil forth, marks the * commotion of a liquid acted upon by fire, and in chemistry it is said of two substances, which by penetrating each other occasion bubbles to rise up.

EFFERVESCENCE, from the Latin *effervescentia*, and *effervesco* to grow hot, marks the commotion which is excited in liquors by a combination of substances; such as of acids, which are mixed and commonly produce heat.

FERMENTATION, from the Latin *fermentatio* and *fermentum* or *fervimentum*, from *ferveo* to grow hot, marks the internal movement which is excited in a liquid of itself by which its components undergo such a change or decomposition, as to form a new body.

Ebullition is a more violent action than *effervescence*; *fermentation* is more gradual and permanent than either. Water is exposed to *ebullition* when acted upon by any powerful degree of external heat; iron in aqua fortis occasions an *effervescence*; beer and wine undergo a *fermentation* before they reach a state of perfection.

These words are all employed in a figurative sense, which is drawn from their physical application. The passions are exposed to *ebullitions*, in which they break forth with all the violence that is observable in water agitated by excessive heat; the heart and affections are exposed to *effervescence* when powerfully awakened by particular objects; minds are said to be in a *ferment* which are agitated by conflicting feelings.

There can be no *ebullition* or *fermentation* without *effervescence*; but there may be *effervescence* without either of the former.

ECCLESIASTIC, DIVINE, THEOLOGIAN.

An **ECCLESIASTIC** derives his title from the office which he bears in the *ecclesia* or church; a **DIVINE** and **THEOLOGIAN** from their pursuit after, or engagement in, *divine* or *theological* matters. An *ecclesiastic* is connected with an episcopacy; a *divine* or *theologian* is unconnected with any form of church government.

An *ecclesiastic* need not in his own person perform any office, although he fills a station; a *divine* not only fills a station, but actually performs the office of teaching; a *theologian* neither fills any particular station, nor discharges any specific duty, but merely follows the pursuit of studying *theology*. An *ecclesiastic* is not always a *divine*, nor a *divine* an *ecclesiastic*; a *divine* is al-

* Vida Beauzée: „Ebullition, effervescence, fermentation.“

ways more or less a *theologian*, but every *theologian* is not a *divine*.

Among the Roman Catholics all monks, and in the Church of England the various dignitaries who perform the episcopal functions, are entitled *ecclesiastics*. There are but few denominations of Christians who have not appointed teachers who are called *divines*. Professors or writers on *theology* are peculiarly denominated *theologians*.

TO ECLIPSE, OBSCURE.

ECLIPSE, in Greek *εκλειπεις*, comes from *εκλειπω* to fail, signifying to cause a failure of light.

OBSCURE, from the adjective *obscure* (v. *Dark*), signifies to cause the intervention of a shadow.

In the natural as well as the moral application *eclipse* is taken in a particular and relative signification; *obscure* is used in a general sense. Heavenly bodies are *eclipsed* by the intervention of other bodies between them and the beholder; things are in general *obscured* which are in any way rendered less striking or visible. To *eclipse* is therefore a species of *obscuring*: that is always *obscured* which is *eclipsed*; but every thing is not *eclipsed* which is *obscured*.

So, figuratively, real merit is *eclipsed* by the intervention of superior merit; it is often *obscured* by an ungracious exterior in the possessor, or by his unfortunate circumstances.

ECSTASY, RAPTURE, TRANSPORT.

There is a strong resemblance in the meaning and application of these words. They all express an extraordinary elevation of the spirits, or an excessive tension of the mind.

ECSTASY marks a passive state, from the Greek *εκστασις* and *εξιστημι* to stand, or be out of one's self, out of one's mind. RAPTURE from the Latin *rapio*, to seize or carry away; and TRANSPORT from *trans* and *porto* to carry beyond oneself, rather designate an active state, a violent impulse with which it hurries itself forward. *Ecstasy* and *rapture* are always pleasurable, or arise from pleasurable causes: *transport* respects either pleasurable or painful feelings: joy occasions *ecstasies* or *raptures*: joy and anger have their *transports*.

An *ecstasy* benumbs the faculties: it will take away the power of speech and often of thought: it is commonly occasioned by sudden and unexpected events: *rapture*, on the other hand, often invigorates the powers, and calls them into action; it frequently arises from deep thought: the former is common

to all persons of ardent feelings, but more particularly to children, ignorant people, or to such as have not their feelings under control; *rapture*, on the contrary, is applicable to persons with superior minds, and to circumstances of peculiar importance. *Transports* are but sudden bursts of passion, which generally lead to intemperate actions, and are seldom indulged even on joyous occasions except by the volatile and passionate: a reprieve from the sentence of death will produce an *ecstasy* of delight in the pardoned criminal. Religious contemplation is calculated to produce holy *raptures* in a mind strongly imbued with pious zeal: in *transports* of rage men have committed enormities which have caused them bitter tears of repentance ever after.

EDIFICE, STRUCTURE, FABRIC.

EDIFICE, in Latin *aedificium* from *aedifico* or *aedes* and *facio*, to make a house, signifies properly the house made.

STRUCTURE, from the Latin *structura* and *struo* to raise, signifies the raising a thing, or the thing raised.

FABRIC, from the Latin *fabrico*, signifies either *fabricating* or the thing *fabricated*.

Edifice in its proper sense is always applied to a building; *structure* and *fabric* are either employed as abstract actions, or the results and fruits of actions: in the former case they are applied to many objects besides buildings; *structure* referring to the act of raising or setting up together; *fabric* to that of framing or contriving.

As *edifice* bespeaks the thing itself, it requires no modification, since it conveys of itself the idea of something superior. The word *structure* must always be qualified; it is employed only to designate the mode of action. *Fabric* is itself a species of epithet, it designates the object as something contrived by the power of art or by design.

Edifices dedicated to the service of religion have in all ages been held sacred; it is the business of the architect to estimate the merits or demerits of any *structure*: when we take a survey of the vast *fabric* of the universe, the mind becomes bewildered with contemplating the infinite power of its Divine author.

When employed in the abstract sense of actions, *structure* is limited to objects of magnitude, or such as consist of complicated parts; *fabric* is extended to every thing in which art or contrivance is requisite; hence we may speak of the *structure* of vessels, and the *fabric* of cloth, iron-ware, and the like.

EDUCATION, INSTRUCTION,
BREEDING.

INSTRUCTION and BREEDING are to EDUCATION as parts to a whole; *instruction* respects the communication of knowledge, and *breeding* respects the manners or outward conduct; but *education* comprehends not only both these, but the formation of the mind, the regulation of the heart, and the establishment of the principles: good *instruction* makes one wiser; good *breeding* makes one more polished and agreeable: good *education* makes one really good.

EFFECT, CONSEQUENCE.

EFFECT and CONSEQUENCE agree in expressing that which follows any thing, but the former marks what follows from a connexion between the two objects; the term *consequence* is not thus limited: an *effect* is that which necessarily flows out of the cause, between which the connexion is so intimate that we cannot think of the one without the other. In the nature of things, causes will have *effects*; and for every *effect* there will be a cause: a *consequence*, on the other hand, may be either casual or natural; it is that on which we can calculate. *Effect* applies either to physical or moral objects, *consequence* only to moral subjects.

There are many diseases which are the *effects* of mere intemperance: an imprudent step in one's first setting out in life is often attended with fatal *consequences*. A mild answer has the *effect* of turning away wrath: the loss of character is the general *consequence* of an irregular life.

TO EFFECT, PRODUCE, PERFORM.

The two latter are in reality included in the former; what is *effected* is both *produced* and *performed*; but what is *produced* or *performed* is not always *effected*.

EFFECT, in Latin *effectus*, participle of *efficio*, compounded of *e* and *facio*, signifies to make out any thing.

PRODUCE, from the Latin *produco*, signifies literally to draw forth.

PERFORM, compounded of *per* and *form*, signifies to form thoroughly or carry through.

To *produce*, signifies to bring something forth or into existence; to *perform*, to do something to the end: to *effect* is to *produce* by *performing*: whatever is *effected* is the consequence of a specific design; it always requires therefore a rational agent to *effect*: what is *produced* may follow incidentally, or arise from the action of an irrational agent or an inanimate object; what is *performed* is done by specific efforts; it is

therefore, like *effect*, the consequence of design, and requires a rational agent.

Effect respects both the end and the means by which it is brought about: *produce* respects the end only; *perform* the means only. No person ought to calculate on *effecting* a reformation in the morals of men, without the aid of religion; changes both in individuals and communities are often *produced* by trifles.

To *effect* is said of that which emanates from the mind of the agent himself; to *perform*, of that which is marked out by rule, or prescribed by another. We *effect* a purpose; we *perform* a part, a duty or office. A true Christian is always happy when he can *effect* a reconciliation between parties who are at variance: it is a laudable ambition to strive to *perform* one's part creditably in society.

EFFECTIVE, EFFICIENT, EFFECTUAL,
EFFICACIOUS.

EFFECTIVE signifies capable of *effecting*; EFFICIENT signifies literally *effecting*; EFFECTUAL and EFFICACIOUS signify having the *effect*, or possessing the power to *effect*. The former two are used only in regard to physical objects, the latter two in regard to moral objects. An army or a military force is *effective*; a cause is *efficient*; a remedy or a cure is *effectual*; a medicine is *efficacious*.

An end or result is *effectual*, the means are *efficacious*. When a thing is not found *effectual*, it is requisite to have recourse to farther measures; that which has been proved to be *inefficacious* should never be adopted.

EFFUSION, EJACULATION.

EFFUSION signifies the thing poured out, and EJACULATION the thing ejaculated or thrown out, both indicating a species of verbal expression; the former either by utterance or in writing; the latter only by utterance. The *effusion* is not so vehement or sudden as the *ejaculation*; the *ejaculation* is not so ample or diffuse as the *effusion*; *effusion* is seldom taken in a good sense; *ejaculation* rarely otherwise. An *effusion* commonly flows from a heated imagination uncorrected by the judgment: it is therefore in general not only incoherent, but extravagant and senseless; an *ejaculation* is produced by the warmth of the moment, but never without reference to some particular circumstance. Enthusiasts are full of extravagant *effusions*; contrite sinners will often express their penitence in pious *ejaculations*.

ELDERLY, AGED, OLD.

These three words rise by gradation in their sense; AGED denotes a greater degree of age than ELDERLY: and OLD still more than either.

The *elderly* man has passed the meridian of life; the *aged* man is fast approaching the term of our existence; the *old* man has already reached this term, or has exceeded it. In conformity, however, to the vulgar prepossession against age and its concomitant infirmities, the term *elderly* or *aged* is always more respectful than *old*, which latter word is often used by way of reproach, and can seldom be used free from such an association, unless qualified by an epithet of praise, as a good old man, a venerable old man.

ELIGIBLE, PREFERABLE.

ELIGIBLE or fit to be elected, and PREFERABLE fit to be preferred, serve as epithets in the sense of choose and prefer (*v. To choose, prefer*): what is *eligible* is desirable in itself, what is *preferable* is more desirable than another. There may be many *eligible* situations, out of which perhaps there is but one *preferable*. Of persons, however, we say rather that they are *eligible* to an office than *preferable*.

ELOCUTION, ELOQUENCE, ORATORY, RHETORIC.

ELOCUTION and ELOQUENCE are derived from the same Latin verb *eloquor* to speak out.

ORATORY, from *oro* to implore, signifies the art of making a set speech.

Elocution consists in the manner of delivery; *eloquence* in the matter that is delivered. We employ *elocution* in repeating the words of another: we employ *eloquence* to express our own thoughts and feeling. *Elocution* is requisite for an actor; *eloquence* for a speaker.

Eloquence lies in the person; it is a natural gift: *oratory* lies in the mode of expression; it is acquired art. RHETORIC, from *ῥῆω* to speak, is properly the theory of that art of which *oratory* is the practice. But the term *rhetoric* may be sometimes employed in an improper sense for the display of *oratory* or scientific speaking. *Eloquence* speaks one's own feelings; it comes from the heart, and speaks to the heart: *oratory* is an imitative art; it describes what is felt by another. *Rhetoric* is the affectation of *oratory*.

An afflicted parent, who pleads for the restoration of her child that has been torn

from her, will exert her *eloquence*; a counsellor at the bar, who pleads the cause of his client, will employ *oratory*; vulgar partisans are full of *rhetoric*.

Eloquence often consists in a look or an action; *oratory* must always be accompanied with language. There is a dumb *eloquence* which is not denied even to the brutes, and which speaks more than all the studied graces of speech and action employed by the orator.

Between *eloquence* and *oratory* there is the same distinction as between nature and art: the former can never be perverted to any base purposes; it always speaks truth: the latter will as easily serve the purposes of falsehood as of truth.

TO EMBARRASS, PERPLEX, ENTANGLE.

EMBARRASS, *v. Difficulty.*

PERPLEX, *v. To distress.*

ENTANGLE, *v. To disengage.*

Embarrass respects a person's manners or circumstances; *perplex* his views and conduct; *entangle* is said of particular circumstances. *Embarrassments* depend altogether on ourselves: the want of prudence and presence of mind are the common causes; *perplexities* depend on extraneous circumstances as well as ourselves; extensive dealings with others are mostly attended with *perplexities*: *entanglements* arise mostly from the evil designs of others.

That *embarrasses* which interrupts the even course or progress of one's actions: that *perplexes* which interferes with one's decisions; that *entangles* which binds a person in his actions.

Pecuniary difficulties *embarrass*, or contending feelings produce *embarrassment*; contrary counsels or interests *perplex*: controversies *entangle*.

Steadiness of mind prevents *embarrassment* in the outward behaviour. Firmness of character is requisite in the midst of *perplexities*: caution must be employed to guard against *entanglements*.

EMBRYO, FOETUS.

EMBRYO, in French *embryon*, Greek *ἐμβρυον*, from *βρῶω* to germinate, signifies the thing germinated. FOETUS, in French *fetus*, Latin *foetus*, from *foveo* to cherish, signifies the thing cherished, both words referring to what is formed in the womb of the mother; but *embryo* properly implies the first fruit of conception, and the *foetus* that which is arrived to a maturity of formation. Anatomists tell us that the *embryo* in the human subject assumes the character of the

foetus about the forty-second day after conception.

Foetus is applicable only in its proper sense to animals: *embryo* has a figurative application to plants and fruits, when they remain in a confused and imperfect state, and also a moral application to plans, or whatever is roughly conceived in the mind.

EMISSARY, SPY.

EMISSARY, in Latin *emissarius*, from *emitto* to send forth, signifies one sent out.

SPY, in French *espion*, from the Latin *specio* to look into or look about, signifies one who searches.

Both these words designate a person sent out by a body on some public concern among their enemies; but they differ in their office according to the etymology of the words.

The *emissary* is by distinction sent forth, he is sent so as to mix with the people to whom he goes, to be in all places, and to associate with every one individually as may serve his purpose; the *spy*, on the other hand, takes his station wherever he can best perceive what is passing; he keeps himself at a distance from all but such as may particularly aid him in the object of his search.

The object of an *emissary* is, by direct communication with the enemy, to sow the seed of dissension, to spread false alarms, and to disseminate false principles; the object of a *spy* is to get information of an enemy's plans and movements.

Although the office of *emissar* and *spy* are neither of them honourable, yet that of the former is more disgraceful than that of the latter. The *emissary* is generally employed by those who have some illegitimate object to pursue; *spies*, on the other hand, are employed by all regular governments in a time of warfare.

TO EMIT, EXHALE. EVAPORATE.

EMIT, from the Latin *emitto*, expresses properly the act of sending out: EXHALE, from *halitus* the breath, and EVAPORATE, from *vapor*, vapour or steam, are both modes of emitting.

Emit is used to express a more positive effort to send out: *exhale* and *evaporate* designate the natural and progressive progress of things: volcanoes *emit* fire and flames: the earth *exhales* the damps, or flowers *exhale* perfumes; liquids *evaporate*.

Animals may *emit* by an act of volition: things *exhale* or *evaporate* by an external action upon them; they *exhale* that which is foreign to them; they *evaporate* that which constitutes a part of their substance.

The pole-cat is reported to *emit* such a

stench from itself when pursued, as to keep its pursuers at a distance from it: bogs and fens *exhale* their moisture when acted upon by the heat: water *evaporates* by means of steam when put into a state of ebullition.

EMPIRE, KINGDOM.

Although these two words obviously refer to two species of states, where the princes assume the title of either emperor or king, yet the difference between them is not limited to this distinction.

* The word EMPIRE carries with it the idea of a state that is vast, and composed of many different people; that of KINGDOM marks a state more limited in extent, and united in its composition. In *kingdoms* there is a uniformity of fundamental laws: the difference in regard to particular laws or modes of jurisprudence being merely variations from custom, which do not affect the unity of political administration. From this uniformity, indeed, in the functions of government, we may trace the origin of the words *king* and *kingdom*: since there is but one prince or sovereign ruler, although there may be many employed in the administration. With *empires* it is different: one part is sometimes governed by fundamental laws, very different from those by which another part of the same *empire* is governed; which diversity destroys the unity of government, and makes the union of the state to consist in the submission of certain chiefs to the commands of a superior general or chief. From this very right of commanding, then, it is evident that the words *empire* and *emperor*, derive their origin; and hence it is that there may be many princes or sovereigns, and *kingdoms*, in the same *empire*.

As a farther illustration of these terms, we need only look to their application from the earliest ages in which they were used, down to the present period. The word *king* had its existence long prior to that of *emperor*, being doubtless derived, through the channel of the northern languages, from the Hebrew *cahen* a priest, since in those ages of primitive simplicity, before the lust of dominion had led to the extension of power and conquest, he who performed the sacerdotal office was unanimously regarded as the fittest person to discharge the civil functions for the community. So in like manner among the Romans the corresponding word *rex*, which comes from *rego*, and the Hebrew *regna* to feed, signifies a pastor or shepherd, because he who filled the office acted both spiritually and civilly as their

* Vide Abbé Bauzée: „Empire, royaume.“

guide. Rome therefore was first a *kingdom*, while it was formed of only one people: it acquired the name of *empire* as soon as other nations were brought into subjection to it, and became members of it; not by losing their distinctive character as nations, but by submitting themselves to the supreme command of their conquerors.

For the same reason the German *empire* was so denominated, because it consisted of several states independent of each other, yet all subject to one ruler or emperor; so likewise the Russian *empire*, the Ottoman *empire*, and the Mogul *empire*, which are composed of different nations: and on the other hand the *kingdom* of Spain, of Portugal, of France, and of England, all of which, though divided into different provinces, were, nevertheless, one people, having but one ruler. While France, however, included many distinct countries within its jurisdiction, it properly assumed the name of an *empire*; and England having by a legislative act united to itself a country distinct both in its laws and customs, has likewise, with equal propriety, been denominated the British *empire*.

EMPIRE, REIGN, DOMINION.

In the preceding article **EMPIRE** has been considered as a species of state: in the present case it conveys the idea of power,* or an exercise of sovereignty. In this sense it is allied to the word **REIGN** which, from the verb to *reign*, signifies the act of *reigning*; and to the word **DOMINION**, which, from the Latin *dominus* a lord, signifies either the power or the exercise of the power of a lord.

Empire is used more properly for the people or nations; *reign* for the individuals who hold the power: hence we say the *empire* of the Assyrians, or of the Turks; the *reign* of the Caesars, or the Paleologi. The glorious epocha of the *empire* of the Babylonians is the *reign* of Nebuchadnezzar; that of the *empire* of the Persians is the *reign* of Cyrus; that of the *empire* of the Greeks is the *reign* of Alexander; that of the Romans is the *reign* of Augustus.

All the epithets applied to the word *empire*, in this sense, belong equally to *reign*; but all which are applied to *reign* are not suitable in application to *empire*. We may speak of a *reign* as long and glorious; but not of an *empire* as long and glorious, unless the idea be expressed paraphrastically. The *empire* of the Romans was of longer duration than that of the Greeks: but the glory

of the latter was more brilliant, from the rapidity of its conquests: the *reign* of George the third was one of the longest and most eventful recorded in history.

Empire and *reign* are both applied in the proper sense to the exercise of public authority; *dominion* applies to the personal act, whether of a sovereign or a private individual: a sovereign may have *dominion* over many nations by the force of arms; but he holds his *reign* over one nation by the force of law. Hence the word *dominion* may, in the proper sense, be applied to the power which man exercises over the brutes, over inanimate objects, or over himself; but if *empire* and *reign* be applied to any thing but civil government, or to nations, it is only in the improper sense: thus a female may be said to hold her *empire* among her admirers; fashions may be said to have their *reign*.

In this application of the terms, *empire* is something wide and all-commanding; *reign* is that which is steady and settled; *dominion* is full of control and force.

TO EMPLOY, USE.

EMPLOY, from the Latin *implico*, signifies to implicate, or apply for any special purpose.

USE, from the Latin *usus* and *utor*, signifies to enjoy or derive benefit from.

Employ expresses less than *use*; it is in fact a species of partial *using*; we always *use* when we *employ*; but we do not always *employ* when we *use*. We *employ* whatever we take into our service, or make subservient to our convenience for a time; we *use* whatever we entirely devote to our purpose. Whatever is *employed* by one person may, in its turn, be *employed* by another, or at different times be *employed* by the same person: but what is *used* is frequently consumed or rendered unfit for a similar *use*. What we *employ* may frequently belong to another; but what one *uses* is supposed to be his exclusive property. On this ground we may speak of *employing* persons as well as things; but we speak of *using* things only, and not persons, except in the most degrading sense. Persons, time, strength, and power, are *employed*; houses, furniture, and all materials, of which either necessities or conveniences are composed, are *used*. It is a part of wisdom to *employ* well the short portion of time which is allotted to us in this sublunary state, and to *use* the things of this world, so as not to abuse them.

EMPTY, VACANT, VOID, DEVOID.

EMPTY, in Saxon *empti*, not improbably

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Empire, regne.“

derived from the Latin *inopis* poor or wanting.

VACANT, in Latin *vacans* or *vaco*, Hebrew *bekak* to empty.

VOID and DEVOID, in Latin *viduus*, and Greek *ιδιος*, signifies solitary or bereft.

Empty is the term in most general use; *vacant*, *void*, and *devoid*, are employed in particular cases: *empty* and *vacant* have either a proper or an improper application; *void* or *devoid* only a moral acceptation.

Empty, in the natural sense, marks an absence of that which is substantial, or adapted for filling; *vacant* designates or marks the absence of that which should occupy or make use of a thing. That which is hollow may be *empty*; that which respects an even space may be *vacant*. A house is *empty* which has no inhabitants; a seat is *vacant* which is without an occupant: a room is *empty* which is without furniture; a space on paper is *vacant* which is free from writing.

In their figurative application *empty* and *vacant* have a similar analogy; a dream is said to be *empty*, or a title *empty*; a stare is said to be *vacant*, or an hour *vacant*.

Void or *devoid* are used in the same sense as *vacant*, as qualifying epithets, but not prefixed as adjectives, and always followed by some object; thus we speak of a creature as *void* of reason, and of an individual as *devoid* of common sense.

ENCOMIUM, EULOGY, PANEGYRIC.

ENCOMIUM, in Greek *εγκωμιον*, signifies a set or form of verses, used for the purposes of praise.

EULOGY, in Greek *ευλογία* from *ευ* and *λογος*, signifies literally, speaking well of any one,

PANEGYRIC, in Greek *πανηγυρικον*, from *πας* the whole, and *αγορα* an assembly, signifies that which is spoken before an assembly, a solemn oration.

The idea of praise is common to all these terms; but the first seems more properly applied to the thing, or the unconscious object; the second to persons in general, their characters and actions; the third to the person of some particular individual; thus we bestow *encomiums* upon any work of art, or production of genius, without reference to the performer: we bestow *eulogies* on the exploits of a hero, who is of another age or country; but we write *panegyrics* either in a direct address, or in direct reference to the person who is *panegyricized*; the *encomium* is produced by merit, real or supposed; the *eulogy* may spring from admiration of the person *eulogized*; the *panegyric* may be

mere flattery, resulting from servile dependence: great *encomiums* have been paid by all persons to the constitution of England; our naval and military heroes have received the *eulogies* of many besides their own countrymen; authors of no mean reputation have condescended to deal out their *panegyrics* pretty freely, in dedications to their patrons.

TO ENCOURAGE, ANIMATE, INCITE, IMPEL, URGE, STIMULATE, INSTIGATE.

ENCOURAGE, v. To cheer.

ANIMATE, v. To animate.

INCITE from the Latin *cito*, and the Hebrew *sat*, to stir up, signifies to put into motion towards an object.

IMPEL, v. To actuate.

URGE, in Latin *urgeo*, comes from the Greek *συγγεω* to set to work.

STIMULATE, from the Latin *stimulus* a spur or goad, and INSTIGATE, from the Latin *stigo*, and Greek *στιζω*, signify literally to goad.

The idea of actuating, or calling into action, is common to these terms, which vary in the circumstances of the action.

Encouragement acts as a persuasive; *animate* as an *impelling* or enlivening cause: we are *encouraged* not to give up or slacken in our exertions; we are *animated* to increase our efforts: the sinner is *encouraged* by offers of pardon, through the merits of a Redeemer, to turn from his sinful ways; the Christian is *animated* by the prospect of a blissful eternity, to go on from perfection to perfection.

What *encourages* and *animates* acts by the finer feelings of our nature; what *incites* acts through the medium of our desires: we are *encouraged* by kindness; we are *animated* by the hope of reward; we are *incited* by the desire of distinction: what *impels*, *urges*, *stimulates*, and *instigates*, acts forcibly, be the cause internal or external; we are *impelled* and *stimulated* mostly by what is internal; we are *urged* and *instigated* by both the internal and external, but particularly the latter: we are *impelled* by motives; we are *stimulated* by passions; we are *urged* and *instigated* by the representations of others: a benevolent man is *impelled* by motives of humanity to relieve the wretched: an ardent mind is *stimulated* by ambition to great efforts; we are *urged* by entreaties to spare those who are in our power; one is *instigated* by malicious representations to take revenge on a supposed enemy.

We may be *impelled* and *urged* though not properly *stimulated* or *instigated* by cir-

circumstances: in this case the two former differ only in the degree of force in the *impelling* cause: less constraint is laid on the will when we are *impelled*, than when we are *urged*, which leaves no alternative or choice: a man is *impelled* by the mere necessity of choosing to take one road in preference to another; he is *urged* by his pecuniary embarrassments to raise money at a great loss.

We may be *impelled*, *urged*, and *stimulated* to that which is bad; we are never *instigated* to that which is good: we may be *impelled* by curiosity to pry into that which does not concern us; we may be *urged* by the entreaties of those we are connected with to take steps of which we afterwards repent; we may be *stimulated* by a desire of revenge to many foul deeds; but those who are not hardened in vice require the *instigation* of persons more abandoned than themselves, before they will commit any desperate act of wickedness.

Encouragement and *incitement* are the abstract nouns either for the act of *encouraging* or *inciting*, or the thing that *encourages* or *incites*: the *encouragement* of laudable undertakings is itself laudable; a single word or look may be an *encouragement*; the *incitement* of passion is at all times dangerous, but particularly in youth; money is said to be an *incitement* to evil. *Incentive*, which is another derivative from *incite*, has a higher application for things that *incite* than the word *incitement*; the latter being mostly applied to sensible, and the former to spiritual objects: savoury food is an *incitement* to sensualists to indulge in gross acts of intemperance: a religious man wants no *incentives* to virtues: his own breast furnishes him with those of the noblest kind. *Impulse* is the derivative from *impel*, which denotes the act of *impelling*; *stimulus*, which is the root of the word *stimulate*, naturally designates the instrument, namely, the spur or goad with which one is *stimulated*: hence we speak of acting by a blind *impulse*, or wanting a *stimulus* to exertion.

TO ENCOURAGE, ADVANCE, PROMOTE, PREFER, FORWARD.

TO ENCOURAGE, *v.* To encourage, animate.

ADVANCE, *v.* To advance.

PROMOTE, from the Latin *promoveo*, signifies to move forward.

PREFER, from the Latin *praefero* or *fero* and *prae* to set before, signifies to set up before others.

TO FORWARD is to put forward.

The idea of exerting one's influence to the

advantage of an object is included in the signification of all these terms, which differ in the circumstances and mode of the action: to *encourage*, *advance*, and *promote*, are applicable to both persons and things; *prefer* to persons only; *forward* to things only.

First as to persons, *encourage* is partial as to the end, and indefinite as to the means: we may *encourage* a person in any thing however trivial, and by any means: thus we may *encourage* a child in his rudeness, by not checking him; or we may *encourage* an artist or man of letters in some great national work; but to *advance*, *promote* and *prefer*, are more general in their end, and specific in the means: a person may *advance* himself, or may be *advanced* by others; he is *promoted* and *preferred* only by others: a person's *advancement* may be the fruit of his industry, or result from the efforts of his friends; *promotion* and *preferment* are the work of one's friends: the former in regard to offices in general, the latter mostly in regard to ecclesiastical situations: it is the duty of every one to *encourage*, to the utmost of his power, those among the poor who strive to obtain an honest livelihood; it is every man's duty to *advance* himself in life by every legitimate means; it is the duty of every good man in the state to *promote* those who show themselves deserving of *promotion*; it is the duty of a minister to accept of *preferment* when it offers, but it is not his duty to be solicitous for it.

When taken in regard to things *encourage* is used in an improper or figurative acceptance; the rest are applied properly: if we *encourage* an undertaking, we give courage to the undertaker; but when we speak of *advancing* a cause, or *promoting* an interest, or *forwarding* a purpose, these terms properly convey the idea of keeping things alive, or in a motion towards some desired end: to *advance* is however generally used in relation to whatever admits of extension and aggrandizement; *promote* is applied to whatever admits of being brought to a point of maturity or perfection; *forward* is but a partial term, employed in the sense of *promote* in regard to particular objects: thus we *advance* religion or learning; we *promote* an art or an invention; we *forward* a plan.

TO ENCOURAGE, EMBOLDEN.

TO ENCOURAGE is to give courage, and to EMBOLDEN to make bold; the former *impelling* to action in general, the latter to that which is more difficult or dangerous: we are *encouraged* to persevere; the resolution is thereby confirmed; we are *emboldened*

to begin; the spirit of enterprise is roused. Success *encourages*; the chance of escaping danger *emboldens*.

Outward circumstances, however trivial, serve to *encourage*; the urgency of the occasion, or the importance of subject, serves to *embolden*: a kind word or a gentle look *encourages* the suppliant to tender his petition; the confidence natural to youth is often sufficient of itself to *embolden* men to great undertakings.

TO ENCROACH, INTRENCH, INTRUDE, INVADE, INFRINGE.

ENCROACH, in French *encrocher*, is compounded of *en* or *in* and *crouch* cringe or creep, signifying to creep into any thing.

INTRENCH, compounded of *in* and *trench*, signifies to *trench* or dig beyond one's own ground into another's ground.

INTRUDE, from the Latin *intrudo*, signifies literally to thrust upon; and INVADE, from *invado*, signifies to march in upon.

INFRINGE, from the Latin *infringo*, compounded of *in* and *frango*, signifies to break in upon.

All these terms denote an unauthorized procedure: but the two former designate gentle or silent actions, the latter violent if not noisy actions.

Encroach is often an imperceptible action, performed with such art as to elude observation; it is, according to its derivation, an insensible creeping into; to *intrench* is in fact a species of *encroachment*, namely, that perceptible species which consists in exceeding the boundaries in marking out the ground or space: it should be one of the first objects of a parent to check the first indications of an *encroaching* disposition in their children; according to the building laws, it is made actionable for any one to *intrench* upon the street or public road with their houses or gardens.

They preserve the same distinction when figuratively applied, as to *encroach* on the authority of another, or *intrench* on his time.

Intrude, *invade*, and *infringe*, denote acts accompanied with more or less violence. *Intrude* and *invade* designate an unauthorized entry; the former in violation of right, equity, or good manners; the latter in violation of public law: the former is more commonly applied to individuals; the latter to nations or large communities; unbidden guests *intrude* themselves sometimes into families to their no small annoyance: an army never *invades* a country without doing some mischief. So likewise in the figurative application thoughts are said to *intrude* them-

selves on the mind. One person *invades* the province of another.

Invade in its improper acceptation bears a close analogy to *infringe*: we speak of *invading* rights, or *infringing* rights; but the former is an act of greater violence than the latter: by a tyrannical and arbitrary exercise of power the rights of the subject are *invaded*; by gradual steps and imperceptible means their liberties may be *infringed*: *invade* is used only for public privileges; *infringe* is applied also to private and individual.

King John of England *invaded* the rights of the Barons in so senseless and arbitrary a manner as to provoke their resistance, and promote the cause of civil liberty: it is of importance to the peace and well-being of society that men should, in their different relations, stations, and duties, guard against any *infringement* on the sphere or department of such as come into connexion with them.

TO END, CLOSE, TERMINATE.

To bring any thing to its last point is the common idea in the signification of these terms.

To END is the simple action of putting an *end* to, without any collateral idea; it is therefore the generic term. To CLOSE is to *end* gradually. To TERMINATE is to *end* in a specific manner. There are persons even in civilized countries so ignorant as, like the brutes, to *end* their lives as they began them, without one rational reflection; the Christian *closes* his career of active duty only with the failure of his bodily powers. A person *ends* a dispute, or puts an *end* to it, by yielding the subject of contest; he *terminates* the dispute by entering into a compromise.

END, EXTREMITY.

Both these words imply the last of those parts which constitute a thing; but the END designates that part generally; the EXTREMITY marks the particular point. The *extremity* is from the Latin *extremus* the very last *end*, that which is outermost. Hence *end* may be said of that which bounds any thing; but *extremity* of that which extends farthest from us: we may speak of the *ends* of that which is circular in its form, or of that which has no specific form; but we speak of the *extremities* of that only which is supposed to project lengthwise.

The *end* is opposed to the beginning; the *extremity* to the centre or point from which we reckon. When a man is said to go to the *end* of a journey or the *end* of the world,

the expression is in both cases indefinite and general; but when he is said to go to the *extremities* of the earth or the *extremities* of a kingdom, the idea of relative distance is manifestly implied.

In the figurative application *end* and *extremity* differ so widely as not to admit of any just comparison.

TO ENDEAVOUR, AIM, STRIVE, STRUGGLE.

ENDEAVOUR, *v. Attempt.*

AIM, *v. Aim.*

STRIVE, *v. Discord, strife.*

STRUGGLE is a frequentative from *strive*.

To *endeavour* is general in its object; *aim* is particular: we *endeavour* to do whatever we set about; we *aim* at doing something which we have set before ourselves as a desirable object.

To *strive* is to *endeavour* earnestly; to *struggle* is to *strive* earnestly.

An *endeavour* springs from a sense of duty; we *endeavour* to do that which is right, and avoid that which is wrong: *aiming* is the fruit of an aspiring temper; the object *aimed* at is always something superior either in reality or imagination, and calls for particular exertion: *striving* is the consequence of an ardent desire; the thing *striven* for is always conceived to be of importance: *struggling* is the effect of necessity; it is proportioned to the difficulty of attainment, and the resistance which is opposed to it; the thing *struggled* for is indispensably necessary.

Those only who *endeavour* to discharge their duty to God and their fellow-creatures can expect real tranquillity of mind. Whoever *aims* at the acquirement of great wealth or much power opens the door for much misery to himself. As our passions are our greatest enemies, we should always *strive* to keep them under our control. There are some men who *struggle* through life to obtain a mere competence; and yet die without succeeding in their object.

ENDEAVOUR, EFFORT, EXERTION.

ENDEAVOUR, *v. Attempt, and To endeavour.*

EFFORT, is changed from the Latin *effert* from *effero* to bring forth, that is, to bring out power.

EXERTION, in Latin *exertio* from *exero*, signifies the putting forth power,

The idea of calling our powers into action is common to these terms: *endeavour* expresses little more than this common idea, being a term of general import: *effort* and *exertion* are particular modes of *endeavour*;

the former being a special strong *endeavour*, the latter a continued strong *endeavour*. An *endeavour* is called forth by ordinary circumstances; *effort* and *exertion* by those which are extraordinary. An *endeavour* flows out of the condition of our being and constitution; as rational and responsible agents we must make daily *endeavours* to fit ourselves for an hereafter; as willing and necessitous agents, we use our *endeavours* to obtain such things as are agreeable or needful for us.

When a particular emergency arises we make a great *effort*; when a serious object is to be obtained we make suitable *exertions*.

An *endeavour* is indefinite both as to the end and the means: the end may be immediate or remote; the means may be either direct or indirect: but in an *effort* the end is immediate; the means are direct and personal: we either make an *endeavour* to get into a room, or we may make an *endeavour* to obtain a situation in life; but we make *efforts* to speak, or we make *efforts* to get through a crowd. An *endeavour* may call forth one or many powers; an *effort* calls forth but one power: the *endeavour* to please in society is laudable, if it do not lead to vicious compliances; it is a laudable *effort* of fortitude to suppress our complaints in the moment of suffering. The *exertion* is as comprehensive in its meaning as the *endeavour*, and as positive as the *effort*; but the *endeavour*: is most commonly, and the *effort* always, applied to individuals only; whereas the *exertion* is applicable to nations as well as individuals. A tradesman uses his best *endeavours* to please his customers: a combatant makes desperate *efforts* to overcome his antagonist: a candidate for literary or parliamentary honours uses great *exertions* to surpass his rival; a nation uses great *exertions* to raise a navy or extend its commerce.

ENEMY, FOE, ADVERSARY, OPPONENT, ANTAGONIST.

ENEMY, in Latin *inimicus*, compounded of *in* privative and *amicus* a friend, signifies one that is unfriendly.

FOE, in Saxon *fah* most probably from the old Teutonic *fian* to hate, signifies one that bears a hatred.

ADVERSARY, in Latin *adversarius* from *adversus* against, signifies one that takes part against another; *adversarius* in Latin was particularly applied to those who contested a point in law with another.

OPPONENT, in Latin *opponens* participle of *oppono* or *obpono* to place in the way, signifies one pitted against another.

ANTAGONIST, in Greek *ανταγωνιζης* compounded of *αντι* against, and *αγωνιζομαι* to contend, signifies one struggling against another.

An *enemy* is not so formidable as a *foe*; the former may be reconciled, but the latter remains always deadly. An *enemy* may be so in spirit, in action, or in relation; a *foe* is always so in spirit, if not in action likewise: a man may be an *enemy* to himself, though not a *foe*. Those who are national or political *enemies* are often private friends, but a *foe* is never any thing but a *foe*. A single act may create an *enemy*, but continued warfare creates a *foe*.

Enemies are either public or private, collective or personal; in the latter sense the word *enemy* is most analogous in signification to that of *adversary*, *opponent*, *antagonist*. * *Enemies* seek to injure each other commonly from a sentiment of hatred; the heart is always more or less implicated: *adversaries* set up their claims, and frequently urge their pretensions with angry strife; but interest more than sentiment stimulates to action: *opponents* set up different parties, and treat each other sometimes with acrimony; but their differences do not necessarily include any thing personal: *antagonists* are a species of *opponents* who are in actual engagement: emulation and direct exertion, but not anger, is concerned in making the *antagonist*. *Enemies* make war, aim at destruction, and commit acts of personal violence: *adversaries* are contented with appropriating to themselves some object of desire, or depriving their rival of it: *opponents* oppose each other systematically and perpetually; each aims at being thought right in their disputes: *antagonists* engage in a trial of strength; victory is the end, the love of distinction or superiority the moving principle.

Enemy and *foe* are likewise employed in a figurative sense for moral objects: our passions are our *enemies* when indulged; envy is a *foe* to happiness.

ENERGY. FORCE. VIGOUR.

ENERGY, in French *energie*, Latin *energia*, Greek *ενεργια* from *ενεργειω* to operate inwardly, signifies the power of producing positive effects.

FORCE, v. *To compel*.

VIGOUR, from the Latin *vigeo* to flourish, signifies unimpaired power, or that which belongs to a subject in a sound or flourishing state.

With *energy* is connected the idea of ac-

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Ennemi, adversaire, antagoniste.“

tivity; with *force* that of capability; with *vigour* that of health. *Energy* lies only in the mind; *force* and *vigour* are the property of either body or mind. Knowledge and freedom combine to produce *energy* of character; *force* is a gift of nature that may be increased by exercise: *vigour*, both bodily and mental; it is an ordinary accompaniment of youth, but is not always denied to old age.

ENJOYMENT, FRUITION, GRATIFICATION.

ENJOYMENT, from *enjoy* to have the joy or pleasure, signifies either the act of *enjoying*, or the pleasure itself derived from that act.

FRUITION, from *fruor* to *enjoy*, is employed only for the act of *enjoying*; we speak either of the *enjoyment* of any pleasure, or of the *enjoyment* as a pleasure: we speak of those pleasures which are received from the *fruition*, in distinction from those which are had in expectation. *Enjoyment* is either corporeal or spiritual, as the *enjoyment* of music, or the *enjoyment* of study: but *fruition* is the enjoyment of any sensible, or at least external object: hope intervenes between the desire and the *fruition*.

GRATIFICATION, from the verb to *gratify*, to make grateful or pleasant, signifies either the act of giving pleasure, or the pleasure received. *Enjoyment* springs from every object which is capable of yielding pleasure; by distinction however, and in the latter sense, from moral and rational objects: but *gratification*, which is a species of *enjoyment*, is obtained through the medium of the senses. *Enjoyment* is not so vivid as *gratification*: *gratification* is not so permanent as *enjoyment*. Domestic life has its peculiar *enjoyments*; brilliant spectacles afford *gratification*. Our capacity for *enjoyment* depends upon our intellectual endowments; our *gratification* depends upon the tone of our feelings, and the nature of our desires.

TO ENLARGE, INCREASE, EXTEND.

ENLARGE, signifies literally to make large or wide, and is applied to dimension and extent.

INCREASE, from the Latin *increasco* to grow to a thing, is applicable to quantity, signifying to become greater in size by the junction of other matter.

EXTEND, in Latin *extendo*, or *ex* and *tendo*, signifies to stretch out, that is, to make greater in space. We speak of *enlarging* a house, a room, premises, or boundaries; of *increasing* an army, or pro-

perty, capital, expense, &c.; of *extending* the boundaries of an empire. We say the hole or cavity *enlarges*, the bulk *enlarges*, the number *increases*, the swelling, inflammation, and the like, *increase*: so likewise in the figurative sense, the views, the prospects, the powers, the ideas - and the mind, are *enlarged*; pain, pleasure, hope, fear, anger, or kindness, is *increased*; views, prospects, connexions, and the like, are *extended*.

ENMITY, ANIMOSITY, HOSTILITY.

ENMITY lies in the heart; it is deep and malignant: ANIMOSITY, from *animus* a spirit, lies in the passions; it is fierce and vindictive: HOSTILITY, from *hostis* a political enemy, lies in the action; it is mischievous and destructive.

Enmity is something permanent; *animosity* is partial and transitory: in the feudal ages, when the darkness and ignorance of the times prevented the mild influence of Christianity, *enmities* between particular families were handed down as an inheritance from father to son; in free states, party spirit engenders greater *animosities* than private disputes.

Enmity is altogether personal; *hostility* mostly respects public measures; *animosity* respects either one or many individuals. *Enmity* often lies concealed in the heart; *animosity* mostly betrays itself by some open act of *hostility*. He who cherishes *enmity* towards another is his own greatest enemy; he who is guided by a spirit of *animosity* is unfit to have any command over others; he who proceeds to wanton *hostility* often provokes an enemy where he might have a friend.

ENORMOUS, HUGE, IMMENSE, VAST.

ENORMOUS, from *e* and *norma* a rule, signifies out of rule or order.

HUGE, is in all probability connected with high, which is *hoog* in Dutch.

IMMENSE, Latin *immensus*, compounded of *in* privative and *mensus* measured, signifies not to be measured.

VAST, in French *vaste*, Latin *vastus* from *vaco*, to be vacant, open, or wide, signifies extended in space.

Enormous and *huge* are peculiarly applicable to magnitude; *immense* and *vast* to extent, quantity, and number. *Enormous* expresses more than *huge*, as *immense* expresses more than *vast*: what is *enormous* exceeds in a very great degree all ordinary bounds; what is *huge* is great only in the superlative degree. The *enormous* is always out of proportion; the *huge* is relatively

extraordinary in its dimensions. Some animals may be made *enormously* fat by a particular mode of feeding: to one who has seen nothing but level ground, common hills will appear to be *huge* mountains.

The *immense* is that which exceeds all calculation: the *vast* comprehends only a very great or unusual excess. The distance between the earth and sun may be said to be *immense*: the distance between the poles is *vast*.

Of all these terms, *huge* is the only one confined to the proper application, and in the proper sense of size: the rest are employed with regard to moral objects. We speak only of a *huge* animal, a *huge* monster, a *huge* mass, a *huge* size, a *huge* bulk, and the like; but we speak of an *enormous* waste, an *immense* difference, and a *vast* number.

The epithets *enormous*, *immense*, and *vast*, are applicable to the same objects, but with the same distinction in their sense. A sum is *enormous* which exceeds in magnitude not only every thing known, but every thing thought of or expected: a sum is *immense* that scarcely admits of calculation: a sum is *vast* which rises very high in calculation. The national debt of England has risen to an *enormous* amount: the revolutionary war was attended with an *immense* loss of blood and treasure to the different nations of Europe: there are individuals who, while they are expending *vast* sums on their own gratifications, refuse to contribute any thing to the relief of the necessitous.

ENORMOUS, PRODIGIOUS, MONSTROUS.

ENORMOUS (vide *Enormous*).

PRODIGIOUS comes from *prodigy*, in Latin *prodigium*, which in all probability comes from *prodigo* to lavish forth, signifying literally breaking out in excess or extravagance.

MONSTROUS, from *monster*, in Latin, *monstrum*, and *monstro* to show or make visible, signifies remarkable, or exciting notice.

The *enormous* contradicts our rules of estimating and calculating: the *prodigious* raises our minds beyond their ordinary standard of thinking: the *monstrous* contradicts nature and the course of things. What is *enormous* excites our surprise or amazement: what is *prodigious* excites our astonishment: what is *monstrous* does violence to our senses and understanding. There is something *enormous* in the present scale upon which property, whether public or private, is amassed and expended: the works of the

ancients in general, but the Egyptian pyramids in particular, are objects of admiration, on account of the *prodigious* labour which was bestowed on them: ignorance and superstition have always been active in producing *monstrous* images for the worship of its blind votaries.

ENOUGH, SUFFICIENT.

ENOUGH, in German *genug*, comes from *genügen*, to satisfy.

SUFFICIENT, in Latin *sufficiens*, participle of *sufficio*, compounded of *sub* and *facio*, signifies made or suited to the purpose.

He has *enough* whose desires are satisfied; he has *sufficient* whose wants are supplied. We may therefore frequently have *sufficient* when we have not *enough*. A greedy man is commonly in this case who has never *enough*, although he has more than a *sufficiency*. *Enough* is said only of physical objects of desire: *sufficient* is employed in a moral application for that which serves the purpose. Children and animals never have *enough* food, nor the miser *enough* money: it is requisite to allow *sufficient* time for every thing that is to be done, if we wish it to be done well.

TO ENROL, ENLIST. REGISTER, RECORD.

ENROL, compounded of *en* or *in* and *roll*, signifies to place in a roll, that is, in a roll of paper or a book.

ENLIST, compounded of *in* and *list*, signifies to put down in a list.

REGISTER, in Latin *registrum*, comes from *regestum*, participle of *regero*, signifying to put down in writing.

RECORD, in Latin *recordor*, compounded of *re* back or again, and *cor* the heart, signifies to bring back to the heart, or call to mind by a memorandum.

Enrol and *enlist* respect persons only; *register* respects persons and things; *record* respects things only. *Enrol* is generally applied to the act of inserting names in an orderly manner into any book. *Enlist* is a species of *enrolling* applicable only to the military. The *enrolment* is an act of authority: the *enlisting* is the voluntary act of an individual. Among the Romans it was the office of the censor to *enrol* the names of all the citizens in order to ascertain their number, and estimate their property: in modern times soldiers are mostly raised by means of *enlisting*.

In the moral application of the terms, to *enrol* is to assign a certain place or rank; to *enlist* is to put one's self under a leader, or attach one's self to a party. Hercules

was *enrolled* among the Gods. The common people are always ready to *enlist* on the side of anarchy and rebellion.

To *enrol* and *register*, both imply writing down in a book; but the former is a less formal act than the latter. The insertion of the bare name or designation in a certain order is enough to constitute an *enrolment*; but *registering* comprehends the birth, family, and other collateral circumstances of the individual. The object of *registering* likewise differs from that of *enrolling*: what is *registered* serves for future purposes, and is of permanent utility to society in general; but what is *enrolled* often serves only a particular or temporary end. Thus in numbering the people it is necessary simply to *enrol* their names; but when in addition to this it was necessary, as among the Romans, to ascertain their rank in the state, every thing connected with their property, their family, and their connexion, required to be *registered*; so in like manner, in more modern times, it has been found necessary for the good government of the state to *register* the births, marriages, and deaths of every citizen: it is manifest, therefore, that what is *registered*, as far as respects persons, may be said to be *enrolled*; but what is *enrolled* is not always *registered*.

Register, in regard to *record*, has a no less obvious distinction: the former is used for domestic and civil transactions, the latter for public and political events. What is *registered* serves for the daily purposes of the community collectively and individually; what is *recorded* is treasured up in a special manner for particular reference and remembrance at a distance. The number or names of streets, houses, carriages, and the like, are *registered* in different offices; deeds and documents which regard grants, charters, privileges, and the like, either of individuals or particular towns, are *recorded* in the archives of nations. To *record* is, therefore, a formal species of *registering*: we *register* when we *record*; but we do not always *record* when we *register*.

In an extended and figurative application things may be said to be *registered* in the memory; or events *recorded* in history.

TO ENSLAVE, CAPTIVATE.

To ENSLAVE is to bring into a state of slavery.

To CAPTIVATE is to make a captive.

There is as much difference between these terms as between *slavery* and *captivity*: he who is a *slave* is fettered both body and mind; he who is a *captive* is only con-

strained as to his body; hence to *enslave* is always taken in the bad sense; *captivate* mostly in the good sense; *enslave* is employed literally or figuratively; *captivate* only figuratively; we may be *enslaved* by persons, or by our passions; we are *captivated* by the charms or beauty of an object.

ENTERPRISING, ADVENTUROUS.

These terms mark a disposition to engage in that which is extraordinary and hazardous; but ENTERPRISING, from *enterprise* (v. *Attempt*), is connected with the understanding; and ADVENTUROUS, from *adventure*, venture or trial, is a characteristic of the passions. The *enterprising* character conceives great projects, and pursues objects that are difficult to be obtained; the *adventurous* character is contented with seeking that which is new, and placing himself in dangerous and unusual situations. An *enterprising* spirit belongs to the commander of an army, or the ruler of a nation; an *adventurous* disposition is suitable to men of low degree. Peter the Great possessed, in a peculiar manner, an *enterprising* genius; Robinson Crusoe was a man of an *adventurous* turn. *Enterprising* characterizes persons only; but *adventurous* is also applied to things, to signify containing *adventures*; hence a journey, or a voyage, or a history, may be denominated *adventurous*.

ENTHUSIAST, FANATIC, VISIONARY.

The ENTHUSIAST, FANATIC, and VISIONARY, have disordered imaginations; but the *enthusiast* is only affected inwardly with an extraordinary fervour, the *fanatic* and *visionary* betray that fervour by some outward mark; the former by singularities of conduct, the latter by singularities of doctrine. *Fanatics* and *visionaries* are therefore always more or less *enthusiasts*; but *enthusiasts* are not always *fanatics* or *visionaries*. *Ενθουσιαζαι* among the Greeks, from *εν* in and *θεος* God, signified those supposed to have, or pretending to have Divine inspiration. *Fanatici* were so called among the Latins, from *fan* (temples) in which they spent an extraordinary portion of their time: they, like the *ενθουσιαζαι* of the Greeks, pretended to revelations and inspirations, during the influence of which they indulged themselves in many extravagant tricks, cutting themselves with knives, and distorting themselves with every species of antic gesture and grimace.

Visionary signifies properly one who deals

in *visions*, that is, in the pretended appearance of supernatural objects; a species of *enthusiasts* who have sprung up in more modern times. The leaders of sects are commonly *visionaries*, having adopted this artifice to establish their reputation and doctrines among their deluded followers; Mahomet was one of the most successful *visionaries* that ever pretended to divine inspiration; and since his time there have been *visionaries*, who have raised religious parties, by having recourse to the same expedient.

Fanatic was originally confined to those who were under religious frenzy, but the present age has presented us with the monstrosity of *fanatics* in irreligion and anarchy. *Enthusiast* is applied in general to every one who is filled with an extraordinary degree of fervour: *visionary* to one who deals in fanciful speculation. The former may sometimes be innocent, if not laudable, according to the nature of the object; the latter is always censurable: the *enthusiast* has always a warm heart; the *visionary* has only a fanciful head. The *enthusiast* suffers imagination to follow his heart; the *visionary* makes understanding bend to his imagination.

EPITHET, ADJECTIVE.

EPITHET is the technical term of the rhetorician. ADJECTIVE that of the grammarian. The same word is an *epithet* as it qualifies the sense; it is an *adjective* as it is a part of speech: thus in the phrase „Alexander the great“ great is an *epithet* inasmuch as it designates Alexander in distinction from all other persons: it is an *adjective* as it expresses a quality in distinction from the noun Alexander, which denotes a thing. The *epithet* *επιθετον* is the word added by way of ornament to the diction; the *adjective*, from *adjectivum*, is the word added to the noun as its appendage, and made subservient to it in all its inflections. When we are estimating the merits of any one's style or composition, we should speak of the *epithets* he uses; when we are talking of words, their dependencies, and relations, we should speak of *adjectives*: an *epithet* is either gentle or harsh, an *adjective* is either a noun or a pronoun *adjective*.

All *adjectives* are *epithets*, but all *epithets* are not *adjectives*; thus in Virgil's *Pater Aeneas*, the *pater* is an *epithet*, but not an *adjective*.

EQUAL, EVEN, EQUABLE. LIKE OR ALIKE, UNIFORM.

EQUAL, in Latin *aequalis*, comes from

aequus, and probably the Greek *εἰσός* *similis*, like.

EVEN is in Saxon *efen*, German *eben*, Swedish *efwen*, *jafn*, or *aem*, Greek *οἶος* like.

EQUABLE, in Latin *equabilis*, signifies susceptible of equality.

LIKE, is in Dutch *lik*, Saxon *gelig*, German *gleich*, Gothic *tholick*, Latin *talis*, Greek *ὅμοιος* such as.

UNIFORM, compounded of *unus* one, and *forma* form, bespeaks its own meaning.

All these epithets are opposed to difference. *Equal* is said of degree, quantity, number, and dimensions, as *equal* in years; of an *equal* age; an *equal* height: *even* is said of the surface and position of bodies; a board is made *even* with another board; the floor or the ground is *even*: *like* is said of accidental qualities in things, as *alike* in colour or in feature: *uniform* is said of things only as to their fitness to correspond; those which are *unlike* in colour, shape, or make, or not *uniform*, cannot be made to match as pairs: *equable* is used only in the moral acceptation, in which all the others are likewise employed.

As moral qualities admit of equality: justice is dealt out in *equal* portions to the rich and the poor: God looks with an *equal* eye on all mankind. As the natural path is rendered uneven by high and low ground, so the evenness of the temper, in the figurative sense, is destroyed by changes of humour, by elevations and depressions of the spirits; and the *equability* of the mind is hurt by the vicissitudes of life, from prosperous to averse: *even* and *equable* are applied to the same mind in relation to itself; *like* or *alike* is applied to the minds of two or more: hence we say they are *alike* in disposition, in sentiment, in wishes, &c.; *uniform* is applied to the temper, habits, character, or conduct: hence a man is said to preserve a *uniformity* of behaviour towards those whom he commands.

TO ERADICATE, EXTIRPATE, EXTERMINATE.

To ERADICATE, from *radix*, the root, is to get out by the root: EXTIRPATE, from *ex* and *stirps* the stem, is to get out the stock, to destroy it thoroughly. In the natural sense we may *eradicate* noxious weeds whenever we pull them from the ground; but we can never *extirpate* all noxious weeds, as they always disseminate their seeds and spring up afresh. These words are seldom used in the physical than in the moral sense; where the former is applied to such objects as are conceived to be plucked up by the

roots, as habits, vices, abuses, evils; and the latter to whatever is united or supposed to be united into a race or family, and is destroyed root and branch. Youth is the season when vicious habits may be thoroughly *eradicated*; by the universal deluge the whole human race was *extirpated*, with the exception of Noah and his family.

EXTERMINATE, in Latin *exterminatus*, participle of *extermino*, from *ex* or *extra* and *terminus*, signifies to expel beyond a boundary (of life), that is, out of existence. It is used only in regard to such things as have life, and designates a violent and immediate action; *extirpate*, on the other hand, may designate a progressive action: the former may be said of individuals, but the latter is employed in the collective sense only. Plague, pestilence, famine, *extirpate*: the sword *exterminates*.

ERROR, MISTAKE, BLUNDER.

ERROR, in French *erreur*, Latin *error*, from *erro* to wander, marks the act of wandering, as applied to the rational faculty. A MISTAKE is a taking amiss or wrong.

BLUNDER is not improbably changed from blind; and signifies any thing done blindly.

Error in its universal sense is the general term, since every deviation from what is right in rational agents is termed *error*, which is strictly opposed to truth: *error* is the lot of humanity; into whatever we attempt to do or think *error* will be sure to creep: the term therefore is of unlimited use; the very mention of it reminds us of our condition: we have *errors* of judgment; *errors* of calculation; *errors* of the head; and *errors* of the heart.

The other terms designate modes of *error*, which mostly refer to the common concerns of life: *mistake* is a voluntary *error* either in thinking or action; *blunder* is a great mistake or error in acting; children and careless people are most apt to make *mistakes*; ignorant, conceited, and stupid people commonly commit *blunders*.

A *mistake* must be rectified; in commercial transactions it may be of serious consequence: *blunders* are frequently so ridiculous as only to excite laughter.

ERROR, FAULT.

ERROR (*v. Error*) respects the act; FAULT, from *fail*, respects the agent: an *error* may lay in the judgment, or in the conduct; but a *fault* lies in the will or intention: the *errors* of youth must be treated with indulgence; but their *faults* must on

all accounts be corrected: *error* is said of that which is individual and partial; *fault* is said likewise of that which is habitual; it is an *error* to use intemperate language at any time; it is a *fault* in the temper of some persons that they cannot restrain their anger.

ERUPTION, EXPLOSION.

ERUPTION, from *e* and *rumpo*, signifies the breaking forth, that is, the coming into view by a sudden bursting; EXPLOSION, from *ex* and *plaudo*, signifies bursting out with a noise: hence of flames there will be properly an *eruption*, but of gunpowder an *explosion*: volcanoes have their *eruptions* at certain intervals, which are sometimes attended with *explosions*: on this account *eruptions* are applied to the human body for whatever comes out as the effects of humour, and may be applied in the same manner to any indications of humour in the mind; the term *explosions* is also applied to the agitations of the mind which burst out.

TO ESCAPE, ELUDE, EVADE.

ESCAPE, in French *échapper*, comes in all probability from the Latin *excipio* to take out of, to get off.

ELUDE, *v.* To avoid.

EVADE, from the Latin *evado*, compounded of *e* and *vado*, signifies to go or get out of a thing.

The idea of being disengaged from that which is not agreeable is comprehended in the sense of all these terms; but *escape* designates no means by which this is effected; *elude* and *evade* define the means, namely, the efforts which are used by one's self: we are simply disengaged when we *escape*; but we disengage ourselves when we *elude* and *evade*: we *escape* from danger, or we *escape* notice; we *elude* search: our *escapes* are often providential, and often narrow; our success in *eluding* depends on our skill: there are many bad men who *escape* detection by the art with which they *elude* observation and inquiry.

Elude and *evade* both imply the practice of art; but the former consists mostly of actions, the latter of words as well as actions: a thief *eludes* those who are in pursuit of him by dexterous modes of concealment; he *evades* the interrogatories of the judge by equivocating replies.

One is said to *elude* a punishment, and to *evade* a law.

ESPECIALLY, PARTICULARLY PRINCIPALLY, CHIEFLY.

ESPECIALLY and PARTICULARLY are exclusive or superlative in their import; they refer to one object out of many that is superior to all: PRINCIPALLY and CHIEFLY are comparative in their import; they designate in general the superiority of some objects over others. *Especially* is a term of stronger import than *particularly*; and *principally* expresses something less general than *chiefly*: we ought to have God before our eyes at all times, but *especially* in those moments when we present ourselves before him in prayer; the heat is very oppressive in all countries under the torrid zone, but *particularly* in the deserts of Arabia, where there is a want of shade and moisture; it is *principally* among the higher and lower orders of society that we find vices of every description to be prevalent; those who declaim so loudly against the measures of government do it *chiefly* (may I not say solely?) with a view to their own interest.

ESSAY, TREATISE, TRACT, DISSERTATION.

All these words are employed by authors to characterize compositions varying in their form and contents. ESSAY, which signifies a trial or attempt (*v.* *Attempt*), is here used to designate in a specific manner an author's attempt to illustrate any point; it is most commonly applied to small detached pieces, which contain only the general thoughts of a writer on any given subject, and afford room for amplification into details also; though by Locke in his „*Essay on the Understanding*,“ Beattie in his „*Essay on Truth*,“ and other authors, it is modestly used for their connected and finished endeavours to elucidate a doctrine. A TREATISE is more systematic than an *essay*; it treats on the subject in a methodical form, and conveys the idea of something laboured, scientific, and instructive. A TRACT is only a species of small *treatise*, drawn up upon particular occasions, and published in a separate form: they are both derived from the Latin *tractus* participle of *trahere* to draw, manage, or handle. DISSERTATION, from *dissero* to argue, is with propriety applied to performances of an argumentative nature.

Essays are either moral, political, philosophical, or literary: *treatises* are mostly written on ethical, political, or speculative subjects, such as Fenelon's, Milton's, or Locke's *treatise* on education; De Lolme's *treatise* on the constitution of England. *disertations* are employed on disputed points

of literature, as Bentley's *dissertation* upon the epistles of Phalaris, De Pauw's *dissertations* on the Egyptians and Chinese: *tracts* are ephemeral productions, mostly on political and religious subjects; of this description are the pamphlets which daily issue from the press, for or against the measures of government, or the public measures of any particular party.

The *essay* is the most popular mode of writing; it suits the writer who has not either talent or inclination to pursue his inquiries farther, and it suits the generality of readers who are amused with variety and superficiality: the *treatise* is adapted for the student; he will not be contented with the superficial *essay*, when more ample materials are within his reach: the *tract* is formed for the political partisan; it receives its interest from the occurrence of the moment: the *dissertation* interests the disputant.

ESTEEM, RESPECT, REGARD.

ESTEEM, *v.* To appraise.

RESPECT, from the Latin *respicio*, signifies to look back upon, to look upon with attention.

REGARD, *v.* To attend to.

A favourable sentiment towards particular objects is included in the meaning of all these terms.

Esteem and *respect* flow from the understanding; *regard* springs from the heart, as well as the head: *esteem* is produced by intrinsic worth; *respect* by extrinsic qualities; *regard* is affection blended with *esteem*: it is in the power of every man, independently of all collateral circumstances, to acquire the *esteem* of others; but *respect* and *regard* are within the reach of a limited number only: the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the equal and the unequal, are each, in their turn, the objects of *esteem*: those only are objects of *respect* who have some mark of distinction, or superiority either of birth, talent, acquirements, or the like; *regard* subsists only between friends, or those who stand in close connexion with each other: industry and sobriety excite our *esteem* for one man, charity and benevolence our *esteem* for another; superior learning or abilities excite our *respect* for a third; a long acquaintance, or a reciprocity of kind offices, excites a mutual *regard*.

TO ESTIMATE, COMPUTE, RATE.

ESTIMATE, *v.* To appraise.

COMPUTE, *v.* To calculate.

RATE, in Latin *ratus*, participle of

reor to think, signifies to weigh in the mind.

All the terms mark the mental operation by which the sum, amount, or value of things is obtained: to *estimate* is to obtain the aggregate sum in one's mind, either by an immediate or a progressive act; to *compute* is to obtain the sum by the gradual process of putting together items; to *rate* is to fix the relative value in one's mind by deduction and comparison: a builder *estimates* the expense of building a house on a given plan; a proprietor of houses *computes* the probable diminution in the value of his property in consequence of wear and tear; the surveyor *rates* the present value of lands or houses.

In the moral acceptation they bear the same analogy to each other; some men are apt to *estimate* the adventitious privileges of birth or rank too high. It would be a useful occupation for men to *compute* the loss they sustain by the idle waste of time on the one hand, and its necessarily unprofitable consumption on the other. He who *rates* his abilities too high is in danger of despising the means which are essential to secure success; and he who *rates* them too low is apt to neglect the means from despair of success.

ETERNAL, ENDLESS, EVERLASTING.

The ETERNAL is set above time, the ENDLESS lies within time; it is therefore by a strong figure that we apply *eternal* to any thing sublunary; although *endless* may with propriety be applied to that which is heavenly: that is properly *eternal* which has neither beginning nor end; that is *endless* which has a beginning, but no end: God is, therefore, an *eternal*, but not an *endless* being: there is an *eternal* state of happiness or misery, which awaits all men, according to their deeds in this life; but their joys or sorrows may be *endless* as regards the present life.

That which is *endless* has no cessation; that which is EVERLASTING has neither interruption nor cessation: the *endless* may be said of existing things; the *everlasting* naturally extends itself into futurity: hence we speak of *endless* disputes, an *endless* warfare; an *everlasting* memorial, an *everlasting* crown of glory.

TO EVADE, EQUIVOCATE, PREVARICATE.

EVADE, *v.* To escape.

EQUIVOCATE, *v.* ambiguity.

PREVARICATE, in Latin *praevaricatus* participle of *prae* and *varicor* to go loosely, signifies to shift from side to side.

These words designate an artful mode of

escaping the scrutiny of an inquirer: we *evade* by artfully turning the subject or calling off attention of the inquirer; we *equivocate* by the use of *equivocal* expressions; we *prevaricate* by the use of loose and indefinite expressions; we avoid giving satisfaction by *evading*; we give a false satisfaction by *equivocating*; we give dissatisfaction by *prevaricating*. *Evading* is not so mean a practice as *equivocating*: it may be sometimes prudent to *evade* a question which we do not wish to answer; but *equivocations* are employed for the purposes of falsehood and interest: *prevarications* are still meaner; and are resorted to mostly by criminals in order to escape detection.

EVASION, SHIFT, SUBTERFUGE.

EVASION (*v. To evade*) is here taken only in the bad sense; SHIFT and SUBTERFUGE are modes of *evasion*: the former signifies that gross kind of *evasion* by which one attempts to *shift* off an obligation from one's self: the *subterfuge*, from *subter* under and *fugio* to fly, is a mode of *evasion* in which one has recourse to some screen or shelter.

The *evasion*, in distinction from the others, is resorted to for the gratification of pride or obstinacy: whoever wishes to maintain a bad cause must have recourse to *evasions*; candid minds despise all *evasions*.

The *shift* is the trick of a knave; it always serves a paltry low purpose; he who has not courage to turn open thief will use any *shifts* rather than not get money dishonestly. The *subterfuge* is the refuge of one's fears; it is not resorted to from the hope of gain, but from the fear of a loss; not for purposes of interest, but for those of character; he who wants to justify himself in a bad cause has recourse to *subterfuges*.

EVEN, SMOOTH, LEVEL, PLAIN.

EVEN, *v. Equal*,

SMOOTH is all probability connected with smear.

LEVEL, in Saxon *laefel*, signifies a carpenter's instrument.

PLAIN, *v. apparent*.

Even and *smooth* are both opposed to roughness: but that which is *even* is free only from great roughnesses or irregularities; that which is *smooth* is free from every degree of roughness, however small: a board is *even* which has no knots or holes; it is not *smooth* unless its surface be an entire plane: the ground is said to be *even*, but not *smooth*; the sky is *smooth*, but not *even*.

Even is to *level*, when applied to the

ground, what *smooth* is to *even*; the *even* is free from protuberances and depressions on its exterior surface; the *level* is free from rises or falls: a path is said to be *even*; a meadow is *level*; ice may be *level*, though it is not *even*; a walk up the side of a hill may be *even*, although the hill itself is the reverse of a *level*: the *even* is said of that which unites and forms one uninterrupted surface; but the *level* is said of things which are at a distance from each other, and are discovered by the eye to be in a parallel line: hence the floor of a room is *even* with regard to itself; it is *level* with that of another room.

Evenness respects the surface of bodies; *plainness* respects their direction and freedom from external obstructions: a path is *even* which has no indentures or footmarks: a path is *plain* which is not stopped up or interrupted by wood, water, or any other thing intervening.

When applied figuratively, the words preserve their analogy: an *even* temper is secured from all violent changes of humour; a *smooth* speech is divested of every thing which can ruffle the temper of others; but the former is always taken in a good sense; and the latter mostly in a bad sense, as evincing an illicit design or a purpose to deceive: a *plain* speech, on the other hand, is divested of every thing obscure or figurative, and is consequently a speech free from disguise and easy to be understood. *Even* and *level* are applied to conduct or condition; the former as regards ourselves; the latter as regards others: he who adopts an *even* course of conduct is in no danger of putting himself upon a *level* with those who are otherwise his inferiors.

EVENT, INCIDENT, ACCIDENT, ADVENTURE, OCCURRENCE.

EVENT, in Latin *eventus*, participle of *evenio* to come out, signifies that which falls out or turns up.

INCIDENT, in Latin *incidens*, from *incido*, signifies that which falls in or forms a collateral part of any thing.

ACCIDENT, *v. Accident*.

ADVENTURE, from the Latin *advenio* to come to, signifies what comes to or befalls one.

OCCURRENCE, from the Latin *occurro*, signifies that which runs or comes in the way.

These terms are expressive of what passes in the world, which is the sole signification of the term *event*, whilst to that of the other terms are annexed some accessory ideas: an *incident* is a personal *event*; an

accident an unpleasant *event*; an *adventure* an extraordinary *event*; an *occurrence* an ordinary or domestic *event*: *event* in its ordinary and limited acceptation excludes the idea of chance; *accident* excludes that of design; *incident*, *adventure*, and *occurrence*, are applicable in both cases.

Events affect nations and communities as well as individuals; *incidents* and *adventures* affect particular individuals; *accidents* and *occurrences* affect persons or things particularly or generally, individually or collectively: the making of peace, the loss of a battle, or the death of a prince, are national *events*; the forming a new acquaintance and the revival of an old one are *incidents*; an escape from shipwreck, an encounter with wild beasts or savages, are *adventures*; a fire, the fall of a house, the breaking of a limb, are *accidents* or *occurrences*; a robbery or the death of individuals are properly *occurrences*.

Event, when used for individuals, is always of greater importance than an *incident*: the settlement of a young person in life, the adoption of an employment, or the taking a wife, are *events* but not *incidents*: whilst on the other hand, the setting out on a journey, the purchase of a house or the dispatch of a vessel, are characterized as *incidents* and not *events*.

It is farther to be observed that *accident*, *event*, and *occurrence* are said only of that which is supposed really to happen: *incidents* and *adventures* are often fictitious.

History records the *events* of nations; plays require to be full of *incident* in order to render them interesting; romances and novels derive most of their charms from the extravagance of the *adventures* which they describe; periodical works supply the public with information respecting daily *occurrences*.

EVENT, ISSUE. CONSEQUENCE.

The **EVENT** (*v. Event*) terminates; the **ISSUE** (*v. To arise*) flows out; the **CONSEQUENCE** (*v. Consequence*) follows.

The term *event* respects great undertakings; *issue* particular efforts; *consequence* respects every thing which can produce a *consequence*. Hence we speak of the *event* of a war; the *issue* of a negotiation; and the *consequences* of either. The measures of government are often unjustly praised or blamed according to the *event*: the fate of a nation sometimes hangs on the *issue* of a battle; its conquest is one of the *consequences* which follows the defeats of its armies.

We must be prepared for *events*, which

are frequently above our control; we must exert ourselves to bring about a favourable *issue*: address and activity will go far towards ensuring success; but if after all our efforts we still fail, it is our duty to submit with resignation to the *consequences*.

EVIDENCE, TESTIMONY, PROOF.

EVIDENCE is whatever makes *evident*; **TESTIMONY** is that which is derived from an individual, namely, *testis* the *witness*.

Where the *evidence* of our own senses concurs with the *testimony* of others, we can have no grounds for withholding our assent to the truth of an assertion; but when these are at variance, it may be prudent to pause. *Evidence* may comprehend the *testimony* of many; *testimony* is confined to the *evidence* of one. Where a body of respectable *evidence* tends to convict a criminal of guilt, the jury cannot attach much weight to the partial *testimony* of one or two individuals. The *evidence* serves to inform. and illustrate; the *testimony* serves to confirm and corroborate: we may give *evidence* exclusively with regard to things; but we bear *testimony* with regard to persons. In all law-suits respecting property, rights, and privileges, *evidence* must be heard in order to substantiate or invalidate a case; in personal and criminal indictments the *testimony* of witnesses is required either for or against the accused party. The *evidence* and *proof* are both signs of something existing: the *evidence* is an evident sign; the *proof* is positive; the *evidence* appeals to the understanding; the *proof* to the senses; the *evidence* produces conviction or a moral certainty; the *proof* produces satisfaction or a physical certainty.

The term *evidence* is applied to that which is moral or intellectual; *proof* is employed mostly for facts or physical objects. *Evidence* may be internal, or lie in the thing itself: *proof* is always external.

EVIL OR ILL, MISFORTUNE, HARM, MISCHIEF.

EVIL, in its full sense, comprehends every quality which is not good, and consequently the other terms express only modification of *evil*.

The word is however more limited in its application than its meaning, and admits therefore of a just comparison with the other words here mentioned. They are all taken in the sense of *evils* produced by some external cause, or *evils* inherent in the object and arising out of it. The *evil*, or, in its contracted form, the **ILL**, befalls a person, the **MISFORTUNE** comes upon him; the

HARM is taken, or he receives the *harm*: the MISCHIEF is done him. *Evil* in its limited application is taken for *evils* of the greatest magnitude; it is that which is *evil* without any mitigation or qualification of circumstances. The *misfortune* is a minor *evil*, it depends upon the opinion and circumstances of the individual; what is a *misfortune* in one respect may be the contrary in another respect. An untimely death, the fracture or a loss of a limb, are denominated *evils*; the loss of a vessel, the overturning of a carriage, and the like, are *misfortunes*, inasmuch as they tend to the diminution of property; but as all the casualties of life may produce various consequences, it may sometimes happen that that which seems to have come upon us by our *ill* fortune turns out ultimately of the greatest benefit; in this respect, therefore, *misfortune* is but a partial *evil*: of *evil* it is likewise observable, that it has no respect to the sufferer as a moral agent; but *misfortune* is used in regard to such things as are controllable or otherwise by human foresight. The *evil* which befalls a man is opposed only to the good which he in general experiences; but the *misfortune* is opposed to the good fortune or the prudence of the individual. Sickness is an *evil*, let it be endured or caused by whatever circumstances it may; it is a *misfortune* for an individual to come in the way of having this *evil* brought on himself; his own relative condition in the scale of being is here referred to.

Harm and *mischiefs* are species of minor *evils*; the former of which is much less specific than the latter both in the nature and cause of the *evil*. A person takes *harm* from circumstances that are not known; the *mischiefs* is done to him from some positive and immediate circumstance. He who takes cold takes *harm*; the cause of which, however, may not be known or suspected: a fall from a horse is attended with *mischiefs*, if it occasion a fracture or any *evil* to the body. *Evil* and *misfortune* respect persons only as the objects; *harm* and *mischiefs* are said of inanimate things as the object. A tender plant takes *harm* from being exposed to the cold air: *mischiefs* is done to it when its branches are violently broken off or its roots are laid bare.

Misfortune is the incidental property of persons who are its involuntary objects; but *evil*, *harm*, and *mischiefs*, are the inherent and active properties of things that flow out of them as effects from their causes: *evil* is said either to lie in a thing or attend it as a companion or follower; *harm* properly

lies in the thing; *mischiefs* properly attends the thing as a consequence.

EXACT, EXTORT.

EXACT, in Latin *exactus*, participle of *exigo* to drive out, signifies the exercise of simple force; but EXTORT, from *extortus*, participle of *extorqueo* to wring out, marks the exercise of unusual force. In the application, therefore, to exact is to demand with force, it is commonly an act of injustice: to extort is to get with violence, it is an act of tyranny. The collector of the revenue *exact*s when he gets from the people more than he is authorized to take: an arbitrary prince *extorts* from his conquered subjects whatever he can grasp at. In the figurative sense, deference, obedience, applause, and admiration, are *exact*ed: a confession, an acknowledgment, a discovery, and the like, are *extorted*.

EXACT, NICE, PARTICULAR, PUNCTUAL.

EXACT, *v.* Accurate.

NICE, in Saxon *nise*, comes in all probability from the German *geniessen*, &c. to enjoy, signifying a quick and discriminating taste.

PARTICULAR signifies here directed to a particular point.

PUNCTUAL, from the Latin *punctum* a point, signifies keeping to a point.

Exact and *nice* are to be compared in their application, either to persons or things; *particular* and *punctual* only in application to persons. To be *exact*, is to arrive at perfection; to be *nice*, is to be free from faults; to be *particular*, is to be *nice* in certain *particulars*; to be *punctual* is to be *exact* in certain points. We are *exact* in our conduct or in what we do; *nice* and *particular* in our mode of doing it; *punctual* as to the time and season for doing it. It is necessary to be *exact* in our accounts; it is necessary to be *nice* as an artist in the choice and distribution of colours; it is necessary to be *particular*, as a man of business, in the number and the details of goods that are to be delivered out; it is necessary to be *punctual* in observing the hour or the day that has been fixed upon.

Exactness and *punctuality* are always taken in a good sense; they designate an attention to that which cannot be dispensed with: they form a part of one's duty: *nice*ness and *particularity* are not always taken in the best sense; they designate an excessive attention to things of inferior importance; to matters of taste and choice. Early habits of method and regularity will make a man very *exact* in the performance of

all his duties, and *particularly punctual* in his payments: an over *niceness* in the observance of mechanical rules often supplies the want of genius: it is the mark of a contracted mind to amuse itself with *particularities* about dress, personal appearance, furniture, and the like.

When *exact* and *nice* are applied to things, the former expresses more than the latter; we speak of an *exact* resemblance and a *nice* distinction. The *exact* point is that which we wish to reach; the *nice* point is that which it is difficult to keep.

EXAMINATION, SEARCH, INQUIRY, RESEARCH, INVESTIGATION, SCRUTINY.

EXAMINATION, *v.* To discuss.

SEARCH, in French *chercher*, is a variation of seek and see.

INQUIRY, *v.* To ask.

RESEARCH is an intensive of *search*.

INVESTIGATION, from the Latin *vestigium* a track, signifies seeking by the tracks or footsteps.

SCRUTINY, from the Latin *scrutor* to search, and *scrutum* lumber, signifies looking for amongst lumber and rubbish, to ransack.

Examination is the most general of these terms. which all agree in expressing an active effort to find out that which is unknown. An *examination* is made either by the aid of the senses or the understanding, the body or the mind; a *search* is principally a physical action; the *inquiry* is mostly intellectual; we *examine* a face or we *examine* a subject; we *search* a house or a dictionary; we *inquire* into a matter. An *examination* is made for the purpose of forming a judgment; a *search* is made for ascertaining a fact; an *inquiry* is made in order to arrive at truth.

To *examine* a person, is either by means of questions to get at his mind, or by means of looks to become acquainted with his person; to *search* a person is by corporeal contact to learn what he has about him. We *examine* the features of those who interest us; officers of justice *search* those who are suspected. *Examinations* and *inquiries* are both made by means of questions; but the former is an official act for a specific end, the latter is a private act for purposes of convenience or pleasure. Students undergo *examinations* from their teachers; they pursue their *inquiries* for themselves.

An *examination* or an *inquiry* may be set on foot on any subject: but the *examination* is direct; it is the setting of things before the view, corporeal or mental, in order to obtain a conclusion: the *inquiry*

is indirect; it is a circuitous method of coming to the knowledge of what was not known before. The student *examines* the evidences of Christianity, that he may strengthen his own belief: the government institutes an *inquiry* into the conduct of subjects. A *research* is a remote *inquiry*; an *investigation* is a minute *inquiry*; a *scrutiny* is a strict *examination*. Learned men of inquisitive tempers make their *researches* into antiquity; magistrates *investigate* doubtful and mysterious affairs; physicians *investigate* the causes of diseases; men *scrutinize* the actions of those whom they hold in suspicion.

TO EXAMINE, SEARCH, EXPLORE.

EXAMINE, *v.* Examination.

SEARCH, *v.* Examination.

EXPLORE, in Latin *exploro*, compounded of *ex* and *ploro*, signifies properly to burst out.

These words are here considered as they designate the looking upon places or objects, in order to get acquainted with them. To *examine* expresses a less effort than to *search*, and this expresses less than to *explore*.

We *examine* objects that are near; we *search* those that are hidden or removed at a certain distance; we *explore* those that are unknown or very distant. The painter *examines* a landscape in order to take a sketch of it; the botanist *searches* after curious plants; the inquisitive traveller *explores* unknown regions.

An author *examines* the books from which he intends to draw his authorities; the antiquarian *searches* every corner in which he hopes to find a monument of antiquity; the classic scholar *explores* the learning and wisdom of the ancients.

EXAMPLE, PATTERN.

EXAMPLE, in Latin *exemplum* very probably changed from *exsimulum* and *exsimulo* or *simulo*, signifies the thing framed according to a likeness.

PATTERN, *v.* Copy.

These words are taken for that which ought to be followed; but the *example* must be followed generally; the *pattern* must be followed particularly; not only as to what, but how a thing is to be done: the former serves as a guide to the judgment; the latter to guide the actions. The *example* comprehends what is either to be followed or avoided; the *pattern* only that which is to be followed or copied. The *example* may be presented either in the object itself, or the

description of it; the *pattern* displays itself most completely in the object. Those who know what is right should set the *example* of practising it; and those who persist in doing wrong, must be made an *example* to deter others from doing the same: every one, let his age and station be what it may, may afford a *pattern* of Christian virtue; the child may be a *pattern* to his playmates of diligence and dutifulness; the citizen may be a *pattern* to his fellow-citizens of sobriety, and conformity to the laws; the soldier may be a *pattern* of obedience to his comrades.

EXAMPLE, PRECEDENT.

EXAMPLE, *v.* *Example*.

PRECEDENT, from the Latin *precedens* preceding, signifies by distinction that preceding which is entitled to notice.

Both these terms apply to that which may be followed or made a rule; but the *example* is commonly present or before our eyes; the *precedent* is properly something past; the *example* may derive its authority from the individual; the *precedent* acquires its sanction from time and common consent; we are led by the *example*, or we copy the *example*; we are guided or governed by the *precedent*. The former is a private and often a partial affair; the latter is a public and often a national concern: we quote *examples* in literature, and *precedents* in law.

EXAMPLE, INSTANCE.

EXAMPLE (*Example, pattern*) refers in this case to the thing.

INSTANCE, from the Latin *insto*, signifies that which stands or serves as a resting-point.

The *example* is set forth by way of illustration or instruction; the *instance* is adduced by way of evidence or proof. Every *instance* may serve as an *example*, but every *example* is not an *instance*. The *example* consists of moral or intellectual objects; the *instance* consists of actions only. Rules are illustrated by *examples*; characters are illustrated by *instances*: the best mode of instructing children is by furnishing them with *examples* for every rule that is laid down; the Roman history furnishes us with many extraordinary *instances* of self-devotion for their country.

TO EXCEED, SURPASS, EXCEL, TRANSCEND, OUTDO.

EXCEED, from the Latin *exedo*, compounded of *ex* and *cedo* to pass out of, or beyond the line, is the general term. SUR-

PASS, compounded of *sur* over, and *pass*, is one species of exceeding. EXCEL compounded of *ex* and *cello* to lift or move over, is another species.

Exceed, in its limited acceptation, conveys no idea of moral desert; *surpass* and *excel* are always taken in a good sense. It is not so much persons as things which *exceed*; both persons and things *surpass*; persons only *excel*. One thing *exceeds* another, as the success of an undertaking *exceeds* the expectations of the undertaker, or a man's exertions *exceed* his strength. One person *surpasses* another, as the English have *surpassed* all other nations in the extent of their naval power; or one thing *surpasses* another, as poetry *surpasses* painting in its effects on the imagination. One person *excels* another; thus formerly the Dutch and Italians *excelled* the English in painting.

We may *surpass* without any direct or immediate effort; we cannot *excel* without effort. Nations as well as individuals will *surpass* each other in particular arts and sciences, as much from local and adventitious circumstances, as from natural genius and steady application; no one can expect to *excel* in learning, whose indolence gets the better of his ambition. The derivatives *excessive* and *excellent* have this obvious distinction between them, that the former always signifies *exceeding* in that which ought not to be *exceeded*; and the latter *exceeding* in that where it is honourable to *exceed*: he who is habitually *excessive* in any of his indulgencies, must be insensible to the *excellence* of a temperate life.

TRANSCEND, from *trans* beyond and *scendo* or *scando* to climb, signifies climbing beyond; and OUTDO, signifies doing out of the ordinary course: the former, like *surpass*, refers rather to the state of things; and *outdo*, like *excel*, to the exertions of persons: the former rises in sense above *surpass*; but the latter is only employed in particular cases, that is, to *excel* in action: *excel* is however confined to that which is good; *outdo* to that which is good or bad. The genius of Homer *transcends* that of almost every other poet: Heliogabalus *outdid* every other emperor in extravagance.

EXCELLENCE, SUPERIORITY.

EXCELLENCE is an absolute term; SUPERIORITY is a relative term: many may have *excellence* in the same degree, but they must have *superiority* in different degrees; *superiority* is often superior *excellence*, but in many cases they are applied to different objects.

There is a moral *excellence* attainable by

all who have the will to strive after it; but there is an intellectual and physical *superiority* which is above the reach of our wishes, and is granted to a few only.

EXCESS, SUPERFLUITY, REDUNDANCY.

EXCESS is that which exceeds any measure; SUPERFLUITY from *super* and *fluo* to flow over; and REDUNDANCY, from *redundo* to stream back or over, signifies an excess of a good measure. We may have an excess of heat or cold, wet or dry, when we have more than the ordinary quantity; but we have a *superfluity* of provisions when we have more than we want. *Excess* is applicable to any object; but *superfluity* and *redundancy* are species of excess; the former applicable in a particular manner to that which is an object of our desire; and *redundancy* to matters of expression or feeling. We may have an excess of prosperity or adversity; a *superfluity* of good things; and a *redundancy* of speech or words.

EXCESSIVE, IMMODERATE, INTEMPERATE.

The EXCESSIVE is beyond measure; the IMMODERATE, from *modus* a mode or measure, is without measure; the INTEMPERATE, from *tempus* a time or term, is that which is not kept within bounds.

Excessive designates excess in general; *immoderate* and *intemperate* designate excess in moral agents. The *excessive* lies simply in the thing which exceeds any given point: the *immoderate* lies in the passions which range to a boundless extent: the *intemperate* lies in the will which is under no control. Hence we speak of an *excessive* thirst: an *immoderate* ambition or lust of power: an *intemperate* indulgence, an *intemperate* warmth. *Excessive* admits of degrees; what is *excessive* may exceed in a greater or less degree: *immoderate* and *intemperate* mark a positively great degree of excess; the former still higher than the latter: *immoderate* is in fact the highest conceivable degree of excess.

The *excessive* use of any thing will always be attended with some evil consequence: the *immoderate* use of wine will rapidly tend to the ruin of him who is guilty of the excess, the *intemperate* use of it will proceed by a more gradual but not less sure process to his ruin.

Excessive designates what is partial; *immoderate* is used oftener for what is partial than what is habitual: *intemperate* oftener for what is habitual than what is partial. A person is *excessively* displeased on

particular occasions: he is an *immoderate* eater at all times, or only *immoderate* in that which he likes: he is *intemperate* in his language; his anger is *intemperate*; or he leads an *intemperate* life. The excesses of youth do but too often settle into confirmed habits of *intemperance*.

TO EXCHANGE, BARTER, TRUCK COMMUTE.

To EXCHANGE (*v. To change*) is the general term signifying to take one for another, or put one thing in the place of another; the rest are but modes of *exchanging*. To BARTER (*v. To change*) is to exchange one article of trade for another. To TRUCK, from the Greek *τροχῶν* to wheel, signifying to bandy about, is a familiar term to express a familiar action for *exchanging* one article of private property for another. COMMUTE, from the Latin syllable *com* or *contra* and *muto* to change, signifies an *exchanging* one mode of punishment for another; we may exchange one book for another; traders *barter* trinkets for gold dust; coachmen or stablemen *truck* a whip for a handkerchief; government *commutes* the punishment of death for that of banishment.

TO EXCITE. INCITE, PROVOKE.

EXCITE, *v. To awaken.*

INCITE, *v. To encourage.*

PROVOKE, *v. To aggravate.*

To *excite* is said more particularly of the inward feelings; *incite* is said of the external actions; *provoke* is said of both.

A person's passions are *excited*; he is *incited* by any particular passion to a course of conduct; a particular feeling is *provoked*, by some action to a particular step. Wit and conversation *excite* mirth; men are *incited* by a lust for gain to fraudulent practices; they are *provoked* by the opposition of others to intemperate language and intemperate measures. To *excite* is very frequently used in a physical acceptation; *incite* always and *provoke* mostly, in a moral application. We speak of *exciting* hunger, thirst, or perspiration; of *inciting* to noble actions; of *provoking* impertinence, *provoking* scorn or resentment.

When *excite* and *provoke* are applied to similar objects, the former designates a much stronger action than the latter. A thing may *excite* a smile, but it *provokes* laughter; it may *excite* displeasure, but it *provokes* anger; it may *excite* joy or sorrow, but it *provokes* to madness.

EXCURSION, RAMBLE, TOUR, TRIP, JAUNT.

EXCURSION signifies going out of one's course, from the Latin *ex* and *cursus* a course or prescribed path: a RAMBLE is a going without any course or regular path, from *roam*, of which it is a frequentative: a TOUR, from the word turn or return, is a circuitous course: a TRIP, from the Latin *tripudio* to go on the toes like a dancer, is properly a pedestrian *excursion* or *tour*, or any short journey that might be made on foot: JAUNT, is from the French *jante* the felly of a wheel, and *janter* to put the felly in motion. Travellers who are not contented with what is to be seen from a high road make frequent *excursions* into the interior of the country. Those who are fond of rural scenery, and pleased to follow the bent of their inclinations, make frequent *rambles*. Those who set out upon a sober scheme of enjoyment from travelling, are satisfied with making the *tour* of some one country or more. Those who have not much time for pleasure take *trips*. Those who have no better means of spending their time make *jaunts* for pleasure.

TO EXCUSE, PARDON.

We EXCUSE (*v. To apologize*) a person or thing by exempting him from blame.

We PARDON (from the prepositive *par* or *per* and *dono* to give) by giving up to another the offence he has committed.

We *excuse* a small fault, we *pardon* a great fault: we *excuse* that which personally affects ourselves; we *pardon* that which offends against morals: we may *excuse* as equals; we can *pardon* only as superiors. We exercise good nature in *excusing*: we exercise generosity or mercy in *pardoning*. Friends *excuse* each other for the unintentional omission of formalities; it is the privilege of the magistrate to *pardon* criminals: the violation of good manners is *inexcusable* in those who are cultivated; falsehood is *unpardonable* even in a child.

TO EXECUTE, FULFIL, PERFORM.

EXECUTE (*v. To accomplish*), in Latin *executus* participle of *exequor*, compounded of *ex* and *sequor*, is to follow up to the end.

To FULFIL is to fill up to the full of what is wanted.

To PERFORM is to form thoroughly or make complete.

To *execute* is more than to *fulfil*, and to *fulfil* than to *perform*. To *execute* is to bring about an end; it involves active measures, and is peculiarly applicable to that which is

extraordinary, or that which requires particular spirit and talents; schemes of ambition are *executed*: to *fulfil* is to satisfy a moral obligation; it is applicable to those duties in which rectitude and equity are involved; we *fulfil* the duties of citizens: to *perform* is to carry through by simple action or labour; it is more particularly applicable to the ordinary and regular business of life; we *perform* a work or a task. One *executes* according to the intentions of others; the soldier *executes* the orders of his general; the merchant *executes* the commissions of his correspondent: one *fulfils* according to the wishes and expectations of others; it is the part of an honest man to enter into no engagements which he cannot *fulfil*; it is the part of a dutiful son, by diligence and assiduity, to *fulfil* the expectations of an anxious parent: one *performs* according to circumstances, what suits one's own convenience and purposes; every good man is anxious to *perform* his part in life with credit and advantage to himself and others.

TO EXERCISE, PRACTISE.

EXERCISE, in Latin *exerceo*, from *ex* and *arceo*, signifies to drive or impel forth.

PRACTISE, from the Greek *πρασσω* to do, signifies to perform a part.

These terms are equally applied to the actions and habits of men; but we *exercise* in that where the powers are called forth; we *practise* in that where frequency and habitude of action are requisite; we *exercise* an art; we *practise* a profession: we may both *exercise* or *practise* a virtue; but the former is that which the particular occurrence calls forth, and which seems to demand a peculiar effort of the mind; the latter is that which is done daily and ordinarily; thus we in a peculiar manner are said to *exercise* patience, fortitude, or forbearance; to *practise* charity, kindness, benevolence, and the like.

A similar distinction characterizes these words as nouns: the former applying solely to the powers of the body or mind; the latter solely to the mechanical operations: the health of the body and the vigour of the mind are alike impaired by the want of *exercise*; in every art *practice* is an indispensable requisite for acquiring perfection; the *exercise* of the memory is of the first importance in the education of children; constant *practice* in writing is almost the only means by which the art of penmanship is acquired.

TO EXERT, EXERCISE.

The employment of some power or qualification that belongs to one's self is the com-

mon idea conveyd by these terms ; but **EX-ERT** (*v. Endeavour*) may be used for what is internal or external of one's self ; **EXER-CISE** (*v. Exercise*) only for that which forms an express part of one's self ; hence we speak of *exerting* one's strength, or *exerting* one's voice, or *exerting* one's influence : of *exercising* one's limbs, *exercising* one's understanding, or *exercising* one's tongue.

Exert is often used only for an individual act of calling forth into action ; *exercise* always conveys the idea of repeated or continued *exertion* : thus a person who calls to another *exerts* his voice ; he who speaks loud for any length of time *exercises* his lungs.

TO EXHORT, PERSUADE.

EXHORT, in Latin *exhortor*, compounded of *ex* and *hortor*, from the Greek *ωγραω* perfect passive of *ωγω* to excite or impel.

PERSUADE, *v. Conviction*.

Exhortation has more of impelling in it ; *persuasion* more of drawing ; a superior *ex-horts* ; his words carry authority with them, and rouse to action : a friend or an equal *persuades* ; he wins and draws by the agreeableness or kindness of his expressions. *Exhortations* are employed only in matters of duty or necessity ; *persuasions* are employed in matters of pleasure or convenience.

EXIGENCY, EMERGENCY.

Necessity is the idea which is common to the signification of these terms : the former, from the Latin *exigo* to demand, expresses what the case demands ; and the latter, from *emergo*, to arise out of, denotes what rises out of the case.

The *exigency* is more common, but less pressing ; the *emergency* is imperious when it comes, but comes less frequently : a prudent traveller will never carry more money with him than what will supply the *exigencies* of his journey ; and in case of an *emergency* will rather borrow of his friends than risk his property.

TO EXIST, LIVE.

EXIST, *v. To be*.

LIVE, through the medium of the Saxon *libban*, and the other northern dialects, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *leb* the heart, which is the seat of animal life.

Existence is the property of all things in the universe ; *life*, which is the inherent power of motion, is the particular property communicated by the Divine Being to some parts only of his creation : *exist*, therefore, is the general, and *live* the specific, term : whatever *lives*, *exists* according to a certain mode ; but many things *exist* without *liv-*

ing : when we wish to speak of things in their most abstract relation, we say they *exist* ; when we wish to characterize the form of *existence*, we say they *live*.

Existence, in its proper sense, is the attribute which we commonly ascribe to the Divine Being, and it is that which is immediately communicable by himself ; *life* is that mode of *existence* which he has made to be communicable by other objects besides himself : *existence* is taken only in its strict and proper sense, independent of all its attributes and appendages ; but *life* is regarded in connexion with the means by which it is supported, as animal life, or vegetable life. In like manner, when speaking of spiritual objects, *exist* retains its abstract sense, and *live* is employed to denote an active principle : animosities should never *exist* in the mind ; and every thing which is calculated to keep them *alive* should be kept at a distance.

EXIT, DEPARTURE.

Both these words are metaphorically employed for death, or a passage out of this life : the former is borrowed from the act of going off the stage ; the latter from the act of setting off on a journey. *Exit* seems to convey the idea of volition ; for we speak of making our *exit* : *departure* designates simply the event ; the hour of a man's *departure* is not made known to him. When we speak of an *exit*, we think only of the place left ; when we speak of a *departure*, we think of the place gone to : the unbeliever may talk of his *exit* ; the Christian most commonly speaks of his *departure*.

TO EXONERATE, EXCULPATE.

EXONERATE, from *onus* a burden, signifies to take off the burden of a charge or of guilt ; to **EXCULPATE**, from *culpa* a fault or blame, is to throw off the blame : the first is the act of another ; the second is one's own act : we *exonerate* him upon whom a charge has lain ; we *exculpate* ourselves when there is any danger of being blamed : circumstances may sometimes tend to *exonerate* ; the explanation of some person is requisite for *exculpating* : in a case of dishonesty the absence of an individual at the moment when the act was committed will altogether *exonerate* him from suspicion ; it is fruitless for any one to attempt to *exculpate* himself from the charge of faithlessness who is detected in conniving at the dishonesty of others.

EXPEDIENT, RESOURCE.

The **EXPEDIENT** is an artificial means ;

the **RESOURCE** is a natural means: a cunning man is fruitful in *expedients*; a fortunate man abounds in *resources*: Robinson Crusoe adopted every *expedient* in order to prolong his existence, at a time when his *resources* were at the lowest ebb.

EXPEDIENT, FIT.

EXPEDIENT, from the Latin *expedio* to get in readiness for a given occasion, supposes a certain degree of necessity from circumstances; **FIT** (*v. Fit*) for the purpose, signifies simply an agreement with, or suitability to, the circumstances: what is *expedient* must be *fit*, because it is called for; what is *fit* need not be *expedient*, for it may not be required. The *expediency* of a thing depends altogether upon the outward circumstances; the *fitness* is determined by a moral rule: it is *expedient* for him who wishes to prepare for death, occasionally to take an account of his life; it is not *fit* for him who is about to die to dwell with anxiety on the things of this life.

EXPERIENCE, EXPERIMENT, TRIAL, PROOF.

EXPERIENCE, EXPERIMENT, from the Latin *experior*, compounded of *e* or *ex* and *perio* or *pario*, signifies to bring forth, that is, the thing brought to light, or the act of bringing to light.

TRIAL signifies the act of *trying*, from *try*, in Latin *tento*, Hebrew *tur*, to explore, examine, search.

PROOF signifies either the act of *proving*, from the Latin *probo* to make good, or the thing made good, *proved* to be good.

By all the actions implied in these terms, we endeavour to arrive at a certainty respecting some unknown particular: *experience* is that which has been tried; an *experiment* is the thing to be tried: *experience* is certain, as it is a deduction from the past for the service of the present; the *experiment* is uncertain, and serves a future purpose: *experience* is an unerring guide, which no man can desert without falling into error; *experiments* may fail, or be superseded by others more perfect. *Experience* serves to lead us to moral truth; *experiments* aid us in ascertaining speculative truth.

The *experiment*, *trial*, and *proof*, have equally the character of uncertainty; but the *experiment* is employed only in matters of an intellectual nature; the *trial* and *proof* are employed in matters of a personal nature, on physical, as well as mental or moral objects; we make an *experiment* in order to know whether a thing be true or false; we make a *trial* in order to know whether it be

capable or incapable, convenient or inconvenient, useful or the contrary; we put a thing to the *proof* in order to determine whether it be good or bad, real or unreal.

Experiments tend to confirm our opinions; the philosopher doubts every position which cannot be demonstrated by repeated *experiments*; *trials* are of absolute necessity in directing our conduct, our taste, and our choice; we judge of our strength by *trials*; we judge of the effect of colours by *trials*, and the like; the *proof* determines the judgment; in the knowledge of men and things, the *proof* of men's characters and merits is best made by observing their conduct.

TO EXPLAIN, EXPOUND. INTERPRET.

EXPLAIN signifies to make *plain*, *v. Apparent*.

EXPOUND, from the Latin *expono*, compounded of *ex* and *pono*, signifies to set forth in detail.

INTERPRET, in Latin *interpreto* and *interpretes*, compounded of *inter* and *partes*, that is, *linguas* tongues, signifying to get the sense of one language by means of another.

To *explain* is the generic, the rest are specific; to *expound* and *interpret* are each modes of *explaining*. Single words or sentences are *explained*; a whole work, or considerable parts of it, are *expounded*; the sense of any writing or symbolical sign is *interpreted*. It is the business of the philologist to *explain* the meaning of words by a suitable definition; it is the business of the divine to *expound* Scripture; it is the business of the antiquarian to *interpret* the meaning of old inscriptions, or of hieroglyphics.

An *explanation* serves to assist the understanding, to supply a deficiency, and remove obscurity; an *exposition* is an ample *explanation*, in which minute particulars are detailed, and the connexion of events in the narrative is kept up; it serves to assist the memory and awaken the attention: both the *explanation* and *exposition* are employed in clearing up the sense of things as they are, but the *interpretation* is more arbitrary; it often consists of affixing or giving a sense to things which they have not previously had: hence it is that the same passages in authors admit of different *interpretations*, according to the character or views of the commentator.

To *explain* and *interpret* are not confined to what is written or said, they are employed likewise with regard to the actions of men; *exposition* is, however, used only with regard to writings. The major part of the misunderstandings and animosities which arise among men, might easily be obviated by a

timely *explanation*; it is characteristic of goodnature to *interpret* the looks and actions of men as favourably as possible. The *explanation* may sometimes flow out of circumstances; the *interpretation* is always the act of a voluntary and rational agent. The discovery of a plot will serve to *explain* the mysterious and strange conduct of such as were previously acquainted with it. According to an old proverb, „Silence gives consent;“ for thus at least they are pleased to *interpret* it, who are interested in the decision.

TO EXPLAIN, ILLUSTRATE, ELUCIDATE.

EXPLAIN, *v.* To explain, expound.

ILLUSTRATE, in Latin *illustratus* participle of *illustro*, compounded of the intensive syllable *in* and *lustro*, signifies to make a thing bright, or easy to be surveyed and examined.

ELUCIDATE, in Latin *elucidatus* participle of *elucido*, from *lux* light, signifies to bring forth into the light.

To *explain* is simply to render intelligible; to *illustrate* and *elucidate* are to give additional clearness: every thing requires to be *explained* to one who is ignorant of it; but the best informed will require to have abstruse subjects *illustrated*, and obscure subjects *elucidated*. We always *explain* when we *illustrate* or *elucidate*, and we always *elucidate*, when we *illustrate*, but not *vice versa*.

We *explain* by reducing compounds to simples, and generals to particulars; we *illustrate* by means of examples, similes, and allegorical figures; we *elucidate* by commentaries, or the statement of facts. Words are the common subject of *explanation*; moral truths require *illustration*; poetical allusions and dark passages in writers require *elucidation*.

EXPLANATORY, EXPLICIT, EXPRESS.

EXPLANATORY signifies containing or belonging to *explanation* (*v.* To explain).

EXPLICIT, in Latin *explicatus* from *explico* to unfold, signifies unfolded or laid open.

EXPRESS, in Latin *expressus*, signifies the same as expressed or delivered in specific terms.

The *explanatory* is that which is superadded to clear up difficulties or obscurities. A letter is *explanatory* which contains an *explanation* of something preceding, in lieu of any thing new. The *explicit* is that which of itself obviates every difficulty; an *explicit* letter, therefore, will leave nothing that requires *explanation*: the *explicit* admits of

a free use of words; the *express* requires them to be unambiguous. A person ought to be *explicit* when he enters into an engagement; he ought to be *express* when he gives commands.

TO EXPOSTULATE, REMONSTRATE.

EXPOSTULATE from *postulo* to demand, signifies to demand reasons for a thing.

REMONSTRATE, from *monstro* to show, signifies to show reasons against a thing.

We *expostulate* in a tone of authority; we *remonstrate* in a tone of complaint. He who *expostulates* passes a censure, and claims to be heard; he who *remonstrates* presents his case and requests to be heard. *Expostulation* may often be the precursor of violence; *remonstrance* mostly rests on the force of reason and representation: the *expostulation* is mostly on matters of personal interest; the *remonstrance* may as often be made on matters of propriety. The Scythian ambassadors *expostulated* with Alexander against his invasion of their country; Artabanes *remonstrated* with Xerxes on the folly of his projected invasion.

TO EXPRESS, DECLARE, SIGNIFY, TESTIFY, UTTER.

To EXPRESS, from the Latin *exprimo* to press out, is said of whatever passes in the mind; to DECLARE (*v.* To declare) is said only of sentiments and opinions. A man expresses anger, joy, sorrow, and all the affections in their turn; he declares his opinion for or against any particular measure.

To *express* is the simple act of communication, resulting from our circumstances as social agents; to *declare* is a specific and positive act that is called for by the occasion: the former may be done in private, the latter is always more or less public.

An *expression* of one's feelings and sentiments to those whom we esteem is the supreme delight of social beings; the *declaration* of our opinions may be prudent or imprudent, according to circumstances. Words, looks, gestures, or movements, serve to *express*; actions, as well as words, may sometimes *declare*: an act of hostility, on the part of a nation, is as much a *declaration* of war as if it were *expressed* in positive terms.

To *express* and SIGNIFY are both said of words; but *express* has always regard to the agent, and the use which he makes of the words. *Signify*, from *signum* a sign, and *facio* to make, has respect to the things of which the words are made the usual signs: hence it is that a word may be made to *express* one thing, while it *signifies* another: and hence it is that many words according

to their ordinary *signification*, will not *express* what the speaker has in his mind, and wishes to communicate: the monosyllable *no* signifies simple negation; but according to the temper of the speaker, and the circumstances under which it is spoken, it may *express* ill-nature, anger, or any other bad passion.

To *signify* and TESTIFY, like the word *express*, are employed in general for any act of communication otherwise than by words; but *express* is used in a stronger sense than either of the former. The passions and strongest movements of the soul are *expressed*, the simple intentions or transitory feelings of the mind are *signified* or *testified*. A person *expresses* his joy by the sparkling of his eye, and the vivacity of his countenance; he *signifies* his wishes by a nod; he *testifies* his approbation by a smile.

Express may be said of all sentient beings, and, by a figure of speech, even of those which have no sense; *signify* is said of rational agents only. The dog has the most *expressive* mode of showing his attachment and fidelity to his master; a *significant* look or smile may sometimes give rise to suspicion, and lead to the detection of guilt. To *signify* and *testify*, though closely allied in sense and application, have this difference, that to *signify* is simply to give a sign of what passes inwardly, to *testify* is to give that sign in the presence of others. A person *signifies* by letter his intention of being at a certain place at a given time: he *testifies* his sense of favours conferred, by every mark of gratitude and respect.

UTTER, from the preposition *out*, signifying to bring out, differs from *express* in this, that the latter respects the thing which is communicated, and the former the means of communication. We *express* from the heart; we *utter* with the lips: those who say what they do not mean, *utter* but not *express*; those who show by their looks what is passing in their hearts, *express* but do not *utter*.

TO EXTENUATE, PALLIATE.

EXTENUATE, from the Latin *tenuis* thin, small, signifies literally to make small.

PALLIATE, in Latin *palliatu*s, participle of *pallio*, from *pallium* a cloak, signifies to throw a cloak over a thing so that it may not be seen.

These terms are both applicable to the moral conduct, and express the act of lessening the guilt of any impropriety. To *extenuate* is simply to lessen guilt without reference to the means: to *palliate* is to lessen it by means of art. To *extenuate* is

rather the effect of circumstances: to *palliate* is the direct effort of an individual. Ignorance in the offender may serve as an *extenuation* of his guilt, although not of his offence: it is but a poor *palliation* of a man's guilt, to say that his crimes have not been attended with the mischief which they were calculated to produce.

EXTRANEOUS, EXTRINSIC, FOREIGN.

EXTRANEOUS, derived from *extraneus*, or *ex* and *terro*, signifies out of the land, not belonging to it.

EXTRINSIC, in Latin *extrinsecus*, compounded of *extra* and *secus*, signifies outward, external.

FOREIGN, from the Latin *foris* out of doors, signifies not belonging to the family.

The *extraneous* is that which forms no necessary or natural part of any thing; the *extrinsic* is that which forms a part or has a connexion, but only in an indirect form; it is not an inherent or component part: the *foreign* is that which forms no part whatever, and has no kind of connexion. A work is said to contain *extraneous* matter, which contains much matter not necessarily belonging to, or illustrative of the subject: a work is said to have *extrinsic* merit when it borrows its value from local circumstances, in distinction from the intrinsic merit, or that which lies in the contents.

Extraneous and *extrinsic* have a general and abstract sense; but *foreign* has a particular signification; they always pass over to some object either expressed or understood: hence we say *extraneous* ideas, or *extrinsic* worth; but that a particular mode of acting is *foreign* to the general plan pursued. Anecdotes of private individuals would be *extraneous* matter in a general history: the respect and credit which men gain from their fellow-citizens by an adherence to rectitude is the *extrinsic* advantage of virtue; the peace of a good conscience and the favour of God, are its *intrinsic* advantages; it is *foreign* to the purpose of one who is making an abridgment of a work, to enter into details in any particular part.

EXTRAORDINARY, REMARKABLE.

Are epithets both opposed to the ordinary; and in that sense the EXTRAORDINARY is that which in its own nature is REMARKABLE: but things however, may be *extraordinary* which are not *remarkable*, and the contrary. The *extraordinary* is that which is out of the ordinary course, but it does not always excite remark, and is not therefore *remarkable*; as when we speak of an *extraordinary* loan, an *extraordinary* mea-

sure of government: on the other hand, when the *extraordinary* conveys the idea of what deserves notice, it expresses much more than *remarkable*. There are but few *extraordinary* things, many things are *remarkable*: the *remarkable* is eminent; the *extraordinary* is supereminent: the *extraordinary* excites our astonishment; the *remarkable* only awakens our interest and attention. The *extraordinary* is unexpected; the *remarkable* is sometimes looked for: every instance of sagacity and fidelity in a dog is *remarkable*, and some *extraordinary* instances have been related which would almost stagger our belief.

EXTRAVAGANT. PRODIGAL. LAVISH. PROFUSE.

EXTRAVAGANT, from *extra* and *vagans*, signifies in general wandering from the line; and **PRODIGAL**, from the Latin *prodigus*, and *prodigo* to launch forth, signifies in general to send forth, or give out in great quantities.

LAVISH comes probably from the Latin *lavo* to wash, signifying to wash away in waste.

PROFUSE, from the Latin *profusus* participle of *profundo* to pour forth, signifies pouring out freely.

The idea of using immoderately is implied in all these terms, but *extravagant* is the most general in its meaning and application. The *extravagant* man spends his money without reason; the *prodigal* man spends it in excesses; the former errs against plain sense, the latter violates the moral law: the *extravagant* man will ruin himself by his follies; the *prodigal* by his vices. One may be *extravagant* with a small sum where it exceeds one's means; one cannot be *prodigal* without great property. *Extravagance* is practised by both sexes; *prodigality* is peculiarly the vice of the male sex. *Extravagance* is opposed to meanness; *prodigality* to avarice. Those who know the true value of money as contributing to their own enjoyments, or those of others, will guard against *extravagance*. Those who lay a restraint on their passions can never fall into *prodigality*.

Extravagant and *prodigal* serve to designate habitual as well as particular actions; *lavish* and *profuse* are employed only for that which is particular: hence we say to be *lavish* of one's money, one's presents, and the like; to be *profuse* in one's entertainments, both of which may be modes of *extravagance*. An *extravagant* man, however, in the restricted sense, mostly spends upon himself to indulge his whims and idle fancies;

but a man may be *lavish* and *profuse* upon others from a misguided generosity.

In a moral use of these terms, a man is *extravagant* in his praises who exceeds either in measure or application: he is *prodigal* of his strength who consumes it by an excessive use; he is *lavish* of his compliments who deals them out so promiscuously as to render them of no value: he is *profuse* in his acknowledgments who repeats them oftener, or delivers them in more words, than are necessary.

Extravagant and *profuse* are said only of individuals; *prodigal* and *lavish* may be said of many in a general sense. A nation may be *prodigal* of its resources; a government may be *lavish* of the public money, as an individual is *extravagant* with his own, and *profuse* in what he gives another.

EXTREMITY, EXTREME.

EXTREMITY is used in the proper or the improper sense; **EXTREME** in the improper sense: we speak of the *extremity* of a line or an avenue, the *extremity* of distress, but the *extreme* of the fashion.

In the moral sense, *extremity* is applicable to the outward circumstances; *extreme* to the opinions and conduct of men: in matters of dispute between individuals it is a happy thing to guard against coming to *extremities*: it is the characteristic of volatile tempers to be always in *extremes*, of joy or sorrow.

EXUBERANT, LUXURIANT.

EXUBERANT, from the Latin *exuberans* or *ex* and *ubero*, signifies very fruitful or superabundant: **LUXURIANT**, in Latin *luxurians* from *luxus*, signifies expanding with unrestrained freedom. These terms are both applied to vegetation in a flourishing state; but *exuberance* expresses the excess, and *luxuriance* the perfection: in a fertile soil where plants are left unrestrainedly to themselves there will be an *exuberance*; plants are to be seen in their *luxuriance* only in seasons that are favourable to them: in the moral application, *exuberance* of intellect is often attended with a restless ambition that is incompatible both with the happiness and advancement of its possessor; *luxuriance* of imagination is one of the greatest gifts which a poet can boast of.

F.

FABLE, TALE, NOVEL, ROMANCE.

FABLE, in Latin *fabula* from *for* to speak or tell, and **TALE**, from *to tell*, both designate a species of narration: **NOVEL**,

from the Italian *novella*, is an extended *tale*; ROMANCE, from the Italian *romanzo*, is a wonderful *tale*, or a *tale* of wonders, such as was most in vogue in the dark ages of European literature.

Different species of composition are expressed by the above words: the *fable* is allegorical; its actions are natural, but its agents are imaginary; the *tale* is fictitious, but not imaginary; both the agents and actions are drawn from the passing scenes of life. Gods and goddesses, animals and men, trees, vegetables, and inanimate objects in general, may be made the agents of a *fable*; but of a *tale*, properly speaking, only men or supernatural spirits can be the agents: of the former description are the celebrated *fables* of Aesop; and of the latter the *tales* of Marmontel, the *tales* of the Genii, the Chinese *tales*, &c.: *fables* are written for instruction; *tales* principally for amusement: *fables* consist mostly of only one incident or action, from which a moral may be drawn; *tales* always of many which excite an interest for an individual.

The *tale* when compared with the *novel* is a simple kind of fiction, it consists of but few persons in the drama; whilst the *novel*, on the contrary, admits of every possible variety in characters: the *tale* is told without much art or contrivance to keep the reader in suspense, without any depth of plot or importance in the catastrophe; the *novel* affords the greatest scope for exciting an interest by the rapid succession of events, the involvements of interests, and the unravelling of its plot. If the *novel* awakens the attention, the *romance* rivets the whole mind and engages the affections; it presents nothing but what is extraordinary and calculated to fill the imagination: of the former description, Cervantes, La Sage, and Fielding, have given us the best specimens; and of the latter we have the best modern specimens from the pen of Mrs. Radcliffe.

FACE, FRONT.

Figuratively designate the particular parts of bodies which bear some sort of resemblance to the human face or forehead.

FACE is applied to that part of bodies which serves as an index or rule, and contains certain marks to direct the observer; FRONT is employed for that part which is most prominent or foremost: hence we speak of the *face* of a wheel or clock, the *face* of a painting, or the *face* of nature; but the *front* of a house or building, and the *front* of a stage: hence, likewise, the propriety of the expressions, to put a good *face* on a thing, to show a bold *front*.

FACE, COUNTENANCE, VISAGE.

FACE, in Latin *facies*, from *facio* to make, signifies the whole form or make.

COUNTENANCE, in French *contenance*, from the Latin *contineo*, signifies the contents, or what is contained in the *face*. VISAGE, from *viso* and *video* to see, signifies the particular form of the *face* as it presents itself to view; properly speaking a kind of *countenance*.

The *face* consists of a certain set of features; the *countenance* consists of the general aggregate of looks produced by these features; the *visage* consists of such looks in particular cases: the *face* is the work of nature; the *countenance* and *visage* are the work of the mind: the *face* remains the same, but the *countenance* and *visage* are changeable. The *face* belongs to brutes as well as men; the *countenance* is the peculiar property of man; the *visage* is peculiarly applicable to superior beings: the last term is employed mostly in the grave or lofty style.

FACETIOUS, CONVERSABLE, PLEASANT, JOCULAR, JOCOSE.

All these epithets designate that companionable quality which consists in loveliness of speech.

FACETIOUS, in Latin *facetus*, may probably come from *for* to speak, denoting the versatility with which a person makes use of words.

CONVERSABLE is literally able to hold a conversation.

PLEASANT (v. *Agreeable*) signifies making ourselves *pleasant* with others, or them pleased with us.

JOCULAR signifies after the manner of a joke.

JOCOSE signifies using or having jokes.

Facetious may be employed either for writing or conversation; the rest only in conversation; the *facetious* man deals in that kind of discourse which may excite laughter; a *conversable* man may instruct as well as amuse; the *pleasant* man says every thing in a *pleasant* manner; his *pleasantries* even on the most delicate subject is without offence: the person speaking is *jocose*; the thing said, or the manner of saying it, is *jocular*. A man is *facetious* from humour; he is *conversable* by means of information; he indulges himself in occasional *pleasantries*, or allows himself to be *jocose*, in order to enliven conversation; a useful hint is sometimes conveyed in *jocular* terms.

FACTION, PARTY.

* These two words equally suppose the union of many persons, and their opposition to certain views different from their own: but FACTION, from *factio* making, denotes an activity and secret machination against those whose views are opposed; and PARTY, from the verb to part or split, expresses only a division of opinion.

The term *party* has of itself nothing odious, that of *faction* is always so: any man, without distinction of rank, may have a *party* either at court or in the army, in the city or in literature, without being himself immediately implicated in raising it; but *factions* are always the result of active efforts: one may have a *party* for one's merit, from the number and ardour of one's friends; but a *faction* is raised by busy and turbulent spirits for their own purposes.

FACTIOUS, SEDITIOUS.

FACTIOUS, in Latin *factiosus* from *facio* to do, signifies the same as busy or intermeddling; ready to take an active part in matters not of one's own immediate concern.

SEDITIONOUS, in Latin *sediciosus*, signifies prone to sedition (*v. Insurrection*).

Factious is an epithet to characterize the tempers of men; *seditious* characterizes their conduct: the *factious* man attempts to raise himself into importance, he aims at authority, and seeks to interfere in the measures of government; the *seditious* man attempts to excite others, and to provoke their resistance to established authority. *Factious* is mostly applied to individuals; *seditious* is employed for bodies of men: hence we speak of a *factious* nobleman, a *seditious* multitude.

FACTOR, AGENT.

Though both these terms, according to their origin, imply a maker or doer, yet at present, they have a distinct signification; the word *factor* is used in a limited, and the word *agent* in a general sense: the *factor* only buys and sells on the account of others; the *agent* transacts every sort of business in general: merchants and manufacturers employ *factors* abroad to dispose of goods transmitted; lawyers are frequently employed as *agents* in the receipt and payment of money, the transfer of estates, and various other pecuniary concerns.

FACULTY. ABILITY, TALENTS.

FACULTY, in Latin *facultas*, changed from *facilitas* facility, which (*v. Face*) sig-

nifies doableness, or the property of being able to do or bring about effects.

ABILITY, *v. Ability*.

TALENT, from the Latin *talentum*, a Greek coin exceeding one hundred pounds sterling in value, derives its figurative signification of a gift, possession, or power, from the use our Saviour has made of it in more than one parable.

The common idea of power is what renders these words synonymous: *faculty* is a power derived from nature; *ability* may be derived either from circumstances or otherwise: the *faculty* is a permanent possession; the *ability* is an incidental possession; it may vary in degree and quality with times and seasons. The powers of seeing and hearing are *faculties*; health, strength, and fortune, are *abilities*. A *faculty* is some specific power which is directed to one single object; it is the power of acting according to a given form; *ability* is in general the power of doing; *faculty* therefore might, in the strict sense, be considered as a species of *ability*.

A man uses the *faculties* with which he is endowed; he gives according to his *ability*: *faculties* and *talents* both owe their being to nature; but a *faculty* may be either physical or mental; a *talent* is altogether mental: the *faculty* of speech, and the rational *faculty*, are the grand marks of distinction between man and the brute; the *talent* of mimicry, of dramatic acting, and of imitation in general, is what distinguishes one man from the other.

These terms are all used in the plural, agreeable to the above explanation: *faculties* include all the endowments of body or mind, which are the inherent properties of the being, as when we speak of a man's retaining his *faculties*, or having his *faculties* impaired: *abilities* include, in the aggregate, whatever a man is able to do; hence we speak of a man's *abilities* in speaking, writing, learning, and the like: *talents* are the particular endowments of the mind, which belong to the individual; hence we say, the *talents* which are requisite for a minister of state are different from those which qualify a man for being a judge.

TO FAIL, FALL SHORT, BE DEFICIENT.

FAIL, in French *faillir*, German, &c. *fehlen*, like the word fall, comes from the Latin *fallo* to deceive, and the Hebrew *repal* to fall or decay.

To *fail* marks the result of actions or efforts; a person *fails* in his undertaking: FALL SHORT designates either the result

* Vide Beauzée: „Faction, parti.“

of actions, or the state of things; a person *falls short* in his calculation, or in his account; the issue *falls short* of the expectation: to BE DEFICIENT marks only the state or quality of objects; a person is *deficient* in good manners. People frequently *fail* in their endeavours for want of knowing how to apply their abilities; when our expectations are immoderate, it is not surprising if our success *falls short* of our hopes and wishes: there is nothing in which people discover themselves to be more *deficient* than in keeping ordinary engagements.

To *fail* and *be deficient* are both applicable to the characters of men; but the former is mostly employed for the moral conduct, the latter for the outward behaviour: hence a man is said to *fail* in his duty, in the discharge of his obligations, in the performance of a promise, and the like: but to be *deficient* in politeness, in attention to his friends, in his address, in his manner of entering a room, and the like.

FAILURE, FAILING.

FAILURE (*v. To fail*) bespeaks the action, or the result of the action; a FAILING is the habit, or the habitual *failure*: the former is said of our undertakings, the latter of our moral character. *Failure* is opposed to success; a *failing* to a perfection. The merchant must be prepared for *failures* in his speculations: the statesman for *failures* in his projects. With our *failings*, however, it is somewhat different; we must never rest satisfied that we are without them, nor contented with the mere consciousness that we have them.

FAILURE, MISCARRIAGE, ABORTION.

FAILURE (*v. To fail*) has always a reference to the agent and his design; MISCARRIAGE, that is, the carrying or going wrong, is applicable to all sublunary concerns, without reference to any particular agent; ABORTION, from the Latin *aborior* to deviate from the rise, or to pass away before it be come to maturity, is in the proper sense applied to the process of animal nature, and in the figurative sense, to the thought and designs which are conceived in the mind.

Failure is more definite in its signification, and limited in its application; we speak of the *failures* of individuals, but of the *miscarriages* of nations or things: a *failure* reflects on the person so as to excite towards him some sentiment, either of compassion, displeasure, or the like; a *miscarriage* is considered mostly in relation to the course of human events: hence the *failure* of Xerxes'

expedition reflected disgrace upon himself; but the *miscarriage* of a military enterprise in general is attributable to the elements, or some such untoward circumstance. The *abortion* in its proper sense, is a species of *miscarriage*; and in application a species of *failure*, as it applies only to the designs of conscious agents; but it does not carry the mind back to the agent, for we speak of the *abortion* of a scheme with as little reference to the schemer, as when we speak of the *miscarriage* of an expedition.

FAINT, LANGUID.

FAINT, from the French *faner*, to fade, signifies that which is faded or withered, which has lost its spirit.

LANGUID, in Latin *languidus*, is from *languo* to languish.

Faint is less than *languid*; *faintness* is in fact in the physical application, the commencement of *languor*; we may be *faint* for a short time, and if continued and extended through the limbs, it becomes *languor*; thus we say, to speak with a *faint* tone, and have a *languid* frame. In the figurative application to make a *faint* resistance, to move with a *languid* air: to form a *faint* idea, to make a *languid* effort.

FAIR, CLEAR.

FAIR, in Saxon *fagar*, comes probably from the Latin *pulcher* beautiful.

CLEAR, *v. Clear*, bright.

Fair is used in a positive sense: *clear* in a negative sense: there must be some brightness in what is *fair*; there must be no spots in what is *clear*. The weather is said to be *fair*, which is not only free from what is disagreeable, but somewhat enlivened by the sun; it is *clear* when it is free from clouds or mists. A *fair* skin approaches to white; a *clear* skin is without spots or irregularities.

In the moral application, a *fair* fame speaks much in praise of a man; a *clear* reputation is free from faults. A *fair* statement contains every thing that can be said *pro* and *con*; a *clear* statement is free from ambiguity or obscurity.

FAIR, HONEST, EQUITABLE, REASONABLE.

FAIR, *v. Fair*, clear.

HONEST, in Latin *honestus*, comes from *honos* honour.

EQUITABLE, signifies having *equity*, or according to *equity*.

REASONABLE signifies having *reason*, or according to *reason*.

Fair is said of persons or things; *honest*

mostly characterizes the person, either as to his conduct or his principle. When *fair* and *honest* are both applied to the external conduct, the former expresses more than the latter: a man may be *honest* without being *fair*; he cannot be *fair* without being *honest*. *Fairness* enters into every minute circumstance connected with the interests of the parties, and weighs them alike for both; *honesty* is contented with a literal conformity to the law, it consults the interest of one party: the *fair* dealer looks to his neighbour as well as himself, he wishes only for an equal share of advantage; a man may be an *honest* dealer while he looks to no one's advantage but his own: the *fair* man always acts from a principle of right; the *honest* man may be so from a motive of fear.

When these epithets are employed to characterize the man generally, *fairness* expresses less than *honesty*; the former is employed only in regard to commercial transactions or minor personal concerns; the latter ranks among the first moral virtues, and elevates a man high above his fellow-creatures. A man is *fair* who is ready to allow his competitor the same advantages as he enjoys himself in every matter, however trivial; or he is *honest* in all his looks, words, and actions; neither his tongue nor his countenance ever belie his heart.

When *fair* is employed as an epithet to qualify things, or to designate their nature, it approaches very nearly in signification to *equitable* and *reasonable*: they are all opposed to what is unjust: *fair* and *equitable* suppose two objects put in collision; *reasonable* is employed abstractedly; what is *fair* and *equitable* is so in relation to all circumstances; what is *reasonable* is so of itself. An estimate is *fair* in which profit and loss, merit and demerit, with every collateral circumstance, is duly weighed: a judgment is *equitable* which decides suitably and advantageously for both parties; a price is *reasonable* which does not exceed the limits of reason or propriety. A decision may be either *fair* or *equitable*; but the former is said mostly in regard to trifling matters, and the latter in regard to the important rights of mankind. It is the business of the umpire to decide *fairly* between the combatants or the competitors for the prize; it is the business of the judge to decide *equitably* between men whose property is at issue.

A demand, a charge, a proposition, or an offer, may be said to be either *fair* or *reasonable*: but the former term always bears a relation to what is right between man and man; the latter to what is right in itself according to circumstances.

FAITH, CREED.

FAITH (*v. Belief*) denotes either the principle of trusting, or the thing trusted.

CREED, from the Latin *credo* to believe, denotes the thing believed.

These words are synonymous when taken for the thing trusted in or believed; but they differ in this, that *faith* has always a reference to the principle in the mind; *creed* only respects the thing which is the object of *faith*: the former is likewise taken generally and indefinitely; the latter particularly and definitely, signifying a set form: hence we say to be of the same *faith*, or to adopt the same *creed*. The holy martyrs died for the *faith* as it is in Christ Jesus; every established form of religion will have its peculiar *creed*. The Church of England has adopted that *creed* which it considers as containing the purest principles of Christian *faith*.

FAITH, FIDELITY.

Though derived from the same source (*v. Belief*), they differ widely in meaning: FAITH here denotes a mode of action, namely, the acting true to the *faith* which others repose in us; FIDELITY, a disposition of the mind to adhere to that *faith* which others repose in us. We keep our *faith*, we show our *fidelity*.

Faith is a public concern, it depends on promises; *fidelity* is a private or personal concern, it depends upon relationships and connexions. A breach of *faith* is a crime that brings a stain on a nation, for *faith* ought to be kept even with an enemy. A breach of *fidelity* attaches disgrace to the individual; for *fidelity* is due from a subject to a prince, or from a servant to his master, or from married people one to another. No treaty can be made with him who will keep no *faith*; no confidence can be placed in him who discovers no *fidelity*.

FAITHFUL, TRUSTY.

FAITHFUL signifies full of *faith*, or *fidelity* (*v. Faith, fidelity*).

TRUSTY signifies fit or worthy to be trusted (*v. Belief*).

Faithful respects the principle altogether; it is suited to all relations and stations, public and private: *trusty* includes not only the principle, but the mental qualifications in general: it applies to those in whom particular *trust* is to be placed. It is the part of a Christian to be *faithful* to all his engagements; it is a particular excellence in a servant to be *trusty*. *Faithful* is applied in the improper sense to an unconscious

agent; *trusty* may be applied with equal propriety to things as to persons. We may speak of a *faithful* heart or a *faithful* picture; a *trusty* sword, or a *trusty* weapon.

FAITHLESS, UNFAITHFUL.

FAITHLESS is mostly employed to denote a breach of faith; and UNFAITHFUL to mark the want of fidelity (*v. Faith, fidelity*). The former is positive; the latter is rather negative, implying deficiency. A prince, a government, a people, or an individual, is said to be *faithless*; a husband, a wife, a servant, or any individual, *unfaithful*.

FAITHLESS, PERFIDIOUS, TREACHEROUS.

FAITHLESS (*v. Faithless*) is the generic term, the rest are specific terms; a breach of good *faith* is expressed by them all, but *faithless* expresses no more: the others include accessory ideas in their signification.

PERFIDIOUS, in Latin *perfidiosus*, signifies literally breaking through faith in a great degree, and now implies the addition of hostility to the breach of *faith*.

TREACHEROUS, most probably changed from *traitorous*, comes from the Latin *trado* to betray, and signifies one species of active hostile breach of *faith*.

A *faithless* man is *faithless* only for his own interest; a *perfidious* man is expressly so to the injury of another. A friend is *faithless* who consults his own safety in time of need; he is *perfidious* if he profits by the confidence reposed in him to plot mischief against the one to whom he has made vows of friendship. *Faithlessness* does not suppose any particular efforts to deceive; it consists of merely violating that *faith* which the relation produces; *perfidy* is never so complete as when it has most effectually assumed the mask or sincerity. Whoever deserts his friend in need is guilty of *faithlessness*: but he is guilty of *perfidy* who draws from him every secret in order to effect his ruin.

Perfidy may lie in the will to do; *treachery* lies altogether in the thing done; one may therefore be *perfidious* without being *treacherous*. A friend is *perfidious* whenever he evinces his *perfidy*; but he is said to be *treacherous* only in the particular instance in which he betrays the confidence and interests of another. I detect a man's *perfidy*, or his *perfidious* aims, by the manner in which he attempts to draw my secrets from me; I am not made acquainted with his *treachery* before I discover that my confidence is betrayed and my secrets are divulg-

ed. On the other hand we may be *treacherous* without being *perfidious*. *Perfidy* is an offence mostly between individuals; it is rather a breach of fidelity (*v. Faith, fidelity*) than of faith; *treachery* on the other hand includes breaches of private or public faith. A servant may be both *perfidious* and *treacherous* to his master: a citizen may be *treacherous*, but not *perfidious* towards his country.

It is said that in the South Sea Islands, when a chief wants a human victim, their officers will sometimes invite their friends or relations to come to them, when they take the opportunity of suddenly falling upon them and despatching them: here is *perfidy* in the individual who acts this false part; and *treachery* in the act of betraying him who is murdered. When the schoolmaster of Falerii delivered his scholars to Camillus, he was guilty of *treachery* in the act, and of *perfidy* towards those who had reposed confidence in him. When Romulus ordered the Sabine women to be seized, it was an act of *treachery*, but not of *perfidy*.

FALL, DOWNFALL, RUIN.

FALL and DOWNFALL, from the German *fallen* has the same derivation as fail (*v. To fail*).

RUIN, *v. Destruction*.

Whether applied to physical objects or the condition of persons, *fall* expresses less than *downfall*, and this less than *ruin*. *Fall* applies to that which is elevated: every thing which is set up, although as trifling as a stick, may *fall*; but we speak of the *downfall* of the loftiest trees or the tallest spires. A *fall* may be attended with more or less mischief, or even with none at all; but *downfall* and *ruin* are accompanied with the dissolution of the bodies that *fall*. The higher a body is raised, and the greater the art that is employed in the structure, the completer the *downfall*; the greater the structure, the more extended the *ruin*. In the figurative application we may speak of the *fall* of man from a state of innocence, a state of ease, or a state of prosperity, or his *downfall* from greatness or high rank. He may recover from his *fall*, but his *downfall* is commonly followed by the entire *ruin* of his concerns, and often of himself. The *fall* of kingdoms, and the *downfall* of empires, must always be succeeded by their *ruin* as an inevitable result.

TO FALL, DROP, DROOP, SINK, TUMBLE.

FALL, *v. Fall*.

DROP and DROOP, in German *tropfen*,

ow German, &c. *druppen*, is an onomatopœia of the *falling* of a drop.

SINK, in German *sincken*, is an intensive of *siegen* to incline downwards.

TUMBLE, in German *tummeln*, is an intensive of *taumeln* to reel backwards and forwards.

Fall is the generic, the rest specific terms: to *drop* is to *fall* suddenly, and mostly in the form of a drop; to *droop* is to *drop* in part; to *sink* is to *fall* gradually; to *tumble* is to *fall* awkwardly or contrary to the usual mode. In cataracts the water *falls* perpetually and in a mass; in rain it *drops* partially; in ponds the water *sinks* low. The head *droops*, but the body may *fall* or *drop* from a height, it may *sink* down to the earth, it may *tumble* by accident.

Fall, *drop*, and *sink*, are employed in a moral sense; *droop* in the physical sense. A person *falls* from a state of prosperity; words *drop* from the lips, and *sink* into the heart. Corn, or the price of corn, *falls*; a subject *drops*; a person *sinks* into poverty or in the estimation of the world.

FALLACIOUS, DECEITFUL, FRAUDULENT.

FALLACIOUS comes from the Latin *fallax* and *fallo* to deceive, signifying the property of misleading.

DECEITFUL, *v.* To deceive.

FRAUDULENT signifies after the manner of a fraud.

The *fallacious* has respect to falsehood in opinion; *deceitful* to that which is externally false: our hopes are often *fallacious*; the appearances of things are often *deceitful*. *Fallacious*, as characteristic of the mind, excludes the idea of mistake; *fraudulent* is a gross species of the *deceitful*. It is a *fallacious* idea for any one to imagine that the faults of others can serve as any extenuation of his own; it is a *deceitful* mode of acting for any one to advise another to do that which he would not do himself; it is *fraudulent* to attempt to get money by means of a falsehood.

FALLACY, DELUSION, ILLUSION.

A FALLACY (*v.* *Fallacious*) is commonly the act of some conscious agent, and includes an intention to deceive; a DELUSION (*v.* *To deceive*) and ILLUSION may be the work of inanimate objects. We endeavour to detect the *fallacy* which lies concealed in a proposition: we endeavour to remove the *delusion* to which the judgment has been exposed; and to dissipate the *illusion* to which the senses or fancy are liable.

In all the reasonings of freethinkers there

are *fallacies* against which a man cannot be always on his guard. The ignorant are perpetually exposed to *delusions* when they attempt to speculate on matters of opinion; amongst the most serious of these *delusions*, we may reckon that of substituting their own feelings for the operations of Divine grace. The ideas of ghosts and apparitions are mostly attributable to the *illusions* of the senses and the imagination.

FAME, REPUTATION, RENOWN.

FAME (from the Greek *φημι* to say) is the most noisy and uncertain; it rests upon report: REPUTATION (*v.* *Character*, *reputation*) is silent and solid; it lies more in the thoughts, and is derived from observation.

RENOWN, in French *renommée*, from *nom* a name, signifies the reverberation of a name; it is as loud as *fame*, but more substantial and better founded: hence we say that a person's *fame* is gone abroad; his *reputation* is established; and he has got *renown*.

Fame may be applied to any object, good bad, or indifferent; *reputation* is applied only to real eminence in some department; *renown* is employed only for extraordinary men and brilliant exploits: the *fame* of a quack may be spread among the ignorant multitude by means of a lucky cure; the *reputation* of a physician rests upon his tried skill and known experience; the *renown* of a general is proportioned to the magnitude of his achievements.

FAME, REPORT, RUMOUR, HEARSAY.

FAME (*v.* *Fame*) has no reference to the thing which gives birth to it; it goes about of itself without any apparent instrumentality. REPORT (from *re* and *porto* to carry back, or away from an object) has always a reference to the reporter. RUMOUR, in Latin *rumor* from *ruo* to rush or to flow, has reference to the flying nature of words that are carried; it is therefore properly a flying report. HEARSAY refers to the receiver of that which is said: it is limited therefore to a small number of speakers, or reporters. *Fame* serves to form or establish a character either of a person or a thing; it will be good or bad according to circumstances; the *fame* of our Saviour's miracles went abroad through the land; a *report* serves to communicate information of events; it may be more or less correct according to the veracity or authenticity of the reporter; *reports* of victories mostly precede the official confirmation: a *rumour* serves the purposes of fiction; it is more or less vague,

according to the temper of the times and the nature of the events; every battle gives rise to a thousand *rumours*: the *hearsay* serves for information or instruction, and is seldom so incorrect as it is familiar.

FAMILY, HOUSE, LINEAGE, RACE.

Divisions of men, according to some rule of relationship or connexion, is the common idea in these terms.

FAMILY is the most general in its import, from the Latin *familia* a family, *famulus* a servant, in Greek *ομιλία* an assembly, and the Hebrew *omal* to labour; it is applicable to those who are bound together upon the principle of dependance.

HOUSE figuratively denotes those who live in the same *house*, and is commonly extended in its signification to all that passes under the same roof: hence we rather say that a woman manages her *family*; that a man rules his *house*. The *family* is considered as to its relationships; the number, union, condition and quality of its members: the *house* is considered more as to what is transacted within its walls. We speak of a numerous *family*, a united or affectionate *family*, a mercantile *house*, and the *house* (meaning the members of the *house* of parliament). If a man cannot find happiness in the bosom of his *family*, he will seek for it in vain elsewhere: the credit of a *house* is to be kept up only by prompt payments.

In an extended application of these words they are made to designate the quality of the individual, in which case *family* bears the same familiar and indiscriminate sense as before: *house* is employed as a term of grandeur. * When we consider a *family* in its domestic relations, in its habits, manners, connexions, and circumstances we speak of a genteel *family*, a respectable *family*, the royal *family*: but when we consider it with regard to its political and civil distinctions, its titles and its power, then we denominate it a *house*. as an illustrious *house*; the *house* of Bourbon, of Brunswick, or of Hanover; the imperial *house* of Austria. Any subject may belong to an ancient or noble *family*: princes are said to be descended from ancient *houses*. A man is said to be of *family* or of no *family*: we may say likewise that he is of a certain *house*; but to say that he is of no *house* would be superfluous.** In republics there are *families* but not *houses*, because there is no nobility; in China likewise, where the private virtues only distinguish the individual or his *family*, the term *house* is altogether inapplicable.

Family includes in it every circumstance of connexion and relationship; LINEAGE respects only consanguinity: *family* is employed mostly for those who are coeval; *lineage* is generally used for those who have gone before. When the Athenian general Iphicrates, son of a shoemaker, was reproached by Harmodius with his birth, he said I had rather be the first than the last of my *family*: David was of the *lineage* of Abraham, and our Saviour was of the *lineage* of David.

RACE, from the Latin *radix* a root, denotes the origin or that which constitutes their original point of resemblance. A *family* supposes the closest alliance; a *race* supposes no closer connexion than what a common property creates. *Family* is confined to a comparatively small number: *race* is a term of extensive import, including all mankind, as the human *race*; or particular nations, as the *race* of South-sea islanders; or a particular *family*, as the *race* of the Heraclides: from Hercules sprang a *race* of heroes.

FAMOUS, CELEBRATED, RENOWNED, ILLUSTRIOUS.

FAMOUS signifies literally having *fame*, or being the cause of *fame*; it is applicable to that which causes a noise or sensation; to that which is talked of, written upon, discussed, and thought of; to that which is reported of far and near; to that which is circulated among all ranks and orders of men.

CELEBRATED signifies literally kept in the memory by a *celebration* or memorial, and is applicable to that which is praised and honoured with solemnity.

RENOWNED signifies literally possessed of a name, and is applicable to whatever extends the name, or causes the name to be often repeated.

ILLUSTRIOUS signifies literally what has or gives a lustre: it is applicable to whatever confers dignity.

Famous is a term of indefinite import; it conveys of itself frequently neither honour nor dishonour, since it is employed indifferently as an epithet for things praiseworthy or otherwise; it is the only one of these terms which may be used in a bad sense. The others rise in a gradually good sense.

* The *celebrated* is founded upon merit and the display of talent in the arts and sciences; it gains the subject respect: the *renowned* is founded upon the possession of rare or extraordinary qualities, upon successful exertions and accordance with public opinion; it brings honour or glory to the subject: the

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Famille, maison.”

** Abbé Roubaud: „Race, lineage, famille, maison.”

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Fameux, illustre, celebre, renommé.”

illustrious is founded upon those solid qualities which not only render one known but distinguished; it ensures regard and veneration.

A person may be *famous* for his eccentricities; *celebrated* as an artist, a writer, or a player; *renowned* as a warrior or a statesman; *illustrious* as a prince, a statesman, or a senator.

The maid of Orleans, who was decried by the English, and idolized by the French, is equally *famous* in both nations. There are *celebrated* authors in whom to censure even that which is censurable, would endanger one's reputation. The *renowned* heroes of antiquity have, by the perusal of their exploits, given birth to a race of modern heroes not inferior to themselves. Princes may shine in their life-time, but they cannot render themselves *illustrious* to posterity except by the monuments of goodness and wisdom which they leave after them.

FANCIFUL, FANTASTICAL, WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS.

FANCIFUL signifies full of *fancy* (*v. Conceit*).

FANTASTICAL signifies belonging to the phantasy, which is the immediate derivative from the Greek.

WHIMSICAL signifies either like a whim, or having whims.

CAPRICIOUS signifies having *caprice*.

Fanciful and *fantastical* are both employed for persons and things; *whimsical* and *caprice* is mostly employed for persons, or what is personal. *Fanciful*, in regard to persons, is said of that which is irregular in the taste or judgment; *fantastical* is said of that which violates all propriety, as well as regularity: the former may consist of a simple deviation from rule; the latter is something extravagant. Lively minds will be *fanciful* in the choice of their dress, furniture, or equipage: the affectation of singularity frequently renders people *fantastical* in their manners as well as their dress.

Fanciful is said mostly in regard to errors of opinion or taste; it springs from an aberration of the mind: *whimsical* is a species of the *fanciful* in regard to one's likes or dislikes: *capricious* respects errors of temper, or irregularities of feeling. The *fanciful* does not necessarily imply instability; but the *capricious* excludes the idea of fixedness. One is *fanciful* by attaching a reality to that which only passes in one's own mind; one is *whimsical* in the inventions of the *fancy*; one is *capricious* by acting and judging without rule or reason in that which admits of both. A person discovers him-

self to be *fanciful* who makes difficulties and objections which have no foundation, but in his own mind; he discovers himself to be *capricious* when he likes and dislikes the same thing in quick succession; he discovers himself to be *whimsical* who falls upon unaccountable modes, and imagines unaccountable things. Sick persons are apt to be *fanciful* in their food; females, whose minds are not well disciplined, are apt to be *capricious*; the English have the character of being a *whimsical* nation. In application to things, the terms *fanciful* and *fantastical* preserve a similar distinction: what is *fanciful* may be the real and just combination of a well regulated *fancy*, or the unreal combination of a distempered *fancy*; the *fantastical* is not only the unreal, but the distorted combination of a disordered *fancy*. In sculpture or painting, drapery may be *fancifully* disposed: the showiness which would not be unbecoming in the dress of a young female, would be *fantastical* in that of an old woman.

FANCY. IMAGINATION.

From what has already been said on FANCY (*v. Conceit* and *fanciful*), the distinction between it and IMAGINATION, as operations of thought, will be obvious. *Fancy*, considered as a power, simply brings the object to the mind, or makes it appear; but *imagination*, from *image*, in Latin *imago*, or *imitago*, or *imitatio*, is a power which presents the images or likenesses of things. The *fancy*, therefore, only employs itself about things without regarding their nature; but the *imagination* aims at tracing a resemblance, and getting a true copy.

The *fancy* consequently forms combinations, either real or unreal, as chance may direct; but the *imagination* is seldom led astray. The *fancy* is busy in dreams, or when the mind is in a disordered state; but the *imagination* is supposed to act when the intellectual powers are in full play. The *fancy* is employed on light and trivial objects, which are present to the senses; the *imagination* soars above vulgar objects, and carries us from the world of matter into the world of spirits, from time present to the time to come. A milliner or mantua-maker may employ her *fancy* in the decorations of a cap or gown; but the poet's *imagination* depicts every thing grand, every thing bold, and every thing remote.

Although Mr. Addison has thought proper, for his convenience, to use the words *fancy* and *imagination* promiscuously when writing on this subject, yet the distinction, as above pointed out, has been observed both in fa-

miliar discourse and in writing. We say that we *fancy*, not that we *imagine*, that we see or hear something; the pleasures of the *imagination*, not of the *fancy*.

FARE, PROVISION.

FARE, from the German *fahren* to go or be, signifies in general the condition or thing that comes to one.

PROVISION, from *provide*, signifies the thing provided for one.

These terms are alike employed for the ordinary concerns of life, and may either be used in the limited sense for the food one procures, or in general for whatever necessary or convenience is procured: to the term *fare* is annexed the idea of accident; *provision* includes that of design: a traveller on the continent must frequently be contented with humble *fare*, unless he takes the precaution of carrying his *provisions* with him.

FARMER, HUSBANDMAN, AGRICULTURIST.

FARMER, from the Saxon *feorm* food, signifies one managing a *farm*, or cultivating the ground for a subsistence: HUSBANDMAN is one following *husbandry*, that is, the tillage of land by manual labour; the *farmer*, therefore, conducts the concern, and the *husbandman* labours under his direction: AGRICULTURIST, from the Latin *ager* a field, and *colo* to till, signifies any one engaged in the art of cultivation. The *farmer* is always a practitioner; the *agriculturist* may be a mere theorist; the *farmer* follows husbandry solely as a means of living; the *agriculturist* follows it as a science. Betwixt the *farmer* and the *agriculturist* there is the same difference as between practice and theory: the former may be assisted by the latter, so long as they can go hand in hand; but in the case of collision, the *farmer* will be of more service to himself and his country than the *agriculturist*; *farming* brings immediate profit from personal service; *agriculture* may only promise future, and consequently contingent advantages.

OF FASHION, OF QUALITY, OF DISTINCTION.

These epithets are employed promiscuously in colloquial discourse; but not with strict propriety: * by men of *fashion* are understood such men as live in the *fashionable* world, and keep the best company; by men of *quality* are understood men of rank or title; by men of *distinction* are under-

* Vide Trusler: „Of Fashion, Of Quality, Of Distinction.“

stood men of honourable superiority, whether by wealth, office, or pre-eminence in society.

Gentry and merchants, though not men of *quality*, may by their mode of living, be men of *fashion*; and by the office they hold in the state, they may likewise be men of *distinction*.

FASTIDIOUS, SQUEAMISH.

FASTIDIOUS, in Latin *fastidiosus* from *fastus* pride, signifies proudly nice, not easily pleased: SQUEAMISH, changed from *qualmish* or weak-stomached, signifies in the moral sense, foolishly sickly, easily disgusted.

A female is *fastidious* when she criticizes with over-nicety the dress or manners of her rival; she is *squeamish* in the choice of her own dress, company, words, &c. Whoever examines his own imperfections will cease to be *fastidious*; whoever restrains humour and caprice will cease to be *squeamish*.

FATIGUE, WEARINESS, LASSITUDE.

FATIGUE, from the Latin *fatigo*, that is *fatim* abundantly or powerfully, and *ago* to act, or *agito* to agitate, designates an effect from a powerful or stimulating cause.

WEARINESS, from *weary*, a frequentative of *wear*, marks an effect from a continued or repeated cause.

LASSITUDE, from the Latin *lassus*, changed from *laxus* relaxed, marks a state without specifying a cause.

Fatigue is an exhaustion of the animal or mental powers; *weariness* is a wearing out the strength, or breaking the spirits; *lassitude* is a general relaxation of the animal frame: the labourer experiences *fatigue* from the toils of the day; *weariness* attends the traveller who takes a long or pathless journey.

Lassitude is the consequence of a distempered system, sometimes brought on by an excess of *fatigue*, sometimes by sickness, and frequently by the action of the external air.

FAVOURABLE, PROPITIOUS.

In a former paragraph (v. *Auspicious*) I have shown *propitious* to be a species of the *favourable*, namely, the *favourable* as it springs from the design of an agent; what is *propitious*, therefore, is always *favourable*, but not *vice versa*: the *favourable* properly characterizes both persons and things; the *propitious*, in the proper sense, characterizes the person only: as applied to persons, an equal may be *favourable*; a superior only is *propitious*: the one may be

favourable only in inclination; the latter is *favourable* also in granting timely assistance. We may all wish to have our friends *favourable* to our projects; none but heathens expect to have a blind destiny *propitious*. In the improper sense, *propitious* may be applied to things with a similar distinction: whatever is well-disposed to us, and seconds our endeavours, or serves our purpose, is *favourable*; whatever efficaciously protects us, speeds our exertions, and decides our success, is *propitious* to us: on ordinary occasions, a wind is said to be *favourable* which carries us to the end of our voyage; but it is said to be *propitious* if the rapidity of our passage forwards any great purpose of our own.

FEARFUL. DREADFUL, FRIGHTFUL, TREMENDOUS, TERRIBLE. TERRIFIC, HORRIBLE, HORRID.

FEARFUL here signifies full of that which causes fear (*v. Alarm*): DREADFUL full of what causes dread (*v. Apprehension*); FRIGHTFUL, full of what causes fright (*v. Afraid*) or apprehension; TREMENDOUS, that which causes trembling; TERRIBLE, or TERRIFIC, causing terror (*v. Alarm*); HORRIBLE, or HORRID, causing horror. The application of these terms is easily to be discovered by these definitions: the first two affect the mind more than the senses; all the others affect the senses more than the mind: a contest is *fearful* when the issue is important, but the event doubtful; the thought of death is *dreadful* to one who feels himself unprepared. The *frightful* is less than the *tremendous*; the *tremendous* than the *terrible*; the *terrible* than the *horrible*: shrieks may be *frightful*, thunder and lightning may be *tremendous*, the roaring of a lion is *terrible*; the glare of his eye *terrific*; the actual spectacle of killing is *horrible* or *horrid*. In their general application, these terms are often employed promiscuously to characterize whatever produces very strong impressions; hence we may speak of a *frightful*, *dreadful*, *terrible*, or *horrid* dream; or a *frightful*, *dreadful*, or *terrible* tempest; *dreadful*, *terrible*, or *horrid* consequences.

FEAST. BANQUET, CAROUSAL, ENTERTAINMENT, TREAT.

As FEASTS, in the religious sense, from *festus*, are always days of leisure, and frequently of public rejoicing, this word has been applied to any social meal for the purposes of pleasure: this is the idea common to the signification of all these words, of which *feast* seems to be the most general; and for all of which it may frequently be

substituted, although they have each a distinct application: *feast* conveys the idea merely of enjoyment: BANQUET is a splendid *feast*, attended with pomp and state; it is a term of noble use, particularly adapted to poetry and the high style: CAROUSAL, in French *carrouse*, in German *geräusch* or *rausch* intoxication, from *rauschen* to intoxicate, is a drunken *feast*: ENTERTAINMENT and TREAT convey the idea of hospitality.

A *feast* may be given by princes or their subjects, by nobility or commonalty: the *banquet* is confined to men of high estate; and more commonly spoken of in former times, when ranks and distinctions were less blended than they are at present: A *feast* supposes indulgence of the appetite, both in eating and drinking, but not intemperately; a *carousal* is confined mostly to drinking, and that to an excess: a *feast*, therefore, is always a good thing, unless it ends in a *carousal*: a *feast* may be given by one or many, at private or public expense; but an *entertainment* and a *treat* are altogether personal acts, and the terms are never used but in relation to the agents: every *entertainment* is a *feast* as far as respects enjoyment at a social board; but a *feast* is not an *entertainment* unless there be some individual who specifically provides for the *entertainment* of others: we may all be partakers of a *feast*, but we are guests at an *entertainment*: an *entertainment* is given between friends and equals, to keep alive the social affections; a *treat* is given by way of favour to those whom one wishes to oblige: a nobleman provides an *entertainment* for a particular party whom he has invited; he gives a *treat* to his servants, his tenants, his tradespeople, or the poor of his neighbourhood.

Feast, *entertainment*, and *treat*, are taken in a more extended sense, to express other pleasures besides those of the table: *feast* retains its signification of a vivid pleasure, such as voluptuaries derive from delicious viands; *entertainment* and *treat* retain the idea of being granted by way of courtesy; we speak of a thing as being a *feast* or high delight; and of a person contributing to one's *entertainment*, or giving one a *treat*. To a mind ardent in the pursuit of knowledge, an easy access to a well-stocked library is a continual *feast*: men of a happy temper give and receive *entertainment* with equal facility; they afford *entertainment* to their guests by the easy cheerfulness which they impart to every thing around them; they in like manner derive *entertainment* from every thing they see, or hear, or observe: a *treat* is given or received only

on particular occasions; it depends on the relative circumstances and tastes of the giver and receiver; to one of a musical turn one may give a *treat* by inviting him to a musical party; and to one of an intelligent turn it will be equally a *treat* to be of the party which consists of the enlightened and conversable.

FEAST, FESTIVAL, HOLIDAY.

FEAST, in Latin *festum*, or *festus*, changed most probably from *fesia* and *feria*, which latter, in all probability, comes from the Greek *ισααι* sacred, because these days were kept sacred or vacant from all secular labour: FESTIVAL and HOLIDAY, as the words themselves denote, have precisely the same meaning in their original sense, with this difference, that the former derives its origin from heathenish superstition, the latter owes its rise to the establishment of Christianity in its reformed state.

A *feast*, in the Christian sense of the word, is applied to every day which is regarded as sacred, and observed with particular solemnity, except Sundays; a *holyday*, or, according to its modern orthography, a *holiday*, is simply a day on which ordinary business is suspended: among the Roman Catholics, there are many days which are kept holy, and consequently by them denominated *feasts*, which in the English reformed church are only observed as *holidays*, or days of exemption from public business; of this description are the Saints' days, on which the public offices are shut: on the other hand, Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide, are regarded in both churches more as *feasts* than as *holidays*.

Feast, as a technical term, is applied only to certain specified *holidays*; a *holiday* is an indefinite term, it may be employed for any day or time in which there is a suspension of business; there are, therefore, many *feasts* where there are no *holidays*, and many *holidays*, where there are no *feasts*; a *feast* is altogether sacred; a *holiday* has frequently nothing sacred in it, not even in its cause; it may be a simple, ordinary transaction, the act of an individual: a *festival* has always either a sacred or a serious object. A *feast* is kept by idleness; a *festival* is kept by mirth and festivity; some *feasts* are *festivals*, as in the case of the carnival at Rome; some *festivals* are *holidays*, as in the case of weddings and public thanksgivings.

TO FEEL, BE SENSIBLE, CONSCIOUS.

From the simple idea of a sense, the word FEEL has acquired the most extensive signification and application in our language,

and may be employed indifferently for all the other terms, but not in all cases: to *feel* is said of the whole frame inwardly and outwardly: it is the accompaniment of existence: to BE SENSIBLE, from the Latin *sentio*, is said only of the senses. It is the property of all living creatures to *feel* pleasure and pain in a greater or less degree: those creatures which have not the sense of hearing will not *be sensible* of sounds.

In the moral application, to *feel* is peculiarly the property or act of the heart; to *be sensible* is that of the understanding: an ingenuous mind *feels* pain when it is *sensible* of having committed an error: one may, however, *feel* as well as *be sensible* by means of the understanding; a person *feels* the value of another's service; is *sensible* of his kindness: one *feels* or is *sensible* of what passes outwardly; one is CONSCIOUS only of what passes inwardly, from *con* or *cum* and *scio* to know to one's self: we *feel* the force of another's remark; we are *sensible* of the evil which must spring from the practice of vice; we are *conscious* of having fallen short of our duty.

FEELING, SENSATION, SENSE.

FEELING and SENSATION express either the particular act, or the general property of *feeling*; SENSE expresses the general property, or the particular mode of *feeling*. *Feeling* is, as before said (v. *To feel*), the general, *sensation* and *sense* are the special terms: *feeling* is either physical or moral; *sensation* is mostly physical; *sense* physical in the general, and moral in the particular application.

We speak either of the *feeling* or *sensation* of cold, the *feeling* or *sense* of virtue: it is not easy to describe the *feelings* which are excited by the cutting of cork or the sharpening of a saw; the *sensation* which pervades the frame after bathing is exceedingly grateful to one who is accustomed to the water: the pleasures of *sense* are not comparable with those of intellect.

The term *feeling* is most adapted to ordinary discourse; that of *sensation* is better suited to the grave and scientific style: a child may talk of an unpleasant *feeling*; a professional man talks of the *sensation* of giddiness, a gnawing *sensation* or of *sensations* from the rocking of a vessel, the motion of a carriage, and the like: it is our duty to command and curb our *feelings*; it is folly to watch every passing *sensation*.

The *feeling*, in a moral sense, has its seat in the heart; it is transitory and variable: *sense* has its seat in the understanding; it is permanent and regular. We may have

feelings of anger, ill-will, envy, and the like, which cannot be too quickly overpowered, and succeeded by those of love, charity, and benevolence; although there is no *feeling*, however good, which does not require to be kept under control by a proper *sense* of religion.

FEELING, SENSIBILITY, SUSCEPTIBILITY.

FEELING, in the present case, is taken for a positive characteristic, namely, the property of *feeling* (v. *To feel*) in a strong degree; in this sense *feeling* expresses either a particular act, or an habitual property of the mind.

SENSIBILITY is always taken in the sense of a habit. Traits of *feeling* in young people are happy omens in the estimation of the preceptor: an exquisite *sensibility* is not a desirable gift; it creates an infinite disproportion of pain. *Feeling* and *sensibility* are here taken as moral properties, which are awakened as much by the operations of the mind within itself as by external objects: SUSCEPTIBILITY from the Latin *suscipio* to take or receive, designates that property of the body or the mind which consists in being ready to take an affection from external objects; hence we speak of a person's *susceptibility* to take cold, or his *susceptibility* to be affected with grief, joy, or any other passion: if an excess of *sensibility* be an evil, an excess of *susceptibility* is a still greater evil; it makes us slaves to every circumstance, however trivial, which comes under our notice.

TO FEIGN, PRETEND.

FEIGN, in Latin *figo* or *figo* comes from the Greek *πρω* to fix or stamp.

PRETEND, in Latin *praetendo*, signifies properly to stretch before, that is, to put on the outside.

These words may be used either for doing or saying; they are both opposed to what is true, but they differ from the motives of the agent: to *feign* is taken either in a bad or an indifferent sense; to *pretend* always in a bad sense: one *feigns* in order to gain some future end; a person *feigns* sickness in order to be excused from paying a disagreeable visit. One *pretends* in order to serve a present purpose; a child *pretends* to have lost his book who wishes to excuse himself for his idleness.

To *feign* consists often of a line of conduct; to *pretend* consists always of words: Ulysses *feigned* madness in order to escape from going to the Trojan war; according to Virgil, the Grecian Sinon *pretended* to be

a deserter come over to the Trojan camp: in matters of speculation, to *feign* is to invent by force of the imagination; to *pretend* is to set up by force of self-conceit: it is *feigned* by the poets that Orpheus went down into hell and brought back Euridice his wife; infidel philosophers *pretend* to account for the most mysterious things in nature upon natural, or, as they please to term it, rational principles.

TO FELICITATE, CONGRATULATE.

FELICITATE, from the Latin *felix*, happy, signifies to make happy, and is applicable only to ourselves; CONGRATULATE, from *gratus* pleasant or agreeable, is to make agreeable, and is applicable either to ourselves or others: we *felicitate* ourselves on having escaped the danger; we *congratulate* others on their good fortune.

FELLOWSHIP, SOCIETY.

Both these terms are employed to denote a close intercourse; but FELLOWSHIP is said of men as individuals, SOCIETY of them collectively: we should be careful not to hold *fellowship* with any one of bad character, or to join the *society* of those who profess bad principles.

FEMALE, FEMININE, EFFEMINATE.

FEMALE is said of the sex itself, and FEMININE of the characteristics of the sex. *Female* is opposed to male, *feminine* to masculine.

In the *female* character we expect to find that which is *feminine*. The *female* dress, manners, and habits, have engaged the attention of all essayists, from the time of Addison to the present period.

The *feminine* is natural to the *female*; the *effeminate* is unnatural to the male. A *feminine* air and voice, which is truly grateful to the observer in the one sex, is an odious mark of *effeminacy* in the other. Beauty and delicacy are *feminine* properties; robustness and vigour are masculine properties the former therefore when discovered in a man entitle him to the epithet of *effeminate*.

FENCE, GUARD, SECURITY.

FENCE, from the Latin *fendo*, to fend or keep off, denotes that which serves to prevent the attack of an external enemy. GUARD, which is but a variety of *ward*, from the German of *wahren* to see, and *wachen* to watch, signifies that which keeps from any danger. SECURITY implies that secures or prevents injury, mischief, and loss.

A *fence* in the proper sense is an inani-

mate object; a *guard* is a living agent; the former is of permanent utility, the latter acts to a partial extent; in the figurative sense they retain the same distinction. Modesty is a *fence* to a woman's virtue; the love of the subject is the monarch's greatest *safeguard*. The *guard* only stands at the entrance, to prevent the ingress of evil: the *security* stops up all the avenues, it locks them up with firmness. A *guard* serves to prevent the ingress of every thing that may have an evil intention or tendency: the *security* rather secures the possession of what one has, and prevents a loss.

FEROCIOUS, FIERCE, SAVAGE.

FEROCIOUS and FIERCE are both derived from the Latin *ferox*, which comes from *fera* a wild beast.

SAVAGE, *v. Cruel.*

Ferocity marks the untamed character of a cruel disposition: *fierceness* has a greater mixture of pride and anger in it, the word *fier* in French designating haughtiness: *savageness* marks a more permanent, but not so violent a sentiment of either cruelty or anger as the two former. *Ferocity* and *fierceness* are in common applied to the brutes, to designate their natural tempers: *savage* is mostly employed to designate the natural temper of man, when uncontrolled by the force of reason and a sense of religion. *Ferocity* is the natural characteristic of wild beasts; it is a delight in blood that needs no outward stimulus to call it into action; but it displays itself most strikingly in the moment when the animal is going to grasp, or when in the act of devouring, its prey: *fierceness* may be provoked in many creatures, but it does not discover itself unless roused by some circumstance of aggravation; many animals become *fierce* by being shut up in cages: and exposed to the view of spectators: *savageness* is as natural a temper in the uncivilized man, as *ferocity* or *fierceness* in the brute; it does not wait for an enemy to attack, but is restless in search of some one whom it may make an enemy, and have an opportunity of destroying. It is an easy transition for the *savage* to become the *ferocious* cannibal, glutting himself in the blood of his enemies, or the *fierce* antagonist to one who sets himself up in opposition to him.

In an extended application of these terms, they bear the same relation to each other: the countenance may be either *ferocious*, *fierce*, or *savage*, according to circumstances. A robber who spends his life in the act of unlawfully shedding blood acquires a *ferocity* of countenance: a soldier who follows a

predatory and desultory mode of warfare betrays the licentiousness of his calling, and his undisciplined temper, in the *fierceness* of his countenance: the tyrant whose enjoyment consists in inflicting misery on his dependants or subjects evinces the *savageness* of his temper by the *savage* joy with which he witnesses their groans and tortures.

FERTILE, FRUITFUL, PROLIFIC.

FERTILE, in Latin *fertilis*, from *fero* to bear, signifies capable of bearing or bringing to light.

FRUITFUL signifies full of *fruit*, or containing within itself much *fruit*.

PROLIFIC is compounded of *proles* and *facio* to make a progeny.

Fertile expresses in its proper sense the faculty of sending forth from itself that which is not of its own nature, and is peculiarly applicable to the ground which causes every thing within itself to grow up. *Fruitful* expresses a state containing or possessing abundantly that which is of the same nature; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to trees, plants, vegetables, and whatever is said to bear fruit. *Prolific* expresses the faculty of generating; it conveys therefore the idea of what is creative, and is peculiarly applicable to animals.

We may say that the ground is either *fertile* or *fruitful*, but not *prolific*: we may speak of a female of any species being *fruitful* and *prolific* but not *fertile*; we may speak of nature as being *fruitful*, but neither *fertile* nor *prolific*. A country is *fertile* as it respects the quality of the soil; it is *fruitful* as it respects the abundance of its produce; it is possible, therefore, for a country to be *fruitful* by the industry of its inhabitants, which was not *fertile* by nature.

An animal is said to be *fruitful* as it respects the number of young which it has; it is said to be *prolific* as it respects its generative power. Some women are more *fruitful* than others; but there are many animals more *prolific* than human creatures. The lands in Egypt are rendered *fertile* by means of mud which they receive from the overflowing of the Nile: they consequently produce harvests more *fruitful* than in almost any other country: there are some insects, particularly amongst the noxious tribes, which are so *prolific*, that they are not many hours in being before they begin to breed.

In the figurative application they admit of a similar distinction. A man is *fertile* in expedients who readily contrives upon the spur of the occasion; he is *fruitful* in resources who has them ready at hand; his

brain is *prolific* if it generates an abundance of new conceptions. A mind is *fertile* which has powers that admit of cultivation and expansion: an imagination is *fruitful* that is rich in stores of imagery; a genius is *prolific* that is rich in invention. Females are *fertile* in expedients and devices: ambition and avarice are *fruitful* sources of discord and misery; novel-writers are the most *prolific* class of authors.

FERVOUR, ARDOUR.

FERVOUR, from *ferveo* to boil, is not so violent a heat as ARDOUR, from *ardeo* to burn. The affections are properly *fervent*; the passions are *ardent*: we are *fervent* in feeling, and *ardent* in acting: the *fervour* of devotion may be rational; but the *ardour* of zeal is mostly intemperate. The first martyr, Stephen, was filled with a holy *fervour*: St Peter, in the *ardour* of his zeal, promised his master to do more than he was able to perform.

FESTIVITY, MIRTH.

There is commonly MIRTH with FESTIVITY, but there may be frequently *mirth* without *festivity*. The *festivity* lies in the outward circumstances; *mirth* in the temper of the mind. *Festivity* is rather the producer of *mirth*, than the *mirth* itself. *Festivity* includes the social enjoyments of eating, drinking, dancing, cards, and other pleasures: *mirth* includes in it the buoyancy of spirits, which is engendered by a participation in such pleasures.

FICTION, FABRICATION. FALSEHOOD.

FICTION is opposed to what is real; FABRICATION and FALSEHOOD to what is true. *Fiction* relates what may be, though not what is: *fabrication* and *falsehood* relate what is not as what is, and *vice versâ*. *Fiction* serves for amusement and instruction: *fabrication* and *falsehood* serve to mislead and deceive. *Fiction* and *fabrication* both require invention: *falsehood* consists of simple contradiction. In an extended sense of the word *fiction*, it approaches still nearer to the sense of *fabricate*, when said of the *fictions* of the ancients, which were delivered as truth, although admitted now to be false: the motive of the narrator is what here constitutes the difference; namely, that in the former case he believes what he relates to be true, in the latter he knows it to be false. The heathen mythology consists principally of the *fictions* of the poets: newspapers commonly abound in *fabrication*.

As epithets, *fictitious* and *false* are very

closely allied; for what is *fictitious* is *false*, though all that is *false* is not *fictitious*; the *fictitious* is that which has been feigned, or *falsely* made by some one; the *false* is simply that which is *false* by the nature of the thing: the *fictitious* account is therefore the invention of an individual, whose veracity is thereby impeached; but there may be many *false* accounts unintentionally circulated.

FIGURE, METAPHOR, ALLEGORY, EMBLEM, SYMBOL, TYPE.

FIGURE, in Latin *figura*, from *figo* to feign, signifies any thing painted or feigned by the mind.

METAPHOR, in Greek *μεταφορα*, from *μεταφερω* to transfer, signifies a transfer of one object to another.

ALLEGORY, in Greek *αλληγορια*, from *αλλος* another, and *αγορευω* to relate, signifies the relation of something under a borrowed term.

EMBLEM, in Greek *εμβλημα*, from *εμβαλλω* to impress, signifies the thing stamped on as a mark.

SYMBOL, from the Greek *συμβαλλω* to consider attentively, signifies the thing cast or conceived in the mind, from its analogy to represent something else.

TYPE, in Greek *τυπος*, from *τυπω* to strike or stamp, signifies the image of something that is stamped on something else.

Likeness between two objects, by which one is made to represent the other, is the common idea in the signification of these terms. *Figure* is the most general of these terms, comprehending every thing which is *figured* by means of the imagination; the rest are but modes of the *figure*. The *figure* consists either in words or in things generally: we may have a *figure* in expression, a *figure* on paper, a *figure* on wood or stone, and the like.

The *metaphor* and *allegory* consist of a representation by means of words only: the *figure*, in this case, is any representation which the mind makes to itself of a resemblance between objects, which is properly a *figure* of thought, which when clothed in words is a *figure* of speech: the *metaphor* is a *figure* of speech of the simplest kind, by which a word acquires other meanings besides that which is originally affixed to it; as when the term *head*, which properly signifies a part of the body, is applied to the leader of an army. The *allegory* is a continued *metaphor* where attributes, modes, and actions, are applied to the objects thus *figured*, as in the *allegory* of sin and death in Milton.

The *emblem* is that sort of *figure* of thought by which we make corporeal objects to stand for moral properties; thus the dove is represented as the *emblem* of meekness, or the beehive is made the *emblem* of industry.

The *symbol* is that species of *emblem* which is converted into a constituted sign among men; thus the olive and laurel are the *symbols* of peace, and have been recognised as such among barbarous as well as enlightened nations.

The *type* is that species of *emblem* by which one object is made to represent another mystically; it is, therefore, only employed in religious matters, particularly in relation to the coming, the office, and the death of our Saviour; in this manner the offering of Isaac is considered as a *type* of our Saviour's offering himself as an atoning sacrifice.

FINAL, CONCLUSIVE.

FINAL, in French *final*, Latin *finalis* from *finis* the end, signifies having an end.

CONCLUSIVE (*v. Conclusive*) signifies shutting up, or coming to a conclusion.

Final designates simply the circumstance of being the last; *conclusive* the mode of finishing or coming to the last; a determination is *final* which is to be succeeded by no other; a reasoning is *conclusive* that puts a stop to farther question. The *final* is arbitrary; it depends upon the will to make it so or not: the *conclusive* is relative; it depends upon the circumstances and the understanding: a person gives a *final* answer at option; but in order to make an answer *conclusive* it must be satisfactory to all parties.

TO FIND, FIND OUT, ESPY, DESCRYP.

FIND, in German *finden*, &c. is most probably connected with the Latin *venio*, signifying to come in the way.

DISCOVER, *v. To detect*.

ESPY, in French *espier*, comes from the Latin *espicio*, signifying to see a thing out.

DESCRY, from the Latin *discerno*, signifies to distinguish a thing from others.

To *find* signifies simply to come within sight of a thing, which is the general idea attached to all these terms: they vary, however, either in the mode of the action or in the object. What we *find* may become visible to us by accident, but what we *find out* is the result of an effort. We may *find* any thing as we pass along in the streets; but we *find out* mistakes in an account by

carefully going over it. What is *found* may have been lost to ourselves, but visible to others. What is *discovered* is always remote and unknown, and when *discovered* is something new. A piece of money may be *found* lying on the ground; but a mine is *discovered* under ground. When Captain Cook *discovered* the islands in the South Sea, many plants and animals were *found*. What has once been *discovered* cannot be *discovered* again; but what is *found* may be many times *found*. *Find out* and *discover* differ principally in the application; the former being applied to familiar, and the latter to scientific objects: scholars *find out* what they have to learn; men of research *discover* what escapes the notice of others.

To *espy* is a species of *finding out*, namely, to *find out* what is secluded or retired: and *descry* is a species of *discovering*, or observing at a distance, or among a number of objects. An astronomer *discovers* fresh stars or planets; he *finds* those on particular occasions which have been already *discovered*. A person *finds out* by continued enquiry any place to which he had been wrong directed; he *espies* an object which lies concealed in a corner or secret place: he *descries* a horseman coming down a hill.

Find and *discover* may be employed with regard to objects, either of a corporeal or intellectual kind; *espy* and *descry* only with regard to sensible objects of corporeal vision: *find*, either for those that are external or internal; *discover*, only for those that are external. The distinction between them is the same as before; we *find* by simple enquiry; we *discover* by reflection and study: we *find* or *find out* the motives which influence a person's conduct; we *discover* the reasons or causes of things: the *finding* serves the particular purpose of the *finder*; the *discovery* serves the purpose of science, by adding to the stock of general knowledge.

When *find* is used as a purely intellectual operation, it admits of a new view, in relation both to *discover* and to *invent*, as may be seen in the following article.

TO FIND, FIND OUT, DISCOVER, INVENT.

FIND, *v. To find*.

DISCOVER, *v. To discover*.

INVENT, in Latin *inventum* from *invenio*, signifies to come at or light upon.

To *find* or *find out* is said of things which do not exist in the forms in which a person combines them: to *discover* is said of that which is new made or modelled. The merit of *finding* or *inventing* consists in

newly applying or modifying the materials, which exist separately; the merit of *discovering* consists in removing the obstacles which prevent us from knowing the real nature of the thing: imagination and industry are requisite for *finding* or *inventing*; acuteness and penetration for *discovering*. A person *finds* reasons for justifying himself: he *discovers* traits of a bad disposition in another. Cultivated minds *find* sources of amusement within themselves, or a prisoner *finds* means of escape. Many traces of a universal deluge have been *discovered*: the physician *discovers* the nature of a particular disorder.

Find is applicable to the operative arts *invent* to the mechanical; *discover* to the speculative. We speak of *finding* modes for performing actions, and effecting purposes; of *inventing* machines, instruments, and various matters of use or elegance: of *discovering* the operations and laws of nature. Many fruitless attempts have been made to *find* the longitude: men have not been so unsuccessful in *finding out* various arts, for communicating their thoughts, commemorating the exploits of their nations, and supplying themselves with luxuries: the astronomer *discovers* the motions of the heavenly bodies, by means of the telescope which has been *invented* for that purpose.

TO FIND FAULT WITH, BLAME, OBJECT TO.

All these terms denote not simply feeling, but also expressing, dissatisfaction with some person or thing. To FIND FAULT with signifies here to point out a *fault*, either in some person or thing; to BLAME is said only of the person; OBJECT is applied to the thing only; we *find fault* with a person for his behaviour: we *find fault* with our seat, our conveyance, and the like; we *blame* a person for his temerity or his improvidence; we *object* to a measure that is proposed. We *find fault* with or *blame* that which has been done; we *object* to that which is to be done.

Finding fault is a familiar action applied to matters of personal convenience or taste; *blame* and *object to*, particularly the latter, are applied to serious objects. *Finding fault* is often the fruit of a discontented temper; there are some who are ever ready to *find fault* with whatever comes in their way: *blame* is a matter of discretion; we *blame* frequently in order to correct: *objecting to* is an affair either of caprice or necessity: some *object to* that which is proposed to them merely from a spirit of op-

position; others *object to* a thing from substantial reasons.

FINE, DELICATE, NICE.

It is remarkable of the word FINE (*v. Beautiful*), that it is equally applicable to large and small objects: DELICATE, in Latin *delicatus*, from *deliciae* delights, and *delicio* to allure, is applied only to small objects. *Fine*, in the natural sense, denotes smallness in general. *Delicate* denotes a degree of *fineness* that is agreeable to the taste. Thread is said to be *fine* as opposed to the coarse and thick; silk is said to be *delicate*, when to *fineness* of texture it adds softness. The texture of a spider's web is remarkable for its *fineness*; that of the ermine's fur is remarkable for its *delicacy*. In writing, all up strokes must be *fine*; but in superior writing they will be *delicately fine*. When applied to colours, the *fine* is coupled with the bold and strong; *delicate* with what is faint, soft, and fair: black and red may be *fine* colours; white and pink *delicate* colours. The tulip is reckoned one of the *finest* flowers; the white moss-rose is a *delicate* flower. A *fine* painter delineates with boldness; but the artist who has a *delicate* taste, throws *delicate* touches into the grandest delineations.

In their moral application these terms admit of the same distinction: the *fine* approaches either to the strong or to the weak; the *delicate* is a high degree of the *fine*; as a *fine* thought, which may be lofty; or *fine* feeling, which is acute and tender; and *delicate* feeling, which exceeds the former in *fineness*.

Delicate is said of that which is agreeable to the sense and the taste; NICE to what is agreeable to the appetite: the former is a term of refinement; the latter of epicurism and sensual indulgence. The *delicate* affords pleasure only to those whose thoughts and desires are purified from what is gross; the *nice* affords pleasure to the young, the ignorant, and the sensual: thus *delicate* food, *delicate* colours, *delicate* shapes and form, are always acceptable to the cultivated; a meal, a show, a colour, and the like, which suits its appetite, or meets its fancy, will be *nice* to a child.

When used in a moral application *nice*, which is taken in a good sense, approaches nearer to the signification of *delicate*. A person may be said to have a *delicate* ear in music, whose ear is offended with the smallest discordance; he may be said to have a *nice* taste or judgment in music, who scientifically discriminates the beauties

and defects of different pieces. A person is *delicate* in his choice, who is guided by taste and feeling; he is *nice* in his choice who adheres to a strict rule.

A point in question may be either *delicate* or *nice*; it is *delicate*, as it is likely to touch the tender feelings of any party; it is *nice*, as it involves contrary interests, and becomes difficult of determination. There are *delicacies* of behaviour which minds of a refined cast are naturally alive to, without any particular learning; there are *nice-ties* in the law, which none but men of superior intellect can properly enter into and discriminate.

FINE, MULCT, PENALTY, FORFEITURE.

FINE, from the Latin *finis* the end or purpose, signifies, by an extended application, satisfaction by way of amends for an offence.

MULCT, in Latin *mulcta* comes from *mulgeo* to draw or wipe, because an offence is wiped off by money.

PENALTY, in Latin *paenalitas*, from *paena* a pain, signifies what gives pain by way of punishment.

FORFEITURE, from *forfeit*, in French *forfait*, from *forfaire*, signifies to do away or lose by doing wrong.

The *fine* and *mulct* are alway pecuniary; a *penalty* may be pecuniary; a *forfeiture* consists of any personal property: the *fine* and *mulct* are imposed; the *penalty* is inflicted or incurred: the *forfeiture* is incurred.

The violation of a rule or law is attended with a *fine* or *mulct*, but the former is a term of general use; the latter is rather a technical term in law: a criminal offence incurs a *penalty*; negligence of duty occasions a *forfeiture*.

A *fine* or *mulct* serves either as punishment to the offender. or as an amends for the offence: a *penalty* always inflicts some kind of pain as a punishment on the offender: a *forfeiture* is attended with loss as a punishment to the delinquent. Among the Chinese, all offences are punished with *finer* or flogging: the Roman Catholics were formerly subject to *penalties* if detected in the performance of their religious worship; societies subject their members to *forfeitures* for the violation of their laws.

FINICAL, SPRUCE, FOPPISH.

These epithets are applied to such as attempt at finery by improper means. The FINICAL is insignificantly fine; the SPRUCE is laboriously and artfully fine; the FOPPISH is fantastically and affectedly fine.

Finical is said mostly of manners and speech; *spruce* is said of the dress; *foppish* of dress and manners.

A *finical* gentleman clips his words and screws his body into as small a compass as possible to give himself the air of a delicate person: a *spruce* gentleman strives not to have a fold wrong in his frill or cravat, nor a hair of his head amiss: a *foppish* gentleman seeks by extravagance in the cut of his clothes, and by the tawdriness in their ornaments, to render himself distinguished for finery. A little mind, full of conceit of itself, will lead a man to be *finical*: a vacant mind that is anxious to be pleasing will not object to the employment of rendering the person *spruce*: a giddy, vain mind, eager after applause, impels a man to *foppery*.

FINITE, LIMITED.

FINITE, from *finis* an end, is the natural property of things; and LIMITED, from *limes* a boundary, is the artificial property; the former is opposite only to the *infinite*; but the latter, which lies within the *finite*, is opposed to the *unlimited* or the *infinite*. The world is *finite*, and space *infinite*; the power of a prince is *limited*. It is not in our power to extend the bounds of the *finite*, but the *limited* is mostly under our control. We are *finite* beings, and our capacities are variously *limited* either by nature or circumstance.

FIRE, HEAT, WARMTH, GLOW.

In the proper sense these words are easily distinguished, but not so easily in the improper sense; and as the latter depends principally upon the former, it is not altogether useless to enter into some explanation of their physical meaning.

FIRE is with regard to HEAT as the cause to the effect; it is itself an inherent property in some material bodies, and when in action communicates *heat*: * *fire* is perceptible to us by the eye, as well as the touch; *heat* is perceptible only by feeling; we distinguish *fire* by means of the flame it sends forth, or by the changes which it produces upon other bodies; but we discover *heat* only by the sensations which it produces in ourselves.

Fire has within itself the power of communicating *heat* to other bodies at a distance from it; but *heat*, when it lies in bodies without *fire*, is not communicable, or even perceptible, except by coming in contact with the body. *Fire* is producible in

* Vide Eberhard: „Hitze, Feuer, Wärme.“

some bodies at pleasure, and when in action will communicate itself without any external influence; but *heat* is always to be produced and kept in being by some external agency: *fire* spreads; but *heat* dies away. *Fire* is producible only in certain bodies; but *heat* may be produced in many more bodies: *fire* may be elicited from a flint, or from wood, steel, and some few other materials; but *heat* is producible, or exists in a greater or less degree, in all material substances.

Heat and WARMTH differ principally in degree; the latter being a gentle degree of the former. The term *heat* is, however, in its most extensive sense, applicable to that universal principle which pervades all nature, and seems to vivify the whole; it is this principle which appears either under the form of *fire*, or under the more commonly conceived form of *heat*, as it is generally understood, and as I have here considered it. *Heat* in this limited sense is less active than *fire*, and more active than *warmth*: the former is produced in bodies, either by the violent action of *fire*, as in the boiling of water, the melting of lead, or the violent friction of two hard bodies; the latter is produced by the simple expulsion of cold, as in the case of feathers, wool, and other substances, which produce and retain *warmth*.

Heat may be the greatest possible remove, but *warmth* may be the smallest possible remove, from cold; the latter is opposed to coolness, which borders on cold. *Heat* is what which to our feelings is painful; but *warmth* is that which is always grateful. In animate bodies *fire* cannot long exist; as it is in its nature consuming and destructive; it is incompatible with animal life: *heat* will not exist, unless when the body is in a diseased or disordered state; but *warmth* is that portion of *heat* which exists in every healthy subject. GLOW is a partial *heat* or *warmth* which exists mostly in the human frame; it is commonly produced in the body when it is in its most vigorous state, and the nerves are firmly braced by the cold.

From the above analysis the figurative application of these terms, and the grounds upon which they are so employed, will be easily discerned. As *fire* is the strongest and most active principle in nature, which seizes every thing within its reach with the greatest possible rapidity, genius is said to be possessed of *fire*, which flies with rapidity through all the regions of thought, and forms the most lively images and combinations; but when *fire* is applied to the

eye or the looks, it borrows its meaning from the external property of the flame, which is very aptly depicted in the eye or the looks of lively people. As *heat* is always excessive and mostly violent, those commotions and fermentations of the mind which flow from the agitation of the angry passions, are termed *heat*. As *warmth* is a gentle and grateful property, it has with most propriety been ascribed to the affections. As *glow* is a partial but vivid feeling of the body, so is friendship a strong but particular affection of the mind; hence the propriety of ascribing a *glow* to friendship.

Age damps the *fire* of the poet. Disputants in the *heat* of contest are apt to forget the forms of good breeding. A man of tender moral feelings speaks with *warmth* of a noble action, or takes *warm* interest in the concerns of the innocent and the distressed. A youth in the full *glow* of friendship feels himself prepared to make any sacrifices in supporting the cause of his friend.

FIRM, FIXED, SOLID, STABLE.

FIRM, *v. Constancy.*

FIXED denotes the state of being *fixed*.

SOLID, in Latin *solidus*, comes from *solum* the ground, which is the most solid thing existing.

STABLE, *v. Constancy.*

That is *firm* which is not easily shaken; that is *fixed* which is fastened to something else, and not easily torn; that is *solid* which is able to bear, and does not easily give way; that is *stable* which is able to make a stand against resistance, or the effects of time. A pillar which is *firm* on its base, *fixed* to a wall of *solid* masonry, is likely to be *stable*. A man stands *firm* in battle who does not flinch from the attack: he is *fixed* to a spot by the order of his commander. An army of *firm* men form a *solid* mass, and by their heroism may deserve the most *stable* monument that can be erected.

In the moral sense, *firmness* is used only for the purpose, or such actions as depend on the purpose; *fixed* is used either for the mind, or for outward circumstances; *solid* is applicable to things in general, in an absolute sense; *stable* is applicable to things in a relative sense. Decrees are more or less *firm*, according to the source from which they spring; none are *firm*, compared with those which arise from the will of the Almighty: laws are *fixed* in proportion as they are connected with a constitution in which it is difficult to innovate. That which is *solid* is so of its own nature, but does not admit of degrees: a *solid* reason has within itself an independent property,

which cannot be increased or diminished. That which is *stable* is so by comparison with that which is of less duration; the characters of some men are more *stable* than those of others; youth will not have so *stable* a character as manhood.

A friendship is *firm* when it does not depend upon the opinion of others; it is *fixed* when the choice is made and grounded in the mind; it is *solid* when it rests on the only *solid* basis of accordancy in virtue and religion; it is *stable* when it is not liable to decrease with time.

FIT, APT, MEET.

FIT (*v. Becoming*) is either an acquired or a natural property; APT, in Latin *aptus*, from the Greek *απτω* to connect, is a natural property; MEET, from to meet or measure, signifying measured, is a moral quality. A house is *fit* for the accommodation of the family according to the plan of the builder; the young mind is *apt* to receive either good or bad impressions. *Meet* is a term of rare use, except in spiritual matters or in poetry it is *meet* to offer our prayers to the supreme Disposer of all things.

TO FIT, EQUIP, PREPARE, QUALIFY.

To FIT (*v. Fit, becoming*) signifies to adopt means in order to make *fit*, and conveys the general sense of all the other terms; they differ principally in the means and circumstances of *fitting*: to EQUIP is to *fit* out by furnishing the necessary materials: to PREPARE, from the Latin *praepero*, compounded of *prae* and *pero* to get before hand, is to take steps for the purpose of *fitting* in future; to QUALIFY, from the Latin *qualifico* or *qualis* and *facio* to make a thing as it should be, is to *fit* or furnish with the moral requisites.

To *fit* is employed for ordinary cases; to *equip* is employed only for expeditions: they may be both applied to the same objects, but with this distinction that a vessel is *equipped* when it is furnished with every thing requisite for a voyage. It is *fitted* by simply putting those things to it which have been temporarily removed.

The word *equip* is also used figuratively: the religious man is *equipped* for the storm as well as the calm in this dubious navigation of life.

To *fit* is for an immediate purpose: to *prepare* is for a remote purpose. A person *fits* himself for taking orders when he is at the university: he *prepares* himself at school before he goes to the university. To *fit* is to adopt positive and decisive measures; to *prepare* is to use those which are only pre-

carious: a scholar *fits* himself for reading Horace by reading Virgil with attention; he *prepares* for an examination by going over what he has already learnt. To *fit* is said of every thing, both in a natural and a moral sense: to *qualify* is used only in a moral sense.

Fit is employed mostly for acquirements which are gained by labour; *qualify* for those which are gained by intellectual exertion: a youth *fits* himself for a mechanical business by working at it; a youth *qualifies* himself for a profession by following a particular course of studies.

TO FIT, SUIT, ADAPT, ACCOMMODATE, ADJUST.

FIT signifies to make or be *fit* (*v. Becoming*).

SUIT signifies to make or be *suitable* (*v. To agree*).

ADAPT, from *aptus* *fit*, signifies to make *fit* for a specific purpose.

ACCOMMODATE signifies to make *commodious* (*v. Commodious*).

ADJUST signifies to make a thing just as it is desired to be.

To *fit* is to provide one's self with the requisite qualification; to *suit* is to provide the thing with the *suitable* or agreeable qualities: we *fit* ourselves for the thing; we *suit* the thing to ourselves. A good education *fits* a person for any office or station; an easy and contented mind is easily *suit*ed with the things that offer. To *fit*, in the intransitive sense, is said of things in general as they respect each other; *suit* mostly of things as they respect the moral agent. In a mechanical and literal sense, things *fit* each other. as the shoe *fits* the foot, or the coat the body; and also in the moral sense, there is a manifest *fitness* in all things which we term right and just: things, whether of a corporeal or spiritual nature, are said to *suit* the taste of a person; thus, a particular house, situation, company, and the like, may *suit* one person more than another.

To *adapt* is a species of *fitting*; to *accommodate* is a species of *suiting*; both applied to the moral actions of conscious beings. *Adaptation* is an act of the judgment; *accommodation* is an act of the will: we *adapt* by an exercise of discretion; we *accommodate* by a management of the humours: an *adaptation* does not interfere with our interests; but an *accommodation* always supposes a sacrifice: we *adapt* our language to the understandings of our hearers; we *accommodate* ourselves to the *humours* of others. The mind of an infinitely wise

Creator is clearly evinced in the world, by the universal *adaptation* of means to their ends; a spirit of *accommodation* is not merely a characteristic of politeness: it is of sufficient importance to be ranked among the Christian duties.

Accommodate and *adjust* are both applied to the affairs of men which require to be kept, or put, in right order: but the former implies the keeping as well as putting in order; the latter simply the putting in order. Men *accommodate* each other, that is, make things commodious for each other: but they *adjust* things either for themselves or for others. Thus they *accommodate* each other in pecuniary matters; or they *adjust* the ceremonial of a visit. On this ground we may say that a difference is either *accommodated* or *adjusted*: for it is *accommodated*, inasmuch as the parties yield to each other; it is *adjusted*, inasmuch as that which was wrong is set right.

TO FIX, FASTEN, STICK.

FIX, *v.* To *fix*, *settle*.

FASTEN is to make *fast*,

STICK is to make *stick* (*v.* *Stick*).

Fix is a generic term; *fasten* and *stick* are but modes of *fixing*: we *fix* whatever we make to remain in a given situation; we *fasten* if we *fix* it firmly: we *stick* when we *fix* a thing by means of *sticking*. A post is *fixed* in the ground: it is *fastened* to a wall by a nail; it is *stuck* to another board by means of glue. Shelves are *fixed*: a horse is *fastened* to a gate: bills are *stuck*.

TO FIX, SETTLE, ESTABLISH.

FIX, in Latin *fixi* perfect of *fixo*, and in Greek *ῥέγω*, signifies simply to make a thing keep its place.

SETTLE, which is a frequentative of *set*, signifies to make to sit or be at rest.

ESTABLISH, from the Latin *stabilis*, signifies to make stable or keep its ground.

Fix is the general and indefinite term: to *settle* and *establish* are to *fix*, strongly. *Fix* and *settle* are applied either to material or spiritual objects, *establish* only to moral objects. A post may be *fixed* in the ground in any manner, but it requires time for it to *settle*. A person may either *fix* himself, *settle* himself or *establish* himself: the first case refers simply to his taking up his abode, or choosing a certain spot; the second refers to his permanency of stay; and the third to the business which he raises or renders permanent.

The same distinction exists between these words in their farther application to the conduct of men. We may *fix* one or many

points, important or unimportant,—it is a mere act of the will; we *settle* many points of importance; it is an act of deliberation: thus we *fix* the day and hour of doing a thing; we *settle* the affairs of our family: so likewise to *fix* is properly the act of one; to *settle* may be the joint act of many: thus a parent *fixes* on a business for his child, or he *settles* the marriage contract with another parent. To *fix* and *settle* are personal acts, and the objects are mostly of a private nature: but *establish* is an indirect action, and the object mostly of a public nature: thus we *fix* our opinions; we *settle* our minds; or we are instrumental in *establishing* laws, institutions, and the like.

TO FIX, DETERMINE, SETTLE, LIMIT.

To FIX (*v.* To *fix*, *settle*) is here the general term; to DETERMINE (*v.* To *decide*); to SETTLE (*v.* *fix*); to LIMIT (*v.* To *bound*); are here modes of *fixing*. They all denote the acts of conscious agents, but differ in the object and circumstances of the action: we may *fix* any object by any point, we may *fix* material objects or spiritual objects, we may *fix* either by means of our senses, or our thoughts; but we can *determine* only by means of our thoughts. In distinction from the rest, to *fix* is said in regard to a single point or line.

To *determine* is always said of one or more points, or a whole. We *fix* where a thing shall begin; but we *determine* where it shall begin and where it shall end, which way, and how far it shall go, and the like; thus we may *fix* our eye upon a star, or we *fix* our minds upon a particular branch of astronomy; but we *determine* the distance of the heavenly bodies, or the specific gravity of bodies, and the like, upon philosophical principles. So in morals we may *fix* the day and hour; but we *determine* the mode of doing.

Determine is to *settle* as a means to the end; we commonly *determine* all subordinate matters, in order to *settle* a matter finally: thus, the *determination* of a single cause will serve to *settle* all other differences.

The *determination* respects the act of the individual who *fixes* certain points and brings them to a term; the *settlement* respects simply the conclusion of the affair, or the termination of all dispute and question.

To *determine* and *limit* both signify to *fix* boundaries; but the former respects only such boundaries as are drawn by the mind within itself, or by the nature of things, as we determine the height, length, or breadth of an object, the view is *determined* by some intervening object. The word *limit*

also includes the idea of *fixing* the boundaries, so that they cannot be extended, as to *limit* a price, or to *limit* one's time.

TO FLAG. DROOP, LANGUISH, PINE.

To FLAG is to hang down loose like a *flag*.

DROOP, *v.* To fall,

To LANGUISH is to become or continue languid (*v.* Faint).

To PINE, from the German *pein*, pain, is to be or continue in pain.

In the proper application, nothing *flags* but that which can be distended and made to flutter by the wind, as the leaves of plants when they are in want of water or in a weakly condition; hence figuratively the spirits are said to *flag*: nothing is said to *droop* but that of which the head *flags* or *drops*; the snowdrop *droops*, and flowers will generally *droop* from excess of drought or heat: the spirits in the same manner are said to *droop*, which expresses more than to *flag*; the human body also *droops* when the strength fails: *languish* is a still stronger expression than *droop*, and is applicable principally to persons; some *languish* in sickness, some in prison, and some in a state of distress: to *pine* is to be in a state of wearing pain which is mostly of a mental nature; a child may *pine* when absent from all its friends, and supposing itself deserted.

FLAME, BLAZE, FLASH, FLARE, GLARE.

FLAME, in Latin *flamma*, from the Greek *φλεγω* to burn, signifies the luminous exhalation emitted from fire.

BLAZE, from the German *blasen* to blow, signifies a *flame* blown up, that is, an extended *flame*: FLASH and FLARE, which are but variations of *flame*, denote different species of *flame*: the former a sudden *flame*, the second a dazzling, unsteady *flame*. Glare, which is a variation of glow, denotes a glowing, that is, a strong *flame* that emits a strong light: a candle burns only by *flame*, paper commonly by a *blaze*, gunpowder by a *flash*, a torch by a *flare*, and a conflagration by a *glare*.

FLAT, LEVEL.

FLAT, in German *flach*, is connected with *platt*, broad, and that with the Latin *latus*, and Greek *πλατυς*.

LEVEL, in all probability from *libella* and *libra* a balance, signifies the evenness of a balance.

Flat is said of a thing with regard to itself; it is opposed to the round or protuberant; *level* as it respects another; it is

opposed to the uneven: a country is *flat* which has no elevation; a wall is *level* with the roof of a house when it rises to the height of the roof.

FLATTERER, SYCOPHANT, PARASITE.

FLATTERER, *v.* To *adulate*.

SYCOPHANT, in Greek *συκοφαντης*, signified originally an informer on the matter of figs, but has now acquired the meaning of an obsequious and servile person.

PARASITE, in Greek *παράσιτος*, from *παρα* and *σιτος* corn or meat, originally referred to the priests who attended feasts, but it is now applied to a hanger-on at the tables of the great.

The *flatterer* is one who flatters by words; the *sycophant* and *parasite* is therefore always a *flatterer*, and something more, for the *sycophant* adopts every mean artifice by which he can ingratiate himself, and the *parasite* submits to every degradation and servile compliance by which he can obtain his base purpose. These terms differ more in the object than in the means: the former having general purposes of favour; and the latter particular and still lower purposes to answer. Courtiers may be *sycophants* in order to be well with their prince, and obtain preferment; but they are seldom *parasites*, who are generally poor and in want of a meal.

FLEXIBLE, PLIABLE, PLIANT, SUPPLE.

FLEXIBLE, in Latin *flexibilis*, from *flecto* to bend, signifies able to be bent.

PLIABLE, signifies able to be *plied* or folded: PLIANT signifies literally *plying*, bending, or folding.

SUPPLE, in French *souple*, from the intensive syllable *sub* and *ply*, signifies very *pliable*.

* *Flexible* is used in a natural or moral sense; *pliable* in the familiar and natural sense only; *pliant* in the higher and moral application only: what can be bent in any degree as a stick is *flexible*; what can be bent as wax, or folded like cloth, is *pliable*. *Supple*, whether in a proper or figurative sense, is an excess of *pliability*; what can be bent backward and forward, like an osier twig, is *supple*.

In the moral application, *flexible* is indefinite both in degree and application; it may be greater or less in point of degree: whereas *pliant* supposes a great degree of *pliability*; and *suppleness*, a great degree of *pliancy* or *pliability*; it applies likewise to the outward actions, to the temper, the

* Vide Roubaud: „Flexible, souple, docile.“

resolution, or the principles; but *pliancy* is applied to the principles, or the conduct dependant upon those principles; *suppleness* to the outward actions and behaviour only. A temper is *flexible* which yields to the entreaties of others; the person or character is *pliant* when it is formed or moulded easily at the will of another; a person is *supple* who makes his actions and his manners bend according to the varying humours of another: the first belongs to one in a superior station, who yields to the wishes of the appellant: the latter two belong to equals or inferiors who yield to the influence of others.

Flexibility may be either good or bad according to the circumstances; when it shortens the duration of resentments it produces a happy effect; but *flexibility* is not a respectable trait in a master or a judge, who ought to be guided by higher motives than what the momentary impulse of feeling suggests: *pliancy* is commendable in youth, when it leads them to yield to the councils of the aged and experienced; but it may sometimes make young men the more easy victims to the seductions of the artful and vicious: *suppleness* is in no case good, for it is *flexibility* either in indifferent matters, or such as are expressly bad. A good-natured man is *flexible*; a weak and thoughtless man is *pliant*; a parasite is *supple*.

Flexibility is opposed to firmness; *pliancy* to steadiness; *suppleness* to rigidity.

TO FLOURISH, THRIVE, PROSPER.

FLOURISH, in French *fleurir*, *florissant*, Latin *floresco* or *floreo*, from *flos*, a flower, is a figure of speech borrowed from the action of flowers which grow in full vigour and health.

THRIVE signifies properly to drive on.

PROSPER, in Latin, *prosper*, *prospere*, compounded of *pro* and *spero*, to hope, signifies to be agreeable to the hopes.

To *flourish* expresses the state of being that which is desirable: to *thrive*, the process of becoming so.

In the proper sense, *flourish* and *thrive* are applied to vegetation: the former to that which is full grown; the latter to that which is in the act of growing: the oldest trees are said to *flourish*, which put forth their leaves and fruits in full vigour: young trees *thrive* when they increase rapidly towards their full grown.

Flourish and *thrive* are taken likewise in the moral sense; *prosper* is employed only in this sense: *flourish* is said either of individuals or communities of men; *thrive*

and *prosper* only of individuals. To *flourish* is to be in full possession of one's powers, physical, intellectual, and incidental; an author *flourishes* at a certain period; an institution *flourishes*; literature or trade *flourishes*; a nation *flourishes*. To *thrive* is to carry on one's concerns to the advantage of one's circumstances; it is a term of familiar use for those who gain by positive labour, the industrious tradesman *thrives*. To *prosper* is to be already in advantageous circumstances: men *prosper* who accumulate wealth agreeably to their wishes, and beyond their expectations.

Flourish and *thrive* are always taken in the good sense; nothing *flourishes* but what ought to *flourish*; the word bespeaks the possession of that which ought to be possessed: when a poet *flourishes* he is the ornament of his country, the pride of human nature, the boast of literature: when a city *flourishes*, it attains all the ends of civil association; it is advantageous not only to its own members, but to the world at large. No one *thrives* without merit: what is gained by the *thriving* man is gained by those qualities which entitle him to all he has. To *prosper* admits of a different view: one may *prosper* by that which is bad, or *prosper* in that which is bad, or become bad by *prospering*; the attainment of one's ends, be they what they may, constitutes *prosperity*; a man may *prosper* by means of fraud and injustice; he may *prosper* in the attainment of inordinate wealth or power: and he may become proud, unfeeling, and selfish, by his *prosperity*; so great an enemy has *prosperity* been considered to the virtue of man, that every good man has trembled to be in that condition.

TO FLOW, STREAM, GUSH.

FLOW, in Latin *fluo*, and Greek *βλῦω* or *φλῡω*, to be in a ferment, is in all probability connected with *γεω*, which signifies literally to *flow*,

STREAM, in German *strömen*, from *riemen* a thong, signifies to run in a line.

GUSH comes from the German *giessen*, &c. to pour out with force.

Flow is here the generic term; the two others are specific terms expressing different modes: water may *flow* either in a large body or in a long but narrow course; the *stream* in a long narrow course only; thus, waters *flow* in seas, rivers, rivulets, or in a small pond; the *stream* only out of spouts, or small channels: they *flow* gently or otherwise; they *stream* gently; but they *gush* with violence: thus, the blood *flows* from a wound which comes from it in any manner:

it *streams* from a wound when it runs as it were in a channel; it *gushes* from a wound when it runs with impetuosity, and in as large quantities as the cavity admits.

FLUCTUATE, WAVER,

FLUCTUATE, in Latin *fluctuatus* participle of *fluctuo*, from *fluctus* a wave, signifies to rise in waves.

To WAVER is a frequentative of to *wave*, which is formed from the substantive *wave*, signifying to move like a *wave*.

To *fluctuate* conveys the idea of strong agitation; to *waver*, that of constant motion backward and forward: when applied in the moral sense, to *fluctuate* designates the action of the spirits or the opinions; to *waver* is said only of the will or opinions: he who is alternately merry and sad in quick succession is said to be *fluctuating*; or he who has many opinions in quick succession is said to *fluctuate*; but he who cannot form an opinion, or come to a resolution, is said to *waver*.

FLUID, LIQUID.

LIQUID, from *fluo* to flow, signifies that which from its nature flows; LIQUID, from *liquesco* to melt, signifies that which is melted. These words may be employed as epithets to the same objects: but they have a distinct office which they derive from their original meaning: when we wish to represent a thing as capable of passing along in a stream or current, we should denominate it a *fluid*; when we wish to represent it as passing from a congealed to a dissolved state, we should name it a *liquid*: water and air are both represented as *fluids* from their general property of flowing through certain spaces; but ice, when thawed, becomes a *liquid* and melts; lead is also termed a *liquid*: the humours of the animal body, and the juices of trees, are *fluids*; what we drink is a *liquid* as opposed to what we eat, which is a solid.

TO FOLLOW, SUCCEED, ENSUE.

FOLLOW comes probably through the medium of the northern languages from the Greek *ὀλκος* to trace or *ελκω* to draw.

SUCCEED, in Latin *succedo* compounded of *sub* and *cedo* to walk after.

ENSUE, in French *ensuivre*, in Latin *insequor*, signifies to follow close upon the back or at the heels.

Follow and *succeed* is said of persons and things: *ensue* of things only: *follow* denotes the going in order, in a trace or line; *succeed* denotes the going or being in the same place immediately after another: many

persons may *follow* each other at the same time; but only one individual properly *succeeds* another. *Follow* is taken literally for the motion of the physical body in relation to another: *succeed* is taken in the moral sense for taking the situation or office of another: people *follow* each other in a procession, or one *follows* another to the grave; a king *succeeds* to a throne, or a son *succeeds* to the inheritance of his father.

To *follow* in relation to things, is said either simply of the order in which they go, or of such as go by a connexion between them; to *succeed* implies simply to take the place after another; to *ensue* is to *follow* by a necessary connexion: people who die quickly one after the other are said to *follow* each other to the grave; a youth of debauchery is *followed* by a diseased old age: as in a natural tempest one wave of the sea *follows* another in rapid succession, so in the moral tempest of political revolutions, one mad convulsion is quickly *succeeded* by another: nothing can *ensue* from popular commotions but bloodshed and misery. *Follow* is used in abstract propositions; *ensue* is used in specific cases: sin and misery *follow* each other as cause and effect; quarrels too often *ensue* from the conversations of violent men who differ either in religion or politics.

TO FOLLOW, PURSUE.

FOLLOW, v. *To follow*.

PURSUE, v. *To continue*.

The idea of going after any thing in order to reach or obtain it is common to these terms, but under different circumstances; one *follows* a person mostly with a friendly intention; one *pursues* with a hostile intention: a person *follows* his fellow traveller whom he wishes to overtake; the officers of justice *pursue* the criminal whom they wish to apprehend: so likewise the huntsmen and hunters *follow* the dogs in the chase; the dogs *pursue* the hare. In application to things, *follow* is taken more in the passive, and *pursue* more in the active sense: a man *follows* the plan of another, and *pursues* his own plan; he *follows* his inclinations, and *pursues* an object.

TO FOLLOW, IMITATE.

FOLLOW, v. *To follow, succeed*.

IMITATE, in Latin *imitatus* participle of *imitor*, from the Greek *μιμνω* to mimic and *ομοιος* alike, signifies to do or make alike.

Both these terms denote the regulating our actions by something that offers itself

to us, or is set before us; but we *follow* that which is either internal or external; we imitate that only which is external: we either *follow* the dictates of our own minds or the suggestions of others; but we *imitate* the conduct of others; in regard to external objects we *follow* either a rule or an example; but we *imitate* an example only: we *follow* the footsteps of our forefathers; we *imitate* their virtues and their perfections.

To *follow* and *imitate* may both be applied to that which is good or bad: the former to any action; but the latter only to the behaviour or the external manners: we may *follow* a person in his career of virtue or vice; we *imitate* his gestures, tone of voice, and the like. Parents should be guarded in their words and actions; for their example will in all probability be *followed* by their children: those who have the charge of young people should be particularly careful to avoid all bad habits of gesture, voice, or speech: as there is a much greater propensity to *imitate* what is ridiculous than what is becoming.

FOLLOWER, ADHERENT, PARTISAN.

A FOLLOWER is one who *follows* a person generally; an ADHERENT is one who *adheres* to his cause; a PARTISAN is the follower of a party: the *follower* follows either the person, the interests, or the principles of any one; thus the retinue of a nobleman, or the friends of a statesman, or the friends of any man's opinions, may be styled his *followers*; but the *adherent* is that kind of *follower* who espouses the interests of another; the *follower* follows from various motives; the *adherent* adheres from a personal motive; the *partisan*, from a partial motive: Charles I. had as many *adherents* as he had *followers*; the rebels had as many *partisans* as they had *adherents*.

FOLLY, FOOLERY.

FOLLY is the abstract of foolish, and characterizes the thing; FOOLERY the abstract of fool, and characterizes the person: we may commit an act of *folly* without being chargeable with weakness or *folly*; but none are guilty of *fooleries* who are not themselves fools, either habitually or temporarily: young people are perpetually committing *follies* if not under proper control; fashionable people only lay aside one *foolery* to take up another.

FOOD, DIET, REGIMEN.

FOOD signifies the thing which one feeds

upon, in Saxon *fode*, low German *föde* or *föder*, Greek *βοτειν*.

DIET, from *διατρω* to live medicinally, signifies any particular mode of living.

REGIMEN, in Latin *regimen* from *rego*, signifies a system or practice by rule.

All these terms refer to our living, or that by which we live: *food* is here the general term; the others are specific. *Food* specifies no circumstance; whatever is taken to maintain life is *food*: *diet* is properly prescribed or regular *food*: it is the hard lot of some among the poor to obtain with difficulty *food* and clothing for themselves and their families; an attention to the *diet* of children is an important branch of their early education; their *diet* can scarcely be too simple.

Food is a term applicable to all living creatures; *diet* is employed only with regard to human beings who make choice of their *food*: corn is as much the natural *food* of some animals as of men; the *diet* of the peasantry consists mostly of bread, milk, and vegetables.

Diet and *regimen* are both particular modes of living: but the former respects the quality of *food*; the latter the quantity as well as quality: *diet* is confined to modes of taking nourishment; *regimen* often respects the abstinence from *food*, bodily exercise, and whatever may conduce to health: *diet* is generally the consequence of an immediate prescription from a physician, and during the period of sickness; *regimen* commonly forms a regular part of a man's system of living: *diet* is in certain cases of much importance for the restoration of a patient; some people are troubled with diseases, from which they cannot get any exemption but by observing a strict *regimen*.

FOOL. IDIOT. BUFFOON.

FOOL is doubtless connected with our word *foul*, in German *faul*, which is either nasty or lazy, and the Greek *φauλος* which signifies worthless or good for nothing.

IDIOT comes from the Greek *ιδιωτης*, signifying either a private person, or one that is rude and unskilled in the ways of the world.

BUFFOON, in French *bouffon*, is in all probability connected with our word *beef*, *buffalo*, and *bull*, signifying a senseless fellow.

The *fool* is either naturally or artificially a *fool*; the *idiot* is a natural *fool*; the *buffoon* is an artificial *fool*: whoever violates common sense in his actions is a *fool*; whoever is unable to act according to common

sense is an *idiot*; whoever intentionally violates common sense is a *buffoon*.

FOOLHARDY, ADVENTUROUS, RASH.

FOOLHARDY signifies having the hardihood of a *fool*.

ADVENTUROUS signifies ready to *venture*.

RASH, in German *rasch*, which signifies swift, comes from the Arabic *raaschen* to go swiftly.

Foolhardy expresses more than the *adventurous*; and *adventurous* than *rash*.

The *foolhardy* man *ventures* in defiance of consequences: the *adventurous* man *ventures* from a love of the arduous and the bold; the *rash* man *ventures* for want of thought: courage and boldness become *foolhardiness* when they lead a person to run a fruitless risk; an *adventurous* spirit sometimes leads a man into unnecessary difficulties; but it is a necessary accompaniment of greatness. There is not so much design, but there is more violence and impetuosity in *rashness* than in *foolhardiness*: the former is the consequence of an ardent temper, which will admit of correction by the influence of the judgment; but the latter comprehends perversion of both the will and the judgment.

TO FORBID, PROHIBIT, INTERDICT.

The *for* in FORBID, from the German *ver*, is negative, signifying to bid not to do.

The *pro* in PROHIBIT, and *inter* in INTERDICT, have both a similarly negative sense: the former verb, from *habeo* to have, signifies to have or hold that a thing shall not be done, to restrain from doing; the latter, from *dico* to say, signifies to say that a thing shall not be done.

Forbid is the ordinary term; *prohibit* is the judicial term; *interdict* the moral term.

To *forbid* is a direct and personal act; to *prohibit* is an indirect action that operates by means of extended influence: both imply the exercise of power or authority of an individual; but the former is more applicable to the power of an individual, and the latter to the authority of government. A parent *forbids* his child marrying when he thinks proper; the government *prohibits* the use of spirituous liquors. *Interdict* is a species of *forbidding* applied to more serious concerns; we may be *interdicted* the use of wine by a physician.

A thing is *forbidden* by a word; it is *prohibited* by a law: hence that which is immoral is *forbidden* by the express word of God; that which is illegal is *prohibited* by the laws of man. To *forbid* or *interdict* are opposed to command; to *prohibit*, to allow.

Forbid and *interdict* as personal acts, are properly applicable to persons only, but by an improper application are extended to things; *prohibit*, however, in the general sense of restraining, is applied with equal propriety to things as to persons: shame *forbids* us doing a thing; law, authority, and the like, *prohibit*.

FORCE, VIOLENCE.

FORCE, *v.* To compel.

VIOLENCE, in Latin *violentia*, from *vis*, and the Greek *βία* strength.

Both these terms imply an exertion of strength; but the former in a much less degree than the latter. *Force* is ordinarily employed to supply the want of a proper will, *violence* is used to counteract an opposing will. The arm of justice must exercise *force* in order to bring offenders to a proper account; one nation exercises *violence* against another in the act of carrying on war. *Force* is mostly conformable to reason and equity; *violence* is always resorted to for the attainment of that which is unattainable by law. All who are invested with authority have occasion to use *force* at certain times to subdue the unruly will of those who should submit: *violence* and rapine are inseparable companions; a robber could not subsist by the latter without exercising the former.

In an extended and figurative application to things, these terms convey the same general idea of exerting strength. That is said to have *force* that acts with *force*; and that to have *violence* that acts with *violence*. A word, an expression, or a remark, has *force*, or is *forcible*; a disorder, a passion, a sentiment, has *violence*, or is *violent*. *Force* is always something desirable; *violence* is always something hurtful. We ought to listen to arguments which have *force* in them; we endeavour to correct the *violence* of all angry passions.

FOREFATHERS, PROGENITORS, ANCESTORS.

FOREFATHERS signifies our *fathers* before us, and includes our immediate parents.

PROGENITORS, from *pro* and *gigno*, signifies those begotten before us, exclusive of our immediate parents.

ANCESTORS, contracted from *antecessors* or those going before, is said of those from whom we are remotely descended. *Forefathers* is a partial and familiar term for the preceding branches of any family. *Progenitors* is a higher term in the same sense, applied to families of distinction: we speak of the *forefathers* of a peasant, but the *progenitors* of a nobleman.

Forefathers and *progenitors*, but particularly the latter, are said mostly of individuals, and respect the regular line of succession in a family; *ancestors* is employed collectively as well as individually, and regards simply the order of succession.

We may speak of the ancestors of a nation as well as of any particular person, and likewise figuratively.

FORERUNNER, PRECURSOR, MESSENGER, HARBINGER.

FORERUNNER and PRECURSOR signify literally the same thing, namely, one *running before*; but the term *forerunner* is properly applied only to one who runs before to any spot to communicate intelligence; and it is figuratively applied to things which in their nature, or from a natural connexion, precede others; *precursor* is only employed in this figurative sense: thus imprudent speculations are said to be the *forerunners* of a man's ruin; the ferment which took place in men's minds, was the *precursor* of the revolution.

MESSENGER signifies literally one bearing messages: and HARBINGER, from the Teutonic *herbinger*, signifies a provider of a *herberge* or inn for princes.

Both terms are employed for persons: but the *messenger* states what has been or is; the *harbinger* announces what is to be. Our Saviour was the *messenger* of glad tidings to all mankind; the prophets were the *harbingers* of the Messiah. A *messenger* may be employed on different offices; a *harbinger* is a *messenger* who acts in a specific office. The angels are represented as *messengers* on different occasions. John the Baptist was the *harbinger* of our Saviour, who prepared the way of the Lord.

FORESIGHT, FORETHOUGHT, FORECAST, PREMEDITATION.

FORESIGHT, from seeing before, and FORETHOUGHT, from thinking beforehand, denote the simple act of the mind in seeing a thing before it happens: FORECAST, from casting the thoughts onward, signifies coming at the knowledge of a thing beforehand by means of calculation: PREMEDITATION, from *meditate*, signifies obtaining the same knowledge by force of meditating or reflecting deeply. *Foresight* and *forethought* are general and indefinite terms; we employ them either on ordinary or extraordinary occasions; but *forethought* is of the two the most familiar term; *forecast* and *premeditation* mostly in the latter case: all business requires *foresight*: state concerns require *forecast*: *foresight* and *forecast* respect what

is to happen; they are the operations of the mind in calculating futurity: *premeditation* respects what is to be said or done; it is a preparation of the thoughts and designs for action: by *foresight* and *forecast* we guard against evils and provide for contingencies; by *premeditation* we guard against errors of conduct. A man betrays his want of *foresight* who does not provide against losses in trade; he shows his want of *forecast* who does not provide against old age; he shows his want of *premeditation* who acts or speaks on the impulse of the moment.

FOREST, CHACE, PARK.

* Are all habitations for animals of venery: but the *forest* is of the first magnitude and importance, it being a franchise and the property of the king; the CHACE and PARK may be either public or private property. The *forest* is so formed of wood, and covers such an extent of ground, that it may be the haunt of wild beasts; of this description are the *forests* in Germany; the *chace* is an indefinite and open space that is allotted expressly for the *chace* of particular animals, such as deer; the *park* is an inclosed space that serves for the preservation of domestic animals.

TO FORETEL, PREDICT, PROPHECY, PROGNOSTICATE.

To FORETEL compounded of *fore* and *tell*; PREDICT from *prae* and *dico*; PROPHECY, in French *prophetiser*, Latin *prophetiso*, Greek *προφητεύω*, all signify to tell, expound, or declare what is to happen, and convey the idea of a verbal communication of futurity to others: PROGNOSTICATE from the Greek *προγινώσκω* to know beforehand, to bode or imagine to one's self beforehand, denotes the action of feeling or knowing rather than speaking of things to come.

Foretel is the most general in its sense, and familiar in its application; we may *foretel* common events, although we cannot *predict* or *prophecy* any thing important: to *foretel* is an ordinary gift; one *foretels* by a simple calculation or guess: to *predict* and *prophecy* are extraordinary gifts; one *predicts* by a supernatural power real or supposed; one *propheesies* by means of inspiration. Men of discernment and experience easily *foretel* the events of undertakings which fall under their notice. The priests among the heathens, like the astrologers and conjurers of more modern times, pretended to *predict* events that affected nations and em-

* Vide Trusler: „Forest, chace, park.“

pires. The gift of *prophecy* was one among the number of the supernatural gifts communicated to the primitive Christians by the Holy Ghost.

Prediction as a noun is employed for both the verbs *foretel* and *predict*; it is therefore a term of less value than *prophecy*. We speak of a *prediction* being verified, and a *prophecy* fulfilled: the *predictions* of almanac-makers respecting the weather, are as seldom verified as the *prophecies* of visionaries and enthusiasts are fulfilled respecting the death of princes or the affairs of governments. To *prognosticate* is an act of the understanding; it is guided by outward symptoms as a rule; it is only stimulated and not guided by outward objects: a physician *prognosticates* the crisis of a disorder by the symptoms discoverable in the patient.

FORGETFULNESS, OBLIVION.

FORGETFULNESS characterizes the person, or that which is personal; OBLIVION the state of the thing: the former refers to him who *forgets*; the latter to that which is *forgotten*: we blame a person for his *forgetfulness*; but we sometimes bury things in *oblivion*.

TO FORGIVE, PARDON, ABSOLVE, REMIT.

FORGIVE, compounded of the privative *for* and *give*; and PARDON, in French *pardonner*, compounded likewise of the privative *par* or *per* and *donner* to give, both signify not to give the punishment that is due. *Forgive* is the familiar term; *pardon* is adapted to the serious style. Individuals *forgive* each other personal offences; they *pardon* offences against law and morals: the former is an act of Christian charity; the latter an act of clemency: the former is an act that is confined to no condition; the latter is peculiarly the act of a superior. He who has been offended has an opportunity of *forgiving* the offender; he who has the authority of punishing the offence may *pardon*. God *forgives* the sins of his creatures as a father pitying his children; he *pardons* their sins as a judge extending mercy to criminals, as far as is consistent with justice.

* *Pardon*, when compared with REMISSION, is the consequence of offence; it respects principally the person offending; it depends upon him who is offended. *Remission* is the consequence of the pardon; it has more particular regard to the punishment;

it is granted either by the prince or magistrates; it arrests the execution of justice. *Remission*, like *pardon*, is peculiarly applicable to the sinner with regard to his Maker. ABSOLUTION is taken in no other sense: it is the consequence of the fault or the sin, and properly concerns the state of the culprit; it properly looses him from the tie with which he is bound; it is pronounced either by the civil judge or the ecclesiastical minister; and it re-establishes the accused or the penitent in the rights of innocence.

The *pardon* of sin obliterates that which is past, and restores the sinner to the Divine favour; *remission* of sin averts the Divine vengeance, which otherwise would fall upon the guilty; *absolution* of sin is the work of God's grace on the heart. The Roman Catholics look upon *absolution* as the immediate act of the Pope, by virtue of his sacred relationship to Christ; but Protestants look to Christ only as the dispenser of this blessing to men, and his ministers simply as messengers to declare the divine will to men.

FORM, FIGURE, CONFORMATION.

FORM, in French *forme*, Latin *forma*, most probably from *φορμα* and *φορεω* to bear, signifies properly the image borne or stamped.

FIGURE (*v. Figure*) signifies the image feigned or conceived.

CONFORMATION, in French *conformation*, in Latin *conformatio*, from *conform*, signifies the image disposed or put together.

* *Form* is the generic term; *figure* and *conformation* are special terms. The *form* is the work either of nature or art; it results from the arrangement of the parts. The *figure* is the work of design: it includes the general contour or outline. The *conformation* includes such a disposition of the parts of a body as is adapted for performing certain functions.

Form is the property of every substance; and the artificial *form* approaches nearest to perfection, as it is most natural: the *figure* is the fruit of the imagination; it is the representation of the actual *form* that belongs to things; it is more or less just as it approaches to the *form* of the thing itself: *conformation* is said only with regard to animal bodies; nature renders it more or less suitable according to the accidental concurrence of physical causes. The erect *form* of man is one of the distinguishing marks of his superiority over every other terrestrial being: the human *figure* when well painted is an object of admiration: the turn of the

* Vide Girard: „Absolution, pardon, remission.“

* Vide Girard: „Façon, figure, forme, conformation.“

mind is doubtless influenced by the *conformation* of the organs. A person's *form* is said to be handsome or ugly, common or uncommon; his *figure* to be correct or incorrect; a *conformation* to be good or bad. The Heathens have worshipped the Deity under various *forms*: mathematical *figures* are the only true *figures* with which we are acquainted: the craniologist affects to judge of characters by the *conformation* of the skull.

Form and *figure* are used in a moral application, although *conformation* is not.

We speak of adopting a *form* of faith, a *form* of words, a *form* of godliness; cutting a showy, a dismal, or ridiculous *figure*.

TO FORM, FASHION, MOULD, SHAPE.

To FORM is to put into a *form*, which is here as before (*v. Form*) the generic term: to FASHION is to put into a particular or distinct *form*: to MOULD is to put into a set *form*: to SHAPE is to *form* simply as it respects the exterior. As everything receives a *form* when it receives existence, to *form* conveys the idea of producing. When we wish to represent a thing as *formed* in any distinct or remarkable way, we may speak of it as *fashioned*. God *formed* man out of the dust of the ground; he *fashioned* him after his own image. When we wish to represent a thing as *formed* according to a precise rule, we should say it was *moulded*; thus the habits of a man are *moulded* at the will of a superior. When we wish to represent a thing as receiving the accidental qualities which distinguish it from others, we talk of *shaping* it: the potter *shapes* the clay; the milliner *shapes* the bonnet; a man *shapes* his actions to the humours of another,

TO FORM, COMPOSE, CONSTITUTE.

FORM (*v. Form, figure*) signifies to give a *form*.

COMPOSE, *v. To compose.*

CONSTITUTE. *v. To constitute.*

Form is a generic and indefinite term. To *compose* and *constitute* are modes of forming. These words may be employed either to designate modes of action, or to characterize things. Things may be *formed* either by persons or things; they are *composed* and *constituted* only by conscious agents: thus persons *form* things, or things *form* one another: thus we *form* a circle, or the reflection of the light after rain *forms* a rainbow. Persons *compose* and *constitute*: thus a musician *composes* a piece of music, or men *constitute* laws. *Form* in regard to persons is the act of the will and determination; *compose* is a work of the intellect; *constitute* is an act of power. We *form* a party,

we *form* a plan; we *compose* a book; men *constitute* governments, offices, &c.

When employed to characterize things, *form* signifies simply to have a *form*, be it either simple or complex; *compose* and *constitute* are said only of those things which have complex *forms*; the former as respecting the material, the latter the essential parts of an object: thus we may say that an object *forms* a circle, or the segment of a circle: a society is *composed* of individuals; but law and order *constitute* the essence of society: so letters and syllables *compose* a word; but sense is essential to *constitute* a word.

FORM, CEREMONY, RITE, OBSERVANCE.

FORM, *v. Form, figure.*

CEREMONY, in Latin *ceremonia*, is supposed to signify the rites of Ceres.

RITE, in Latin *ritus*, is probably changed from *ratus*, signifying a custom that is esteemed.

OBSERVANCE signifies the thing observed.

All these terms are employed with regard to particular modes of action in civil society. *Form* is here, as in the preceding sections, the most general in its sense and application; *ceremony*, *rite*, and *observance*, are particular kinds of *form*, suited to particular occasions. *Form*, in its distinct application, respects all determinate modes of acting and speaking, that are adopted by society at large, in every transaction of life; *ceremony* respects those *forms* of outward behaviour which are made the expressions of respect and deference; *rite* and *observance* are applied to national *ceremonies* in matters of religion. A certain *form* is requisite for the sake of order, method, and decorum, whether in affairs of state, in a court of law, in a place of worship, or in the private intercourse of friends. So long as distinctions are admitted in society, and men are agreed to express their sentiments of regard and respect to each other; it will be necessary to preserve the *ceremonies* of politeness which have been established. Every country has adopted certain *rites* founded upon its peculiar religious faith, and prescribed certain *observances* by which individuals could make a public profession of their faith. Administering oaths by the magistrate is a necessary *form* in law; kissing the king's hand is a *ceremony* practised at court; baptism is one *rite* of initiation into the Christian church, and confirmation another; prayer, reading the Scriptures, and preaching, are different religious *observances*.

As far as *ceremonies, rites, and observances*, respect religion, the first may be said either of an individual or a community: the second only of a community; and the last, more properly of an individual either in public or private. The *ceremony* of kneeling during the time of prayer is the most becoming posture for a suppliant, whether in public or private. The discipline of a Christian church consists in its *rites*, to which every member, either as a layman or a priest, is obliged to conform. Public worship is an *observance* which no Christian thinks himself at liberty to neglect.

FORMAL, CEREMONIOUS.

FORMAL and CEREMONIOUS, from *form* and *ceremony* (v. *Form, ceremony*), are either taken in an indifferent sense with respect to what contains *form* and *ceremony*, or in a bad sense, as expressing the excess of *form* and *ceremony*. A person expects to have a *formal* dismissal before he considers himself as dismissed; people of fashion pay each other *ceremonious* visits, by way of keeping up a distant intercourse. Whatever communications are made from one government to another must be made in a *formal* manner. It is the business of the church to regulate the *ceremonious* part of religion.

Formal, in the bad sense, is opposed to easy: *ceremonious* to the cordial. A *formal* carriage prevents a person from indulging himself in the innocent familiarities of friendly intercourse; a *ceremonious* carriage puts a stop to all hospitality and kindness.

FORMERLY, IN TIMES PAST, IN OLD TIMES, DAYS OF YORE, ANCIENTLY, OR ANCIENT TIMES.

FORMERLY supposes a less remote period than IN TIMES PAST; and that less remote than IN DAYS OF YORE and ANCIENTLY. The two first may be said of what happen within the age of man; the last two are extended to many generations and ages. Any individual may use the word *formerly* with regard to himself: thus, we enjoyed our health better *formerly* than now. An old man may speak of *times past*, as when he says he does not enjoy himself as he did *in times past*. OLD TIMES, *days of yore*, and *anciently*, are more applicable to nations than to individuals; and all these express different degrees of *remoteness*. With respect to our present period, the age of Queen Elizabeth may be called *old times*; the days of Alfred and still later, the *days of yore*; the earliest period in which Britain

is mentioned may be termed ANCIENT TIMES.

FORMIDABLE, DREADFUL, TERRIBLE, SHOCKING.

FORMIDABLE is applied to that which is apt to excite fear (v. *To apprehend*); DREADFUL (v. *To apprehend*) to what is calculated to excite dread; TERRIBLE (v. *Alarm*) to that which excites terror; and SHOCKING (from *shake*) is applied to that which violently shakes or agitates (v. *To agitate*). The *formidable* acts neither suddenly nor violently; the *dreadful* may act violently; thus the appearance of an army may be *formidable*; that of a field of battle is *dreadful*. The *terrible* and *shocking* act both suddenly and violently; but the former acts both on the senses and imagination, the latter on the moral feelings: thus the glare of a tiger's eye is *terrible*; the unexpected news of a friend's death is *shocking*.

FORSAKEN, FORLORN, DESTITUTE.

To be FORSAKEN (v. *To abandon*) is to be deprived of the company and assistance of others; to be FORLORN, from the German *verloren* lost, is to be *forsaken* in times of difficulty, to be without a guide in an unknown road; to be DESTITUTE, from the Latin *destitutus*, is to be deprived of the first necessities of life.

To be *forsaken* is a partial situation; to be *forlorn* and *destitute* is a permanent condition. We may be *forsaken* by a fellow traveller on the road; we are *forlorn* when we get into a deserted path, with no one to direct us; we are *destitute* when we have no means of subsistence, nor the prospect of obtaining the means. It is particularly painful to be *forsaken* by the friend of our youth, and the sharer of our fortunes; the orphan, who is left to travel the road of life without counsellor or friend, is of all others in the most *forlorn* condition; if to this be added poverty, his misery is aggravated by his becoming *destitute*.

TO FORSWEAR, PERJURE, SUBORN.

FORSWEAR is Saxon; PERJURE is Latin; the prepositions *for* and *per* are both privative, and the words signify literally to swear contrary to the truth; this is, however, not their only distinction: to *forswear* is applied to all kinds of oaths; to *perjure* is employed only for such oaths as have been administered by the civil magistrate.

A soldier *forswears* himself who breaks his oath of allegiance by desertion; and a subject *forswears* himself who takes an oath of allegiance which he afterwards violates: a

man *perjures* himself in a court of law who swears to the truth of that which he knows to be false. *Forswear* is used only in the proper sense: *perjure* may be used figuratively with regard to lover's vows; he who deserts the mistress to whom he has pledged his affection is a *perjured* man.

Forswear and *perjure* are the acts of individuals: SUBORN, from the Latin *subornare*, signifies to make to *forswear*: a *perjured* man has all the guilt upon himself; but he who is *suborned* shares his guilt with the *suborner*.

FORTUNATE, LUCKY, PROSPEROUS, SUCCESSFUL.

FORTUNATE signifies having *fortune* (v. *Chance, fortune*).

LUCKY signifies having *luck*, which is in German *glück*, and in all probability comes from *gelingen* to succeed.

PROSPEROUS, v. *To flourish*.

SUCCESSFUL signifies full of *success*, enabled to *succeed*.

The *fortunate* and *lucky* are both applied to that which happens without the control of man; but the latter, which is a collateral term, describes the capricious goddess *Fortune* in her most freakish humours, while *fortunate* represents her in her more sober mood; in other words, the *fortunate* is more according to the ordinary course of things; the *lucky* is something sudden, unaccountable, and singular.

A circumstance is said to be *fortunate* which turns up suitably to our purpose; it is said to be *lucky* when it comes upon us unexpectedly, at the moment that it is wanted: hence we speak of a man as *fortunate* in his business, and the ordinary concerns of life; but *lucky* in the lottery or in games of chance: a *fortunate* year will make up for the losses of the past year; a *lucky* hit may repair the ruined spendthrift's *fortune* only to tempt him to still greater extravagances.

Prosperous and *successful* seem to exclude the idea of what is *fortuitous*, although *prosperity* and *success* are both greatly aided by good *fortune*. *Fortunate* and *lucky* are applied as much to the removal of evil as to the attainment of good; *prosperous* and *successful* are concerned only in what is good, or esteemed as such: we may be *fortunate* in making our escape; we are *prosperous* in the acquirement of wealth. *Fortunate* is employed for single circumstances; *prosperous* for a train of circumstances; a man may be *fortunate* in meeting with the approbation of a superior; he is *prosperous* in business. *Prosperity* is extended to whatever is the

object of our wishes in this world; *success* is that degree of *prosperity* which immediately attends our endeavours. Wealth, honours, children, and all outward circumstances, constitute *prosperity*; the attainment of any object constitutes *success*: the *fortunate* and *lucky* man can lay no claim to merit, because they preclude the idea of exertion; *prosperous* and *successful* may claim a share of merit proportioned to the exertion.

Prosperous is applied as an epithet to that which produces prosperity or contains prosperity, as a *prosperous* wind.

TO FOSTER, CHERISH, HARBOUR, INDULGE.

To FOSTER is probably connected with father, in the natural sense, to bring up with a parent's care; to CHERISH, from the Latin *carus* dear, is to feed with affection; to HARBOUR, from a *harbour* or *haven*, is to provide with a shelter and protection; to INDULGE, from the Latin *dulcis* sweet, is to render sweet and agreeable. These terms are all employed here in the moral acceptation, to express the idea of giving nourishment to an object.

To *foster* in the mind is to keep with care and positive endeavours; as when one *fosters* prejudices by encouraging every thing which favours them: to *cherish* in the mind is to hold dear or set a value upon; as when one *cherishes* good sentiments, by dwelling upon them with inward satisfaction. to *harbour* is to allow room in the mind, and is generally taken in the worst sense, for giving admission to that which ought to be excluded; as when one *harbours* resentment by permitting it to have a resting-place in the heart: to *indulge* in the mind, is to give the whole mind to, to make it the chief source of pleasure; as when one *indulges* an affection, by making the will and the outward conduct bend to its gratifications.

TO FOUND, GROUND, REST, BUILD.

FOUND, in French *fonder*, Latin *fundo*, comes from *fundus* the *ground*, and, like the verb GROUND, properly signifies to make firm in the *ground*, to make the *ground* the support.

To *found* implies the exercise of art and contrivance in making a support; to *ground* signifies to lay a thing so deep that it may not totter; it is merely in the moral sense that they are here considered, as the verb to *ground* with this signification is never used otherwise. *Found* is applied to outward circumstances; *ground* to what passes inwardly.

A man *founds* his charge against another upon certain facts that are come to his knowledge; he *grounds* his belief upon the most substantial evidence: monarchs commonly *found* their claims to a throne upon the right of primogeniture; Christians *ground* their hopes of immortality on the word of God.

To *found* and *ground* are said of things which demand the full exercise of the mental powers; to *REST* in an action of less importance: whatever is *founded* requires and has the utmost support; whatever is *rested* is more by the will of the individual: a man *founds* his reasoning upon some unequivocal fact; he *rests* his assertion upon mere hearsay. The words *found*, *ground*, and *rest*, have always an immediate reference to the thing that supports; to *BUILD* has an especial reference to that which is supported, to the superstructure that is raised: we should not say that a person *founds* an hypothesis, without adding something, as observations, experiments, and the like, upon which it was *founded*; but we may speak of his simply *building* systems, supposing them to be the fruit of his distempered imagination; or we may say that a system of astronomy has been *built* upon the discovery of Copernicus respecting the motion of the earth.

FOUNDATION, GROUND, BASIS.

FOUNDATION and GROUND derive their meaning and application from the preceding article: a report is said to be without any *foundation*, which has taken its rise in mere conjecture, or in some arbitrary cause independent of all fact; a man's suspicion is said to be without *ground*, which is not supported by the shadow of external evidence: *unfounded* clamours are frequently raised against the measures of government; *groundless* jealousies frequently arise between families to disturb the harmony of their intercourse.

Foundation and *BASIS* may be compared with each other, either in the proper or the improper signification: both *foundation* and *basis* are the lowest parts of any structure; but the former lies under *ground*, the latter stands above: the *foundation* supports some large and artificially erected pile; the *basis* supports a simple pillar: hence we speak of the *foundation* of St. Paul's, and the *base* or *basis* of the monument: this distinction is likewise preserved in the moral application of the terms: disputes have too often their *foundation* in frivolous circumstances; moral worth is the *basis* of a lasting reputation.

FRAGILE, FRAIL, BRITTLE.

FRAGILE and FRAIL, in French *frêle*, both come from the Latin *fragilis*, signifying breakable; but the former is used in the proper sense only, and the latter more generally in the improper sense: man, corporeally considered, is a *fragile* creature, his frame is composed of *fragile* materials: mentally considered, he is a *frail* creature, for he is liable to every sort of *frailty*.

BRITTLE comes from the Saxon *brittan* to break, and by the termination *le* or *lis*, denotes likewise a capacity to break, that is properly breakable; but it conveys a stronger idea of this quality than *fragile*: the latter applies to whatever will break from the effects of time; *brittle* to that which will not bear a temporary violence: in this sense all the works of men are *fragile*, and in fact all sublunary things; but glass, stone, and ice, are peculiarly denominated *brittle*.

FRAME, TEMPER, TEMPERAMENT, CONSTITUTION.

FRAME in its natural sense is that which forms the exterior edging of any thing, and consequently determines its form; it is applied to man physically or mentally, as denoting that constituent portion of him which seems to hold the rest together; and by an extension of the metaphor is likewise put for the whole contents, the whole body, or the whole mind.

TEMPER and TEMPERAMENT, in Latin *temperamentum* from *tempero* to govern or dispose, signify the particular modes of being disposed or organized.

CONSTITUTION, from *constitute* or appoint, signifies the particular mode of being *constituted* or formed.

Frame, when applied to the body, is taken in its most universal sense; as when we speak of the *frame* being violently agitated, or the human *frame* being wonderfully constructed: when applied to the mind it will admit either of a general or restricted signification. *Temper*, which is applicable only to the mind, is taken in the general or particular state of the individual. The *frame* comprehends either the whole body of mental powers, or the particular disposition of those powers in individuals; the *temper* comprehends the general or particular state of feeling as well as thinking in the individual.

The mental *frame* which receives any violent concussion is liable to derangement; it is necessary for those who govern to be well acquainted with the *temper* of those whom they govern. By reflection on the various attributes of the Divine Being, a

man may easily bring his mind into a *frame* of devotion: by the indulgence of a fretful repining *temper*, a man destroys his own peace of mind, and offends his Maker.

Temperament and *constitution* mark the general state of the individual; the former comprehends a mixture of the physical and mental; the latter has a purely physical application. A man with a warm *temperament* owes his warmth of character to the rapid impetus of the blood; a man with a delicate *constitution* is exposed to great fluctuations in his health. Men of sanguine *tempers* are frequent in warm climates; the *constitutions* of females are more tender than those of the male, and their *frames* are altogether more susceptible.

FRANK, CANDID, INGENUOUS, FREE, OPEN, PLAIN.

FRANK, in French *franc*, German, &c. *frank*, is connected with the word *frech* bold, and *frei* free.

CANDID, *v. Candid.*

INGENUOUS comes from the Latin *ingenuus*, which signifies literally freeborn, as distinguished from the *liberti* who where afterwards made *free*: hence the term has been employed by a figure of speech to denote nobleness of birth or character. According to Girard, *ingenu* in French is taken in a bad sense; and Dr. Trusler, in translating his article *sincerité*, *franchise*, *naïveté*, *ingénuité*, has erroneously assigned the same office to our word *ingenuous*; but this has kept true to the original, by being always an epithet of commendation.

FREE is to be found in most of the northern languages under different forms, and is supposed by Adelung to be connected with the preposition *from*, which denotes a separation or enlargement.

OPEN, *v. Candid.*

PLAIN, *v. Apparent*, also *evident*.

All these terms convey the idea of a readiness to communicate and be communicated with; they are all opposed to concealment, but under different circumstances. The *frank* man is under no constraint; his thoughts and feelings are both at ease, and his lips are ever ready to give utterance to the dictates of his heart; he has no reserve: the *candid* man has nothing to conceal; he speaks without regard to self-interest or any partial motive; he speaks nothing but the truth: the *ingenuous* man throws off all disguise; he scorns all artifice, and brings every thing to light; he speaks the whole truth. *Frankness* is acceptable in the general transactions of society; it inspires confidence, and invites communication: *candour* is of peculiar use

in matters of dispute: it serves the purposes of equity, and invites to conciliation; *ingenuousness* is most wanted where there is most to conceal; it courts favour and kindness by an acknowledgement of that which is against itself.

Frankness is associated with unpolished manners, and frequently appears in men of no rank or education; sailors have commonly a deal of *frankness* about them: *candour* is the companion of uprightness; it must be accompanied with some refinement, as it acts in cases where nice discriminations are made: *ingenuousness* is the companion of a noble and elevated spirit: it exists most frequently in the unsophisticated period of youth.

Frankness displays itself in the outward behaviour; we speak of a *frank* air and *frank* manner: *candour* displays itself in the language which we adopt, and the sentiments we express; we speak of a *candid* statement, a *candid* reply: *ingenuousness* shows itself in all the words, looks, or actions: we speak of an *ingenuous* countenance, an *ingenuous* acknowledgement, an *ingenuous* answer. *Frankness* and *candour* may be either habitual or occasional; *ingenuousness* is a permanent character: a disposition may be *frank*, or an air of *frankness* and *candour* may be assumed for the time; but an *ingenuous* character remains one and the same.

Frankness is a voluntary effusion of the mind between equals; a man *frankly* confesses to his friend the state of his affections or circumstances: *candour* is a debt paid to justice from one independent being to another; he who is *candid* is so from the necessity of the case; when a *candid* man feels himself to have been in an error which affects another, he is impelled to make the only reparation in his power by acknowledging it: *ingenuousness* is the offering of an uncorrupted mind at the shrine of truth; it presupposes an inferiority in outward circumstances, and a motive, if not a direct necessity, for communication; the lad who does not wish to screen himself from punishment by a lie will *ingenuously* confess his offence; he who does not wish to obtain false applause will *ingenuously* disclaim his share in the performance which has obtained the applause.

Free, *open*, and *plain*, have not so high an office as the first three: *free* and *open* may be taken either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; but seldomer in the first than in the two last senses.

The *frank*, *free*, and *open* man all speak without constraint; but the *frank* man is not impertinent like the *free* man, nor indiscreet

like the *open* man. The *frank* man speaks only of what concerns himself; the *free* man speaks of what concerns others: a *frank* man may confess his own faults or inadvertencies; the *free* man corrects those which he sees in another: the *frank* man opens his heart from the warmth of his nature; the *free* man opens his mind from the conceit of his temper; and the *open* man says all he knows and thinks, from the inconsiderate levity of his temper.

A *frank* man is not *frank* to all, nor on all occasions; he is *frank* to his friends, or he is *frank* in his dealings with others: but the *open* man lets himself out like a running stream to all who choose to listen, and communicates trivial or important matters with equal eagerness: on the other hand, it is sometimes becoming in one to be *free* where counsel can be given with advantage and pleasure to the receiver; and it is pleasant to see an *open* behaviour, particularly in young persons, when contrasted with the odious trait of cunning and reserve.

Plainness, the last quality to be here noticed, is a virtue which, though of the humbler order, is not to be despised: it is sometimes employed like *freedom* in the task of giving counsel; but it does not convey the idea of any thing unauthorized either in matter or manner. A *free* counsellor is more ready to display his own superiority, than to direct the wanderer in his way; he rather aggravates faults, than instructs how to amend them: the *plain* man is *free* from these faults: he speaks *plainly* but truly; he gives no false colouring to his speech; it is not calculated to offend, and it may serve for improvement: a *free* speaker is in danger of being hated; a *plain* dealer must at least be respected.

FREAK, WHIM.

FREAK most probably comes from the German *frech*, bold and petulant. WHIM from Teutonic *wimmen* to whine or whimper: but they have at present somewhat deviated from their original meaning; for a *freak* has more of childishness and humour than boldness in it, a *whim* more of eccentricity than of childishness. Fancy and fortune are both said to have their *freaks*, as they both deviate most widely in their movements from all rule; but *whims* are at most but singular deviations of the mind from its ordinary and even course. Females are most liable to be seized with *freaks*, which are in their nature sudden and not to be calculated upon; men are apt to indulge themselves in *whims* which are in their nature strange and often laughable. We should call

it a *freak* for a female to put on the habit of a man, and so accoutred to sally forth into the streets: we term it a *whim* in a man who takes a resolution never to shave himself any more.

FREE, LIBERAL.

In the former section (v. *Frank*) FREE is considered only as it respects communication by words, in the present case it respects actions and sentiments. In all its acceptations *free* is a term of dispraise, and LIBERAL that of commendation. To be *free* signifies to act or think at will; to be *liberal* is to act according to the dictates of an enlarged heart and an enlightened mind. A clown or a fool may be *free* with his money, and may squander it away to please his humour, or gratify his appetite; but the nobleman and the wise man will be *liberal* in rewarding merit, in encouraging industry, and in promoting whatever can contribute to the ornament, prosperity, or improvement of his country. A man who is *free* in his sentiments thinks as he pleases; the man who is *liberal* thinks according to the extent of his knowledge. The *free* thinking man is wise in his own conceit, he despises the opinions of others; the *liberal*-minded thinks modestly on his own personal attainments, and builds upon the wisdom of others.

TO FREE, SET FREE, DELIVER, LIBERATE.

To FREE is properly to make *free*, in distinction from SET FREE; the first is employed in what concerns ourselves, and the second in that which concerns another. A man *frees* himself from an engagement; he *sets* another *free* from his engagement: we *free*, or *set* ourselves *free*, from that which has been imposed upon us by ourselves or by circumstances; we are DELIVERED or LIBERATED from that which others have imposed upon us; the former from evils in general, the latter from the evil of confinement. I *free* myself from a burden; I *set* my own slave *free* from his slavery; I *deliver* another man's slave from a state of bondage; I *liberate* a man from prison. A man *frees* an estate from rent, service, taxes, and all incumbrances; a king *sets* his subjects *free* from certain imposts or tributes, he *delivers* them from a foreign yoke, or he *liberates* those who have been taken in war. We *free* either by an act of the will, or by contrivance and method; we *set free* by an act of authority; we *deliver* or *liberate* by active measures and physical strength. A man *frees* himself from impertinence by escaping the company of the impertinent; he

sets others free from all apprehensions by assuring them of his protection; he *delivers* them out of a perilous situation by his presence of mind.

When applied in a spiritual sense *freedom* is opposed to sin; *set free* is employed for obligation and responsibility; *deliver* is employed for external circumstances. God, as our Redeemer, *frees* us from the bondage and consequences of sin, by the dispensations of his atoning grace; but he does not *set* us free from any of our moral obligations or moral responsibility as *free* agents; as our Preserver he *delivers* us from dangers and misfortunes, trials and temptations.

FREE. FAMILIAR.

FREE has already been considered as it respects words, actions, and sentiments (*v. Free*); in the present case it is coupled with FAMILIARITY, inasmuch as they respect the outward behaviour or conduct in general of men one to another.

To be *free* is to be disengaged from all the constraints which the ceremonies of social intercourse impose; to be *familiar* is to be upon the footing of a *familiar*, of a relative, or one of the same family. Neither of these terms can be admitted as unexceptionable: but *freedom* is that which in general is totally unauthorized; *familiarity* sometimes shelters itself under the sanction of long, and friendly intercourse.

Free is a term of much more extensive import than *familiar*; a man may be *free* towards another in a thousand ways; but he is *familiar* towards him only in his manners and address. A man who is *free* looks upon every thing as his which he chooses to make use of; a *familiar* man only wants to share with another and to stand upon an equal footing. A man who is *free* will take possession of another man's house or room in his absence, as it suits his convenience; his *freedom* always turns upon that which contributes to his own indulgences: a man who is *familiar* will smile upon you, take hold of your arm, call you by some friendly name, and seek to enjoy with you all the pleasures of social intercourse; his *familiarity* always turns upon that which will increase his own importance. No man can be *free* without being in danger of infringing upon what belongs to another, nor *familiar* without being in danger of obtruding himself to the annoyance of others.

FREE, EXEMPT.

FREE, *v. Free, liberal.*

EXEMPT, in Latin *exemptus*, participle

of *eximo*, signifies set out or disengaged from any thing.

The condition and not the conduct of men is here considered. *Freedom* is either accidental or intentional; the *exemption* is always intentional: we may be *free* from disorders, or *free* from troubles; we are *exempt*, that is *exempted* by government, from serving in the militia. *Free* is applied to every thing from which any one may wish to be *free*; but *exempt*, on the contrary, to those burdens which we should share with others: we may be *free* from imperfections, *free* from inconveniences, *free* from the interruptions of others; but *exempt* from any office or tax. We may likewise be said to be *exempt* from troubles when speaking of them as the dispensations of Providence to others.

PREEDOM, LIBERTY.

FREEDOM, the abstract noun of *free*, is taken in all the senses of the primitive. LIBERTY, from the Latin *liber* free is only taken in the sense of *free* from external constraint, from the action of power.

Freedom is personal and private; *liberty* is public. The *freedom* of the city is the privilege granted by the city to individuals; the *liberties* of the city are the immunities enjoyed by the city. By the same rule of distinction we speak of the *freedom* of the will, the *freedom* of manners, the *freedom* of conversation, or the *freedom* of debate; but the *liberty* of conscience, the *liberty* of the press, the *liberty* of the subject. A slave obtains his *freedom*; a captive obtains his *liberty*.

Freedom serves moreover to qualify the action; *liberty* is applied only to the agent: hence we say, to speak or think with *freedom*; but to have the *liberty* of speaking, thinking, or acting. *Freedom* and *liberty* are likewise employed for the private conduct of individuals towards each other; but the former is used in a qualified good sense, the latter in an unqualified bad sense. A *freedom* may sometimes be licensed or allowed; a *liberty* is always taken in a bad sense. A *freedom* may be innocent and even pleasant; a *liberty* always does more or less violence to the decencies of life, or the feelings of individuals. There are little *freedoms* which may pass between youth of different sexes, so as to heighten the pleasures of society; but a modest woman will be careful to guard against any *freedoms* which may admit of misinterpretation, and resent every *liberty* offered to her as an insult.

FREIGHT, CARGO, LADING, LOAD, BURDEN.

FREIGHT, through the Northern languages in all probability comes from the Latin *fero* to bring, signifying the thing brought.

CARGO, in French *cargaison*, probably a variation from *carriage*, is employed for all the contents of a vessel, with the exception of the persons that it carries.

LADING and LOAD (in German *laden* to load), comes most probably from the word *last* a burden, signifying the *burden* or weight imposed upon any carriage.

BURDEN, which through the medium of the Northern languages, comes from the Greek *φορτος* and *φερω* to carry, conveys the idea of weight which is borne by the vessel.

A captain speaks of the *freight* of his ship as that which is the object of his voyage, by which all who are interested in it are to make their profit; the value and nature of the *freight* are the first objects of consideration: he speaks of the *lading* as the thing which is to fill the ship; the quantity, and weight of the *lading* are to be taken into consideration: he speaks of the *cargo* as that which goes with the ship, and belongs as it were to the ship; the amount of the *cargo* is that which is first thought of: he speaks of the *burden* as that which his vessel will bear; it is the property of the ship which is to be estimated.

The ship-broker regulates the *freight*: the captain and the crew dispose the *lading*: the agent sees to the disposal of the *cargo*: the ship-builder determines the *burden*: the carrier looks to the *load* which he has to carry. The *freight* must consist of such merchandise as will pay for the transport and risk; the *lading* must consist of such things as can be most conveniently stowed: the value of a *cargo* depends not only on the nature of the commodity, but the market to which it is carried: the *burden* of a vessel is estimated by the number of tons which it can carry.

TO FREQUENT, RESORT TO, HAUNT.

FREQUENT comes from *frequent*, in Latin *frequens* crowded, signifying to come in numbers or come often to the same place.

RESORT, in French *ressortir*, compounded of *re* and *sortir*, signifies to go backward and forward.

HAUNT, from the French *hanter* to frequent.

Frequent is more commonly used of an individual who goes often to a place; *resort* and *haunt* of a number of individuals. A man is said to *frequent* a public place; but

several persons may *resort* to a private place; men who are not fond of home *frequent* taverns; in the first ages of Christianity, while persecution raged, its professors used to *resort* to private places for purposes of worship.

Frequent and *resort* are indifferent actions; but *haunt* is always used in a bad sense. A man may *frequent* a theatre, a club, or any other social meeting, innocent or otherwise; people from different quarters may *resort* to a fair, a church, or any other place where they wish to meet for a common purpose: but those who *haunt* any place go to it in privacy for some bad purpose; thus thieves *haunt* the darkest and most retired parts of a city in order to concert measures for obtaining plunder.

FRESH, NEW, RECENT.

Adelung supposes the German word *frisch* to be derived from *frieren* to freeze, as the idea of coolness is prevalent in its application to the air; it is therefore figuratively applied to that which is in its first, pure, and best state.

NEW, in German *neu*, comes from the Latin *novus*, and the Greek *νεος*.

RECENT, in Latin *recens*, is supposed to come from *re* and *candeo* to whiten or give a fair colour to, because what is *new* looks so much fairer than what is old.

The *fresh* is properly opposed to the stale, as the *new* is to the old: the *fresh* has undergone no change; the *new* has not been long in being. Meat, beer, and provisions in general, are said to be *fresh*; but that which is substantial and durable, as houses, clothes, books, and the like, are said to be *new*.

Recent is taken only in the improper application; the other two admit of both applications: the *fresh* is said in relation to what has lately preceded; *new* is said in relation to what has not long subsisted; *recent* is used for what has just passed in distinction from that which has long gone by. A person gives *fresh* cause of offence who has already offended; a thing receives a *new* name in lieu of the one which it has long had; a *recent* transaction excites an interest which cannot be excited by one of earlier date. *Fresh* intelligence arrives every day; it quickly succeeds the events: that intelligence which is *recent* to a person at a distance is already old to one who is on the spot. *Fresh* circumstances continually arise to confirm reports; *new* changes continually take place to supersede the things that were established.

TO FRIGHTEN, INTIMIDATE.

Between FRIGHTEN and INTIMIDATE there is the same difference as between *fright* (v. *Alarm*) and *fear* (v. *To apprehend*): the danger that is near or before the eyes *frightens*; that which is seen at a distance *intimidates*: hence females are oftener *frightened*, and men are oftener *intimidated*: noises will *frighten*; threats may *intimidate*: we may run away when we are *intimidated*: we fear immediate bodily harm when we are *frightened*; we fear harm to our property as well as our persons when we are *intimidated*; *frighten*, therefore, is always applied to animals, but *intimidate* never.

FROLIC, GAMBOL, PRANK.

FROLIC, in German, &c. *fröhlich* cheerful, comes from *froh* merry, and *freude* joy.

GAMBOL signifies literally leaping into the air, from *gamb*, in French *jamb* the leg.

PRANK is changed from *prance*, which literally signifies to throw up the feet after the manner of a horse, and is most probably connected with the German *prangen* to make a parade or fuss, and Hebrew *pa-rang* to set free, because the freedom indicated by the word *prank* is more or less discoverable in the sense of all these terms. The *frolic* is a merry, joyous entertainment; the *gambol* is a dancing, light entertainment; the *prank* is a freakish, wild entertainment. Laughing, singing, noise, and feasting, constitute the *frolic* of the careless mind; it belongs to a company: conceit, levity, and trick, in movement, gesture, and contrivance, constitute the *gambol*; it belongs to the individual: adventure, eccentricity, and humour, constitute the *prank*; it belongs to one or many. *Frolic* is the mirth rather of vulgar minds; servants have their *frolics* in the kitchen while their masters have pleasures abroad: *gambols* are the diversions of youth; the Christmas season has given rise to a variety of *gambols* for the entertainment of both sexes: *pranks* are the diversions of the undisciplined; the rude school-boy broke loose from school spends his time in molesting a neighbourhood with his mischievous *pranks*. *Frolic* is the diversion of human beings only; *gambol* and *prank* are likewise applicable to brutes: a kitten *gambols*; a horse, a monkey, and a squirrel, will play *pranks*.

TO FULFIL, ACCOMPLISH, REALIZE.

To FULFIL is literally to fill quite full, that is, to bring about *full* to the wishes of

a person; ACCOMPLISH (v. *To accomplish*) is to bring to perfection, but without reference to the wishes of any one; to REALIZE is to make *real*, namely, whatever has been aimed at. The application of these terms is evident from their explanations: the wishes, the expectations, the intentions, and promises, of an individual, are appropriately said to be *fulfilled*: national projects, or undertakings, prophecies, and whatever is of general interest, are said to be *accomplished*: the fortune, or the prospects of an individual, or whatever results successfully from specific efforts, is said to be *realized*. The *fulfilment* of our wishes may be as much the effect of good fortune as of design; the *accomplishment* of projects mostly results from extraordinary exertion; the *realization* of hopes results more commonly from moderate well-combined efforts, than from any thing extraordinary.

FULNESS, PLENITUDE.

Although PLENITUDE is no more than a derivative from the Latin for FULNESS, yet the latter is used either in the proper sense to express the state of objects that are *full*, or in the improper sense to express great quantity, which is the accompaniment of *fulness*: the former only in the higher style and in the improper sense: hence we say in the *fulness* of one's heart, in the *fulness* of one's joy; but the *plenitude* of glory, the *plenitude* of power.

FUNERAL, OBSEQUIES.

FUNERAL, in Latin *funus*, is derived from *funis* a cord, because lighted cords, or torches, were carried before bodies which were interred by night; the term *funeral*, therefore, denotes the ordinary solemnity which attends the consignment of a body to the grave.

OBSEQUIES, in Latin *exaequiae*, are both derived from *sequor*, which, in its compound sense, signifies to perform or execute; they comprehend, therefore, *funerals* attended with more than ordinary solemnity.

We speak of the *funeral* as the last sad office which we perform for a friend; we speak of *obsequies* as the greatest tribute of respect which can be paid to the person of one high in station or public esteem: the *funeral*, by its frequency, becomes so familiar an object, that it passes by unheeded; *obsequies* which are performed over the remains of the great, attract our notice from the pomp and grandeur with which they are conducted.

G.

GAIN, PROFIT, EMOLUMENT, LUCRE.

GAIN signifies in general what is gained (*v. To acquire*).

PROFIT, *v. Advantage*.

EMOLUMENT, from *emolior*, signifies to work out or get by working.

LUCRE is in Latin *lucrum* gain, which probably comes from *luo* to pay, signifying that which comes to a man's purse.

Gain is here a general term, the other terms are specific: the *gain* is that which comes to a man; it is the fruit of his exertions, or agreeable to his wish. The *profit* is that which accrues from the thing.

When applied to riches, that which increases a man's estate are his *gains*; that which flows out of his trade are his *profits*; that is, they are his *gains* upon dealing. *Emolument* is a species of *gain* from labour, or a collateral *gain*; of this description are a man's *emoluments* from an office. A man estimates his *gains* by what he receives in the year; he estimates his *profits* by what he receives on every article; he estimates his *emoluments* according to the nature of the service which he has to perform.

Gain and *profit* are also taken in an abstract sense; *lucre* is never used otherwise; but the latter always conveys a bad meaning; it is, strictly speaking, unhallowed *gain*: an immoderate thirst for *gain* is the vice of men who are always calculating *profit* and loss; a thirst for *lucre* deadens every generous feeling of the mind.

Gain and *profit* may be extended to other objects, and sometimes opposed to each other; for as that which we *gain* is what we wish only, it is often the reverse of *profitable*: hence the force of that important question in Scripture, What shall it *profit* a man, if he *gain* the whole world and lose his own soul?

GALLANT, BEAU, SPARK.

These words convey nothing respectful of the person to whom they are applied; but the first, as is evident from its derivation, has something in it to recommend it to attention above the others: as true valour is ever associated with a regard for the fair sex, a GALLANT man will always be a *gallant* when he can render a female any service; sometimes, however, his *gallantries* may be such as to do them harm, rather than good; insignificance and effeminacy characterize the BEAU or fine gentleman; he is the woman's man—the humble servant to supply the place of a lacquey: the SPARK has but

a *spark* of that fire which shows itself in impertinent puerilities; it is applicable to youth who are just broke loose from school or college, and eager to display their manhood.

GAMESTER, GAMBLER.

These words are frequently confounded; the former is taken in an indifferent sense, but the latter is always in a bad sense: a man is a *gamester* who is in the habit of staking large sums in games of chance; he is a *gambler* who is in the habit of using dishonest means in order to win.

TO GAPE, STARE, GAZE.

To GAPE, in German *gaffen*, Saxon *geopnian* to make open or wide, is to look with an open or wide mouth.

STARE, from the German *starr* fixed, signifies to look with a fixed eye.

GAZE comes very probably from the Greek *αἰσχρομαίω* to admire, because it signifies to look steadily from a sentiment of admiration.

Gape and *stare* are taken in a bad sense; the former indicating the astonishment of gross ignorance; the latter not only ignorance but impertinence: *gaze* is taken always in a good sense, indicating laudable feeling of astonishment, pleasure, or curiosity: a clown *gapes* at the pictures of wild beasts which he sees at a fair; an impertinent fellow *stares* at every woman he looks at, and *stares* a modest woman out of countenance; a lover of the fine arts will *gaze* with admiration and delight at the productions of Raphael or Titian.

TO GATHER, COLLECT.

To GATHER, in Saxon *gatherian* probably contracted from *get here*, signifies simply to bring to one spot. To COLLECT (*v. To assemble, collect*) annexes also the idea of binding or forming into a whole; we *gather* that which is scattered in different parts: thus stones are *gathered* into a heap; vessels are *collected* so as to form a fleet. *Gathering* is a mere act of necessity or convenience; *collecting* is an act of design or choice: we *gather* apples from a tree, or a servant *gathers* books from off a table; the antiquarian *collects* coins, and the bibliomaniac *collects* rare books.

GENDER, SEX.

GENDER, in Latin *genus*, signifies properly a *genus* or kind. SEX, in French *sexe*, Latin *sexus*, comes from the Greek *ἕξις*, signifying the habit or nature. The *gender* is that distinction in words which marks the distinction of *sex* in things; there

are therefore, three *genders*, but only two *sexes*. The *genders* therefore are divided in grammar into *masculine*, *feminine*, and *neuter*; and animals are divided into male and female *sex*.

GENERAL, UNIVERSAL.

The **GENERAL** is to the **UNIVERSAL** what the part is to the whole. What is *general* includes the greater part or number; what is *universal* includes every individual or part. The *general* rule admits of many exceptions; the *universal* rule admits of none. Human government has the *general* good for its object: the government of Providence is directed to *universal* good. *General* is opposed to particular, and *universal* to individual. A scientific writer will not content himself with *general* remarks, when he has it in his power to enter into particulars; the *universal* complaint which we hear against men for their pride, shows that in every individual it exists to a greater or less degree.

GENERATION, AGE.

GENERATION is said of the persons who live during any particular period; and **AGE** is said of the period itself.

Those who are born at the same time constitute the *generation*; that period of time which comprehends the age of man is the *age*: there may therefore be many *generations* spring up in the course of an *age*; a fresh *generation* is springing up every day, which in the course of an *age* passes away, and is succeeded by fresh *generations*.

We consider man in his *generation* as to the part which he has to perform. We consider the *age* in which we live as to the manners of men and the events of nations.

GENTEEL, POLITE.

GENTEEL, in French *gentil*, Latin *gentilis*, signifies literally one belonging to the same family, or the next akin to whom the estate would fall, if there were no children; hence by an extended application it denoted to be of family.

POLITE, *v. Civil*.

Gentility respects rank in life; *politeness* the refinement of the mind and outward behaviour.

A *genteel* education is suited to the station of a gentleman; a *polite* education fits for polished society and conversation, and raises the individual among his equals.

There may be *gentility* without *politeness*; and *vice versa*. A person may have *genteel* manners, a *genteel* carriage, a *genteel* mode of living as far as respects his general rela-

tion with society; but a *polite* behaviour and a *polite* address, which qualify him for every relation in society, and enable him to shine in connexion with all orders of men, are independent of either birth or wealth; they are in part gifts of nature, although to be acquired by art.

GENTILE, HEATHEN, PAGAN.

*The Jews comprehended all strangers under the name *Goim*, nations or **GEN-TILES**: among the Greeks and Romans they were designed by the name of barbarians. By the name *Gentile* was understood especially those who were not of the Jewish religion, including, in the end, even the Christians; for, as Fleury remarks, there were some among these uncircumcised *Gentiles* who worshipped the true God, and were permitted to dwell in the holy land provided they observed the law of nature and abstinence.

Some learned men pretend that the *Gentiles* were so named from their having only a natural law, and such as they imposed on themselves, in opposition to the Jews and Christians, who have a positive revealed law to which they are obliged to submit.

Frisch and others derive the word **HEATHEN** from the Grek *εθνη, εθνικός*; which is corroborated by the translation in the Anglo Saxon law of the word *haethne* by the Greek *εθνη*. Adelung, however, thinks it to be more probably derived from the word *heide* a field, for the same reason as **PAGAN** is derived from *pagus* a village, because when Constantine banished idolaters from the towns, they repaired to the villages, and secretly adhered to their religious worship, whence they were termed by the Christians of the fourth century *Pagani*, which, as he supposes, was translated literally into the German *heidener*, a villager or worshipper in the field. Be this as it may, it is evident that the word *Heathen* is in our language more applicable than *Pagan*, to the Greeks, the Romans, and the cultivated nations who practised idolatry; and, on the other hand, *Pagan* is more properly employed for rude and uncivilized people who worship false Gods.

The *Heathens* or *Pagans* are *Gentiles*; but the *Gentiles* are not all either *Heathens* or *Pagans*. Confucius and Socrates, who rejected the plurality of gods, and the followers of Mahomet, who adore the true God, are, properly speaking, *Gentiles*. The worshippers of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, and all the deities of the ancients, are termed *Heathens*. The worshippers of Fo, Brama, Xaca,

* Vire Roubaud: „Gentils, païens.“

and all the deities of savage nations, are termed *Pagans*.

GENTLE, TAME.

Gentle, as before observed (v. *Genteel*), signifies literally well-born, and is opposed either to the fierce or the rude: *tame*, in German *zahn*, from *zaum*, a bridle, signifies literally curbed or kept under, and is opposed either to the wild, or the spirited.

GENTLENESS lies rather in the natural disposition; TAMENESS is the effect either of art or circumstances. Any unbroken horse may be *gentle*, but not *tame*: a horse that is broken in will be *tame*, but not always *gentle*.

Animals are in general said to be *gentle* which show a disposition to associate with man, and conform to his will; they are said to be *tame*, if either by compulsion or habit they are brought to mix with human society.

In the moral application *gentle* is always employed in the good, and *tame* in the bad, sense: a *gentle* spirit needs no control; it amalgamates freely with the will of another: a *tame* spirit is without any will of its own; it is alive to nothing but submission; it is perfectly consistent with our natural liberty to have *gentleness*, but *tameness* is the accompaniment of slavery. The same distinction marks the use of these words when applied to the outward conduct or the language: *gentle* bespeaks something positively good; *tame* bespeaks the want of an essential good: a *gentle* expression is devoid of all acrimony, and serves to turn away wrath; a *tame* expression is devoid of all force or energy, and ill-calculated to inspire the mind with any feeling whatever. In giving counsel to an irritable and conceited temper, it is necessary to be *gentle*: *tame* expressions are no where such striking deformities as in a poem or an oration.

TO GET, GAIN, OBTAIN, PROCURE.

To GET signifies simply to cause to have or possess; it is generic, and the rest specific: to GAIN (v. *To acquire*) is to get the thing one wishes, or that is for one's advantage: to OBTAIN is to get the thing aimed at or striven after; to PROCURE, from *pro* and *curo* to care for, is to get the thing wanted or sought for.

Get is not only the most general in its sense, but its application; it may be substituted in almost every case for the other terms, for we may say to get or gain a prize, to get or obtain a reward, to get or procure a book; and it is also employed in numberless familiar cases, where the other

terms would be less suitable, for what this word gains in familiarity, it loses in dignity: hence we may with propriety talk of a servant's *getting* some water, or a person *getting* a book off a shelf, or *getting* meat from the butcher, with numberless similar cases in which the other terms could not be employed without losing their dignity. Moreover, *get* is promiscuously used for whatever comes to the hand, whether good or bad, desirable or not desirable, sought for or not; but *gain*, *obtain*, and *procure*, always include either the wishes, or the instrumentality of the agent, or both together. Thus a person is said to *get* a cold, or a fever, a good or an ill name, without specifying any of the circumstances of the action: but he is said to *gain* that approbation which is gratifying to his feelings; to *obtain* a recompence which is the object of his exertions; to *procure* a situation which is the end of his endeavours.

The word *gain* is peculiarly applicable to whatever comes to us fortuitously; what we *gain* constitutes our good fortune; we *gain* a victory, or we *gain* a cause; the result in both cases may be independent of our exertions. To *obtain* and *procure* exclude the idea of chance, and suppose exertions directed to a specific end; but the former may include the exertions of others; the latter is particularly employed for one's own personal exertions. A person *obtains* a situation through the recommendation of a friend: he *procures* a situation by applying for it. *Obtain* is likewise employed only in that which requires particular efforts, that which is not immediately within our reach; *procure* is applicable to that which is to be got with ease, by the simple exertion of a walk, or of asking for.

GIFT, PRESENT, DONATION.

GIFT is derived from to *give*, in the sense of what is communicated to another gratuitously, of one's property.

PRESENT is derived from to *present*, signifying the thing *presented* to another.

DONATION, from the French *donation*, and the Latin *dono* to present or give, is a species of gift.

The gift is an act of generosity or condescension; it contributes to the benefit of the receiver: the *present* is an act of kindness, courtesy, or respect; it contributes to the pleasure of the receiver. The gift passes from the rich to the poor, from the high to the low, and creates an obligation; the *present* passes either between equals, or from the inferior to the superior. Whatever we receive from God, through the bounty of his Providence, we entitle a gift; what-

ever we receive from our friends, or whatever princes receive from their subjects, are entitled *presents*. We are told by all travellers that it is a custom in the east, never to approach a great man without a *present*. The value of a *gift* is often heightened by being given opportunely; the value of a *present* often depends upon the value we have for the giver.

The *gift* is private, and benefits the individual; the *donation* is public, and serves some general purpose: what is given to relieve the necessities of any poor person is a *gift*; what is given to support an institution is a *donation*. The clergy are indebted to their patrons for the livings which are in their *gift*: it has been the custom of the pious and charitable, in all ages, to make *donations* for the support of alms-houses, hospitals, infirmaries, and such institutions as serve to diminish the sum of human misery.

GIFT, ENDOWMENT, TALENT.

GIFT, *v. Gift*.

ENDOWMENT signifies the thing with which one is endowed.

TALENT, *v. Faculty*.

Gift and *endowment* both refer to the act of giving and endowing, and of course include the idea of something given, and something received: the word *talent* conveys no such collateral idea. When we speak of a *gift*, we refer in our minds to a giver; when we speak of an *endowment*, we refer in our minds to the receiver; when we speak of a *talent*, we only think of its intrinsic quality.

A *gift* is either supernatural or natural; an *endowment* is only natural. The primitive Christians received various *gifts* through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as the *gift* of tongues, the *gift* of healing, &c. There are some men who have a peculiar *gift* of utterance; beauty of person, and corporeal agility, are *endowments* with which some are peculiarly invested.

The word *gift* excludes the idea of any thing acquired by exertion; it is that which is communicated to us altogether independently of ourselves, and enables us to arrive at that perfection in any art, which could not be attained any other way. Speech is denominated a general *gift*, inasmuch as it is given to the whole human race, in distinction from the brutes; but the *gift* of eloquence is a peculiar *gift* granted to a few individuals, in distinction from others, and one which may be exerted for the benefit of mankind. *Endowments*, though inherent in us, are not independent of our exertions; they are qualities which admit of improvement by being used; they are in fact the

gifts of nature, which serve to adorn and elevate the possessor, when employed for a good purpose. *Talents* are either natural or acquired, or in some measure of a mixed nature; they denote powers without specifying the source from which they proceed; a man may have a *talent* for music, for drawing, for mimicry, and the like; but this *talent* may be the fruit of practice and experience, as much as of nature.

It is clear from the above that an *endowment* is a *gift*, but a *gift* is not always an *endowment*; and that a *talent* may also be either a *gift* or an *endowment*, but that it is frequently distinct from both. The terms *gift* and *talent* are applicable to corporeal as well as spiritual actions; *endowment* to corporeal or mental qualities. To write a superior hand is a *gift*, inasmuch as it is supposed to be unattainable by any force of application and instruction; it is a *talent* inasmuch as it is a power or property worth our possession, but it is never an *endowment*. On the other hand, courage, discernment, a strong imagination, and the like, are both *gifts* and *endowments*; and when the intellectual *endowment* displays itself in any creative form, as in the case of poetry, music, or any art, so as to produce that which is valued and esteemed, it becomes a *talent* to the possessor.

TO GIVE, GRANT, BESTOW.

GIVE, in Saxon *gifan*, German *geben*, &c. is derived by Adelung from the old word *gaff* the hollow of the hand.

GRANT and BESTOW, *v. To allow*.

The idea of communicating to another what is our own, or in our power, is common to these terms; this is the whole signification of *give*; but *grant* and *bestow* include accessory ideas in their meaning. To *grant* is to give at one's pleasure; to *bestow* is to give with a certain degree of necessity. *Giving* is confined to no object; whatever property we transfer into the hands of another, that we give; we give money, clothes, food, or whatever is transferable: *granting* is confined to such objects as afford pleasure or convenience; they may consist of transferable property or not: *bestowing* is applied to such objects only as are necessary to supply wants, which always consists of that which is transferable. We give what is liked or not liked, asked for or unasked for: we grant that only which is wished for and requested. One may give poison or medicine; one may give to a beggar, or to a friend; one grants a sum of money by way of loan: we give what is wanted or not wanted; we bestow that only which is expressly

wanted: we *give* with an idea of a return or otherwise: we *grant* voluntarily, without any prospect of a return: we *give* for a permanency or otherwise; we *bestow* only in particular cases which require immediate notice. Many *give* things to the rich only to increase the number of their superfluities, and they *give* to the poor to relieve their necessities; they *bestow* their alms on an indigent sufferer.

To *give* has no respect to the circumstances of the action or the agent; it is applicable to persons of all conditions: to *grant* bespeaks not only the will, but the power and influence of the *granter*: to *bestow* bespeaks the necessitous condition of the receiver. Children may *give* to their parents and parents to their children, kings to their subjects or subjects to their kings; but monarchs only *grant* to their subjects, or parents to their children; and superiors in general *bestow* upon their dependants that which they cannot provide for themselves.

In an extended application of the terms to moral objects or circumstances, they strictly adhere to the same line of distinction. We *give* our consent; we *give* our promise; we *give* our word; we *give* credit; we *give* in all cases that which may be simply transferred from one to another. Liberties, rights, privileges, favours, indulgences, permissions, and all things are *granted*, which are in the hands only of a few, but are acceptable to many. Blessings, care, concern, and the like, are *bestowed* upon those who are dependant upon others for whatever they have.

Give and *bestow* are likewise said of things as well as of persons; *grant* is said only of persons. *Give* is here equally general and indefinite; *bestow* conveys the idea of *giving* under circumstances of necessity and urgency. One *gives* a preference to a particular situation; one *gives* a thought to a subject that is proposed; one *gives* time and labour to any matter that engages one's attention: but one *bestows* pains on that which demands particular attention; one *bestows* a moment's thought on one particular subject, out of the number which engage attention.

TO GIVE, AFFORD.

GIVE (*v. To give, grant*), and AFFORD (*v. To afford*), are allied to each other in the sense of sending forth: but the former denotes an unqualified and unconditional action, as in the preceding article; the latter bears a relation to the circumstances of the agent. A person is said to *give* money without any regard to the state of his finances: he is said to *afford* what he *gives*, when one wishes to define his pecuniary condition.

The same idea runs through the application of these terms to all other cases, in which inanimate things are made the agents. When we say a thing *gives* satisfaction, we simply designate the action; when we say it *affords* pleasure, we refer to the nature and properties of the thing thus specified; the former is employed only to declare the fact, the latter to characterize the object. Hence, in certain cases, we should say, this or that posture of the body *gives* ease to a sick person; but as a moral sentiment, we should say, nothing *affords* such ease to the mind as a clear conscience. Upon the same grounds the use of these terms is justified in the following cases; to *give* rise; to *give* birth; or *give* occasion: to *afford* an opportunity; to *afford* a plea or a pretext; to *afford* ground, and the like.

TO GIVE, PRESENT, OFFER, EXHIBIT.

These terms have a common signification, inasmuch as they designate the manual act of transferring something from one's self to another. The first is here as elsewhere (*v. To give, grant*) the most definite and extensive in its meaning; it denotes the complete act: * the two latter refer rather to the preliminaries of GIVING, than to the act itself. What is *given* is actually transferred: what is PRESENTED, that is, made a *present* to any one, or OFFERED, that is, brought in his way, is put in the way of being transferred: we *present* in *giving*, and *offer* in order to *give*; but we may *give* without presenting or offering; and on the other hand, we may *present* or *offer* without *giving*.

To *give* is the familiar term which designates the ordinary transfer of property: to *present* is a term of respect; it includes in it the formality and ceremony of setting before another that which we wish to *give*: to *offer* is an act of humility or solemnity; it bespeaks the movement of the heart, which impels to the making a transfer or *gift*. We *give* to our domestics; we *present* to princes; we *offer* to God: we *give* to a person what we wish to be received; we *present* to a person what we think agreeable; we *offer* what we think acceptable: we *give* a person not only our external property, but our esteem, our confidence, our company, and the like; an ambassador presents his credentials at court; a subject *offers* his services to his king.

They bear the same relation to each other when applied to words or actions, we speak

* Vide Girard: , Donner, presenter, offrir."

of *giving* a person an assurance, or a contradiction; of *presenting* an address, and *offering* an apology. They may likewise be extended in their application, not only to personal and individual actions, but also to such as respect the public at large: we *give* a description in writing, as well as by word of mouth; one *presents* the public with the fruit of one's labours; we *offer* remarks on such things as attract notice, and call for animadversion.

These terms may also be employed to designate the actions of unconscious agents, by which they are characterized: in this sense, they come very near to the word EXHIBIT, which, from *exhibeo*, signifies to hold or put forth. Here the word *give* is equally indefinite and general, denoting simply to send from one's self, and applies mostly to what proceeds from another, by a natural cause: thus, a thing is said to *give* pain, or to *give* pleasure. Things are said to *present* or *offer*: thus, a town is said to *present* a fine view, or an idea *presents* itself to the mind; an opportunity *offers*, that is, *offers* itself to our notice. To *exhibit* is properly applied in this sense of setting forth to view; but expresses, likewise, the idea of attracting notice also: that which is *exhibited* is more striking than what is *presented* or *offered*; thus a poem is said to *exhibit* marks of genius.

TO GIVE UP, DELIVER, SURRENDER, YIELD, CEDE, CONCEDE.

We GIVE UP (*v. To give, grant*) that which we wish to retain; we DELIVER that which we wish not to retain. *Deliver* does not include the idea of a transfer; but *give up* implies both the *giving* from, and the *giving* to: we *give up* our house to the accommodation of our friends; we *deliver* property into the hands of the owner. To *give up* is a colloquial substitute for either SURRENDER or YIELD; as it designates no circumstance of the action it may be employed in familiar discourse, in almost every case for the other terms: where the action is compulsory, we may either say an officer *gives up* or *surrenders* his sword; when the action is discretionary, we may either say he *gives up*, or *yields* a point of discussion: *give up* has, however, an extensiveness of application, which *gives* it an office distinct from either *surrender* or *yield*. When we speak of familiar and personal subjects, *give up* is more suitable than *surrender*, which is confined to matters of public interest or great moment: a man *gives up* his place, his right, his claim, and the like; he *surrenders* a fortress, a vessel, or his property

to his creditors. When *give up* is compared with *yield*, they both respect personal matters: but the former expresses a much stronger action than the latter: a man *gives up* his whole judgment to another; he *yields* to the opinion of another in particular cases: he *gives himself up* to sensual indulgences; he *yields* to the force of temptation.

CEDE, from the Latin *cedo* to *give*, is properly to *surrender* by virtue of a treaty: we may *surrender* a town as an act of necessity; but the *cession* of a country is purely a political transaction: thus, generals frequently *surrender* such towns as they are not able to defend; and governments *cede* such countries as they find it convenient not to retain. To CONCEDE, which is but a variation of *cede*, is a mode of *yielding* which may be either an act of discretion or courtesy; as when a government *concedes* to the demands of the people certain privileges, or when an individual *concedes* any point in dispute for the sake of peace.

TO GIVE UP, ABANDON, RESIGN, FOREGO.

These terms differ from the preceding (*v. give up*), inasmuch as they designate actions entirely free from foreign influence. A man GIVES UP, ABANDONS (*v. To abandon*), and RESIGNS from the dictates of his own mind, independently of all control from others. To *give up* and *abandon* both denote a positive decision of the mind; but the former may be the act of the understanding or the will, the latter is more commonly the act of the will and the passions; to *give up* is applied to familiar cases: *abandon* to matters of importance: one *gives up* an idea, an intention, a plan, and the like; one *abandons* a project, a scheme, a measure of government.

To *give up* and *resign* are applied either to outward actions, or merely to inward movements; but the former is active, and determinately fixes the conduct; the latter seems to be rather passive, it is the leaning of the mind to the circumstances: a man *gives up* his situation by a positive act of his choice; he *resigns* his office when he feels it inconvenient to hold it: so, likewise, we *give up* expectations, and *resign* hopes. In this sense, FOREGO, which signifies to let go, is comparable with *resign*, inasmuch as it expresses a passive action; but we *resign* that which we have, and we *forego* that which we might have: thus, we *resign* the claims which we have already made; we *forego* the claims which we might make: the former may be a mat-

ter of prudence; the latter is always an act of forbearance. When applied reflectively, to *give up* is used either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; *abandon* always in a bad sense; *resign* always in a good sense: a man may *give himself up*, either to studious pursuits, to idle vagaries, or vicious indulgences; he *abandons* himself to gross vices; he *resigns* himself to the will of Providence, or to the circumstances of his condition.

GLAD, PLEASED, JOYFUL, CHEERFUL.

GLAD is obviously a variation of *glee* and *glow* (v. *Fire*).

PLEASED, from to *please*, marks the state of being *pleased*.

JOYFUL, bespeaks its own meaning, either as full of *joy* or productive of great *joy*.

CHEERFUL, v. *Cheerful*.

Glad denotes either a partial state, or a permanent and habitual sentiment: in the former sense it is most nearly allied to *pleased*; in the latter sense to *joyful* and *merry*.

Glad and *pleased* are both applied to the ordinary occurrences of the day; but the former denotes rather a lively and momentary sentiment, the latter a gentle but rather more lasting feeling; we are *glad* to see a friend who has been long absent; we are *glad* to have good intelligence from our friends and relatives; we are *glad* to get rid of a troublesome companion: we are *pleased* to have the approbation of those we esteem: we are *pleased* to hear our friends well spoken of; we are *pleased* with the company of an intelligent and communicative person.

Glad, *joyful*, and *cheerful*, all express more or less lively sentiments; but *glad* is less vivid than *joyful*, and more so than *cheerful*. *Gladness* seems to arise as much from physical as mental causes; wine is said to make the heart *glad*: *joy* has its source in the mind, as it is influenced by external circumstances; instances of good fortune, either for ourselves or our friends, excite *joy*: *cheerfulness* is an even tenor of the mind, which it may preserve of itself independently of all external circumstances; religious contemplation produces habitual *cheerfulness*.

A comfortable meal to an indigent person *gladdens* his heart: a nation *rejoices* at the return of peace after a long-protracted war: a traveller is *cheered* in a solitary desert by the sight of a human being, or the sound of a voice; or a sufferer is *cheered* by his trust in Divine Providence.

Glad is seldom employed as an epithet to qualify things, except in the scriptural or solemn style, as, *glad tidings of great joy*: *joyful* is seldomer used to qualify persons than things; hence we speak of *joyful news*, a *joyful* occurrence, *joyful* faces, *joyful* sounds, and the like: *cheerful* is employed either to designate the state of the mind or the property of the thing; we either speak of a *cheerful* disposition, a *cheerful* person, a *cheerful* society, or a *cheerful* face, a *cheerful* sound, a *cheerful* aspect, and the like.

When used to qualify one's actions they all bespeak the temper of the mind: *gladly* denotes a high degree of willingness as opposed to aversion; one who is suffering under excruciating pains *gladly* submits to any thing which promises relief: *joyfully* denotes unqualified *pleasure*, unmixed with any alloy or restrictive consideration; a convert to Christianity *joyfully* goes through the initiatory ceremonies which entitle him to all its privileges, spiritual and temporal: *cheerfully* denotes the absence of unwillingness, it is opposed to reluctantly; the zealous Christian *cheerfully* submits to every hardship to which he is exposed in the course of his religious profession.

TO GLANCE AT. ALLUDE TO.

GLANCE, probably from the German *glänzen* to shine, signifies to make appear to the eye.

ALLUDE, v. *To allude*.

These terms are nearly allied in the sense of indirectly referring to any object, either in written or verbal discourse: but *glance* expresses a cursory and latent action; *allude*, simply an indirect but undisguised action: ill-natured satirists are perpetually *glancing* at the follies and infirmities of individuals; the Scriptures are full of *allusions* to the manners and customs of the Eastern nations.

GLARING, BAREFACED.

GLARING, is here used in the figurative sense, drawn from its natural signification of broad light, which strikes powerfully upon the senses.

BAREFACED signifies literally having a *bare* or *uncovered* face, which denotes the absence of all disguise or all shame.

Glaring designates the thing; *barefaced* characterizes the person: a *glaring* falsehood is that which strikes the observer in an instant to be falsehood; a *barefaced* lie or falsehood betrays the effrontery of him who utters it. A *glaring* absurdity will be seen instantly without the aid of reflection.

tion; a *barefaced* piece of impudence characterizes the agent as more than ordinary lost to all sense of decorum.

GLEAM, GLIMMER, RAY, BEAM.

GLEAM is in Saxon *gleomen*, German *glimmen*, &c. GLIMMER is a variation of the same.

RAY is connected with the word row.

BEAM comes from the German *baum*, a tree.

Certain portions of light are designated by all these terms, but *gleam* and *glimmer* are indefinite. *ray* and *beam* are definite. A *gleam* is properly the commencement of light, or that portion of opening light which interrupts previous darkness: a *glimmer* is an unsteady *gleam*: *ray* and *beam* are portions of light which emanate from some luminous body; the former from all luminous bodies in general, the latter more particularly from the sun: the former is, as its derivation denotes, a row of light issuing in a greater or less degree from any body; the latter is a great row of light, like a pole issuing from a body. There may be a *gleam* of light visible on the wall of a dark room, or a *glimmer* if it be moveable: there may be *rays* of light visible at night on the back of a glow-worm, or *rays* of light may break through the shutters of a closed room; the sun in the height of its splendour sends forth its *beams*. *Gleam* and *ray* may be applied figuratively; *beam* only in the natural sense: a *gleam* of light may break in on the benighted understanding; but a *glimmer* of light rather confuses; *rays* of light may dart into the mind of the most ignorant savage who is taught the principles of Christianity by the pure practice of its professors.

GLIMPSE, GLANCE.

A GLIMPSE is the action of the object appearing to the eye; a GLANCE is the action of the eye seeking the object: one casts a *glance* at an object: the latter therefore is properly the means, the former is the end: we get a *glimpse* by means of a *glance*. The *glimpse* is the hasty, imperfect, and sudden view which we get of an object; the *glance* is the hasty and imperfect view which we take of an object: the former may depend upon a variety of circumstances; the latter depends upon the will of the agent. We can seldom do more than get a *glimpse* of objects in a carriage that is going with rapidity: when we do not wish to be observed to look we take but a *glance* of an object.

GLOBE, BALL.

GLOBE, in Latin *globus*, comes probably from the Greek *γηλοφος*, a hillock of earth,

BALL, in Teutonic *ball*, is doubtless connected with the words *bowl*, *bow*, *bend*, and the like, signifying that which is turned or rounded.

Globe is to *ball* as the species to the genus; a *globe* is a *ball*, but every *ball* is not a *globe*. The *globe* does not in its strict sense require to be of an equal rotundity in all its parts; it is properly an irregularly round body; a *ball* on the other hand, is generally any round body, but particularly one that is entirely regularly round: the earth itself is therefore properly denominated a *globe* from its unequal rotundity; and for the same reason the mechanical body, which is made to represent the earth, is also denominated a *globe*; but in the higher style of writing the earth is frequently denominated a *ball*, and in familiar discourse every solid body which assumes a spherical form is entitled a *ball*.

GLOOM, HEAVINESS.

GLOOM has its source internally, and is often independent of outward circumstances; HEAVINESS is a weight upon the spirits, produced by a foreign cause; the former belongs to the constitution; the latter is occasional. People of a melancholy habit have a particular *gloom* hanging over their minds, which pervades all their thoughts: *heaviness* of spirits is itself a temporary thing, and may be succeeded by vivacity or lightness of mind when the pressure of the moment has subsided.

GLOOMY, SULLEN, MOROSE, SPLENETIC.

All these terms denote a temper of mind the reverse of easy or happy: GLOOMY lies either in the general constitution or the particular frame of the mind; SULLEN lies in the temper; a man of a *gloomy* disposition is an involuntary agent; it is his misfortune, and renders him in some measure pitiable: the *sullen* man yields to his evil humours; *sullenness* is his fault, and renders him offensive. A man may be rendered *gloomy* for a time by the influence of particular circumstances; but *sullenness* creates pains for itself when external circumstances of a painful nature are wanting.

Sullenness and MOROSENES are both the inherent properties of the temper; but the former discovers itself in those who have to submit, and the latter in those who have

to command: *sullenness* therefore betrays itself mostly in early life; *moroseness* is the peculiar characteristic of age. The *sullen* person has many fancied hardships to endure from the control of others; the *morose* person causes others to endure many real hardships, by keeping them under too severe a control. *Sullenness* shows itself mostly by an unseemly reserve; *moroseness* shows itself by the hardness of the speech, and the roughness of the voice. *Sullenness* is altogether a sluggish principle, that leads more or less to inaction; *moroseness* is a harsh feeling, that is not contented with exacting obedience unless it inflicts pain.

Moroseness is a defect of the temper; but **SPLEEN**, from the Latin *splen*, is a defect in the heart: the one betrays itself in behaviour, the other more in conduct. A *morose* man is an unpleasant companion; a *splenetic* man is a bad member of society; the former is ill-natured to those about him, the latter is ill-humoured with all the world. *Moroseness* vents itself in temporary expressions, *spleen* indulges itself in perpetual bitterness of expression.

GLORY, HONOUR.

GLORY is something dazzling and widely diffused. The Latin word *gloria*, anciently written *glosia*, is in all probability connected with our words *gloss*, *glaze*, *glitter*, *glow*, through the medium of the northern words *gleissen*, *glotzen*, *glänzen*, *glühen*, all which come from the Hebrew *gehel*, a live coal. That the moral idea of *glory* is best represented by light is evident from the *glory* which is painted round the head of our Saviour.

HONOUR is something less splendid, but more solid, and probably comes from the Hebrew *hon* wealth or substance.

Glory impels to extraordinary efforts and to great undertakings. *Honour* induces to a discharge of one's duty. Excellence in the attainment, and success in the exploit, bring *glory*; a faithful exercise of one's talents reflects *honour*. *Glory* is connected with every thing which has a peculiar public interest; *honour* is more properly obtained within a private circle. *Glory* is attainable but by few, and may be an object of indifference to one; *honour* is more or less within the reach of all, and must be disregarded by no one. A general at the head of an army goes in pursuit of *glory*; the humble citizen who acts his part in society so as to obtain the approbation of his fellow citizens, is in the road for *honour*. A nation acquires *glory* by the splendour of its victories; it obtains *honour* by its

strict adherence to equity and good faith in its dealings with other nations.

The military career of Alexander was *glorious*; his humane treatment of the Persian princesses who were his prisoners, was an *honourable* trait in his character.

TO GLORY, BOAST.

To **GLORY** is to hold as one's *glory*. To **BOAST** is to set forth to one's advantage. Both words denote the value which the individual sets upon that which belongs to himself. To *glory* is more particularly the act of the mind, the indulgence of the internal sentiment: to *boast* denotes rather the expression of the sentiment. To *glory* is applied only to matters of moment; *boast* is rather suitable to trifling points. A Christian martyr *glories* in the cross of Christ; a soldier *boasts* of his courage and his feats in battle.

Glory is but seldom used in a bad sense, and *boast* still seldomer in a good sense. It is an unbecoming action for an individual to *boast* of any thing in himself; but a nation, in its collective capacity, may *boast* of its superiority without doing violence to decorum. An Englishman *glories* in the reflection of belonging to such a distinguished nation, although he would do very idly to *boast* of it as a personal quality.

TO GLOSS, VARNISH, PALLIATE.

GLOSS and **VARNISH** are figurative terms, which borrow their signification from the act of rendering the outer surface of any physical object shining.

To *gloss*, which is connected with to *glaze*, is to give a *gloss* or brightness to any thing by means of friction, as in the case of japan or mahogany: to *varnish* is to give an artificial *gloss*, by means of applying a foreign substance. Hence in the figurative use of the terms, to *gloss* is to put the best face upon any thing by various artifices; but to *varnish* is to do the same thing by means of direct falsehood; to **PALLIATE**, which likewise signifies to give the best possible outside to a thing (*v. To extenuate*), requires still less artifice than either. One *glosses* over that which is bad, by giving it a soft name; as when a man's vices are *glossed* over with the name of indiscretion, or a man's mistress is termed his friend: one *varnishes* a bad character by ascribing good motives to his bad actions, by withholding facts that are to his discredit, and fabricating circumstances in his favour; an *unvarnished* tale contains nothing but the simple truth; the *varnished* tale on the other hand contains a great mixture of

falsehood: to *palliate* is to diminish the magnitude of an offence, by making an excuse in favour of the offender; as when an act of theft is *palliated* by considering the starving condition of the thief.

GODLIKE, DIVINE, HEAVENLY.

GODLIKE bespeaks its own meaning, as like *God*, or after the manner of *God*.

DIVINE, in Latin *divinus* from *divus* or *Deus*, signifies appertaining to *God*.

HEAVENLY, or HEAVENLIKE, signifies like or appertaining to *heaven*.

Godlike is a more expressive, but less common term than *divine*: the former is used only as an epithet of peculiar praise for an individual; *divine* is generally employed for that which appertains to a superior being, in distinction from that which is human. Benevolence is a *godlike* property: the *divine* image is stamped on the features of man, hence the face is called by Milton, 'the human face *divine*.' As *divine* is opposed to human, so is *heavenly* to earthly: the term *Divine Being* distinguishes the Creator from all other beings; but a *heavenly* being denotes the angels or inhabitants of *heaven*, in distinction from earthly beings or the inhabitants of earth. The *Divine will* is the foundation of all moral law and obligation; *heavenly* joys are the fruit of all our labours in this earthly course.

GODLY, RIGHTEOUS.

GODLY is a contraction of *godlike* (v. *Godlike*).

RIGHTEOUS signifies conformable to *right* or *truth*.

These epithets are both used in a spiritual sense, and cannot, without an indecorous affectation of religion, be introduced into any other discourse than that which is properly spiritual. *Godliness*, in the strict sense, is that outward deportment which characterizes a heavenly temper; prayer, reading of the Scriptures, public worship, and every religious act, enters into the signification of *godliness*, which at the same time supposes a temper of mind, not only to delight in, but to profit by such exercises: *righteousness* on the other hand comprehends Christian morality, in distinction from that of the heathen or unbeliever; a *righteous* man does *right*, not only because it is *right*, but because it is agreeable to the will of his Maker, and the example of his Redeemer: *righteousness* is therefore to *godliness* as the effect to the cause. The *godly* man goes to the sanctuary, and by converse with his Maker assimilates all his affections to the character of that Being whom he

worships; when he leaves the sanctuary he proves the efficacy of his *godliness* by his *righteous* converse with his fellow-creatures.

GOLD, GOLDEN.

These terms are both employed as epithets, but GOLD is the substantive used in composition, and GOLDEN the adjective, in ordinary use. The former is strictly applied to the metal of which the thing is made, as a *gold* cup, or a *gold* coin; but the latter to whatever appertains to *gold*, whether properly or figuratively: as the *golden* lion, the *golden* crown, the *golden* age, or a *golden* harvest.

GOOD, GOODNESS.

GOOD, which under different forms runs through all the northern languages, and has a great affinity to the Greek *αγαθος*, is supposed by Adelung to be derived from the Latin *gaudeo*, Greek *γηθειν*, and Hebrew *chada* to rejoice.

Good and GOODNESS are abstract terms, drawn from the same word; the former to denote the thing that is *good*, the latter the inherent *good* property of a thing. All *good* comes from God, whose *goodness* towards his creatures is unbounded.

The *good* we do is determined by the tendency of the action; but our *goodness* in doing it is determined by the motive of our actions. *Good* is of a twofold nature, physical and moral, and is opposed to evil; *goodness* is applicable either to the disposition of moral agents or the qualities of inanimate objects; it is opposed to badness: by the order of Providence the most horrible convulsions are made to bring about *good*; the *goodness* or badness of any fruit depends upon its fitness to be enjoyed.

GOOD, BENEFIT, ADVANTAGE.

GOOD is an abstract universal term, which in its unlimited sense comprehends every thing that can be conceived of, as suited in all its parts to the end proposed. In this sense BENEFIT and ADVANTAGE, as well as utility, service, profit, &c. are all modifications of *good*; but the term *good* has likewise a limited application, which brings it to a just point of comparison with the other terms here chosen: the common idea which allies these words to each other is that of *good* as it respects a particular object. *Good* is here employed indefinitely; *benefit* and *advantage* are specified by some collateral circumstances. *Good* is done without regard to the person who does it, or him to whom it is done; but *benefit* has

always respect to the relative condition of the giver and receiver, who must be both specified. Hence we say of a charitable man, that he does much *good* or that he bestows *benefits* upon this or that individual. In like manner, when speaking of particular communities or society at large, we may say that it is for the *good* of society or for the *good* of mankind that every one submits to the sacrifice of some portion of his natural liberty; but it is for the *benefit* of the poorer orders that the charitably disposed employ so much time and money in giving them instruction.

Good is limited to no mode or manner, no condition of the person or the thing; it is applied indiscriminately; *benefit* is more particularly applicable to the external circumstances of a person, as to his health, his improvement, his pecuniary condition, and the like: exercise is always attended with some *good* it is of particular *benefit* to those who are of a lethargic habit: an indiscreet zeal does more harm than *good* to the cause of religion; a patient cannot expect to derive *benefit* from a medicine when he counteracts its effects.

Good is mostly employed for some positive and direct *good*; *advantage* for an *adventitious* and indirect *good*: a *good* is that which would be *good* to all; an *advantage* is that which is partially *good*, or *good* only in particular cases: it is *good* for a man to exert his talents; it is an *advantage* to him if in addition to his own efforts he has the support of friends: it may frequently happen that he who has the most *advantages* derives the least *good* from them; talents, person, voice, powerful interest, a pleasing address, are all *advantages*; but they may produce evil instead of *good* if they are not directed to right purposes.

GOODNATURE, GOODHUMOUR.

GOODNATURE and GOODHUMOUR both imply the disposition to please and be pleased; but the former is habitual and permanent, the latter is temporary and partial: the former lies in the nature and frame of the mind; the latter in the state of the humours or spirits. A *goodnatured* man recommends himself at all times for his *goodnature*; a *goodhumoured* man recommends himself particularly as a companion: *goodnature* displays itself by a readiness in doing kind offices; *goodhumour* is confined mostly to the ease and cheerfulness of one's outward deportment in social converse. *Goodnature* is applicable only to the character of the individual;

goodhumour may be said of a whole company: it is a mark of *goodnature* in a man not to disturb the *goodhumour* of the company he is in, by resenting the affront that is offered him by another.

GOODS, FURNITURE, CHATTELS, MOVEABLES, EFFECTS.

All these terms are applied to such things as belong to an individual: the first term is the most general, both in sense and application; all the rest are species.

FURNITURE comprehends all household goods; wherefore in regard to an individual, supposing the house to contain all he has, the general is put for the specific term, as when one speaks of a person's moving his GOODS for his *furniture*: but in the strict sense *goods* comprehends more than *furniture*, including not only that which is adapted for the domestic purposes of a family, but also every thing which is of value to a person: the chairs and tables are a part of *furniture*; papers, books, and money, are included among his *goods*: it is obvious therefore that *goods*, even in its most limited sense, is of wider import than *furniture*.

CHATTELS, which is properly changed from *cattle*, is a term not in ordinary use, but still sufficiently employed to deserve notice. It comprehends that species of *goods* which is in a special manner separated from one's person and house; a man's cattle, his implements of husbandry, the alienable rights which he has in land or buildings, are all comprehended under *chattels*: hence the propriety of the expression to seize a man's *goods* and *chattels*, as denoting the disposable property which he has about his person, or at a distance. MOVEABLES comprehends all the other terms in the limited application to property, as far as it admits of being removed from one place to the other; it is opposed either to fixtures, when speaking of *furniture*, or to land as contrasted to *goods* and *chattels*.

EFFECTS is a term of nearly as extensive a signification as *goods*, but not so extensive in application: whatever a man has that is of any supposed value or convertible into money, is entitled his *goods*; whatever a man has that can effect, produce, or bring forth money by sale, is entitled his *effects*: *goods* therefore is applied only to that which a man has at his own disposal; *effects* more properly to that which is left at the disposal of others. A man makes a sale of his *goods* on his removal from any place; his creditors or ex-

ecutors take care of his *effects* either on his bankruptcy or decease: *goods* in this case, is seldom employed but in the limited sense of what is removeable, but *effects* includes every thing personal, freehold, and copyhold.

GOODS, POSSESSIONS, PROPERTY.

All these terms are applicable to such things as are the means of enjoyment; but the former term respects the direct quality of producing enjoyment, the latter two have regard to the subject of the enjoyment: we consider GOODS as they are real or imaginary, adapted or not adapted for the producing of real happiness; those who abound in the *goods* of this world are not always the happiest: POSSESSIONS must be regarded as they are lasting or temporary; he who is anxious for earthly *possessions* forgets that they are but transitory and dependant upon a thousand contingencies: PROPERTY is to be considered as it is legal or illegal, just or unjust; those who are anxious for great *property* are not always scrupulous about the means by which it is to be obtained.

The purity of a man's character is in danger from an overweening attachment to earthly *goods*; no wise man will boast the multitude of his *possessions*, when he reflects that the time is not far distant when he must leave them; the validity of one's claim to *property* which comes by inheritance is better founded than any other.

TO GOVERN, RULE, REGULATE.

GOVERN, in French *gouverner*, Latin *gubernare*; Greek *κυβερνάνω*.

RULE and REGULATE signify to bring under a *rule*, or make by *rule*.

The exercise of authority enters more or less into the signification of these terms; but to *govern* implies the exercise of judgment and knowledge.

Rule implies rather the unqualified exercise of power, the making the will the *rule*; a king *governs* his people by means of wise laws and an upright administration.

A despot *rules* over a nation according to his arbitrary decision; if he have no principle his *rule* becomes an oppressive tyranny: of Robespierre, it has been said, that if he did not know how to *govern*, he aimed at least at *ruling*.

These terms are applied either to persons or things: persons *govern* or *rule* others; or they *govern*, *rule*, or *regulate* things.

In regard to persons, *govern* is always in a good sense, but *rule* is sometimes taken in a bad sense; it is naturally asso-

ciated with an abuse of power: to *govern* is so perfectly discretionary, that we speak of *governing* ourselves; but we speak only of *ruling* others: nothing can be more lamentable than to be ruled by one who does not know how to *govern* himself,

To *govern* necessarily supposes the adoption of judicious means; but *ruling* is confined to no means but such as will obtain the end of subjecting the will of one to that of another; thus a woman is said to *rule* by obeying.

In application to things, *govern* and *rule* admit of a similar distinction: a minister *governs* the state, and a pilot *governs* the vessel; the movements of the machine are in both cases directed by the exercise of the judgment. A person *rules* the times, seasons, fashions, and the like; it is an act of the individual will.

Regulate is a species of *governing* simply by judgment: the word is applicable to things of minor moment, where the force of authority is not so requisite.

One *governs* the affairs of a nation, or a large body where great interests are involved: we *regulate* the concerns of an individual: so likewise in regard to ourselves, we *govern* our passions, but we *regulate* our affections. *Govern*, *rule*, and *regulate* are all properly used to denote the acts of conscious agents, but by a figure of personification they may be applied to inanimate or moral objects: the price of one market *governs* the price of another; fashion and caprice *rule* the majority, or particular fashions *rule* them; the time of one clock *regulates* that of many others.

GOVERNMENT, ADMINISTRATION.

Both these terms may be employed either to designate the act of GOVERNING and ADMINISTERING, or the persons *governing* and *administering*. In both cases *government* has a more extensive meaning than *administration*: the former includes every exercise of authority; the *administration* implies only that exercise of authority which consists in putting the laws or will of another in force: hence, when we speak of the *government*, as it respects the persons, it implies the whole body of constituted authorities; and the *administration*, only that part which puts in execution the intentions of the whole: the *government* of a country therefore may remain unaltered, while the *administration* undergoes many changes.

GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION.

GOVERNMENT is here as in the for-

mer article (*v. Government*) the generic term; **CONSTITUTION** the specific. *Government* implies generally the act of governing or exercising authority under any form whatever; *constitution* implies any constituted or fixed form of government: we may have a government without a constitution; we cannot have a constitution without a government. In the first formation of society government was placed in the hands of individuals who exercised authority according to discretion rather than any fixed rule or law; here then was government without a constitution: as time and experience proved the necessity of some established form, and the wisdom of enlightened men discovered the advantages and disadvantages of different forms, government in every country assumed a more definite shape, and became the constitution of the country; hence then the union of government and constitution. Governments are divided by political writers into three classes, monarchical, aristocratic, and republican: but these three general forms have been adopted with such variations and modifications as to impart to the constitution of every country something peculiar.

GRACE, FAVOUR.

GRACE, in French *grace*, Latin *gratia*, comes from *gratus* kind, because a grace results from pure kindness independently of the merit of the receiver; but **FAVOUR** is that which is granted voluntarily and without hope of recompence independently of all obligation.

Grace is never used but in regard to those who have offended and made themselves liable to punishment; *favour* is employed for actual good. An act of grace is employed to denote that act of the government by which insolvent debtors are released; but otherwise the term is in most frequent use among Christians to denote that merciful influence which God exerts over his most unworthy creatures from the infinite goodness of his Divine nature; it is to his special grace that we attribute every good feeling by which we are prevented from committing sin: the term *favour* is employed indiscriminately with regard to man or his maker; those who are in power have the greatest opportunity of conferring favours; but all we receive at the hands of our Maker must be acknowledged as a favour. The Divine grace is absolutely indispensable for men as sinners; the Divine favour is perpetually necessary for men as his creatures dependent upon him for every thing.

GRACE, CHARM.

GRACE is altogether corporeal; **CHARM** is either corporeal or mental: the *grace* qualifies the action of the body; the *charm* is an inherent quality in the body itself. A lady moves, dances, and walks with grace; the charms of her person are equal to those of her mind.

GRACEFUL, COMELY, ELEGANT.

A **GRACEFUL** figure is rendered so by the deportment of the body; a **COMELY** figure has that in itself which pleases the eye. *Gracefulness* results from nature, improved by art; *comeliness* is mostly the work of nature. It is possible to acquire *gracefulness* by the aid of the dancing-master, but for a *comely* form we are indebted to nature aided by circumstances. *Grace* is a quality pleasing to the eye; but **ELEGANCE**, from the Latin *eligo*, *electus*, select and choice, is a quality of a higher nature, that inspires admiration; *elegant* is applicable, like *graceful*, to the motion of the body, or like *comely*, to the person, and is extended in its meaning also to language and even to dress. A person's step is *graceful*; his air or his movements are *elegant*; the *grace* of an action lies chiefly in its adaptation to the occasion.

Grace is in some degree a relative quality; the *gracefulness* of an action depends on its suitability to the occasion: *elegance* is a positive quality: it is, properly speaking, beauty in regard to the exterior of the person; an *elegance* of air and manner is the consequence not only of superior birth and station, but also of superior natural endowments.

GRACE, MERCY.

GRACIOUS, when compared to **MERCIFUL**, is used only in the spiritual sense; the latter is applicable to the conduct of man as well as of the Deity.

Grace is exerted in doing good to an object that has merited the contrary; *mercy* is exerted in withholding the evil which has been merited. God is *gracious* to his creatures in affording them not only an opportunity to address him, but every encouragement to lay open their wants; their unworthiness and sinfulness are not made impediments of access to him. God is *merciful* to the vilest of sinners, and lends an ear to the smallest breath of repentance; in the moment of executing vengeance he stops his arm at the voice of supplication: he expects the same *mercy* to be extended by man toward his offending brother.

Grace, in the lofty sense in which it is here admitted, cannot with propriety be made the attribute of any human being, however elevated his rank: nothing short of infinite wisdom as well as goodness can be supposed capable of doing good to offenders without producing ultimate evil. Were a king to attempt any display of *grace* by bestowing favours on criminals, his conduct would be injurious to individuals as well as the public at large, and call down upon him the just censure of all good men; but when we speak of the Almighty as dispensing his goods to sinners, and even courting them by every act of endearment to lay aside their sins, we clearly perceive that this difference arises from the infinite disparity between him and us; which makes that „his ways are not our ways, nor are his thoughts our thoughts.“ I am inclined therefore to think that in our language we have made a particularly just distinction between *grace* and *mercy*, by confining the former to the acts of the Almighty, and applying the latter indiscriminately to both; for it is obvious that *mercy*, as far as it respects the suspension of punishment, lies altogether within the reach of human discretion.

GRACIOUS, KIND.

GRACIOUS, when compared with KIND, differs principally as to the station of the persons to whom it is applied. *Gracious* is altogether confined to superiors; *kind* is indiscriminately employed for superiors and equals: a king gives a *gracious* reception to the nobles who are presented to him; one friend gives a *kind* reception to another by whom he is visited. *Gracious* is a term in peculiar use at court, and among princes; it necessarily supposes a voluntary descent from a lofty station, to put one's self, for the time being, upon a level with those to whom one speaks: it comprehends, therefore, condescension in manner, and affability in address. *Kindness* is a domestic virtue; it is the display of our good-will not only in the manner, but in the action itself; it extends to actual services in the closest relations of society; a master is *kind* to his servants in the time of their sickness; friends who are *kind* to one another have many opportunities of displaying their *kindness* in various little offices.

GRANDEUR, MAGNIFICENCE.

GRANDEUR, from *grand*, in French *grande*, great, Latin *grandis*, probably from *γεγαυος* ancient, because the term in Latin is applied mostly to great age, and

afterwards extended in its application to greatness in general, but particularly that greatness which is taken in the good sense.

MAGNIFICENCE, in Latin *magnificentia*, from *magnus* and *facio*, signifies making or acting on a large scale.

An extensive assemblage of striking qualities in the exterior constitutes the common signification of these terms, of which *grandeur* is the genus, and *magnificence* the species. *Magnificence* cannot exist without *grandeur*, but *grandeur* may exist without *magnificence*: the former is distinguished from the latter both in degree and in application. When applied to the same objects they differ in degree; *magnificence* being the highest degree of *grandeur*. As it respects the style of living, *grandeur* is within the reach of subjects; *magnificence* is mostly confined to princes. A person is said to live in a style of *grandeur*, who rises above the common level, in the number of his servants, the quality of his equipage, and the size of his establishment: no one is said to live in a style of *magnificence* who does not surpass the *grandeur* of his contemporaries. Wealth, such as falls to the lot of many, may enable them to display *grandeur*; but nothing short of a princely fortune gives either a title or a capacity to aim at *magnificence*. *Grandeur* admits of degrees and modifications: it may display itself in various ways, according to the taste of the individual; but *magnificence* is that which has already reached the highest degree of superiority in every particular. The *grandeur* of European courts is lost in a comparison with the *magnificence* of Eastern princes.

Grandeur is applicable to the works of nature as well as art, of mind as well as matter; *magnificence* is altogether the creature of art. A structure, a spectacle, an entertainment, and the like, may be *grand* or *magnificent*; but a scene, a prospect, a conception, and the like, is *grand*, but not *magnificent*.

TO GRATIFY, INDULGE, HUMOUR.

To GRATIFY, make *grateful* or *pleasant* (v. *Acceptable*), is a positive act of the choice. To INDULGE, from the Latin *indulgeo* and *dulcis* to sweeten or make palatable, is a negative act of the will, a yielding of the mind to circumstances. One *gratifies* his appetites; and *indulges* his humours. To *gratify* and *indulge*, as individual acts, may be both allowable; but to *gratify* is unrestricted by any moral consideration; *indulging* always involves the sacrifice of some general rule of conduct

or principle of action. We may sometimes gratify a laudable curiosity, and indulge ourselves in a salutary recreation; but gratifying as a habit becomes a vice, and indulging as a habit is a weakness. A person who is in search of pleasure gratifies his desires as they rise; he who has higher objects in view, than a momentary gratification will be careful not to indulge himself too much in such things as will wean him from his purpose.

To gratify is a selfish act; we gratify ourselves only, but not others: to indulge is often a kind action; we indulge others as well as ourselves: to HUMOUR is to indulge or fall in with the humour; it may be selfish or prudent. The sensualist gratifies his passions, and sacrifices not only his own happiness, but the peace of others to the gratification: a good parent indulges his child in whatever he knows is not hurtful: it is sometimes necessary to humour the temper in some measure, the better to correct it. Things gratify; persons only indulge: we are gratified with any spectacle which we witness; we are indulged with the opportunity of witnessing this spectacle through the kindness of a friend.

GRATUITOUS, VOLUNTARY.

GRATUITOUS is opposed to that which is obligatory. VOLUNTARY is opposed to that which is compulsory, or involuntary. A gift is gratuitous when it flows entirely from the free will of the giver, independently of right: an offer is voluntary which flows from the free will, independently of all external constraint. Gratuitous is therefore to voluntary as a species to the genus. What is gratuitous is voluntary, although what is voluntary is not always gratuitous. The gratuitous is properly the voluntary in regard to the disposal of one's property: and the voluntary is applicable to all other actions.

GRATUITY, RECOMPENCE.

The distinction between these terms is very similar to the above (v. Gratuitous). They both imply a gift, and a gift by way of return for some supposed service; but the gratuity is independent of expectation as well as right: the recompence is founded upon some admissible claim. Those who wish to confer a favour in a delicate manner, will sometimes do it under the shape of a gratuity: those who overrate their services, will in all probability be disappointed in the recompence they receive.

GRAVE, SERIOUS, SOLEMN.

GRAVE, in Latin *gravis* heavy, denotes the weight which keeps the mind or person down, and prevents buoyancy; it is opposed to the light.

SERIOUS, in Latin *serus* late or slow, marks the quality of slowness or considerateness, either in the mind, or that which occupies the mind: it is opposed to the jocose.

Grave expresses more than serious; it does not merely bespeak the absence of mirth, but that heaviness of mind which is displayed in all the movements of the body; seriousness, on the other hand, bespeaks no depression, but simply steadiness of action, and a refrainment from all that is jocular. A man may be grave in his walk, in his tone, in his gesture, in his looks, and all his exterior; he is serious only in his general air, his countenance, and demeanour. Gravity is produced by some external circumstance; seriousness springs from the operation of the mind itself, or from circumstances. Misfortunes or age will produce gravity: seriousness is the fruit of reflection. Gravity is, in the proper sense, confined to the person, as a characteristic of his temper; serious, on the other hand, is a characteristic either of persons or things: hence we should speak of a grave assembly not a serious assembly of old men; grave, senators; a grave speaker: but a serious, not a grave sermon; a serious writer; a serious, sentiment; a serious, not properly a grave objection: grave is, however, sometimes extended to things in the sense of weighty, as when we speak of grave matters of deliberation. Gravity is peculiarly ascribed to a judge, from the double cause, that much depends upon his deportment, in which there ought to be gravity, and that the weighty concerns which press on his mind are most apt to produce gravity: on the other hand, both gravity and seriousness may be applied to the preacher; the former only as it respects the manner of delivery; the latter as it respects especially the matter of his discourse: the person may be grave or serious; the discourse is only serious.

SOLEMN expresses more than either grave or serious; from the Latin *solemnis* yearly, as applied to the stated religious festivals of the Romans, it has acquired the collateral meaning of religious gravity: like serious, it is employed not so much to characterize the person as the thing: a judge pronounces the solemn sentence of condemnation in a solemn manner; a preacher de-

livers many *solemn* warnings to his hearers. *Gravity* may be the effect of corporeal habit, and *seriousness* of mental habit; but *solemnity* is something occasional and extraordinary. Some children discover a remarkable *gravity* as soon as they begin to observe; a regular attention to religious worship will induce a habit of *seriousness*; the admonitions of a parent on his death-bed will have peculiar *solemnity*.

GRAVE, TOMB, SEPULCHRE.

All these terms denote the place where bodies are deposited. *GRAVE*, from the German *graben*, &c. has a reference to the hollow made in the earth. *TOMB*, from *tumulus* and *tumeo* to swell, has a reference to the rising that is made above it. *SEPULCHRE*, from *sepelio* to bury, has a reference to the use for which it is employed. From this explanation it is evident, that these terms have a certain propriety of application: „to sink into the grave“ is an expression that carries the thoughts where the body must rest in death: „to inscribe on the tomb, or to encircle the tomb with flowers,“ carries our thoughts to the exterior of the place in which the body is interred. To enter a *sepulchre*, or to visit a *sepulchre*, reminds us of a place in which bodies are deposited.

GREAT, LARGE, BIG.

GREAT, derived through the medium of the northern languages from the Latin *crassus* thick, and *cresco* to grow, is applied to all kinds of dimensions in which things can grow or increase.

LARGE, in Latin *largus* wide, is probably derived from the Greek *λα* and *γενν* to flow plentifully; for *largior* signifies to give freely, and *large*, has in English a similar sense: it is properly applied to space, extent, and quantity.

BIG, from the German *bauch* belly, and the English *bulk*, denotes *great* as to expansion or capacity.

A house, a room, a heap, a pile, an army, etc. is *great* or *large*; an animal or a mountain is *great* or *big*: a road, a city, a street, and the like, is termed rather *great* than *large*. *Great* is used generally in the improper sense; *large* and *big* are used only occasionally so; a noise, a distance, a multitude, a number, a power, and the like, is termed *great*, but not *large*: we may, however, speak of a *large* portion, a *large* share, a *large* quantity; or of a mind *big* with conception, or of an event *big* with the fate of nations.

GREAT, GRAND, SUBLIME.

These terms are synonymous only in their moral application. *GREAT* simply designates extent; *GRAND* includes likewise the idea of excellence and superiority. A *great* undertaking characterizes only the extent of the undertaking; a *grand* undertaking bespeaks its superior excellence: *great* objects are seen with facility; *grand* objects are viewed with admiration. It is a *great* point to make a person sensible of his faults; it should be the *grand* aim of all to aspire after moral and religious improvement.

Grand and *SUBLIME* are both superior to *great*; but the former marks the dimension of *greatness*; the latter, from the Latin *sublimis*, designates that of height. A scene may be either *grand* or *sublime*: it is *grand* as it fills the imagination with its immensity; it is *sublime* as it elevates the imagination beyond the surrounding and less important objects. There is something *grand* in the sight of a vast army moving forward, as it were by one impulse; there is something peculiarly *sublime* in the sight of huge mountains and craggy cliffs of ice, shaped into various fantastic forms. *Grand* may be said either of the works of art or nature; *sublime* is applicable only to the works of nature. The Egyptian pyramids, or the ocean, are both *grand* objects: a tempestuous ocean is a *sublime* object. *Grand* is sometimes applied to the mind: *sublime* is applied both to the thoughts and the expressions. There is a *grandeur* of conception in the writings of Milton; there is a *sublimity* in the Inspired Writings, which far surpasses all human productions.

GRIEVANCE, HARDSHIP.

GRIEVANCE, from the Latin *gravis* heavy or burdensome, implies that which lies heavy at heart. *HARDSHIP*, from the adjective *hard*, denotes that which presses or bears violently on the person.

Grievance is in general taken for that which is done by another to *grieve* or distress us: *hardship* is a particular kind of *grievance* that presses upon individuals. There are national *grievances*, though not national *hardships*.

An infraction of one's rights, an act of violence or oppression, are *grievances* to those who are exposed to them, whether as individuals or bodies of men: an unequal distribution of labour, a partial indulgence of one to the detriment of another, constitute the *hardship*. A weight of taxes levied by a despotic prince in order to support an unjust war, will be esteemed a *griev-*

ance: the partiality and caprice of the collector in making it fall with unequal weight upon particular persons will be regarded as a *hardship*.

TO GRIEVE, MOURN, LAMENT.

GRIEVE, *v.* *Affliction*.

MOURN, like *moan* and *murmur* is probably but an imitation of the sound which is produced by pain.

To *grieve* is the general term; *mourn* the particular term. To *grieve*, in its limited sense, is an inward act: to *mourn* is an outward act: the *grief* lies altogether in the mind; the *mourning* displays itself by some outward mark. A man *grieves* for his sins; he *mourns* for the loss of his friends. One *grieves* for that which immediately concerns one's self; one *mourns* for that which concerns others: one *grieves* over the loss of property; one *mourns* the fate of a deceased relative.

Grieving is the act of an individual; *mourning* may be the common act of many; a nation *mourns* though it does not *grieve*, for a public calamity. To *grieve* is applicable to domestic troubles; *mourn* may refer to public or private ills. Many a good man has had occasion to *grieve* for the loss of that which is immediately dear to himself, and to *mourn* over the misfortunes which have overwhelmed his country.

Grieve and *mourn* are permanent sentiments; LAMENT (*v.* *To bewail*) is a transitory feeling: the former are produced by substantial causes, which come home to the feelings; the latter respects things of a more partial, oftentimes of a more remote and indifferent nature. A widow *mourns* for the loss of her husband; we *lament* a thing to-day which we may forget to-morrow. *Mourn* and *lament* are both expressed by some outward sign; but the former is composed and free from all noise; the latter displays itself either in cries or simple words. In the moment of trouble, when the distress of the mind is at its height, it may break out into loud *lamentation*; but commonly *grieving* and *mourning* commence when *lamentation* ceases.

As epithets, *grievous*, *mournful*, and *lamentable*, have a similar distinction. What presses hard on persons, their property, connexions, and circumstances, is *grievous*; what touches the tender feelings, and tears asunder the ties of kindred and friendship, is *mournful*; whatever excites a painful sensation in our minds is *lamentable*. Famine is a *grievous* calamity for a nation; the violent separation of friends by death is a

mournful event; a state of ignorance is truly *lamentable*.

TO GROAN, MOAN.

GROAN and MOAN are both an onomatopoeia, from the sounds which they express. *Groan* is a deep sound produced by hard breathing: *moan* is a plaintive long-drawn sound produced by the organs of utterance. The *groan* proceeds involuntarily as an expression of severe pain, either of body or mind: the *moan* proceeds often from the desire of awakening attention or exciting compassion. Dying *groans* are uttered in the agonies of death: the *moans* of a wounded sufferer are sometimes the only resource he has left to make his destitute case known.

GROSS, COARSE.

GROSS derives its meaning in this application from the Latin *crassus* thick from fat, or that which is of common materials.

COARSE, *v.* *Coarse*.

These terms are synonymous in the moral application. *Grossness* of habit is opposed to delicacy; *coarseness* to softness and refinement. A person becomes *gross* by an unrestrained indulgence of his sensual appetites, particularly in eating and drinking; he is *coarse* from the want of polish either as to his mind or manners. A *gross* sensualist approximates very nearly to the brute; a *coarse* person approaches nearest to the savage; a *gross* expression conveys the idea of that which should be kept from the view of the mind, which shocks the moral feeling; a *coarse* expression conveys the idea of an unseemly sentiment in the mind of the speaker.

GROSS, TOTAL.

GROSS is connected with the word great: from the idea of size which enters into the original meaning of this term is derived that of quantity: TOTAL, from the Latin *totus*, signifies literally the whole: the *gross* implies that from which nothing has been taken; the *total* signifies that to which nothing need be added: the *gross* sum includes every thing without regard to what it may be; the *total* includes every thing which one wishes to include; we may, therefore, deduct from the *gross* that which does not immediately belong to it; but the *total* is that which admits of no deduction. The *gross* weight in trade is applicable to any article, the whole of which, good or bad, pure or dross, is included in opposition to the neat weight; the *total* amount supposes all to be included which ought to form a part, in opposition to any smaller amounts or subdivi-

sions. When employed in the improper sense, they preserve the same distinction: things are said to be taken or considered in the *gross*, that is, in the large and comprehensive way, one with another; things are said to undergo a *total* change.

TO GUARANTEE, BE SECURITY, BE RESPONSIBLE, WARRANT.

GUARANTEE and WARRANT are both derived from the Teutonic *währen* to defend or make safe and binding; SECURITY from *secure* (v. *Certain*), has the same original meaning; RESPONSIBLE (v. *Amenable*).

Guarantee is a term of higher import than the others: one *guarantees* for others in matters of contract and stipulation: *security* is employed in matters of right and justice; one may be *security* for another, or give *security* for one's self: *responsibility* is employed in moral concerns; we take *responsibility* upon ourselves: *warrant* is employed in civil and commercial concerns; we *warrant* for that which concerns ourselves.

We *guarantee* by virtue of our power and the confidence of those who accept the *guarantee*; it is given by means of a word which is accepted as a pledge for the future performance of a contract. Governments, in order to make peace, frequently *guarantee* for the performance of certain stipulations by powers of minor importance. We are *security* by virtue of our wealth and credit; the *security* is not confined to a simple word, it is always accompanied with some act that binds, it regards the payment of money for another; tradesmen are frequently *security* for others who are not supposed sufficiently wealthy to answer for themselves: a person is *responsible* by virtue of his office and relation; *responsibility* binds for the reparation of injuries; masters are *responsible* for the good conduct of the children intrusted to their care: one *warrants* by virtue of one's knowledge and situation: the *warrant* binds to make restitution; the seller *warrants* his articles on sale to be such as are worth the purchase, or in case of defectiveness to be returned.

TO GUARD, DEFEND, WATCH.

GUARD is but a variation of *ward*, which comes from the German *währen* to look to.

DEFEND, v. *Apology*, and to *defend*.

WATCH and WAKE through the medium of the northern languages, are derived from the Latin *vigil* watchful, *vigeo* to flourish, and the Greek *αγαλλω* to exult or be in spirits.

Guard seems to include in it the idea of

both *defend* and *watch*, inasmuch as one aims to keep off danger, by personal efforts and employs one's eyes and attention to detect the danger. One *defends* and *watches*, therefore, when one *guards*; but one does not always *guard* when one *defends* or *watches*.

To *defend* is employed in a case of actual attack; to *guard* is to *defend*, by preventing the attack: the soldier *guards* the palace of the king in time of peace; he *defends* the power and kingdom of his prince in time of war, or the person of the king in the field of battle: one *guards* in cases where resistance is requisite, and attack is threatened; one *watches* in cases where an unresisting enemy is apprehended: soldiers or armed men are employed to *guard* those who are in custody; children are set to *watch* the corn which is threatened by the birds: hence it is that those are termed *guards* who surround the person of the monarch, and those are termed *watchmen* who are employed by night, to *watch* for thieves and give the alarm, rather than make any attack.

In the improper application they have a similar sense: modesty *guards* a female's honour: clothing *defends* against the inclemency of the weather: a person who wants to escape *watches* his opportunity to slip out unobserved. The love of his subjects is the king's greatest safe *guard*; walls are no *defence* against an enraged multitude; it is necessary for every man to set a *watch* upon his lips, lest he suffer that to escape from him of which he may afterwards repent.

GUARD, SENTINEL.

These terms are all employed to designate those who are employed for the protection of either persons or things.

GUARD has been explained above (v. *To guard*); SENTINEL, in French *sentinelle*, is properly a species of *guard*, namely, a military *guard* in the time of a campaign; any one may be set as *guard* over property, who is empowered to keep off every intruder by force; but the *sentinel* acts in the army as the *watch* (v. *To guard*) in the police, rather to observe the motions of the enemy, than to repel any force.

GUARD, GUARDIAN.

These words are derived from the verb *guard* (v. *To guard*); but they have acquired a distinct office.

GUARD is used either in the literal or figurative sense; GUARDIAN only in the proper sense. *Guard* is applied either to persons or things; *guardian* only to per-

sons. In application to persons, the *guard* is temporary; the *guardian* is fixed and permanent: the *guard* only guards against external evils; the *guardian* takes upon him the office of parent, counsellor, and director: when a house is in danger of being attacked, a person may sit up as a *guard*; when a parent is dead, a *guardian* supplies his place, in the care of his children.

TO GUARD AGAINST, TAKE HEED.

Both these terms imply express care on the part of the agent; but the former is used with regard to external or internal evils, the latter only with regard to internal or mental evils: in an enemy's country it is essential to be on one's *guard*, for fear of a surprise; in difficult matters, where we are liable to err, it is of importance to *take heed* lest we run from one extreme to another: young men, on their entrance into life, cannot be too much on their *guard against* associating with those who would lead them into expensive pleasures; in slippery paths, whether physically or morally understood, it is necessary to *take heed* how we go.

TO GUESS, CONJECTURE, DIVINE.

GUESS, in Saxon and Low German *gissen*, is connected with the word *ghost*, and the German *geist*, &c. spirit, signifying the action of a spirit,

CONJECTURE, *v. Conjecture.*

DIVINE, from the Latin *divinus* and *deus* a god, signifies to think and know as a god.

We *guess* that a thing actually is; we *conjecture* that which may be: we *guess* that it is a certain hour; we *conjecture* at the meaning of a person's actions. *Guessing* is opposed to the certain knowledge of a thing; *conjecture* is opposed to the full conviction of a thing: a child *guesses* at that portion of his lesson which he has not properly learned; a fanciful person employs *conjecture* where he cannot draw any positive conclusion.

To *guess* and to *conjecture* are natural acts of the mind; to *divine*, in its proper sense, is a supernatural act: in this sense the heathens affected to *divine* that which was known only to an Omniscient Being; and impostors in our time presume to *divine* in matters that are set above the reach of human comprehension. The term is however employed to denote a species of *guessing* in different matters, as to *divine* the meaning of a mystery.

GUEST, VISITOR, OR VISITANT.

GUEST, from the northern languages, signifies one who is entertained; VISITOR

or VISITANT is the one who pays the visit. The *guest* is to the *visitor* as the species to the genus: every *guest* is a *visitor*, but every *visitor* is not a *guest*; the *visitor* simply comes to see the person: and enjoy social intercourse; but the *guest* also partakes of hospitality: we are *visitors* at the tea-table, at the card-table, and round the fire; we are *guests* at the festive board.

GUIDE, RULE.

GUIDE is to RULE as the genus to the species: every *rule* is a *guide* to a certain extent; but the *guide* is often that which exceeds the *rule*. The *guide*, in the moral sense, as in the proper sense, goes with us; and points out the exact path; it does not permit us to err either to the right or left: the *rule* marks out a line, beyond which we may not go; but it leaves us to trace the line, and consequently to fail either on the one side or other.

The Bible is our best *guide* for moral practice; its doctrines as interpreted in the articles of the established church are the best *rule* of faith for every Christian.

GUILTLESS, INNOCENT, HARMLESS.

GUILTLESS, without *guilt*, is more than INNOCENT: *innocence*, from *noceo* to hurt, extends no farther than the quality of not hurting by any direct act; *guiltless* comprehends the quality of not intending to hurt: it is possible, therefore, to be *innocent* without being *guiltless*, though not *vice versa*; he who wishes for the death of another is not *guiltless*, though he may be *innocent* of the crime of murder. *Guiltless* seems to regard a man's general condition; *innocent* his particular condition; no man is *guiltless* in the sight of God, for no man is exempt from the guilt of sin; but he may be *innocent* in the sight of men, or *innocent* of all such intentional offences as render him obnoxious to his fellow-creatures. *Guiltlessness* was that happy state of perfection which men lost at the fall; *innocence* is that relative or comparative state of perfection which is attainable on earth.

Guiltless is in the proper sense applicable only to the condition of man; and when applied to things, it still has a reference to the person: *innocent* is equally applicable to persons or things; a person is *innocent* who has not committed any injury, or has not any direct purpose to commit any injury; or a conversation is *innocent* which is free from what is hurtful. *Innocent* and HARMLESS both recommend themselves as qualities negatively good; either in the person

or thing, they designate a freedom from injuring, and differ only in regard to the nature of the injury: *innocence* respects moral injury, and *harmless* physical injury: a person is *innocent* who is free from moral impurity and wicked purposes; he is *harmless* if he have not the power or disposition to commit any violence; a diversion is *innocent* which has nothing in it likely to corrupt the morals; a game is *harmless* which is not likely to inflict any wound, or endanger the health.

GUISE, HABIT.

GUISE and wise are both derived from the northern languages, and denote the manner; but the former is employed for a particular or distinguished manner of dress.

HABIT, from the Latin *habitus* a habit, fashion, or form: is taken for a settled or permanent mode of dress.

The *guise* is that which is unusual, and often only occasional; the *habit* is that which is usual amongst particular classes: a person sometimes assumes the *guise* of a peasant, in order the better to conceal himself; he who devotes himself to the clerical profession puts on the *habit* of a clergyman.

GULF, ABYSS.

GULF, in Greek *κολπος* from *κοιλος* hollow, is applied literally in the sense of a deep concave receptacle for water, as the *gulf* of Venice.

ABYSS, in Greek *αβυσσος*, compounded of *α* privative and *βυσσος* a bottom, signifies literally a bottomless pit.

One is overwhelmed in a *gulf*; it carries with it the idea of liquidity and profundity, into which one inevitably sinks never to rise: one is lost in an *abyss*; it carries with it the idea of immense profundity, into which he who is cast never reaches a bottom, nor is able to return to the top; an insatiable voracity is the characteristic idea in the signification of this term.

A *gulf* is a capacious bosom, which holds and buries within itself all objects that suffer themselves to sink into it, without allowing them the possibility of escape; hell is represented as a fiery *gulf*, into which evil spirits are plunged, and remain perpetually overwhelmed; a guilty mind may be said, figuratively, to be plunged into a *gulf* of woe or despair, when filled with the horrid sense of its enormities. An *abyss* presents nothing but an interminable space which has neither beginning nor end: as the ocean, in the natural sense, is a great *abyss*; so are metaphysics an immense *abyss*,

into which the human mind precipitates itself only to be bewildered.

H.

TO HAPPEN, CHANCE.

To HAPPEN, that is, to fall out by a *hap*, is to CHANCE (*v. Chance, fortune*) as the genus to the species; whatever *chances happens*, but not *vice versa*. *Happen* respects all events without including any collateral idea; *chance* comprehends, likewise, the idea of the cause and order of events: whatever comes to pass *happens*, whether regularly in the course of things, or particularly, and out of the order; whatever *chances happens* altogether without concert, intention, and often without relation to any other thing. Accidents *happen* daily which no human foresight could prevent; the newspapers contain an account of all that *happens* in the course of the day or week: listeners and busy bodies are ready to catch every word that *chances* to fall in their hearing.

HAPPINESS, FELICITY, BLISS, BLESSEDNESS, BEATITUDE.

HAPPINESS signifies the state of being *happy*.

FELICITY, in Latin *felicitas*, from *felix* happy, most probably comes from the Greek *ηλιξ* youthful, being the age of purest enjoyment.

BLISS, BLESSEDNESS, signifies the state or property of being *blessed*.

BEATITUDE, from the Latin *beatus*, signifies the property of being *happy* in a superior degree.

Happiness comprehends that aggregate of pleasurable sensations which we derive from external objects; it is the ordinary term which is employed alike in the colloquial or the philosophical style; *felicity* is a higher expression, comprehending inward enjoyment, or an aggregate of inward pleasure, without regard to the source whence they are derived: *bliss* is a still higher term, expressing more than either *happiness* or *felicity*, both as to the degree and nature of the enjoyment.

Happiness admits of degrees, since every individual is placed in different circumstances, either of body or mind, which fit him to be more or less *happy*. *Felicity* is not regarded in the same light; it is that which is positive and independent of all circumstances: domestic *felicity*, and conjugal *felicity* are regarded as moral enjoyments, abstracted from every thing which can serve as an alloy. *Bliss* is that which is purely spiritual; it

has its source in the imagination, and rises above the ordinary level of human enjoyments: of earthly *bliss* little is known but in poetry; of heavenly *bliss* we form but an imperfect conception from the utmost stretch of our powers. *Blessedness* is a term of spiritual import, which refers to the happy condition of those who enjoy the Divine favour, and are permitted to have a foretaste of heavenly *bliss*, by the exaltation of their minds above earthly happiness. *Beatitude* denotes the quality of happiness only which is most exalted; namely, heavenly happiness.

HAPPY, FORTUNATE.

HAPPY and FORTUNATE are both applied to the external circumstances of a man; but the former conveys the idea of that which is abstractedly good, the latter implies rather what is agreeable to one's wishes. A man is *happy* in his marriage, in his children, in his connexions, and the like: he is *fortunate* in his trading concerns. *Happy* excludes the idea of chance; *fortunate* excludes the idea of personal effort: a man is *happy* in the possession of what he gets; he is *fortunate* in getting it.

In the improper sense they bear a similar analogy. A *happy* thought, a *happy* expression, a *happy* turn, a *happy* event, and the like, denotes a degree of positive excellence; a *fortunate* idea, a *fortunate* circumstance, a *fortunate* event, are all relatively considered, with regard to the wishes and views of the individual.

HARBOUR, HAVEN, PORT.

The idea of a resting-place for vessels is common to these terms, of which HARBOUR is general, and the two others specific in their signification.

Harbour, from the Teutonic *herbergen* to shelter, carries with it little more than the common idea of affording a resting or anchoring place. *HAVEN*, from the Teutonic *haben* to have or hold, conveys the idea of security. *PORT*, from the Latin *portus* and *porta* a gate, conveys the idea of an inclosure. A *haven* is a natural harbour; a *port* is an artificial harbour. We characterize a harbour as commodious; a haven as snug and secure; a port as safe and easy of access. A commercial country profits by the excellence and number of its harbours; it values itself on the security of its havens, and increases the number of its ports accordingly. Merchantmen are perpetually going in and out of a harbour; a distressed vessel, at a distance from home, seeks some haven in which it may winter; the weary mariner looks to the port, not

as the termination of his labour, but as the commencement of his enjoyments.

TO HARBOUR, SHELTER, LODGE.

The idea of giving a resting place is common to these terms: but HARBOUR (*v. To foster*) is used always in a bad sense: SHELTER (*v. Asylum*) is in an indefinite sense: LODGE, in French *loge*, from the German *liegen* to lie, in an indifferent sense. One harbours that which ought not to find room any where; one shelters that which cannot find security elsewhere; one lodges that which wants a resting place. Thieves, traitors, or conspirators, are harboured by those who have an interest in securing them from detection: either the wicked or the unfortunate may be sheltered from the evil with which they are threatened: travellers are lodged as occasion may require.

In the moral sense, a man harbours resentment, ill-will, evil thoughts, and the like: he shelters himself from a charge by retorting it upon his adversary: he lodges a complaint or information against any one with a magistrate. Harbour and shelter are said of things as well as of persons, in the active sense; lodge is said of things in the neuter sense. Beds and bed-furniture harbour vermin; trees, as well as houses, shelter from a storm: a ball from a gun lodges in the human body, or any other solid substance.

HARM, FIRM, SOLID.

The close adherence of the component parts of a body constitutes HARDNESS. The close adherence of different bodies to each other constitutes FIRMNESS (*v. Fixed*). That is *hard* which will not yield to a closer compression; that is *firm* which will not yield so as to produce a separation. Ice is *hard*, as far as respects itself, when it resists every pressure; it is *firm*, with regard to the water which it covers, when it is so closely bound as to resist every weight without breaking.

Hard and *SOLID* respect the internal constitution of bodies, and the adherence of the component parts; but *hard* denotes a much closer degree of adherence than *solid*: the *hard* is opposed to the soft; the *solid* to the fluid: every *hard* body is by nature *solid*; although every *solid* body is not *hard*. Wood is always a *solid* body, but it is sometimes *hard*, and sometimes soft: water, when congealed, is a *solid* body, and admits of different degrees of hardness.

In the improper application, hardness is allied to insensibility; firmness to fixed-

ness; *solidity* to substantiality: a *hard* man is not to be acted upon by any tender motives; a *firm* man is not to be turned from his purpose; a *solid* man holds no purposes that are not well founded. A man is *hardened* in that which is bad, by being made insensible to that which is good: a man is *confirmed* in any thing good or bad, by being rendered less disposed to lay it aside; his mind is *consolidated* by acquiring fresh motives for action.

HARD, CALLOUS, HARDENED, OB- DURATE.

HARD is here, as in the former case (*v. Hard*), the general term, and the rest particular; *hard*, in its most extensive physical sense, denotes the property of resisting the action of external force, so as not to undergo any change in its form, or separation in its parts: CALLOUS is that species of the *hard*, in application to the skin, which arises from its dryness, and the absence of all nervous susceptibility. *Hard* and *callous* are likewise applied in the moral sense: but *hard* denotes the absence of tender feeling, or the property of resisting any impression which tender objects are apt to produce; *callous* denotes the property of not yielding to the force of motives to action. A *hard* heart cannot be moved by the sight of misery, let it be presented in ever so affecting a form: a *callous* mind is not to be touched by any persuasions however powerful.

Hard does not designate any circumstance of its existence or origin: we may be *hard* from a variety of causes; but *callousness* arises from the indulgence of vices, passions, and the pursuit of vicious practices. When we speak of a person as *hard*, it simply determines what he is; if we speak of him as *callous*, it refers also to what he was, and from what he is become so.

Callous, HARDENED, and OBDURATE, are all employed to designate a morally depraved character: but *callousness* belongs properly to the heart and affections; *hardened* to both the heart and the understanding; *obdurate* more particularly to the will. A child discovers himself to be *callous*, when the tears and entreaties of a parent cannot awaken in him a single sentiment of contrition; a youth discovers himself to be *hardened* when he begins to take a pride and a pleasure in a vicious career; a man shows himself to be *obdurate* when he betrays a settled and confirmed purpose to pursue his abandoned course, without regard to consequences.

HARD, HARDY, INSENSIBLE, UNFEEL- ING.

HARD (*v. Hard*) may either be applied to that which makes resistance to external impressions, or that which presses with a force upon other objects: HARDY, which is only a variation of *hard*, is applicable only in the first case: thus, a person's skin may be *hard*, which is not easily acted upon; but the person is said to be *hardy* who can withstand the elements; on the other hand, *hard*, when employed as an active principle, is only applied to the moral character; hence the difference between a *hardy* man who endures every thing, and a *hard* man who makes others endure. INSENSIBLE and UNFEELING are but modes of the *hard*; that is, they designate the negative quality of *hardness*, or its incapacity to receive impression: *hard*, therefore, is always the strongest term of the three; and of the two others, *unfeeling* is stronger than *insensible*. *Hard* and *insensible* are applied physically and morally; *unfeeling* is employed only as a moral characteristic. A horse's mouth is *hard*, when it is insensible to the action of the bit; a man's heart is *hard*, which is insensible to the miseries of others; a man is *unfeeling*, who does not regard the feelings of others. The heart may be *hard* by nature, or rendered so by the influence of some passion; but a person is commonly *unfeeling* from circumstances: people who enjoy an uninterrupted state of good health, are often *unfeeling* in cases of sickness.

As that which is *hard* mostly hurts or pains when it comes in contact with the soft, the term *hard* is peculiarly applicable to superiors, or such as have power to inflict pain: a creditor may be *hard* towards a debtor. As *insensibility* signifies a want of sense, it may be sometimes necessary: a surgeon, when performing an operation, must be *insensible* to the present pain which he inflicts. As *unfeeling* signifies a want of feeling, it is always taken for a want of good feeling: where the removal of pain is required the surgeon shows himself to be *unfeeling* who does not do every thing in his power to lessen the pain of the sufferer.

HARD, DIFFICULT.

HARD is here taken in the improper sense of trouble caused, and pains taken, in which sense it is a much stronger term than DIFFICULT, which from the Latin *difficilis*, compounded of the privative *dis* and *facilis*, signifies merely not easy. *Hard* is therefore positive, and *difficult* negative. A *difficult* task cannot be got through without exertion,

but a *hard* task requires great exertion. *Difficult* is applicable to all trivial matters which call for a more than usual portion either of labour or thought; *hard* is applicable to those which are of the highest importance, and accompanied with circumstances that call for the utmost stretch of every power. It is a *difficult* matter to get admittance into some circles of society; it is a *hard* matter to find societies that are select: it is *difficult* to decide between two fine paintings which is the finest; it is a *hard* matter to come at any conclusion on metaphysical subjects.

HARD, HEARTED, CRUEL, UNMERCIFUL, MERCILESS.

HARDHEARTED is here, as the word *hard* (*v. Hard*), the strongest of these terms: in regard to CRUEL, it bespeaks a settled character; whereas *cruelty* may be frequently a temporary disposition, or even extend no farther than the action. A *hardhearted* man must always be *cruel*; but it is possible to be *cruel*, and yet not *hardhearted*. A *hardhearted* parent is a monster who spurns from him the being that owes his existence to him, and depends upon him for support. A child is often *cruel* to animals from the mistaken conception that they are not liable to the same sufferings as himself.

The UNMERCIFUL and MERCILESS are both modes or characteristics of the *hardhearted*. An *unmerciful* man is *hardhearted* inasmuch as he is unwilling to extend his compassion or mercy to one who is in his power; a *merciless* man, which is more than an *unmerciful* man, is *hardhearted* inasmuch as he is restrained by no compunctious feelings from inflicting pain on those who are in his power. Avarice makes a man *hardhearted* even to those who are bound to him by the closest ties; it makes him *unmerciful* to those who are in his debt. There are many tyrants in domestic life, who show their *cruel* disposition by their *merciless* treatment of their poor brutes.

HARDLY, SCARCELY.

What is HARD is not common, and in that respect SCARCE: hence the idea of unfrequency assimilates these terms both in signification and application. In many cases they may be used indifferently; but where the idea of practicability predominates, *hardly* seems most proper; and where the idea of frequency predominates *scarcely* seems preferable. One can *hardly* judge of a person's features by a single and partial glance; we *scarcely* ever see men lay aside their vices from a thorough conviction of their

enormity: but it may with equal propriety be said in general sentences; *hardly* one in a thousand, or *scarcely* one in a thousand, would form such a conclusion.

HARSH, ROUGH, SEVERE, RIGOROUS.

HARSH, *v. Acrimony.*

ROUGH, *v. Abrupt.*

SEVERE, *v. Austere.*

RIGOROUS, from the Latin *rigor* and *rigeo* to stiffen, designates unbending, flexible.

These terms mark different modes of treating those that are in one's power, all of which are the reverse of kindness

Harsh and *rough* borrow their moral signification from the physical properties of the bodies to which they belong. The *harsh* and the *rough* both act painfully upon the taste, but the former with much more violence than the latter. An excess of the sour mingled with other unpleasant properties constitutes *harshness*: an excess of astringency constitutes *roughness*. Cheese is said to be *harsh* when it is dry and biting: *roughness* is the peculiar quality of the damascene.

From this physical distinction between these terms we discover the ground of their moral application. *Harshness* in a person's conduct acts upon the feelings, and does violence to the affections: *roughness* acts only externally on the senses: we may be *rough* in the tone of the voice, in the mode of address, or in the manner of handling or in touching an object: but we are *harsh* in the sentiment we convey, and according to the persons to whom it is conveyed: a stranger may be *rough*; only a friend, or one in the tenderest relations, can be *harsh*. An officer of justice deals *roughly* with the prisoner in his charge, to whom he denies every indulgence in a *rough* and forbidding tone: a parent deals *harshly* with a child, who refuses every endearment, and only speaks to command or forbid. *Harsh* and *rough* are unamiable and always censurable epithets: they indicate the *harshness* and *roughness* of the humour: *severity* and *rigour* are not always to be condemned; they spring from principle, and are often resorted to from necessity. *Harshness* is always mingled with anger and personal feeling: *severity* and *rigour* characterize things more than the temper of persons.

A *harsh* master renders every burden which he imposes doubly *severe*, by the grating manner in which he communicates his will: a *severe* master simply imposes the burden in a manner to enforce obedience. A *harsh* man is therefore always *severe*,

but with injustice: a *severe* man, however, is not always *harsh*. *Rigour* is a high degree of *severity*. One is *severe* in the punishment of offences: one is *rigorous* in exacting compliance and obedience. *Severity* is always more or less necessary in the army, or in a school, for the preservation of good order: *rigour* is essential in dealing with the stubborn will and unruly passions of men. A general must be *severe* while lying in quarters, to prevent drunkenness and theft: but he must be *rigorous* when invading a foreign country, to prevent the ill treatment of the inhabitants.

A measure is *severe* that threatens heavy consequences to those who do not comply: a line of conduct is *rigorous* that binds men down with great exactitude to a particular mode of proceeding.

TO HASTEN, ACCELERATE, SPEED, EXPEDITE, DISPATCH.

HASTEN, in French *hâter*, and in the Northern languages *hasten*, &c. is most probably connected with *heiss*, expressing what is vivid and active.

ACCELERATE, from *celer* quick, signifies literally to quicken for a specific purpose.

SPEED, from the Greek *σπουδή*, signifies to carry on diligently.

EXPEDITE, v. *Diligent*.

DISPATCH, in French *dépêcher*, from *pes* a foot, signifies putting off or clearing.

Quickness in movement and action is the common idea in all these terms, which vary in the nature of the movement and the action. To *hasten* expresses little more than the general idea of quickness in moving towards a point; thus, he *hastens* who runs to get to the end of his journey: *accelerate* expresses moreover the idea of bringing something to a point; thus, every mechanical business is *accelerated* by the order and distribution of its several parts. It may be employed, like the word *hasten*, for corporeal and familiar actions: a tailor *accelerates* any particular work that he has in hand by putting on additional hands, or a compositor *accelerates* the printing of a work by doing his part with correctness. The word *speed* includes not only quick but forward movement. He who goes with *speed* goes effectually forward, and comes to his journey's end the soonest. This idea is excluded from the term *haste*, which may often be a planless unsuitable quickness. Hence the proverb, „The more *haste*, the less *speed*.“

Expedite and *dispatch* are terms of higher import in application to the most serious

concerns in life; but to *expedite* expresses a process, a bringing forward towards an end: *dispatch* implies a putting an end to, a making a clearance. We do every thing in our power to *expedite* a business: we *dispatch* a great deal of business within a given time. *Expedition* is requisite for one who executes; *dispatch* is most important for one who determines and directs. An inferior officer must proceed with *expedition* to fulfil the orders of his commander; a general or minister of state *dispatches* the concerns of planning, directing, and instructing. Hence; it is we speak only of *expediting* a thing but we may speak of *dispatching* a person as well as a thing.

Every man *hastens* to remove his property in case of fire. Those who are anxious to bring any thing to an end will do every thing in their power to *accelerate* its progress. Those who are sent on any pressing errand will do great service by using *speed*. The success of a military progress depends often on the *expedition* with which it is conducted. In the counting-house and the cabinet, *dispatch* is equally important.

TO HASTEN, HURRY.

HASTEN, v. *To hasten*.

HURRY, in French *hâter*, probably comes from the Hebrew *charrer* or *harrer* to be inflamed, or be in a hurry.

To *hasten* and *hurry* both imply to move forward with quickness in any matter; but the former may proceed with some design and good order, but the latter always supposes perturbation and irregularity. To *hasten* is opposed to delay or a dilatory mode of proceeding; it is frequently indispensable to *hasten* in the affairs of human life: to *hurry* is opposed to deliberate and cautious proceeding: it must always be prejudicial to *hurry*; men may *hasten*; children *hurry*.

As epithets, *hasty* and *hurried* are both employed in the bad sense; but *hasty* implies merely an overquickness of motion which outstrips consideration; *hurried* implies a disorderly motion which springs from a disordered state of mind. Irritable people use *hasty* expressions; they speak before they think: deranged people walk with *hurried* steps; they follow the blind impulse of undirected feeling.

TO HATE, DETEST.

HATE, v. *Antipathy*.

DETEST, v. *To abhor*.

The alliance between these terms in signification is sufficiently illustrated in the articles referred to. Their difference consists more in sense than application.

To *hate* is a personal feeling directed towards the object independently of its qualities; to *detest* is a feeling independent of the person, and altogether dependent upon the nature of the thing. What one *hates*, one *hates* commonly on one's own account; what one *detests*, one *detests* on account of the object: hence it is that one *hates*, but not *detests*, the person who has done an injury to one's self; and that one *detests*, rather than *hates*, the person who has done injuries to others. Joseph's brethren *hated* him because he was more beloved than they; we *detest* a traitor to his country because of the enormity of his offence.

In this connexion, to *hate* is always a bad passion; to *detest* always laudable: but when both are applied to inanimate objects, to *hate* is bad or good according to circumstances; to *detest* always retains its good meaning. When men *hate* things because they interfere with their indulgences, as the wicked *hate* the light, it is a bad personal feeling, as in the former case; but when good men are said to *hate* that which is bad, it is a laudable feeling justified by the nature of the object. As this feeling is, however, so closely allied to *detest*, it is necessary farther to observe that *hate*, whether rightly or wrongly applied, seeks the injury or destruction of the object; but *detest* is confined simply to the shunning of the object, or thinking of it with very great pain. God *hates* sin, and on that account punishes sinners; conscientious men *detest* all fraud, and therefore cautiously avoid being concerned in it.

HATEFUL, ODIUS.

HATEFUL signifies literally full of that which is apt to excite *hatred*.

ODIOUS, from the Latin *odi* to *hate*, has the same sense originally.

These epithets are employed in regard to such objects as produce strong aversion in the mind; but when employed as they commonly are upon familiar subjects; they indicate an unbecoming vehemence in the speaker. *Hateful* is properly applied to whatever violates general principles of morality: lying and swearing are *hateful* vices: *odious* is more commonly applied to such things as affect the interests of others, and bring *odium* upon the individual; a tax that bears particularly hard and unequally is termed *odious*; or a measure of government that is oppressive is denominated *odious*. There is something particularly *hateful* in the meanness of cringing sycophants: nothing was more *odious* than the attempts of James to introduce popery.

HATRED, ENMITY, ILL-WILL, RANCOUR.

HATRED, v. *Aversion*.

ENMITY, v. *Enemy*.

ILL-WILL signifies either an evil will, or a willing of evil.

RANCOUR, in Latin *rancor* from *ranceo* to grow stale, signifies staleness, mustiness.

These terms agree in this particular, that those who are under the influence of such feeling derive a pleasure from the misfortune of others; but *hatred* expresses more than *enmity*, and this more than *ill-will*. *Hatred* is not contented with merely wishing *ill* to others, but derives its whole happiness from their misery or destruction; *enmity*, on the contrary, is limited in its operations to particular circumstances: *hatred*, is frequently confined to the feeling of the individual; but *enmity* consists as much in the action as the feeling. He who is possessed with *hatred* is happy when the object of his passion is miserable; but the *hater* is not always instrumental in causing his misery or destroying his happiness: he who is inflamed with *enmity* is more active in disturbing the peace of his *enemy*; but oftener displays his temper in trifling than in important matters. *Ill-will*, as the word denotes, lies only in the mind, and is so indefinite in its signification that it admits of every conceivable degree. When the will is evilly directed towards another in ever so small a degree it constitutes *ill-will*. *Rancour* is a species of bitter deep-rooted *enmity*.

Hatred is opposed to love; *enmity* is opposed to friendship; *ill-will* is opposed to good-will.

There is a farther distinction between these terms; that *hatred* and *ill-will* are oftener the fruit of a depraved mind than the consequence of any external provocation; *enmity* and *rancour*, on the contrary, are mostly produced by particular circumstances of offence or commission: the best of men are sometimes the objects of *hatred* on account of their very virtues; good advice, however kindly given, may probably occasion *ill-will* in the mind of him who is not disposed to receive it kindly; an angry word or a party contest is frequently the cause of *enmity* between irritable people, and of *rancour* betwixt resentful and imperious people.

TO HAVE, POSSESS.

HAVE, in German *haben*, Latin *habeo*, not improbably from the Hebrew *aba* to desire, because those who have most desire most.

POSSESS, in Latin *possessus*, participle

of *possideo* compounded of *pos* or *potis* and *sedeo*, signifies to have the power of resting upon or keeping.

Have is the general, *possess* is the particular term: *have* designates no circumstance of the action; *possess* expresses a particular species of having.

To *have* is sometimes to *have* in one's hand or within one's reach; but to *possess* is to *have* as one's own: a clerk *has* the money which he has fetched for his employer; the latter *possesses* the money, which he *has* the power of turning to his use. To *have* is sometimes to *have* the right to, to belong; to *possess* is to *have* by one and at one's command: a debtor *has* the property which he has surrendered to his creditor; but he cannot be said to *possess* it, because he *has* it not within his reach, and at his disposal: * we are not necessarily masters of that which we *have*; although we always are of that which we *possess*: to *have* is sometimes only temporary; to *possess* is mostly permanent: we *have* money which we are perpetually disposing of; we *possess* lands which we keep for a permanency: a person *has* the good graces of those whom he pleases; he *possesses* the confidence of those who put every thing in his power: we *have* things by halves when we share them with others; we *possess* them only when they are exclusively ours and we enjoy them undividedly: a lover *has* the affections of his mistress by whom he is beloved; he *possesses* her whole heart when she loves him alone: one *has* an interest in a mercantile concern in which he is a partner; the lord of a manor *possesses* all the rights annexed to that manor.

HAUGHTINESS, DISDAIN, ARROGANCE.

HAUGHTINESS denotes the abstract quality of *haughty*, which, contracted from *high-hearty*, in Dutch and low German *hoog-harty*, signifies literally high-spirited. We have engrafted the French orthography of *au* on the original orthography of the northern languages, through the medium of which it may be traced to the Hebrew *agag* to be high.

DISDAIN, *v. To contemn.*

ARROGANCE, *v. Arrogance.*

Haughtiness (says Dr. Blair) is founded on the high opinion we entertain of ourselves; *disdain*, on the low opinion we have of others; *arrogance* is the result of both, but if any thing, more of the former than the latter. *Haughtiness* and *disdain* are properly sentiments of the mind, and *arrogance* a mode of acting resulting from a state

of mind: there may therefore be *haughtiness* and *disdain* which have not betrayed themselves by any visible action; but *arrogance* is always accompanied with its corresponding action: the *haughty* man is known by the air of superiority which he assumes; the *disdainful* man by the contempt which he shows to others; the *arrogant* man by his lofty pretensions.

Haughtiness and *arrogance* are both vicious; they are built upon a false idea of ourselves; but *disdain* may be justifiable when provoked by what is infamous: a lady must treat with *disdain* the person who insults her honour.

HAUGHTY, HIGH, HIGHMINDED.

HAUGHTY, *v. Haughtiness.*

HIGH is derived from the same source as *haughty*.

Haughty characterizes mostly the outward behaviour; *high* respects both the external behaviour and the internal sentiment; HIGH-MINDED marks the sentiment only, or the state of the mind.

With regard to the outward behaviour, *haughty* is a stronger term than *high*: a *haughty* carriage bespeaks not only a *high* opinion of one's self, but a strong mixture of contempt for others: a *high* carriage denotes simply a *high* opinion of one's self: *haughtiness* is therefore always offensive, as it is burdensome to others; but to be *high* may sometimes be laudable, inasmuch as it is justice to one's self: one can never give a command in a *haughty* tone without making others feel their inferiority in a painful degree; we may sometimes assume a *high* tone in order to shelter ourselves from insult.

With regard to the sentiment of the mind, *high* denotes either a particular or an habitual state; *highminded* is most commonly understood to designate an habitual state: the former may be either good or bad according to circumstances; the latter is expressly inconsistent with Christian *humility*. He is properly *high* who is set above any mean condescension; *highmindedness*, on the contrary, includes in it a self-complacency that rests upon one's personal and incidental advantages, rather than upon what is worthy of ourselves as rational agents. Superiors are apt to indulge a *haughty* temper which does but excite the scorn and hatred of those who are compelled to endure it; a *high* spirit is not always serviceable to one in dependent circumstances, but when regulated by discretion, it enhances the value of a man's character; one can scarcely be *highminded* without thinking better of

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Avoir, posséder.“

himself, and worse of others, than he ought to think.

TO HAZARD, RISK, VENTURE.

HAZARD, *v. Chance.*

RISK, *v. Danger.*

VENTURE is the same as adventure (*v. Event*).

All these terms denote actions performed under an uncertainty of the event; but *hazard* bespeaks a want of design and choice on the part of the agent; to *risk* implies a choice of alternatives; to *venture*, a calculation and balance of probabilities: one *hazards* and *risks* under the fear of an evil; one *ventures* with the hope of a good. He who *hazards* an opinion or an assertion does it generally upon slight grounds; chances are rather against him than for him that it may prove erroneous: he who *risks* a battle does it often from necessity; he chooses the least of two evils, although the event is dubious, and fears less from a failure than from inaction: he who *ventures* on a mercantile speculation flatters himself with a favourable event, and acquires boldness from the prospect.

There are but few circumstances to justify us in *hazarding*; there may be several occasions which render it necessary to *risk*, and very many cases in which it may be advantageous to *venture*.

HEALTHY, WHOLESOME, SALUBRIOUS, SALUTARY.

HEALTHY signifies not only having *health*, but also causing *health*.

WHOLESOME, like the German *heilsam*, signifies making whole, keeping whole or sound.

SALUBRIOUS and SALUTARY, from the Latin *salus* safety or *health*, signify likewise contributive to *health* or good in general.

These epithets are all applicable to such objects as have a kindly influence on the bodily constitution: *healthy* is the most general and indefinite; it is applied to exercise, to air, situation, climate, and most other things, but food, for which *wholesome* is commonly substituted: the life of a farmer is reckoned the most *healthy*; and the simplest diet is the most *wholesome*.

Healthy and *wholesome* are rather negative in their sense; *salubrious* and *salutary* are positive: that is *healthy* and *wholesome* which does no injury to the *health*; that is *salubrious* which serves to improve the *health*; and that is *salutary* which serves to remove a disorder: climates are *healthy* or *unhealthy*, according to the constitution of the

person. Water is a *wholesome* beverage for those who are not dropsical; bread is a *wholesome* diet for man. The air and climate of southern France has been long famed for its *salubrity*, and has induced many invalids to repair thither for the benefit of their *health*; yet the effects have not been equally *salutary* in all cases.

Wholesome and *salutary* have likewise an extended and moral application; *healthy* and *salubrious* are employed only in the proper sense: *wholesome* in this case seems to convey the idea of making whole again what has been unsound; but *salutary* retains the idea of improving the condition of those who stand in need of improvement: correction is *wholesome* which serves the purpose of amendment without doing any injury to the body; admonition is *salutary* when it serves the purpose of strengthening good principles and awakening a sense of guilt or impropriety: laws and punishments are *wholesome* to the body politic, as diet is to the physical body; restrictions are *salutary* in checking irregularities.

TO HEAP, PILE, ACCUMULATE, AMASS.

To HEAP signifies to form into a *heap*, which through the medium of the northern languages is derivable from the Latin *copia* plenty. To PILE is to form into a *pile*, which, being a variation of *pole*, signifies a high-raised *heap*. To ACCUMULATE, from the Latin *cumulus* a *heap*, signifies to put *heap* upon *heap*. To AMASS is literally to form into a *mass*.

To *heap* is an indefinite action; it may be performed with or without order: to *pile* is a definite action done with design and order; thus we *heap* stones, or *pile* wood: to *heap* may be to make into large or small *heaps*: to *pile* is always to make something considerable: children may *heap* sticks together: men *pile* loads of wood together. To *heap* and *pile* are used mostly in the physical, *accumulate* and *amass* in the physical or moral acceptation; the former is a species of *heaping*, the latter of *piling*: we *accumulate* whatever is brought together in a loose manner; we *amass* that which can coalesce: thus a man *accumulates* guineas, and *amasses* wealth.

To *accumulate* and to *amass* are not always the acts of conscious agents: things may *accumulate* or *amass*: water or snow *accumulates* by the continual accession of fresh quantities; ice *amasses* in rivers until they are frozen over: so in the moral acceptation, evils, abuses, and the like, *accumulate*; corruption *amasses*: although over-

whelmed with an *accumulation* of sorrows, the Christian believer is never left comfortless; the industrious inquirer may *amass* a store of intelligence.

TO HEAR, HEARKEN, OVERHEAR.

To HEAR is properly the act of the ear; it is sometimes totally abstracted from the mind, when we *hear* and do not understand: to HEARKEN is an act of the ear, and the mind in conjunction; it implies an effort to *hear*, a tendency of the ear: to OVERHEAR is to *hear* clandestinely, or unknown to the person who is heard, whether designedly or not. We *hear* sounds: we *hearken* for the sense; we *overhear* the words: a quick ear *hears* the smallest sound; a willing mind *hearkens* to what is said: a prying curiosity leads to *overhearing*.

HEARTY, WARM, SINCERE, CORDIAL.

HEARTY signifies having the heart in a thing.

WARM, *v. Fire.*

SINCERE, *v. Candid.*

CORDIAL, from *cor* the heart, signifies according to the heart.

Hearty and *warm* express a stronger feeling than *sincere*; *cordial* is a mixture of the *warm* and *sincere*. There are cases in which it may be peculiarly proper to be *hearty*, as when we are supporting the cause of religion and virtue; there are other cases in which it is peculiarly proper to be *warm*, as when our affections ought to be roused in favour of our friends; in all cases we ought to be *sincere*, when we express either a sentiment or a feeling; it is peculiarly pleasant to be on terms of *cordial* regard with those who stand in any close relation to us. A man himself should be *hearty*; his heart *warm*; professions *sincere*; and reception *cordial*.

TO HEAVE, SWELL.

HEAVE is used either transitively or intransitively, as a reflective or a neuter verb; SWELL is used only as a neuter verb. *Heave* implies raising, and *swell* implies distension: they differ therefore very widely in sense, but they sometimes agree in application. The bosom is said both to *heave* and to *swell*; because it happens that the bosom *swells* by *heaving*; the waves are likewise said to *heave* themselves or to *swell*, in which there is a similar correspondence between the actions: otherwise most things which *heave* do not *swell*, and those which *swell* do not *heave*.

HEAVY, DULL, DROWSY.

HEAVY is allied to both DULL and

DROWSY, but the latter have no close connexion with each other.

Heavy and *dull* are employed as epithets both for persons and things; *heavy* characterizes the corporeal state of a person; *dull* qualifies the spirits or the understanding of the subject. A person has a *heavy* look whose temperament seems composed of gross and weighty materials which weigh him down and impede his movements; he has a *dull* countenance in whom the ordinary brightness and vivacity of the mind is wanting: *heaviness* is either a characteristic of the constitution, or only a temporary state arising from external or internal causes; *dullness* as it respects the frame of the spirits, is a partial state as it respects the mental vigour, it is a characteristic of the individual. It is a misfortune frequently attached to those of a corpulent habit to be very *heavy*: there is no one who from the changes of the atmosphere may not be occasionally *heavy*. Those who have no resources in themselves are always *dull* in solitude: those who are not properly instructed, or have a deficiency of capacity, will appear *dull* in all matters of learning.

Heavy is either properly or improperly applied to things which are conceived to have an undue proportion of tendency to pressure or leaning downwards: *dull* is in like manner employed for whatever fails in the necessary degree of brightness or vivacity; the weather is *heavy* when the air is full of thick and weighty materials; it may be *dull* from the intervention of clouds.

Heavy and *drowsy* are both employed in the sense of sleepy; but the former is only a particular state, the latter particular or general; all persons may be occasionally *heavy* or *drowsy*; some are habitually *drowsy* from disease; they likewise differ in degree; the latter being much the greater of the two: occasionally they are applied to such things as produce sleepiness.

HEAVY, BURDENSOME, WEIGHTY, PONDEROUS.

HEAVY, from *heave*, signifies the causing to heave, or requiring to be lifted up with force.

BURDENSOME, signifies having a *burden*.

WEIGHTY, signifies having a *weight*, and PONDEROUS, from the Latin *pondus* a weight, has the same original meaning.

Heavy is the natural property of some bodies; *burdensome* is incidental to some. In the vulgar sense, things are termed *heavy* which are found difficult to lift in distinction from those which are light or easy to be lifted; but those things are *burdensome* which

are too troublesome to be carried or borne: many things therefore are actually *heavy* that are never *burdensome*; and others are occasionally *burdensome* that are never *heavy*: that which is *heavy* is so whether lifted or not, but that which is *burdensome* must be *burdensome* to some one: hard substances are mostly *heavy*; but to a weak person the softest substance may sometimes be *burdensome* if he is obliged to bear it: things are *heavy* according to the difficulty with which they are lifted; but they are *weighty* according as they *weigh* other things down. The *heavy* is therefore indefinite; but the *weighty* is definite, and something positively great; what is *heavy* to one may be light to another; but that which is *weighty* exceeds the ordinary weight of other things: *ponderous* expresses even more than *weighty*, for it includes also the idea of bulk; the *ponderous* therefore is that which is so *weighty* and large that it cannot easily be moved.

HEED, CARE, ATTENTION.

HEED, *v.* To attend.CARE, *v.* Care, solicitude.ATTENTION, *v.* To attend.

Heed applies to matters of importance to one's moral conduct; *care* to matters of minor import: a man is required to take *heed*; a child required to take *care*: the former exercises his understanding in taking *heed*; the latter exercises his thoughts and his senses in taking *care*: the former looks to the remote and probable consequences of his actions, and endeavours to prevent the evil that may happen; the latter sees principally to the thing that is immediately before him. When a young man enters the world, he must take *heed* lest he be ensnared by his companions into vicious practices; in a slippery path we must take *care* that we do not fall.

Heed has moreover the sense of thinking on what is proposed to our notice, in which it agrees with *attention*; hence we speak of giving *heed* and paying *attention*: but the former is applied only to that which is conveyed to us by another, in the shape of a direction, a caution, or an instruction; but the latter is said of every thing which we are set to perform. A good child gives *heed* to his parents when they caution him against any dangerous or false step; he pays *attention* to the lesson which is set him to learn.

TO HEIGHTEN, RAISE. AGGRAVATE.

To HEIGHTEN is to make *higher* (*v.* *Haughty*). To RAISE is to cause to *rise* (*v.* *To arise*). To AGGRAVATE (*v.* *To aggravate*) is to make *heavy*. *Heighten* refers more to the result of the action of mak-

ing *higher*; *raise* to the mode: we *heighten* a house by *raising* the roof; as *raising* conveys the idea of setting up aloft, which is not included in the word *heighten*. On the same ground a head-dress may be said to be *heightened*, which is made *higher* than it was before; and a chair or a table is *raised* that is set upon something else: but in speaking of a wall, we may say, that it is either *heightened* or *raised*, because the operation and result must in both cases be the same. In the improper sense of these terms they preserve a similar distinction: we *heighten* the value of a thing; we *raise* its price; we *heighten* the grandeur of an object; we *raise* a family.

Heighten and *aggravate* have connexion with each other only in application to offences: the enormity of an offence is *heightened*, the guilt of the offender is *aggravated* by particular circumstances. The horrors of a murder are *heightened* by being committed in the dead of the night; the guilt of the perpetrator is *aggravated* by the addition of ingratitude to murder.

HEINOUS, FLAGRANT, FLAGITIOUS, ATROCIOUS.

HEINOUS, in French *heinous*, Greek *αινος* or *δεινος* terrible.

FLAGRANT, in Latin *flagrans* burning, is a figurative expression for what is excessive and violent in its nature.

FLAGITIOUS, in Latin *flagitiosus*. from *flagitium* infamy, denotes that which is peculiarly infamous.

ATROCIOUS, in Latin *atrox* cruel, from *ater* black, signifies exceedingly black in guilt.

These epithets, which are applied to crimes, seem to rise in degree. A crime is *heinous* which seriously offends against the laws of men; a sin is *heinous* which seriously offends against the will of God; an offence is *flagrant* which is in direct defiance of established opinions and practice; it is *flagitious* if a gross violation of the moral law, or coupled with any grossness; a crime is *atrocious* which is attended with any aggravating circumstances. Lying is a *heinous* sin; gaming and drunkenness are *flagrant* breaches of the Divine law; the murder of a whole family is in the fullest sense *atrocious*.

TO HELP. ASSIST, AID, SUCCOUR, RELIEVE.

HELP, in Saxon, *helpan*, German *helfen*, probably from the Greek *οφελω* to do good to.

ASSIST, in Latin *assisto*, or *ad* and *sisto*,

signifies to place one's self by another so as to give him our strength.

AID, in Latin *adjuvo*, that is the intensive syllable *ad* and *juvo*, signifies to profit towards a specific end.

SUCCOUR, in Latin *succurro* to run to the *help* of any one.

RELIEVE, *v.* To *alleviate*.

The idea of communicating to the advantage of another is common to all these terms. *Help* is the generic term; the rest specific: *help* may be substituted for the others, and in many cases where they would not be applicable. The first three are employed either to produce a positive good or to remove an evil; the two latter only to remove an evil. We *help* a person to prosecute his work, or *help* him out of a difficulty; we *assist* in order to forward a scheme, or we *assist* a person in the time of his embarrassment; we *aid* a good cause, or we *aid* a person to make his escape; we *succour* a person who is in danger; we *relieve* him in time of distress. To *help* and *assist* respect personal service, the former by corporeal, the latter by corporeal or mental labour; one servant *helps* another by taking a part in his employment; one author *assists* another in the composition of his work. We *help* up a person's load, we *assist* him to rise when he has fallen: we speak of an *helper* or a *helpmate* in mechanical employments, of an *assistant* to a professional man.

To *assist* and *aid* are used for services directly or indirectly performed; but the former is said only of individuals, the latter may be said of bodies as well as individuals. One friend *assists* another with his purse, with his counsel, and the like: one person *aids* another in carrying on a scheme; or one king, or nation, *aids* another with armies and subsidies. We come to the *assistance* of a person when he has met with an accident; we come to his *aid* when contending against numbers. *Assistance* is given, *aid* is sent.

To *succour* is a species of immediate *assistance*, which is given on the spur of the occasion; we may *succour* one who calls us by his cries; or we may *succour* the poor whom we find in circumstances of distress. The word *relieve* has nothing in common with *succour*, except that they both express the removal of pain; but the latter does not necessarily imply any mode by which this is done, and therefore excludes the idea of personal interference.

All these terms, except *succour*, may be applied to things, as well as persons: we may walk by the *help* of a stick; read with the *assistance* of glasses; learn a task quickly

by the *aid* of a good memory; obtain *relief* from medicine.. To *help* or *assist* is commonly an act of goodnature; to *aid*, frequently an act of policy; to *succour* or *relieve*, an act of generosity or humanity. When a person meets with an accident. he requires the *help* of the by-standers, the *assistance* of his friends, and the *aid* of a medical man; it is noble to *succour* an enemy; it is charitable to *relieve* the wretched.

HERETIC, SCHISMATIC, SECTARIAN, OR SECTARY, DISSENTER, NONCONFORMIST.

A HERETIC is a maintainer of *heresy* (*v.* *Heterodox*); the SCHISMATIC is the author or promoter of *schism*; the SECTARIAN or SECTARY is the member of a *sect*; the DISSENTER is one who *dissents* from the established religion and the NONCONFORMIST one who does not *conform* to the established religion. A man is a *heretic* only for matters of faith and doctrine, but he is a *schismatic* in matters of discipline and practice. The *heretic* therefore is not always a *schismatic*, nor the *schismatic* a *heretic*. Whoever holds the doctrines that are common to the Roman Catholic and the reformed Churches, is not a *heretic* in the protestant sense of the word; although he may in many outward formalities be a *schismatic*. Calvinists are not *heretics*, but many among them are *schismatics*; on the other hand there are many members of the establishment, who hold though they do not avow *heretical* notions.

The *heretic* is considered as such with regard to the Catholic Church or the whole body of Christians, holding the same fundamental principles; but the *schismatic* and *sectarian* are considered as such with regard to particular established bodies of Christians. *Schism*, from the Greek *σχίζω* to split, denotes an action, and the *schismatic* is an agent who splits for himself in his own individual capacity: the *sectarian* does not expressly perform a part, he merely holds a relation. Whatever guilt attaches to *schism* attaches to the *schismatic*; he is a voluntary agent, acting from an erroneous principle: the *sectarian* is often an involuntary agent; he follows that to which he has been incidentally attached. It is possible, therefore, to be a *schismatic*, and not a *sectarian*; as also to be a *sectarian*, and not a *schismatic*. Those professed members of the establishment, who wish to ingraft their own modes and forms into its discipline, are *schismatics*, but not *sectarians*; on the other hand, those who by birth and education are attached to a *sect*, are *sectarians*, but not always *schis-*

matics. Consequently, *schismatic* is a term of much greater reproach than *sectarian*.

The *schismatic* and *sectarian* have a reference to any established body of Christians of any country; but *dissenter* is a term applicable only to the inhabitants of Great Britain, and bearing relation only to the established Church of England: it includes not only those who have individually and personally renounced the doctrines of the Church, but those who are in a state of *dissent* or difference from it. *Dissenters* are not necessarily either *schismatics* or *sectarians*, for British Roman Catholics and the Presbyterians of Scotland are all *dissenters*, although they are the reverse of what is understood by *schismatic* and *sectarian*: it is equally clear that all *schismatics* and *sectarians* are not *dissenters*, because every established community of Christians, all over the world, have had individuals or smaller bodies of individuals setting themselves up against them: the term *dissenter* being in a great measure technical, it may be applied individually or generally without conveying any idea of reproach: the same may be said of *nonconformist*, which is a more special term, including only such as do not conform to some established or national religion; among whom may be reckoned Independents, Presbyterians, Baptists, Quakers, Methodists, and all other such *sects* as have been formed since the reformation.

TO HESITATE, FAULTER, STAMMER, STUTTER.

HESITATE, *v.* To demur.

FAULTER or FALTER seems to signify to commit a *fault* or blunder, or it may be a frequentative of to fall, signifying to stumble.

STAMMER, in the Teutonic *stammern*, comes most probably from the Hebrew *satem* to obstruct.

STUTTER is but a variation of *stammer*.

A defect in utterance is the idea which is common in the signification of all these terms: they differ either as to the cause or the mode of the action. With regard to the cause, a *hesitation* results from the state of the mind, and an interruption in the train of thoughts; *falter* arises from a perturbed state of feeling; *stammer* and *stutter* arise either from an incidental circumstance, or more commonly from a physical defect in the organs of utterance. A person who is not in the habit of public speaking, or of collecting his thoughts into a set form, will be apt to *hesitate* even in familiar conversation; he who first addresses a public assembly will be apt to *falter*. Children who first begin

to read will *stammer* at hard words: and one who has an impediment in his speech will *stutter* when he attempts to speak in a hurry.

With regard to the mode or degree of the action, *hesitate* expresses less than *falter*; *stammer* less than *stutter*.

HETERODOXY, HERESY.

HETERODOXY, from the Greek *ετερος* and *δοξη*, signifies another or a different doctrine.

HERESY, from the Greek *αιρεσις* a choice, signifies an opinion adopted by individual choice.

*To be of a different persuasion is *heterodoxy*; to have a faith of one's own is *heresy*: the *heterodoxy* characterizes the opinions formed; the *heresy* characterizes the individual forming the opinion: the *heterodoxy* exists independently and for itself; the *heresy* sets itself up against others. As all division supposes error either on one side or on both, the words *heterodoxy* and *heresy* are applied only to human opinions, and strictly in the sense of a false opinion, formed in distinction from that which is better founded; but the former respects any opinions important or otherwise; the latter refers only to matters of importance: the *heresy* is therefore a fundamental error. There has been much *heterodoxy* in the Christian world at all times, and among these have been *heresies* denying the plainest and most serious truths which have been acknowledged by the great body of Christians since the Apostles.

HIDEOUS, GHASTLY, GRIM, GRISLY.

HIDEOUS comes probably from *hide*, signifying fit only to be hidden from the view.

GHASTLY signifies like a ghost.

GRIM, in German *grimm*, signifies fierce.

GRISLY, from *grizzle*, signifies *grizzled*, or mostly coloured.

An unseemly exterior is characterized by these terms; but the *hideous* respects natural objects, and the *ghastly* more properly that which is supernatural or what resembles it. A mask with monstrous grinning features looks *hideous*: a human form with a visage of deathlike paleness is *ghastly*. *Grim* is applicable only to the countenance; dogs or wild beasts may look very *grim*: *grisly* refers to the whole form, but particularly to the colour; as blackness or darkness has always something terrific in it, a *grisly* figure, having a monstrous assemblage of dark colour, is particularly calculated to strike ter-

* Vide Roubaud: „Herétique, hétérodoxe.“

ror. *Hideous* is applicable to objects of hearing also, as a *hideous* roar; but the rest to objects of sight only.

HIGH, TALL, LOFTY.

HIGH, in German *hoch*, comes from the Hebrew *agag* to be *high*.

TALL, in Welsh *tal*, is derived by Davis from the Hebrew *talal* to elevate.

LOFTY is doubtless derived from *lift*, and that from the Latin *levatus* raised.

High is the term in most general use, which seems likewise in the most unqualified manner to express the idea of extension upwards, which is common to them all. Whatever is *tall* and *lofty* is *high*, but every thing is not *tall* or *lofty* which is *high*. *Tall* and *lofty* both designate a more than ordinary degree of *height*; but *tall* is peculiarly applicable to what shoots up or stands up in a perpendicular direction: while *lofty* is said of that which is extended in breadth as well as in *height*; that which is lifted up or raised by an accretion of matter or an expansion in the air. By this rule we say that a house is *high*, a chimney *tall*, a room *lofty*.

Trees are in general said to be *high* which exceed the ordinary standard of *height*; they are opposed to the low. A poplar is said to be *tall*, not only from its exceeding others in *height*, but from its perpendicular and spiral manner of growing; it is opposed to that which is bulky. A man and a horse are likewise said to be *tall*; but a hedge, a desk, and other common objects, are *high*. Churches are in general *high*, but the steeples or the domes of cathedrals are *lofty*, and their spires are *tall*.

With the *high* is associated no idea of what is striking; but the *tall* is coupled with the aspiring or that which strives to out-top: the *lofty* is always coupled with the grand, and that which commands admiration.

High and *lofty* have a moral acceptation, but *tall* is taken in the natural sense only: *high* and *lofty* are applied to persons or what is personal, with the same difference in degree as before: a *lofty* title or *lofty* pretension conveys more than a *high* title or a *high* pretension. Men of *high* rank should have *high* ideas of virtue and personal dignity: a *lofty* ambition often soars too *high* to serve the purpose of its possessor.

TO HINDER, PREVENT, IMPEDE, OBSTRUCT.

HINDER, from *hind* or *behind*, signifies to *hinder*, by going *behind*, and pulling a person back.

PREVENT, from *prae* and *venio* to come before, signifies to *hinder* by coming before,

or to cross another by the anticipation of his purpose.

IMPEDE, from *in* and *pedes*, signifies to come between a person's feet and entangle him in his progress.

OBSTRUCT, from *ob* and *struo*, signifies to set up something in his way, to block the passage.

Hinder is the most general of these terms, as it conveys little more than the idea which is common to them all, namely, that of keeping one from his purpose. To *hinder* is commonly said of that which is rendered impossible for the time being, or merely delayed; *prevent* is said of that which is rendered altogether impracticable. A person is *hindered* by the weather and his various engagements from reaching a place at the time he intended; he is *prevented* but not *hindered* by ill health from going thither at all. If a friend calls, he *hinders* me from finishing the letter which I was writing; if I wish to *prevent* my son from reading any book, I keep it out of his way.

To *hinder* is an act of the moment, it supposes no design; *prevent* is a premeditated act, deliberated upon, and adopted for general purposes: the former is applied only to the movements of any particular individual, the latter to events and circumstances. I *hinder* a person who is running, if I lay hold of his arm and make him walk: it is the object of every good government to *prevent* offences rather than to punish offenders. In ordinary discourse, these words fall very much into one another, when the circumstances of the case do not sufficiently define whether the action in hand be altogether suspended, or only suspended for a time; but the above explanation must make it very clear, that to *hinder*, in its proper sense and application, is but a temporary act, and to *prevent* a decisive and permanent one.

To *impede* and *obstruct* are a species of *hindering* which is said rather of things than of persons; *hinder* is said of both; but *hinder* is commonly employed in regard to trifling matters, or such as retard a person's proceedings in the smallest degree; *impede* and *obstruct* are acts of greater importance, or produce a still greater degree of delay. A person is *hindered* in his work, although neither *impeded* nor *obstructed*; but the quantity of artillery and baggage which is attached to an army, will greatly *impede* it in its march; and the trees which are thrown across the roads will *obstruct* its march.

Whatever causes a person to do a thing slower than he wishes is a *hindrance*; whatever binds him so that he cannot move freely forward is an *impediment*; whatever is in

his path or passage so as to prevent him moving forward is an *obstruction*. Every *impediment* and *obstruction* is a *hindrance*, though not *vice versa*. A person is *hindered* in the thing he is about if he be called off to do something else; ill health *impedes* a person's progress in learning; any foreign body lodging in the vessels of the human body, *obstructs* the course of the fluids, and consequently brings on serious diseases. *Hindrances* always suppose the agency of a person, either of the one who *hinders*, or the one who is *hindered*; but *impediments* and *obstructions* may be employed with regard to the operations of nature on inanimate objects. Cold *impedes* the growth of plants; a dam *obstructs* the course of water.

TO HINDER, STOP.

HINDER, *v.* To hinder.

STOP signifies to make to stand.

Hindering refers solely to the prosecution of an object; *stop* refers simply to the cessation of motion; we may be *hindered*, therefore, by being *stopped*; but we may also be *hindered* without being expressly *stopped*, and we may be *stopped* without being *hindered*. If the *stoppage* do not interfere with any other object in view, it is a *stoppage*, but not a *hindrance*; as when we are *stopped* by a friend whilst walking for pleasure: but if *stopped* by an idler in the midst of urgent business, this is both a *stoppage* and a *hindrance*: on the other hand, if we are interrupted in the regular course of our proceeding, but not compelled to stand still or give up our business for any time, this may be a *hindrance*, but not a *stoppage*: in this manner, the conversation of others, in the midst of our business, may considerably retard its progress, and so far *hinder*, but not expressly put a *stop* to the whole concern.

TO HINT, SUGGEST, INTIMATE, INSINUATE.

HINT, *v.* To allude.

SUGGEST, *v.* To allude.

To INTIMATE is to make one *intimate*, or specially acquainted with, to communicate one's most inward thoughts.

INSINUATE, from the Latin *sinus* the bosom, is to introduce gently into the mind of another.

All these terms denote indirect expressions of what passes in one's own mind. We *hint* at a thing from fear and uncertainty; we *suggest* a thing from prudence and modesty; we *intimate* a thing from indecision; a thing is *insinuated* from artifice. A person who

wants to get at the certain knowledge of any circumstance, *hints* at it frequently in the presence of those who can give him the information; a man who will not offend others by an assumption of superior wisdom, *suggests* his ideas on a subject, instead of setting them forth with confidence; when a person's mind is not made up on any future action, he only *intimates* what may be done; he who has any thing offensive to communicate to another will choose to *insinuate* it, rather than declare it in express terms. *Hints* are thrown out; they are frequently characterized as broken: *suggestions* are offered; they are frequently termed idle or ill-grounded: *intimations* are given, and are either slight or broad: *insinuations* are thrown out; they are commonly designated as slanderous, malignant, and the like.

To *hint* is taken either in a bad or an indifferent sense; to *suggest* is oftener used in the good than the bad sense; to *intimate* is taken either in a good or an indifferent sense; to *intimate* is always taken in a bad sense. A person is said to take a *hint*, to follow a *suggestion*, to receive an *intimation*, to disregard an *insinuation*.

HIRELING, MERCENARY.

HIRELING, from *hire*, and MERCENARY, from *merx* wages, are applied to any one who follows a sordid employment; but *hireling* may sometimes be taken in its proper and less reproachful sense, for one who is *hired* as a servant to perform an allotted work; but in general they are both reproachful epithets; the former having particular reference to the meanness of the employment, and the latter to the sordid character of the person. *Hireling* prints are those which are in the pay of a party; a *mercenary* principle will sometimes actuate men in the highest station.

TO HOLD, KEEP, DETAIN, RETAIN.

HOLD, Saxon *healden*, Teutonic *holden*, &c.

KEEP in all probability comes from *capio* to lay hold of.

DETAIN and RETAIN both come from the Latin *teneo* to hold; the first signifies, by virtue of the particle *de*, to *hold* from another; the second, by virtue of the particle *re*, signifies to *hold* back for oneself.

To *hold* is a physical act; it requires a degree of bodily strength, or at least the use of the limbs; to *keep* is simply to have by one at one's pleasure. The mode of the action is the leading idea in the signification of *hold*; the durability of the action is

the leading idea in the word *keep*: we may *hold* a thing only for a moment; but what we *keep* we *keep* for a time. On the other hand, we may *keep* a thing by *holding* it, although we may *keep* it by various other means: we may therefore *hold* without *keeping*, and we may *keep* without *holding*. A servant *holds* a thing in his hand for it to be seen, but he does not *keep* it; he gives it to his master, who puts it into his pocket, and consequently *keeps*, but does not *hold* it. A thing may be *held* in the hand, or *kept* in the hand; in the former case, the pressure of the hand is an essential part of the action, but in the latter case it is simply a contingent part of the action: the hand *holds*, but the person *keeps* it.

What is *held* is fixed in position, but what is *kept* is left loose, or otherwise at the will of the individual. Things are *held* by men in their hands, by beasts in their claws or mouths, by birds in their beaks; things are *kept* by people either about their persons or in their houses, according to convenience.

Detain and *retain* are modes of *keeping*; the former signifies *keeping* back what belongs to another; the latter signifies *keeping* a long time for one's own purpose. A person may be either *held*, *kept*, *detained*, or *retained*: when he is *held* he is *held* contrary to his will by the hand of another; as suspected persons are *held* by the officers of justice, that they may not make their escape; he is *kept*, if he stops in any place, by the desire of another; as a man is *kept* in prison until his innocence is proved; or a child is *kept* at school, until he has finished his education; he is *detained* if he be *kept* away from any place to which he is going, or from any person to whom he belongs; as the servant of another is *detained* to take back a letter; or one is *detained* by business, so as to be prevented attending to an appointment: a person is *retained* who is *kept* for a continuance in the service of another; as some servants are said to be *retained*, while others are dismissed.

Things are *held* in the improper sense: they are *kept*, *detained*, and *retained*, in the proper sense. A money-lender *holds* the property of others in pledge; the idea of a temporary and partial action is here expressed by *hold*, in distinction from *keep*, which is used to express something definite and permanent: the moneylender *keeps* the property as his own, if the borrower forfeits it by breach of contract. What is *detained* is *kept* either contrary to the will, or without the consent of the possessor: when things are suspected to be stolen, the officers have

the right of *detaining* them until inquiry be instituted. What is *retained* is continued to be *kept*; it supposes, however, some alteration in the terms or circumstances under which it is *kept*; a person *retains* his seat in a coach notwithstanding he finds it disagreeable; or a lady *retains* some of the articles of millinery, which are sent for her choice, but she returns the rest.

All are used in a moral application except *detain*; in this case they are marked by a similar distinction. A person is said to *hold* an office, by which simple possession is implied; he may *hold* it for a long or a short time, at the will of others, or by his own will, which are not marked: he *keeps* a situation, or he *keeps* his post, by which his continuance in the situation, or at the post, are denoted: but to say he *retains* his office, signifies that he might have given it up, or lost it, had he not been led to continue in it. In like manner, with regard to one's sentiments, or feelings, a man is said to *hold* certain opinions, which are ascribed to him as a part of his creed; he *keeps* the opinions which no one can induce him to give up; he *retains* his old attachments, notwithstanding the lapse of years, and change of circumstances.

TO HOLD, OCCUPY, POSSESS.

HOLD, v. *To hold*.

OCCUPY, in Latin *occupo*, or *oc* and *cipio* to hold or keep, so that it cannot be held by others.

POSSESS, in Latin *possideo*, or *potis* and *sedeo*, signifies to sit as master of.

We *hold* a thing for a long or a short time; we *occupy* it for a permanence; we *hold* it for ourselves or others; we *occupy* it only for ourselves; we *hold* it for various purposes; we *occupy* only for the purpose of converting it to our private use. Thus a person may *hold* an estate, or, which is the same thing, the title deeds to an estate *pro tempore*, for another person's benefit; but he *occupies* an estate if he enjoys the fruit of it. On the other hand, to *occupy* is only to *hold* under a certain compact; but to *possess* is to *hold* as one's own. The tenant *occupies* the farm when he *holds* it by a certain lease, and cultivates it for his subsistence: but the landlord *possesses* the farm, *possessing* the right to let it, and to receive the rent. We may *hold* by force, or fraud, or right; we *occupy* either by force, or right; we *possess* only by right. Hence we say figuratively, to *hold* a person in esteem or contempt, to *occupy* a person's attention, or to *possess* his affection.

TO HOLD, SUPPORT, MAINTAIN.

HOLD, *v.* To hold, keep.SUPPORT, *v.* To countenance.MAINTAIN, *v.* To assist, maintain.

Hold is here, as in the former article, a term of very general import; he who *supports* and *maintains* must *hold*, though not *vice versa*.

Hold and *support* are employed in the proper sense, *maintain* is the improper sense. To *hold* is a term unqualified by any circumstance: we may *hold* a thing in any direction, *hold* it up or down, in a straight or oblique direction: *support* is a species of *holding* up; to *hold* up, however, is a personal act, or a direct effort of the individual; to *support* may be an indirect and a passive act; he who *holds* any thing up keeps it in an upright posture by the exertions of his strength; he who *supports* a thing only bears its weight, or suffers it to rest upon himself: persons or voluntary agents can *hold* up; inanimate objects may *support*: a servant *holds* up a child that it may see; a pillar *supports* a building.

Hold, *maintain*, and *support*, are likewise employed still farther in a moral application, as it respects different circumstances; opinions are *held* and *maintained* as one's own; they are *supported* when they are another's. We *hold* and *maintain* when we believe; we *support* the belief or doctrine of another, or what we ourselves have asserted and *maintained* at a former time. What is *held* is *held* by the act of the mind within one's self; what is *maintained* and *supported* is openly declared to be *held*. To *hold* marks simply the state of one's own mind; to *maintain* indicates the effort which one makes to inform others of this state; to *support* indicates the efforts which one makes to justify that state. We *hold* an opinion only as it regards ourselves; we *maintain* and *support* it as it regards others; that is, we *maintain* it either with others, for others, or against others; we *support* it in an especial manner against others: we *maintain* it by assertion; we *support* it by argument,

Hold is applied not only to principles and opinions, but also to sentiments; *maintain* and *support* are confined either to abstract and speculative opinions, or to the whole mind: we *hold* a thing dear or cheap, we *hold* it in abhorrence, or we *hold* it sacred; but we *maintain* or *support* truth or error; we *maintain* an influence over ourselves; we *support* our resolution.

HOLINESS, SANCTITY.

HOLINESS, which comes from the northern

languages, has altogether acquired a Christian's signification; it respects the life and temper of a Christian.

SANCTITY, which is derived from the Latin *sanctus* and *sanctio* to sanction, has merely a moral signification, which it derives from the *sanction* of human authority.

Holiness is to the mind of a man what *sanctity* is to his exterior; with this difference, that *holiness* to a certain degree ought to belong to every man professing Christianity; but *sanctity*, as it lies in the manners, the outward garb, and deportment, is becoming only to certain persons, and at certain times.

HOLLOW, EMPTY.

HOLLOW, from *hole*, signifies being like a hole.

EMPTY, *v.* *Empty*.

Hollow respects the body itself; the absence of its own materials produces *hollowness*: *empty* respects foreign bodies; their absence in another body constitutes *emptiness*. *Hollowness* is therefore a preparative to *emptiness*, and may exist independently of it; but *emptiness* presupposes the existence of *hollowness*: what is *empty* must be *hollow*; but what is *hollow* need not be *empty*. *Hollowness* is often the natural property of a body; *emptiness* is a contingent property: that which is *hollow* is destined by nature to contain; but that which is *empty* is deprived of its contents by a casualty: a nut is *hollow* for the purpose of receiving the fruit; it is *empty* if it contain no fruit.

They are both employed in a moral acceptance, and in a bad sense; in this case *hollow* is applied to what ought to be solid or sound; and *empty* to what ought to be filled; a person is *hollow* whose goodness lies only at the surface, whose fair words are without meaning; a truce is *hollow* which is only an external cessation from hostilities: a person is *empty* who is without a requisite portion of understanding and knowledge; an excuse is *empty* which is unsupported by fact and reason; a pleasure is *empty* which cannot afford satisfaction.

HOLY, PIOUS, DEVOUT, RELIGIOUS.

HOLY, *v.* *Holiness*.

PIOUS, in Latin *pius*, which is most probably changed from *dius* or *deus*, signifies having a regard for the gods.

DEVOUT, in Latin *devotus*, from *devo-veo* to engage by a vow, signifies *devoted* or *consecrated*.

RELIGIOUS, in Latin *religiosus*, comes from *religio* and *religo* to bind, because re-

ligion binds the mind, and produces in it a fixed principle.

A strong regard to the Supreme Being is expressed by all these epithets; but *holy* conveys the most comprehensive idea; *pious* and *devout* designate most fervour of mind; *religious* is the most general and abstract in its signification. A *holy* man is in all respects heavenly-minded; he is more fit for heaven than earth: *holiness* to whatever degree it is possessed, abstracts the thoughts from sublunary objects, and fixes them on things that are above: it is therefore a quality, which is not to be attained in its full perfection by human beings, in their present imperfect state. *Pious* is a term more restricted in its signification, and consequently more extended in application than *holy*: *piety* is the homage of the heart and the affections to a superior Being: from a similarity in the relationship between a heavenly and an earthly parent, *devotedness* of the mind has in both cases been denominated *piety*. *Piety* towards God naturally produces *piety* towards parents; for the obedience of the heart, which gives rise to the virtue in the one case, seems instantly to dictate the exercise of it in the other. The difference between *holiness* and *piety* is obvious from this, that our Saviour and his apostles are characterized as *holy*, but not *pious*, because *piety* is swallowed up in *holiness*. On the other hand, Jew and Gentile, Christian and Heathen, are alike termed *pious*, when they cannot be called *holy*, because *piety* is not only a more practicable virtue, but because it is more universally applicable to the dependant condition of man.

Devotion is a species of *piety* peculiar to the worshipper; it bespeaks that *devotedness* of mind which displays itself in the temple, when the individual seems by his outward services solemnly to *devote* himself, soul and body, to the service of his Maker. *Piety*, therefore, lies in the heart, and may appear externally; but *devotion* does not properly exist, except in an external observance: a man *piously* resigns himself to the will of God, in the midst of his afflictions; he prays *devoutly* in the bosom of his family.

Religious is a term of less import than either of the others; it denotes little more than the simple existence of *religion*, or a sense of *religion* in the mind: the *religious* man is so, more in his principles than in his affections; he is *religious* in his sentiments, inasmuch as he directs all his views according to the will of his Maker; and he is *religious* in his conduct, inasmuch as he observes the outward formalities of homage that are due to his Maker. A *holy* man fits

himself for a higher state of existence, after which he is always aspiring; a *pious* man has God in all his thoughts, and seeks to do his will: a *devout* man bends himself in humble adoration, and pays his vows of prayer and thanksgiving; a *religious* man conforms in all things to the dictates of his conscience.

When applied to things, these terms preserve a similar distinction: we speak of the *holy* sacrament; of a *pious* discourse, a *pious* ejaculation; of a *devout* exercise, a *devout* air; a *religious* sentiment, a *religious* life, and the like.

HOLY, SACRED, DIVINE.

HOLY, *v.* *Holiness*.

SACRED, in Latin *sacer*, is derived either from the Greek *αγιος* *holy*, or *σας* whole, perfect, and the Hebrew *zakah* pure.

DIVINE, *v.* *Godlike*.

Holy is here, as in the former article, a term of higher import than either *sacred* or *divine*: whatever is most intimately connected with religion and religious worship, in its purest state, whatever is elevated in the greatest possible degree, so as to suit the nature of an infinitely perfect and exalted Being is *holy*. Among the Jews the *holy* of *holies* was that place which was intended to approach the nearest to the heavenly abode, consequently was preserved as much as possible from all contamination with that which is earthly; among the Christians, that religion or form of religion is termed *holy*, which is esteemed purest in its doctrine, discipline, and ceremonies. Upon this ground we speak of the church as a *holy* place, of the sacrament as the *holy* sacrament, and the ordinances of the church as *holy*.

Sacred is less than *holy*; the *sacred* derives its sanction from human institutions, and is connected rather with our moral than our religious duties: what is *holy* is altogether spiritual, and abstracted from the earthly; what is *sacred* may be simply the human purified from what is gross and corrupt: what is *holy* must be regarded with awe, and treated with every possible mark of reverence; what is *sacred* must not be violated nor infringed upon. The laws are *sacred*, but not *holy*; a man's word should be *sacred*, though not *holy*: for neither of these things is to be revered, but both are to be kept free from injury or external violence. The *holy* is not so much opposed to as it is set above, every thing else; the *sacred* is opposed to the profane: the Scriptures are properly denominated *holy*, because they are the word of God, and the fruit of his *Holy* Spirit; but other writings may be termed *sacred* which appertain to re-

ligion, in distinction from the profane, which appertain only to wordly matters.

Divine is a term of even less import than *sacred*; it signifies either belonging to a deity, or being like a deity; but from the looseness of its application, it has lost in some respects the dignity of its meaning. The *divine* is often contrasted with the human; but there are many human things which are denominated *divine*; Milton's poem is entitled a *divine* poem, not merely on account of the subject, but from the exalted manner in which the poet has treated his subject: what is *divine*, therefore, may be so superlatively excellent as to be conceived of as having the stamp of inspiration from the Deity, which of course, as it respects human performances, is but an hyperbolical mode of speech.

From the above explanation of these terms, it is clear that there is a manifest difference between them, and yet that their resemblance is sufficiently great for them to be applied to the same objects. We speak of the *Holy Spirit*, and of *Divine* inspiration; by the first of which epithets is understood not only what is superhuman, but what is a constituent part of the Deity; by the second is represented merely in a general manner the source of the inspiration as coming from the Deity, and not from man. Subjects are denominated either *sacred* or *divine*, as when we speak of *sacred* poems, or *divine* hymns; *sacred* here characterizes the subjects of the poems, as those which are to be held *sacred*; and *divine* designates the subject of the hymns as not being ordinary or merely human: it is clear, therefore, that what is *holy* is in its very nature *sacred*, but not *vice versa*; and that what is *holy* and *sacred* is in its very nature *divine*; but the *divine* is not always either *holy* or *sacred*.

HOMAGE, FEALTY, COURT.

HOMAGE, in French *hommage*, comes from *homme* a man, signifying a man's, that is, an inferior's, act of acknowledging superiority. *Homage*, in the technical sense, was an oath taken, or a service performed, by the tenant to his lord, on being admitted to his land; or by inferior princes to a sovereign, whereby they acknowledged his sovereignty, and promised fidelity: in its extended and figurative sense, it comprehends any solemn mark of deference, by which the superiority of another is acknowledged.

FEALTY (from the French *féal*, loyal, trusty), is a lower species of *homage*, consisting only of an oath; it was made formerly by tenants, who were bound thereby to personal service under the feudal system;

it is never taken otherwise than in the proper sense.

COURT, which derives its meaning from the verb to *court*, woo, and seek favour, is a species of *homage*, complaisance, or deference, which is assumed for a specific purpose; it is not only voluntary, but depends upon the humour and convenience of the courter.

Homage is paid or done to superior endowments; *court* is paid to the contingent, not the real, superiority of the individual. *Homage* consists in any form of respect which is admitted in civil society; the Romans did *homage* to the talent of Virgil, by always rising when he entered the theatre; men do *homage* to the wisdom of another, when they do not venture to contradict his assertions, or call in question his opinions. *Court* is every thing or nothing, as circumstances require; he who pays his *court* consults the will and humour of him to whom it is paid, while he is consulting his own interest.

HONESTY, UPRIGHTNESS, INTEGRITY, PROBITY.

HONESTY, *v. Fair*.

UPRIGHTNESS, from *upright*, in German *aufrichtig* or *aufgerichtet*, from *auf-richten* to set up, signifies in a straight direction, not deviating nor turning aside.

Honest is the most familiar and universal term; it is applied alike to actions and principles, to a mode of conduct or a temper of mind; *upright* is applied to the conduct, but always with reference to the moving principle. As it respects the conduct, *honesty* is a much more homely virtue than *uprightness*: a man is said to be *honest* who in his dealings with others does not violate the laws; thus a servant is *honest* who does not take any of the property of his master, or suffer it to be taken; a tradesman is *honest* who does not sell bad articles; and people in general are denominated *honest* who pay what they owe, and do not adopt any methods of defrauding others: *honesty* in this sense, therefore, consists in negatives; but *uprightness* is positive, and extends to all matters which are above the reach of the law; it avoids not only every thing which is known to be hurtful, but also whatever may chance to be hurtful. To be *honest* requires nothing but a knowledge of the first principles of civil society; but to be *upright* supposes a superiority of understanding or information, which qualifies a person to discriminate between that which may or may not injure another. An *honest* man is contented with not overcharging another for that which he sells to him; but an *upright*

man seeks to provide him with that which shall fully answer his purpose. From this difference between *honesty* and *uprightness* arises another, namely, that the *honest* man may be *honest* only for his own convenience, out of regard to his character, or a fear of the laws; but the *upright* man is always *upright*, from his sense of what is right, and his concern for others.

Honest, in its extended sense, as it is applied to principles, or to the general character of a man, is of a higher cast than the common kind of *honesty* abovementioned; *uprightness*, however, in this case, still preserves its superiority. An *honest* principle is the first and most applicable principle, which the mind forms of what is right and wrong; and the *honest* man, who is so denominated on account of his having this principle, is looked upon with respect, inasmuch as he possesses the foundation of all moral virtue in his dealings with others. *Honest* is here the generic term, and *uprightness* the specific term; the former does not exclude the latter, but the latter includes the former. There may be many *honest* men and *honest* minds; but there are not so many *upright* men nor *upright* minds. The *honest* man is rather contrasted with the rogue, and an *honest* principle is opposed to the selfish or artful principle: but the *upright* man or the *upright* mind, can be compared or contrasted with nothing but itself. An *honest* man will do no harm if he know it; but an *upright* man is careful not to do to another what he would not have another do to him.

Honesty is a feeling that actuates and directs by a spontaneous impulse; *uprightness* is a principle that regulates or puts every thing into an even course. *Honesty* can be dispensed with in no case; but *uprightness* is called into exercise only in certain cases. We characterize a servant or the lowest person as *honest*: but we do not entitle any one in so low a capacity as *upright*, since *uprightness* is exercised in matters of higher moment, and rests upon the evidence of a man's own mind: a judge, however, may with propriety be denominated *upright*, who scrupulously adheres to the dictates of an unbiassed conscience in the administration of justice.

Uprightness is applicable only to principles and actions; INTEGRITY (from the Latin *integer* whole) is applicable to the whole man or his character; and PROBITY (from *probus* or *prohibus* restraining, that is, restraining from evil) is in like manner used only in the comprehensive sense. *Uprightness* is the straightness of rule by which actions and conduct in certain cases

are measured; *integrity* is the wholeness or unbrokenness of a man's character throughout life in his various transactions; *probity* is the excellence and purity of a man's character in his various relations. When we call a man *upright*, we consider him in the detail; we bear in mind the uniformity and fixedness of the principle by which he is actuated: when we call him a man of *integrity*, we view him in the gross, not in this or that circumstance of life, but in every circumstance in which the rights and interests of others are concerned. *Uprightness* may therefore be looked upon in some measure as a part of *integrity*; with this difference, that the acting principle is in the one case only kept in view, whereas in the other case the conduct and principle are both included. The distinction between these terms is farther evident by observing their different application. We do not talk of a man's *uprightness*; but of his *integrity* being shaken, and his preserving his *integrity*. We may, however, ascribe the particular conduct of any individual as properly to the *integrity* of his principles or mind, as to the *uprightness* of his principles. A judge shows his *uprightness* in his daily administration of justice, when he remains uninfluenced by any partial motive; he shows his *integrity* when he resists the most powerful motives of personal interest out of respect to right and justice.

Integrity and *probity* are both general and abstract terms; but the former is relative, the latter is positive: *integrity* refers to the external injuries by which it may be assailed or destroyed; it is goodness tried and preserved: *probity* is goodness existing of itself, without reference to any thing else. There is no *integrity* where private interest is not in question; there is no *probity* wherever the interests of others are injured: *integrity*, therefore, includes *probity*, but *probity* does not necessarily suppose *integrity*. *Probity* is a free principle that acts without any force; *integrity* is a defensive principle, that is obliged to maintain itself against external force. *Probity* excludes all injustice; *integrity* excludes in a particular manner that injustice which would favour one's-self.

Were I to take an estimate of the comparative value of these four terms, I should denominate *honesty* a current coin which must be in every man's hands; he cannot dispense with it for his daily use: *uprightness* is fine silver: *probity* fine gold without any alloy: and *integrity* gold tried and purified: all which are in the hands of but comparatively few, yet carry a value with them independently of the use which is made of them.

HONESTY, HONOUR.

Both these terms respect the principle which actuates men in the adjustment of their rights with each other. The words are both derived from the same source, namely, the Hebrew *hon* substance or wealth (*v. Honesty*), which, being the primitive source of esteem among men, became at length put for the measure or standard of esteem, namely, what is good. Hence HONESTY and HONOUR are both founded upon what is estimable, with this difference, that *honesty* is confined to the first principles or laws upon which civil society is founded, and *honour* is an independent principle that extends to every thing which by usage has been admitted as estimable, or entitled to esteem. An *honest* action, therefore, can never reflect so much credit on the agent as an *honourable* action, since in the performance of the one he may be guided by motives comparatively low, whereas in the other case he is actuated solely by a fair regard for the *honour* or the esteem of others. A breach of *honesty* is attended with punishment and personal inconvenience in various forms; but to a breach of *honour* is annexed only disgrace or the ill opinion of others: men are compelled to be *honest* whether they will or not, but they are entirely free in the choice of being *honourable*.

On the other hand, since *honesty* is founded on the very first principles of human society, and *honour* on the incidental principles which have been annexed to them in the progress of time and culture; the former is positive and definite, and he who is actuated by this principle can never err; but the latter is indefinite and variable, and, as it depends upon opinion, it will easily mislead. We cannot have a false *honesty*, but we may have false *honour*. *Honesty* always keeps a man within the line of his duty; but a mistaken notion of what is *honourable* may carry a man very far from what is right, and may even lead him to run counter to common *honesty*.

TO HONOUR, REVERENCE, RESPECT.

These terms agree in expressing the act of an inferior towards his superior; but HONOUR (*v. Glory*) expresses less than REVERENCE (*v. To adore*), and more than RESPECT (*v. To esteem*).

To *honour* is only an outward act; to *reverence* is either an act of the mind, or the outward expression of a sentiment; to *respect* is only an act of the mind. We *honour* God by adoration and worship, as well by the performance of his will; we *honour* our

parents by obeying them and giving them our personal service: we *reverence* our Maker by cherishing in our minds a dread of offending him; we *reverence* our parents by holding a similar sentiment in a less degree.

To *honour* and *respect* are extended to other objects besides our Maker and our parents; but *reverence* is confined to objects of a religious description: „We *honour* the king and all that are put in authority under him,“ by rendering to them the tribute that is due to their station; we *respect* all who possess superior qualities: the former is an act of duty, it flows out of the constitution of civil society; the latter is a voluntary act flowing out of the temper of the mind towards others. To *respect*, as has been before observed, signifies merely to feel *respect*; but to show *respect*, or a mark of *respect*, supposes an outward action which brings it still nearer to *honour*. It is a mark of *honour* in subjects to keep the birth-day of their Sovereign; it is a mark of *respect* to any individual to give him the upper seat in a room or at a table.

HONOUR, DIGNITY.

HONOUR (*v. Honour*) may be taken either for that which intrinsically belongs to a person, or for that which is conferred on him.

DIGNITY, from the Latin *dignus* worthy, signifying worthiness, may be equally applied to what is extrinsic or intrinsic in a man.

In the first case *honour* has a reference to what is esteemed by others; *dignity* to that which is esteemed by ourselves: a sense of *honour* impels a man to do that which is esteemed *honourable* among men; a sense of *dignity* to do that which is consistent with the worth and greatness of his nature: the former strives to elevate himself as an individual; the latter to raise himself to the standard of his species: the former may lead a person astray; but the latter is an unerring guide. It is *honour* which makes a man draw his sword upon his friend: it is *dignity* which makes him despise every paltry affront from others, and apologize for every apparent affront on his own part. This distinction between the terms is kept up in their application to what is extraneous of a man: *honour* is that which is conferred on him by others: but *dignity* is the worth or value which is added to his condition: hence we always speak of *honours* as conferred or received; but *dignities* as possessed or maintained. *Honours* may sometimes be casual; but *dignities* are always permanent: an act of condescension from the sovereign is an *honour*; but the *dignity* lies in the elevation

of the office. Hence it is that *honours* are mostly civil or political; *dignities* ecclesiastical.

HOPE, EXPECTATION, TRUST, CONFIDENCE.

HOPE, in German *hoffen*, probably comes from the Greek *σπου* to look at with pleasure.

EXPECTATION, *v.* To await.

TRUST, *v.* Belief.

CONFIDENCE, *v.* To confide.

Anticipation of futurity is the common idea expressed by all these words. *Hope* is welcome; *expectation* is either welcome or unwelcome: we *hope* only for that which is good; we *expect* the bad as well as the good. In bad weather we *hope* it will soon be better; but in a bad season we *expect* a bad harvest. *Hope* is simply a presentiment; it may vary in degree, more according to the temper of the mind than the nature of the circumstances; *expectation* approaches to a conviction; we *expect* in proportion as that conviction is positive: we *hope* that which may be or can possibly be; we *expect* that which must be or which ought to be. The young man *hopes* to live many years; the old man *expects* to die in a few years.

Trust and *confidence* agree with *hope* in regard to the objects anticipated; they agree with *expectation* in regard to the certainty of the anticipation: *expectation*, *trust*, and *confidence*, when applied to some future good, differ principally in the grounds on which this certainty or positive conviction rests. *Expectation* springs either from the character of the individual, or the nature of the event which is the subject of anticipation: in the former it is a decision; in the latter a rational conclusion: *trust* springs altogether from a view of the circumstances connected with the event, and is an inference or conclusion of the mind drawn from the whole: *confidence* arises more from the temper of the mind than from the nature of the object; it is rather an instantaneous decision than a rational conclusion. *Expectation* and *confidence* therefore are often erroneous, and mostly unwarrantable; the latter still more frequently than the former: *trust*, like *hope*, is always warrantable, even though it may sometimes be deceived.

If we *expect* our friends to assist us in time of need, it may be a reasonable *expectation* founded upon their regard for us and promises of assistance; or it may be an extravagant *expectation* founded upon our self-love and selfishness: if we *trust* that an eminent physician will cure us, it is found-

ed upon our knowledge of his skill, and of the nature of our case; if we indulge *confident expectation* that our performances will meet with universal approbation, it is founded upon our vanity and ignorance of ourselves.

HOT, FIERY, BURNING, ARDENT.

HOT, in German *heiss*, Latin *aestus*, comes from the Hebrew *ash* fire.

FIERY signifies having fire.

BURNING denotes the actual state of burning.

ARDENT, *v.* Fervour.

These terms characterize either the presence of *heat* or the cause of *heat*: *hot* is the general term which marks simply the presence of *heat*; *fiery* goes farther, it denotes the presence of *fire*, which is the cause of *heat*; *burning* denotes the action of *fire*, and consequently is more expressive than the preceding two; *ardent*, which is literally the same in signification, is employed either in poetry or in application to moral objects: a room is *hot*; a furnace or the tail of a comet *fiery*; a coal *burning*; the sun *ardent*,

In the figurative application, a temper is said to be *hot* or *fiery*: *rage* is *burning*; the mind is *ardent* in pursuit of an object. Zeal may be *hot*, *fiery*, *burning*, and *ardent*; but in the first three cases, it denotes the intemperance of the mind when *heated* by religion or politics; the latter is admissible so long as it is confined to a good object.

HOWEVER, YET, STILL, NEVERTHELESS, NOTWITHSTANDING.

These conjunctions are in grammar termed adversative, because they join sentences together that stand more or less in opposition to each other. HOWEVER is the most general and indefinite; it serves as a conclusive deduction drawn from the whole.

„The truth is *however* not yet all come out;“ — by this is understood that much of the truth remains to be told: so likewise in similar sentences, „I am not *however* of that opinion;“ where it is implied either that many hold the opinion, or much may be said of it, but be that as it may, I am not of that opinion: „*however*, you may rely on my assistance to that amount;“ that is, at all events, let whatever happen, you may rely on so much of my assistance; *however*, as is obvious from the above examples, connects not only one single proposition, but many propositions either expressed or understood. YET, STILL NEVERTHELESS, and NOTWITHSTANDING, are mostly employed to set two specific propositions either in contrast or direct opposition to each other; the two latter are but species of the

former, pointing out the opposition in a more specific manner.

There are cases in which *yet* is peculiarly proper. *Yet* bespeaks a simple contrast; „Addison was not a good speaker, *yet* he was an admirable writer; Johnson was a man of uncouth manners, *yet* he had a good heart and a sound head;“ *still nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* could not in these cases have been substituted. *Still nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* are mostly used to imply effects or consequences opposite to what might naturally be expected to result. „He has acted an unworthy part; *nevertheless* I will be a friend to him as far as I can; he has acted an unworthy part *still* I will be a friend to him as far as I can;“ that is, although he has acted an unworthy part, I will be no less his friend as far as lies in my power. „*Notwithstanding* all I have said, he still persists in his own imprudent conduct,“ that is, all I have said *notwithstanding* or not restraining him from it, he still persists. „He is still rich *notwithstanding* his loss;“ that is, his loss *notwithstanding*, or *not standing* in the way of it, he is still rich. From this resolution of the terms, more than from any specific rule, we may judge of their distinct applications, and clearly perceive that in such cases as those above cited, the conjunctions *nevertheless* and *notwithstanding* could not be substituted for each other, nor *yet* for either: in other cases, *however*, where the objects are less definitely pointed out, they may be used indifferently. „The Jesuits piqued themselves always upon their strict morality, and *yet* (*notwithstanding*, *nevertheless*) they admitted of many things not altogether consonant with moral principle: you know that these are but tales, *yet* (*notwithstanding*, *nevertheless still*) you believe them.“

HUMAN, HUMANE.

Though both derived from *homo* a man, they are thus far distinguished that HUMAN is said of the genus, and HUMANE of the species. The *human* race or *human* beings are opposed to the irrational part of the creation; a *humane* race or a *humane* individual is opposed to one that is cruel and fond of inflicting pain. He who is not *human* is divested of the first and distinguishing characteristics of his kind; he who is not *humane*, of the most important and elevated characteristic of his nature.

HUMBLE, LOWLY, LOW.

HUMBLE (*v. Humble, modest*) is here compared with the other terms as it respects both persons and things. A person is said

to be *humble* on account of the state of his mind: he is said to be LOWLY and LOW either on account of his mind or his outward circumstances. A *humble* person is so in his principles and in his conduct; a *lowly* person is so in the tone of his feelings, or in his station and walk of life; a *low* person is so either in his sentiments, in his actions, or in his rank and condition.

The *humble* and *lowly* are always taken in a good sense; but the *low* either in a bad or an indifferent sense. A *lowly* man, whether as it respects his mind or his condition, is so without any moral debasement; but a man who is *low* in his condition is likewise conceived to be *low* in his habits and his sentiments, which is being near akin to the *vicious*. The same distinction is preserved in applying these terms to inanimate or spiritual objects. A *humble* roof, a *humble* office, a *humble* station, are associated with the highest moral worth; while a *low* office, a *low* situation, a *low* birth, seem to exclude the idea of worth.

HUMBLE, MODEST, SUBMISSIVE.

HUMBLE, in Latin *humilis* low, comes from *humus* the ground, which is the lowest position.

MODEST, *v. Modest*.

SUBMISSIVE, in Latin *submissus*, participle of *submitto*, signifies put under.

These terms designate a temper of mind the reverse of self-conceit or pride. We are *humble* either with regard to ourselves or others: *modesty* is that which respects ourselves only: *submissiveness* that which respects others. A man is *humble* from a sense of his comparative inferiority to others in point of station and outward circumstances; or he is *humble* from a sense of his imperfections and a consciousness of not being what he ought to be: he is *modest* inasmuch as he sets but little value on his qualifications, acquirements, and endowments.

Between *humble* and *submissive* there is this distinction, that the former marks a temper of mind, the latter a mode of action: the former is therefore often the cause of the latter, but not so always: we may be *submissive* because we are *humble*; but we may likewise be *submissive* from fear, from interested motives, from necessity, from duty, and the like; and on the other hand, we may be *humble* without being *submissive*, when we are not brought into connexion with others. A man is *humbled* in his closet when he takes a review of his sinfulness: he is *submissive* to a master whose displeasure he dreads.

As *humility* may display itself in the out-

ward conduct, *humble* approaches still nearer to *submissive* in application: hence we say a *humble* air and a *submissive* air; the former to denote a man's sense of his own comparative littleness, the latter to indicate his readiness to submit to the will of another: a man therefore carries his *humble* air about with him to the world at large; but he puts on his *submissive* air only to the individual who has the power of controlling him. Upon the same principle, if I *humbly* ask a person's pardon, or *humbly* solicit any favour, I mean to express a sense of my own unworthiness, compared with the individual addressed; but when a counsellor *submissively*, or with *submission* addresses a judge on the bench, it implies his willingness to *submit* to the decision of the bench; or if a person *submissively* yields to the wishes of another, it is done with an air that bespeaks his readiness to conform his actions to a prescribed rule.

TO HUMBLE, HUMILIATE, DEGRADE.

HUMBLE, and HUMILIATE are both drawn from the same source (v. *Humble*, *modest*).

DEGRADE, v. *To abase.*

Humble is commonly used as the act either of persons or things: a person may *humble* himself or he may be *humbled*: *humiliate* is employed to characterize things: a thing is *humiliating* or an *humiliation*. No man *humbles* himself by the acknowledgment of a fault; but it is a great *humiliation* for a person to be dependant on another for a living when he has it in his power to obtain it for himself: to *humble* is to bring down to the ground; it supposes a certain eminence, either created by the mind, or really existing in the outward circumstances: to *degrade* is to let down lower; it supposes steps for ascending or descending. A lesson in the school of adversity is *humbling* to one who has known nothing but prosperity: terms of peace may be *humiliating*: low vices are peculiarly *degrading* to a man of rank.

HUMOUR, TEMPER, MOOD.

HUMOUR literally signifies moisture or fluid, in which sense it is used for the fluids of the human body: and as far as these *humours* or their particular state is connected with, or has its influence on, the animal spirits and the moral feelings, so far is *humour* applicable to moral agents.

TEMPER (v. *Disposition*) is less specific in its signification; it may with equal propriety, under the changed form of temperament, be applicable to the general state of the body or the mind.

MOOD, which is but a change from *mode* or manner, has an original signification not less indefinite than the former; it is applied however only to the mind. As the *humours* of the body are the most variable parts of the animal frame, *humour* in regard to the mind denotes but a partial transitory state when compared with the *temper*, which is a general and habitual state. The *humour* is so fluctuating that it varies in the same mind perpetually; but the *temper* is so far confined that it always shows itself to be the same whenever it shows itself at all: the *humour* makes a man different from himself; the *temper* makes him different from others. Hence we speak of the *humour* of the moment; of the *temper* of youth or of old age: so likewise we say, to accommodate one's self to the *humour* of a person; to manage his *temper*: to put one into a certain *humour*; to correct or sour the *temper*. *Humour* is not less partial in its nature than in its duration; it respects only one particular direction of the feelings: *temper* extends to all the actions and opinions as well as feelings of a man; it gives a colouring to all he says, does, thinks, and feels. We may be in a *humour* for writing, or reading; for what is gay or what is serious; for what is noisy or what is quiet: but our *temper* is discoverable in our daily conduct; we may be in a good or ill *humour* in company, but in domestic life and in our closest relations we show whether we are good or ill *tempered*. A man shows his *humour* in indifferent or trifling actions; he shows his *temper* in the most important actions: it may be a man's *humour* to sit while others stand, or to go unshaven while others shave; but he shows his *temper* in living peaceably, or indulging himself in contentions.

The same distinction is kept up between the terms when applied to bodies of men. A nation may have its *humour* and its *temper* as much as an individual: the former discovers itself in the manners and fashions; the latter in its public spirit towards its government or other nations. It has been the *humour* of the present day to banish ceremony, from all companies: the *temper* of the times is somewhat more sober now than it was during the revolutionary mania.

Humour and *mood* agree in denoting a particular and temporary state of feeling; but they differ in the cause: the former being attributable rather to the physical state of the body; and the latter to the moral frame of the mind: the former therefore is independent of external circumstances, or at all events, of any that are reducible to system; the latter is guided entirely by events,

or the view which the mind takes of events. *Humour* is therefore generally taken in a bad sense, unless actually qualified by some epithet to the contrary: *mood* is always taken in an indifferent sense. There is no calculating on the *humour* of a man; it depends upon his *mood* whether he performs ill or well.

HUMOUR, CAPRICE.

HUMOUR, *v.* *Humour*.

CAPRICE, *v.* *Fantastical*.

Humour is general; *caprice* is particular: *humour* may be good or bad; *caprice* is always taken in a bad sense. *Humour* is always independent of fixed principle; it is the feeling or impulse of the moment: *caprice* is always opposed to fixed principle, or rational motives of acting; it is the feeling of the individual setting at nought all rule, and defying all reason. The feeling only is perverted when the *humour* predominates; the judgment and will is perverted by *caprice*: a child shows its *humour* in fretfulness and impatience; a man betrays his *caprice* in his intercourse with others, in the management of his concerns, in the choice of his amusements.

Indulgence renders children *humoursome*; prosperity or unlimited power is apt to render a man *capricious*: a *humoursome* person commonly objects to be pleased, or is easily displeased; a *capricious* person likes and dislikes, approves and disapproves the same thing in quick succession. *Humour*, when applied to things, has the sense of wit; whence the distinction between *humoursome* and *humorous*: the former implying the existence of *humour* or perverted feeling in the person; the latter implying the existence of *humour* or wit in the person or thing. *Caprice* is improperly applied to things to designate their total irregularity and planlessness of proceeding; we speak of the *caprice* of fashion; and diseases are termed *capricious* which act in direct opposition to all established rule.

HUNT, CHACE.

The leading idea in the word HUNT is that of searching after; the leading idea in the word CHACE is that of driving away, or before one. In a strict sense, *hunt* denotes a search for objects not within sight; *chace* is a pursuit after such objects as are within sight: we may *hunt*, therefore, without *chasing*; we may *chase* without *hunting*: a person *hunts* after, but does not *chase* that which is lost: a boy *chases*, but does not *hunt* a butterfly. When applied to field sports, the *hunt* commences as soon

as the huntsman begins to look for the game; the *chace* commences as soon as it is found: on this ground, perhaps, it is, that *hunt* is used in familiar discourse, to designate the specific act of taking this amusement; and *chace* is used only in particular cases where the peculiar idea is to be expressed: a fox *hunt*, or a stag *hunt*, is said to take place on a particular day; or that there has been no *hunting* this season, or that the *hunt* has been very bad: but we speak, on the other hand, of the pleasures of the *chace*; or that the *chace* lasted very long; the animal gave a long *chace*.

HURTFUL, PERNICIOUS, NOXIOUS, NOISOME.

HURTFUL signifies full of *hurt*, or causing plenty of *hurt*.

PERNICIOUS, *v.* *Destructive*.

NOXIOUS and NOISOME, from the Latin *noxius* and *noceo* to *hurt*, and the Italian *noioso*, signifies the same originally as *hurtful*.

Between *hurtful* and *pernicious* there is the same distinction as between *hurting* and *destroying*: that which is *hurtful* may *hurt* in various ways; but that which is *pernicious* necessarily tends to destruction: confinement is *hurtful* to the health: bad company is *pernicious* to the morals. *Noxious* and *noisome* are species of the *hurtful*: things may be *hurtful* both to body and mind; *noxious* and *noisome* only to the body: that which is *noxious* inflicts a direct injury; that which is *noisome* inflicts it indirectly: *noxious* insects are such as wound; *noisome* vapours are such as tend to create disorders: Ireland is said to be free from every *noxious* weed or animal; where filth is brought together, there will always be *noisome* smells.

HYPOCRITE, DISSEMBLER.

HYPOCRITE, in Greek *υποκριτης* from *υπο* and *κρινωμαι*, signifies one appearing under a mask.

DISSEMBLER, from *dissemble*, in Latin *dissimulo* or *dis* and *similis*, signifies one who makes himself appear unlike what he really is.

The *hypocrite* feigns to be what he is not; the *dissembler* conceals what he is; the former takes to himself the credit of virtues which he has not; the latter conceals the vices that he has: every *hypocrite* is a *dissembler*; but every *dissembler* is not a *hypocrite*: the *hypocrite* makes truth serve the purpose of falsehood; the *dissembler* is content with making falsehood serve its own particular purpose.

I.

IDEA, THOUGHT, IMAGINATION.

IDEA, in Latin *idea*, Greek *εἰδέα*, signifies the form or image of an object, from *εἶδω* to see, that is, the thing seen in the mind.

THOUGHT literally signifies the thing thought.

IMAGINATION signifies the thing imagined.

The *idea* is the simple representation of an object; the *thought* is the reflection; and the *imagination* is the combination of *ideas*: we have *ideas* of the sun, the moon, and all material objects; we have *thoughts* on moral subjects; we have *imagination* drawn from the *ideas* already existing in the mind. *Ideas* are formed; they are the rude materials with which the *thinking* faculty exerts itself: *thoughts* arise in the mind by means of association, or recur in the mind by the power of the memory; they are the materials with which the *thinking* faculty employs itself: *imaginings* are created by the mind's reaction on itself; they are the materials with which the understanding seeks, to enrich itself.

The word *idea* is not only the most general in sense, but the most universal in application; *thought* and *imagination* are particular terms used only in connexion with the agent *thinking* or *imagining*. All these words have therefore a distinct office, in which they cannot properly be confounded with each other. *Idea* is used in all cases for the mental representation, abstractedly from the agent that represents them: hence *ideas* are either clear or distinct; *ideas* are attached to words; *ideas* are analysed, confounded, and the like; in which cases the word *thought* could not be substituted. *Thought* belongs only to thinking and rational beings: the brutes may be said to have *ideas*, but not *thoughts*: hence *thoughts* are either mean, fine, grovelling, or sublime, according to the nature of the mind in which they exist: hence we say with more propriety, to indulge a *thought* than to indulge an *idea*; to express one's *thoughts*, rather than one's *ideas*, on any subject: although the latter term *idea*, on account of its comprehensive use, may without violation of any express rule be indifferently employed in general discourse for *thought*; but the former term does not on this account lose its characteristic meaning.

Imagination is not only the fruit of *thought*, but of peculiar *thought*: the *thought* may be another's; the *imagination* is one's own: the *thought* occurs and recurs; it is retained or rejected at the pleasure of the *thinking* being: the *imagination*

is framed by special desire; it is cherished with the partiality of a parent for its offspring. *Thoughts* are busied with the surrounding objects; *imaginings* are employed on distant and strange objects; hence *thoughts* are denominated sober, chaste, and the like; *imaginings*, wild and extravagant. *Thoughts* engage the mind as circumstances give rise to them; they are always supposed to have a foundation in some thing: *imaginings*, on the other hand, are often the mere fruit of a disordered brain; they are regarded as unsubstantial, if not unreal; they frequently owe their origin to the suggestions of the appetites and passions; whence they are termed the *imaginings* of the heart.

IDEAL, IMAGINARY.

IDEAL does not strictly adhere to the sense of its primitive, *idea* (v. *Idea*): the *idea* is the representation of a real object in the mind; but *ideal* signifies belonging to the *idea* independently of the reality or the external object. IMAGINARY preserves the signification of its primitive *imagination* (v. *Fancy*, also v. *Idea*), as denoting what is created by the mind itself.

The *ideal* is not directly opposed to, but abstracted from, the real; the *imaginary*, on the other hand, is directly opposed to the real; it is the unreal thing formed by the *imagination*. *Ideal* happiness is the happiness which is formed in the mind, without having any direct and actual prototype in nature; but it may, nevertheless, be something possible to be realized: the *imaginary* is that which is opposite to some positive existing reality; the pleasure which a lunatic derives from the conceit of being a king is altogether *imaginary*.

IDLE, LAZY, INDOLENT.

IDLE is in German *eitel* vain.

LAZY, in German *lässig*, comes from the Latin *lassus* weary, because weariness naturally engenders laziness.

INDOLENT, in Latin *indolens*, signifies without feeling, having apathy or unconcern.

A propensity to inaction is the common idea by which these words are connected; they differ in the cause and degree of the quality: *idle* expresses less than *lazy*, and *lazy* less than *indolent*: one is termed *idle* who will do nothing useful; one is *lazy* who will do nothing at all without great reluctance; one is *indolent* who does not care to do any thing or set about any thing. There is no direct inaction in the *idler*; for a child is *idle* who will not learn his lesson, but he is active enough in that which pleases

himself; there is an aversion to corporeal action in a *lazy* man, but not always to mental action; he is *lazy* at work, *lazy* in walking, or *lazy* in sitting; but he may not object to any employment, such as reading or thinking, which leaves his body entirely at rest: an *indolent* man, on the contrary, fails in activity from a defect both in the mind and the body; he will not only not move, but he will not even think, if it give him trouble; and trifling exertions of any kind are sufficient to deter him from attempting to move.

Idleness is common to the young and the thoughtless; the *idle* man is opposed to one that is diligent: *laziness* is frequent among those who are compelled to work for others; it is opposed to industry: *indolence* is a physical property of the mind, a want of motive or purpose to action: the *indolent* man is not so fond of his bodily ease as the *lazy* man, but he shrinks from every species of exertion still more than the latter; it is a disease most observable in the higher classes; the *indolent* stands in direct opposition to nothing but the general term active.

IDLE, LEISURE, VACANT.

IDLE, *v. Idle.*

LEISURE, otherwise spelt *leasure*, comes from *lease*, as in the compound *release*, and the Latin *laxo* to make lax or loose, that is, loosed or free.

VACANT, *v. Free.*

Idle is opposed here to the busy; *leisure* simply to the employed: he therefore who is *idle*, instead of being busy, commits a fault; which is not always the case with him who is at *leisure* or free from his employment. *Idle* is always taken in a sense more or less unfavourable: *leisure* in a sense perfectly indifferent: if a man says of himself that he has spent an *idle* hour in this or that place, in amusement, company, and the like, he means to signify he would have spent it better if any thing had offered; on the other hand, he would say that he spends his *leisure* moments in a suitable relaxation: he who values his time will take care to have as few *idle* hours as possible; but since no one can always be employed in severe labour, he will occupy his *leisure* hours in that which best suits his taste.

Idle and *leisure* are said in particular reference to time that is employed; *vacant* is a more general term, that simply qualifies the thing: an *idle* hour is one without any proper employment; a *vacant* hour is in general one free from the employments with which it might be filled up; a person

has *leisure* time according to his wishes; but he may have *vacant* time from necessity, that is, when he is in want of employment.

IDLE, VAIN.

IDLE, *v. Idle, lazy.*

VAIN, in Latin *vanus*, probably changed from *vacaneus*, signifies empty.

These epithets are both opposed to the solid or substantial; but *idle* has a more particular reference to what ought or ought not to engage the time or attention; *vain* seems to qualify the thing without any such reference. A pursuit may be termed either *idle* or *vain*: in the former case, it reflects immediately on the agent for not employing his time on something more serious; but in the latter case, it simply characterizes the pursuit as one that will be attended with no good consequences: an *idle* effort is made by one who does not care to exert himself for any useful purpose, who works only to please himself; a *vain* effort is made by one who is in a state of desperation.

IGNORANT, ILLITERATE, UNLEARNED, UNLETTERED.

IGNORANT, in Latin *ignorans*, from the privative *ig* or *in* and *noro*, or the Greek *γινωσκω*, signifies not knowing things in general, or not knowing any particular circumstance.

UNLEARNED, ILLITERATE, and UNLETTERED, are compared with *ignorant* in the general sense.

Ignorant is a comprehensive term; it includes the other terms, *illiterate*, *unlearned*, and *unlettered*, which express different forms of *ignorance*. *Ignorance* is not always to one's disgrace, since it is not always one's fault; the term is not therefore directly reproachful: the poor *ignorant* savage is an object of pity, rather than condemnation; but when *ignorance* is coupled with self-conceit and presumption, it is a perfect deformity: hence the word *illiterate*, which is used only in such cases as become a term of reproach: an *ignorant* man who sets up to teach others, is termed an *illiterate* preacher; and quacks, whether in religion or medicine, from the very nature of their calling, are altogether an *illiterate* race of men. The words *unlearned* and *unlettered* are disengaged from any unfavourable associations. A modest man, who makes no pretensions to learning, may suitably apologize for his supposed deficiencies by saying he is an *unlearned* or *unlettered* man; the former is, however, a term of more familiar use than the latter. A man may be described either as generally *unlearned*,

or as *unlearned* in particular sciences or arts; as *unlearned* in history; *unlearned* in the ways of the world: a poet may describe his muse as *unlettered*.

TO ILLUMINATE, ILLUMINE, ENLIGHTEN.

ILLUMINATE, in Latin *illuminatus*, participle of *illumino*, and ENLIGHTEN, from the noun *light*, both denote the communication of light; the former in the natural, the latter in the moral sense. We *illuminate* by means of artificial lights; the sun *illuminates* the world by its own light: preaching and instruction *enlighten* the minds of men. *Illumine* is but a poetic variation of *illuminate*; as, the Sun of Righteousness *illuminated* the benighted world: *illuminations* are employed as public demonstrations of joy: no nation is now termed *enlightened* but such as have received the light of the Gospel.

TO IMITATE, COPY, COUNTERFEIT.

To IMITATE, *v*, To follow.

COPY, *v*, Copy.

COUNTERFEIT, from the Latin *contra* and *facio*, signifies to make in opposition to the reality.

The idea of taking a likeness of some object is common to all these terms; but *imitate* is the generic, *copy* and *counterfeit* the specific terms: to *imitate* is to take a general likeness; to *copy*, to take an exact likeness: to *counterfeit*, to take a false likeness: to *imitate* is, therefore almost always used in a good or an indifferent sense; to *copy* mostly, and to *counterfeit* always, in a bad sense: to *imitate* an author's style is at all times allowable for one who cannot form a style for himself; but to *copy* an author's style would be a too slavish adherence even for the dullest writer. To *imitate* is applicable to every object, for every external object is susceptible of *imitation*; to *copy* is applicable only to certain objects which will admit of a minute likeness being taken; thus, an artist may be said to *copy* from nature; to *counterfeit* is applicable but to few objects; we may *counterfeit* coin, or we may *counterfeit* the person, the character, the voice, or the handwriting, of any one.

TO IMITATE, MIMICK, MOCK, APE.

IMITATE, *v*, To follow.

MIMICK, from the Greek *μιμος*, has the same origin as *imitate*.

MOCK, in French *mocquer*, Greek *μωχάω* to laugh at.

To APE signifies to *imitate* like an ape.

To *imitate* is here the general term: to *mimick* and to *ape* are both species of vicious *imitation*.

One *imitates* that which is deserving of *imitation*, or the contrary: one *mimicks* either that which is not an authorised subject of *imitation*, or which is *imitated* so as to excite laughter. A person wishes to make that his own which he *imitates*, but he *mimicks* for the entertainment of others. To *ape* is a serious though an absurd act of *imitation*; to *mimick* is a jocose act of *imitation*: to *mock* is an ill-natured and vulgar act of *imitation*. The *ape imitates* to please himself, but the *mimick imitates* to please others. The *ape* seriously tries to come as near the original as he can; the *mimick* tries to render the *imitation* as ridiculous as possible: the former *apes* out of deference to the person *aped*; the latter *mimicks* out of contempt or disregard.

Show-people display their talents in *mimicking* the cries of birds or beasts, for the entertainment of the gaping crowd; weak and vain people, who wish to be admired for that which they have not in themselves, *ape* the dress, the manners, the voice, the mode of speech, and the like, of some one who is above them. *Mimickry* excites laughter from that which is burlesque in it; *aping* excites laughter from that which is absurd and unsuitable in it; *mockery* excites laughter from the malicious temper of those who enjoy it.

IMMINENT, IMPENDING, THREATENING.

IMMINENT, in Latin *imminens*, from *maneo* to remain, signifies resting or coming upon.

IMPENDING, from the Latin *pendeo* to hang, signifies hanging.

THREATENING is used in the sense of the verb to *threaten*.

All these terms are used in regard to some evil that is exceedingly near; *imminent* conveys no idea of duration; *impending* excludes the idea of what is momentary. A person may be in *imminent* danger of losing his life in one instant, and the danger may be over the next instant; but an *impending* danger is that which has been long in existence, and gradually approaching: one can seldom escape *imminent* danger by any efforts of one's own; but we may be successfully warned to escape from an *impending* danger. *Imminent* and *impending* are said of dangers that are not discoverable; but a *threatening* evil gives intimations of its own approach; we perceive the *threatening* tempest in the blackness of

the sky; we hear the *threatening* sounds of the enemy's clashing swords.

IMMODEST, IMPUDENT, SHAMELESS.

IMMODEST signifies the want of *modesty*: IMPUDENT and SHAMELESS signify without *shame*.

Immodest is less than either *impudent* or *shameless*; an *immodest* girl lays aside the ornament of her sex, and puts on another garb that is less becoming; but her heart need not be corrupt until she becomes *impudent*: she wants a good quality when she is *immodest*; she is possessed of a positively bad quality when she is *impudent*. There is always hope that an *immodest* woman may be sensible of her error, and amend; but of an *impudent* woman there is no such chance, she is radically corrupt.

Impudent may characterize the person or the thing: *shameless* characterizes the person. A person's air, look, and words, are *impudent*, when contrary to all modesty; the person himself is *shameless* who is devoid of all sense of *shame*.

TO IMPAIR, INJURE.

IMPAIR comes from the Latin *im* and *pejuro* or *pejor* worse, signifying to make worse.

INJURE, from *in* and *jus* against right, signifies to make otherwise than it ought to be.

Impair seems to be in regard to *injure* as the species to the genus; what is *impaired* is *injured*, but what is *injured* is not necessarily *impaired*. To *impair* is a progressive mode of *injuring*: an *injury* may take place either by degrees; or by an instantaneous act: straining of the eyes *impairs* the sight, but a blow *injures* rather than *impairs* the eye. A man's health may be *impaired* or *injured* by his vices, but his limbs are *injured* rather than *impaired* by a fall. A person's circumstances are *impaired* by a succession of misfortunes; they are *injured* by a sudden turn of fortune.

IMPERFECTION, DEFECT, FAULT, VICE.

IMPERFECTION denotes either the abstract quality of *imperfect*, or the thing which constitutes it *imperfect*.

DEFECT, v. *Blemish*.

FAULT, v. *Fault*.

VICE, v. *Crime*.

These terms are applied either to persons or things. An *imperfection* in a person arises from his want of *perfection*, and the infirmity of his nature; there is no one without some *imperfection* which is obvious to

others, if not to himself: a *defect* is a deviation from the general constitution of man; it is what may be natural to the man as an individual, but not natural to man as a species; in this manner we may speak of a *defect* in the speech, or a *defect* in temper. The *fault* and *vice* rise in degree and character above either of the former terms; they both reflect disgrace more or less on the person possessing them; but the *fault* always characterizes the agent, the *vice* characterizes the action, and may be considered abstractedly: hence we speak of a man's *faults* as the things we may condemn in him; but we may speak of the *vices* of drunkenness, lying, and the like, without any immediate reference to any one who practises these *vices*. When they are both employed for an individual, their distinction is obvious: the *fault* may lessen the amiability or excellence of the character; the *vice* is a stain; a single act destroys purity, an habitual practice is a pollution.

In regard to things the distinction depends upon the preceding explanation. The word *imperfection* is the most unqualified term of all: there may be *imperfection* in regard to our Maker; or there may be *imperfection* in regard to what we conceive of *perfection*: and in this case, the term simply and generally implies whatever falls short in any degree or manner of *perfection*. *Defect* is a positive degree of *imperfection*; it is contrary both to our ideas of *perfection*, or our particular intention: thus, there may be a *defect* in the materials of which a thing is made; or a *defect* in the mode of making it: the term *defect*, however, whether said of persons or things, characterizes rather the object than the agent. *Fault*, on the other hand, when said of things, always refers to the agent: thus we may say there is a *defect* in the glass, or a *defect* in the spring; but there is a *fault* in the workmanship, or a *fault* in the putting together, and the like. *Vice*, with regard to things, is properly a serious or radical *defect*; the former lies in the constitution of the whole, the latter may lie in the parts; the former lies in essentials, the latter lies in the accidents: there may be a *defect* in the shape or make of a horse; but the *vice* is said in regard to his soundness, or unsoundness, his docility or indocility.

IMPERFECTION, WEAKNESS, FRAILTY, FAILING, FOIBLE.

IMPERFECTION (v. *Imperfection*) has already been considered as that which in the most extended sense abridges the mora

perfection of man; the rest are but modes of *imperfection* varying in degree and circumstances. **WEAKNESS** is a positive and strong degree of *imperfection* which is opposed to strength; it is what we do not so necessarily look for, and therefore distinguishes the individual who is liable to it. **FRAILITY** is another strong mode of *imperfection* which characterizes the fragility of man; it differs from *weakness* in respect to the object. A *weakness* lies more in the judgment or in the sentiment; *frailty* lies more in the moral features of an action. It is a *weakness* in a man to yield to the persuasions of any one against his better judgment; it is a *frailty* to yield to intemperance or illicit indulgences. **FAILINGS** and **FOIBLES** are the smallest degrees of *imperfection* to which the human character is liable: we have all our *failings* in temper, and our *foibles* in our habits and our prepossessions; and he, as Horace observes, is the best who has the fewest. For our *imperfections* we must seek superior aid: we must be most on our guard against those *weaknesses* to which the softness or susceptibility of our minds may most expose us, and against those *frailties* into which the violence of our evil passions may bring us: towards the *failings* and *foibles* of others we may be indulgent, but should correct them in ourselves.

IMPERIOUS, LORDLY, DOMINEERING, OVERBEARING.

All these epithets imply an unseemly exercise or affectation of power or superiority. **IMPERIOUS**, from *impero* to command, characterizes either the disposition to command without adequate authority, or to convey one's commands in an offensive manner: **LORDLY**, signifying like a *lord*, characterizes the manner of acting the *lord*: and **DOMINEERING**, from *dominus* a *lord*, denotes the manner of ruling like a *lord*, or rather of attempting to rule: hence a person's temper or his tone is denominated *imperious*; his air or deportment is *lordly*; his tone is *domineering*. A woman of an *imperious* temper commands in order to be obeyed: she commands with an *imperious* tone in order to enforce obedience. A person assumes a *lordly* air in order to display his own importance: he gives orders in a *domineering* tone in order to make others feel their inferiority. There is always something offensive in *imperiousness*: there is frequently something ludicrous in that which is *lordly*; and a mixture of the ludicrous and offensive in that which is *domineering*; the *lordly* is an affectation of grandeur where

there are the fewest pretensions; and the *domineering* is an affectation of authority where it least exists: *lordly* is applied even to the brutes who set themselves up above those of their kind; *domineering* is applied to servants and ignorant people, who have the opportunity of commanding without knowing how to command. A turkeycock struts about the yard in a *lordly* style: an upper servant *domineers* over all that are under him.

The first three of these terms are employed for such as are invested with some sort of power: or endowed with some sort of superiority, however trifling; but **OVERBEARING** is employed for men in the general relations of society, whether superiors or equals. A man of an *imperious* temper and some talent will frequently be so *overbearing* in the assemblies of his equals as to awe the rest into silence, and carry every measure of his own without contradiction.

IMPERTINENT, RUDE, SAUCY, IMPUDENT, INSOLENT.

IMPERTINENT, in Latin *in* and *per-tinens* not belonging to one, signifies being or wanting to do what it does not belong to one to be or do.

RUDE, in Latin *rudus* rude, and *raudus* a ragged stone, in the Greek *ραβδος* a rough stick, signifies literally unpolished; and in an extended sense, wanting all culture.

SAUCY comes from *sauce*, and the Latin *salsus*, signifying literally salt; and in an extended sense, stinging like salt.

IMPUDENT, v. *Assurance*.

INSOLENT, from the Latin *in* and *solens*, contrary to custom, signifies being or wanting to be contrary to custom.

Impertinent is allied to *rude*, as respects one's general relations in society, without regard to station; it is allied to *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent*, as respects the conduct of inferiors.

He who does not respect the laws of civil society in his intercourse with individuals, and wants to assume to himself what belongs to another, is *impertinent*: if he carry this *impertinence* so far as to commit any violent breach of decorum in his behaviour, he is *rude*. *Impertinence* seems to spring from too high a regard of one's self: *rudeness* from an ignorance of what is due to others. An *impertinent* man will ask questions for the mere gratification of curiosity; a *rude* man will stare in one's face in order to please himself. An *impertinent* man will take possession of the best seat

without regard to the right or convenience of another: a *rude* man will burst into the room of another, or push against his person, in violation of ceremony.

Impertinent, in comparison with the other terms, *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent*, is the most general and indefinite: whatever one does or says that is not compatible with our humble station is *impertinent*; *saucy* is a sharp kind of *impertinence*; *impudent* an unblushing kind of *impertinence*; *insolence* is an outrageous kind of *impertinence*, it runs counter to all established order: thus, the terms seem to rise in sense. A person may be *impertinent* in words or actions; he is *saucy* in words or looks: he is *impudent* or *insolent* in words, tones, gesture, looks, and every species of action. A person's *impertinence* discovers itself in not giving the respect which is due to his superiors in general, strangers or otherwise; as when a common person sits down in the presence of a man of rank; *sauciness* discovers itself towards particular individuals, in certain relations; as in the case of servants who are *saucy* to their masters, or children who are *saucy* to their teachers: *impudence* and *insolence* are the strongest degrees of *impertinence*; but the former is more particularly said of such things as reflect disgrace upon the offender, and spring from a low depravity of mind, such as the abuse of one's superiors, and a vulgar defiance of those to whom one owes obedience and respect: *insolence*, on the contrary, originates from a haughtiness of spirit, and a misplaced pride, which breaks out into a contemptuous disregard of the station of those by whom one is offended; as in the case of a servant who should offer to strike his master, or of a criminal who sets a magistrate at defiance.

IMPERVIOUS, IMPASSABLE, INACCESSIBLE.

IMPERVIOUS, from the Latin *in*, *per*, and *via*, signifies not having a way through; IMPASSABLE, not to be passed through; INACCESSIBLE, not to be approached. A wood is *impervious*, when the trees, branches and leaves are entangled to such a degree as to admit of no passage at all: a river is *impassable* that is so deep that it cannot be forded: a rock or a mountain is *inaccessible*, the summit of which is not to be reached by any path whatever. What is *impervious* is for a permanency; what is *impassable* is commonly so only for a time: roads are frequently *impassable* in the winter that are *passable* in the summer, while a thicket is *impervious* during the whole

of the year: *impassable* is likewise said only of that which is to be passed by living creatures, but *impervious* may be extended to inanimate objects; a wood may be *impervious* to the rays of the sun.

IMPLACABLE, UNRELENTING, RELENTLESS, INEXORABLE.

IMPLACABLE, unappeasable, signifies not to be allayed nor softened.

UNRELENTING or RELENTLESS from, the Latin *lenio* to soften, or to make pliant, signifies rendered soft.

INEXORABLE, from *oro* to pray, signifies not to be turned by prayers.

Inflexibility is the idea expressed in common by these terms, but they differ in the causes and circumstances with which it is attended. Animosities are *implacable* when no misery which we occasion can diminish their force, and no concessions on the part of the offender can lessen the spirit of revenge: the mind or character of a man is *unrelenting*, when it is not to be turned from its purpose by a view of the pain which it inflicts: a man is *inexorable* who turns a deaf ear to every solicitation or entreaty that is made to induce him to lessen the rigour of his sentence. A man's angry passions render him *implacable*; it is not the magnitude of the offence, but the temper of the offended that is here in question: fixedness of purpose renders a man *unrelenting* or *relentless*; an *unrelenting* temper is not less callous, than an *implacable* temper; but it is not grounded always on resentment for personal injuries, but sometimes on a certain principle of right and a sense of necessity: the *inexorable* man adheres to his rule, as the *unrelenting* man does to his purpose; the former is insensible to any workings of his heart which might shake his purpose, the latter turns a deaf ear to all the solicitations of others which would go to alter his decrees; savages are mostly *implacable* in their animosities; Titus Manlius Torquatus displayed an instance of *unrelenting* severity towards his son; Minos, Aeacus, and Rhodomanthus were the *inexorable* judges of hell.

Implacable and *unrelenting* are said only of animate beings in whom is wanting an ordinary portion of the tender affections: *inexorable* may be improperly applied to inanimate objects; justice and death are both represented as *inexorable*.

TO IMPLANT, INGRAFT, INCULCATE, INSTIL, INFUSE.

To *plant* is properly to fix plants in the ground; to IMPLANT is, in the improper

sense, to fix principles in the mind. To *graft* is to make one plant grow on the stock of another; to *INGRAFT* is to make particular principles flourish in the mind, and to form a part of the character. *Calco* is in Latin to tread; and *INCULCATE*, to stamp into the mind. *Stillo*, in Latin, is literally to fall dropwise: *instillo*, to *INSTIL*, is, in the improper sense, to make sentiments as it were drop into the mind. *Fundo*, in Latin, is literally to pour in a stream: *infundo*, to *INFUSE*, is in the improper sense to pour principles or feelings into the mind.

To *implant*, *ingraft*, and *inculcate*, are said of abstract opinions, or rules of right and wrong: *instil* and *infuse* of such principles that influence the heart, the affections, and the passions. It is the business of the parent in early life to *implant* sentiments of virtue in his child; it is the business of the teacher to *ingraft* them. *Instil* is a corresponding act with *implant*: we *implant* belief; we *instil* the feeling which is connected with this belief. It is not enough to have an abstract belief of a God *implanted* into the mind: we must likewise have a love and a fear of him, and reverence for his holy name and Word, *instilled* into the mind.

To *instil* is a gradual process which is the natural work of education; to *infuse* is a more arbitrary and immediate act. Sentiments are *instilled* into the mind, not altogether by the personal efforts of any individual, but likewise by collateral endeavours; they are, however, *infused* at the express will, and with the express endeavour of some person. By the reading of the Scriptures, an attendance on public worship, and the influence of example, combined with the instructions of a parent, religious sentiments are *instilled* into the mind; by the counsel and conversation of an intimate friend, an even current of the feeling becomes *infused* into the mind. *Instil* is applicable only to permanent sentiments; *infuse* may be said of any partial feeling: hence we speak of *infusing* a poison into the mind by means of insidious and mischievous publications; or *infusing* a jealousy by means of crafty insinuations, or *infusing* an ardour into minds of soldiers by means of spirited addresses coupled with military successes.

TO IMPLICATE, INVOLVE.

IMPLICATE, from *plico* to fold, denotes to fold into a thing; and *INVOLVE* from *volvo* to roll, signifies to roll into a thing: by which explanation we perceive

that to *implicate* marks something less entangled than to *involve*: for that which is folded may be folded only once, but that which is rolled is rolled many times. In application therefore to human affairs, people are said to be *implicated* who have taken ever so small a share in a transaction; but they are *involved* only when they are deeply concerned: the former is likewise especially applied to criminal transactions, the latter to those things which are in themselves troublesome: thus a man is *implicated* in the guilt of robbery who should stand by and see it done, without interfering for its prevention; he who is engaged in a lawsuit is said to be *involved* in it; he who is in debt in every direction is strictly *involved* in debt.

IMPORTANCE, CONSEQUENCE, WEIGHT, MOMENT.

IMPORTANCE, from *porto* to carry, signifies the carrying or bearing with, or in itself.

CONSEQUENCE, from *consequor* to follow, or result, signifies the following, or resulting from a thing.

WEIGHT signifies the *quantum* that the thing weighs.

MOMENT, from *momentum*, signifies the force that puts in motion.

Importance is what things have in themselves; they may be of more or less *importance*, according to the value which is set upon them: *consequence* is the *importance* of a thing from its *consequence*. This term, therefore, is peculiarly applicable to such things, the *consequences* of which may be more immediately discerned either from the neglect or the attention: it is of *consequence* for a letter to go off on a certain day, for the affairs of an individual may be more or less affected by it; an hour's delay sometimes in the departure of a military expedition may be of such *consequence* as to determine the fate of a battle. The term *weight* implies a positively great degree of *importance*: it is that *importance* which a thing has intrinsically in itself, and which makes it weigh in the mind: it is applied therefore to such things as offer themselves to deliberation: hence the counsels of a nation are always *weighty*, because they involve the interests of so many. *Moment* is that *importance* which a thing has from the power in itself to produce effects, or to determine interests: it is applicable, therefore, only to such things as are connected with our prosperity or happiness: when used without any adjunct, it implies a great de-

gree of *importance*, but may be modified in various ways: as a thing of no *moment*, of small *moment*, or great *moment*; but we cannot say with the same propriety, a thing of small *weight*, and still less a thing of great *weight*: it is a matter of no small *moment* for every one to choose that course of conduct which will stand the test of a deathbed reflection.

TO IMPRINT, IMPRESS, ENGRAVE.

PRINT and PRESS are both derived from *pressus*, participle of *primo*, signifying in the literal sense to press, or to make a mark by pressing: to IMPRESS and IMPRINT are morally employed in the same sense. Things are *impressed* on the mind so as to produce a conviction; they are *imprinted* on it so as to produce recollection. If the truths of Christianity be *impressed* on the mind, they will show themselves in a corresponding conduct: whatever is *imprinted* on the mind in early life, or by any particular circumstance, is not readily forgotten. ENGRAVE, from *grave* and the German *graben* to dig, expresses more in the proper sense than either, and the same in its moral application; for we may truly say that if the truths of Christianity be *engraven* in the minds of youth, they can never be eradicated.

TO IMPUGN, ATTACK.

IMPUGN, in Latin *in* and *pugno*, signifies to fight against.

ATTACK, v. *To attack*.

These terms are employed synonymously only in regard to doctrines or opinions; in which case, to *impugn* signifies to call in question, or bring arguments against; to *attack* is to oppose with warmth. Sceptics *impugn* every opinion, however self-evident or well-grounded they may be: infidels make the most indecent *attacks* upon the Bible, and all that is held sacred by the rest of the world.

He who *impugns* may sometimes proceed insidiously and circuitously to undermine the faith of others: he who *attacks* always proceeds with more or less violence. To *impugn* is not necessarily taken in a bad sense; we may sometimes *impugn* absurd doctrines by a fair train of reasoning: to *attack* is always objectionable, either in the mode of the action, or its object, or in both: it is a mode of proceeding oftener employed in the cause of falsehood than truth: when there are no arguments wherewith to *impugn* a doctrine, it is easy to *attack* it with ridicule and scurrility.

INABILITY, DISABILITY.

INABILITY denotes the absence of *ability* in the most general and abstract sense. DISABILITY implies the absence of *ability* only in particular cases: the *inability* lies in the nature of the thing, and is irremediable; the *disability* lies in the circumstances, and may sometimes be removed: weakness, whether physical or mental, will occasion an *inability* to perform a task; there is a total *inability* in an infant to walk and act like an adult: a want of knowledge or of the requisite qualifications may be a *disability*; in this manner minority of age or an objection to take certain oaths may be a *disability* for filling a public office.

INACTIVE, INERT, LAZY, SLOTHFUL, SLUGGISH.

A Reluctance to bodily exertion is common to all these terms. INACTIVE is the most general and unqualified term of all: it expresses simply the want of stimulus to exertion: INERT is something more positive, from the Latin *iners* or *sine arte* without art or mind; it denotes a specific deficiency either in body or mind.

LAZY (v. *Idle*). SLOTHFUL, from *slow*, that is, full of slowness; and SLUGGISH from *slug*, that is, like a *slug*, drowsy and heavy: all rise upon one another, to denote an expressly defective temperament of the body, which directly impedes action.

To be *inactive* is to be indisposed to action; that is, to the performance of any office, to the doing any specific business: to be *inert* is somewhat more; it is to be indisposed to movement: to be *lazy* is to move with pain to one's self: to be *slothful* is never to move otherwise than slowly: to be *sluggish* is to move in a sleepy and heavy manner.

A person may be *inactive* from a variety of incidental causes, as timidity, ignorance, modesty, and the like, which combine to make him averse to enter upon any business, or take any serious step; a person may be *inert* from temporary indisposition; but *laziness*, *slothfulness*, and *sluggishness*, are inherent physical defects: *laziness* is however not altogether independent of the mind or the will; but *slothfulness* and *sluggishness* are purely the offspring of nature, or, which is the same thing, habit superinduced upon nature. A man of mild character is frequently *inactive*; he wants that ardour which impels perpetually to action: he wishes for nothing with sufficient warmth to make action agreeable; he is therefore *inactive* by a natural con-

sequence: some diseases, particularly of the melancholy kind, are accompanied with a strong degree of *inertness*; since they seem to deprive the frame of its ordinary powers to action, and to produce a certain degree of torpor; *lazy* people move as if their bodies were a burden to themselves; they are fond of rest, and particularly averse to be put in action; but they will sometimes move quickly, and perform much when once impelled to move. *slothful* people never vary their pace; they have a physical impediment in themselves to quick motion: *sluggish* people are with difficulty brought into action; it is their nature to be in a state of stupor.

INADVERTENCY, INATTENTION, OVERSIGHT.

INADVERTENCY, from *advert* to turn the mind to, is allied to INATTENTION (*v. Attentive*), when the act of the mind is signified in general terms; and to OVERSIGHT when any particular instance of *inadvertency* occurs. *Inadvertency* never designates a habit, but *inattention* does; the former term, therefore, is unqualified by the reproachful sense which attaches to the latter: any one may be guilty of *inadvertencies*, since the mind that is occupied with many subjects may be turned so steadily towards some that others may escape notice; but *inattention*, which designates a direct want of *attention*, is always a fault, and belongs only to the young, or such as are thoughtless by nature: since *inadvertency* is an occasional act, it must not be too often repeated, or it becomes *inattention*. An *oversight* is properly a species of *inadvertency*, which arises from looking over, or passing by, a thing. *Inadvertency* seems to refer rather to the cause of the mistake, namely, the particular abstraction of the mind from the object; the term *oversight* seems to refer to the mistake itself: it is an *inadvertency* in a person to omit speaking to one of the company; it is an *oversight* in a tradesman who omits to include certain articles in his reckoning; we pardon an *inadvertency* in another, since the consequences are never serious; we must be guarded against *oversights* in business, as their consequences may be serious.

INCAPABLE, INSUFFICIENT, INCOMPETENT, INADEQUATE.

INCAPABLE, that is, *not* having *capacity* (*v. Ability*): INSUFFICIENT, or *not sufficient*, or *not* having what is *sufficient*; INCOMPETENT, or *not compe-*

tent (*v. Competent*); are employed either for persons or things: the first in a general, the last two in a specific sense: INADEQUATE, or *not adequate*, or equalled, is applied most generally to things.

When a man is said to be *incapable*, it characterizes his whole mind; if he be said to have *insufficiency* and *incompetency*, it respects the particular objects to which he has applied his power: he may be *insufficient* or *incompetent* for certain things; but he may have a *capacity* for other things: the term *incapacity*, therefore, implies a charge upon the understanding, which is not implied by the *insufficiency* and *incompetency*. An *incapacity* consists altogether of a physical defect: an *insufficiency* and *incompetency* are incidental defects; the former depending upon the age, the condition, the acquisitions, moral qualities, and the like, of the individual; the latter on the extent of his knowledge, and the nature of his studies: where there is direct *incapacity*, a person has no chance of making himself fit for any office or employment; youth is naturally accompanied with *insufficiency* to fill stations which belong to mature age, and to perform offices which require the exercise of judgment; a young person is, therefore, still more *incompetent* to form a fixed opinion on any one subject, because he can have made himself master of none.

Incapable is applied sometimes to the moral character, to signify the absence of that which is bad; *insufficient* and *incompetent* always convey the idea of a deficiency in that which is at least desirable: it is an honour to a person to be *incapable* of falsehood, or *incapable* of doing an ungenerous action; but to be *insufficient* and *incompetent*, are, at all events, qualities not to be boasted of, although they may not be expressly disgraceful. These terms are likewise applicable to things, in which they preserve a similar distinction: infidelity is *incapable* of affording a man any comfort; when the means are *insufficient* for obtaining the ends, it is madness to expect success; it is a sad condition of humanity when a man's resources are *incompetent* to supply him with the first necessities of life.

Inadequate is relative in its signification, like *insufficient* and *incompetent*: but the relation is different. A thing is *insufficient* which does not suffice either for the wishes, the purposes, or necessities, of any one, in particular or in general cases: thus, a quantity of materials may be *insufficient* for a particular building: *incompetency* is an *insufficiency* for general purposes, in

things of the first necessity; thus, an income may be *incompetent* to support a family: *inadequacy* is still more particular, for it denotes any deficiency which is measured by comparison with the object to which it refers; thus, the strength of an animal may be *inadequate* to the labour which is required, or a reward may be *inadequate* to the service.

INCESSANTLY, UNCEASINGLY, UNINTERRUPTEDLY, WITHOUT INTERMISSION.

INCESSANTLY and **UNCEASINGLY** are but variations from the same word, *cease*.

UNINTERRUPTEDLY, *v. To disturb.*
INTERMISSION, *v. To subside.*

Continuity, but not duration, is denoted by these terms: *incessantly* is the most general and indefinite of all; it signifies never ceasing; it cannot therefore be applied to what has any cessation. In familiar discourse, *incessantly* is an extravagant mode of speech, by which one means to denote the absence of those ordinary intervals which are to be expected; as when one says a person is *incessantly* talking; by which is understood, that he does not allow himself the ordinary intervals of rest from talking: *unceasingly*, on the other hand, is more literally employed for a positive want of cessation; a noise is said to be *unceasing* which literally never ceases; or complaints are *unceasing* which are made without any pauses or intervals. *Incessantly* and *unceasingly* are said of things which act of themselves; *uninterruptedly* is said of that which depends upon other things: it rains *incessantly*, marks a continued operation of nature, independent of every thing; but to be *uninterruptedly* happy, marks one's freedom from every foreign influence which is unfriendly to one's happiness.

Incessantly and the other two words are employed either for persons or things; *without intermission* is however mostly employed for persons: things act and react *incessantly* upon one another; a man of a persevering temper goes on labouring *without intermission*, until he has effected his purpose.

INCLINATION, TENDENCY, PROPENSITY, PRONENESS.

All these terms are employed to designate the state of the will towards an object: **INCLINATION** (*v. Attachment*) denotes its first movement towards an object; **TENDENCY** (from *to tend*) is a continued *inclination*; **PROPENSITY**, from the Latin *pro-*

pensus and *propendeo* to hang forward, denotes a still stronger leaning of the will; and **PRONE**, from the Latin *pronus* downward, characterizes an habitual and fixed state of the will towards an object. The *inclination* expresses the leaning but not the direction of leaning; it may be to the right or to the left, upwards or downwards; consequently we may have an *inclination* to that which is good or bad, high or low, *Tendency* does not specify any particular direction; but from the idea of pressing, which it conveys, it is appropriately applied to those things which degenerate or lead to what is bad; excessive strictness in the treatment of children has a *tendency* to damp the spirits. *Propensity* and *prone-ness* both designate a downward direction, and consequently refer only to that which is bad and low; a person has a *propensity* to drinking, and a *prone-ness* to lying.

TO INCLOSE, INCLUDE.

From the Latin *includo* and its participle *inclusus* are derived **INCLOSE** and **INCLUDE**; the former to express the proper, and the latter the improper signification: a yard is *inclosed* by a wall; particular goods are *included* in a reckoning: the kernel of a nut is *inclosed* in a shell; morality as well as faith is *included* in Christian perfection.

INCONSISTENT, INCONGRUOUS, INCOHERENT.

INCONSISTENT, from *sisto* to place, marks the unfitness of being placed together. **INCONGRUOUS**, from *congruo* to suit, marks the unsuitableness of one thing to another.

INCOHERENT, from *haereo* to stick, marks the incapacity of two things to coalesce or be united to each other.

Inconsistency attaches either to the actions or sentiments of men: *incongruity* attaches to the modes and qualities of things; *incoherency* to words or thoughts: things are made *inconsistent* by an act of the will; a man acts or thinks *inconsistently*, according to his own pleasure: *incongruity* depends upon the nature of the things: there is something very *incongruous* in blending the solemn and decent service of the church with the extravagant rant of Methodism: *incoherence* marks the want of coherence in that which ought to follow in a train; extemporary effusions from the pulpit are often distinguished most by their *incoherence*.

TO INCONVENIENCE, ANNOY, MOLEST.

To INCONVENIENCE is to make not convenient (v. *Convenient*).

To ANNOY, from the Latin *noceo* to hurt, is to do some hurt to. To MOLEST, from the Latin *moles* a mass or weight, signifies to press with a weight.

We *inconvenience* in small matters, or by omitting such things as might be *convenient*; we *annoy* or *molest* by doing that which is positively painful: we are *inconvenienced* by a person's absence; we are *annoyed* by his presence if he renders himself offensive: we are *inconvenienced* by what is temporary; we are *annoyed* by that which is either temporary or durable; we are *molested* by that which is weighty and oppressive: we are *inconvenienced* simply in regard to our circumstances; we are *annoyed* mostly in regard to our corporeal feelings; we are *molested* mostly in regard to our minds; the removal of a seat or a book may *inconvenience* one who is engaged in business: the buzzing of a fly, or the stinging of a gnat, may *annoy*; the impertinent freedom, or the rude insults of ill-disposed persons may *molest*.

INCORPOREAL, UNBODIED, OR DISEMBODIED, IMMATERIAL, SPIRITUAL.

INCORPOREAL, from *corpus* a body, marks the quality of not belonging to the body, or having properties in common with it; UNBODIED denotes the state of being without the body, or not inclosed in a body: a thing may therefore be *incorporeal* without being *unbodied*; but not *vice versa*: the soul of man is *incorporeal*, but not *unbodied*, during his natural life.

Incorporeal is used in reference to such beings as are supposed to act in this world without the help of the body; hence we speak of *incorporeal* agency, or *incorporeal* agents: IMMATERIAL is applied to inanimate objects; men are *corporeal* as men, spirits are *incorporeal*; the body is the *material* part of man, the soul his *immaterial* part: whatever external object acts upon the senses is *material*; but the action of the mind on itself, and its results, are all *immaterial*: the earth, sun, moon, &c. are termed *material*; but the impressions which they make on the mind, that is, our ideas of them, are *immaterial*.

The *incorporeal* and *immaterial* have always a relative sense; the SPIRITUAL is that which is positive: God is a *spiritual*, not properly an *incorporeal* nor *immaterial* being: the angels are likewise designated, in general, as the *spiritual* inhabitants of Heaven; although, when spoken of in regard

to men, they may be denominated *incorporeal*.

TO INCREASE, GROW.

INCREASE, from the Latin *in* and *cresco*, signifies to grow upon or grow to a thing, to become one with it.

GROW, in Saxon *growan*, very probably comes from, or is connected with, the Latin *crevi*, perfect of *cresco*.

The idea of becoming larger is common to both these terms: but the former expresses the idea of unqualified manner: and the latter annexes to this general idea also that of the mode or process by which this is effected. To *increase* is either a gradual or an instantaneous act; to *grow* is a gradual process: a stream *increases* by the addition of other waters; it may come suddenly or in course of time, by means of gentle showers or the rushing in of other streams; but if we say that the river or stream *grows*, it is supposed to *grow* by some regular and continual process of receiving fresh water, as from the running in of different rivulets or smaller streams. To *increase* is either a natural or an artificial process; to *grow* is always natural: money *increases* but does not *grow*, because it *increases* by artificial means; corn may either *increase* or *grow*: in the former case we speak of it in the sense of becoming larger or *increasing* in bulk; in the latter case we consider the natural process of vegetation. On this ground we say that a child *grows* when we wish to denote the natural process by which his body arrives at its proper size; but we may speak of his *increasing* in stature, in size, and the like. For this reason likewise *increase* is used in a transitive as well as intransitive sense; but *grow* always in an intransitive sense: we can *increase* a thing, though not properly *grow* a thing, because we can make it larger by whatever means we please; but when it *grows* it makes itself larger.

In their improper acceptation these words preserve the same distinction: „trade *increases*“ bespeaks the simple fact of its becoming larger; but „trade *grows*“ implies that gradual *increase* which flows from the natural concurrence of circumstances. The affections which are awakened in infancy, *grow* with one's growth; here is a natural and moral process combined. The fear of death sometimes *increases* as one grows old; the courage of a truly brave man *increases* with the sight of danger: here is a moral process which is both gradual and immediate, but in both cases produced by some foreign cause.

I have enlarged on these two words the more because they appear to have been involved in some considerable perplexity by the French writers, Girard and Roubaud, who have entered very diffusely into the distinction between the words *croître* and *augmenter*, corresponding to *increase* and *grow*; but I trust that from the above explanation, the distinction is clearly to be observed.

INCREASE, ADDITION, ACCESSION, AUGMENTATION.

INCREASE is here as in the former article the generic term (*v. To increase*): there will always be *increase* where there is AUGMENTATION, ADDITION, and ACCESSION, though not *vice versa*.

Addition is to *increase* as the means to the end: the *addition* is the artificial mode of making two things into one; the *increase* is the result: when the value of one figure is added to another, the sum is *increased*; hence a man's treasures experience an *increase* by the *addition* of other parts to the main stock. *Addition* is an intentional mode of *increasing*; *accession* is an accidental mode; one thing is added to another, and thereby *increased*; but an *accession* takes place of itself; it is the coming or joining of one thing to another so as to *increase* the whole. A merchant *increases* his property by *adding* his gains in trade every year to the mass; but he receives an *accession* of property either by inheritance or any other contingency. In the same manner a monarch *increases* his dominions by *adding* one territory to another, or by various *accessions* of territory which fall to his lot.

When we speak of an *increase*, we think of the whole and its relative magnitude at different times; when we speak of an *addition*, we think only of the part and the agency by which this part is joined; when we speak of an *accession*, we think only of the circumstance by which one thing becomes thus joined to another. *Increase* of happiness does not depend upon *increase* of wealth; the miser makes daily *additions* to the latter without making any to the former: sudden *accessions* of wealth are seldom attended with good consequences; they turn the thoughts out of their sober channel and bend them too strongly on present possessions and good fortune.

Augmentation is another term for *increase*, which differs less in sense than in application. We may say that a person experiences an *increase* or an *augmentation* in his family; or that he has had an *increase* or an *augmen-*

tation of his salary: in both cases the former term is most adapted to the colloquial, and the latter to the grave style.

INDEBTED, OBLIGED.

INDEBTED is more binding and positive than OBLIGED: we are *indebted* to whoever confers an essential service; we are *obliged* to him who does us any service. A man is *indebted* to another for the preservation of his life; he is *obliged* to him for an ordinary act of civility: a *debt* whether of legal or moral right must in justice be paid; an *obligation* which is only moral, ought in reason to be returned. When we are *indebted* to another expressly for a certain sum of money we are bound to compensation; but when we are simply *obliged*, we owe particular good will. We may be *indebted* to things; we are *obliged* to persons only; we are *indebted* to Christianity not only for a superior faith, but also for a superior system of morality; the little courtesies which pass between friends lay them under *obligations* which it is equally agreeable to receive and to pay.

INDECENT, IMMODEST, INDELICATE.

INDECENT is the contrary of *decent* (*v. Becoming*), IMMODEST the contrary of *modest* (*v. Modest*), INDELICATE the contrary of *delicate* (*v. Fine*).

Indecency and *immodesty* violate the fundamental principles of morality: the former however in external matters, as dress words, and looks; the latter in conduct and disposition. A person may be *indecent* for want of either knowing or thinking better; but a female cannot be *immodest* without radical corruption of principle. *Indecency* may be a partial,—*immodesty* is a positive and entire breach of the moral law. *Indecency* belongs to both sexes; *immodesty* is peculiarly applicable to the misconduct of females.

Indecency is less than *immodesty*, but more than *indelicate*: they both respect the outward behaviour; but the former springs from illicit or uncurbed desire; *indelicate* from the want of education. It is a great *indecent* for a man to marry again very quickly after the death of his wife: it is a great *indelicate* in any one to break in upon the retirement of such as are in sorrow and mourning. It is *indecent* for females to expose their persons as many do whom we cannot call *immodest* women; it is *indelicate* for females to engage in masculine exercises.

INDIFFERENCE, INSENSIBILITY,
APATHY.

INDIFFERENCE signifies *no difference*; that is, having *no difference* of feeling for one thing more than another.

INSENSIBILITY, from *sense* and *able*, signifies incapable of feeling.

APATHY, from the Greek privative α and $\pi\alpha\theta\omicron\varsigma$ feeling, implies without feeling.

Indifference is a partial state of the mind; *apathy* and *insensibility* are general states of the mind; he who has *indifference* is not to be awakened to feeling by some objects, though he may by others; but he who has not *sensibility* is incapable of feeling; and he who has *apathy* is without any feeling. *Indifference* is mostly a temporary state; *insensibility* is either a temporary or a permanent state; *apathy* is always a permanent state.

Indifference is either acquired or accidental; *insensibility* is either produced or natural; *apathy* is natural. A person may be in a state of *indifference* about a thing the value of which he is not aware of, or acquire an *indifference* for that which he knows to be of little value: he may be in a state of *insensibility* from some lethargic torpor which has seized his mind; or he may have an habitual *insensibility* arising from the contractedness of his powers, or the physical bluntness of his understanding, and deadness of his passions; his *apathy* is born with him, and forms a prominent feature in the constitution of his mind.

Indifference is often the consequence of *insensibility*; for he who is not *sensible* or alive to any feeling must naturally be without choice or preference: but *indifference* is not always *insensibility*, since we may be *indifferent* to one thing because we have more liking to another.

In like manner *insensibility* may spring from *apathy*, for he who has no feeling is naturally not to be awakened to feeling; but since his *insensibility* may spring from other causes besides those that are natural, he may be *insensible* without having *apathy*.

INDIFFERENT, UNCONCERNED,
REGARDLESS.

INDIFFERENT (*v. Indifference*) marks the want of inclination: UNCONCERNED, that is, having *no concern* (*v. Care*); and REGARDLESS, that is, without *regard* (*v. Care*); marks the want of serious consideration. *Indifferent* respects only the will, *unconcerned* either the will or the understanding, *regardless* the understanding only;

we are *indifferent* about matters of minor consideration: we are *unconcerned* or *regardless* about serious matters that have remote consequences. To be *indifferent* is sometimes an act of wisdom or virtue; to be *unconcerned* or *regardless* is mostly an act of folly or a breach of duty: hence a wise man is *indifferent* about the applause of the multitude; a good parent will never be *unconcerned* about the religious education of his children; or a good child *regardless* of the admonition of a parent.

INDIGNITY, INSULT.

INDIGNITY, from the Latin *dignus* worthy, signifies unworthy treatment.

INSULT, *v. Affront*.

Indignity respects the feeling and condition of the person offended: *insult* respects the temper of the offending party. We measure the *indignity* in our own mind; it depends upon the consciousness we have of our own worth: we measure the *insult* by the disposition which is discovered in another to degrade us. Persons in high stations are peculiarly exposed to *indignities*; persons in every station may be exposed to *insults*; it would be an *indignity* to a female of any station to be compelled to expose her person; on the other hand, an *insult* does not extend beyond an abusive expression, a triumphant contemptuous look, or any breach of courtesy.

INDISTINCT, CONFUSED.

INDISTINCT is negative; it marks simply the want of *distinctness*: CONFUSED is positive; it marks a positive degree of *indistinctness*. A thing may be *indistinct* without being *confused*; but it cannot be *confused* without being *indistinct*; two things may be *indistinct*, or not easily distinguished from each other; but many things, or parts of the same things, are *confused*: two letters in a word may be *indistinct*; but the whole of a writing or many words are *confused*: sounds are *indistinct* which reach our ears only in parts; but they are *confused* if they come in great numbers and out of all order. We see objects *indistinctly*; we cannot see all the features by which they are distinguished from other objects: we see them *confusedly* when every part is so blended with the other that no one feature can be distinguished: by means of great distance objects become *indistinct*; from a defect in sight objects become more *confused*.

INDOLENT, SUPINE, LISTLESS,
CARELESS.

INDOLENT, *v. Idle, lazy*.

SUPINE, in Latin *supinus*, from *super* above, signifying lying on one's back, or with one's face upward, which, as it is the action of a lazy or idle person, has been made to represent the qualities themselves.

LISTLESS, without *list*, in German *lust* desire, signifies without desire.

CARELESS signifies without care or concern.

These terms represent a diseased or unnatural state of the mind, when its desires, which are the springs of action, are in a relaxed and torpid state, so as to prevent the necessary degree of exertion. *Indolence* has a more comprehensive meaning than *supineness*, and this signifies more than *listlessness* or *carelessness*: *indolence* is a general indisposition of a person to exert either his mind or his body; *supineness* is a similar indisposition that shows itself on particular occasions: there is a corporeal as well as a mental cause for *indolence*; but *supineness* lies principally in the mind: corpulent and large made people are apt to be *indolent*; but timid and gentle dispositions are apt to be *supine*. To an *indolent* person all labour, both corporeal and mental, is irksome; a *supine* person objects to undertake any thing which threatens to give him trouble: the *indolent* person is so for a permanency; the *supine* person is so only in matters that require more than an ordinary portion of his exertion. The *indolent* and *supine* are not, however, like the *listless*, expressly without desire; an *indolent* or *supine* man has desire enough to enjoy what is within his reach, although not always sufficient desire to surmount the aversion to labour in trying to obtain it; the *listless* man, on the contrary, is altogether without the desire, and is in fact in a state of moral torpor, which is however but a temporary or partial state arising from particular circumstances; after the mind has been wrought up to the highest pitch, it will sometimes sink into a state of relaxation in which it ceases to have apparently any active principle within itself. *Indolence* is a habit of both body and mind; *supineness* is sometimes only a mode of inaction flowing out of a particular frame of mind; *listlessness* is only a certain frame of mind: an active person may sometimes be *supine* in setting about a business which runs counter to his feelings; a *listless* person, on the other hand, if he be habitually so, will never be active in any thing, because he will have no impulse to action.

Carelessness expresses less than any of the above; for though a man who is *indolent*, *supine*, and *listless*, is naturally *careless*, yet *carelessness* is properly applicable to

such as have no such positive disease of mind or body. The *careless* person is neither averse to labour or thought, nor devoid of desire, but wants in reality that *care* or thought which is requisite for his state or condition. *Carelessness* is rather an error of the understanding, or conduct, than of the will; since the *careless* man would *care* for, or be interested about things, if he could be brought to reflect on their importance, or if he did not for a time forget himself.

INDUBITABLE, UNQUESTIONABLE, INDISPUTABLE, UNDENIABLE, INCONTROVERTIBLE, IRREFRAGABLE.

INDUBITABLE signifies admitting of no doubt (v. *Doubt*); **UNQUESTIONABLE**, admitting of no question (v. *Doubt*); **INDISPUTABLE**, admitting of no dispute (v. *To Controvert*); **UNDENIABLE**, not to be denied (v. *To deny, disown*); **INCONTROVERTIBLE**, not to be controverted (v. *To controvert*); **IRREFRAGABLE**, from *frango* to break, signifies not to be broken, destroyed, or done away. Those terms are all opposed to uncertainty; but they do not imply absolute certainty, for they all express the strong persuasion of a person's mind rather than the absolute nature of the thing: when a fact is supported by such evidence as admits of no kind of doubt, it is termed *indubitable*; when the truth of an assertion rests on the authority of a man whose character for integrity stands unimpeached, it is termed *unquestionable* authority; when a thing is believed to exist on the evidence of every man's senses, it is termed *undeniable*; when a sentiment has always been held as either true or false, without dispute, it is termed *indisputable*; when arguments have never been controverted, they are termed *incontrovertible*; and when they have never been satisfactorily answered, they are termed *irrefragable*.

INDULGENT, FOND.

INDULGENT, v. *To gratify*.

FOND, v. *Amorous*.

Indulgence lies more in forbearing from the exercise of authority; *fondness* in the outward behaviour and endearments: they may both arise from an excess of kindness or love; but the former is of a less objectionable character than the latter. *Indulgence* may be sometimes wrong; but *fondness* is seldom right: an *indulgent* parent is seldom a prudent parent; but a *fond* parent does not rise above a fool: all who have the care of young people should occasionally relax from the strictness of the disciplinarian,

and show an *indulgence* where a suitable opportunity offers; a *fond* mother takes away from the value of *indulgences* by an invariable compliance with the humours of her children: however, when applied generally or abstractedly, they are both taken in a good sense.

INFAMOUS, SCANDALOUS.

INFAMOUS, like *infamy* (v. *Infamy*), is applied to both persons and things; SCANDALOUS, only to things: a character is *infamous*, or a transaction is *infamous*; but a transaction only is *scandalous*. *Infamous* and *scandalous* are both said of that which is calculated to degrade the offenders in the general estimation; but the *infamous* seems to be that which produces greater publicity, and more general reprehension, than the *scandalous*, consequently is that which is more serious in its nature, and a greater violation of good morals. Many of the leaders in the French revolution rendered themselves *infamous* by their violence, their rapine, and their murders; the trick which was played upon the subscribers to the South Sea Company was a *scandalous* fraud.

INFAMY, IGNOMINY, OPPROBRIUM.

INFAMY is the opposite to good *fame*; it consists in an evil report.

IGNOMINY, from the privative *in* and *nomen* a name, signifies an ill name, a stained name.

OPPROBRIUM, a Latin word, compound of *op* or *ob* and *probrum*, signifies the highest degree of reproach or stain.

The idea of discredit or disgrace in the highest possible degree is common to all these terms: but *infamy* is that which attaches more to the thing than to the person; *ignominy* is thrown upon the person; and *opprobrium* is thrown upon the agent rather than the action.

Infamy causes either the person or thing to be ill spoken of by all; abhorrence of both is expressed by every mouth, and the ill report spreads from mouth to mouth: *ignominy* causes the name and the person to be held in contempt: *opprobrium* causes the person to be spoken of in severe terms of reproach, and to be shunned as something polluted. The *infamy* of a traitorous proceeding is increased by the addition of ingratitude; the *ignominy* of a public punishment is increased by the wickedness of the offender; *opprobrium* sometimes falls upon the innocent, when circumstances seem to convict them of guilt.

Infamy does not belong to one nation or one age, but to every age: the *infamy* of a

base transaction, as the massacre of the Danes in England, or of the Hugonots in France, will be handed down to the latest posterity. *Ignominy*, seldom extends beyond the individuals who are immediately concerned in it: every man, would fain preserve his name from being branded with the *ignominy* of his having suffered himself, or any of his family, death by the gallows. *Opprobrium* is the judgment passed by the public on individuals, it is more silent and even more confined than the *infamy* and the *ignominy*; every good man would be anxious to escape the *opprobrium* of having forfeited his integrity.

INFLUENCE, AUTHORITY, ASCENDANCY, SWAY.

INFLUENCE, v. *Credit*.

AUTHORITY, in Latin *auctoritas*, from *auctor* the author or prime mover of a thing, signifies that power which is vested in the prime mover of any business.

ASCENDANCY, from *ascend*, signifies having the upper hand.

SWAY, like our word *swing*, and the German *schweben*, comes from the Hebrew *za* to move.

These terms imply power, under different circumstances: *influence* is altogether unconnected with any right to direct; *authority* includes the idea of right: superiority of rank, talent, or property, personal attachment, and a variety of circumstances give *influence*; superior wisdom, age, office, and relation, give *authority*: *ascendancy* and *sway* are modes of *influence*, differing only in degree: they both imply an excessive and improper degree of *influence* over the mind: the former is, however, more gradual in its process, and consequently more confirmed in its nature; the latter may be only temporary, but may be more violent. A person employs many arts, and for a length of time, to gain the *ascendancy*; but he exerts a *sway* by a violent stretch of power. It is of great importance for those who have *influence*, to conduct themselves consistently with their rank and station: men are apt to regard the warnings and admonitions of a friend as an odious assumption of *authority*, while they voluntarily give themselves up to the *ascendancy* which a valet or a mistress has gained over them, who exert the most unwarrantable *sway* to serve their own interested and vicious purposes.

Influence and *ascendancy* are said likewise of things as well as persons: true religion will have an *influence* not only on the outward conduct of a man, but on the inward affections of his heart; and that man is truly

happy in whose mind it has the *ascendancy* over every other principle.

TO INFORM, MAKE KNOWN, ACQUAINT, APPRIZE.

The idea of bringing to the knowledge of one or more persons is common to all these terms. INFORM, from the Latin *informo* to fashion the mind, comprehends this general idea only; it is therefore the generic term, and the rest specific: to *inform* is to communicate what has lately happened, or the contrary; but to MAKE KNOWN is to bring to light what has long been *known* and purposely concealed: to *inform* is to communicate directly or indirectly to one or many; to *make known* is mostly to communicate indirectly to many; one *informs* the public of one's intentions, by means of an advertisement in one's own name; one *makes known* a fact through a circuitous channel, and without any name. To *inform* may be either a personal address or otherwise; to ACQUAINT and APPRIZE are immediate and personal communications. One *informs* the government, or any public body, or one *informs* one's friends; one *acquaints* or *apprizes* only one's friends, or particular individuals: one is *informed* of that which either concerns the *informant*, or the person *informed*; one *acquaints* a person with, or *apprizes* him of such things as peculiarly concern himself, but the latter in more specific circumstances than the former: we *inform* a correspondent by letter of our wishes we *acquaint* a father with all the circumstances that respect his son's conduct: one *apprizes* a friend of a bequest that has been made to him; one *informs* the magistrate of any irregularity that passes; we *acquaint* the master of a family with the misconduct of his servants; we *apprize* a person of the time when he will be obliged to appear.

TO INFORM, INSTRUCT, TEACH.

The communication of knowledge in general is the common idea by which these words are connected with each other. INFORM is here, as in the preceding article (*v. To inform, make known*), the general term; the other two are specific terms. To *inform* is the act of persons in all conditions; to INSTRUCT and TEACH are the acts of superiors, either on one ground or another: one *informs* by virtue of an accidental superiority or priority of knowledge; one *instructs* by virtue of superior knowledge or superior station; one *teaches* by virtue of superior knowledge, rather than of station: diplomatic agents *inform* their governments of the political transactions in which they

have been concerned; government *instructs* its different functionaries and officers in regard to their mode of proceeding; professors and preceptors *teach* those who attend public schools to learn.

To *inform* is applicable to matters of general interest; we may *inform* ourselves or others on any thing which is a subject of inquiry or curiosity: to *instruct* is applicable to matters of serious concern, or to that which is practically useful: to *teach* respects matters of art and science; the learner depends upon the *teacher* for the formation of his mind, and the establishment of his principles. Every one ought to be properly *informed* before he pretends to give an opinion; the young and inexperienced must be *instructed* before they can act; the ignorant must be *taught*, in order to guard them against error. Truth and sincerity are all that is necessary for an *informant*; general experience and a perfect knowledge of the subject are requisite for the *instructor*; fundamental knowledge is requisite for a *teacher*.

To *inform* and to *teach* are employed for things as well as persons; to *instruct* only for persons: books and reading *inform* the mind; history or experience *teaches* mankind.

INFORMANT, INFORMER.

These two epithets, from the verb to *inform*, have acquired by their application an important distinction. The INFORMANT being he who informs for the benefit of others, and the INFORMER to the molestation of others. What the *informant* communicates is for the benefit of the individual, and what the *informer* communicates is for the benefit of the whole. The *informant* is thanked for his civility in making the communication; the *informer* undergoes a great deal of odium. We may all be *informants* in our turn, if we know of any thing of which another may be informed; but none are *informers* who do not inform against the transgressors of any law.

INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE, NOTICE, ADVICE.

INFORMATION (*v. To inform*) signifies the thing of which one is informed: INTELLIGENCE, from the Latin *intelligo* to understand, signifies that by which one is made to understand: NOTICE, from the Latin *notitia*, is that which brings a circumstance to our knowledge: ADVICE (*v. Advice*) signifies that which is made known. These terms come very near to each other in signification, but differ in application: *information* is the most general and indefinite; the three others are but modes of *informa-*

tion. Whatever is communicated to us is *information*, be it public or private, open or concealed; *notice*, *intelligence*, and *advice* are mostly public, but particularly the former. *Information* and *notice* may be communicated by word of mouth or by writing; *intelligence* is mostly communicated by writing or printing; *advices* are mostly sent by letter.

Information is mostly an informal mode of communication; *notice*, *intelligence*, and *advice*, are mostly formal communications. A servant gives his master *information*, or one friend sends another *information* from the country; magistrates or officers give *notice* of such things as it concerns the public to know and to observe; spies give *intelligence* of all that passes under their notice; or *intelligence* is given in the public prints of any thing worthy of notice: a military commander sends *advice* to his government of the operations which are going forward under his direction; or one merchant gives *advice* to another of the state of the market.

Information and *intelligence*, when applied as characteristics of men, have a farther distinction: the man of *information* is so denominated only on account of his knowledge; but a man of *intelligence* is so denominated on account of his understanding as well as experience and *information*. It is not possible to be *intelligent* without *information*; but we may be well *informed* without being remarkable for *intelligence*: a man of *information* may be an agreeable companion, and fitted to maintain conversation; but an *intelligent* man will be an instructive companion, and most fitted for conducting business.

TO INFRINGE, VIOLATE, TRANSGRESS.

INFRINGE, from *frango* to break, signifies to break into.

VIOLATE, from the Latin *vis* force, signifies to use force towards.

TRANSGRESS, from *trans* and *gredior*, signifies to go beyond, or farther than we ought.

Civil and moral laws are *infringed* by those who act in opposition to them; treaties and engagements are *violated* by those who do not hold them sacred; the bounds which are prescribed by the moral law are *transgressed* by those who are guilty of any excess.

It is the business of government to see that the rights and privileges of individuals or particular bodies be not *infringed*: where the particular interests of princes are more regarded than the dictates of con-

science, treaties and compacts are first *violated* and then justified: the passions, when not kept under proper control, will ever hurry men on to *transgress* the limits of reason.

INFRINGEMENT, INFRACTION.

INFRINGEMENT and INFRACTION, which are both derived from the Latin verb *infringo* or *frango* (v. *To infringe*), are employed according to the different senses of the verb *infringe*: the former being applied to the rights of individuals, either in their domestic or public capacity; and the latter rather to national transactions. Politeness, which teaches us what is due to every man, considers any unasked for interference in the private affairs of another as an *infringement*. Equity, which enjoins on nations as well as individuals, an attentive consideration to the interests of the whole, forbids the *infraction* of a treaty in any case.

INGENUITY, WIT.

INGENUITY, v. *Ingenuous*.

WIT, from the German *wissen*, to know, signifies knowledge or understanding.

Both these terms imply acuteness of understanding, and differ mostly in the mode of displaying themselves. *Ingenuity* comprehends invention; *wit* comprehends knowledge. One is *ingenious* in matters either of art or science; one is *witty* only in matters of sentiment: things may, therefore, be *ingenious*; or both *witty* and *ingenious*. A mechanical invention, or any ordinary contrivance, is *ingenious*, but not *witty*: we say, an *ingenious*, not a *witty* solution of a difficulty; a flash of *wit*, not a flash of *ingenuity*; a *witty* humour, a *witty* conversation; not an *ingenious* humour or conversation: on the other hand, a conceit is *ingenious*, as it is the fruit of one's own mind; it is *witty*, as it contains point, and strikes on the understanding of others.

INGENUOUS, INGENIOUS.

It would not have been necessary to point out the distinction between these two words, if they had not been confounded in writing, as well as in speaking. *INGENUOUS*, in Latin *ingenuus*, and *INGENIOUS*, in Latin *ingeniosus*, are, either immediately or remotely, both derived from *ingigno* to be inborn; but the former respects the freedom of the station and consequent nobleness of the character which is inborn; the latter respects the genius or mental powers which are inborn. We love the *ingenuous* character, on account of the qualities of his heart;

we admire the *ingenious* man on account of the endowments of his mind. One is *ingenuous* as a man; or *ingenious* as an author: a man confesses an action *ingenuously*; he defends it *ingeniously*.

INHERENT, INBRED, INBORN, INNATE.

The INHERENT, from *haereo* to stick, denotes a permanent quality or property, as opposed to that which is adventitious and transitory. INBRED denotes that which is derived principally from habit or by a gradual process, as opposed to what is acquired by actual efforts. INBORN denotes that which is purely natural, in opposition to the artificial. *Inherent* is the most general in its sense; for what is *inbred* and *inborn* is naturally *inherent*; but all is not *inbred* and *inborn* which is *inherent*. Inanimate objects have *inherent* properties; but the *inbred* and *inborn* exist only in that which receives life; solidity is an *inherent*, but not an *inbred* or *inborn* property of matter; a love of truth is an *innate* property of the human mind; it is consequently *inherent*, inasmuch as nothing can totally destroy it. That which is *inbred* is bred or nurtured in us from our birth; that which is *inborn* is simply born in us: a property may be *inborn*, but not *inbred*; it cannot, however, be *inbred* and not *inborn*. Habits which are ingrafted into the natural disposition are properly *inbred*: propensities, on the other hand, which are totally independent of education or external circumstances, are properly *inborn*, as an *inborn* love of freedom; hence, likewise, the properties of animals are *inbred* in them, inasmuch as they are derived through the medium of the breed of which the parent partakes.

Inborn and INNATE, from the Latin *natus* born, are precisely the same in meaning, yet they differ somewhat in application. Poetry and the grave style have adopted *inborn*; philosophy has adopted *innate*: genius is *inborn* in some men; nobleness is *inborn* in others: there is an *inborn* talent in some men to command, and an *inborn* fitness in others to obey. Mr. Locke and his followers are pleased to say, there is no such thing as *innate* ideas: and if they only mean that there are no sensible impressions on the soul, until it is acted upon by external objects, they may be right: but if they mean to say that there are no *inborn* characters or powers in the soul, which predispose it for the reception of certain impressions, they contradict the experience of the learned and the unlearned in all ages, who believe, from close observation, that man has, from his birth, not only the general

character, which belongs to him in common with his species, but also those peculiar characteristics which distinguish individuals from their earliest infancy: all these characters or characteristics are, therefore, not supposed to be produced, but elicited, by circumstances; and our ideas, which are but the sensible forms that the soul assumes in its connexion with the body, are, on that account, in vulgar language termed *innate*.

INJURY, DAMAGE, HURT, HARM, MISCHIEF.

INJURY, *v.* Disadvantage.

DAMAGE, from the Latin *damnum*, signifies literally a loss.

HURT, *v.* Disadvantage.

HARM, *v.* Evil.

MISCHIEF, *v.* Evil.

The idea of making a thing otherwise than it ought to be is common to these terms. *Injury* is the most general term, simply implying what happens contrary to right; the rest are but modes of *injury*; *damage* is that *injury* which takes away from the value of a thing: *hurt* is the *injury* which destroys the soundness or wholeness of a thing: *harm* is *injury* which is attended with trouble and inconvenience: *mischief* is *injury* which interrupts the order and consistency of things. *Injury* is applicable to all bodies, physical and moral: *damage* is applicable only to physical bodies. Trade may suffer an *injury*; a building may suffer an *injury*; but a building, a vessel, or merchandise, suffer a *damage*. When applied to physical bodies, *injury* comprehends every thing which makes an object otherwise than it ought to be; that is to say, all collateral circumstances which are connected with the end and purpose of things; but *damage* implies that actual *injury* which affects the structure and materials of the object: the situation of some buildings is an *injury* to them; the falling of a chimney, or the breaking of a roof, is a *damage*: an *injury* is not easily removed; a *damage* is easily repaired.

Injury and *hurt* are both applied to persons; but *injury* may either affect their bodies, their circumstances, or their minds; *hurt* in its proper sense affects only their bodies.

We may receive an *injury* or a *hurt* by a fall; but the former term is employed when the health or spirits of a person suffer, the latter when any fracture or wound is produced. A person sometimes sustains an *injury* (from a fall, either by losing the use of a limb, or by the deprivation of his senses) which descends with him to the grave;

a sprain, a cut, or a bruise, are little *hurts* which are easily cured. The term *hurt* is sometimes figuratively employed as it respects the circumstances of a man, where the idea of inflicting a wound or a pain is implied; as in *hurting* a man's good name, *hurting* his reputation, *hurting* his morals, and other such cases, in which the specific term *hurt* may be substituted for the general term *injury*.

The terms *injury*, *harm*, and *mischief*, are all employed for the circumstances of either things or men; but *injury* comprehends cause and effect; *harm* and *mischief* respect the evil as it is. If we say that an *injury* is done, we always think of either the agent by which it is done, or the object to which it is done, or both; when we speak of a *harm* or a *mischief*, we only think of the nature and measure of the one or the other. It is an *injury* to society to let public offenders go free: young people do not always consider the *harm* which there may be in some of their most imprudent actions: the circulation of a scandalous report is frequently the occasion of much *mischief*.

INJUSTICE, INJURY, WRONG.

INJUSTICE (*v. Justice*), INJURY (*v. Disadvantage*), and WRONG, signifying the thing that is *wrong*, are all opposed to the right; but the *injustice* lies in the principle, the *injury* in the action. There may, therefore, be *injustice* where there is no specific *injury*; and, on the other hand, there may be *injury*, where there is no *injustice*. When we think worse of a person than we ought to think, we do him an act of *injustice*; but we do not, in the strict sense of the word do him an *injury*: on the other hand, if we say any thing to the discredit of another, it will be an *injury* to his reputation if it be believed; but it may not be an *injustice*, if it be strictly conformable to truth, and that which one is compelled to say.

The violation of justice, or a breach of the rule of right, constitutes the *injustice*; but the quantum of ill which falls on the person constitutes the *injury*. Sometimes a person is dispossessed of his property by fraud or violence, this is an act of *injustice*; but it is not an *injury*, if, in consequence of this act, he obtains friends who make it good to him beyond what he has lost; on the other hand, a person suffers very much through the inadvertence of another, which to him is a serious *injury*, although the offender has not been guilty of *injustice*.

A *wrong* partakes both of *injustice* and *injury*; it is in fact an *injury* done by one

person to another, in express violation of justice. The man who seduces a woman from the path of virtue does her the greatest of all *wrongs*. One repents of *injustice*, repairs *injuries*, and redresses *wrongs*.

INSIDE, INTERIOR.

The term INSIDE may be applied to bodies of any magnitude, small or large; INTERIOR is peculiarly appropriate to bodies of great magnitude. We may speak of the *inside* of a nut shell, but not of its *interior*: on the other hand, we speak of the *interior* of St. Paul's, or the *interior* of a palace. This difference of application is not altogether arbitrary: for *inside* literally signifies the side that is inward; but *interior* signifies the space which is more inward than the rest, which is inclosed in an inclosure: consequently cannot be applied to any thing but a large space that is inclosed.

INSIDIOUS, TREACHEROUS.

INSIDIOUS, in Latin *insidiosus*, from *insidiae* stratagem or ambush, from *insideo* to lie in wait or ambush.

TREACHEROUS is changed from *traitorous*, and derived from *trado* to betray, signifying in general the disposition to betray,

The *insidious* man is not so bad as the *treacherous* man; for the former only lies in wait to ensnare us, when we are off our guard; but the latter throws us off our guard, by lulling us into a state of security, in order the more effectually to get us into his power: an enemy is, therefore, denominated *insidious*, but a friend is *treacherous*. The *insidious* man has recourse to various artifices, by which he wishes to effect his purpose, and gain an advantage over his opponent; the *treacherous* man pursues a system of direct falsehood in order to ruin his friend: the *insidious* man objects to a fair and open contest; but the *treacherous* man assails in the dark him whom he should support.

INSIGHT, INSPECTION.

The INSIGHT as to any thing is what we receive: the INSPECTION is what we give: one gets a view into a thing by an *insight*; one takes a view over a thing by an *inspection*. An *insight* serves to increase our own knowledge: *inspection* enables us to instruct others. An inquisitive traveller tries to get an *insight* into the manners, customs, laws, and government of the countries which he visits; by *inspection* a master discovers the errors which are committed by his scholars, and sets them right.

TO INSINUATE, INGRATIATE.

INSINUATE (*v. To hint*), and INGRATIATE, from *gratus* grateful or acceptable, are employed to express an endeavour to gain favour; but they differ in the circumstances of the action. A person who *insinuates* adopts every art to steal into the good-will of another; but he who *ingratiates* adopts unartificial means to conciliate good will. A person of *insinuating* manners wins upon another imperceptibly, even so as to convert dislike into attachment; a person with *ingratiating* manners procures good-will by a permanent intercourse. *Insinuate* and *ingratiates* differ in the motive, as well as the mode, of the action: the motive is, in both cases, self-interest; but the former is unlawful, and the latter allowable. In proportion as the object to be attained by another's favour is base, so is it necessary to have resource to *insinuation*; when the object to be attained is that which may be avowed, *ingratiating* will serve the purpose. Low persons *insinuate* themselves into the favour of their superiors, in order to obtain an influence over them; it is commendable in a young person to wish to *ingratiates* himself with those who are entitled to his esteem and respect.

Insinuate may be used in the improper sense for unconscious agents; *ingratiates* is always the act of a conscious agent. Water will *insinuate* itself into every body that is in the smallest degree porous; there are few persons of so much apathy, that it may not be possible, one way or another, to *ingratiates* one's self into their favour.

INSINUATION, REFLECTION.

These both imply personal remarks, or such remarks as are directed towards an individual; but the former is less direct and more covert than the latter. An INSINUATION always deals in half words; a REFLECTION is commonly open. They are both levelled at the individual with no good intent: but the *insinuation* is general, and may be employed to convey any unfavourable sentiment; the *reflection* is particular, and commonly passes between intimates and persons in close connexion.

The *insinuation* respects the honour, the moral character, or the intellectual endowments, of the person: the *reflection* respects his particular conduct or feelings towards another. Envious people throw out *insinuations* to the disparagement of those whose merits they dare not openly question; when friends quarrel, they deal largely in *reflections* on the past.

INSIPID, DULL, FLAT.

INSIPID, in Latin *insipidus*, from *in* and *sapio*, to taste, signifies without savour.

DULL, *v. Dull.*

FLAT, *v. Flat.*

A want of spirit in the moral sense is designated by these epithets, which borrow their figurative meaning from different properties in nature: the taste is referred to in the word *insipid*; the properties of colours are considered under the word *dull*; the property of surface is referred to by the word *flat*. As the want of flavour in any meat constitutes it *insipid*, and renders it worthless, so does the want of mind or character in a man render him equally *insipid*, and devoid of the distinguishing characteristic of his nature: as the beauty and perfection of colours consist in their brightness, the absence of this essential property, which constitutes *dulness*, renders them uninteresting objects to the eye; the want of spirit in a moral composition, which constitutes its *dulness*, deprives it at the same time of that ingredient which should awaken attention: as in the natural world objects are either elevated or *flat*, so in the moral world the spirits are either raised or depressed, and such moral representations as are calculated to raise the spirits are termed spirited, whilst those which fail in this object are termed *flat*. An *insipid* writer is without sentiment of any kind or degree; a *dull* writer fails in vivacity and vigour of sentiment; a *flat* performance is wanting in the property of provoking mirth, which should be its peculiar ingredient.

TO INSIST, PERSIST.

Both these terms being derived from the Latin *sisto* to stand, express the idea of resting or keeping to a thing; but INSIST signifies to rest on a point, and PERSIST, from *per* through or by and *sisto* (*v. To continue*), signifies to keep on with a thing, to carry it through. We *insist* on a matter by maintaining it; we *insist* by the force of authority or argument; we *persist* by the mere act of the will. A person *insists* on that which he conceives to be his right: or he *insists* on that which he conceives to be right: but he *persistent* in that which he has no will to give up. To *insist* is therefore an act of discretion; to *persist* is mostly an act of folly or caprice: the former is always taken in a good or indifferent sense; the latter mostly in a bad sense. A parent ought to *insist* on all matters that are of essential importance to

his children, a spoiled child *persists* in its follies from perversity of humour.

TO INSNARE, ENTRAP, ENTANGLE,
INVEIGLE.

The idea of getting an object artfully into one's power is common to all these terms: TO INSNARE is to take in or by means of a *snare*; to ENTRAP is to take in a *trap*; to ENTANGLE is to take in a *tangle*, or by means of *tangled* thread; to INVEIGLE is to take by means of making blind, from the French *aveugle* blind.

Insnare and *entangle* are used either in the natural or moral sense; *entrap* mostly in the natural, *inveigle* only in the moral sense. In the natural sense birds are *insnared* by means of birdlime, nooses, or whatever else may deprive them of their liberty: men and beasts are *entrapped* in whatever serves as a *trap* or an enclosure; they may be *entrapped* by being lured into a house or any place of confinement; all creatures are *entangled* by nets, or that which confines the limbs and prevents them from moving forward.

In the moral sense, men are said to be *insnared* by their own passions and the allurements of pleasure; they are *entangled* by their errors and imprudences in difficulties; they are *inveigled* by the artifices of others.

INSOLVENCY, FAILURE, BANKRUPTCY.

INSOLVENCY, from *insolvo* not to pay, signifies the state of not paying, or not being able to pay.

FAILURE, *v.* *Failure*.

BANKRUPTCY, from the two words *banca rupta*, signifies a broken bank.

All these terms are in particular use in the mercantile world, but are not excluded also from general application. *Insolvency* is a state; *failure*, an act flowing out of that state; and *bankruptcy* an effect of that act. *Insolvency* is a condition of not being able to pay one's debts; *failure* is a cessation of business, from the want of means to carry it on; and *bankruptcy* is a legal surrender of all one's remaining goods into the hands of one's creditors, in consequence of a real or supposed *insolvency*. These terms are seldom confined to one person, or description of persons. As an incapacity to pay debts is very frequent among others besides men of business, *insolvency* is said of any such persons; a gentleman may die in a state of *insolvency* who does not leave effects sufficient to cover all demands. Although *failure* is here specifically taken for a *failure*

in business, yet there may be a *failure* in one particular undertaking without any direct *insolvency*: a *failure* may likewise only imply a temporary *failure* in payment, or it may imply an entire *failure* of the concern. As a *bankruptcy* is a legal transaction, which entirely dissolves the firm under which any business is conducted, it necessarily implies a *failure* in the full extent of the term; yet it does not necessarily imply an *insolvency*; for some men may in consequence of a temporary *failure*, be led to commit an act of *bankruptcy*, who are afterwards enabled to give a full dividend to all their creditors.

INSPECTION, SUPERINTENDENCY,
OVERSIGHT.

The office of looking into the conduct of others is expressed by both these terms; but the former comprehends little more than the preservation of good order; the latter includes the arrangement of the whole.

The monitor of a school has the INSPECTION of the conduct of his school-fellows, but the master has the SUPERINTENDENCE of the school. The officers of an army *inspect* the men, to see that they observe all the rules that have been laid down to them; a general or superior officer has the *superintendence* of any military operation. Fidelity is peculiarly wanted in an *inspector*, judgment and experience in a *superintendent*. *Inspection* is said of things as well as persons; OVERSIGHT only of persons: one has the *inspection* of books in order to ascertain their accuracy; one has the *oversight* of persons to prevent irregularity: there is an *inspector* of the customs, and an *overseer* of the poor.

INSTANT, MOMENT.

INSTANT, from *insto* to stand over signifies the point of time that stands over us, or as it were over our heads.

MOMENT, from the Latin *momentum*, is any small particle, particularly a small particle of time.

Instant is always taken for the time present; *moment* is taken generally for either past, present, or future. A dutiful child comes the *instant* he is called; a prudent person embraces the favourable *moment*. When they are both taken for the present time, *instant* expresses a much shorter space than *moment*: when we desire a person to do a thing this *instant*, it requires haste; if we desire him to do it this *moment*, it only admits of no delay. *Instantaneous* relief is necessary on some occasions to preserve life; a *moment's* thought will furnish a ready wit with a suitable reply.

TO INSTITUTE, ESTABLISH, FOUND, ERECT.

INSTITUTE, in Latin *institutus*, participle of *instituo*, from *in* and *statuo* to place or appoint, signifies to dispose or fix a specific end.

ESTABLISH, *v.* To fix.

FOUND, *v.* To found.

ERECT, *v.* To build.

To *institute* is to form according to a certain plan; to *establish* is to fix in a certain position what has been formed; to *found* is to lay the foundation of any thing; to *erect* is to make *erect*. Laws, communities, and particular orders, are *instituted*; schools, colleges, and various societies, are *established*: in the former case something new is supposed to be framed; in the latter case it is supposed only to have a certain situation assigned to it. The order of the Jesuits was *instituted* by Ignatius de Loyola; schools were *established* by Alfred the Great, in various parts of his dominions. The act of *instituting* comprehends design and method; that of *establishing* includes the idea of authority. The inquisition was *instituted* in the time of Ferdinand; the church of England is *established* by authority. To *institute* is always the immediate act of some agent; to *establish* is sometimes the effect of circumstances. Men of public spirit *institute* that which is for the public good; a communication or trade between certain places becomes *established* in course of time. An *institution* is properly of a public nature, but *establishments* are as often private: there are charitable and literary *institutions*, but domestic *establishments*. To *found* is a species of *instituting* which borrows its figurative meaning from the nature of buildings, and is applicable to that which is formed after the manner of a building; a public school is *founded* when its pecuniary resources are formed into a fund or *foundation*. To *erect* is a species of *founding*, for it expresses in fact a leading particular in the act of *founding*: nothing can be *founded* without being *erected*; although some things may be *erected* without being expressly *founded* in the natural sense; a house is both *founded* and *erected*; a monument is *erected* but not *founded*; so in the figurative sense, a college is *founded* and consequently *erected*: but a tribunal is *erected*, but not *founded*.

INSTRUMENT, TOOL.

INSTRUMENT, in Latin *instrumentum*, from *instruo*, signifies the thing by which an effect is produced.

TOOL comes probably from *toil*, signi-

fying the thing with which one toils. These terms are both employed to express the means of producing an end; they differ principally in this, that the former is used mostly in a good sense, the latter only in a bad sense, for persons. Individuals in high stations are often the *instruments* in bringing about great changes in nations; spies and informers are the worthless *tools* of government.

INSURRECTION, SEDITION, REBELLION, REVOLT.

INSURRECTION, from *surgo* to rise up, signifies rising up against any power that is.

SEDITION, in Latin *seditio*, compounded of *se* and *itio*, signifies a going apart, that is, the people going apart from the government.

REBELLION, in Latin *rebellio*, from *re-bello*, signifies turning upon or against in a hostile manner.

REVOLT, in French *revolter*, is most probably compounded of *re* and *volter*, from *volvo* to roll, signifying to roll or turn back from, to turn against.

The term *insurrection* is general; it is used in a good or bad sense, according to the nature of the power against which one rises up: *sedition* and *rebellion* are more specific; they are always taken in the bad sense of unallowed opposition to lawful authority. There may be an *insurrection* against usurped power, which is always justifiable; but *sedition* and *rebellion* are levelled against power universally acknowledged to be legitimate. *Insurrection* is always open; it is a rising up of many in a mass; but it does not imply any concerted, or any specifically active measure; a united spirit of opposition, as the moving cause, is all that is comprehended in the meaning of the term: *sedition* is either secret or open, according to circumstances: *rebellion* is the consummation of *sedition*; the scheme of opposition which has been digested in secrecy breaks out into open hostilities, and becomes *rebellion*. *Insurrections* may be made by nations against a foreign domination, or by subjects against their government: *sedition* and *rebellion* are carried on by subjects only against their government: *revolt* is carried on only by nations against a foreign dominion.

INTELLECT, GENIUS, TALENT.

INTELLECT, in Latin *intellectus*, from *intelligo* to understand, signifies the gift of understanding as opposed to mere instinct or impulse.

GENIUS, in Latin *genius*, from *gigno* to

be born, signifies that which is peculiarly born with us.

TALENT, *v. Faculty.*

Intellect is here the generic term, as it includes in its own meaning that of the two others: there cannot be *genius* or *talent* without *intellect*; but there may be *intellect* without *genius* or *talent*; a man of *intellect* distinguishes himself from the common herd of mankind, by the acuteness of his observation, the accuracy of his judgment, the originality of his conceptions, and other peculiar attributes of mental power; *genius* is a particular bent of the *intellect*, which distinguishes a man from every other individual; *talent* is a particular *modus* or modification of the *intellect*, which is of practical utility to the possessor. *Intellect* sometimes runs through a family, and becomes as it were an hereditary portion: *genius* is not of so communicable a nature; it is that tone of the thinking faculty which is altogether individual in its character; it is opposed to every thing artificial, acquired, circumstantial, or incidental; it is a pure spark of the Divine flame, which raises the possessor above all his fellow mortals; it is not expanded, like *intellect*, to many objects; for in its very nature it is contracted within a very short space; and, like the rays of the sun, when concentrated within a focus, it gains in strength what it loses in expansion.

We consider *intellect* as it generally respects speculation and abstraction; but *genius* as it respects the operations of the imagination; *talent* as it respects the exercise or acquirements of the mind. A man of *intellect* may be a good writer; but it requires a *genius* for poetry to be a poet, a *genius* for painting to be a painter, a *genius* for sculpture to be a statuary, and the like: it requires a *talent* to learn languages; it requires a *talent* for the stage to be a good actor; some have a *talent* for imitation, others a *talent* for humour. *Intellect*, in its strict sense, is seen only in a mature state; *genius* or *talent* may be discovered in its earliest dawn: we speak in general of the *intellect* of a man only; but we may speak of the *genius* or *talent* of a youth: *intellect* qualifies a person for conversation, and affords him great enjoyment: *genius* qualifies a person for the most exalted efforts of the human mind; *talent* qualifies a person for the active duties and employments of life.

INTENT, INTENSE.

INTENT and INTENSE are both derived from the verb to *intend*, signifying to stretch towards a point, or to a great de-

gree: the former is said only of the person or mind; the latter qualifies things in general: a person is *intent* when his mind is on the stretch towards an object; his application is *intense* when his mind is for a continuance closely fixed on certain objects; cold is *intense* when it seems to be wound up to its highest pitch.

TO INTERCEDE, INTERPOSE, MEDIATE, INTERFERE, INTERMEDDLE.

INTERCEDE signifies literally going between; INTERPOSE, placing one's self between; MEDIATE, coming in the middle; INTERFERE, setting one's self between; INTERMEDDLE, meddling or mixing among.

One *intercedes* between parties that are unequal: one *interposes* between parties that are equal; one *intercedes* in favour of that party which is threatened with punishment; one *interposes* between parties that threaten each other with evil: we *intercede* with the parent in favour of the child who has offended, in order to obtain pardon for him; one *interposes* between two friends who are disputing, to prevent them from going to extremities. One *intercedes* by means of persuasion; one *interposes* by an exercise of authority. The favourite of a monarch *intercedes* in behalf of some criminal; the magistrates *interpose* with their authority, to prevent the disorderly from coming to serious acts of violence.

To *mediate* and *intercede* are both conciliatory acts: the *intercessor* and *mediator* are equals or even inferiors; to *interpose* belongs most commonly to a superior: one *intercedes* or *interposes* for the removal of evil; one *mediates* for the attainment of good: Christ is our *Intercessor*, to avert from us the consequences of our guilt; he is our *Mediator*, to obtain for us the blessings of grace and salvation. An *intercessor* only pleads: a *mediator* guarantees; he takes upon himself a responsibility. Christ is our *Intercessor*, by virtue of his relationship with the Father: he is our *Mediator*, by virtue of his atonement.

To *intercede* and *interpose* are employed on the highest and lowest occasions; to *mediate* is never employed but in matters of the greatest moment. As earthly offenders we require the *intercession* of a fellow mortal; as offenders against the God of Heaven, we require the *intercession* of a Divine Being: without the timely *interposition* of a superior, trifling disputes may grow into bloody quarrels; without the *interposition* of Divine Providence, we cannot conceive of any thing important as taking place: to settle the affairs of nations, *mediators* may afford

a salutary assistance; to bring about the redemption of a lost world, the Son of God condescended to be our *Mediator*.

All these acts are performed for the good of others; but *interfere* and *intermeddle* are of a different description: one may *interfere* for the good of others, or to gratify one's self; one never *intermeddles* but for selfish purposes: the first three terms are therefore, always used in a good sense; the fourth in a good or bad sense, according to circumstances; the last always in a bad sense.

To *interfere* has nothing conciliating in it like *intercede*, nothing authoritative in it like *interpose*, nothing responsible in it like *mediate*; it may be useful, or it may be injurious; it may be authorized or unauthorized; it may be necessary, or altogether impertinent: when we *interfere* so as to make peace between men, it is useful; but when we *interfere* unreasonably, it often occasions differences rather than removes them.

Intercede, and the others, are said in cases where two or more parties are concerned; but *interfere* and *intermeddle* are said of what concerns only one individual: one *interferes* and *intermeddles* rather in the concern, than between the persons; and, on that account, it becomes a question of some importance to decide when we ought to *interfere* in the affairs of another: with regard to *intermeddle*, it always is the unauthorized act of one who is busy in things that ought not to concern him.

INTERCOURSE, EXCHANGE, RECIPROCITY.

INTERCHANGE is a frequent and mutual exchange (*v. Change*); EXCHANGE consists of one act only; an *interchange* consists of many acts: an *interchange* is used mostly in the proper sense: an *interchange* of civilities keeps alive good will; an *exchange* of commodities is a convenient mode of trade.

Interchange is an act; RECIPROCITY is an abstract property: by an *interchange* of sentiment, friendships are engendered; the *reciprocity* of good services is what renders them doubly acceptable to those who do them, and to those who receive them.

INTERCOURSE, COMMUNICATION, CONNEXION, COMMERCE.

INTERCOURSE, in Latin *intercursus*, signifies literally a running between.

COMMUNICATION, *v. To communicate*.

CONNEXION, *v. To connect*.

COMMERCE, from *com* and *merces* merchandize, signifies literally an exchange of merchandize, and generally an interchange.

Intercourse and *commerce* subsist only between persons; *communication* and *connexion* between persons and things. An *intercourse* with persons may be carried on in various forms; either by an interchange of civilities, which is a friendly *intercourse*; by an exchange of commodities, which is a *commercial intercourse*; or by an exchange of words, which is a verbal and partial *intercourse*: a *communication*, in this sense, is a species of *intercourse*; namely, that which consists in the *communication* of one's thoughts to another: a *connexion* consists of a permanent *intercourse*; since one who has a regular *intercourse* for purposes of trade with another is said to have a *connexion* with him, or to stand in *connexion* with him. There may, therefore, be a partial *intercourse* or *communication* where there is no *connexion*, nothing to bind or link the parties to each other: but there cannot be a *connexion* which is not kept up by continual *intercourse*.

Commerce is a species of general but close *intercourse*; it may consist either of frequent meeting and regular co-operation, or in cohabitation: in this sense we speak of the *commerce* of men one with another, or the *commerce* of man and wife, of parents and children, and the like.

As respects things, *communication* is said of places in the proper sense; *connexion* is used for things in the proper or improper sense: there is said to be a *communication* between two rooms when there is a passage open from one to the other; one house has a *connexion* with another where there is a common passage or thoroughfare to them: a *communication* is kept up between two countries by means of regular or irregular conveyances; a *connexion* subsists between two towns when the inhabitants trade with each other, intermarry, and the like.

INTEREST, CONCERN.

The INTEREST (from the Latin *interest* to be amongst, or have a part or a share in a thing), is more comprehensive than CONCERN (*v. Affair*). We have an *interest* in whatever touches or comes near to our feelings or our external circumstances; we have a *concern* in that which respects our external circumstances. *Interest* is that which is agreeable; it consists of either profit, advantage, gain, or amusement; it binds us to an object, and makes us think of it: *concern*, on the other hand, is something involuntary or painful; we have a *concern* in that which we are obliged to look to, which we are bound to from the fear of losing or of suffering. It is the *interest* of every man

to cultivate a religious temper; it is the concern of all to be on their guard against temptation.

INTERMEDIATE, INTERVENING.

INTERMEDIATE signifies being in the midst, between two objects; INTERVENING signifies coming between: the former is applicable to space and time; the latter either to time or circumstances.

The *intermediate* time between the commencement and the termination of a truce is occupied with preparations for the renewal of hostilities; *intervening* circumstances sometimes change the views of the belligerent parties, and dispose their minds to peace.

INTERVAL, RESPITE.

INTERVAL, in Latin *intervallum*, signifies literally the space between the stakes which formed a Roman intrenchment; and, by an extended application, it signifies any space,

RESPITE; probably contracted from *respirit*, a breathing again.

Every *respite* requires an *interval*; but there are many *intervals* where there is no *respite*. The term *interval* respects time only; *respite* includes the idea of action or circumstances, subsequent or preceding; *intervals* of ease are a *respite* to one who is oppressed with labour; the *interval* which is sometimes granted to a criminal before his execution is in the properest sense a *respite*.

INTERVENTION, INTERPOSITION.

INTERVENTION, from *inter* between, and *venio* to come, is said of inanimate objects; INTERPOSITION, from *inter* between, and *pono* to place, is said only of rational agents. The light of the moon is obstructed by the *intervention* of the clouds; the life of an individual is preserved by the *interposition* of a superior: human life is so full of contingencies, that when we have formed our projects we can never say what may *intervene* to prevent their execution; when a man is engaged in an unequal combat, he has no chance of escaping but by the timely *interposition* of one who is able to rescue him.

INTOXICATION, DRUNKENNESS, INFATUATION.

INTOXICATION, from the Latin *toxicum* a poison, signifies the state of being imbued with a poison.

DRUNKENNESS signifies the state of having drunk over much.

INFATUATION, from *fatuus* foolish, signifies making foolish.

Intoxication and *drunkenness* are either in the proper or the improper sense; *infatuation* in the improper sense only; *intoxication* is a general state; *drunkenness* a particular state; *intoxication* may be produced by various causes; *drunkenness* is produced only by an immoderate indulgence in some *intoxicating* liquor: a person may be *intoxicated* by the smell of strong liquors, or by vapours which produce a similar effect; he becomes *drunken* by the drinking of wine or other spirits. In the improper sense a deprivation of one's reasoning faculties is the common idea in the signification of all these terms: *intoxication* and *drunkenness* spring from the intemperate state of the feelings; *infatuation* springs from the ascendancy of the passions over the reasoning powers: a person is *intoxicated* with success, *drunk* with joy, and *infatuated* by an excess of vanity; or an impetuosity of character.

A person who is naturally *intoxicated* reels and is giddy; he who is in the moral sense *intoxicated* is disorderly and unsteady in his conduct: a *drunken* man is deprived of the use of all his senses, and in the moral sense he is bewildered and unable to collect himself: an *infatuated* man is not merely foolish but wild; he carries his folly to the most extravagant pitch.

INTRINSIC, REAL, GENUINE, NATIVE.

INTRINSIC, in Latin *intrinsecus*, signifies on the inside, that is, lying in the thing itself.

REAL, from the Latin *res*, signifies belonging to the very thing.

GENUINE, in Latin *genuinus* from *geno* or *gigno* to bring forth, signifies actually brought forth, or springing out of a thing.

NATIVE, in Latin *nativus* and *natus* born, signifies actually born, or arising from a thing.

The value of a thing is either *intrinsic* or *real*: but the *intrinsic* value is said in regard to its extrinsic value; the *real* value in regard to the artificial: the *intrinsic* value of a book is that which it will fetch when sold in a regular way, in opposition to the extrinsic value, as being the gift of a friend, a particular edition, or a particular type; the *real* value of a book, in the proper sense, lies in the fineness of the paper, and the costliness of its binding; and, in the improper sense, it lies in the excellence of its contents, in opposition to the artificial value

which it acquires in the minds of bibliomaniacs from being a scarce edition.

The worth of a man is either *genuine* or *native*: the *genuine* worth of a man lies in the excellence of his moral character, as opposed to his adventitious worth, which he acquires from the possession of wealth, power, and dignity: his *native* worth is that which is inborn in him, and natural, in opposition to the meretricious and borrowed worth which he may derive from his situation, his talent, or his efforts to please.

An accurate observer discriminates between the *intrinsic* and *extrinsic* value of every thing; a wise man appreciates things according to their *real* value; the most depraved man will sometimes be sensible of *genuine* worth. We sometimes meet with characters whose *native* excellence shines forth in all their words, looks, and actions.

TO INTRODUCE, PRESENT.

To INTRODUCE, from the Latin *introduco*, signifies literally to bring within or into any place; To PRESENT (*v. To give*) signifies to bring into the *presence* of. As they respect persons, the former passes between equals, the latter only among persons of rank and power: one literary man is *introduced* to another by means of a common friend, or a person may *introduce* himself; a nobleman is *presented* at court.

As these terms respect things, we say that subjects are *introduced* in the course of conversation; men's particular views upon certain subjects are *presented* to the notice of others through the medium of publication.

TO INTRUDE, OBTRUDE.

To INTRUDE is to thrust one's self into a place; to OBTRUDE is to thrust one's self in the way, or in the notice of another. It is *intrusion* to go into any society unasked and undesired; it is *obtruding* to join any company and take a part in the conversation without invitation or consent. We violate the rights of another when we *intrude*; we set up ourselves by *obtruding*: one *intrudes* with one's person in the place which does not belong to one's self; one *obtrudes* with one's person, remarks, &c. upon another: a person *intrudes* out of curiosity or any other personal gratification; he *obtrudes* out of vanity.

Politeness denominates it *intrusion* to pass the threshold of another, without having first ascertained that we are perfectly welcome; modesty denominates it *obtruding* to offer an opinion in the presence of another, unless we are expressly invited or authorized by our relationship and situation.

In the moral acceptation they preserve the same distinction. In moments of devotion, the serious man endeavours to prevent the *intrusion* of improper ideas in his mind. The suings of conscience *obtrude* themselves upon the guilty even in the season of their greatest merriment.

INTRUDER, INTERLOPER.

An INTRUDER (*v. To intrude*) thrusts himself in: an INTERLOPER, from the German *laufen* to run, runs in between and takes his station. The *intruder* therefore is only for a short space of time, and in an unimportant degree; but the *interloper* abridges another of his essential rights and for a permanency. A man is an *intruder* who is an unbidden guest at the table of another: he is an *interloper* when he joins any society in such manner as to obtain its privileges, without sharing its burdens. *Intruders* are always offensive in the domestic circle: *interlopers* in trade are always regarded with an evil eye.

INVALID, PATIENT.

INVALID, in Latin *invalidus*, signifies literally one not strong or in good health; PATIENT, from the Latin *patiens* suffering, signifies one suffering under disease. *Invalid* is a general, and *patient* a particular term: a person may be an *invalid* without being a *patient*: he may be a *patient* without being an *invalid*. An *invalid* is so denominated from his wanting his ordinary share of health and strength; but the *patient* is one who is labouring under some bodily suffering. Old soldiers are called *invalids* who are no longer able to bear the fatigues of warfare: but they are not necessarily *patients*. He who is under the surgeon's hands for a broken limb is a *patient*, but not necessarily an *invalid*.

INVASION, INCURSION, IRRUPTION, INROAD.

The idea of making a forcible entrance into a foreign territory is common to all these terms. INVASION, from *vado* to go, expresses merely this general idea, without any particular qualification: INCURSION, from *curro* to run, signifies a hasty and sudden *invasion*: IRRUPTION, from *rumpe* to break, signifies a particularly violent *invasion*: INROAD, from *in* and *road*, signifies a making a road or way for one's self, which includes for the most part not only *invasion*, but also more or less of occupation; but the term may be employed simply to denote a partial *invasion*.

Invasion is said of that which passes in

distant lands; *incursion* is said of neighbouring states. *Invasion* is the act of a regular army: it is a systematic military movement: *irruption* is the irregular and impetuous movement of undisciplined troops: he who *invades* a country, and gets possession of its strong places so as to have an entire command of the land, is said to make *inroads* into that country; but since it is possible to get forcible possession of a country by other means besides that of a military entry, there may be an *inroad* where there is no express *invasion*. Hannibal crossed the Alps and *invaded* Italy; the borderers on each side of the Tweed used to make frequent *incursions* in England or Scotland. The study of ancient literature was interrupted in Europe by the *irruption*, of the Northern nations. Alexander made *inroads* into Persia and became master of the whole country.

These terms bear a similar distinction in the improper sense. In this case *invasion* is figuratively employed to express a violent seizure, in general of what belongs to individuals, particularly that which they enjoy by civil compact, namely, their rights and privileges; when these are forcibly broken in upon, or any one is dispossessed of them by an unlawful exercise of power, they are said to be *invaded*. In like manner we speak of the *inroads* which disease makes on the constitution; of the *incursion* or *irruption* of unpleasant thoughts in the mind.

TO INVENT, FEIGN, FRAME, FABRICATE, FORGE.

INVENT, *v.* To contrive.

FEIGN, *v.* To feign.

FRAME signifies to make according to a frame.

FABRICATE, in Latin *fabricatus* from *faber* a workman, is changed from *facio*, signifying to make according to a frame.

FORGE, from the noun *forge*, signifies to make in a forge.

All these terms are employed to express the production of something out of the mind, by means of its own efforts. To *invent* is the general term; the other terms imply modes of *invention* under different circumstances. To *invent*, as distinguished from the rest, is busied in creating new forms, either by means of the imagination or the reflective powers; it forms combinations either purely spiritual, or those which are mechanical and physical: the poet *invents* imagery; the philosopher *invents* mathematical problems or mechanical instruments.

Invent is used for the production of new forms to real objects, or for the creation of

unreal objects; to *feign* is used for the creation of unreal objects, or such as have no existence but in the mind: a play or a story is *invented* from what passes in the world; Mahomet's religion consists of nothing but *inventions*: the Heathen poets *feigned* all the tales and fables which constitute the mythology, or history of their deities. To *frame* is a species of *invention* which consists in the disposition as well as the combination of objects. Psalmanazar *framed* an entirely new language, which he pretended to be spoken on the island of Formosa; Solon *framed* a new set of laws for the city of Athens. To *invent*, *feign*, and *frame*, are all occasionally employed in the ordinary concerns of life, and in a bad sense; *fabricate* and *forge* are never used any otherwise. *Invent* is employed as to that which is the fruit of one's own mind; to *feign* is employed as to that which is unreal; to *frame* is employed as to that which requires deliberation and arrangement; to *fabricate* and *forge* are employed as to that which is absolutely false, and requiring more or less exercise of the *inventive* power. A person *invents* a lie, and *feigns* sorrow; *invents* an excuse, and *feigns* an attachment. A story is *invented*, inasmuch as it is new, and not before conceived by others; it is *framed* inasmuch as it requires to be duly disposed in all its parts, so as to be consistent; it is *fabricated* inasmuch as it runs in direct opposition to actual circumstances, and therefore has required the skill and labour of a workman; it is *forged* inasmuch as it seems by its utter falsehood and extravagance to have caused as much severe action in the brain, as what is produced by the fire in a furnace or forge.

TO INVEST, ENDUE, OR ENDOW.

To INVEST, from *vestio*, signifies to clothe in any thing.

INDUE or ENDOW, from the Latin *induo*, signifies to put on any thing. One is *invested* with that which is external: one is *endued* with that which is internal. We *invest* a person with an office or a dignity; a person is *endued* with good qualities. To *invest* is a real external action; but to *endue* may be merely fictitious or mental. The king is *invested* with supreme authority; a lover *endues* his mistress with every earthly perfection. *Endow* is but a variation of *endue*, and yet it seems to have acquired a distinct office: we may say that a person is *endued* or *endowed* with a good understanding; but as an act of the imagination *endow* is not to be substituted for *endue*: for we

do not say that it *endows* but *endues* things with properties.

INVIDIOUS, ENVIOUS.

INVIDIOUS, in Latin *invidiosus*, from *invidia* and *invideo* not to look at, signifies looking at with an evil eye: ENVIOUS is literally only a variation of *invidious*. *Invidious* in its common acceptation signifies causing ill-will; *envious* signifies having ill-will.

A task is *invidious* that puts one in the way of giving offence; a look is *envious* that is full of *envy*. *Invidious* qualifies the thing; *envious* qualifies the temper of the mind. It is *invidious* for one author to be judge against another who has written on the same subject: a man is *envious* when another's happiness gives him pain.

INVINCIBLE, UNCONQUERABLE, INSUPERABLE, INSURMOUNTABLE.

INVINCIBLE signifies not to be vanquished (*a. To conquer*): UNCONQUERABLE not to be conquered: INSUPERABLE not to be overcome; INSURMOUNTABLE not to be surmounted. Persons or things are in the strict sense *invincible* which can withstand all force; but as in this sense nothing created can be termed *invincible*, the term is employed to express strongly whatever can withstand human force in general; on this ground the Spaniards termed their Armada *invincible*. The qualities of the mind are termed *unconquerable* when they are not to be gained over or brought under the controul of one's own reason, or the judgment of another: hence obstinacy is with propriety denominated *unconquerable*, which will yield to no foreign influence. The particular disposition of the mind or turn of thinking is termed *insuperable*, inasmuch as it baffles our resolution or wishes to have it altered: an aversion is *insuperable* which no reasoning or endeavour on our own part can overcome. Things are denominated *insurmountable*, inasmuch as they baffle one's skill or efforts to get over them, or put them out of one's way: an obstacle is *insurmountable* which in the nature of things is irremovable. Some people have an *insuperable* antipathy to certain animals; some persons are of so modest and timid a character, that the necessity of addressing strangers is with them an *insuperable* objection to using any endeavours for their own advancement; the difficulties which Columbus had to encounter in his discovery of the New World, would have appeared *insurmountable* to any mind less determined and persevering.

INWARD, INTERNAL, INNER, INTERIOR.

INWARD signifies towards the side that is not absolutely within: INTERNAL, signifies positively within: INNER, as the comparative of *inward*, signifies more *inward*; and INTERIOR, as the comparative of *internal*, signifies more *internal*. *Inward* is employed more frequently to express a state than to qualify an object; *internal* to qualify the object: a thing is said to be turned *inward* which forms a part of the inside; it is said to be *internal* as one of its characteristics: *inward*, as denoting the position, is indefinite; any thing that is *in* in the smallest degree is *inward*; thus what we take in the mouth is *inward* in distinction from that which may be applied to the lips; but that is properly *internal* which lies in the very frame and system of the body: *inner*, which rises in degree on *inward*, is applicable to such bodies as admit of specific degrees of enclosure; thus the *inner* shell of a nut is that which is enclosed in the *inward*: so likewise *interior* is applicable to that which is capacious, and has many involutions, as the *interior* coat of the intestines.

IRRATIONAL, FOOLISH, ABSURD, PREPOSTEROUS.

IRRATIONAL, compounded of *ir* or *in* and *ratio*, signifies contrary to reason, and is employed to express the want of the faculty itself, or a deficiency in the exercise of this faculty.

FOOLISH (*v. Folly*) signifies the perversion of this faculty.

ABSURD, from *surdus* deaf signifies that to which one would turn a deaf ear.

PREPOSTEROUS, from *prae* before and *post* behind, signifies literally that side foremost which is unnatural and contrary to common sense.

Irrational is not so strong a term as *foolish*: it is applicable more frequently to the thing than to the person, to the principle than to the practice; *foolish* on the contrary is commonly applicable to the person as well as the thing; to the practice rather than the principle. Scepticism is the most *irrational* thing that exists; the human mind is formed to believe but not to doubt: he is of all men most *foolish* who stakes his eternal salvation on his own fancied superiority of intelligence, and illumination. *Foolish*, *absurd*, and *preposterous*, rise in degree: a violation of common sense is implied by them all, but they vary according to the degree: *foolish* is applied to any thing, however trivial,

which in the smallest degree offends our understandings: the conduct of children is therefore often *foolish*, but not *absurd* and *preposterous*, which are said only of serious things that are opposed to our judgments: it is *absurd* for a man to persuade another to do that which he in like circumstances would object to do himself; it is *preposterous* for a man to expose himself to the ridicule of others, and then be angry with those who will not treat him respectfully.

IRREGULAR, DISORDERLY, INORDINATE, INTEMPERATE.

IRREGULAR, that is literally *not regular*, marks merely the absence of a good quality: DISORDERLY, that is literally out of order marks the presence of a positively bad quality. What is *irregular* may be so from the nature of the thing; what is *disorderly* is rendered so by some external circumstance. Things are planted *irregularly* for want of design: the best troops are apt to be *disorderly* in a long march. *Irregular* and *disorderly* are taken in a moral as well as a natural sense: INORDINATE, which signifies also put out of order, is employed only in the moral sense. What is *irregular* is contrary to the rule that is established, or ought to be; what is *disorderly* is contrary to the order that has existed; what is *inordinate* is contrary to the order that is prescribed; what is INTEMPERATE is contrary to the temper or spirit that ought to be encouraged. Habits are *regular* which are conformable to the laws of society; our practices will be *disorderly* when we follow the blind impulse of passion. Our desires will be *inordinate* when they are not under the controul of reason; our indulgencies will be *intemperate* when we consult nothing but our appetites.

IRRELIGIOUS, PROFANE, IMPIOUS.

As epithets to designate the character of the person, they seem to rise in degree: IRRELIGIOUS is negative: PROFANE and IMPIOUS are positive: the latter being much stronger than the former. All men who are not positively actuated by principles of religion are *irreligious*; *profanity* and *impiety* consist not in the mere absence of regard for religion, but in a positive contempt of it, and in open outrage against its laws; the *profane* man treats what is sacred as if it were *profane*; what a believer holds in reverence, and utters with awe, is pronounced with an air of indifference or levity, and as a matter of common discourse, by a *profane* man; he knows no difference between sacred and *profane*; the *impious* man is di-

rectly opposed to the *pious* man; the former is filled with defiance and rebellion against his Maker, as the latter is with love and fear; the former curses while the latter prays: the former is bloated with pride and conceit; the latter is full of humility and self-abasement. When applied to things the term *irreligious* seems to be somewhat more positively opposed to religion: an *irreligious* book is not merely one in which there is no religion, but that also which is detrimental to religion, such as sceptical or licentious writings; the epithet *profane* in this case is not always a term of reproach, but is employed to distinguish what is temporal from that which is expressly spiritual in its nature; the history of nations is *profane* as distinguished from the sacred history contained in the Bible; the writings of the heathens are altogether *profane* as distinguished from the moral writings of Christians, or the believers in Divine Revelation. On the other hand, when we speak of a *profane* sentiment, or a *profane* joke, *profane* lips, and the like, the sense is personal and reproachful; *impious* is never applied but to what is personal, and in the very worst sense; an *impious* thought, an *impious* wish, or an *impious* vow, are the fruits of an *impious* mind.

J.

TO JANGLE, JAR, WRANGLE.

A verbal contention is expressed by all these terms, but with various modifications: JANGLE seems to be an onomatopoeia, for it conveys by its own discordant sound an idea of the discordance which accompanies this kind of war of words: JAR and war are in all probability but variations of each other, as also *jangle* and WRANGLE. There is in *jangling* more of cross questions and perverse replies than direct differences of opinion; there is more of discordant feeling and opposition of opinion in *jarring*: married people may destroy the good humour of the company by *jangling*, but they destroy their domestic peace and felicity by *jarring*. To *wrangle* is technically, what to *jangle* is morally: those who dispute by a verbal opposition only are said to *wrangle*; and the disputers who engage in this scholastic exercise are termed *wranglers*; most disputations amount to little more than *wrangling*.

JEALOUSY, ENVY.

JEALOUSY, in French *jalousie*, Latin *zelotypia*, Greek *ζηλοτυπία* compounded

of ζηλος and τυπω to strike or fill, signifies properly filled with a burning desire.

ENVY, in French *envie*, Latin *invidia* from *invideo*, compounded of *in* privative and *video* to see, signifies not looking at, or looking at in a contrary direction.

We are *jealous* of what is our own; we are *envious* of what is another's. *Jealousy* fears to lose what it has; *envy* is pained at seeing another have. Princes are *jealous* of their authority; subjects are *jealous* of their rights; courtiers are *envious* of superior favour.

The *jealous* man has an object of desire, something to get and something to retain; he does not look beyond the object that interferes with his enjoyment; a *jealous* husband may therefore be appeased by the declaration of his wife's animosity against the object of his *jealousy*. The *envious* man sickens at the sight of enjoyment: he is easy only in the misery of others; all endeavours, therefore, to satisfy an *envious* man are fruitless. *Jealousy* is a noble or an ignoble passion, according to the object; in the former case it is emulation sharpened by fear; in the latter case it is greediness stimulated by fear; *envy* is always a base passion, having the worst passions in its train.

Jealous is applicable to bodies of men as well as individuals; *envious* to individuals only. Nations are *jealous* of any interference on the part of any other power in their commerce, government, or territory; individuals are *envious* of the rank, wealth, and honours of each other.

TO JEST, JOKE, MAKE GAME, SPORT.

JEST is in all probability abridged from *gesticulate*, because the ancient mimics used much *gesticulation* in breaking their jests on the company.

JOKE, in Latin *jocus*, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *tsechek* to laugh.

To MAKE GAME signifies here to make the subject of game or play (*v. Play*).

To SPORT signifies here to sport with, or convert into a subject of amusement.

One *jest*s in order to make others laugh; one *jokes* in order to please one's self. The *jest* is directed at the object; the *joke* is practised with the person or on the person. One attempts to make a thing laughable or ridiculous by *jesting* about it, or treating it in a *jesting* manner; one attempts to excite good humour in others, or indulge it in one's self by *joking* with them. *Jests* are therefore seldom harmless; *jokes* are frequently allowable. The most serious subject may be degraded by being turned into

a *jest*; but melancholy or dejection of the mind may be conveniently dispelled by a *joke*. To *make game* of is applicable only to persons: to *make a sport* of or *sport* with, is applied to objects in general, whether persons or things; both are employed like *jest* in the bad sense of treating a thing more lightly than it deserves.

To *jest* consists of words or corresponding signs; it is peculiarly appropriate to one who acts a part: to *joke* consists not only of words, but of simple actions, which are calculated to produce mirth; it is peculiarly applicable to the social intercourse of friends; to *make game of* consists more of laughter than any; it has not the ingenuity of the *jest*, nor the good-nature of the *joke*; it is the part of the fool who wishes to make others appear what he himself really is: to *sport* with or to *make sport of*, consists not only of simple actions, but of conduct; the fool *sports* with his reputation, when he risks the loss of it for a bauble.

JOURNEY, TRAVEL, VOYAGE.

JOURNEY, from the French *journée* a day's work, and Latin *diurnus* daily, signifies the course that is taken in the space of a day, or in general any comparatively short passage from one place to another.

TRAVEL, from the French *travailler* to labour, signifies such a course or passage as requires labour and causes fatigue; in general any long course. The word is now mostly used in the plural number.

VOYAGE is most probably changed from the Latin *via* a way, and originally signified any course or passage to a distance, but is now confined to passages by sea.

We take *journeys* in different counties in England; we make a *voyage* to the Indies; long *travel* renders a man more delighted with the return to his home and family.

A *journey* is taken for domestic business; *travels* are made for amusement or information: *voyages* are made by captains or merchants for purposes of commerce.

We estimate *journeys* by the day, as one or two days *journey*; we estimate *travels* and *voyages* by the months and years that are employed.

The Israelites are said to have *journeyed* in the wilderness forty years, because they went but short distances at a time. It is a part of polite education for young men of fortune to *travel* into those countries of Europe which comprehend the grand tour as it is termed. A *voyage* round the world, which was at first a formidable undertaking, is now become familiar to the mind by its frequency.

JOY, GLADNESS, MIRTH.

JOY, in French *joie*, comes from the Latin *jocundus* or *jucundus* pleasant.

GLADNESS, *v. Glad.*

MIRTH, *v. Festivity.*

The happy condition of the soul is designated by all these terms; but *joy* and *gladness* lie more internally; *mirth* is the more immediate result of external circumstances. What creates *joy* and *gladness* is of a permanent nature; that which creates *mirth* is temporary: *joy* is the most vivid sensation in the soul; *gladness* is the same in quality, but inferior in degree: *joy* is awakened in the mind by the most important events in life; *gladness* springs up in the mind on ordinary occasions: the return of the prodigal son awakened *joy* in the heart of his father; a man feels *gladness* at being relieved from some distress or trouble: public events of a gratifying nature produce universal *joy*; relief from either sickness or want brings *gladness* to an oppressed heart; he who is absorbed in his private distresses, is ill prepared to partake of the *mirth* with which he is surrounded at the festive board.

Joy is depicted on the countenance, or expresses itself by various demonstrations: *gladness* is a more tranquil feeling, which is enjoyed in secret, and seeks no outward expressions: *mirth* displays itself in laughter, singing, and noise.

JUDGE, UMPIRE, ARBITER, ARBITRATOR.

JUDGE, in Latin *judico* and *judex* from *jus* right, signifies one pronouncing the law or determining right.

UMPIRE is most probably a corruption from empire, signifying one who has authority.

ARBITER and ARBITRATOR, from *arbitror* to think, signify one who decides.

Judge is the generic term, the others are only species of *judge*. The *judge* determines in all matters disputed or undisputed; he pronounces what is law now as well as what will be law for the future; the *umpire* and *arbiter* are only *judges* in particular cases that admit of dispute: there may be *judges* in literature, in arts, and civil matters; *umpires* and *arbiters* are only *judges* in civil matters. The *judge* pronounces, in matters of dispute, according to a written law or a prescribed rule: the *umpire* decides in all matters of contest; and the *arbiter* or *arbitrator* in all matters of litigation, according to his own judgment. The *judge* acts under the appointment of govern-

ment; the *umpire* and *arbitrator* are appointed by individuals.

Arbiter is used in the higher, *arbitrator* more generally in familiar style.

JUDGMENT, DISCRETION, PRUDENCE.

These terms are all employed to express the various modes of practical wisdom, which serve to regulate the conduct of men in ordinary life. JUDGMENT is that faculty which enables a person to distinguish right and wrong in general: DISCRETION and PRUDENCE serve the same purpose in particular cases. *Judgment* is conclusive; it decides by positive inference; it enables a person to discover the truth: *discretion* is intuitive (*v. Discernment*); it discerns or perceives what is in all probability right. *Judgment* acts by a fixed rule; it admits of no question or variation; *discretion* acts according to circumstances, and is its own rule. *Judgment* determines in the choice of what is good: *discretion* sometimes only guards against error or corrects mistakes; it chooses what is nearest to truth. *Judgment* requires knowledge and actual experience; *discretion* requires reflection and consideration: a general exercises his *judgment* in the disposition of his army, and in the mode of attack; he exercises his *discretion* in the choice of officers for different posts, in the treatment of his men, in his negotiations with the enemy, and various other measures which depend upon contingencies.

Discretion looks to the present; *prudence*, which is the same as providence or foresight, calculates on the future; *discretion* takes a wide survey of the case that offers; it looks to the moral fitness of things, as well as the consequences which may follow from them; it determines according to the real propriety of any thing, as well as the ultimate advantages which it may produce: *prudence* looks only to the good or evil which may result from things; it is, therefore, but a mode or accompaniment of *discretion*; we must have *prudence* when we have *discretion*, but we may have *prudence* where there is no occasion for *discretion*. Those who have the conduct or direction of others require *discretion*; those who have the management of their own concerns require *prudence*. For want of *discretion* the master of a school, or the general of an army, may lose his authority: for want of *prudence* the merchant may involve himself in ruin; or the man of fortune may be brought to beggary.

As epithets, *judicious* is applied to things oftener than to persons; *discreet* is applied

to persons rather than to things; *prudent* is applied to both: a remark, or a military movement, is *judicious*; it displays the *judgment* of the individual from whom it emanates.

A matron is *discreet*, who by dint of years, experience, and long reflection, is enabled to determine on what is befitting the case. A person is *prudent* who does not inconsiderately expose himself to danger; a measure is *prudent* that guards against the chances of evil.

JUSTICE, EQUITY.

* JUSTICE, from *jus* right, is founded on the laws of society: EQUITY, from *aequitas* fairness, rightness, and equality is founded on the laws of nature.

Justice is a written or prescribed law, to which one is bound to conform and make it the rule of one's decisions: *equity* is a law in our hearts; it conforms to no rule but to circumstances, and decides by the consciousness of right and wrong. The proper object of *justice* is to secure property; the proper object of *equity* is to secure the rights of humanity. *Justice* is exclusive, it assigns to every one his own; it preserves the subsisting inequality between men: *equity* is communicative; it seeks to *equalize* the condition of men by a fair distribution.

Justice forbids us doing wrong to any one; and requires us to repair the wrongs we have done to others: *equity* forbids us doing to others what we would not have them do to us; it requires us to do to others what in similar circumstances we would expect from them.

The obligations to *justice* are imperative; the observance of its laws is enforced by the civil power, and the breach of them is exposed to punishment: the obligations to *equity* are altogether moral; we are impelled to it by the dictates of conscience. *Justice* is inflexible, it follows one invariable rule, which can seldom be deviated from consistently with the general good; *equity*, on the other hand, varies with the circumstances of the case, and is guided by discretion; *justice* may, therefore, sometimes run counter to *equity*, when the interests of the individual must be sacrificed to those of the community; and *equity* sometimes tempers the rigour of *justice* by admitting of reasonable deviations from the literal interpretations of its laws. The rights of property are alike to be preserved by both *justice* and *equity*; but the former respects only the general and fundamental principles

which are universally admitted in the social compact, and comprehended under the laws; the latter respects those particular principles which belong to the case of individuals: *justice* is, therefore, properly a virtue belonging only to a large and organized society: *equity* must exist wherever two individuals come in connexion with each other. When a father disinherits his son, he does not violate *justice*, although he does not act consistently with *equity*; the disposal of his property is a right which is guaranteed to him by the established laws of civil society; but the claims which a child has by nature over the property of his parent, become the claims of *equity*, which the latter is not at liberty to set at nought without the most substantial reasons.

JUSTNESS, CORRECTNESS.

JUSTNESS, from *jus* law (*v. Justice*), is the conformity to established principle: CORRECTNESS, from *rectus* right or straight (*v. Correct*), is the conformity to a certain mark or line: the former is used in the moral or improper sense only; the latter is used in the proper or improper sense. We estimate the value of remarks by their *justness*, that is, their accordance to certain admitted principles. *Correctness* of outline is of the first importance in drawing; *correctness* of dates enhances the value of a history. It has been *justly* observed by the moralists of antiquity, that money is the root of all evil; partisans seldom state *correctly* what they see and hear.

K.

TO KEEP, PRESERVE, SAVE.

KEEP, *v. To hold, keep.*

PRESERVE, compounded of *pre* and the Latin *servo* to keep, signifies to keep away from all mischief.

SAVE signifies to keep safe.

The idea of having in one's possession, is common to all these terms; which is, however, the simple meaning of *keep*: to *preserve* is to keep with care, and free from all injury; to *save* is to keep laid up in a safe place, and free from destruction. Things are *kept* at all times, and under all circumstances; they are *preserved* in circumstances of peculiar difficulty and danger; they are *saved* in the moment in which they are threatened with destruction: things are *kept* at pleasure; they are *preserved* by an exertion of power; they are *saved* by the use of extraordinary means: the shepherd *keeps* his flock by simply watching over them;

* Vide Roubaud: „Justice, equité.“

children are sometimes wonderfully *preserved* in the midst of the greatest dangers; things are frequently *saved* in the midst of fire, by the exertions of those present.

TO KEEP, OBSERVE, FULFIL.

KEEP, *v.* To hold, keep.

OBSERVE in Latin *observo* compounded of *ob* and *servo*, signifies to *keep* in one's view, to fix one's attention.

FULFIL, *v.* To accomplish.

These terms are synonymous in the moral sense of abiding by, and carrying into execution what is prescribed or set before one for his rule of conduct: to *keep* is simply to have by one in such a manner that it shall not depart; to *observe* is to *keep* with a steady attention; to *fulfil* is to *keep* to the end or to the full intent. A day is either *kept* or *observed*: yet the former is not only a more familiar term, but it likewise implies a much less solemn act than the latter; one must add, therefore, the mode in which it is *kept*, by saying that it is *kept* holy, *kept* sacred, or *kept* as a day of pleasure; the term *observe*, however, implies always that it is *kept* religiously: we may *keep*, but we do not *observe* a birth-day; we *keep* or *observe* the sabbath.

To *keep* marks simply perseverance or continuance in a thing; a man *keeps* his word if he do not depart from it. To *observe* marks fidelity and consideration: we *observe* a rule when we are careful to be guided by it. To *fulfil* marks the perfection and consummation of that which one has *kept*; we *fulfil* a promise by acting in strict conformity to it.

A person is said to *keep* the law when he does not commit any violent breach of it; he *observes* every minutiae in the law if he is anxious to show himself a good citizen; by this conduct he *fulfils* the intentions of the legislator: St. Paul recommends Christians to *keep* the faith, which they can never do effectually, unless they *observe* all the precepts of our Saviour, and thereby *fulfil* the law: children may *keep* silence when they are desired; but it is seldom in their power to *observe* it as a rule, because they have not sufficient understanding.

KEEPING, CUSTODY.

KEEPING, *v.* To keep hold.

CUSTODY, in Latin *custodia* and *custos*, in all probability from *cura* care, because care is particularly required in *keeping*: the first of these terms is, as before, the most general in its signification; the latter is more frequent in its use. The *keeping* amounts to little more than having purposely in one's possession; but *custody*

is a particular kind of *keeping*, for the purpose of preventing an escape: inanimate objects may be in one's *keeping*; but a prisoner, or that which is in danger of getting away, is placed in *custody*: a person has in his *keeping* the property of an absent friend; the officers of justice take into *custody* those who have offended against the laws. or such property as has been stolen.

TO KILL, MURDER, ASSASSINATE, SLAY, OR SLAUGHTER.

KILL, in Saxon *cyelan*, Dutch *kelan*.

MURDER, in German *mord*, &c. is connected with the Latin *mors* death.

ASSASSINATE signifies to *kill* after the manner of an *assassin*; which word probably comes from the *Levant*, where a prince of the Arsacides or *assassins*, who was called the old man of the mountains, lived in a castle between Antioch and Damascus, and brought up young men to lie in wait for passengers.

SLAY or SLAUGHTER, in German *schlagen*, &c. probably from *liegen* to lie, signifying to lay low.

To *kill* is the general and indefinite term, signifying simply to take away life; to *murder* is to *kill* with open violence and injustice; to *assassinate* is to *murder* by surprise, or by means of lying in wait; to *slay* is to *kill* in battle: to *kill* is applicable to men, animals, and also vegetables; to *murder* and *assassinate* to men only; to *slay* mostly men, but sometimes to animals; to *slaughter* only to animals in the proper sense, but it may be applied to men in the improper sense, when they are *killed* like brutes, either as to the numbers or to the manner of *killing* them.

KIND, SPECIES, SORT.

KIND, most probably from the Teutonic *kind* a child, signifies related, or of the same family.

SPECIES, in Latin *species*, from *specio* to behold, signifies literally the form or appearance, and in an extended sense that which comes under a particular form.

SORT, in Latin *sors* a lot, signifies that which constitutes a particular lot or parcel.

Kind and *species* are both employed in their proper sense? *sort* has been diverted from its original meaning by colloquial use; *kind* is properly employed for animate objects, particularly for mankind, and improperly for moral objects; *species* is a term used by philosophers, classing things according to their external or internal properties. *Kind*, as a term in vulgar use, has a less definite meaning than *species*, which serves to form the groundwork of

science: we discriminate things in a loose or general manner by saying that they are of the animal or vegetable *kind*; of the canine or feline *kind*; but we discriminate them precisely if we say that they are a *species* of the arbutus, of the pomegranate, of the dog, the horse, and the like. By the same rule we may speak of a *species* of madness, a *species* of fever, and the like; because diseases have been brought under a systematic arrangement: but on the other hand, we should speak of a *kind* of language, a *kind* of feeling, a *kind* of influence; and in similar cases where a general resemblance is to be expressed.

Sort may be used for either *kind* or *species*; it does not necessarily imply any affinity, or common property in the objects, but simple assemblage, produced as it were by *sors*, chance: hence we speak of such *sort* of folks or people; such *sort* of practices; different *sorts* of grain; the various *sorts* of merchandizes: and in similar cases where things are *sorted* or brought together, rather at the option of the person, than according to the nature of the thing.

KINDRED, RELATIONSHIP. AFFINITY, CONSANGUINITY.

The idea of a state in which persons are placed with regard to each other is common to all these terms, which differ principally in the nature of this state. **KINDRED** signifies that of being of the same *kind* (*v. Kind*). **RELATIONSHIP** signifies that of holding a nearer *relation* than others (*v. To connect*). **AFFINITY** (*v. Affinity*) signifies that of being affined or coming close to each other's boundaries. **CONSANGUINITY**, from *sanguis* the blood, signifies that of having the same blood.

The *kindred* is the most general state here expressed: it may embrace all mankind, or refer to particular families or communities; it depends upon possessing the common property of humanity: the philanthropist claims *kindred* with all who are unfortunate, when it is in his power to relieve them. *Relationship* is a state less general than *kindred*, but more extended than either *affinity* or *consanguinity*; it applies to particular families only, but it applies to all of the same family, whether remotely or distantly related. *Affinity* denotes a close *relationship*, either of an artificial or a natural *kind*: there is an *affinity* between the husband and the wife in consequence of the marriage tie; and there is an *affinity* between those who descend from the same parents or relations in a direct line. *Consanguinity* is, strictly speaking, this latter

species of descent; and the term is mostly employed in questions of law respecting descent and inheritance.

TO KNOW, BE ACQUAINTED WITH.

To **KNOW** is a general term; to **BE ACQUAINTED WITH** is particular (*v. Acquainted*). We may *know* things or persons in various ways; we may *know* their internal properties or characters; we may simply *know* their figure; we may *know* them by report; or we may *know* them by a direct intercourse: one is *acquainted with* either a person or a thing, only in a direct manner, and by an immediate intercourse in one's own person. We *know* a man to be good or bad, virtuous or vicious, by being a witness to his actions; we become *acquainted with* him by frequently being in his company.

KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE, LEARNING, ERUDITION.

KNOWLEDGE, from *know*, in all probability comes from the Latin *nosco*, and the Greek *γινωσκω*.

SCIENCE, in Latin *scientia*, from *scio*, Greek *ισχυμι* to know, and *secah* to see or perceive.

LEARNING, from *learn*, signifies the thing *learned*.

ERUDITION, in Latin *eruditio*, comes from *erudio* to bring out of a state of rudeness or ignorance.

Knowledge is a general term which simply implies the thing *known*: *science*, *learning*, and *erudition*, are modes of *knowledge* qualified by some collateral idea: *science* is a systematic species of *knowledge* which consists of rule and order; *learning* is that species of *knowledge* which one derives from schools, or through the medium of personal instruction: *erudition* is scholastic *knowledge* obtained by profound research: *knowledge* admits of every possible degree, and is expressly opposed to ignorance; *science*, *learning*, and *erudition*, are positively high degrees of *knowledge*.

The attainment of *knowledge* is, of itself, a pleasure, independent of the extrinsic advantages which it brings to individuals, according to their station of life; the pursuits of *science* have a particular interest for men of a particular turn: those who thirst after general *knowledge* may not have a reach of intellect to take the comprehensive survey of nature, which is requisite for a *scientific* man. *Learning* is less dependant on the genius, than on the will of the individual; men of moderate talents have overcome the deficiencies of na-

ture, by labour and perseverance, and have acquired such stores of *learning* as have raised them to a respectable station in the republic of letters. Profound *erudition* is obtained but by few; a retentive memory, a patient industry, and deep penetration, are requisites for one who aspires to the title of a *erudite* man.

L.

TO LABOUR, TAKE PAINS OR TROUBLE, USE ENDEAVOUR.

LABOUR, in Latin *labor*, comes in all probability from *labo* to falter or faint, because *labour* causes faintness.

To TAKE PAINS is to expose one's-self to *pains*; and to TAKE the TROUBLE is to impose *trouble* on one's-self.

ENDEAVOUR (*v. To endeavour*).

The first three terms suppose the necessity for a painful exertion: but to *labour* expresses more than to *take pains*, and this more than to *trouble*; to *use endeavour* excludes every idea of pain or inconvenience. To *labour* is either a corporeal or a mental action; to *take pains* is principally an effort of the mind or the attention; to *take trouble* is an effort either of the body or mind: a faithful minister of the Gospel *labours* to instil Christian principles into the minds of his audience, and to heal all the breaches which the angry passions make between them: when a child is sensible of the value of improvement, he will *take pains* to profit by the instruction of the master; he who is too indolent to *take the trouble* of making his wants known cannot expect others to *trouble* themselves with the relief of his necessities: a good name is of such value to every man that he ought to *use his best endeavours* to preserve it unblemished.

LABYRINTH, MAZE.

Intricacy is common to both the objects expressed by these terms; but the term LABYRINTH has it to a much greater extent than MAZE: the *labyrinth*, from the Greek *λαβυρινθος*, was a work of antiquity which was constructed on so prodigious a scale, and with so many windings, that when a person was once entered, he could not find his way out without the assistance of a clue or thread. *Maze*, probably from the Saxon *mase* a gulf, is a modern term for a similar structure, on a smaller scale, which is frequently made by way of ornament in large gardens. From the proper meaning of the two words we may easily see the ground of their metaphorical application:

political and polemical discussions are compared to a *labyrinth*; because the mind that is once entangled in them is unable to extricate itself by any efforts of its own: on the other hand, that perplexity and confusion into which the mind is thrown by unexpected or inexplicable events, is termed a *maze*; because, for the time, it is bereft of its power to pursue its ordinary functions of recollection and combination.

LAND. COUNTRY, SOIL.

LAND, in German *land*, &c. from *lean* and *line*, signifies an open, even space, and refers strictly to the earth. COUNTRY, in French *contrée*, from *con* and *terra*, signifies *lands* adjoining so as to form one portion. The term *land*, therefore, properly excludes the idea of habitation; the term *country* excludes that of the earth, or the parts of which it is composed: hence we speak of the *land*, as rich or poor, according to what it yields: of a *country*, as rich or poor, according to what its inhabitants possess: so, in like manner, we say, the *land* is ploughed or prepared for receiving the grain, and speak of *land* in distinction from water. On the other hand the *country* is cultivated; the *country* is under a good government; or, a man's *country* is dear to him.

In an extended application, these words may be put for one another: the word *land* may sometimes be put for any portion of *land* that is inhabited or under a government, as the *land* of liberty, and *country* may be put for the *soil*, as a rich *country*.

Soil in contra-distinction to *land*, conveys the idea of the peculiar qualities of the ground and its suitableness for cultivation; hence we speak of a marshy *soil*, a gravelly *soil*, a poor *soil*, &c. we also speak figuratively of our natal *soil*.

LANGUAGE. TONGUE, SPEECH, IDIOM, DIALECT.

LANGUAGE, from the Latin *lingua* a TONGUE, signifies, like the word *tongue*, that which is spoken by the *tongue*.

SPEECH is the act of speaking, or the thing spoken.

IDIOM, in Latin *idioma*, Greek *ιδιωμα*, from *ιδιος* proprius, proper, or peculiar, signifies a peculiar mode of speaking.

DIALECT, in Latin *dialectica*, Greek *διαλεκτικη*, from *διαλεγομαι* to speak in a distinct manner, signifies a distinct mode of speech.

All these terms mark the manner of expressing our thoughts, but under different circumstances. *Language* is the most ge-

neral term in its meaning and application; it conveys the general idea without any modification, and is applied to other modes of expression, besides that of words, and to other objects besides persons; the *language* of the eyes frequently supplies the place of that of the *tongue*; the deaf and dumb use the *language* of signs; birds and beasts are supposed to have their peculiar *language*: *tongue*, *speech*, and the other terms, are applicable only to human beings. *Language* is either written or spoken; but a *tongue* is conceived of mostly as something to be spoken; and *speech* is, in the strict sense, that only which is spoken or uttered. A *tongue* is a totality, or an entire assemblage, of all that is necessary for the expression of thought: it comprehends not only words, but modifications of meaning, changes of termination, modes and forms of words, with the whole scheme of syntactical rules; a *tongue* therefore comprehended, in the first instance, only those *languages* which were originally formed: the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, are in the proper sense *tongues*; but those which are spoken by Europeans, and owe their origin to the former, commonly bear the general denomination of *languages*.

Speech is an abstract term, implying either the power of uttering articulate sounds; as when we speak of the gift of *speech*, which is denied to those who are dumb; or the words themselves which are spoken; as when we speak of the parts of *speech*, or the particular mode of expressing one's-self; or that a man is known by his *speech*. *Idiom* and *dialect* are not properly a *language*, but the properties of *language*; *idiom* is the peculiar construction and turn of a *language*, which distinguishes it altogether from others; it is that which enters into the composition of the *language*, and cannot be separated from it. A *dialect* is that which is engrafted on a *language* by the inhabitants of particular parts of a country, and admitted by its writers and learned men to form an incidental part of the *language*; as the *dialects* which originated with the Ionians, the Athenians, the Aeolians, and were afterwards amalgamated into the Greek *tongue*; as also the *dialects* of the high and low German, which are distinguished by similar peculiarities.

Languages simply serve to convey our thoughts: *tongues* consist of words, written or spoken: *speech* consists of words spoken: *idioms* are the expression of national manners, customs, and turns of sentiment, which are the most difficult to be transferred from one language to another:

dialects do not vary so much in the words themselves, as in the forms of words; they are prejudicial to the perspicuity of a *language*, but add to its harmony.

LARGE, WIDE, BROAD.

LARGE (*v. Great*) is applied in a general way to express every dimension; it implies not only abundance in solid matter, but also freedom in the space, or extent of a plane superficies.

WIDE, in German *weit*, is most probably connected with the French *vide*, and the Latin *viduus* empty, signifying properly an empty or open space unincumbered by any obstructions.

BROAD, in German *breit*, probably comes from the noun *bret*, a board; because it is the peculiar property of a board, that is to say, it is the *width* of what is particularly long. Many things are *large*, but not *wide*; as a *large* town, a *large* circle, a *large* ball, a *large* nut: other things are both *large* and *wide*; as a *large* field, or a *wide* field: a *large* house, or a *wide* house: but the field is said to be *large* from the quantity of ground it contains; it is said to be *wide* both from its figure, or the extent of its space in the cross directions; in like manner, a house is *large* from its extent in all directions; it is said to be *wide* from the extent which it runs in front; some things are said to be *wide* which are not denominated *large*; that is, either such things as have less bulk and quantity than extent of plane surface; as *ell-wide* cloth, a *wide* entrance, and the like; or such as have an extent of space only one way; as a *wide* road, a *wide* path, a *wide* passage, and the like. What is *broad* is in sense, and mostly in application, *wide*, but not *vice versa*: a ribbon is *broad*; a ledge is *broad*; a ditch is *broad*; a plank is *broad*; the brim of a hat is *broad*; or the border of any thing *broad*: on the other hand, a mouth is *wide*, but not *broad*; apertures in general are *wide*, but not *broad*. *Large* is opposed to small; *wide* to close; *broad* to narrow. In the moral application, we speak of *largeness* in regard to liberality; *wide* and *broad* only in the figurative sense of space or size: as a *wide* difference; or a *broad* line of distinction.

LARGELY, COPIOUSLY, FULLY.

LARGELY (*v. Great*) is here taken in the moral sense, and, if the derivation given of it be true, in the most proper sense.

COPIOUSLY comes from the Latin *copia* plenty, signifying in a plentiful degree.

FULLY signifies in a *full* degree; to the *full* extent as far as it can reach.

Quantity is the idea expressed in common by all these terms; but *largely* has always a reference to the freedom of the will in the agent; *copiously* qualifies actions that are done by inanimate objects; *fully* qualifies the actions of a rational agent, but it denotes a degree or extent which cannot be surpassed.

A person deals *largely* in things, or he drinks *large* draughts; rivers are *copiously* supplied in rainy seasons; a person is *fully* satisfied, or *fully* prepared. A bountiful Providence has distributed his gifts *largely* among his creatures: blood flows *copiously* from a deep wound when it is first made: when a man is not *fully* convinced of his own insufficiency, he is not prepared to listen to the counsel of others.

LAST, LATEST, FINAL, ULTIMATE.

LAST and LATEST, both from *late*, in German *letze*, come from the Greek *λοισθος* and *λειπω* to leave, signifying left or remaining.

FINAL, *v. Final*.

ULTIMATE comes from *ultimus* the last.

Last and *ultimate* respect the order of succession: *latest* respects the order of time; *final* respects the completion of an object. What is *last* or *ultimate* is succeeded by nothing else: what is *latest* is not succeeded by any great interval of time; what is *final* requires to be succeeded by nothing else. The *last* is opposed to the first; the *ultimate* is distinguished from that which might follow; the *latest* is opposed to the earliest; the *final* is opposed to the introductory or beginning. A person's *last* words are those by which one is guided; his *ultimate* object is distinguished from that more remote one which may possibly be in his mind; a conscientious man remains firm to his principles to his *latest* breath; the *final* determination of difficult matters requires caution.

LASTLY, AT LAST, AT LENGTH.

LASTLY, like *last* (*v. Last*), respects the order of succession: AT LAST or AT LENGTH refer to what has preceded. When a sermon is divided into many heads, the term *lastly* comprehends the *last* division. When an affair is settled after much difficulty it is said to be *at last* settled; and if it be settled after a protracted continuance, it is said to be settled *at length*.

LAUDABLE, PRAISEWORTHY, COMMENDABLE.

LAUDABLE, from the Latin *laudo* to

praise, is in sense literally PRAISEWORTHY, that is *worthy of praise*, or to be praised (*v. To praise*).

COMMENDABLE signifies entitled to commendation.

Laudable is used in a general application; *praiseworthy* and *commendable* are applied to individuals: things are *laudable* in themselves; they are *praiseworthy* or *commendable* in this or that person.

That which is *laudable* is entitled to encouragement and general approbation; what is *praiseworthy* obtains the respect of all men; what is *commendable* is not equally important with the two former; it entitles a person only to a temporary or partial expression of good will and approbation: it is a *laudable* ambition to wish to excel in that which is good; it is *praiseworthy* in a child to assist its parents as occasion may require; silence is *commendable* in a young person when he is reproved.

TO LAUGH AT, RIDICULE.

LAUGH, through the medium of the Saxon *hlahan*, old German *lahan*, Greek *γελαω*, comes from the Hebrew *lahak*, with no variation in the meaning.

RIDICULE, from the Latin *rideo*, has the same original meaning.

Both these verbs are used here in the improper sense for *laughter*, blended with more or less of contempt: but the former displays itself by the natural expression of *laughter*: the latter shows itself by a verbal expression: the former is produced by a feeling of mirth, on observing the real or supposed weakness of another; the latter is produced by a strong sense of the absurd or irrational in another: the former is more immediately directed to the person who has excited the feeling; the latter is more commonly produced by things than by persons. We *laugh at* a person to his face; but we *ridicule* his notions by writing or in the course of conversation: we *laugh at* the individual; we *ridicule* that which is maintained by him. It is better to *laugh at* the fears of a child than to attempt to restrain them by violence: folly can be assailed with no weapon so effectual as *ridicule*.

LAUGHABLE, LUDICROUS, RIDICULOUS, COMICAL OR COMIC, DROLL.

LAUGHABLE signifies exciting or fit to excite *laughter*.

LUDICROUS, in Latin *ludicer* or *ludicrus* from *ludus* a game, signifies belonging to a game or sport.

RIDICULOUS, exciting or fit to excite *ridicule*.

Either the direction of *laughter* or a corresponding sentiment is included in the signification of all these terms: they differ principally in the cause which produces the feeling; the *laughable* consists of objects in general whether personal or otherwise; the *ludicrous* and *ridiculous* have more or less reference to that which is personal. What is *laughable* may excite simple merriment independently of all personal reference: the DROLL tricks of a monkey, or the humorous stories of wit, are *laughable* from the nature of the things themselves: without any allusion, however remote to any individual but the one whose senses or mind is gratified. The *ludicrous* and *ridiculous* are however species of the *laughable* which arise altogether from reflecting on that which is to the disadvantage of another. The *ludicrous* lies mostly in the outward circumstances of the individual, or such as are exposed to view and serve as a show; the *ridiculous* applies to every thing personal, whether external or internal. The *ludicrous* does not comprehend that which is so much to the disparagement of the individual as the *ridiculous*; whatever there is in ourselves which excites *laughter* in others is accompanied in their minds with a sense of our inferiority: and consequently the *ludicrous* always produces this feeling; but only in a slight degree compared with the *ridiculous*, which awakens a positive sense of contempt. Whoever is in a *ludicrous* situation is, let it be in ever so small a degree, placed in an inferior station, with regard to those by whom he is thus viewed; but he who is rendered *ridiculous* is positively degraded. It is possible, therefore, for a person to be in a *ludicrous* situation without any kind of moral demerit, or the slightest depreciation of his moral character; since that which renders his situation *ludicrous* is altogether independent of himself: or it becomes *ludicrous* only in the eyes of incompetent judges. „Let an ambassador,“ says Mr. Pope, „speak the best sense in the world, and deport himself in the most graceful manner before a prince, yet if the tail of his shirt happen, as I have known it happen to a very wise man, to hang out behind, more people will *laugh* at that than attend to the other,“ This is the *ludicrous*. The same can seldom be said of the *ridiculous*; for as this springs from positive moral causes, it reflects on the person to whom it attaches in a less questionable shape, and produces positive disgrace. Persons very rarely appear *ridiculous* without being really so; and he who is really *ridiculous* justly excites contempt.

Droll and COMICAL are in the proper sense applied to things which cause *laughter*, as when we speak of a *droll* story, or a *comical* incident, or a COMIC song. They may be applied to the person; but not so as to reflect disadvantageously on the individual, as in the former terms.

LAWFUL, LEGAL, LEGITIMATE, LICIT.

LAWFUL, from *law*, and the French *loi*, comes from the Latin *lex*, in the same manner as LEGAL or LEGITIMATE, all signifying in the proper sense, belonging to *law*. They differ therefore according to the sense of the word *law*; *lawful* respects the *law* in general defined or undefined; *legal* respects only the civil *law* which is defined; and *legitimate* respects the laws or rules of science as well as civil matters in general. LICIT, from the Latin *licet* to be allowed, is used only to characterize the moral quality of actions: the *lawful* property implies conformable to or enjoined by *law*; the *legal* what is in the form or after the manner of *law*, or binding by *law*: a good citizen will be anxious to avoid every thing which is *unlawful*: it is the business of the lawyer to define what is *legal* or *illegal*: it is the business of the critic to define what is *legitimate* verse in poetry; it is the business of the linguist to define the *legitimate* use of words: it is the business of the moralist to point out what is *illicit*.

TO LAY OR TAKE HOLD OF, CATCH, SEIZE, SNATCH, GRASP, GRIPE.

TO LAY or TAKE HOLD OF is here the generic expression: it denotes simply getting into one's possession, which is the common idea in the signification of all these terms, which differ in regard to the motion in which the action is performed. To CATCH is to *lay hold of* with an effort. To SEIZE is to *lay hold of* with violence. To SNATCH is to *lay hold of* by a sudden effort. One is said to *lay hold of* that on which one places his hand; he *takes hold of* that which he secures in his hand. We *lay hold of* any thing when we see it falling; we *take hold of* any thing when we wish to lift it up; we *catch* what attempts to escape; we *seize* it when it makes resistance; we *snatch* that which we are particularly afraid of not getting otherwise. A person who is fainting *lays hold of* the first thing which comes in his way; a sick person or one that wants support *takes hold of* another's arm in walking; various artifices are employed to *catch* animals; the wild beasts of the forest *seize* their prey the moment they come within their reach; it is rude sport

of a schoolboy to *snatch* out of the hand of another that which he is not willing to let go.

To *lay hold of* is to get in the possession.

To GRASP and to GRIPE signify to have or keep in the possession: an eagerness to keep or not to let go is expressed by that of *grasping*; a fearful anxiety of losing and an earnest desire of keeping is expressed by the act of *gripping*. When a famished man *lays hold of* food he *grasps* it, from a convulsive kind of fear lest it should leave him; when a miser *lays hold of* money he *gripes* it from the love he bears to it, and the fear he has that it will be taken from him.

LEAN, MEAGRE.

LEAN is in all probability connected with line, lank, and long, signifying that which is simply long without any other dimension.

MEAGRE, in Latin *macer*, Greek *μικρός* small.

Lean denotes want of fat; *meagre* want of flesh: what is lean is not always *meagre*; but nothing can be *meagre* without being *lean*. Brutes as well as men are *lean*, but men only are said to be *meagre*: *leanness* is frequently connected with the temperament; *meagreness* is the consequence of starvation and disease. There are some animals by nature inclined to be *lean*: a *meagre* pale visage is to be seen perpetually in the haunts of vice and poverty.

TO LEAN, INCLINE, BEND.

LEAN and INCLINE both come from the Latin *clino*, and Greek *κλινω* to bow or bend.

BEND, *v. Bend*.

In the proper sense *lean* and *incline* are both said of the position of bodies; *bend* is said of the shape of bodies: that which *leans* rests on one side, or in a sideward direction; that which is *inclined*, *leans* or turns only in a slight degree: that which *bends* forms a curvature: a house *leans* when the foundation gives way; a tree may grow so as to *incline* to the right or the left, or a road may *incline* this or that; a tree or a road *bends* when it turns out of the straight course.

In the improper sense the judgment *leans*, the will *inclines*, the will or conduct *bends*, in consequence of some outward action. A person *leans* to this or that side of a question; he *inclines* or is *inclined* to this or that mode of conduct: he *bends* to the will of another. It is the duty of a judge to *lean* to the side of mercy as far as is consistent with justice: whoever *inclines* too

readily to listen to the tales of distress which are continually told to excite compassion will find himself in general deceived; an *unbending* temper is the bane of domestic felicity.

TO LEAVE, QUIT, RELINQUISH.

LEAVE, in Saxon *leafve*, in old German *laube*, Latin *linquo*, Greek *λείπω*, signifies either to *leave* or be wanting, because one is wanting in the place which one *leaves*,

QUIT, in French *quitter*, from the Latin *quietus* rest, signifies to rest or remain, to give up the hold of.

RELINQUISH, *v. To abandon*.

We *leave* that to which we may intend to return; we *quit* that to which we return no more: we may *leave* a place voluntarily or otherwise; but we *relinquish* it unwillingly. We *leave* persons or things; we *quit* and *relinquish* things only. I *leave* one person in order to speak to another; I *leave* my house for a short time; I *quit* it not to return to it.

Leave and *quit* may be used in the improper as well as the proper sense. A prudent man *leaves* all questions about minor matters in religion and politics to men of busy, restless tempers: it is a source of great pleasure to a contemplative mind to revisit the scenes of early childhood, which have been long *quitted* for the busy scenes of active life: a miser is loath to *relinquish* the gain which has added so greatly to his stores and his pleasures.

TO LEAVE, TAKE LEAVE, BID FAREWELL, OR ADIEU.

LEAVE is here general as before (*v. To leave*); it expresses simply the idea of separating one's self from an object, whether for a time or otherwise; to TAKE LEAVE and BID FAREWELL imply a separation for a perpetuity.

To *leave* is an unqualified action; it is applied to objects of indifference, or otherwise, but supposes in general no exercise of one's feelings. We *leave* persons as convenience requires; we *leave* them on the road, in the field, in the house, or wherever circumstances direct; we *leave* them with or without speaking; but to *take leave* is a parting ceremony between friends; to *bid farewell* or ADIEU is a still more solemn ceremony, when the parting is expected to be final. When applied to things we *leave* such as we do not wish to meddle with; we *take leave* of those things which were agreeable to us, but which we find it prudent to give up; and we *bid farewell* to those for whom we still retain a great

attachment. It is better to *leave* a question undecided than to attempt to decide it by altercation or violence; it is a greater virtue in a man to *take leave* of his vices, than to let them *take leave* of him: when a man engages in schemes of ambition, he must *bid adieu* to all the enjoyments of domestic life.

LEAVE, LIBERTY, PERMISSION, LICENCE.

LEAVE has here the sense of freedom granted, because what is left to itself is left free.

LIBERTY, *v. Freedom.*

PERMISSION signifies the act of *permitting* (*v. To allow*), or the thing *permitted*.

LICENCE, in Latin, *licentia* from *licet* to be lawful, signifies the state of being *permitted* by law.

Leave and *liberty* are either given or taken; *permission* is given only; *licence* is granted, and that in a special manner: *leave* is employed only on familiar occasions; *liberty* in more important matters: the master gives *leave* to his servant to go out for his pleasure; a gentleman gives his friends the *liberty* of shooting on his grounds: *leave* is taken in indifferent matters, particularly as it respects *leave* of absence; *liberty* is taken by a greater, and in general an unauthorized, stretch of one's powers, and is, therefore, an infringement on the rights of another. What is done without the *leave*, may be done without the knowledge, though not contrary to the will, of another; but *liberties* which are taken without offering an apology are always calculated to give offence.

Leave is granted by private individuals, but *licence* is granted by public authority: a parent gives *leave* to a child to take a walk; the government grants *licences* for selling different commodities.

Leave and *permission* are said to be asked for, but not *liberty*: we beg *leave* to offer our opinions; we request *permission* but not *liberty*, to speak: *licences* are obtained upon application, by such persons as are proper to receive them.

LEAVINGS, REMAINS.

LEAVINGS are the consequence of a voluntary act: they signify what is left: REMAINS are what follow in the course of things; they are what *remains*: the former is therefore taken in the bad sense to signify what has been left as worthless; the latter is never taken in this bad sense. When many persons of good taste have the liberty of choosing, it is fair to expect that the

leavings will be worth little or nothing, after all have made their choice. By the *remains* of beauty which are discoverable in the face of a female, we may be enabled to estimate what her personal gifts were.

TO LET, LEAVE, SUFFER.

LET, through the medium of the Gothic *letan*, and other changes in the French *laisser*, German *lassen*, &c. comes in all probability from the Latin *laxo*, to loosen, or set loose, free.

LEAVE, *v. To leave.*

SUFFER, from the Latin *suffero*, to bear with, signifies not to put a stop to.

The removal of hindrance or constraint on the actions of others, is implied by all these terms; but *let* is a less formal action than *leave*, and this than *suffer*. I *let* a person pass in the road by getting out of his way: I *leave* a person to decide on a matter according to his own discretion, by declining to interfere: I *suffer* a person to go his own way, over whom I am expected to exercise a controul. It is in general most prudent to *let* things take their own course: in the education of youth, the greatest art lies in *leaving* them to follow the natural bent of their minds and turn of their dispositions, and at the same time not *suffering* them to do any thing prejudicial to their character or future interests.

LETTER, EPISTLE.

According to the origin of these words, LETTER, in Latin *literae*, signifies any document composed of written *letters*; and EPISTLE, in Greek *επιστολη*, from *επισ-τελλω* to send, signifies a *letter* sent or addressed to any one; consequently the former is the generic, the latter the specific term. *Letter* is a term altogether familiar; it may be used for whatever is written by one friend to another in domestic life, or for the public documents of this description, which have emanated from the pen of writers, as the *letters* of Madame de Sevigné, the *letters* of Pope or of Swift; and even those which were written by the ancients, as the *letters* of Cicero, Pliny, and Seneca; but in strict propriety those are entitled *epistles*, as a term most adapted to whatever has received the sanction of ages; by the same rule, likewise, whatever is particularly solemn in its contents has acquired the same epithet, as the *epistles* of St. Paul, St. Peter, St. John, St. Jude; and by an analogous rule, whatever poetry is written in the *epistolary* form is denominated an *epistle* rather than a *letter*, whether of ancient or modern date, as the *epistles* of Horace, or

the *epistles* of Boileau; and finally, whatever is addressed by way of dedication is denominated a dedicatory *epistle*. Ease and a friendly familiarity should characterize the *letter*: sentiment and instruction are always conveyed by an *epistle*.

LETTERS, LITERATURE, LEARNING.

LETTERS and LITERATURE signify knowledge, derived through the medium of written *letters* or books, that is, information: LEARNING (v. *Knowledge*) is confined to that which is communicated, that is, scholastic knowledge. The term men of *letters*, or the republic of *letters*, comprehends all who devote themselves to the cultivation of their minds: *literary* societies have for their object the diffusion of general information: *learned* societies propose to themselves the higher object of extending the bounds of science, and increasing the sum of human knowledge. Men of *letters* have a passport for admittance into the highest circles; *literary* men can always find resources for themselves in their own society: *learned* men; or men of *learning*, are more the objects of respect and admiration than of imitation.

TO LIE, LAY.

By a vulgar error these verbs have been so confounded as to deserve some notice. TO LIE is neuter, and designates a state: to LAY is active, and denotes an action on an object; it is properly to cause to *lie*: a thing *lies* on the table; some one *lays* it on the table; he *lies* with his fathers; they *laid* him with his fathers. In the same manner, when used idiomatically, we say, a thing *lies* by us until we bring it into use; we *lay* it by for some future purpose: we *lie* down in order to repose ourselves; we *lay* money down by way of deposit: the disorder *lies* in the constitution; we *lay* a burden upon our friends.

LIFELESS, DEAD, INANIMATE.

LIFELESS and DEAD suppose the absence of life where it has once been; INANIMATE supposes its absence where it has never been; a person is said to be *lifeless* or *dead* from whom life has departed; the material world consists of objects which are by nature *inanimate*. *Lifeless* is negative: it signifies simply without life, or the vital spark: *dead* is positive; it denotes an actual and perfect change in the object. We may speak of a *lifeless* corpse, when speaking of a body which sinks from a state of *animation* into that of *inanimation*; we speak of *dead* bodies to designate such as

have undergone an entire change. A person, therefore, in whom *animation* is suspended, is, for the time being, *lifeless*, in appearance at least, although we should not say *dead*.

In the moral acceptation, *lifeless* and *inanimate* respect the spirits; *dead* respects the moral feeling. A person is said to be *lifeless* who has lost the spirits which he once had; he is said to be *inanimate* when he is naturally wanting in spirits: a person who is *lifeless* is unfitted for enjoyment; he who is *dead* to moral sentiment is totally bereft of the essential properties of his nature.

TO LIFT, HEAVE, HOIST.

LIFT is in all probability contracted from *levatus*, participle of *levo* to lift, which comes from *levis* light, because what is light is easily borne up.

HEAVE, in Saxon *heavian*, German *heben*, &c. comes from the absolute particle *ha*, signifying high, because to *heave* it to set up on high.

HOIST, in French *hausser*, low German *hissen*, is a variation from the same source as *heave*.

The idea of making high is common to all these words, but they differ in the objects and the circumstances of the action; we *lift* with or without an effort; we *heave* and *hoist* always with an effort; the former is a more partial action than the latter: we *lift* a child up to let him see any thing more distinctly; workmen *heave* the stones or beams which are used in a building; sailors *hoist* the long boat into the water. To *lift* and *hoist* are transitive verbs; they require an agent and an object: *heave* is also intransitive, it may have an inanimate object for an agent: a person *lifts* his hand to his head; when whales are killed, they are *hoisted* into vessels: the bosom *heaves* when it is oppressed with sorrow; the waves of the sea *heave* when they are agitated by the wind.

TO LIFT, RAISE, ERECT, ELEVATE, EXALT.

LIFT, v. To lift.

RAISE, signifies to cause to rise.

ERECT, in Latin *erectus*, participles of *erigo* or *e* and *rego*, probably from the Greek *ορευνω*, signifies literally to extend or set forth in the height.

ELEVATE is a variation from the same source as *lift*.

EXALT comes from the Latin *altus* high, and the Hebrew *holah* to ascend, and signifies to cease to be high (v. *High*).

The idea of making one thing higher than another is common to these verbs, which differ in the circumstances of the action. To *lift* is to take off from the ground; to *raise* and *erect* are to place in a higher position, while in contact with the ground: we *lift* up a stool: we *raise* a chair, by giving it longer legs; we *erect* a monument by heaping one stone on another.

Whatever is to be carried is *lifted*; whatever is to be situated higher is to be *raised*; whatever is to be constructed above other objects is *erected*. A ladder is *lifted* upon the shoulders to be conveyed from one place to another; a standard ladder is *raised* against a building; a scaffolding is *erected*.

These terms are likewise employed in a moral acceptation; *exalt* and *elevate* are used in no other sense, *Lift* expresses figuratively the artificial action of setting aloft; as in the case of *lifting* a person into notice: to *raise* preserves the idea of making higher by the accession of wealth, honour, or power: as in the case of persons who are *raised* from beggary to a state of affluence; to *erect* retains its idea of artificially constructing, so as to produce a solid as well as lofty mass; as in the case of *erecting* a tribunal, *erecting* a system of spiritual dominion. A person cannot *lift* himself, but he may *raise* himself; individuals *lift* or *raise* up each other; but communities, or those only who are invested with power, have the opportunity of *erecting*.

To *lift* is seldom used in a good sense; to *raise* is used in a good or an indifferent sense; to *elevate* and *exalt* are always used in the best sense. A person is seldom *lifted* up for any good purpose, or from any merit in himself; it is commonly to suit the ends of party that people are *lifted* into notice, or *lifted* into office; a person may be *raised* for his merits, or *raise* himself by his industry, in both which cases he is entitled to esteem: one is *elevated* by circumstances, but still more so by one's character and moral qualities; one is rarely *exalted* but by means of superior endowments. To *elevate* may be the act of individuals for themselves; to *exalt* must be the act of others. There are some who require no adventitious circumstances to *elevate* them; the world have always agreed to *exalt* great power, great wisdom, and great genius.

LIGHTNESS, LEVITY, FLIGHTINESS, VOLATILITY, GIDDINESS.

LIGHTNESS, from *light*, signifies the abstract quality.

LEVITY, in Latin *levitas*, from *levis* light, signifies the same.

VOLATILITY, in Latin *volatilitas*, from *volo* to fly, signifies flitting, or ready to fly, swiftly on.

FLIGHTINESS, from *flighty* and *fly* signifies a readiness to fly.

GIDDINESS is from *giddy*, in Saxon *gidig*.

Lightness and *giddiness* are taken either in the natural or metaphorical sense; the rest only in the moral sense: *lightness* is said of the outward carriage, or the inward temper; *levity* is said only of the outward carriage; a light-minded man treats every thing *lightly*, be it ever so serious; the *lightness* of his mind is evident from the *lightness* of his motions. *Lightness* is common to both sexes: *levity* is peculiarly striking in females; and in respect to them, they are both exceptionable qualities in the highest degree: when a woman has *lightness* of mind, she verges very near towards direct vice; when there is *levity* in her conduct she exposes herself to the imputation of criminality. *Volatility*, *flightiness*, and *giddiness*, are degrees of *lightness*, which rise in signification on one another; *volatility* being more than *lightness*, and the others more than *volatility*; *lightness* and *volatility* are defects as they relate to age; those only who ought to be serious or grave are said to be *light* or *volatile*: a *light-minded* person sets care at a distance; a *volatile* person catches pleasure from every passing object. *Flightiness* and *giddiness* are the defects of youth; they bespeak that entire want of command over one's feelings and animal spirits which is inseparable from a state of childhood: a *flighty* child, however, only fails from a want of attention; but a *giddy* child, like one whose head is in the natural sense *giddy*, is unable to collect itself so as to have any consciousness of what passes: a *flighty* child makes mistakes; a *giddy* child commits extravagancies.

LIKENESS, RESEMBLANCE, SIMILARITY, OR SIMILITUDE.

LIKENESS denotes the quality of being *alike* (v. *Equal*).

RESEMBLANCE, from *resemble*, compounded of *re* and *semble*, in French *sembler*, Latin *simulo* signifies putting on the form of another thing.

SIMILARITY, in Latin *similaritas* from *similis*, in Greek *ομοιος* like, from the Hebrew *semel* an image, denotes the abstract property of *likeness*.

Likeness is the most general, and at the same time the most familiar, term of the

three; it respects either external or internal properties: *resemblance* respects only the external properties: *similarity* only the internal properties: we speak of a *likeness* between two persons; of a *resemblance* in the cast of the eye, a *resemblance* in the form or figure; of a *similarity* in age and disposition.

Likeness is said only of that which is actual; *resemblance* may be said of that which is apparent: a *likeness* consists of something specific; a *resemblance* may be only partial and contingent. A thing is said to be, but not to appear, *like* another; it may, however, have the shadow of a *resemblance*: things are *alike* in their essential properties; but they *resemble* each other in a partial degree, or in certain particulars. We are most *like* the Divine Being in the act of doing good; there is nothing existing in nature, which has not certain points of *resemblance* with something else.

Similarity, or SIMILITUDE, which is a higher term, is in the moral application, in regard to *likeness*, what *resemblance* is to the physical sense: what is *alike* has the same nature; what is *similar* has certain features of *similarity*: in this sense feelings are *alike*, sentiments are *alike*, persons are *alike*; but cases are *similar*, circumstances are *similar*, conditions are *similar*. *Likeness* excludes the idea of difference; *similarity* includes only the idea of casual *likeness*.

LIKENESS, PICTURE, IMAGE, EFFIGY.

In the former article LIKENESS is considered as an abstract term, but in connexion with the words *picture* and *image* it signifies the representation of *likeness*.

PICTURE, in Latin *pictura*, from *pingo* to paint, signifies the thing painted.

IMAGE, in Latin *imago*, contracted from *imitago*, comes from *imitor* to imitate, signifying an imitation.

EFFIGY, in Latin *effigies*, from *effingo*, signifies that which is formed after another thing.

Likeness is a general and indefinite term; *picture* and *image* express something positively *like*. A *likeness* is the work of art; it is sketched by the pencil, and is more or less real; a *picture* is either the work of art or nature; it may be drawn by the pencil or the pen, or it may be found in the incidental resemblances of things; it is more or less exact: the *image* lies in the nature of things, and is more or less striking. It is the peculiar excellence of the painter to produce a *likeness*; the withering and falling of the leaves from the trees

in autumn is a *picture* of human nature in its decline; children are frequently the very *image* of their parents.

A *likeness* is that which is to represent the actual *likeness*; but an *effigy* is an artificial or arbitrary *likeness*; it may be represented on paper, or in the figure of a person. Artists produce *likenesses*; boys attempt to produce *effigies*.

LIMIT, EXTENT.

LIMIT is a more specific and definite term than EXTENT: by the former we are directed to the point where any thing ends; by the latter we are led to no particular point, but to the whole space included: *limits* are in their nature something finite; *extent* is either finite or infinite: we therefore speak of that which exceeds the *limits*, or comes within the *limits*; and of that which comprehends the *extent*, or is according to the *extent*: a plenipotentiary or minister must not exceed the *limits* of his instructions; when we think of the immense *extent* of this globe, and that it is among the smallest of an infinite number of worlds, the mind is lost in admiration and amazement: it does not fall within the *limits* of a periodical work to enter into historical details; a complete history of any country is a work of great *extent*.

TO LINGER, TARRY, LOITER, LAG, SAUNTER.

LINGER, from *longer*, signifies to make the time long in doing a thing.

TARRY, from *tardus* slow, is to be slow.

LOITER may probably come from *lentus* slow.

LAG, from *lie*, signifies to lie back.

SAUNTER, from *sancta terra* the Holy Land; because, in the time of the crusades, many idle persons were going backwards and forwards: hence idle, planless going about, came to be so denominated.

Suspension of action or slow movement enters into the meaning of all these terms: to *linger* is to stop altogether, or to move but slowly forward; to *tarry* is properly to suspend one's movement: the former proceeds from reluctance to leave the spot on which we stand; the latter from motives of discretion: he will naturally *linger* who is going to leave the place of his nativity for an indefinite period; those who have much business to transact will be led to *tarry* long in a place; to *leiter* is to move slowly and reluctantly, but, from a bad cause; a child *loiters* who is unwilling to go to school; to *lag* is to move slower than others; to stop

while they are going on; this is seldom done for a good purpose; those who *lag* have generally some sinister and private end to answer: to *saunter* is altogether the act of an idler; those who have no object in moving either backward or forward will *saunter* if they move at all.

LIQUID, LIQUOR, JUICE, HUMOUR.

LIQUID (v. *Fluid*) is the generic term: LIQUOR, which is but a variation from the same Latin verb, *liquesco*, whence *liquid* is derived, is a *liquid* which is made to be drunk: JUICE, in French *jus*, is a *liquid* that issues from bodies: and HUMOUR, in Latin *humor*, probably from the Greek *ρῆμα* and *ρῆω* to flow or pour out, is a species of *liquid* which flows in bodies and forms a constituent part of them. All natural bodies consist of *liquids* or solids, or a combination of both; *liquor* serves to quench the thirst as food satisfies the hunger: the *juices* of bodies are frequently their richest parts; and the *humours* are commonly the most important parts; the former of these two belong peculiarly to vegetable, and the latter to animal bodies: water is the simplest of all *liquids*; wine is the most inviting of all *liquors*; the orange produces the most agreeable *juice*; the *humours* of both men and brutes are most liable to corruption.

LIST, ROLL, CATALOGUE, REGISTER.

LIST, in French *liste*, and German *liste*, comes from the German *leiste* a last, signifying in general any long and narrow body.

ROLL signifies in general any thing *rolled* up particularly paper with its written contents.

CATALOGUE, in Latin *catalogus*, Greek *καταλογος* from *καταλεγω* to write down, signifies a written enumeration.

REGISTER, from the verb *rego* to govern, signifies what is done or inserted by order of government.

A collection of objects brought into some kind of order is the common idea included in the signification of these terms. The contents and disposition of a *list* is most simple; it consists of little more than names arranged under one another in a long narrow line, as a *list* of words, a *list* of plants and flowers, a *list* of deaths, of births, of marriages: *roll*, which is figuratively put for the contents of a *roll*, is a *list* *rolled* up for convenience, as a long *roll* of saints: *catalogue* involves more details than a simple *list*; it specifies not only names, but dates, qualities, and circumstances. A *list* of books contains their titles: a *catalogue* of books contains an enumeration of their size,

price, number of volumes, edition, &c.; a *roll* of saints simply specifies their names a *catalogue* of saints enters into particulars of their ages, deaths, &c.: a *register* contains more than either: for it contains events, with dates, actors, &c. in matters of public interest.

LITTLE, SMALL, DIMINUTIVE.

LITTLE, in low German *litje*, Dutch *lettel*, is in all probability connected with light, in Saxon *leoht*, old German *lihto*, Sweden *lätt*, etc.

SMALL is, with some variations, to be found in most of the northern dialects, in which it signifies, as in English, a contracted space or quantity.

DIMINUTIVE, in Latin *diminutivus*, signifies made *small*.

Little is properly opposed to great (v. *Great*), *small* to the large, and *diminutive* is a species of the *small*, which is made so contrary to the course of things: a child is said to be *little* as respects its age as well as its size; it is said to be *small* as respects its size only; it is said to be *diminutive* when it is exceedingly *small* considering its age: if we look down from any very great height, the largest men will look *diminutive*.

LIVELIHOOD, LIVING, SUBSISTENCE, MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, SUSTENANCE.

The means of *living* or supporting life is the idea common to all these terms, which vary according to the circumstances of the individual and the nature of the object which constitutes the means; a LIVELIHOOD is that which is sought after by the day; a labourer earns a *livelihood* by the sweat of his brow: a SUBSISTENCE is obtained by irregular efforts of various descriptions; beggars meet with so much that they obtain something better than a precarious and scanty *subsistence*: LIVING is obtained by more respectable and less severe efforts than the two former; tradesmen obtain a good *living* by keeping shop; artists procure a *living* by the exercise of their talents: MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, and SUSTENANCE, differ from the other three, inasmuch as they do not comprehend what one gains by one's own efforts, but by the efforts of others: *maintenance* is that which is permanent; *support* may be casual, and vary in degree: the object of most public charities is to afford a *maintenance* to such as cannot obtain a *livelihood* for themselves. *Maintenance* and *support* are always granted; but *sustenance* is that which is taken or received: the former comprehends the

means of obtaining food; *sustenance* comprehends that which sustains the body, which supplies the place of food; it is the duty of the rich to give support in time of sickness and distress to such as are poor.

LIVELY, SPRIGHTLY, VIVACIOUS, SPORTIVE, MERRY, JOCUND.

LIVELY signifies having life or the animal spirits which accompany the vital spark.

SPRIGHTLY, contracted from *sprightly* or *spiritfully*, signifies full of spirits.

VIVACIOUS, in Latin *vivax*, from *vivo* to live, has the same original meaning as *lively*.

SPORTIVE, fond of, or ready for sport.

MERRY, *v. Cheerful*.

JOCUND, in Latin *jocundus*, from *jucundus* and *juvo* to delight or please, signifies delighted or pleased.

The activity of the heart when it beats high with a sentiment of gaiety is strongly depicted by all these terms; the *lively* is the most general and literal in its signification. *Liveliness* is the property of childhood, youth, or even maturer age; *sprightliness* is the peculiar property of youth; *vivacity* is a quality compatible with the sobriety of years: an infant shows itself to be *lively* or otherwise in a few months after its birth; a female, particularly in her early years, often affords a pleasing picture of *sprightliness*; a *vivacious* companion recommends himself wherever he goes. *Sportiveness* is an accompaniment of *liveliness* or *sprightliness*: a *sprightly* child will show its *sprightliness* by its *sportive* humour: mirth and *jocundity* are the forms of *liveliness* which display themselves in social life; the former is a familiar quality, more frequently to be discovered in vulgar than in polished society; *jocundity* is a form of *liveliness* which poets have ascribed to nymphs and goddesses, and other aerial creatures of the imagination.

The terms preserve the same sense when applied to the characteristics or actions of persons as when applied to the persons themselves; imagination, wit, conception, representation, and the like, are *lively*; a person's air, manner, look, tune, dance, are *sprightly*; a conversation, a turn of mind, a society, is *vivacious*; the muse, the pen, the imagination, is *sportive*; the meeting, the laugh, the song, the conceit is *merry*; the train, the dance, is *jocund*.

LIVING, BENEFICE.

LIVING signifies literally the pecuniary resource by which one lives.

BENEFICE, from *benefacio*, signifies

whatever one obtains as a benefit: the former is applicable to any situation of life, but particularly to that resource which a parish affords to the clergyman; the latter is applicable to no other object: we speak of a *living* as a resource immediately derived from the parish, in distinction from a curacy, which is derived from an individual; we speak of a *benefice* in respect to the terms by which it is held, according to the ecclesiastical law: there are many *livings* which are not *benefices*, although not *vice versa*.

LODGINGS, APARTMENTS.

The word **LODGING** signifies in the general sense a place to lodge or dwell in; it comprehends single rooms or many rooms, or in fact any place which can be made to serve the purpose; *lodgings* in the specific signification is mostly used for rooms that are let out to hire, or that serve a temporary purpose. **APARTMENTS** respect only suites of rooms: apartments are therefore in the strict sense *lodgings*; but all *lodgings* are not *apartments*. On the other hand all *apartments* to let out for hire are *lodgings*; but *apartments* not to let out for hire are not *lodgings*.

LOOK, GLANCE.

LOOK, *v. Air*.

GLANCE, *v. To glance at*.

Look is the generic and *glance* the specific term; that is to say, a casual or momentary *look*: a *look* may be characterized as severe or mild, fierce or gentle, angry or kind; a *glance* as hasty or sudden, imperfect, or slight: so likewise we speak of taking a *look*, or catching a *glance*.

TO LOOK, SEE, BEHOLD, VIEW, EYE.

LOOK, in Saxon *locan*, upper German *lugen*, comes from *lux* light, and the Greek *law* to see.

SEE, in German *sehen*, probably a variation from the Latin *video* to see.

BEHOLD, compounded of the intensive *be* and *hold*, signifies to *hold* or fix the eye on an object.

VIEW, from the French *voir*, *vu*, and the Latin *video*, signifies simply to see.

To **EYE**, from the noun *eye*, naturally signifies to fathom with the *eye*.

We *look* voluntarily; we *see* involuntarily: the eye *sees*; the person *looks*: absent people often *see* things before they are fully conscious that they are at hand: we may *look* without *seeing*, and we may *see* without *looking*: near-sighted people often *look* at that which is too distant to strike the visual

organ. To *behold* is to *look* at for a continuance; to *view* is to *look* at in all directions; to *eye* is to *look* at earnestly, and by side glances: that which is *seen* may disappear in an instant; it may strike the *eye* and be gone; but what is *looked* at must make some stay; consequently lightning, and things equally fugitive and rapid in their flight, may be *seen*, but cannot be *looked* at.

To *look* at is the familiar, as well as the general term, in regard to the others: we *look* at things in general, which we wish to *see*, that is, to *see* clearly, fully, and in all their parts; but we *behold* that which excites a moral or intellectual interest; we *view* that which demands intellectual attention; we *eye* that which gratifies any particular passion: an inquisitive child *looks* at things which are new to it, but does not *behold* them; we *look* at plants, or finery, or whatever gratifies the senses, but we do not *behold* them: on the other hand, we *behold* any spectacle which excites our admiration, our astonishment, our pity, or our love: we *look* at objects in order to observe their external properties; but we *view* them in order to find out their component parts, their internal properties, &c.: we *look* at things to gratify the curiosity of the moment, or for mere amusement; but the jealous man *eyes* his rival, in order to mark his movements, his designs, and successes; the envious man *eyes* him who is in prosperity, with a malignant desire to *see* him humbled.

To *look* is an indifferent, to *behold* and *view* are good and honourable actions; to *eye*, as the act of persons, is commonly a mean, and even base, action.

TO LOOK. APPEAR.

LOOK is here taken in the neuter and improper sense: in the preceding article (v. *To look*) it denotes the action of persons striving to see; in the present case it denotes the action of things figuratively striving to be seen.

APPEAR, from the Latin *appareo* or *pareo*, Greek *παρεμι*, signifies to be present or at hand, within sight.

The *look* of a thing respects the impressions which it makes on the senses, that is, the manner in which it *looks*; its *appearance* implies the simple act of its coming into sight: the *look* of any thing is therefore characterized as good or bad, mean or handsome, ugly or beautiful; the *appearance* is characterized as early or late, sudden or unexpected; there is something very unseemly in the *look* of a clergyman affecting the airs of a fine gentleman; the *appearance* of the stars in an evening presents an inter-

esting view even to the ordinary beholder. As what *appears* must *appear* in some form, the signification of the term has been extended to the manner of the *appearance*, and brought still nearer to *look* in its application; in this case the term *look* is rather more familiar than that of *appearance*: we may speak either of regarding the *look* or the *appearance* of a thing, as far as it may impress others; but the latter is less colloquial than the former: a man's conduct is said to *look* rather than to *appear* ill; but on the other hand, we say a thing assumes an *appearance*, or has a certain *appearance*.

Look is always employed for what is real; what a thing *looks* is that which it really is; *appear*, however, sometimes refers not only to what is external, but to what is superficial: if we say a person *looks* ill, it supposes some positive and unequivocal evidence of illness: if we say he *appears* to be ill, it is a less positive assertion than the former; it leaves room for doubt, and allows the possibility of a mistake. We are at liberty to judge of things by their *looks*, without being chargeable with want of judgment; but as *appearances* are said to be deceitful, it becomes necessary to admit them with caution as the rule of our judgment. *Look* is employed mostly in regard to objects of sense; *appearance* respects natural and moral objects indifferently: the sky *looks* lowering; an object *appears* through a microscope greater than it really is; a person's conduct *appears* in a more culpable light when seen through the representation of an enemy.

LOOKER-ON, SPECTATOR, BEHOLDER, OBSERVER.

The LOOKER-ON and the SPECTATOR are both opposed to the agents or actors in any scene; but the former is still more abstracted from the objects he sees than the latter.

A *looker-on* (v. *To look at*) is careless; he has no part and takes no part in what he sees; he *looks on*, because the thing is before him, and he has nothing else to do: a *spectator* may likewise be unconcerned, but in general he derives amusement, if nothing else, from what he sees. A clown may be a *looker-on*, who with open mouth gapes at all that is before him, without understanding any part of it; but he who *looks on* to draw a moral lesson from the whole is in the moral sense not an uninterested *spectator*.

The BEHOLDER has a nearer interest than the *spectator*; and the OBSERVER has an interest not less near than that of

the *beholder*, but somewhat different: the *beholder* has his affections roused by what he sees; the *observer* has his understanding employed in that which passes before him: the *beholder* indulges himself in contemplation; the *observer* is busy in making it subservient to some proposed object: every *beholder* of our Saviour's sufferings and patience was struck with the conviction of his Divine character; every calm *observer* of our Saviour's words and actions was convinced of his Divine mission.

LOOSE, VAGUE, LAX, DISSOLUTE, LICENTIOUS.

LOOSE is in German *los*, &c. Latin *laxus*, Greek *αλασσειν*, and Hebrew *chalatz*, to make free.

VAGUE, in Latin *vagus*, signifies wandering.

LAX, in Latin *laxus*, has a similar origin with *loose*.

DISSOLUTE, in Latin *dissolutus* participle of *dissolvo*, signifies *dissolved* or set free.

LICENTIOUS signifies having the *licence* or power to do as one pleases (*v. Leave, liberty*).

Loose is the generic, the rest are specific terms; they are all opposed to that which is bound or adheres closely: *loose* is employed either for moral or intellectual subjects; *vague* only for intellectual objects: *lax* sometimes for what is intellectual, but oftener for the moral; *dissolute* and *licentious* only for moral matters: whatever wants a proper connexion, or linking together of the parts, is *loose*; whatever is scattered and remotely separated is *vague*: a style is *loose*, where the words and sentences are not made to coalesce, so as to form a regularly connected series; assertions are *vague* which have but a remote connexion with the subject referred to: by the same rule, *loose* hints thrown out at random may give rise to speculation and conjecture, but cannot serve as the ground of any conclusion: ignorant people are apt to credit every *vague* rumour, and to communicate it as a certainty.

Opinions are *loose*, either inasmuch as they want logical precision, or as they fail in moral strictness; suggestions and surmises are in their nature *vague*, as they spring from a remote channel, or are produced by the wanderings of the imagination; opinions are *lax*, inasmuch as they have a tendency to lessen the moral obligation, or to loosen moral ties: *loose* notions arise from the unrestrained state of the will, from the influence of the unruly passions; *lax* notions from the error of the judgment: *loose*

principles affect the moral conduct of individuals; *lax* principles affect the speculative opinions of men, either as individuals or in society: one is *loose* in practice, and *lax* in speculation or in discipline. *Dissoluteness* is the excess of *looseness*; *licentiousness* is the consequence of *laxity*, or the freedom from external constraint.

Looseness of character, if indulged, soon sinks into *dissoluteness* of morals; and *laxity* of discipline is quickly followed by *licentiousness* of manners.

A young man of *loose* character makes light of moral obligations in general; but one of *dissolute* character commits every excess, and totally disregards every restraint; in proportion as a commander is *lax* in the punishment of offences, an army will become *licentious*.

LORD'S SUPPER, EUCHARIST, COMMUNION, SACRAMENT.

The LORD'S SUPPER is a term of familiar and general use among Christians, as designating in literal terms the supper of our Lord; that is, either the last solemn supper which he took with his disciples previous to his crucifixion, or the commemoration of that event which conformably to his commands has been observed by the professors of Christianity. EUCHARIST is a term of peculiar use among the Roman Catholics, from Greek *ευχαριζω* to give thanks, because personal adoration, by way of returning thanks, constitutes in their estimation the chief part of the ceremony. As the social affections are kept alive mostly by the common participation of meals, so is brotherly love, the essence of Christian fellowship, cherished and warmed in the highest degree by the common participation in this holy festival: hence, by distinction, it has been denominated the COMMUNION. As the vows which are made at the altar of our Lord are the most solemn which a Christian can make, comprehending in them the entire devotion of himself to Christ, the general term SACRAMENT, signifying an oath, has been employed by way of emphasis for this ordinance. The Roman Catholics have employed the same term for six other ordinances; but the Protestants, who attach a similar degree of sacredness to no other than baptism, annex this appellation only to these two.

TO LOSE, MISS.

LOSE, in all probability, is but a variation of *loose*, because what gets *loose* or away from a person is *lost* to him.

To MISS, probably from the participle

mis wrong, signifies to *lose* by mistake. What is *lost* is not at hand: what is *missing* is not to be seen; it does not depend upon ourselves to recover what is lost, it is supposed to be irrevocably gone; what we *miss* one time we may by diligence and care recover at another time. A person *loses* his health and strength by a decay of nature, and must submit patiently to the *loss* which cannot be repaired: if a person *misses* the opportunity of improvement in his youth, he will never have another opportunity that is equally good.

LOSS, DAMAGE, DETRIMENT.

LOSS, signifies the act of *losing* or the thing *lost*.

DAMAGE, in French *dommage*, Latin *damnum* from *demo* to take away, signifies the thing taken away.

DETRIMENT, v. *Disadvantageous*.

Loss is here the generic term; *damage* and *detriment* are species or modes of *loss*. The person sustains the *loss*, the thing suffers the *damage* or *detriment*. Whatever is gone from us which we wish to retain is a *loss*; hence we may sustain a *loss* in our property, in our reputation, in our influence in our intellect, and every other object of possession: whatever renders an object less serviceable or valuable, by any external violence, is a *damage*; as a vessel suffers a *damage* in a storm; whatever is calculated to cross a man's purpose is a *detriment*; the bare want of a good name may be a *detriment* to a young tradesman; the want of prudence is always a great *detriment* to the prosperity of a family.

LOUD, NOISY, HIGH-SOUNDING, CLAMOROUS.

LOUD is doubtless connected through the medium of the German *laut*, a sound, and *lauschen* to listen, with the Greek *αλφω* to hear, because sounds are the object of hearing.

NOISY, having a *noise*, like *noisome* and *noxious*, comes from the Latin *noceo* to hurt, signifying in general offensive, that is, to the sense of hearing, of smelling, and the like.

HIGH-SOUNDING signifies the same as pitched upon an elevated key, so as to make a great noise, to be heard at a distance.

CLAMOROUS, from the Latin *clamo* to cry, signifies crying with a loud voice.

Loud is here the generic term, since it signifies a great sound, which is the idea common to them all. As an epithet for persons, *loud* is mostly taken in an indifferent sense; all the others are taken for being

loud beyond measure: *noisy* is to be lawlessly and unseasonably *loud*; *high-sounding* is only to be *loud* from the bigness of one's words: *clamorous* is to be disagreeably and painfully *loud*. We must speak *loudly* to a deaf person in order to make ourselves heard: children will be *noisy* at all times if not kept under control: flatterers are always *high-sounding* in their eulogiums of princes: children will be *clamorous* for what they want, if they expect to get it by dint of *noise*. In the improper application, *loud* is taken in as bad a sense as the rest; the *loudest* praises are the least to be regarded: the applause of a mob is always *noisy*: *high-sounding* titles serve only to excite contempt where there is not some corresponding sense: it is the business of party to be *clamorous*, as that serves the purpose of exciting turbulence among the ignorant.

LOVE, FRIENDSHIP.

LOVE (v. *Affection*) is a term of very extensive import; it may be either taken in the most general sense for every strong and passionate attachment, or only for such as subsist between the sexes; in either of which cases it has features by which it is easily distinguished from FRIENDSHIP.

Love subsists between members of the same family; it springs out of their natural relationship, and is kept alive by their close intercourse and constant interchange of kindnesses: *friendship* excludes the idea of any tender and natural relationship; nor is it, like *love*, to be found in children, but is confined to maturer years; it is formed by time, by circumstances, by congruity of character, and sympathy of sentiment. *Love* always operates with ardour; *friendship* is remarkable for firmness and constancy. *Love* is peculiar to no station; it is to be found equally among the high and the low, the learned and the unlearned: *friendship* is of nobler growth; it finds admittance only into minds of a loftier make: it cannot be felt by men of an ordinary stamp.

Both *love* and *friendship* are gratified by seeking the good of the object; but *love* is more selfish in its nature than *friendship*; in indulging another it seeks its own gratification, and when this is not to be obtained, it will change into the contrary passion of hatred; *friendship*, on the other hand, is altogether disinterested, it makes sacrifices of every description, and knows no limits to its sacrifice. As *love* is a passion, it has all the errors attendant upon passion: but *friendship*, which is an affection tempered by reason, is exempt from every such exceptionable quality. *Love* is blind to the

faults of the objects of its devotion; it adores, it idolizes, it is fond, it is foolish: *friendship* sees faults, and strives to correct them; it aims to render the object more worthy of esteem and regard. *Love* is capricious, humoursome, and changeable; it will not bear contradiction, disappointment, nor any cross or untoward circumstance: *friendship* is stable; it withstands the rudest blasts, and is unchanged by the severe shocks of adversity. *Love* is exclusive in its nature; it insists upon a devotion to a single object; it is jealous of any intrusion from others: *friendship* is liberal and communicative; it is bounded by nothing but rules of prudence; it is not confined as to the number but as to the nature of the objects.

When *love* is not produced by any social relation, it has its groundwork in sexuality, and subsists only between persons of different sexes; in this case it has all the former faults with which it is chargeable to a still greater degree, and others peculiar to itself; it is even more selfish, capricious, changeable, and exclusive, than when subsisting between persons of the same kindred. *Love* is in this case as unreasonable in its choice of an object as it is extravagant in its regard of the object; it is formed without examination; it is the effect of a sudden glance, the work of a moment, in which the heart is taken by surprise, and the understanding is discarded: *friendship*, on the other hand, is the entire work of the understanding; it does not admit the senses or the heart to have any undue influence in the choice. A fine eye, a fair hand, a graceful step, are the authors of *love*; talent, virtue, fine sentiment, a good heart, and a sound head, are the promoters of *friendship*: *love* wants no excitement from personal merit; *friendship* cannot be produced without merit. Time, which is the consolidator of *friendship*, is the destroyer of *love*; an object improvidently chosen is as carelessly thrown aside; and that which was not chosen for its merits, is seldom rejected for its demerits, the fault lying rather in the humour of *love*, which can abate of its ardour as the novelty of the thing ceases, and transfer itself to other objects: *friendship*, on the other hand, is slow and cautious in choosing, and still more gradual in the confirmation, as it rests on virtue and excellence; it grows only with the growth of one's acquaintance, and ripens with the maturity of esteem.

In the last place, *love* when misdirected is dangerous and mischievous; in ordinary cases awaking flattering hopes and delusive dreams, which end in disappointment

and mortification; and in some cases it is the origin of the most frightful evils; there is nothing more atrocious than what has owed its origin to slighted *love*: but *friendship*, even if mistaken, will awaken no other feeling than that of pity; when a friend proves faithless or wicked, he is lamented as one who has fallen from the high estate to which we thought him entitled.

LOVER, SUITOR, WOOER.

LOVER signifies literally one who *loves*, and is applicable to any object; there are *lovers* of money, and *lovers* of wine, *lovers* of particular women in the good sense, or *lovers* of women in the bad sense. The SUITOR is one who *sues* and strives after a thing; it is equally undefined as to the object, but may be employed for such as *sue* for favours from their superior, or *sue* for the affections and person of a female. The WOOER is only a species of the term *lover*, who *wooes* or solicits the kind regards of a female. There is most sincerity in the *lover*, he simply proffers his *love*; there is most ceremony in the *sutor*, he prefers his *suit*; there is most ardour in the *wooer*, he makes his vows.

LOW, MEAN, ABJECT.

LOW, *v. Humble.*

MEAN, in German *gemein*, &c. comes from the Latin *communis* common (*v. Common*).

ABJECT, in French *abject*, Latin *abjectus*, participle of *abjicio* to cast down, signifies literally brought low.

Low is a much stronger term than *mean*; for what is *low* stands more directly opposed to what is high, but what is *mean* is intermediate: the *low* is applied only to a certain number or description; but *mean*, like common, is applicable to the great bulk of mankind. A man of *low* extraction falls below the ordinary level; he is opposed to a nobleman: a man of *mean* birth does not rise above the ordinary level; he is upon a level with the majority. When employed to designate character, they preserve the same distinction; the *low* is that which is positively sunk in itself; but the *mean* is that which is comparatively low, in regard to the outward circumstances and relative condition of the individual. Swearing and drunkenness are low vices; boxing, cudgelling, and wrestling, are *low* games: a misplaced economy in people of property is *mean*: a condescension to those who are beneath us, for our own petty advantage in *meanness*. A man is commonly *low* by birth, education, or habits; but *meanness* is a defect of na-

ture which sinks a person in spite of every external advantage.

The *low* and *mean* are qualities either of the condition or the character: but *object* is a peculiar state into which a man is thrown: a man is in the course of things *low*; he is voluntarily *mean*, and involuntarily *object*. *Lowness* discovers itself in one's actions and sentiments; the *mean* and *object* in one's spirit; the latter being much more powerful and oppressive than the former: the *mean* man stoops in order to get; the *object* man crawls in order to submit: the *lowest* man will sometimes have a consciousness of what is due to himself: he will even rise above his condition: the *mean* man sacrifices his dignity to his convenience; he is always below himself; the *object* man altogether forgets that he has any dignity; he is kept down by the pressure of adverse circumstances. The condition of a servant is *low*; his manners, his words, and his habits, will be *low*; but by good conduct he elevates himself in his sphere of life: a nobleman is in a station the reverse of *low*; but if he will stoop to the artifices practised by the vulgar in order to carry a point, we denominate it *mean*. The slave is in every sense of the word, *object*; whether a man be a slave to another's will or to any passion, such as fear or superstition, he is equally said to be *object*.

M.

MADNESS, PHRENZY, RAGE, FURY.

MADNESS, *v. Derangement.*

PHRENZY, in Latin *phrenesis*. Greek *φρενιτις* from *φρον* the mind, signifies a disordered mind.

RAGE, in French *rage*, Latin *rabies*.

FURY, in Latin *furor*, comes in all probability from *ferror* to be carried, because *fury* carries a person away.

Madness and *phrenzy* are used in the physical and moral sense; *rage* and *fury* only in the moral sense: in the first case, *madness* is a confirmed derangement in the organ of thought; *phrenzy* is only a temporary derangement from the violence of fever: the former lies in the system, and is, in general, incurable; the latter is only occasional, and yields to the power of medicine.

Moral *madness* differs both in degree and duration from *phrenzy*; if it spring from the extravagance of *rage*, it bursts out into every conceivable extravagance, but is only transitory; if it spring from disappointed love, or any other disappointed passion, it is as

permanent as direct physical *madness*; *phrenzy* is always temporary, but even more impetuous than *madness*; in the *phrenzy* of despair men commit acts of suicide: in the *phrenzy* of distress and grief, people are hurried into many actions fatal to themselves or others.

Rage refers more immediately to the agitation that exists within the mind; *fury* refers to that which shows itself outwardly: a person contains or stifles his *rage*; but his *fury* breaks out into some external mark of violence: *rage* will subside of itself; *fury* spends itself: a person may be choked with *rage*; but his *fury* finds a vent: an *enraged* man may be pacified; a *furious* one is deaf to every remonstrance. *Rage*, when applied to persons, commonly signifies highly inflamed anger; but it may be employed for inflamed passion towards any object which is specified: as a *rage* for music. a *rage* for theatrical performances, a fashionable *rage* for any whim of the day. *Fury*, though commonly signifying *rage* bursting out, yet it may be any impetuous feeling displaying itself in extravagant action: as the divine *fury* supposed to be produced upon the priestess of Apollo, by the inspiration of the god, and the Bacchanalian *fury*, which expression depicts the influence of wine upon the body and mind.

In the improper application, to inanimate objects, the words *rage* and *fury* preserve a similar distinction: the *rage* of the heat denotes the excessive height to which it is risen; the *fury* of the winds indicates their violent commotion and turbulence: so in like manner the *raging* of the tempest characterizes figuratively its burning anger; and the *fury* of the flames marks their impetuous movements, their wild and rapid spread.

MAGISTERIAL, MAJESTIC. STATELY. POMPOUS, AUGUST, DIGNIFIED.

MAGISTERIAL, from *magister* a master, and MAJESTIC, from *majestas*, are both derived from *magis* more, or *major* greater, that is, more or greater than others; but they differ in this respect, that the *magisterial* is something assumed and, is therefore often false; the *majestic* is natural, and consequently always real: an upstart, or an intruder into any high station or office, may put on a *magisterial* air, in order to impose on the multitude; but it will not be in his power to be *majestic*, which never shows itself in a borrowed shape; none but those who have a superiority of character, or outward station, can be *majestic*: a petty magistrate in the country may be *magisterial*,

a king or queen cannot uphold their station without a *majestic* deportment.

STATELY and POMPOUS are most nearly allied to *magisterial*; AUGUST and DIGNIFIED to *majestic*: the former being merely extrinsic and assumed; the latter intrinsic and inherent. *Magisterial* respects the authority which is assumed; *stately* regards splendour and rank; *pompous* regards personal importance, with all the appendages of greatness and power. A person is *magisterial* in the exercise of his office, and the distribution of his commands; he is *stately* in his ordinary intercourse with his inferiors and equals; he is *pompous* on particular occasions of appearing in public: a person demands silence in a *magisterial* tone: he marches forward with a *stately* air; he comes forward in a *pompous* manner, so as to strike others with a sense of his importance.

Majestic is an epithet that characterizes the exterior of an object; *august* is that which marks an essential characteristic in the object; *dignified* serves to characterize a person's action: the form of a female is termed *majestic*, when it has something imposing in it, suited to the condition of majesty, or the most elevated station in society; a monarch is entitled *august* in order to describe the extent of his empire; a public assembly is denominated *august* to bespeak its high character, and its weighty influence in the scale of society: a reply is termed *dignified* when it upholds the individual and personal character of a man as well as his relative character in the community to which he belongs; the two former of these terms are associated only with grandeur of outward circumstances: the last is applicable to men of all stations, who have each in his sphere a *dignity* to maintain which belongs to man as an independent moral agent.

MAGNIFICENCY, SPLENDOUR, POMP.

MAGNIFICENCE, from *magnus* and *facio*, signifies doing largely, or on a large scale.

SPLENDOUR, in Latin *splendor*, from *splendeo* to shine, signifies brightness in the external.

POMP, in Latin *pompa*, Greek *πομπή* a procession, from *πεμπω* to send, signifies in general formality and ceremony.

Magnificence lies not only in the number and extent of the objects presented, but in their degree of richness as to their colouring and quality; *splendour* is but a characteristic of *magnificence*, attached to such objects as dazzle the eye by the quantity of light, or the beauty and strength of co-

louring: the entertainments of the eastern monarchs and princes are remarkable for their *magnificence*, from the immense number of their attendants, the crowd of equipages, the size of their palaces, the multitude of costly utensils, and the profusion of viands which constitute the arrangements for the banquet; the entertainments of Europeans present much *splendour*, from the richness, the variety, and the brilliancy, of dress, of furniture, and all the apparatus of a feast, which the refinements of art have brought to perfection. *Magnificence* is seldom unaccompanied with *splendour* than *splendour* with *magnificence*: since quantity, as well as quality, is essential to the one; but quality more than quantity is an essential to the other: a large army drawn up in battle array is a *magnificent* spectacle, from the immensity of their numbers and the order of their disposition; it will in all probability be a *splendid* scene if there be much richness in the dresses; the *pomp* will here consist in such large bodies of men acting by one impulse, and directed by one will: hence military *pomp*; it is the appendage of power, when displayed to public view, on particular occasions: a monarch, seated on his throne, surrounded by his courtiers, and attended by his guards, is said to appear with *pomp*.

TO MAKE, DO.

MAKE, in Dutch *maaken*, Saxon *macan*, &c. comes from the Greek *μακάνη* art, signifying to put together with art.

DO, v. *To act*.

We cannot *make* without *doing*, but we may *do* without *making*: to *do* is simply to move for a certain end; to *make* is to *do*, so as to bring something into being, which was not before: we *make* a thing what it was not before; we *do* a thing in the same manner as we *did* it before: what is *made* is either better or worse, or the same as another; what is *done*, is *done* either wisely or unwisely.

TO MAKE, FORM, PRODUCE, CREATE.

MAKE, v. *To make*.

FORM, v. *To form*.

PRODUCE, v. *To afford*.

CREATE, v. *To cause*.

The idea of giving birth to a thing is common to all these terms, which vary in the circumstances of the action: to *make* is the most general and unqualified term; to *form* signifies to give a *form* to a thing, that is, to *make* it after a given *form*; to *produce* is to bring forth into the light, to call into

existence; to *create* is to bring into existence by an absolute exercise of power: to *make* is the simplest action of all, and comprehends a simple combination by the smallest efforts; to *form* requires care and attention, and greater efforts; to *produce* requires time, and also labour: whatever is put together so as to become another thing, is *made*; a chair or a table is *made*: whatever is put into any distinct *form* is *formed*; the potter *forms* the clay into an earthen vessel: whatever emanates from a thing, so as to become a distinct object, is *produced*; fire is often *produced* by the violent friction of two pieces of wood with each other. The process of *making* is always performed by some conscious agent, who employs either mechanical means, or the simple exercise of power: a bird *makes* its nest; man *makes* various things, by the exercise of his understanding and his limbs; the Almighty Maker has *made* every thing by his word. The process of *forming* does not always require a conscious agent; things are likewise *formed* by the active operations of other bodies; melted lead, when thrown into water will *form* itself into various little bodies; hard substances are *formed* in the human body which give rise to the disease termed the gravel. What is *produced* is oftener *produced* by the process of nature, than by any express design; the earth *produces* all kinds of vegetables from seed; animals, by a similar process, *produce* their young. *Create*, in this natural sense of the term, is employed as the act of an intelligent being, and that of the Supreme Being only; it is the act of *making* by a simple effort of power, without the use of materials, and without any process.

They are all employed in the moral sense, and with a similar distinction: *make* is indefinite; we may *make* a thing that is difficult or easy, simple or complex; we may *make* a letter, or *make* a poem; we may *make* a word, or *make* a sentence. To *form* is the work either of intelligence, or of circumstances: education has much to do in *forming* the habits, but nature has more to do in *forming* the disposition. To *produce* is the effect of great mental exertion; or it is the natural operation of things: no industry could ever *produce* a poem or a work of the imagination: but a history or a work of science may be *produced* by the force of mere labour: quarrels *produce* hatred, and kindness *produces* love; heat *produces* inflammation and fever, or disease *produces* death. Since genius is a spark of the Divine power that acts by its own independent agency, the property of *creation* has

been figuratively ascribed to it: the *creative* power of the human mind is a faint emblem of that power which brought every thing into existence out of nothing.

MALEDICTION, CURSE, IMPRECATION, EXECRATION, ANATHEMA.

MALEDICTION, from *male* and *dico*, signifies a saying ill, that is, declaring an evil wish against a person.

CURSE, in Saxon *kursiad*, comes in all probability from the Greek *zugow* to sanction or ratify, signifying a bad wish declared upon oath, or in a solemn manner.

IMPRECATION from *im* and *precor*, signifies a praying down evil upon a person.

EXECRATION, from the Latin *execror*, that is, *è sacris excludere*, signifies the same as to excommunicate, with every form of solemn *imprecation*.

ANATHEMA, in Greek *αναθημα*, signifies a setting out, that is, a putting out of a religious community as a penance.

Malediction is the most indefinite and general term, signifying simply the declaration of evil; *curse* is a solemn denunciation of evil: the former is employed mostly by men; the latter by God or man: the rest are species of the *curse* pronounced only by man. The *malediction* is caused by simple anger; the *curse* is occasioned by some grievous offence: men, in the heat of their passion, will utter *maledictions* against any object that offends them; God pronounced a *curse* upon Adam, and all his posterity, after the fall.

The term *curse* differs in the degree of evil pronounced or wished; *imprecation* and *execration* always imply some positive great evil, and, in fact, as much evil as can be conceived by man in his anger; the *anathema* respects the evil which is pronounced according to the canon law, by which a man is not only put out of the church, but held up as an object of offence. The *malediction* is altogether an unallowed expression of private resentment; the *curse* was admitted, in some cases, according to the Mosaic law; and that, as well as the *anathema*, at one time formed a part of the ecclesiastical discipline of the Christian church; the *imprecation* formed a part of the heathenish ceremony of religion; but the *execration* is always the informal expression of the most violent personal anger.

MALEVOLENT, MALICIOUS, MALIG-NANT.

These words have all their derivation from *malus* bad; that is, MALEVOLENT, wishing ill; MALICIOUS (*v. Malice*), having

an evil disposition : and **MALIGNANT**, having an evil tendency.

Malevolence has a deep root in the heart, and is a settled part of the character; we denominate the person *malevolent*, to designate the ruling temper of his mind: *maliciousness* may be applied as an epithet to particular parts of a man's character or conduct; one may have *malicious* joy or pleasure in seeing the distresses of another: *malignity* is not employed to characterize the person, but the thing; the *malignity* of a design is estimated by the degree of mischief which was intended to be done.

Malicious and *malignant* are both applied to things; but the former is applied to those which are of a personal nature, the latter to objects purely inanimate: a story or tale is termed *malicious*, which emanates from a *malicious disposition*; a star is termed *malignant*, which is supposed to have a bad or *malignant* influence.

MALICE, RANCOUR, SPITE, GRUDGE, PIQUE.

MALICE, in Latin *malitia*, from *malus* bad, signifies the very essence of badness lying in the heart; **RANCOUR** (v. *Hatred*) is only continued *hatred*: the former requires no external cause to provoke it, it is inherent in the mind; the latter must be caused by some personal offence. *Malice* is properly the love of evil for evil's sake, and is, therefore, confined to no number or quality of objects, and limited by no circumstance; *rancour*, as it depends upon external objects for its existence, so it is confined to such objects only as are liable to cause displeasure or anger: *malice* will impel a man to do mischief to those who have not injured him, and are perhaps strangers to him; *rancour* can subsist only between those who have had sufficient connexion to be at variance.

SPITE, from the Italian *dispetto* and the French *despit*, denotes a petty kind of *malice*, or disposition to offend another in trifling matters; it may be in the temper of the person, or it may have its source in some external provocation; children often show their *spite* to each other.

GRUDGE, connected with *grumble* and *growl*, and **PIQUE**, from *pike*, denoting the prick of a pointed instrument, are employed for that particular state of *rancorous* or *spiteful* feeling which is occasioned by personal offences: the *grudge* is that which has long existed; the *pique* is that which is of recent date: a person is said to owe another a *grudge* for having done him a disservice; or he is said to have a *pique*

towards another, who has shown him an affront.

MANLY, MANFUL.

MANLY, or like a man, is opposed to juvenile, and of course applicable to youths; but **MANFUL**, or full of manhood, is opposed to effeminate, and is applicable more properly to grown persons: a premature *manliness* in young persons is hardly less unseemly than a want of *manfulness* in one who is called upon to display his courage.

MANNERS, MORALS.

MANNERS (v. *Air, manner*) respect the minor forms of acting with others and towards others; **MORALS** include the important duties of life: *manners* have, therefore, been denominated minor *morals*. By an attention to good *manners* we render ourselves good companions; by an observance of good *morals* we become good members of society: the former gains the good will of others, the latter their esteem. The *manners* of a child are of more or less importance, according to his station in life; his *morals* cannot be attended to too early, let his station be what it may.

MARITIME, MARINE, NAVAL, NAUTICAL.

MARITIME and **MARINE**, from the Latin *mare* a sea, signifies belonging to the sea; **NAVAL**, from *navis* a ship, signifies belonging to a ship; and **NAUTICAL**, from *nauta* a sailor, signifies belonging to a sailor, or to navigation.

Countries and places are denominated *maritime* from their proximity to the sea, or their great intercourse by sea; hence England is called the most *maritime* nation in Europe. *Marine* is a technical term, employed by persons in office, to denote that which is officially transacted with regard to the sea in distinction from what passes on land; hence we speak of the *marines* as a species of soldiers acting by sea, of the *marine* society, or *marine* stores. *Naval* is another term of art as opposed to military, and used in regard to the arrangements of government or commerce: hence we speak of *naval* affairs, *naval* officers, *naval* tactics a *naval* force and the like. *Nautical* is a scientific term, connected with the science of navigation or the management of vessels: hence we talk of *nautical* instruction, of *nautical* calculations. The *maritime* laws of England are essential for the preservation of the *naval* power which it has so justly acquired. The *marine* of England is one of its glories. The *naval* administra-

tion is one of the most important branches of our government in the time of war. *Nautical* tables and a *nautical* almanack have been expressly formed for the benefit of all who apply themselves to *nautical* subjects.

MARK, PRINT, IMPRESSION, STAMP.

MARK is the same in the northern languages, and in the Persian *marz*.

PRINT and IMPRESSION, both from the Latin *premo* to press, signify the visible effect produced by *printing* or *pressing*.

STAMP signifies the effect produced by *stamping*.

The word *mark* is the most general in sense: whatever alters the external face of an object is a *mark*; a *print* is some specific *mark*, or a figure drawn upon the surface of an object; an *impression* is the *mark* pressed either upon or into a body; a *stamp* is the *mark* that is *stamped* in or upon the body. The *mark* is confined to no size, shape, or form; the *print* is a *mark* that represents an object: the *mark* may consist of a spot, a line, a stain, or a smear; but a *print* describes a given object, as a house, a man, &c. A *mark* is either a protuberance or a depression; an *impression* is always a sinking in of the object: the *stamp* mostly resembles the *impression*, unless in the case of the seal, which is *stamped* upon paper, and occasions an elevation with the wax.

The *mark* is occasioned by every sort of action, gentle or violent, artificial or natural: the *print* is occasioned by artificial means of compression, as when the *print* of letters or pictures is made on paper; or by accidental and natural compression, as when the *print* of the hand is made on the wall, or the *print* of the foot is made on the ground: the *impression* is made by means more or less violent, as when an *impression* is made upon wood by the axe or hammer; or by gradual and natural means, as by the dripping of water on stone: the *stamp* is made by means of direct pressure with an artificial instrument.

Mark is of such universal application, that it is confined to no objects whatever, either in the natural or moral world. *Print* is mostly applied to material objects, the face of which undergoes a lasting change, as the *printing* made on paper or wood. *Impression* is more commonly applied to such natural objects as are particularly solid; *stamp* is generally applied to paper, or still softer and more yielding bodies. *Impression* and *stamp* have both a moral application: events or speeches make

an *impression* on the mind; things bear a certain *stamp* which bespeaks their origin.

MARK, SIGN, NOTE, SYMPTOM, TOKEN, INDICATION.

MARK, *v.* *Mark*, *impression*.

SIGN, in Latin *signum*, Greek *σημα* from *σιζω* to punctuate, signifies the thing that points out.

SYMPTOM, in Latin *symptoma*, Greek *συμπτωμα* from *συμπιπτω* to fall out in accordance, signifies what presents itself to confirm one's opinion.

TOKEN, *v.* *To betoken*.

INDICATION, in Latin *indicatio*, from *indico*, and the Greek *ενδεικω* to point out, signifies the thing which points out.

The idea of an external object, which serves to direct the observer, is common to all these terms; the difference consists in the objects that are employed. Any thing may serve as a *mark*, a stroke, a dot, a stick set up, and the like; it serves simply to guide the senses; the *sign* is something more complex: it consists of a figure or representation of some object, as the twelve *signs* of the Zodiac, or the *signs* which are affixed to houses of entertainment, or to shops. *Marks* are arbitrary; every one chooses his *mark* at pleasure: *signs* have commonly a connexion with the object that is to be observed: a house, a tree, a letter, or any external object may be chosen as a *mark*: but a tobacconist chooses the *sign* of a black man: the innkeeper chooses the head of the reigning prince. *Marks* serve in general simply to aid the memory in distinguishing the situation of objects, or the particular circumstances of persons or things; *signs*, on the contrary, serve to direct the understanding. Many objects may be both a *mark* and a *sign*: the cross which is employed in books, by way of reference to notes, is a *mark* only, because it serves merely to guide the eye, or assist the memory; but the figure of the cross, when employed in reference to the cross of our Saviour, is a *sign*, inasmuch as it conveys a distinct idea of something else to the mind. It is, moreover, clear, that there are many objects which serve as *marks*, which are never *signs*; and, on the other hand, although *signs* are mostly composed of *marks*, yet there are two sorts of *signs* which have nothing to do with *marks*; namely, those which we obtain by any other sense than that of sight; or those which are only figures in the mind. When words are spoken, and not written, they are *signs* and not *marks*; and in like manner the *sign* of the cross, when made on the forehead of chil-

dren in baptism, is a *sign* but not a *mark*. This illustration of these two words, in their strict and proper sense, will serve to explain them in their extended and metaphorical sense. A *mark* stands for nothing but what is visible; the *sign* stands for that only which is real. A star on the breast of an officer or nobleman is a *mark* of distinction or honour, because it distinguishes one person from another, and in a way that is apt to reflect honour; but it is not a *sign* of honour, because it is not the indubitable test of a man's honourable feelings, since it may be conferred by favour or by mistake, or from some partial circumstance.

The *mark* and *sign* may both stand for the appearances of things, and in that case, the former shows the cause by the effect, the latter the consequent by the antecedent. When a thing is said to bear the *marks* of violence, the cause of the *mark* is judged of by the *mark* itself; but when we say that a lowering sky is a *sign* of rain, the future or consequent event is judged of by the present appearance. So likewise we judge by the *marks* of a person's foot that some one has been walking there; when mariners meet with birds at sea, they consider them as a *sign* that land is near at hand.

It is here worthy of observation, however, that the term *mark* is only used for that which may be seen, but that *signs* may serve to direct our conclusion, even in that which affects the hearing, feelings, smell, or taste; thus hoarseness is a *sign* that a person has a cold; the effects which it produces on the head of the patient are to himself sensible *signs* that he labours under such an affection. The smell of fire is a *sign* that some place is on fire; one of the two travellers in La Mothe's fable, considered the taste of the wine as a *sign* that there must be leather in the bottle, and the other that there must be iron; and it proved that they were both right, for a little key with a bit of leather tied to it was found at the bottom.

In relation to the conduct of persons the *mark* illustrates the spring of the action; the *sign* shows the state of the mind or sentiments; it is a *mark* of folly or weakness in a man to yield himself implicitly to the guidance of an interested friend; tears are not always a *sign* of repentance.

Note is rather a *sign* than a *mark*; but it is properly the *sign* which consists of *marks*, as a note of admiration (!), and likewise a *sign* which consists of many letters and words.

Symptom is rather a *mark* than a *sign*; it explains the cause or origin of complaints, by the appearances they assume, and is em-

ployed as a technical term only in the science of medicine: as a foaming at the mouth and an abhorrence of drink, are *symptoms* of canine madness; it may likewise be used figuratively in application to moral objects.

Token is a species of *mark* in the moral sense, *indication* a species of *sign*: a *mark* shows what is, a *token* serves to keep in mind what has been: a gift to a friend is a *mark* of one's affection and esteem; if it be permanent in its nature it becomes a *token*: friends who are in close intercourse have perpetual opportunities of showing each other *marks* of their regard by reciprocal acts of courtesy and kindness; when they separate for any length of time they commonly leave some *token* of their tender sentiments in each other's hands, as pledge of what shall be, as well as an evidence of what has been.

Sign, as it respects *indication*, is said in abstract and general propositions: *indication* itself is only employed for some particular individual referred to; it bespeaks the act of the persons: but the *sign* is only the face or appearance of the thing. When a man does not live consistently with the profession which he holds, it is a *sign* that his religion is built on a wrong foundation; parents are gratified when they observe the slightest *indications* of genius or goodness in their children.

MARK, TRACE, VESTIGE, FOOTSTEP, TRACT.

The word MARK has already been considered at large in the preceding article, but it will admit of farther illustration when taken in the sense of that which is visible, and serves to show the existing state of things; *mark* is here as before, the most general and unqualified term; the other terms varying in the circumstances or manner of the *mark*.

TRACE, in Italian *treccia*, Greek *τροχην* to run, and Hebrew *darek* way, signifies any continued *mark*.

VESTIGE, in Latin *vestigium*, not improbably contracted from *pedis* and *stigma* or *stigma*, from *στίζω* to imprint, signifies a print of the foot.

FOOTSTEP is taken for the place in which the foot has stepped, or the *mark* made by that step.

TRACK, derived from the same as trace, signifies the way run, or the *mark* produced by that running.

The *mark* is said mostly of that which is fresh and uninterrupted; the *trace* is said of that which is broken by time: a carriage in driving along the sand leaves *marks* of the wheels, but in a short time all *traces* of its

having been there will be lost; a *mark* is produced by the action of bodies on one another in every possible form; the spilling of a liquid may leave a *mark* on the floor; the blow of a stick leaves a *mark* on the body; but the *trace* is a *mark* produced only by bodies making a progress or proceeding in a continued course: the ship that cuts the waves, and the bird that cuts the air, leave no *trace* of their course behind; so men pass their lives, and after death leave no *traces* that they ever were.

They are both applied to moral objects, but the *mark* is produced by objects of inferior importance; it excites a momentary observation, but does not carry us back to the past; its cause is either too obvious or too minute to awaken attention: a *trace* is generally a *mark* of something which we may wish to see. *Marks* of haste and imbecility in a common writer excite no surprise, and call forth no observation: in a writer of long-standing celebrity, we look for *traces* of his former genius.

The *vestige* is a species of the *mark* caused literally by the foot of man, and consequently applied to such places as have been inhabited, where the active industry of man has left visible *marks*; it is a species of *trace*, inasmuch as it carries us back to that which was, but is not at present. We discover by *marks* that things have been; we discover by *traces* and *vestiges* what they have been: a hostile army leaves evident *marks* of its having passed through a country; there are *traces* of the Roman roads still visible in London and different parts of England: Rome contains many *vestiges* of its former greatness. *Vestige*, may be applied to moral as well as natural objects with the same line of distinction. A person betrays *marks* of levity in his conduct: wherever we discover *traces* of the same customs or practices in one country which are prevalent in another, we suppose those countries to have had an intercourse or connexion of some kind at a remote period: there are customs still remaining in some parts of England which are *vestiges* of barbarism.

Footstep and *track* are sometimes employed as a *mark*, but oftener as a road or course: when we talk of following the *footsteps* of another, it may signify either to follow the *marks* of his *footsteps* as a guide for the course we should take, or to take the very same steps as he has done: the former is the act of one who is in pursuit of another; the latter is the act of him who follows in a train. *Footsteps* is employed only for the steps of an individual: the *track* is made by the steps of many; it is the line which

has been beaten out or made by stamping. The *footstep* can be employed only for men or brutes; but the *track* is applied to inanimate objects, as the wheel of a carriage: a *track* of blood from the body of a murdered man may sometimes lead to the detection of the murderer.

In the metaphorical application they do not signify a *mark*, but a course of conduct; the former respects one's moral feelings or mode of dealing; the latter one's mechanical and habitual manner of acting: the former is the consequence of having the same principles; the latter proceeds from imitation or constant repetition.

A good son will walk in the *footsteps* of a good father. In the management of business it is rarely wise in a young man to leave the *track* which has been *marked* out for him by his superiors in age and experience.

MARK, BADGE, STIGMA.

MARK (*v. Mark, print*) is still the general, and the two others specific terms; they are employed for whatever serves to characterize persons externally, or betoken any part either of their character or circumstances: *mark* is employed either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; *BADGE* in an indifferent one; *STIGMA* in a bad sense: a thing may either be a mark of honour, of disgrace, or of simple distinction: a *badge* is a *mark* simply of distinction; the *stigma* is a *mark* of disgrace. A *mark* of honour is conferred upon a person for his merits, as medals, stars, and ribands are bestowed by princes upon meritorious officers and soldiers; or the *mark* attaches to a person, or is affixed to him, in consequence of his demerits; as a low situation in his class is a *mark* of disgrace to a scholar; or a brand in the forehead is a *mark* of ignominy for criminals: the *badge* is that which voluntarily assumed by one's self according to established custom; it consists of dress by which the office, station, and even religion of a particular community is distinguished: as the gown and wig are the *badge* of gentlemen in the law; the gown and surplice that of clerical men; the uniform of charity children is the *badge* of their condition; the peculiar habit of the Quakers and Methodists is the *badge* of their religion: the *stigma* consists not so much in what is openly imposed upon a person as what falls upon him in the judgment of others; it is the black *mark* which is set upon a person by the public, and is consequently the strongest of all *marks*, and one which every one most dreads, and every good man seeks least to deserve.

A simple *mark* may sometimes be such

only in our own imagination; as when one fancies that dress is a *mark* of superiority, or the contrary; that the courtesies which we receive from a superior are *marks* of his personal esteem and regard: but the *stigma* is not what an individual imagines for himself but what is conceived towards him by others; the office of a spy and informer is so odious, that every man of honest feeling holds the very name to be a *stigma*.

MARK, BUTT.

After all that has been said upon the word MARK (*v. Mark, print*), it has this additional meaning in common with the word BUTT, that it implies an object aimed at: the *mark* is however literally a *mark* that is said to be shot at by the *marksman* with a gun or a bow; or it is metaphorically employed for the man who by his peculiar characteristics makes himself the object of notice; he is the *mark* at which every one's looks and thoughts are directed: the *butt*, from the French *bout* the end, is a species of *mark* in this metaphorical sense; but the former only calls forth general observation, the latter provokes the laughter and jokes of every one. Whoever renders himself conspicuous by his eccentricities must not complain if he become a *mark* for the derision of the public; it is a man's misfortune rather than his fault if he become the *butt* of a company who are rude and unfeeling enough to draw their pleasures from another's pain.

TO MARK, NOTE, NOTICE.

MARK is here taken in the intellectual sense, fixing as it were a *mark* (*v. Mark*) upon a thing so as to keep it in mind, which is in fact to fix one's attention upon it in such a manner as to be able to distinguish it by its characteristic qualities: to *mark* is therefore altogether an intellectual act: to NOTE has the same end as that of *marking*; namely, to aid the memory, but one *notes* a thing by making a written *note* of it; this is therefore a mechanical act: to NOTICE, on the other hand, is a sensible operation, from *notitia* knowledge, signifies to bring to one's knowledge, perception, or understanding by the use of our senses. We *mark* and *note* that which particularly interests us; the former is that which serves a present purpose; *notice* that which may be of use in future. The impatient lover *marks* the hours until the time arrives for meeting his mistress: travellers *note* whatever strikes them of importance to be remembered when they return home: to *notice* may serve either for the present or the future; we may *notice*

things merely by way of amusement; as a child will *notice* the actions of animals, or we may *notice* a thing for the sake of bearing it in mind, as a person *notices* a particular road when he wishes to return.

MARRIAGE, WEDDING, NUPTIALS.

MARRIAGE, from to *marry*, denotes the act of *marrying*; WEDDING and NUP-TIALS denote the ceremony of being *married*. To *marry*, in French *marier*, and Latin *marito*, signifies to be joined to a male; hence *marriage* comprehends the act of choosing and being legally bound to a man or a woman; *wedding*, from *wed*, and the Teutonic *wetten* to promise or betroth, implies the ceremony of *marrying*, inasmuch as it is binding upon the parties. *Nuptials* comes from the Latin *nubo* to veil, because the Roman ladies were veiled at the time of *marriage*: hence it has been put for the whole ceremony itself. *Marriage* is an institution which, by those who have been blessed with the light of Divine Revelation, has always been considered as sacred: among the lower orders of society, the day of their *wedding* is often converted into a day of riot and intemperance: the Roman Catholics in England are allowed to have their *nuptials* solemnized by a priest of their own persuasion.

MARRIAGE, MATRIMONY, WEDLOCK.

MARRIAGE (*v. Marriage*) is oftener an act than a state: MATRIMONY and WED-LOCK both describe states.

Marriage is taken in the sense of an act, when we speak of the laws of *marriage*, the day of one's *marriage*, a happy or unhappy *marriage*, the fruits of one's *marriage*, and the like; it is taken in the sense of a state, when we speak of the pleasures or pains of *marriage*; but in this latter case *matrimony*, which signifies a *married* life abstractedly from all agents or acting persons, is preferable; so likewise, to think of *matrimony*, and to enter into the holy state of *matrimony*, are expressions founded upon the signification of the term. As *matrimony* is derived from *mater*, a mother, because *married* women are in general mothers, it has particular reference to the domestic state of the two parties; broils are but too frequently the fruits of *matrimony*, yet there are few cases in which they might not be obviated by the good sense of those who are engaged in them. Hasty *marriages* cannot be expected to produce happiness; young people who are eager for *matrimony* before they are fully aware of its consequences will pur-

chase their experience at the expense of their peace.

Wedlock is the old English word for *matrimony*, and is in consequence admitted in law, when one speaks of children born in *wedlock*; agreeably to its derivation it has a reference to the bond of union which follows the *marriage*: hence one speaks of living happily in a state of *wedlock*, of being joined in holy *wedlock*.

MARTIAL, WARLIKE, MILITARY, SOLDIER-LIKE.

MARTIAL, from *Mars*, the god of war, is the Latin term for belonging to war: **WARLIKE** signifies literally like *war*, having the image of war. In sense these terms approach so near to each other, that they may be easily admitted to supply each other's place; but custom, the lawgiver of language, has assigned an office to each that makes it not altogether indifferent how they are used. *Martial* is both a technical and a more comprehensive term than *warlike*; on the other hand, *warlike* designates the temper of the individual more than *martial*: we speak of *martial* array, *martial* preparations, *martial* law, a court *martial*; but of a *warlike* nation, meaning a nation which is fond of war; a *warlike* spirit or temper, also a *warlike* appearance, inasmuch as the temper is visible in the air and carriage of a man.

MILITARY, from *miles*, signifies belonging to a soldier, and **SOLDIER-LIKE** like a soldier. *Military* in comparison with *martial* is a term of particular import, *martial* having always a reference to war in general; and *military* to the proceedings consequent upon that: hence we speak of *military* in distinction from naval, as *military* expeditions, *military* movements, and the like; but in characterizing the men, we should say that they had a *martial* appearance; but of a particular place, that it had a *military* appearance, if there were many soldiers.

Military, compared with *soldier-like*, is used for the body, and the latter for the individual. The whole army is termed the *military*: the conduct of an individual is *soldier-like* or otherwise.

MATTER, MATERIALS, SUBJECT.

MATTER and **MATERIALS** are both derived from the same source, namely the Latin *materia*, which comes in all probability from *mater* a mother, because *matter* from which every thing is made, acts in the production of bodies like a mother.

SUBJECT, in Latin *subjectum*, participle of *subjicio* to lie, signifies the thing lying under and forming the foundation.

Matter in the physical application is taken for all that composes the sensible world in distinction from that which is spiritual or discernible only by the thinking faculty; hence *matter* is always opposed to mind.

In regard to *materials* it is taken in an indivisible as well as a general sense; the whole universe is said to be composed of *matter*, though not of *materials*: and *matter* is said of those things which are the natural parts of the universe: *materials* consist of those particular parts of *matter* which serve for the artificial production of objects; a house, a table, and a chair, consist of *materials* because they are works of art; but a plant, a tree, an animal body, consist of *matter* because they are the productions of nature.

The distinction of these terms in their moral application is very similar: the *matter* which composes a moral discourse is what emanates from the author; but the *materials* are those with which one is furnished by others. The style of some writers is so indifferent that they disgrace the *matter* by the manner; periodical writers are furnished with *materials* for their productions out of the daily occurrences in the political and moral world. Writers of dictionaries endeavour to compress as much *matter* as possible into a small space; they draw their *materials* from every other writer.

Matter seems to bear the same relation to *subject* as the whole does to any particular part, as it respects moral objects: the *subject* is the groundwork of the *matter*; the *matter* is that which flows out of the subject: the *matter* is that which we get by the force of invention; the *subject* is that which offers itself to notice: many persons may therefore have a *subject* who have no *matter*, that is, nothing in their own minds which they can offer by way of illustrating this *subject*; but it is not possible to have *matter* without a *subject*: hence the word *matter* is taken for the substance, and for that which is substantial: the *subject* is taken for that which engages the attention: we speak of a *subject* of conversation and *matter* for deliberation; a *subject* of inquiry, a *matter* of curiosity. Nations in a barbarous state afford but little *matter* worthy to be recorded in history; people who live a secluded life and in a contracted sphere have but few *subjects* to occupy their attention.

MAXIM, PRECEPT, RULE, LAW.

MAXIM (v. *Axiom*) is a moral truth that carries its own weight with itself. **PRECEPT** (v. *Command*), **RULE** (v. *Guide*),

and LAW, from *lex* and *lego*, signifying the thing specifically chosen or marked out, all borrow their weight from some external circumstance: the *precept* derives its authority from the individual delivering it; the *rule* acquires a worth from its fitness for guiding us in our proceeding; the *law*, which is a species of *rule*, derives its weight from the sanction of power. *Maxims* are often *precepts* inasmuch as they are communicated to us by our parents; they are *rules* inasmuch as they serve as a *rule* for our conduct; they are *laws* inasmuch as they have the sanction of conscience. We respect the *maxims* of antiquity as containing the essence of human wisdom; we reverence the *precepts* of religion as the foundation of all happiness; we regard the *rules* of prudence as preserving us from errors and misfortunes; we respect the *laws* as they are the basis of civil society,

MEAN, PITIFUL, SORDID.

The moral application of these terms to the characters of men, in their transactions with each other, is what constitutes their common signification. Whatever a man does in common with those below him is MEAN; it evinces a temper that is prone to sink rather than to rise in the scale of society: whatever makes him an object of pity, and consequently of contempt for his sunken character, makes him PITIFUL: whatever makes him grovel and crawl in the dust, licking up the dross and filth of the earth, is SORDID, from the Latin *sordeo* to be filthy and nasty. *Meanness* is in many cases only relatively bad: for instance what is *meanness* in one, might be generosity or prudence in another: the due estimate of circumstances is allowable in all, but it is *meanness* for any one to attempt to save at the expense of others, that which he can conveniently afford either to give or pay: hence an undue spirit of seeking gain or advantage for one's self to the detriment of others, is denominated a *mean* temper. *Pitifulness* goes farther than *meanness*: it is not merely that which degrades, but unmans the person; it is that which is bad as well as low: when the fear of evil or the love of gain prompts a man to sacrifice his character and forfeit his veracity he becomes truly *pitiful*. *Sordidness* is peculiarly applicable to one's love of gain; although of a more corrupt, yet it is not of so degrading a nature as the two former; the *sordid* man does not deal in trifles like the *mean* man; and has nothing so low and vicious in him as the *pitiful* man. A continual habit of getting money will engender a *sordid* love of it in the human

mind; but nothing short of a radically wicked character leads a man to be *pitiful*. We think lightly of a *mean* man: we hold a *pitiful* man in profound contempt: we hate a *sordid* man. *Meanness* descends to that which is insignificant and worthless; *pitifulness* sinks into that which is despicable: *sordidness* contaminates the mind with what is foul.

MEAN, MEDIUM.

MEAN is but a contraction of MEDIUM, which signifies in Latin the middle path. The term *mean* is used abstractedly in all speculative matters: there is a *mean* in opinions between the two extremes: this *mean* is doubtless the point nearest to truth. *Medium* is employed in practical matters; computations are often erroneous from being too high or too low: the *medium* is in this case the one most to be preferred. The moralist will always recommend the *mean* in all opinions that widely differ from each other: between insolent resistance or *mean* compliance; discretion recommends the *medium* or middle course.

MEETING, INTERVIEW.

MEETING, from to meet, is the act of meeting or coming into the company of any one: INTERVIEW, compounded of *inter* between, and *view* to view, is a personal view of each other. A *meeting* is an ordinary concern, and its purpose familiar; *meetings* are daily taking place between friends; an *interview* is extraordinary and formal: its object is commonly business; an *interview* sometimes takes place between princes, or commanders of armies.

MELODY, HARMONY, ACCORDANCE.

MELODY, in Latin *melodus* from *melos*, in Greek *μελος* a verse, and the Hebrew *mela* a word or a verse.

HARMONY, in Latin *harmonia*, Greek *αἰσωνία* concord, from *αἰω* *apto* to fit or suit, signifies the agreement of sounds.

ACCORDANCE denotes the act or state of according (*v.* To agree).

Melody signifies any measured or modulated sounds measured after the manner of verse into distinct members or parts; *harmony* signifies the suiting or adapting different modulated sounds to each other; *melody* is therefore to *harmony* as a part to the whole: we must first produce *melody* by the rules of art; the *harmony* which follows must be regulated by the ear: there may be *melody* without *harmony*, but there cannot be *harmony* without *melody*: we speak of simple *melody* where the modes of music

are not very much diversified; but we cannot speak of *harmony* unless there be a variety of notes to fall in with each other.

A voice is *melodious* inasmuch as it is capable of producing a regularly modulated note; it is *harmonious* inasmuch as it strikes agreeable on the ear, and produces no discordant sounds. The song of a bird is *melodious* or has *melody* in it, inasmuch as there is a concatenation of sounds in it which are admitted to be regular, and consequently agreeable to the musical ear; there is *harmony* in a concert of voices and instruments.

Accordance is strictly speaking the property on which both *melody* and *harmony* is founded: for the whole of music depends on an *accordance* of sounds. The same distinction marks *accordance* and *harmony* in the moral application. There may be occasional *accordance* of opinion or feeling; but *harmony* is an entire *accordance* in every point.

MEMBER, LIMB.

MEMBER in Latin *membrum*, probably from the Greek *μερος* a part, because a *member* is properly a part.

LIMB is connected with the word *lame*.

Member is a general term applied either to the animal body or to other bodies, as a *member* of a family, or a *member* of a community: *limb* is applicable to animal bodies; *limb* is therefore a species of *member*; for every *limb* is a *member*, but every *member* is not a *limb*.

The *members* of the body comprehend every part which is capable of performing a distinct office; but the *limbs* are those jointed *members* that are distinguished from the head and the body: the nose and the eyes are *members* but not *limbs*; the arms and legs are properly denominated *limbs*.

MEMORY, REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, REMINISCENCE.

MEMORY, in Latin *memoria* or *memor*, Greek *μνημων* and *μνασμαι*, comes in all probability from *μερος* the mind, because *memory* is the principal faculty of the mind.

REMEMBRANCE, from the verb *remember*, contracted from *re* and *memoro* to bring back to the mind, comes from *memor*, as before.

RECOLLECTION, from *recollect*, compounded of *re* and *collect*, signifies *collecting* again.

REMINISCENCE, in Latin *reminiscencia* from *reminiscor* and *memor*, as before, signifies bringing back to the mind what was there before.

Memory is the power of recalling images

once made on the mind; *remembrance*, *recollection*, and *reminiscence*, are operations or exertions of this power, which vary in their mode.

The *memory* is a power which exerts itself either independently of the will, or in conformity with the will; but all the other terms express the acts of conscious agents, and consequently are more or less connected with the will. In dreams the *memory* exerts itself. *Remembrance* is the exercise of *memory* in a conscious agent; it may be the effect of repetition or habit, as in the case of a child who *remembers* his lesson after having learnt it several times; or of a horse who *remembers* the road which he has been continually passing; or it may be the effect of association and circumstances, by which images are casually brought back to the mind. In these cases *remembrance* is an involuntary act; for things return to the mind before one is aware of it, as in the case of one who hears a particular name, and *remembers* that he has to call on a person of the same name; or of one who, on seeing a particular tree, *remembers* all the circumstances of his youth which were connected with a similar tree.

Remembrance is however likewise a voluntary act, and the consequence of a direct determination, as in the case of a child who strives to *remember* what it has been told by its parent; or of a friend who *remembers* the hour of meeting another friend.

The power of *memory*, and the simple exercise of that power in the act of *remembering*, are possessed in common, though in different degrees, by man and brute; but *recollection* and *reminiscence* are exercises of the *memory* that are connected with the higher faculties of man, his judgment and understanding. To *remember* is to call to mind that which has once been presented to the mind; but to *recollect* is to *remember* afresh, to *remember* what has been *remembered* before. *Remembrance* busies itself with objects that are at hand; *recollection* carries us back to distant periods: simple *remembrance* is engaged in things that have but just left the mind, *recollection* tries to retrace the faint images of things that have been so long unthought of as to be almost obliterated from the *memory*. In this manner we are said to *remember* in one half hour what was told us in the preceding or to *remember* what passes from one day to another; but we *recollect* the incidents of childhood; we *recollect* what happened in our native place after years' of absence from it. *Remembrance* is

that homely, every-day exercise of the *memory* which renders it of essential service in the acquirement of knowledge, or in the performance of one's duties; *recollection* is that exalted exercise of the *memory* which affords us the purest of enjoyments and serves the noblest of purposes; the *recollection* of all the minute incidents of childhood is a more sincere pleasure than any which the present moment can afford.

Reminiscence, if it deserve any notice as a word of English use, is altogether an abstract exercise of the *memory*, which is employed on purely intellectual ideas in distinction from those which are awakened by sensible objects; the mathematician makes use of *reminiscence* in deducing unknown truths from those which he already knows. *Reminiscence* among the disciples of Socrates was the *remembrance* of things purely intellectual, or of that natural knowledge which the souls had had before their union with the body, whilst the *memory* was exercised upon sensible things, or that knowledge which was acquired through the medium of the senses: therefore the Latins said that *reminiscence* belonged exclusively to man because it was purely intellectual, but that *memory* was common to all animals because it was merely the depot of the senses; but this distinction, from what has been before observed is only preserved as it respects the meaning of *reminiscence*.

Memory is a generic term, as has been already shown; it includes the common idea of reviving former impressions, but does not qualify the nature of the ideas revived: the term is however extended in its application to signify not merely a power but also a seat or resting-place, as is likewise *remembrance* and *recollection*; but still with this difference, that the *memory* is spacious, and contains every thing; the *remembrance* and *recollection* are partial, and comprehend only passing events; we treasure up knowledge in our *memory*; the occurrences of a preceding year are still fresh in our *remembrance* or *recollection*.

MENTAL, INTELLECTUAL.

There is the same difference between MENTAL and INTELLECTUAL as between *mind* and *intellect*; the *mind* comprehends the thinking faculty in general, with all its operations; the *intellect* includes only that part of it which consists in understanding and judgment: *mental* is therefore opposed to corporeal: *intellectual* is opposed to sensual or physical: *mental* exertions are not to be expected from all; *intellectual* enjoyments fall to the lot of comparatively few.

Objects, pleasures, pains, operations, gifts, etc. are denominated *mental*; subjects, conversation, pursuits, and the like, are entitled *intellectual*. It is not always easy to distinguish our *mental* from our corporeal pleasures which we enjoy in common with the brutes: the latter are however greatly heightened by the former in whatever degree they are blended: in a society of well-informed persons the conversation will turn principally on *intellectual* subjects.

TO MENTION, NOTICE.

MENTION from *mens* mind signifies here to bring to mind.

NOTICE (*v. To mark*).

These terms are synonymous only in as much as they imply the act of calling things to another person's mind. We *mention* a thing in direct terms: we *notice* it indirectly or in a casual manner; we *mention* that which may serve as information; we *notice* that which may be merely of a personal or incidental nature. One friend *mentions* to another what has passed at a particular meeting: in the course of conversation he *notices* to his companion the badness of the road, the wideness of the street, or the like.

MERCANTILE, COMMERCIAL.

MERCANTILE, from *merchandize*, respects the actual transaction of business, or a transfer of *merchandize* by sale or purchase; COMMERCIAL comprehends the theory and practice of *commerce*: hence we speak in a peculiar manner of a *mercantile* house, a *mercantile* town, a *mercantile* situation, and the like; but of a *commercial* education, a *commercial* people, and the like.

MESSAGE, ERRAND.

MESSAGE, from the Latin *missus*, participle of *mitto* to send, signifies the thing sent.

ERRAND, from *erro* to wander or to go to a distance, signifies the thing for which one goes to a distance.

The *message* is properly any communication which is conveyed; the *errand* is that which causes one to go: servants are the bearers of *messages*, and are sent on various *errands*. A *message* may be either verbal or written; an *errand* is limited to no form, and to no circumstance: one delivers the *message* and goes the *errand*. Sometimes the *message* may be the *errand*, and the *errand* may include the *message*; thus it is that the greater part of *errands*

consist of sending *messages* from one person to another.

MINDFUL, REGARDFUL, OBSERVANT.

MINDFUL (*v. To attend to*) respects that which we wish from others; **REGARDFUL** (*v. To regard*) respects that which in itself demands *regard* or serious thought; **OBSERVANT** respects both that which is communicated by others, or that which carries its own obligations with it: a child should always be *mindful* of its parents' instructions: every one should be *regardful* of his several duties and obligations: one ought to be *observant* of one's religious duties. By being *mindful* of what one hears from the wise and good, one learns to be wise and good; by being *regardful* of what is due to one's self, and to society at large, one learns to pass through the world with satisfaction to one's self and esteem from others; by being *observant* of rule and order, we afford to others a salutary example for their imitation.

MINISTER, AGENT.

MINISTER comes from *minus* less, as *magister* comes from *magis* more; the one being less, and the other more, than the rest of mankind: the *minister*, therefore, is literally one that acts in a subordinate capacity: and the **AGENT** (from *ago* to act) is the one that takes the acting part: they both perform the will of another, but the *minister* performs a higher part than the *agent*: the *minister* gives his counsel, and exerts his intellectual powers in the service of another; but the *agent* executes the orders or commission given him: a *minister* is employed by government in political affairs; an *agent* is employed by individuals in commercial and pecuniary affairs, or by government in subordinate matters.

TO MINISTER, ADMINISTER, CONTRIBUTE.

TO MINISTER, from the noun *minister*, in the sense of a servant (*v. Minister*), signifies to act in subservience to another in that which is wrong: we *minister* to the caprices and indulgences of another when we encourage them unnecessarily.

ADMINISTER, on the other hand, is taken in the good sense of serving another to his advantage; thus the good Samaritan *administered* to the comfort of the man who had fallen among thieves. **CONTRIBUTE** (*v. To conduce*) is taken in either a good or bad sense; we may *contribute* to the relief

of the indigent, or we may *contribute* to the follies and vices of others.

Princes are often placed in the unfortunate situation, that those who should direct them in early life only *minister* to their vices: it is the part of the Christian to *administer* comfort to those who are in want, consolation to the afflicted, advice to those who require it, help to those who are feeble, and support to those who cannot uphold themselves: it is the part of all who are in high stations to *contribute* to the dissemination of religion and morality among their dependants.

MIRTH, MERRIMENT, JOVIALITY, JOLLITY, HILARITY.

These terms all express that species of gaiety or joy which belongs to company, or to men in their social intercourse.

MIRTH refers to the feeling displayed in the outward conduct: **MERRIMENT** and the other terms, refer rather to the external expressions of the feeling, or the causes of the feeling, than to feeling itself: *mirth* shows itself in laughter, in dancing, singing, and noise; *merriment* consists of such things as are apt to excite *mirth*: the more we are disposed to laugh, the greater is our *mirth*; the more there is to create laughter, the greater is the *merriment*: the tricks of Punch, or the jokes of a clown, cause much *mirth* among the gaping crowd of rustics; the amusements with the swing, or the roundabout, afford much *merriment* to the visitants of a fair. *Mirth* is confined to no age or station; but *merriment* belongs more particularly to young people, or those of the lower station; *mirth* may be provoked wherever any number of persons is assembled; *merriment* cannot go forward any where so properly as at fairs, or common and public places. **JOVIALITY** or **JOLLITY**, and **HILARITY**, are species of *merriment* which belong to the convivial board, or to less refined indulgences: *joviality* or *jollity* is the unrefined, unlicensed indulgence in the pleasures of the table, or any social entertainments; *hilarity* is the same thing qualified by the cultivation and good sense of the company; we may expect to find much *joviality* and *jollity* at a public dinner of mechanics, watermen, or labourers: we may expect to find *hilarity* at a public dinner of noblemen: eating, drinking, and noise, constitute the *joviality*; the conversation, the songs, the toasts, and the public spirit of the company contribute to *hilarity*.

TO MISCONSTRUE, MISINTERPRET.

MISCONSTRUE and **MISINTERPRET**

signify to explain in a wrong way; but the former respects the sense of one's words, the latter the implication of one's actions: those who indulge in a light mode of speech towards children are liable to be *misconstrued*; too great a tenderness to the criminal may be easily *misinterpreted* into favour of the crime.

These words may likewise be employed in speaking of language in general; but the former respects the literal transmission of foreign ideas into our native language; the latter respects the general sense which one affixes to any set of words, either in a native or foreign language: the learner of a language will unavoidably *misconstrue* it at times; in all languages there are ambiguous expressions, which are liable to *misinterpretation*. *Misconstruing* is the consequence of ignorance; *mis-interpretation* of particular words is often the consequence of prejudice and voluntary blindness, particularly in the explanation of the law or of the Scriptures.

TO MIX, MINGLE, BLEND, CONFOUND.

MIX, is in German *mischen*, Latin *misco*, Greek *μισγω*, Hebrew *mazeg*. MINGLE, in Greek *μυγνυμι*, is but a variation of *mix*.

BLEND, in German *blenden* to dazzle, comes from *blind*, signifying to see confusedly, or confused objects in a general way.

CONFOUND, *v. Confound*.

Mix is here a general and indefinite term, signifying simply to put together; but we may *mix* two or several things; we *mingle* several objects: things are *mixed* so as to lose all distinction; but they may be *mingled* and yet retain a distinction: liquids *mix* so as to become one, and individuals *mix* in a crowd so as to be lost; things are *mingled* together of different sizes if they lie in the same spot, but they may still be distinguished. To *blend* is only partially to *mix*, as colours *blend* which fall into each other: to *confound* is to *mix* in a wrong way, as objects of sight are *confounded* when they are erroneously taken to be joined.

To *mix* and *mingle* are mostly applied to material objects, except in poetry; to *blend* and *confound* are mental operations, and principally employed on spiritual subjects: thus, events and circumstances are *blended* together in a narrative; the ideas of the ignorant are *confounded* in most cases, but particularly when they attempt to think for themselves.

MIXTURE, MEDLEY, MISCELLANY.

MIXTURE is the thing *mixed*. *v. To mix*.

MEDLEY, from *meddle* or *middle*, signifies what comes between another.

MISCELLANY, in Latin *miscellaneous*, from *misceo* to *mix*, signifies also a *mixture*.

The term *mixture* is general; whatever objects can be *mixed* will form a *mixture*: a *medley* is a *mixture* of things not fit to be *mixed*: and a *miscellany* is a *mixture* of many different things. Flower, water, and eggs, may form a *mixture* in the proper sense; but if to these were added all sorts of spices, it would form a *medley*. *Miscellany* is a species applicable only to intellectual subjects; the *miscellaneous* is opposed to that which is systematically arranged; essays are *miscellaneous* in distinction from works on one particular subject.

MODERATION, MEDIOCRITY.

MODERATION (*v. Modesty*) is the characteristic of persons; MEDIOCRITY (that is, the mean or medium), characterizes their condition: *moderation* is a virtue of no small importance for beings who find excess in every thing to be an evil; *mediocrity* in external circumstances is exempt from all the evils which attend either poverty or riches.

MODEST, BASHFUL, DIFFIDENT.

MODEST, in Latin *modestus*, from *modus* a measure, signifies setting a measure to one's estimate of one's self.

BASHFUL signifies ready to be abashed.

DIFFIDENT, *v. Distrustful*.

Modesty is a habit or principle of the mind; *bashfulness* is a state of feeling: *modesty* is at all times becoming; *bashfulness* is only becoming in females, or very young persons, in the presence of their superiors: *modesty* discovers itself in the absence of every thing assuming, whether in look, word, or action; *bashfulness* betrays itself by a downcast look, and a timid air: a *modest* deportment is always commendable; a *bashful* temper is not desirable.

Modesty is a proper distrust of ourselves; *diffidence* is a culpable distrust. *Modesty* though opposed to assurance, is not incompatible with a confidence in ourselves; *diffidence* altogether unmans a person, and disqualifies him for his duty: a person is generally *modest* in the display of his talents to others; but a *diffident* man cannot turn his talents to his own use.

MODESTY, MODERATION, TEMPERANCE, SOBRIETY.

MODESTY, in French *modestie*, Latin *modestia*, and MODERATION, in Latin *moderatio* and *moderor*, both come from *modus* a measure, limit or boundary; that is, forming a measure or rule.

TEMPERANCE, in Latin *temperantia*, from *tempus* time, signifies fixing a time (*v. Abstemious*).

SOBRIETY, *v. Abstemious*.

Modesty lies in the mind, and in the tone of feeling; *moderation* respects the desires: *modesty* is a principle that acts discretionally; *moderation* is a rule or line that acts as a restraint on the views and the outward conduct.

Modesty consists in a fair and medium estimate of one's character and qualification; it guards a man against too high an estimate: it recommends to him an estimate below the reality: *moderation* consists in a suitable regulation of one's desires, demands, and expectations; it consequently depends very often on *modesty* as its groundwork: he who thinks *modestly* of his own acquirements, will be *moderate* in his expectations of praise; he, on the other hand, who overrates his own abilities and qualifications, will consequently be *immoderate* in the price which he sets upon his services: in such cases, therefore, *modesty* and *moderation* are to each other as cause and effect; but there may be *modesty* without *moderation*, and *moderation* without *modesty*. *Modesty* is a sentiment confined to one's self as the object, and consisting solely of one's judgment, of what one is, and what one does; but *moderation*, as is evident from the above, extends to objects that are external of ourselves: *modesty*, rather than *moderation*, belongs to an author; *moderation*, rather than *modesty*, belongs to a tradesman, or a man who has gains to make and purposes to answer.

Moderation is the measure of one's desires, one's habits, one's actions, and one's words; *temperance* is the adaption of the time or season for particular feelings, actions, or words: a man is said to be *moderate* in his principles who adopts the medium or middle course of thinking; it rather qualifies the thing than the person: he is said to be *temperate* in his anger, if he do not suffer it to break out into any excesses: *temperance* characterizes the person rather than the thing.

A *moderate* man in politics endeavours to steer clear of all party spirit, and is consequently so *temperate* in his language

as to provoke no animosity. *Moderation* in the enjoyment of every thing is essential in order to obtain the purest pleasure: *temperance* in one's indulgences is always attended with the happiest effects to the constitution; as, on the contrary, any deviation from *temperance*, even in a single instance, is always punished with bodily pain and sickness.

Temperance and *sobriety* have already been considered in their proper application, which will serve to illustrate their improper application (*v. Abstemious*). *Temperance* is an action; it is the *tempering* of our words and actions to the circumstances: *sobriety* is a state in which one is exempt from every stimulus to deviate from the right course; as a man who is intoxicated with wine runs into excesses, and loses that power of guiding himself which he has when he is *sober*, so is he who is intoxicated with any passion, in like manner, hurried away into irregularities which a man in his right senses will not be guilty of: *sobriety* is, therefore, the state of being in one's right or sober senses; and *sobriety* is with regard to *temperance*, as a cause to the effect; *sobriety* of mind will not only produce *moderation* and *temperance*, but extend its influence to the whole conduct of a man to his internal behaviour; hence we speak of *sobriety* in one's mien or deportment, *sobriety* in one's dress and manners, *sobriety* in one's religious opinions and observances.

MOISTURE, HUMIDITY, DAMPNESS.

MOISTURE, from the French *moite* moist, is probably contracted from the Latin *humidus*, from which HUMIDITY is immediately derived.

DAMPNESS comes from the German *dampfen* a vapour.

Moisture is used in general to express any small degree of infusion of a liquid into a body; *humidity* is employed scientifically to describe the state of having any portion of liquid: hence we speak of the *moisture* of a table, the *moisture* of paper, or the *moisture* of a floor that has been wetted; but of the *humidity* of the air, or of a wall that has contracted *moisture* of itself. *Dampness* is that species of *moisture* that arises from the gradual contraction of a liquid in bodies capable of retaining it; in this manner a cellar is *damp*, or linen that has lain long by may become *damp*.

MONEY, CASH.

MONEY comes from the Latin *moneta*, which signified stamped coin, from *moneo*

to advise, to inform of its value, by means of an inscription or stamp.

CASH, from the French *caisse* a chest, signifies that which is put in a chest.

* *Money* is applied to every thing which serves as a circulating medium: *cash* is, in a strict sense, put for coin only; bank notes are *money*; guineas and shillings are *cash*: all *cash* is therefore *money*, but all *money* is not *cash*. The only *money* the Chinese have are square bits of metal, with a hole through the centre, by which they are strung upon a string: travellers on the Continent must always be provided with letters of credit, which may be turned into *cash*, as convenience requires.

MONUMENT, MEMORIAL, REMEMBRANCE.

MONUMENT, in Latin *monumentum* or *monimentum*, from *moneo* to advise or remind, signifies that which puts us in mind of something.

MEMORIAL, from *memory*, signifies the thing that helps the memory; and REMEMBRANCER, from *remember* (v. *Memory*), the thing that causes to remember.

From the above it is clear that these terms have, in their original derivation, precisely the same signification, and differ in their collateral acceptations: *monument* is applied to that which is purposely set up to keep a thing in mind; *memorials* and *remembrancers* are any things which are calculated to call a thing to mind: a *monument* is used to preserve a public object of notice from being forgotten; a *memorial* serves to keep an individual in mind: the *monument* is commonly understood to be a species of building; as a tomb which preserves the *memory* of the dead, or a pillar which preserves the *memory* of some public event: the *memorial* consists of something which was the property or in the possession, of another; as his picture, his handwriting, his hair, and the like. The *Monument* at London was built to commemorate the dreadful fire of the city in the year 1666; friends who are at a distance are happy to have some token of each other's regard, which they keep as a *memorial* of their former intercourse.

The *monument* in its proper sense, is made of wood or stone for some specific purpose; but in the improper sense, any thing may be termed a *monument* when it serves the purpose of reminding the public of any circumstance: thus, the pyramids are *monuments* of antiquity; the actions of a good prince are more lasting *monu-*

ments than either brass or marble. *Memorials* are always of a private nature, and at the same time such as remind us naturally of the object to which they have belonged; this object is generally some person, but it may likewise refer to some thing, if it be of a personal nature: our Saviour instituted the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper as a *memorial* of his death.

A *memorial* respects some object external of ourselves; the *remembrancer* is said of that which directly concerns ourselves and our particular duty: a man leaves *memorials* of himself to whomsoever he leaves his property; but the *remembrancer* is that which we acquire for ourselves: the *memorial* revives in our minds what we owe to another; the *remembrancer* puts us in mind of what we owe to ourselves, it is that which recalls us to a sense of our duty: a gift is the best *memorial* we can give of ourselves to another; a sermon is often a good *remembrancer* of the duties which we have neglected to perform.

MOTION, MOVEMENT.

These are both abstract terms to denote the act of *moving*, but MOTION is taken generally abstractedly from the thing that *moves*; MOVEMENT, on the other hand, is taken in connexion with the agent or thing that *moves*: hence we speak of a state of *motion* as opposed to a state of rest, of perpetual *motion*, the laws of *motion*, and the like; on the other hand, we say, to make a *movement* when speaking of an army, a general *movement* when speaking of an assembly.

When *motion* is qualified by the thing that *moves*, it denotes continued *motion*; but *movement* implies only a particular *motion*: hence we say, the *motion* of the heavenly bodies, the *motion* of the earth; a person is in continual *motion*, or an army is in *motion*; but a person makes a *movement* who rises or sits down, or goes from one chair to another; the different *movements* of the springs and wheels of any instrument.

MOURNFUL, SAD.

MOURNFUL signifies full of what causes *mourning*; SAD (v. *Dull*), signifies either a painful sentiment, or what causes this painful sentiment. The difference in the sentiment, constitutes the difference between these epithets: the *mournful* awakens tender and sympathetic feelings: the *sad* oppresses the spirits and makes one heavy at heart; a *mournful* tale contains an account of other's distresses; a *sad* story contains an account of one's own distress; a *mournful* event

* Vide Trucler: „Money, cash.“

befalls our friends and relatives; a *sad* misfortune befalls ourselves.

MOVING, AFFECTING, PATHETIC.

The MOVING is in general whatever moves the affections or the passions; the AFFECTING and PATHETIC are what move the affections in different degrees. The good or bad feelings may be *moved*; the tender feelings only are *affected*. A field of battle is a *moving* spectacle: the death of king Charles was an *affecting* spectacle.

The *affecting* acts by means of the senses, as well as the understanding; the *pathetic* applies only to what is addressed to the heart: hence, a sight or a description is *affecting*; but an address is *pathetic*.

MULTITUDE, CROWD, THRONG, SWARM.

The idea of many is common to all these terms, and peculiar to that of MULTITUDE, from the Latin *multus*; CROWD, from the verb to *crowd*, signifies the many that *crowd* together; and THRONG, from the German *drängen* to press, signifies the many that press together: and SWARM, from the German *schwärmen* to fly about, signifies running together in numbers. These terms vary, either in regard to the object, or the circumstance: *multitude* is applicable to any object; *crowd*, *throng*, and *swarm*, are in the proper sense applicable mostly to animate objects; but *crowd* is figuratively applied to other objects that are pressed close together.

Swarm is commonly applied to bees which fly together in numbers, but sometimes to human beings, to denote their very great numbers when scattered about; as the *swarms* of children in low neighbourhoods. A *multitude* may be either in a stagnant or a moving state; all the rest denote a *multitude* in a moving state: a *crowd* is always pressing, generally eager and tumultuous; a *throng* may be busy and active, but not always pressing or incommodious: it is always inconvenient, sometimes dangerous to go into a *crowd*: it is amusing to see the *throng* that is perpetually passing in the streets of the city.

TO MUTILATE, MAIM, MANGLE.

MUTILATE, in Latin *mutilatus*, from *mutilo* and *mutilus*, Greek *μυτιλος* without horns, signifies to take off any necessary part.

MAIM and MANGLE are in all probability derived from the Latin *mancus*, which comes from *manus*, signifying to deprive of a hand or to wound in general.

Mutilate has the most extended mean-

ing; it implies the abridging of any limb: *mangle* is applied to irregular wounds in any part of the body: *maim* is confined to wounds in the hands. Men are exposed to be *mutilated* by means of cannon balls; they are in danger of being *mangled* when attacked promiscuously with the sword; they frequently get *maimed* when boarding vessels or storming places.

One is *mutilated* and *mangled* by active means; one becomes *maimed* by natural infirmity: *mutilate* and *mangle* are applicable to moral objects; *maim* is employed only in the natural sense. In this case *mangle* is a much stronger term than *mutilate*; the latter signifies to lop off an essential part; to *mangle* is to *mutilate* a thing to such a degree as to render it useless or worthless. Every sect of Christians is fond of *mutilating* the Bible, of setting aside such parts as do not favour its own scheme, and amongst them all the sacred Scriptures become literally *mangled*, and stripped of all its most important doctrines.

MUTUAL, RECIPROCAL.

MUTUAL, in Latin *mutuus* from *muto* to change, signifies exchanged so as to be equal or the same on both sides.

RECIPROCAL, in Latin *reciprocus* from *recipio* to take back, signifies giving backward and forward by way of return. *Mutual* supposes a sameness in condition at the same time: *reciprocal* supposes an alternation or succession of returns. * Exchange is free and voluntary; we give in exchange, and this action is *mutual*: return is made either according to law or equity; it is obligatory, and when equally obligatory on each in turn it is *reciprocal*. Voluntary disinterested services rendered to each other are *mutual*: imposed or merited services, returned from one to the other, are *reciprocal*: friends render one another *mutual* services; the services between servants and masters are *reciprocal*. The husband and wife pledge their faith to each other *mutually*; they are *reciprocally* bound to keep their vow of fidelity. The sentiment is *mutual*, the tie is *reciprocal*. *Mutual* applies mostly to matters of will and opinion: a *mutual* affection, a *mutual* inclination to oblige, a *mutual* interest, a *mutual* concern to avoid that which will displease the other—these are the sentiments which render the marriage state happy: *reciprocal* ties, *reciprocal* bonds, *reciprocal* rights, *reciprocal* duties—these are what every one ought to bear in mind as a mem-

* Vide Roubaud: „Mutual, reciproque.“

ber of society, that he may expect of no man more than what in equity he is disposed to return. *Mutual* applies to nothing but what is personal; *reciprocal* is applied to things remote from the idea of personality, as *reciprocal* verbs, *reciprocal* terms, *reciprocal* relations, and the like.

MYSTERIOUS, MYSTIC.

MYSTERIOUS (*v. Dark*) and **MYSTIC** are but variations of the same original; the former however is more commonly applied to that which is supernatural, or veiled in an impenetrable obscurity; the latter to that which is natural, but concealed by an artificial or fantastical veil; hence we speak of the *mysterious* plans of Providence: *mystic* schemes of theology or *mystic* principles.

N.

TO NAME, CALL.

NAME, from the Latin *nomen*, Greek *ονομα*, Hebrew *nam*, is properly to pronounce a word, but is now employed for distinguishing or addressing one by *name*. **To CALL** (*v. To Call*) signifies properly to address loudly by *name*, consequently we may *name* without *calling*, when we only mention a *name* in conversation; but we cannot very well *call* a person without *naming* him. The terms may however be employed in the sense of assigning a *name*. In this case a person is *named* by his *name*, whether proper, patronymic, or whatever is usual; he is *called* according to the characteristics by which he is distinguished. The emperor Tiberius was *named* Tiberius; he was *called* a monster. William the First of England is *named* William; he is *called* the Conqueror. Heleus went three times round the wooden horse in order to discover the snare, and, with the hope of taking the Greeks by surprise, *called* their principal captains, *naming* them by their *names*, and counterfeiting the voices of their wives. Many ancient nations in *naming* any one, *called* him the son of some one, as Richardson, the son of Richard, and Robertson, the son of Robert.

NAME, APPELLATIVE OR APPELLATION, TITLE, DENOMINATION.

NAME, *v. To name*.

APPELLATION, in French *appellation*, Latin *appellatio* from *appello* to call, signifies that by which a person is called.

TITLE, in French *titre*, Latin *titulus*, from the Greek *τιω* to honour, signifies that application which is assigned to any one for the purpose of honour.

DENOMINATION signifies that which *denominates* or distinguishes.

Name is a generic term, the rest are specific. Whatever word is employed to distinguish one thing from another is a *name*; therefore, an *appellation* and a *title* is a *name*, but not *vice versa*. or technically *appellative*.

A *name* is either common or proper; an *appellation* is generally a common *name* given for some specific purpose as characteristic. Several kings of France had the *names* of Charles, Louis, Philip, but one was distinguished by the *appellation* of the Stammerer, another by that of the Simple, and a third by that of the Hardy, arising from particular characters or circumstances.

A *title* is a species of *appellation*, not drawn from any thing personal, but conferred as a ground of political distinction. An *appellation* may be often a term of reproach; but a *title* is always a mark of honour. An *appellation* is given to all objects, animate or inanimate; a *title* is given mostly to persons, sometimes to things. A particular house may have the *appellation* of 'the Cottage' or 'the Hall'; as a particular person may have the *title* of Duke, Lord, or Marquis.

Denomination is to particular bodies, what *appellation* is to an individual; namely, a term of distinction, drawn from their peculiar characters and circumstances. The Christian world is split into a number of different bodies or communities, under the *denominations* of Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, Presbyterians, &c.

TO NAME, DENOMINATE, STYLE, ENTITLE, DESIGNATE, CHARACTERIZE.

To NAME (*v. To name, call*) signifies simply to give a *name* to, or to address or specify by the given *name*; to **DENOMINATE** is to give a specific *name* upon specific ground, to distinguish by the *name*; to **STYLE**, from the noun *style* or manner (*v. Diction, style*), signifies to address by a specific *name*; to **ENTITLE** is to give the specific or appropriate *name*. Adam *named* every thing; we *denominate* the man who drinks excessively, a drunkard; subjects *style* their monarch 'His Majesty'; books are *entitled* according to the judgment of the author. *To name, denominate, style, and entitle*, are the acts of conscious agents only.

To DESIGNATE, signifying to mark out, and **CHARACTERIZE**, signifying to form a *characteristic*. are said only of things, and agree with the former only inasmuch as words may either *designate* or *characterize*: thus

the word, capacity, is said to *designate* the power of holding; and, 'finesse' characterizes the people by whom it was adopted.

NAME, REPUTATION, REPUTE, CREDIT.

NAME is here taken in the improper sense for a *name* acquired in public by any peculiarity or quality in an object.

REPUTATION and REPUTE from, *reputo* or *re* and *puto* to think back, or in reference to some immediate object, signifies the state of being thought of by the public, or held in public estimation.

CREDIT (*v. Credit*) signifies the state of being believed or trusted in general.

Name implies something more specific than the *reputation*; and *reputation* something more substantial than *name*; a *name* may be acquired by some casualty or by some quality that has more show than worth; *reputation*, is acquired only by time, and built on merit; a *name* may be arbitrarily given, simply by way of distinction; *reputation* is not given, but acquired, or follows as a consequence of one's honourable exertions. A physician sometimes gets a *name* by a single instance of professional skill, but unless he have a commensurate degree of talent, this *name* will never ripen into a solid *reputation*.

Inanimate objects get a *name*, but *reputation* is applied only to persons or that which is personal. Fashion is liberal in giving a *name* to certain shops, certain streets, as well as to certain tradespeople, and the like. Universities, academies, and public institutions, acquire a *reputation* for their learning, or their encouragement and promotion of the arts and sciences. *Name* and *reputation* are of a more extended nature than *repute* and *credit*: strangers and distant countries hear of the *name* and the *reputation* of any thing; but only neighbours and those who have the means of personal observation can take a part in its *repute* and *credit*. It is possible, therefore, to have a *name* and *reputation* without having *repute* and *credit*, and *vice versa*, for the objects which constitute the former are sometimes different from those which produce the latter. A manufacturer has a *name* for the excellence of a particular article of his own manufacture; a book has a *name* among wittlings and pretenders to literature: a good writer seeks to establish his *reputation* for genius, learning, or some praise-worthy characteristic: a preacher is in high *repute* among those who attend him: a master gains great *credit* from the good performances of his scholars.

Name and *repute* are taken either in a

good or bad sense; *reputation* and *credit* are taken in the good sense only: a person or thing may get a good or an ill *name*; a person or thing may be in good or ill *repute*; *reputation* may rise to different degrees of height, or it may sink again to nothing, but it never sinks into that which is bad; *credit* may likewise be high or low, but when it becomes bad it is *discredit*. Families get an ill *name* for their meanness; houses of entertainment get a good *name* for their accommodation; houses fall into bad *repute* when said to be haunted; a landlord comes into high *repute* among his tenants, if he be considerate and indulgent towards them.

NASTY, FILTHY, FOUL.

NASTY is connected with *nauseous*.

FILTHY and FOUL are variations from the Greek *φαιλος*.

The idea of dirtiness is common to these terms, but in different degrees, and with different modifications. Whatever dirt is offensive to any of the senses, renders that thing *nasty* which is soiled with it: the *filthy* exceeds the *nasty*, not only in the quantity but in the offensive quality of the dirt; and the *foul* exceeds the *filthy* in the same proportion.

NATAL, NATIVE, INDIGENOUS.

NATAL, in Latin *natalis*, from *natus*, signifies belonging to one's birth, or the act of one's being born; but NATIVE, in Latin *nativus*, likewise from *natus*, signifies having the origin or beginning.

INDIGENOUS, in Latin *indigena*, from *inde* and *genitus*, signifies sprung from that place.

The epithet *natal* is applied only to the circumstance of a man's birth, as his *natal* day: his *natal* hour; a *natal* star. *Native* has a more extensive meaning, as it comprehends the idea of one's relationship by origin to an object; as one's *native* country, one's *native* soil, *native* village, or *native* place, *native* language, and the like. *Indigenous* is the same with regard to plants, as *native* in regard to human beings or animals.

NATIVE, NATURAL.

NATIVE (*v. Natal*) is to NATURAL as a species to the genus: every thing *native* is according to its strict signification *natural*; but many things are *natural* which are not *native*. Of a person we may say that his worth is *native*, to designate that it is some valuable property which is born with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon his cha-

racter; but we say of his disposition, that it is *natural*, as opposed to that which is acquired by habit. The former is always employed in a good sense, in opposition to what is artful, assumed and unreal; the other is used in an indifferent sense, as opposed to whatever is the effect of habit or circumstances. When children display themselves with all their *native* simplicity, they are interesting objects of notice: when they display their *natural* turn of mind, it is not always that which tends to raise human nature in our esteem.

NATURALLY, CONSEQUENTLY, OF COURSE.

The connexion between events, actions, and things, is expressed by all these terms. **NATURALLY** signifies according to the nature of things, and is applied therefore to the connexion which subsists between events according to the original constitution or inherent properties of things: **CONSEQUENTLY** signifies by a consequence, that is, by a necessary law of dependance, which makes one thing follow another: **OF COURSE** signifies on account of the course which things most commonly or even necessarily take.

Naturally describes things as they are; *consequently* and *of course*, represent them as they must be; *naturally* states facts or realities; *consequently* and *of course*, state the inferences drawn from those facts, or consequences resulting from them; a mob is *naturally* disposed to riot, and *consequently* it is dangerous to appeal to a mob for its judgment; soldiers leave the town *of course* at assize or election times. *Naturally* is opposed to the artificial or forced; *of course* is opposed to the irregular: *naturally* excludes the idea of design or purpose; *of course* includes the idea of arrangement and social order: the former is applicable to every thing that has an independent existence; the latter is applied to the constituted order of society: the former is, therefore, said of every object, animate or inanimate, having *natural* properties, and performing *natural* operations; the latter only of persons and their establishment. Plants that require much air *naturally* thrive most in an open country: members of a society, who do not forfeit their title by the breach of any rule or law, are readmitted *of course*, after ever so long an absence.

Consequently is either a speculative or a practical inference; *of course* is always practical. We know that all men must die, and *consequently* we expect to share the common lot of humanity: we see that our friends are particularly engaged at a certain

time *consequently* we do not interrupt them by calling upon them: when a man does not fulfil his engagements, he cannot *of course* expect to be rewarded, as if he had done his duty.

NECESSARY, EXPEDIENT, ESSENTIAL, REQUISITE.

NECESSARY (v. *Necessity*) from the Latin *necesse* and *ne cedo*, signifies not to be departed from.

EXPEDIENT signifies belonging to, or forming a part of, expedition.

ESSENTIAL signifies containing that essence or property which cannot be omitted.

REQUISITE signifies literally required (v. *To demand*).

Necessary is a general and indefinite term; things may be *necessary* in the course of nature; they may be *necessary* according to the circumstances of the case, or our views of *necessity*; in this manner we conceive it *necessary* to call upon another.

Expedient, *essential*, and *requisite*, are modes of relative *necessity*: the *expedience* of a thing is a matter of discretion and calculation; it may be *expedient* for a person to consult another, or it may not, according as circumstances may present themselves. The *requisite* and the *essential* are more obviously *necessary* than the *expedient*; but the former is less so than the latter: what is *requisite* may be *requisite* only in part or entirely; it may be *requisite* to complete a thing when begun, but not to begin it; the *essential*, on the contrary, is that which constitutes the *essence*, and without which a thing cannot exist. It is *requisite* for one who will have a good library to select only the best authors; exercise is *essential* for the preservation of health. In all matters of dispute it is *expedient* to be guided by some impartial judge; it is *requisite* for every member of the community to contribute his share to the public expenditure as far as he is able: it is *essential* to a teacher, to know more than those he teaches.

NECESSITIES, NECESSARIES.

NECESSITY, in Latin *necessitas*, and **NECESSARY**, in Latin *necessarius*, from *necesse*, or *ne* and *cesso*, signify not to be yielded or given up. *Necessity* is the mode or state of circumstances, or the thing which circumstances render *necessary*; the *necessary* is that which is absolutely and unconditionally *necessary*.

Art has ever been busy in inventing things to supply the various *necessities* of our nature, and yet there are always numbers

who want even the first *necessaries* of life. Habit and desire create *necessities*; nature only requires *necessaries*: a voluptuary has *necessities* which are unknown to a temperate man; the poor have in general little more than *necessaries*.

NECESSITY, NEED.

NECESSITY, *v. necessary*.

NEED in German *noth*, probably from the Greek *αναγκη* necessity.

Necessity respects the thing wanted; *need* the person wanting. There would be no *necessity* for punishments if there were not evil doers: he is peculiarly fortunate who finds a friend in time of *need*. *Necessity* is more pressing than *need*: the former places in a positive state of compulsion to act; it is said to have no law, it prescribes the law for itself: the latter yields to circumstances, and leaves in a state of deprivation. We are frequently under the *necessity* of going without that of which we stand most in *need*.

From these two nouns arise two epithets for each, which are worthy of observation, namely, *necessary* and *needful*, *necessitous* and *needy*. *Necessary* and *needful* are both applicable to the thing wanted; *necessitous* and *needy* to the person wanting; NECESSARY is applied to every object indiscriminately; NEEDFUL only to such objects as supply temporary or partial wants. Exercise is *necessary* to preserve the health of the body; restraint is *necessary* to preserve that of the mind; assistance is *needful* for one who has not sufficient resources in himself; money is *needful* for one who is travelling.

NECESSITOUS expresses more than *needy*: the former comprehends a general state of *necessity*; NEEDY expresses only a particular condition. It is charity to supply the wants of the *necessitous*, but those of the *needy* are sometimes not worthy of one's pity.

TO NEGLECT, OMIT.

NEGLECT, *v. disregard*.

OMIT, in Latin *omitto*, or *ob* and *mitto*, signifies to put aside.

The idea of letting pass or slip, or of not using, is comprehended in the signification of both these terms; the former is, however, a culpable, the latter an indifferent, action. What we *neglect* ought not to be *neglected*; but what we *omit* may be *omitted* or otherwise, as convenience requires. These terms differ likewise in the objects to which they are applied: that is *neglected* which is practicable or serves for

action; that is *omitted* which serves for intellectual purposes: we *neglect* an opportunity, we *neglect* the means, the time, the use and the like; we *omit* a word, a sentence, a figure, a stroke, a circumstance, and the like.

NEGLIGENT, REMISS, CARELESS, THOUGHTLESS, HEEDLESS, INATTENTIVE.

NEGLIGENCE (*v. To disregard*) and REMISSNESS respect the outward action: CARELESS, HEEDLESS, THOUGHTLESS, and INATTENTIVE, respect the state of the mind.

Negligence and *remissness* consist in not doing what ought to be done: *carelessness* and the other mental defects may show themselves in doing wrong, as well as not doing at all; *negligence* and *remissness* are, therefore, to *carelessness* and the others, as the effect to the cause; for no one is so apt to be *negligent* and *remiss* as he who is *careless*, although at the same time *negligence* and *remissness* arise from other causes, and *carelessness*, *thoughtlessness*, &c. produce likewise other effects. *Negligent* is a stronger term than *remiss*; one is *negligent* in *neglecting* the thing that is expressly before one's eyes; one is *remiss* in forgetting that which was enjoined some time previously: the want of will renders a person *negligent*; the want of interest renders a person *remiss*: one is *negligent* in regard to business, and the performance of bodily labour; one is *remiss* in duty, or in such things as respect mental exertion. Servants are commonly *negligent* in what concerns their master's interest; teachers are *remiss* in not correcting the faults of their pupils. *Negligence* is therefore the fault of persons of all descriptions, but particularly those in low condition: *remissness* is a fault peculiar to those in a more elevated station: a clerk in an office is *negligent* in not making proper memorandums: a magistrate, or the head of an institution, is *remiss* in the exercise of his authority to check irregularities.

Careless denotes the want of care (*v. Care*) in the manner of doing things; *thoughtless* denotes the want of thought or reflection about things; *heedless* denotes the want of heeding (*v. To attend*) or regarding things; *inattentive* denotes the want of attention to things (*v. attend to*).

One is *careless* in trivial matters of behaviour; one is *thoughtless* in matters of greater moment, in what respects the conduct. *Carelessness* is occasional, *thoughtlessness* is permanent; the former is inseparable from a state of childhood, the lat-

er is a constitutional defect, and sometimes attends a man to his grave. *Carelessness* as well as *thoughtlessness* betrays itself not only in the thing that immediately employs the mind, but also in those which regard futurity. We may not only be *careless* in not doing the thing well that we are about, but we may be *careless* in *neglecting* to do it at all, or *careless* about the event, or *careless* about our future interest; it still differs, however, from *thoughtless* in this, that it bespeaks a want of interest or desire for the thing; but *thoughtless* bespeaks the want of thinking or reflecting upon it: the *careless* person abstains from using the means, because he does not care about the end; the *thoughtless* person cannot act, because he does not think: the *careless* person sees the thing, but does not try to obtain it; the *thoughtless* person has not the thought of it in his mind.

Careless is applied to such things as require permanent care; *thoughtless* to such as require permanent thought. *Heedless* and *inattentive* are mostly applied to passing objects, or such at least as engage the senses or the thoughts of the moment.

One is *careless* in business, *thoughtless* in conduct, *heedless* in walking or running, *inattentive* in listening: *careless* and *thoughtless* persons neglect the necessary use of their powers; the *heedless* and *inattentive* neglect the use of their senses. *Careless* people are unfit to be employed in the management of any concerns; *thoughtless* people are unfit to have the management of themselves; *inattentive* children are unfit to be led by others. One is *careless* and *inattentive* in providing for his good; one is *thoughtless* and *heedless* in not guarding against evil: a *careless* person does not trouble himself about advancement; an *inattentive* person does not concern himself about improvement; a *thoughtless* person brings himself into distress: a *heedless* person exposes himself to accidents.

TO NEGOTIATE, TREAT FOR OR ABOUT, TRANSACT.

The idea of conducting business with others is included in the signification of all these terms; but they differ in the mode of conducting it, and the nature of the business to be conducted. **NEGOTIATE**, in the Latin *negotatus*, participle of *negotior*, from *negotium*, is applied in the original mostly to merchandise or traffic, but it is more commonly employed in the complicated concerns of governments and nations. **TREAT**, from the Latin *tracto*, frequentative of *traho* to draw, signifies to turn

over and over, or set forth in all ways: these two verbs, therefore, suppose deliberation: but **TRANSACT**, from *transactus*, participle of *transago*, to carry forward or bring to an end, supposes more direct agency than consultation or deliberation: this latter is therefore adopted to the more ordinary and less entangled concerns of commerce. *Negotiations* are conducted by many parties, and involve questions of peace or war, dominions, territories, rights of nations, and the like: *treaties* are often a part of *negotiations*; they are seldom conducted by more than two parties, and involve only partial questions, as in *treaties* about peace, about commerce, about the boundaries of any particular state. A congress carries on *negotiations* for the establishment of good order among the ruling powers of Europe; individual states *treat* with each other, to settle their particular differences. To *negotiate* mostly respects political concerns, except in the case of *negotiating* bills: to *treat*, as well as *transact*, is said of domestic and private concerns: we *treat* with a person about the purchase of a house; and *transact* our business with him by making good the purchase and paying down the money.

As nouns, *negotiation* expresses rather the act of deliberating than the thing deliberated: *treaty* includes the ideas of the terms proposed, and the arrangement of those terms: *transaction* expresses the idea of something actually done and finished. *Negotiations* are sometimes very long pending before the preliminary terms are even proposed, or any basis is defined; *treaties* of commerce are entered into by civilized countries, in order to obviate misunderstandings, and enable them to preserve an amicable intercourse; the *transactions* which daily pass in a great metropolis, like that of London, are of so multifarious a nature, that the bare contemplation of them fills the mind with astonishment. *Negotiations* are long or short; *treaties* are advantageous or the contrary; *transactions* are honourable or dishonourable.

NEIGHBOURHOOD. VICINITY.

NEIGHBOURHOOD, from *nigh*, signifies the place which is nigh, that is nigh to one's habitation.

VICINITY, from *vicus* a village, signifies the place which does not exceed in distance the extent of a village.

Neighbourhood, which is of Saxon origin, and first admitted into our language, is employed in reference to the inhabitants, or in regard to inhabited places; that is, it sig-

nifies either a community of neighbours, or the place they occupy: but *vicinity*, which in Latin bears the same acceptation as *neighbourhood*, is employed in English for the place in general, that is, near to the person speaking, whether inhabited or otherwise; hence the propriety of saying, a populous *neighbourhood*, a quiet *neighbourhood*, a respectable *neighbourhood*, and a pleasant *neighbourhood*, either as it respects the people or the country; to live in the *vicinity* of a manufactory, to be in the *vicinity* of the metropolis or of the sea.

NEWS, TIDINGS.

NEWS implies any thing *new* that is related or circulated; but TIDINGS, from *tide*, signifies that which flows in periodically like the *tide*. *News* is unexpected; it serves to gratify idle curiosity; *tidings* are expected; they serve to allay anxiety. In time of war the public are eager after *news*; and they who have relatives in the army, are anxious to have *tidings* of them.

NIGHTLY, NOCTURNAL.

NIGHTLY, immediately from the word *night*, and NOCTURNAL, from *nox* night, signify belonging to the night, or the night season: the former is more familiar than the latter; we speak of *nightly* depredations to express what passes every night, or *nightly* disturbances; *nocturnal* dreams, *nocturnal* visits.

NOBLE, GRAND.

NOBLE, in Latin *nobilis*, from *nosco* to know, signifies knowable, or worth knowing.

GRAND (v. *Grandeur*).

Noble is a term of general import: it simply implies the quality by which a thing is distinguished for excellence above other things: the *grand* is, properly speaking, one of those qualities by which an object acquires the name of *noble*; but there are many *noble* objects which are not denominated *grand*. A building may be denominated *noble* for its beauty as well as its size; but a *grand* building is rather so called for the expense which is displayed upon it: *nobleness* of acting or thinking comprehends all moral excellence that rises to a high pitch; but *grandeur* of mind is peculiarly applicable to such actions or traits as denote an elevation of character, rising above all that is common. A family may be either *noble* or *grand*; but it is *noble* by birth; it is *grand* by wealth, and an expensive tyle of living.

NOISE, CRY, OUTCRY, CLAMOUR.

NOISE is any loud sound; CRY, OUTCRY, and CLAMOUR, are particular kinds of noises, differing either in the cause or the nature of the sounds. A *noise* proceeds either from animate or inanimate objects; the *cry* proceeds only from animate objects. The report of a cannon, or the loud sounds occasioned by a high wind, are *noises*, but not *cries*; *cries* issue from birds, beasts, and men. A *noise* is produced often by accident; a *cry* is always occasioned by some particular circumstance: when many horses and carriages are going together they make a great *noise*; hunger and pain cause *cries* to proceed both from animals and human beings.

Noise, when compared with *cry*, is sometimes only an audible sound; the *cry* is a very loud *noise*: whatever disturbs silence, as the falling of a pin in a perfectly still assembly, is denominated a *noise*; but a *cry* is that which may often drown other *noises*, as the *cries* of people selling things about the streets. A *cry* is in general a regular sound, but *outcry* and *clamour* are irregular sounds; the former may proceed from one or many, the latter from many in conjunction. A *cry* after a thief becomes an *outcry* when set up by many at a time; it becomes a *clamour*, if accompanied with shouting, bawling, and *noises* of mixed and tumultuous nature.

These terms may all be taken in an improper as well as a proper sense. Whatever is obtruded upon the public notice, so as to become the universal subject of conversation and writing, is said to make a *noise*; in this manner a new and good performer at the theatre makes a *noise* on his first appearance. A *noise* or *cry* may, however, be for or against; an *outcry*, and *clamour*, are mostly against the object, varying in the degree and manner in which they display themselves: *cry* implies less than *outcry*, and this is less than *clamour*. When the public voice is raised in an audible manner upon any particular matter, it is a *cry*; if the *cry* be mingled with intemperate language it is an *outcry*; if the *cry* be vehement and exceedingly *noisy*, it is a *clamour*. Partisans raise a *cry* in order to form a body in their favour; the discontented are ever ready to set up an *outcry* against men in power; a *clamour* for peace in the time of war is easily raised by those who wish to thwart the government.

TO NOMINATE, NAME.

NOMINATE comes immediately from the

Latin *nominatus*, participle of *nomino*; NAME comes from the Teutonic, &c. *name*, and both from the Latin *nomen*, &c. (v. *To name*).

To *nominate* and to *name* are both to mention by *name*: but the former is to mention for a specific purpose: the latter for a general purpose: persons only are *nominated*; things as well as persons are *named*: one *nominates* a person in order to propose him, or appoint him, to an office; but one *names* a person casually, in the course of conversation, or one *names* him in order to make some inquiry respecting him. To be *nominated* is a public act; to be *named* is generally private: one is *nominated* before an assembly; one is *named* in any place: to be *nominated* is always an honourable, or the contrary, according to the circumstances under which it is mentioned: a person is *nominated* as member of Parliament; he is *named* whenever he is spoken of.

NOTED, NOTORIOUS.

NOTED (v. *Distinguished*) employed either in a good or a bad sense; NOTORIOUS is never used but in a bad sense: men may be *noted* for their talents, or their eccentricities; they are *notorious* only for their vices: *noted* characters excite many and diverse remarks from their friends and their enemies; *notorious* characters are universally shunned.

TO NOTICE, REMARK, OBSERVE.

To NOTICE (v. *To attend to*) is either to take or to give notice: to REMARK, compounded of *re* and *mark* (v. *Mark*), signifies to reflect or bring back any *mark* to our own mind, or communicate the same to another: to *mark* is to mark a thing once, but to *remark* is to mark it again.

OBSERVE (v. *Looker-on*) signifies either to keep a thing present before one's own view, or to communicate our view to another.

In the first sense of these words, as the action respects ourselves, to *notice* and *remark* require simple attention, to *observe* requires examination. To *notice* is a more cursory action than to *remark*: we may *notice* a thing by a single glance, or on merely turning one's head; but to *remark* supposes a reaction of the mind on an object: we *notice* that a person passes our door on a certain day and at a certain hour; but we *remark* to others that he goes past every day at the same hour: we *notice* that the sun sets this evening under a cloud, and we *remark* that it has done so for several even-

ings successively: we *notice* the state of a person's health or his manners in company; we *remark* his habits and peculiarities in domestic life. What is *noticed* and *remarked* strikes on the senses, and awakens the mind; what is *observed* is looked after and sought for: the former are often involuntary acts; we see, hear, and think, because the objects obtrude themselves uncalled for; but the latter is intentional as well as voluntary; we see, hear, and think, on that which we have watched. We *remark* things as matters of fact: we *observe* them in order to judge of, or draw conclusions from them; we *remark* that the wind lies for a long time in a certain quarter; we *observe* that whenever it lies in a certain quarter it brings rain with it. A general *notices* any thing particular in the appearance of his army; he *remarks* that the men have not for a length of time worn contented faces; he consequently *observes* their actions, in order to discover the cause of their dissatisfaction.

In the latter sense of these verbs, as respects the communications to others of what passes in our own minds, to *notice* is to make known our sentiments by various ways; to *remark* and *observe* are to make them known only by means of words. To *notice* is a personal act towards an individual, in which we direct our attention to him, as may happen either by a bow, a nod, a word, or even a look; to *remark* and *observe* are said of the thoughts which pass in our own minds, and are expressed to others: friends *notice* each other when they meet; they *remark* to others the impression which passing objects make upon their minds: the *observations* which intelligent people make are always entitled to *notice*, from young persons.

NOVEL, NEW.

NOVEL and NEW both come immediately from the Latin *novus* (v. *News*), and the former is to the latter as the species to the genus: every thing *novel* is *new*; but all that is *new* is not *novel*: what is *novel* is mostly strange and unexpected; but what is *new* is usual and expected: the freezing of the river Thames is a *novelty*; the frost in every winter is something *new* when it first comes: that is a *novel* sight which was either never seen before, or seen but seldom; that is a *new* sight which is seen for the first time: the entrance of the French king into the British capital was a sight as *novel* as it was interesting; the entrance of a king into the capital of France was a *new* sight, after the revolution which had so long existed.

TO NOURISH, NURTURE, CHERISH.

To NOURISH and NURTURE are but variations from the same verb *nutrio*.

CHERISH, *v.* Foster.

Things *nourish*, persons *nurture* and *cherish*: to *nourish* is to afford bodily strength, to supply the physical necessities of the body. To *nurture* is to extend one's care to the supply of all physical necessities, to preserve life, occasion growth, and increase vigour. The breast of the mother *nourishes*; the fostering care and attention of the mother *nurtures*. To *nurture* is a physical act; to *cherish* is a mental as well as a physical act: a mother *nurtures* her infant while it is entirely dependant upon her; she *cherishes* her child in her bosom, and protects it from every misfortune, or affords consolation in the midst of all its troubles, when it is no longer an infant.

NUMB, BENUMBED, TORPID.

NUMB and BENUMBED come from the Hebrew *num* to sleep; the former denoting the quality, and the latter the state: there are but few things *numb* by nature; but there may be many things which may be *benumbed*. TORPID, in Latin *torpidus*, from *torpeo* to languish, is most commonly employed to express the permanent state of being *benumbed*, as in the case of some animals, which lie in a *torpid* state all the winter; or in the moral sense to depict the *benumbed* state of the thinking faculty; in this manner we speak of the *torpor* of persons who are *benumbed* by any strong affection, or by any strong external action.

NUMERAL, NUMERICAL.

NUMERAL, or belonging to number, is applied to a class of words in grammar, as a *numeral* adjective, or a *numeral* noun: NUMERICAL, or containing number, is applied to whatever other objects respect number; as a *numerical* difference, where the difference consists between any two numbers, or is expressed by numbers.

O.

OBEDIENT, SUBMISSIVE, OBSEQUIOUS.

OBEDIENT, *v.* Dutiful.

SUBMISSIVE denotes the disposition to submit (*v.* To yield).

OBSEQUIOUS, in Latin *obsequius*, from *obsequor*, or the intensive *ob* and *sequor* to follow, signifies following diligently, or with intensity of mind.

One is *obedient* to command, *submissive*

to power or the will, *obsequious* to persons. *Obedience* is always taken in a good sense; one ought always to be *obedient* where *obedience* is due: *submission* is relatively good; it may, however, be indifferent or bad: one may be *submissive* from interested motives, or meanness of spirit; but to be *submissive* for conscience' sake is the bounden duty of a Christian: *obsequiousness* is never good; it is an excessive concern about the will of another which has always interest for its end.

Obedience is a course of conduct conformable either to some specific rule, or the express will of another; *submission* is often a personal act, immediately directed to the individual. We show our *obedience* to the law by avoiding a breach of it; we show our *obedience* to the will of God, by making that will the rule of our life: on the other hand, we show *submission* to the person of the magistrate; we adopt a *submissive* deportment by a downcast look and a bent body. *Obedience* is founded upon principle and cannot be feigned; *submission* is a partial bending to another, which is easily affected in our outward behaviour: the understanding and the heart produce *obedience*; but force, or the necessity of circumstances give rise to *submission*.

Obedience and *submission* suppose a restraint on one's own will, in order to bring it into accordance with that of another; but *obsequiousness* is the consulting the will or pleasure of another; we are *obedient* from a sense of right; we are *submissive* from a sense of necessity; we are *obsequious* from a desire of gaining favour.

OBJECT, SUBJECT.

OBJECT, in Latin *objectus*, participle of *objicio* to lie in the way, signifies the thing that lies in one's way.

SUBJECT, in Latin *subjectus*, participle of *subjicio* to lie under, signifies the thing forming the groundwork.

The *object* puts itself forward; the *subject* is in the back-ground: we notice the *object*; we observe or reflect on the *subject*; *objects* are sensible; the *subject* is altogether intellectual; the eye, the ear, and all the senses, are occupied with the surrounding *objects*: the memory, the judgment, and the imagination are supplied with *subjects* suitable to the nature of the operations.

When *object* is taken for that which is intellectual, it retains a similar signification; it is the thing that presents itself to the mind; it is seen by the mind's eye: the *subject*, on the contrary, is that which must be sought for, and when found it engages

the mental powers: hence we say an *object* of consideration, an *object* of delight, an *object* of concern; a *subject* of reflection, a *subject* of mature deliberation; the *subject* of a poem, the *subject* of grief, of lamentation, and the like. When the mind becomes distracted by a multiplicity of *objects*, it can fix itself on no one individual *object* with sufficient steadiness to take a survey of it: religion and politics are interesting, but delicate *subjects* of discussion.

TO OBJECT, OPPOSE.

To OBJECT (*v. Object*) is to cast in the way, to OPPOSE is to place in the way; there is, therefore, very little original difference, except that casting is a more momentary and sudden proceeding, placing is a more premeditated action; which distinction, at the same time, corresponds with the use of the terms in ordinary life; to *object* to a thing is to propose or start something against it; but to *oppose* it is to set one's self up steadily against it: one *objects* to ordinary matters that require no reflection; one *opposes* matters that call for deliberation, and afford serious reasons for and against: a parent *objects* to his child's learning the classics, or to his running about the streets; he *opposes* his marriage when he thinks the connexion or the circumstances not desirable: we *object* to a thing from our own particular feelings; we *oppose* a thing because we judge it improper.

OBJECTION, DIFFICULTY, EXCEPTION.

OBJECTION (*v. Demur*) is here a general term; it comprehends both the DIFFICULTY and the EXCEPTION, which are but species of the *objection*: an *objection* and a *difficulty* are started; an *exception* is made: the *objection* to a thing is in general that which renders it less desirable; but the *difficulty* is that which renders it less practicable: there is an *objection* against every [scheme which incurs a serious risk; the want of means to begin, or resources to carry on a scheme, are serious *difficulties*.

Objection and *exception* both respect the nature, the moral tendency, or moral consequences of a thing; but an *objection* may be frivolous or serious; an *exception* is something serious: the *objection* is positive; the *exception* is relatively considered, that is, the thing *excepted* from other things, as not good, and consequently *objected* to. *Objections* are made sometimes to proposals for the mere sake of getting rid of an engagement: those who do not wish to give themselves trouble find an easy method of disen-

gaging themselves, by making *objections* to every proposition; lawyers make *exceptions* to charges which are not sufficiently substantiated. In all engagements entered into, it is necessary to make *exceptions* to the parties, whenever there is any thing *exceptionable* in their characters.

OBLONG, OVAL.

OBLONG, in Latin *oblongus*, from the intensive syllable *ob*, signifies very long, longer than it is broad.

OVAL, from the Latin *ovum*, an egg, signifies egg-shaped.

The *oval* is a species of the *oblong*: what is *oval* is *oblong*; but what is *oblong* is not always *oval*. *Oblong* is peculiarly applied to figures formed by right lines, that is, all rectangular parallelograms, except squares, are *oblong*; but the *oval* is applied to curvilinear *oblong* figures, as ellipses, which are distinguished from the circle; tables are oftener *oblong* than *oval*; garden beds are as frequently *oval* as they are *oblong*.

OBNOXIOUS, OFFENSIVE.

OBNOXIOUS, from the intensive syllable *ob*, signifies exceedingly *noxious* and causing offence, or else liable to offence from others by reason of its *noxiousness*; OFFENSIVE signifies simply liable to give offence. *Obnoxious* is, therefore, a much more comprehensive term than *offensive*; for an *obnoxious* man both suffers from others and causes sufferings to others: an *obnoxious* man is one whom others seek to exclude; an *offensive* man may possibly be endured: gross vices, or particularly odious qualities, make a man *obnoxious*; but rude manners, and perverse tempers, make men *offensive*; a man is *obnoxious* to many, and *offensive* to individuals: a man of loose Jacobinical principles will be *obnoxious* to a society of loyalists; a child may make himself *offensive* to his friends.

OBSERVATION, OBSERVANCE.

These terms derive their use from the different significations of the verb: OBSERVATION is the act of observing objects with the view to examine them (*v. To notice*); OBSERVANCE is the act of observing in the sense of keeping or holding sacred (*v. To keep*). From a minute *observation* of the human body, anatomists have discovered the circulation of the blood, and the source of all the humours; by strict *observance* of truth and justice, a man acquires the title of an upright man.

TO OBSERVE, WATCH.

OBSERVE, *v.* To notice.WATCH, *v.* To watch.

These terms agree in expressing the act of looking at an object; but to *observe* is not to look after so strictly as is implied by to *watch*; a general *observes* the motions of an enemy when they are in no particular state of activity; he *watches* the motions of an enemy when they are in a state of commotion. We *observe* a thing in order to draw an inference from it; we *watch* any thing in order to discover what may happen. We *observe* with coolness; we *watch* with eagerness: we *observe* carefully; we *watch* narrowly: the conduct of mankind in general is *observed*; the conduct of suspicious individuals is *watched*.

OBSTINATE, CONTUMACIOUS, STUBBORN, HEADSTRONG, HEADY.

OBSTINATE, in Latin *obstinatus*, participle of *obstino*, from *ob* and *stino*, *sto* or *sisto*, signifies standing in the way of another.

CONTUMACIOUS, *v.* Contumacy.

STUBBORN, or *stoutborn*, signifies stiff or immovable by nature.

HEADSTRONG signifies strong in the head or the mind; and HEADY, full of one's own head.

Obstinacy is a habit of the mind; *contumacy* is either a particular state of feeling or a mode of action: *obstinacy* consists in an attachment to one's own mode of acting; *contumacy* consists in a swelling contempt of others.

The *obstinate* man adheres tenaciously to his own ways, and opposes reason to reason; the *contumacious* man disputes the right of another to control his actions, and opposes force to force. *Obstinacy* interferes with a man's private conduct, and makes him blind to reason; *contumacy* is a crime against lawful authority; the *contumacious* man sets himself against his superiors: when young people are *obstinate* they are bad pupils: when grown people are *contumacious* they are troublesome subjects.

The *stubborn* and the *headstrong* are species of the *obstinate*; the former lies altogether in the perversion of the will; the latter in the perversion of the judgment: the *stubborn* person wills what he thinks; the *headstrong* person thinks what he will: the *headstrong* seizes the first opinion that offers, and acts upon it in spite of all remonstrance; the *stubborn* follows the ruling will or bent of his mind, without regard to any opinions.

Stubbornness is mostly inherent in a per-

son's nature; a *headstrong* temper is commonly associated with violence and impetuosity of character. *Obstinacy* discovers itself in persons of all ages and stations a *stubborn* and *headstrong* disposition betray themselves mostly in those who are bound to conform to the will of another.

OCCASION, OPPORTUNITY.

OCCASION, in Latin *occasio*, from *ob-*
casio, or *ob* and *cado*, signifies that which falls in the way so as to produce some change.

OPPORTUNITY, in Latin *opportunitas*, from *opportunus* fit, signifies the thing that happens fit for the purpose.

These terms are applied to the events of life; but the *occasion* is that which determines our conduct, and leaves us no choice; it amounts to a degree of necessity: the *opportunity* is that which invites to action; it tempts us to embrace the moment for taking a step. We do things, therefore, as the *occasion* requires, or as the opportunity offers. There are many *occasions* on which a man is called upon to uphold his opinions. There are but few *opportunities* for men in general to distinguish themselves. The *occasion* obtrudes upon us; the *opportunity* is what we seek or desire. On particular *occasions* it is necessary for a commander to be severe; but a man of an humane disposition will profit by every *opportunity* to show his lenity to offenders.

OCCASION, NECESSITY.

OCCASION (*v.* *Occasion*) includes, NECESSITY (*v.* *Necessity*) excludes, the idea of choice or alternative. We are regulated by the *occasion*, and can exercise our own discretion; we yield or submit to the *necessity*, without even the exercise of the will. On the death of a relative we have *occasion* to go into mourning, if we will not offer an affront to the family; but there is no express *necessity*: in case of an attack on our persons, there is a *necessity* of self-defence for the preservation of life.

OCCASIONAL, CASUAL.

These are both opposed to what is fixed or stated; but OCCASIONAL carries with it more the idea of unfrequency, and CASUAL that of unfixedness, or the absence of all design.

A minister is termed an *occasional* preacher, who preaches only on certain *occasions*; his preaching at a particular place, or a certain day may be *casual*. Our acts of charity may be *occasional*; but they ought not to be *casual*.

OCCUPANCY, OCCUPATION.

Are words which derive their meaning from the different acceptations of the primitive verb *occupy*: the former being used to express the state of holding or possessing any object; the latter to express the act of taking possession of, or keeping in possession. He who has the *occupancy* of land enjoys the fruits of it: the *occupation* of a country by force of arms is of little avail, unless one has an adequate force to maintain one's ground.

ODD, UNEVEN.

ODD, probably a variation from *add*, seems to be a mode of the UNEVEN; both are opposed to the even, but *odd* is only said of that which has no fellow; the *uneven* is said of that which does not square or come to an even point: of numbers we say that they are either *odd* or *uneven*; but of gloves, shoes, and every thing which is made to correspond, we say that they are *odd*, when they are single; but that they are *uneven* when they are both different: in like manner a plank is *uneven* which has an unequal surface, or disproportionate dimensions; but a piece of wood is *odd* which will not match nor suit with any other piece.

OECONOMICAL, SAVING, SPARING, THRIFTY. PENURIOUS, NIGGARDLY.

The idea of not spending is common to all these terms: but OECONOMICAL (*v. Economy*) signifies not spending unnecessarily or unwisely.

SAVING is keeping and laying by with care; SPARING is keeping out of that which ought to be spent; THRIFTY or THRIVING is accumulating by means of *saving*: PENURIOUS is suffering as from *penury* by means of *saving*: NIGGARDLY, after the manner of a *niggard*, nigh or close person, is not spending or letting go, but in the smallest possible quantities. To be *oeconomical* is a virtue in those who have but narrow means; all the other epithets however are employed in a sense more or less unfavourable; he who is *saving* when young, will be covetous when old; he who is *sparing* will generally be *sparing* out of the comforts of others; he who is *thrifty* commonly adds the desire of getting with that of *saving*; he who is *penurious* wants nothing to make him a complete miser; he who is *niggardly* in his dealings will be mostly avaricious in his character.

OECONOMY, FRUGALITY, PARSIMONY.

OECONOMY, from the Greek *οικονομία*, implies management. FRUGALITY, from

the Latin *fruges* fruits, implies temperance. PARSIMONY (*v. Avaricious*) implies simply forbearing to spend, which is in fact the common idea included in these terms; but the *oeconomical* man spares expense according to circumstances; he adapts his expenditure to his means, and renders it by contrivance as effectual to his purpose as possible: the *frugal* man spares expense on himself or on his indulgences; he may however be liberal to others whilst he is *frugal* towards himself; the *parsimonious* man saves from himself as well as others; he has no other object than saving. By *oeconomy*, a man may make a limited income turn to the best account for himself and his family; by *frugality* he may with a limited income be enabled to do much good to others; by *parsimony* he may be enabled to accumulate great sums out of a narrow income: hence it is that we recommend a plan for being *oeconomical*; we recommend a diet for being *frugal*; we condemn a habit or a character for being *parsimonious*.

OECONOMY, MANAGEMENT.

OECONOMY (*v. Oeconomy*) has a more comprehensive meaning than *management*; for it includes the system of science and of legislation as well as that of domestic arrangements; as the *oeconomy* of agriculture: the internal *oeconomy* of a government; political, civil, or religious *oeconomy*; or the *oeconomy* of one's household. *Management*, on the contrary, is an action that is very seldom abstracted from its agent, and is always taken in a partial sense, namely, as a part of *oeconomy*. The internal *oeconomy* of a family depends principally on the prudent *management* of the female: the *oeconomy* of every well-regulated community requires that all the members should preserve a strict subordination; the *management* of particular branches of this *oeconomy* should belong to particular individuals.

OFFENCE, TRESPASS, TRANSGRESSION, MISDEMEANOUR, MISDEED, AFFRONT.

OFFENCE is here the general term, signifying merely the act that *offends* (*v. To displease*), or runs counter to something else.

Offence is properly indefinite; it merely implies an object without the least signification of the nature of the object; TRESPASS and TRANSGRESSION have a positive reference to an object *trespassed* upon or *transgressed*; *trespass* is contracted from *trans* and *pass* that is a passing beyond; and *transgress* from *trans* and *gressus* a

going beyond. The *offence* therefore which constitutes a *trespass* arises out of the laws of property; a passing over or treading upon the property of another is a *trespass*: the *offence* which constitutes a *transgression* flows out of the laws of society in general which fix the boundaries of right and wrong: whoever therefore goes beyond or breaks through these bounds is guilty of a *transgression*. The *trespass* is a species of *offence* which peculiarly applies to the land or premises of individuals; *transgression* is a species of moral as well as political evil. Hunters are apt to commit *trespasses* in the eagerness of their pursuit; the passions of men are perpetually misleading them and causing them to commit various *transgressions*: the term *trespass* is sometimes employed improperly as respects time and other objects; *transgression* is always used in one uniform sense as respects rule and law; we *trespass* upon the time or patience of another; we *transgress* the moral or civil law.

An *offence* is either public or private; a MISDEMEANOUR is properly a private *offence*, although improperly applied for an *offence* against public law (*v. Crime*); for it signifies a wrong *demeanour* or an *offence* in one's *demeanour* against propriety; a MISDEED is always private, it signifies a wrong *deed*, or a *deed* which *offends* against one's duty. Riotous and disorderly behaviour in company are serious *misdeemeanours*; every act of drunkenness, lying, fraud, or immorality of every kind, are *misdeeds*.

An *offence* is that which affects persons or principles, communities or individuals, and is committed either directly or indirectly against the person; an AFFRONT is altogether personal; it is an *offence* against another to speak disrespectfully of him in his absence; it is an *affront* to push past him with violence and rudeness.

Offences are either against God or man: a *trespass* is always an *offence* against man; a *transgression* is against the will of God or the laws of men; the *mindemeanour* is more particularly against the established order of society; a *misdeed* is an *offence* against the Divine Law; an *affront* is an *offence* against good manners.

OFFENDER. DELINQUENT.

The OFFENDER (*v. To displease*) is he who *offends* in any thing, either by commission or omission; the DELINQUENT, from *delinquo* to fail, signifies properly he who fails by omission, but it is extended to signify failing by the violation of a law. Those who go into a wrong place are *offenders*; those who stay away when they ought

to go are *delinquents*; there are many *offenders* against the sabbath who commit violent and open breaches of decorum; there are still more *delinquents* who never attend a public place of worship.

OFFENDING. OFFENSIVE.

OFFENDING signifies either actually *offending* or calculated to *offend* (*v. To displease*): OFFENSIVE signifies calculated to *offend* at all times; a person may be *offending* in his manners to a particular individual, or use an *offending* expression on a particular occasion without any imputation on his character; but if his manners are *offensive*, it reflects both on his temper and education.

TO OFFER, BID, TENDER, PROPOSE.

OFFER, *v. To give.*

BID, *v. To ask.*

TENDER, like the word *tend*, from *tendo* to stretch, signifies to stretch forth by way of *offering*.

PROPOSE, in Latin *proposui*, perfect of *propono* to place or set before, likewise characterizes a mode of *offering*.

Offer is employed for that which is literally transferable, or for that which is indirectly communicable: *bid* and *tender* belong to *offer* in the first sense; *propose* belongs to *offer* in the latter sense. To *offer* is a voluntary and discretionary act; an *offer* may be accepted or rejected at pleasure: to *bid* and *tender* are specific modes of *offering* which depend on circumstances: one *bids* with the hope of its being accepted; one *tenders* from a prudential motive, and in order to serve specific purposes.

We *offer* money to a poor person, it is an act of charity or good nature; we *bid* a price for the purchase of a house, it is a commercial dealing subject to the rules of commerce; we *tender* a sum of money by way of payment, it is a matter of prudence in order to fulfil an obligation. By the same rule one *offers* a person the use of one's horse; one *bids* a sum at an auction; one *tenders* one's services to the government.

To *offer* and *propose* are both employed in matters of practice or speculation; but the former is a less definite and decisive act than the latter: we *offer* an opinion by way of promoting a discussion; we *propose* a plan for the deliberation of others.

Sentiments which differ widely from the majority ought to be *offered* with modesty and caution; we should not *propose* to another what we are unwilling to do ourselves. We commonly *offer* by way of obliging; we commonly *propose* by way of arranging or accommodating. It is an act of puerility to

offer to do more than one is enabled to perform; it does not evince a sincere disposition for peace to *propose* such terms as we know cannot be accepted.

OFFERING, OBLATION.

OFFERING from *offer*, and OBLATION from *oblatio* and *oblatus* or *oflatus*, come both from *offero* (v. *To offer*): the former is however a term of much more general and familiar use than the latter. *Offerings* are both moral and religious; *oblation* is religious only; the money which is put into the sacramental plate is an *offering*; the consecrated bread and wine at the sacrament is an *oblation*. The *offering* in a religious sense is whatever one *offers* as a gift by way of reverence to a superior; the *oblation* is the *offering* which is accompanied with some particular ceremony. The wise men made an *offering* to our Saviour, but not properly an *oblation*. The Jewish sacrifices, as in general all religious sacrifices, were in the proper sense *oblations*.

OFFICE, PLACE, CHARGE, FUNCTION.

OFFICE, in Latin *officium*, from *officio* or *efficio*, signifies either the duty performed or the situation in which the duty is performed. PLACE comprehends no idea of duty, for there may be sinecure *places* which are only nominal *offices*, and designate merely a relationship with the government: every *office* therefore of a public nature is in reality a *place*, yet every *place* is not an *office*. The *place* of secretary of state is likewise an *office*, but that of ranger of a park is sometimes a *place* only, and not always an *office*. An *office* is held; a *place* is filled: the *office* is given or entrusted to a person; the *place* is granted or conferred: the *office* reposes a confidence, and imposes a responsibility; the *place* gives credit and influence: the *office* is bestowed on a man from his qualification; the *place* is granted to him by favour or as a reward for past services: the *office* is more or less honourable; the *place* is more or less profitable.

In an extended application of the terms *office* and *place*, the latter has a much lower signification than that of the former, since the *office* is always connected with the state; but the *place* is a private concern; the *office* is a *place* of trust, but the *place* may be a *place* for menial labour. The *office* is frequently taken not with any reference to the *place* occupied, but simply to the thing done; this brings it nearer in signification to the term CHARGE (v. *Care*). An *office* imposes a task or some performance; a *charge* imposes a responsibility; we have al-

ways something to do in an *office*; always something to look after in a *charge*: the *office* is either public or private, the *charge* is always of a private and personal nature: a person performs the *office* of a magistrate, or of a minister; he undertakes the *charge* of instructing youth, or of being a guardian, or of conveying a person's property from one *place* to another.

An *office* is that which is assigned by another; a FUNCTION is properly the act of discharging or completing an *office* or business, from *fungor*, viz. *finem* and *ago*, to put an end to or bring to a conclusion; it is extended in its acceptation to the *office* itself or the thing done. The *office* therefore in its strict sense is performed only by conscious or intelligent agents, who act according to their instructions; the *function*, on the other hand, is an operation of unconscious objects according to the laws of nature. The *office* of an herald is to proclaim public events or to communicate circumstances from one public body to another: the *function* of the tongue is to speak; that of the ear, to hear; that of the eye, to see. The word *office* is sometimes employed in the same application by the personification of nature, which assigns an *office* to the ear, to the tongue, to the eye, and the like. When the frame becomes overpowered by a sudden shock, the tongue will frequently refuse to perform its *office*; when the animal *functions* are impeded for a length of time, the vital power ceases to exist.

OFFSPRING, PROGENY, ISSUE.

OFFSPRING is that which springs off or from; PROGENY that which is brought forth or out of; ISSUE that which *issues* or proceeds from; and all in relation to the family or generation of the human species. *Offspring* is a familiar term applicable to one or many children; *progeny* is employed only as a collective noun for a number; *issue* is used in an indefinite manner without particular regard to number. When we speak of the children themselves, we denominate them the *offspring*; when we speak of the parents, we denominate the children their *progeny*. A child is said to be the only *offspring* of his parents, or he is said to be the *offspring* of low parents; a man is said to have a numerous or a healthy *progeny*, or to leave his *progeny* in circumstances of honour and prosperity. The *issue* is said only in regard to a man that is deceased: he dies with male or female *issue*: with or without *issue*; his property descends to his male *issue* in a direct line.

OFTEN, FREQUENTLY.

OFTEN, or its contracted form *oft*, comes in all probability though the medium of the northern languages, from the Greek *αυ* again, and signifies properly repetition of action.

FREQUENTLY, from *frequent* crowded or numerous, respects a plurality or number of objects.

An ignorant man *often* uses a word without knowing what it means; ignorant people *frequently* mistake the meaning of the words they hear. A person goes out very *often* in the course of a week; he has *frequently* six or seven persons to visit him in the course of that time. *By doing a thing *often* it becomes habitual; we *frequently* meet the same persons in the route which we *often* take.

OLD, ANCIENT, ANTIQUE, ANTIQUATED, OLD-FASHIONED, OBSOLETE.

OLD, in German *alt*, low German, *old* &c. comes from the Greek *εωλος* of yesterday.

ANCIENT, in French *ancien*, and ANTIQUE, ANTIQUATED, all come from the Latin *antiquus*, and *antea* before, signifying in general before our time.

OLD-FASHIONED signifies after an *old* fashion.

OBSOLETE, in Latin *obsoletus*, participle of *obsoleo*, signifies literally out of use.

Old respects what has long existed and still exists; *ancient* what existed at a distant period, but does not necessarily exist at present: *antique*, that which has been long *ancient*, and of which there remain but faint traces: *antiquated*, *old-fashioned*, and *obsolete* what has ceased to be any longer used or esteemed. A *fashion* is *old* when it has been long in use; a custom is *ancient* when its use has long been passed; a bust or statue is *antique* when the model of it only remains; a person is *antiquated* whose appearance is grown out of date; manners which are gone quite out of *fashion* are *old-fashioned*; a word or custom is *obsolete* which is grown out of use.

The *old* is opposed to the new; *ancient* and *antique* are opposed to modern; the *antiquated* is opposed to the customary and established; the *old-fashioned* to the fashionable; the *obsolete* to that which is still in use.

OMEN, PROGNOSTIC, PRESAGE:

All these terms express some token or sign of what is to come. OMEN, in Latin

omen, probably comes from the Greek *οιοναι* to think, because it is what gives rise to much conjecture.

PROGNOSTIC, in Greek *προγνωστικον*, from *προγνωσχω* to know before, signifies the sign by which one judges a thing before hand, because a *prognostic* is rather a deduction by the use of the understanding.

PRESAGE, v, Augur

The *omen* and *prognostic* are both drawn from external objects; the *presage* is drawn from one's own feelings. The *omen* is drawn from objects that have no necessary connexion with the thing they are made to represent; the *prognostic*, on the contrary, is a sign which partakes in some degree of the quality of the thing denoted. *Omens* were drawn by the heathens from the flight of birds, or the entrails of beasts; *prognostics* are discovered only by an acquaintance with the objects in which they exist, as the *prognostics* of a mortal disease are known to none so well as the physician; the *prognostics* of a storm or tempest are best known to the mariner. The *omen* and *presage* respect either good or bad events; *prognostic* respects mostly the bad. It is an *omen* of our success, if we find those of whom we have to ask a favour in a good-humour; the spirit of discontent which pervades the countenances and discourse of a people is a *prognostic* of some popular commotion; the quickness of powers discoverable in a boy is sometimes a *presage* of his future greatness.

ONE, SINGLE, ONLY.

Unity is the common idea of all these terms; and at the same time the whole signification of ONE, which is opposed to none; SINGLE, in Latin *singulus* each or one by itself probably contracted from *sine angulo*, without an angle, because what is entirely by itself cannot form an angle, signifies that *one* which is abstracted from others, and is particularly opposed to two, or a double which may form a pair; ONLY, contracted from *onely*, signifying in the form of unity, is employed for that of which there is no more. A person has *one* child, is a positive expression that bespeaks its own meaning: a person has a *single* child, conveys the idea that there might be more, that more were expected, or that once there were more: a person has an *only* child implies that he never had more.

ONWARD, FORWARD, PROGRESSIVE.

ONWARD is taken in the literal sense of going nearer to an object: FORWARD is ta-

* Vide Trusler: „Often, frequently.“

ken in the sense of going from an object, or going farther in the line before one: PROGRESSIVE has the sense of going gradually or step by step before one.

A person goes *onward* who does not stand still; he goes *forward* who does not recede; he goes *progressively* who goes *forward* at certain intervals.

Onward is taken only in the proper acceptance of travelling; the traveller who has lost his way feels it necessary to go *onward* with the hope of arriving at some point; *forward* is employed in the improper as well as the proper application; a traveller goes *forward* in order to reach his point of destination as quickly as possible; a learner uses his utmost endeavours to get *forward* in his learning: *progressively* is employed only in the improper application to what requires time and labour in order to bring it to a conclusion; every man goes on *progressively* in his art, until he arrives at a certain point of perfection.

OPAKE, DARK.

OPAKE, in Latin *opacus*, comes from *ops* the earth, because the earth is the darkest of all bodies; the word *opake* is to DARK as the species to the genus, for it expresses that species of darkness which is inherent in solid bodies, in distinction from those which emit light from themselves, or admit of light into themselves; it is therefore employed scientifically for the more vulgar and familiar term *dark*. On this ground the earth is termed an *opake* body in distinction from the sun, moon, or other luminous bodies: any solid substance, as a tree or a stone is an *opake* body in distinction from glass which is a clear or transparent body.

OPENING, APERTURE, CAVITY.

OPENING signifies in general any place left *open* without defining any circumstances; the APERTURE is generally a specific kind of *opening* which is considered scientifically: there are *openings* in a wood when the trees are partly cut away; *openings* in streets by the removal of houses; or *openings* in a fence that has been broken down; but anatomists speak of *apertures* in the skull or in the heart, and the naturalist describes the *apertures* in the nests of bees, ants, beavers, and the like: the *opening* or *aperture* is the commencement of an inclosure; the CAVITY is the whole inclosure: hence they are frequently as a part to the whole: many animals make a *cavity* in the earth for their nest with only a small *aperture* for their egress and ingress.

OPINIATED OR OPINIATIVE, CONCEITED, EGOISTICAL.

A fondness for one's opinion bespeaks the OPINIATED man; a fond conceit of one's-self bespeaks the CONCEITED man: a fond attachment to himself bespeaks the EGOISTICAL man: a liking for one's-self or one's own is evidently the common idea that runs through these terms; they differ in the mode and in the object.

An *opiniated* man is not only fond of his own *opinion*, but full of his own *opinion*: a *conceited* man has a high *opinion* of his own talent; it is not only great in competition with others, but it is so high as to be set above others: the *egoistical* man makes himself the darling theme of his own contemplation; he admires and loves himself to that degree that he can talk and think of nothing else; his children, his house, his garden, his rooms, and the like, are the incessant theme of his conversation, and become invaluable from the mere circumstance of belonging to him.

OPINION, SENTIMENT, NOTION.

OPINION, in Latin *opinio* from *opinor*, and the Greek *επινοεω* to think or judge, is the work of the head.

SENTIMENT, from *sentio* to feel, is the work of the heart.

NOTION, in Latin *notio*, from *nosco* to know, is a simple operation of the thinking faculty.

We form *opinions*; we have *sentiments*: we get *notions*. *Opinions* are formed on speculative matter; they are the result of reading, experience, and reflection: *sentiments* are entertained on matters of practice; they are the consequence of habits and circumstances: *notions* are gathered upon sensible objects, and arise out of the casualties of hearing and seeing. We have *opinions* on religion, as respects its doctrines; we have *sentiments* on religion as respects its practice and its precepts. The unity of the Godhead in the general sense, and the doctrine of the Trinity in the particular sense, are *opinions*: honour and gratitude towards the Deity; the sense of our dependance upon him, and obligations to him, are *sentiments*.

Opinions are more liable to error than *sentiments*; the former depend upon knowledge, and must therefore be liable to inaccuracy; the latter depend rather upon instinct, and a well organized frame of mind. *Notions* are still more liable to error than either; they are the immature decisions of the uninformed mind on the appearances of

things. The difference of *opinion* among men, on the most important questions of human life, is a sufficient evidence that the mind of man is very easily led astray in matters of *opinion*: whatever difference of *opinion* there may be amongst Christians, there is but one *sentiment* of love and goodwill among those who follow the example of Christ, rather than their own passions; the *notions* of a Deity are so imperfect among savages in general, that they seem to amount to little more than an indistinct idea of some superior invisible agent.

TO OPPOSE, RESIST, WITHSTAND, THWART.

OPPOSE, *v.* To contradict.

RESIST signifies literally to stand back, away from, or against.

With in WITHSTAND has the force of *re* in *resist*.

THWART, from the German *quer* cross, signifies to come across.

The action of setting one thing up against another is obviously expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the manner and the circumstances. To *oppose* is the most general and unqualified term; it simply denotes the relative position of two objects, and when applied to persons it does not necessarily imply any personal characteristic: we may *oppose* reason or force to force; or things which are in *opposite* directions may be opposed to each other, as a house to a church. *Resist* is always an act of more or less force when applied to persons; it is mostly a culpable action, as when men *resist* lawful authority: *resistance* is in fact always bad, unless in case of actual self-defence. *Opposition* may be made in any form, as when we *oppose* a person's admittance into a house by our personal efforts: or *oppose* his admission into a society by a declaration of our opinions. *Resistance* is always a direct action, as when we *resist* an invading army by the sword, or *resist* the evidence of our senses by denying our assent; or, in relation to things, when wood or any hard substance *resists* the violent efforts of steel or iron to make an impression.

Withstand and *thwart* are modes of *resistance* applicable only to conscious agents. To *withstand* is negative; it implies not to yield to any foreign agency: thus, a person *withstands* the entreaties of another to comply with a request. To *thwart* is positive; it is actively to cross the will of another: thus humoursome people are perpetually *thwarting* the wishes of those with whom they are in connexion. It is a happy thing when a young man can *withstand* the allurements

of pleasure. It is a part of our duty to bear with patience events that *thwart* our purposes.

OPTION, CHOICE.

OPTION is immediately of Latin derivation, and is consequently a term of less frequent use than the word CHOICE, which has been shown (*v.* To choose) to be of Celtic origin. The former term, from the Greek *οπτομαι* to see or consider, implies an uncontrolled act of the mind; the latter a simple leaning of the will. We speak of *option* only as regards one's freedom from external constraint in the act of *choosing*: one speaks of *choice* only as the simple act itself. The *option* or the power of *choosing* is given; the *choice* itself is made: hence we say a thing is at a person's *option*, or it is his own *option*, or the *option* is left to him, in order to designate his freedom of *choice* more strongly than is expressed by the word *choice* itself.

ORDER, METHOD, RULE.

ORDER, *v.* To dispose.

METHOD, in French *methode*, Latin *methodus*, Greek *μεθοδος* from *μετα* and *odos*, signifies the ready or right way to do a thing.

RULE comes from the Latin *regula* a rule, and *rego* to govern, direct, or make straight, the former expressing the act of making a thing straight, or that by which it is made so; the latter the abstract quality of being so made.

Order is applied in general to every thing that is disposed; *method* and *rule* are applied only to that which is done; the *order* lies in consulting the time, the place, and the object, so as to make them accord: the *method* consists in the right choice of means to an end; the *rule* consists in that which will keep us in the right way. Where there is a number of objects there must be *order* in the disposition of them: there must be *order* in a school as to the arrangement both of the pupils and of the business: where there is work to carry on, or any object to obtain, or any art to follow, there must be *method* in the pursuit; a tradesman or merchant must have *method* in keeping his accounts; a teacher must have a *method* for the communication of instruction. The *rule* is the part of the *method*; it is that on which the *method* rests; there cannot be *method* without *rule*, but there may be *rule* without *method*; the *method* varies with the thing that is to be done; the *rule* is that which is permanent and serves as a guide under all circumstances. We adopt the *method* and

follow the *rule*. A painter adopts a certain *method* of preparing his colours according to the *rules* laid down by his art.

Order is said of every complicated machine, either of a physical or a moral kind, *method* is the work of the understanding, mostly as it is employed in the mechanical process; sometimes, however, as respects intellectual objects: *rule* is said either as it respects mechanical and physical actions or moral conduct. The *order* of society is preserved by means of government, or authority: laws or *rules* are employed as instruments in the preservation of order: no work should be performed without *method*; this *method* will be more or less correct, as it is formed according to definite *rules*.

The term *rule*, is, however, as before observed, employed distinctly from either *order* or *method*, for it applies to the moral conduct of the individual. The Christian religion contains *rules* for the guidance of our conduct in all the relations of human society.

As epithets, *orderly*, *methodical*, and *regular*, are applied to persons and even to things according to the above distinction of the nouns: an *orderly* man, or an *orderly* society, is one that adheres to the established *order* of things; the former in his domestic habits, the latter in their public capacity, their meetings and measures: a *methodical* man is one who adopts *method* in all he sets about; such a one may sometimes run into the extreme of formality, by being precise where precision is not necessary: we cannot speak of a *methodical* society, for *method* is altogether a personal quality. A man is *regular*, inasmuch as he follows a certain *rule* in his moral actions, and thereby preserves a uniformity of conduct: a *regular* society is one founded by a certain prescribed *rule*.

Regularity of life is of as much more importance than *order* and *method*, as a man's durable happiness is to the happiness of the moment: the *orderly* and *methodical* respect only the transitory modes of things; but the *regular* concerns a man both for *body* and *soul*.

These terms are in like manner applied to that which is personal; we say, an *orderly* proceeding, or an *orderly* course, for what is done in due order: a *regular* proceeding, or a *regular* course, which goes on according to a prescribed rule; a *methodical* grammar, a *methodical* declination, and the like, for what is done according to a given *method*.

ORIFICE, PERFORATION.

ORIFICE, in Latin *orificium* or *orifacium*,

from *os* and *factum*, signifies a made mouth, that is an opening made, as it were.

PERFORATION, in Latin *perforatio*, from *perforo*, signifies a piercing through.

These terms are both scientifically employed by medical men, to designate certain cavities in the human body; but the former respects that which is natural, the latter that which is artificial: all the vessels of the human body have their *orifices* which are so constructed as to open or close of themselves. Surgeons are frequently obliged to make *perforations* in the bones: sometimes *perforation* may describe what comes from a natural process, but it denotes a cavity made through a solid substance; but the *orifice* is particularly applicable to such openings as most resemble the mouth in form and use. In this manner the words may be extended in their application to other bodies besides animal substances, and in other sciences besides anatomy: hence we speak of the *orifice* of a tube; the *orifice* of any flower, and the like; or *perforation* of a tree, by means of a cannon ball or an iron instrument.

ORIGIN, ORIGINAL, BEGINNING, RISE, SOURCE.

ORIGIN and ORIGINAL both come from the Latin *orior* to rise: the former designating the abstract property of *rising*: the latter the thing that is *rising*. *Origin* is said only of things that *rise*; *original* is said of those which give an *origin* to another: the *origin* serves to date the existence of a thing; the term *original* serves to show the author of a thing, and is opposed to the copy. The *origin* of the world is described in the first chapter of Genesis; Adam was the *original* from whom all the human race has sprung.

Origin has respect to the cause, BEGINNING to the period of existence: every thing owes its existence to its *origin*; it dates its existence from its *beginning*: there cannot be an *origin* without a *beginning*; but there may be a *beginning* where we do not speak of an *origin*. We look to the *origin* of a thing in order to learn its nature; we look to the *beginning* in order to learn its duration or other circumstances: when we have discovered the *origin* of a quarrel, we are in a fair way of becoming acquainted with the aggressors; when we trace a quarrel to the *beginning*, we may easily ascertain how long it has lasted.

Origin and the RISE are both employed for the primary state of existence; but the latter is a much more familiar term than the former: we speak of the *origin* of an empire,

the *origin* of a family, the *origin* of a dispute, and the like; but we say that a river takes its *rise* from a certain mountain, that certain disorders take their *rise* from particular circumstances which happen in early life: it is moreover observable that the term *origin* is confined solely to the first commencement of a thing's existence; but *rise* comprehends its gradual progress in the first stages of its existence. It is in vain to attempt to search the *origin* of evil, unless, as we find it explained in the word of God. Diseases take their *rise* in certain parts of the body, and after lying for some time dormant, break out in after life.

The *origin* and *rise* are said only of one object; the *SOURCE* is said of that which produces a succession of objects: the *origin* of evil in general has given *rise* to much speculation; the love of pleasure is the *source* of incalculable mischiefs to individuals, as well as to society at large: the *origin* exists but once; the *source* is lasting: the *origin* of every family is to be traced to our first parent, Adam; we have a never-failing *source* of consolation in religion.

TO OVERBALANCE, OUTWEIGH,
PREPONDERATE.

To OVERBALANCE is to throw the balance over on one side.

To OUTWEIGH is to exceed in weight.

To PREPONDERATE, from *prae* before and *pondus* a weight, signifies also to exceed in weight.

Although these terms approach so near to each other in their original meaning, yet they have now a different application: in the proper sense, a person *overbalances* himself who loses his balance and goes on one side; a heavy body *outweighs* one that is light, when they are put into the same pair of scales. *Overbalance* and *outweigh* are likewise used in the improper application; *preponderate* is never used otherwise: things are said to *overbalance* which are supposed to turn the scale to one side or the other; they are said to *outweigh* when they are to be weighed against each other; they are said to *preponderate* when they weigh every thing else down: the evils which arise from innovations in society commonly *overbalance* the good; the will of a parent should *outweigh* every personal consideration in the mind; which will always be the case where the power of religion *preponderates*.

TO OVERBEAR, BEAR DOWN, OVER-
POWER, OVERWHELM, SUBDUE.

To OVERBEAR is to bear one's self over another, that is make another bear one's

weight; to BEAR DOWN is literally to bring down by bearing upon; to OVERPOWER is to get the power over an object; to OVERWHELM, from *whelm* or *wheel*, signifies to turn quite round as well as over; to SUBDUE (v. *To conquer*) is literally to bring or put underneath. A man *overbears* by carrying himself higher than others, and putting to silence those who might claim an equality with him; an *overbearing* demeanour is most conspicuous in narrow circles where an individual, from certain casual advantages, affects a superiority over the members of the same community. To *bear down* is an act of greater violence: one *bears down* opposition; it is properly the opposing force to force, until one side yields. *Overpower*, as the term implies, belongs to the exercise of power which may be either physical or moral: one may be *overpowered* by another; or one may be *overpowered* in an argument. One is *overborne* or *borne down* by the exertions of individuals; *overpowered* by the active efforts of individuals, or by the force of circumstances; *overwhelmed* by circumstances or things only; *overborne* by another of superior influence; *borne down* by the force of his attack; *overpowered* by numbers, by entreaties, by looks, and the like; and *overwhelmed* by the torrent of words, or the impetuosity of the attack.

Overpower and *overwhelm* denote a partial superiority; *subdue* denotes that which is permanent and positive; we may *overpower* or *overwhelm* for a time, or to a certain degree; but to *subdue* is to get an entire and lasting superiority. *Overpower* and *overwhelm* are said of what passes between persons nearly on a level; but *subdue* is said of those who are, or may be, reduced to a low state of inferiority: individuals or armies are *overpowered* or *overwhelmed*; individuals or nations are *subdued*: we may be *overpowered* in one engagement, and *overpower* our opponent in another; we may be *overwhelmed* by the suddenness and impetuosity of an attack, yet we may recover ourselves so as to renew it; but when we are *subdued* all power of resistance is gone.

To *overpower*, *overwhelm*, and *subdue*, are likewise applied to the moral feelings, as well as to the external relations of things: but the two former are the effects of external circumstances; the latter follows from the exercise of the reasoning powers: the tender feelings are *overpowered*; the mind is *overwhelmed* with painful feelings; the unruly passions are *subdued* by the force of religious contemplation: a person may be so *overpowered*, on seeing a dying friend, as to be unable to speak; a person may be so

overwhelmed with grief, upon the death of a near and dear relative, as to be unable to attend to his ordinary avocations; the passions of anger may be completely *subdued* by the influence of religion on the heart.

TO OVERFLOW, INUNDATE, DELUGE.

What **OVERFLOWS** simply *flows over*; what **INUNDATES** (from *in* and *unda* a wave) *flows into*; what **DELUGES** (from *diluo*) washes away.

The term *overflow* bespeaks abundance; whatever exceeds the measure of contents must *flow over*, because it is more than can be held: to *inundate* bespeaks not only abundance, but vehemence; when it *inundates* it *flows* in faster than is desired, it fills to an inconvenient height: to *deluge* bespeaks impetuosity; a *deluge* irresistibly carries away all before it. This explanation of these terms in their proper sense will illustrate their improper application: the heart is said to *overflow* with joy, with grief, and the like, in order to denote the superabundance of the thing; a country is said to be *inundated* by swarms of beggars, when speaking of numbers who intrude themselves to the annoyance of the natives; the town is said to be *deluged* with publications of different kinds, when they appear in such profusion and in such quick succession as to supersede others of more value.

TO OVERRULE, SUPERSEDE.

To **OVERRULE** is literally to get the superiority of rule; and to **SUPERSEDE** is to get the upper or superior seat; but the former is employed only as the act of persons; the latter is applied to things as the agents: a man may be *overruled* in his domestic government, or he may be *overruled* in a public assembly, or he may be *overruled* in the cabinet; large works in general *supersede* the necessity of smaller ones, by containing that which is superior both in quantity and quality.

OVERSPREAD, OVERRUN, RAVAGE.

To **OVERSPREAD** signifies simply to cover the whole surface of a body; but **OVERRUN** is a mode of spreading, namely, by running; things in general, therefore, are said to *overspread* which admit of extension; nothing can be said to *overrun* but what literally or figuratively runs: the face is *overspread* with spots; the ground is *overrun* with weeds. To *overrun* and to **RAVAGE** are both employed to imply the active and extended destruction of an enemy; but the former expresses more than the latter; a

small body may *ravage* in particular parts; but immense numbers are said to *overrun*: the Barbarians *overran* all Europe, and settled in different countries; detachments are sent out to *ravage* the country or neighbourhood.

TO OVERTURN, OVERTHROW, SUBVERT, INVERT, REVERSE.

To **OVERTURN** is simply to turn over, which may be more or less gradual: but to **OVERTHROW** is to throw over, which will be more or less violent. To *overturn* is to turn a thing either with its side or its bottom upward; but to **SUBVERT** is to turn that under which should be upward: to **REVERSE** is to turn that before which should be behind; and to **INVERT** is to place that on its head which should be on its feet. These terms differ accordingly in their application and circumstances; things are *overturned* by contrivance and gradual means; infidels attempt to *overturn* Christianity by the arts of ridicule and falsehood: the French revolutionists *overthrew* the government by every act of violence. To *overturn* is said of small matters; to *subvert* only of national or large concerns: domestic economy may be *overturned*; religious or political establishments may be *subverted*; that may be *overturned* which is simply set up; that is *subverted* which has been established: an assertion may be *overturned*; the best sanctioned principles may by artifice be *subverted*.

To *overturn*, *overthrow*, and *subvert*, generally involve the destruction of the thing so *overturned*, *overthrown*, or *subverted*, or at least renders it for the time useless, and are, therefore, mostly unallowed acts; but *reverse* and *invert*, which have a more particular application, have a less specific character: we may *reverse* a proposition by taking the negative instead of the affirmative; a decree may be *reversed* so as to render it nugatory; but both of these acts may be right or wrong, according to circumstances: likewise, the order of particular things may be *inverted* to suit the convenience of parties; but the order of society cannot be *inverted* without *subverting* all the principles on which civil society is built.

TO OVERWHELM, CRUSH.

To **OVERWHELM** (v. *To overbear*) is to cover with a heavy body, so that one should sink under it: to **CRUSH** is to destroy the consistency of a thing by violent pressure: a thing may be *crushed* by being *overwhelmed*, but it may be *overwhelmed* without being *crushed*; and it may be *crushed* without being *overwhelmed*: the girl Tarpeia, who betrayed the Capitoline hill to the Sabines,

is said to have been *overwhelmed* with their arms, by which she was *crushed* to death: when many persons fall on one, he may be *overwhelmed* but not necessarily *crushed*: when a waggon goes over a body, it may be *crushed* but not *overwhelmed*.

TO OUTLIVE, SURVIVE.

To **OUTLIVE** is literally to live out the life of another, to live longer: to **SURVIVE**, in French *survivre*, is to live after; the former is employed to express the comparison between two lives; the latter to denote a protracted existence beyond any given term: one person is said properly to *outlive* another who enjoys a longer life; but we speak of *surviving* persons or things, in an indefinite or unqualified manner; it is not a peculiar blessing to *outlive* all our nearest relatives and friends; no man can be happy in *surviving* his honour.

OUTWARD, EXTERNAL, EXTERIOR.

OUTWARD, or inclined to the *out*, after the manner of the *out*, indefinitely describes the situation; **EXTERNAL**, from the Latin *externus* and *extra*, is more definite in its sense, since it is employed only in regard to such objects as are conceived to be independent of man as a thinking being: hence, we may speak of the *outward* part of a building, of a board, of a table, a box, and the like; but of *external* objects acting on the mind, or of an *external* agency. **EXTERIOR** is still more definite than either, as it expresses a higher degree of the *outward* or *external*; the former being in the comparative, and the two latter in the positive degree: when we speak of any thing which has two coats, it is usual to designate the outermost by the name of the *exterior*; when we speak simply of the surface, without reference to any thing behind, it is denominated *external*: as the *exterior* coat of a walnut, or the *external* surface of things. In the moral application the *external* or *outward* is that which comes simply to the view; but the *exterior* is that which is prominent, and which consequently may conceal something: a man may sometimes neglect the *outside*, who is altogether mindful of the *in*; a man with a pleasing *exterior* will sometimes gain more friends than he who has more solid merit.

P.

PACE, STEP.

PACE, in French *pas*, Latin *passus* comes from the Hebrew *pashat* to pass, and signi-

fies the act of passing, or the ground passed over.

STEP, which comes through the medium of the northern languages, from the Greek *στειβω*, signifies the act of *stepping*, or the ground *stepped* over.

As respects the act, the term *pace* expresses the general manner of passing on, or moving the body; *step* implies the manner of treading with the foot: the *pace* is distinguished by being either a walk or a run; and in regard to horses a trot or a gallop: the *step* is distinguished by the right or left, the forward or the backward. The same *pace* may be modified so as to be more or less easy, more or less quick; the *step* may vary as it is light or heavy, graceful or ungraceful, long or short: we may go a slow *pace* with long *steps*, or we may go a quick *pace* with short *steps*: a slow *pace* is best suited to the solemnity of a funeral; a long *step* must be taken by soldiers in a slow march.

As respects the space passed or *stepped* over, the *pace* is a measured distance, formed by a long *step*; the *step*, on the other hand, is indefinitely employed for any space *stepped* over, but particularly that ordinary space which one *steps* over without an effort: a thousand *paces* was the Roman measurement for a mile; a *step* or two designates almost the shortest possible distance.

PAIN, PANG, AGONY, ANGUISH.

PAIN is to be traced, through the French and northern languages, to the Latin and Greek *ποινή* punishment, *πονος* labour, and *πεινῶμαι* to be poor or in trouble. **PANG** is but a variation of *pain*, contracted from the Teutonic *peinigen* to torment.

AGONY comes from the Greek *αγωνίζω* to struggle or contend, signifying the labour or *pain* of a struggle.

ANGUISH comes from the Latin *ango*, contracted from *ante* and *ago*, to act against, or in direct opposition to, and signifies the pain arising from severe pressure.

Pain, is here the generic, and the rest are specific terms: *pain* and *agony* are applied indiscriminately to what is physical and mental; *pang* and *anguish* mostly respect that which is mental: *pain* signifies either individual feeling or a permanent state; *pang* is only a particular feeling: *agony* is sometimes employed for the individual feeling, but more commonly for the state; *anguish* is always employed for the state. *Pain* is indefinite with regard to the degree; it may rise to the highest, or sink to the lowest possible degree; the rest are positively high degrees of *pain*; the *pang* is a sharp *pain*;

the *agony* is a severe and permanent *pain*; the *anguish* is an overwhelming *pain*.

The causes of *pain* are as various as the modes of *pain*, or as the circumstances of sensible beings: it attends disease and want in an infinite variety of forms: the *pangs* of conscience frequently trouble the man who is not yet hardened in guilt; *agony* and *anguish* are produced by violent causes, and disease in its most terrible shape; wounds and torments naturally produce corporeal *agony*; a guilty conscience that is awakened to a sense of guilt will suffer mental *agony*: *anguish* arises altogether from moral causes; a mother suffers *anguish* when she sees her child labouring under severe *pain*, or in danger of losing its life, without having the power to relieve it.

TO PAINT, DEPICT.

PAINT and DEPICT both come from the Latin *pingo* to represent forms and figures: as a verb, to *paint* is employed either literally to represent figures on paper, or to represent circumstances and events by means of words; to *depict* is used only in this latter sense, but the former word expresses a greater exercise of the imagination than the latter: it is the art of the poet to *paint* nature in lively colours; it is the art of the historian or narrator to *depict* a real scene of misery in strong colours.

PAINTING, PICTURE.

As nouns, PAINTING rather describes the action or operation, and PICTURE the result.

When we speak of a good *painting*, we think particularly of its execution as to drapery, disposition of colours, and the like; but when we speak of a fine *picture*, we refer immediately to the object represented, and the impression which it is capable of producing on the beholder: *paintings* are confined either to oil *paintings* or *paintings* in colours: but every drawing, whether in pencil, in crayons, or in India ink, may produce a *picture*; and we have likewise *pictures* in embroidery, *pictures* in tapestry, and *pictures* in Mosaic.

Painting is employed only in the proper sense; *picture* is often used figuratively: old *paintings* derive a value from the master by whom they were executed; a well-regulated family, bound together by the ties of affection, presents the truest *picture* of human happiness.

PALATE, TASTE.

PALATE, in Latin *palatum*, comes either from the Greek *παιω* to eat, or, which is

more probable, from the Etruscan word *far-lantum*, signifying the roof or arch of Heaven, or, by an extended application, the roof of the mouth.

TASTE comes from the German *tasten* to touch lightly, because the sense of *taste* requires but the slightest touch to excite it.

Palate is, in an improper sense, employed for *taste*, because it is the seat of *taste*; but *taste* is never employed for *palate*: a person is said to have a nice *palate* when he is nice in what he eats or drinks; but his *taste* extends to all matters of sense, as well as those which are intellectual. A man of *taste*, or of a nice *taste*, conveys much more as a characteristic, than a man of a nice *palate*: the former is said only in a good sense; but the latter is particularly applicable to the epicure.

PALE, PALLID, WAN.

PALE, in French *pale*, and PALLID, in Latin *pallidus*, both came from *palleo* to turn *pale*, which probably comes from the Greek *παλλυνω* to make white, and that from *παλη* flour.

WAN is connected with *want* and *wane*, signifying in general a deficiency or a losing colour.

Pallid rises upon *pale*, and *wan* upon *pallid*: the absence of colour in any degree, where colour is a requisite quality, constitutes *paleness*: but *pallidness* is an excess of *paleness*, and *wan* is an unusual degree of *pallidness*: *paleness* in the countenance may be temporary; but *pallidness* and *wanness* are permanent; fear, or any sudden emotion, may produce *paleness*; but protracted sickness, hunger, and fatigue, bring on *pallidness*; and, when these calamities are combined and heightened by every aggravation, they may produce that which is peculiarly termed *wanness*.

Pale is an ordinary term applicable to different objects, to persons, colours, lights, and luminaries. *Paleness* may be either a natural, or an acquired deficiency: a person is said to be *pale*, a colour *pale*, a light *pale*, the sun *pale*; the deficiency may be desirable or otherwise; the *paleness* of the moon is agreeable, that of the complexion the contrary. Nothing is said to be *pallid* but the human face, and that not from the ordinary course of nature, but as the effect of disease; those who paint are most apt to look *pallid*. *Wan* is applicable only to ghastly objects, or such as are rendered monstrous by unusual causes: the effects of death on the human visage are fully expressed by the term *wan*, when applied to an individual who is reduced, by severe absti-

nence or sickness, to a state bordering on the grave.

TO PALPITATE, FLUTTER, PANT, GASP.

PALPITATE, in Latin *palpitatus*, from *palpito*, is a frequentative of the Greek *παλλω* to vibrate.

FLUTTER is a frequentative of fly, signifying to fly backward and forward in an agitated manner.

PANT, probably derived from *pent*, and the Latin *pendo* to hang in a state of suspense, so as not to be able to move backward or forward, as is the case with the breath when one *pants*.

GASP is a variation of *gape*, which is the ordinary accompaniment in the action of *gasping*.

These terms agree in a particular manner, as they respect the irregular action of the heart or lungs: the two former are said of the heart; and the two latter of the lungs or breath: to *palpitate* expresses that which is strong; it is a strong beating of the blood against the vessels of the heart: to *flutter* expresses that which is rapid; it is a violent and alternate motion of the blood backward and forward; fear and suspense produce commonly *palpitation*, but joy and hope produce a *fluttering*: *panting* is, with regard to the breath, what *palpitating* is with regard to the heart; *panting* is occasioned by the inflated state of the respiratory organs which renders this *palpitating* necessary: *gasping* differs from the former, inasmuch as it denotes a direct stoppage of the breath; a cessation of action in the respiratory organs.

PARABLE, ALLEGORY.

PARABLE, in French *parabole*, Greek *παραβολή* from *παραβαλλω*, signifies what is thrown out or set before one, in lieu of something which it resembles.

ALLEGORY, *v.* Figure.

* Both these terms imply a veiled mode of speech, which serves more or less to conceal the main object of the discourse by presenting it under the appearance of something else, that accords with it in most of the particulars: the *parable* is mostly employed for moral purposes; the *allegory* in describing historical events.

The *parable* substitutes some other subject or agent, who is represented under a character that is suitable to the one referred to. In the *allegory* are introduced strange and arbitrary persons in the place of the real personages, or imaginary characteristics,

and circumstances are ascribed to real persons.

The *parable* is principally employed in the sacred writings; the *allegory* forms a grand feature in the productions of the eastern nations.

PART, DIVISION, PORTION, SHARE.

PART, in Latin *pars*, comes from the Hebrew *peresh* to divide.

DIVISION, *v.* To divide.

PORTION, in Latin *portio*, is supposed to be changed from *partio*, which comes from *partior* to distribute, and originally from *peresh*, as the word *part*.

SHARE, in Saxon *scynan* to divide, comes in all probability from the Hebrew *shar* to remain, that is, to remain after a *division*.

Part is a term not only of more general use, but of more comprehensive meaning than *division*; it is always employed for the thing *divided*, but *division* may be either employed for the act of *dividing*, or the thing that is *divided*: in all cases the word *division* has always a reference to some action, and the agent by whom it has been performed; whereas *part*, which is perfectly abstract, has altogether lost this idea. We always speak of the *part* as opposed to the whole, but of the *division* at it has been made of the whole.

A *part* is formed by accident, or made by design; a *division* is always the effect of design: a *part* is indefinite as to its quantity or nature, it may be large or small, round or square, of any dimension, form, or character; but a *division* is always regulated by some certain principles, it depends upon the circumstances of the *divisor* and thing to be *divided*. A page, a line, or a word, is the *part* of any book; but the books, chapters, sections, and paragraphs, are the *divisions* of the book. Stones, wood, water, air, and the like, are *parts* of the world; fire, air, earth, and water, are physical *divisions* of the globe; continents, seas, rivers, mountains, and the like, are geographical *divisions*, under which are likewise included its political *divisions* into countries, kingdoms, &c.

A *part* may be detached from the whole; a *division* is always conceived of in connexion with the whole; *portion* and *share* are particular species of *divisions*, which are said of such matters as are assignable to individuals; *portion* respects individuals without any distinction; *share* respects individuals specially referred to. The *portion* of happiness which falls to every man's lot is more equal than is generally supposed; the *share* which partners have in the profits

* Vide Abbé Girard: „Parable, allegorie.“

of any undertaking depends upon the sum which each has contributed towards its completion. The *portion* is that which simply comes to any one; but the *share* is that which belongs to him by a certain right. According to the ancient customs of Normandy, the daughters could have no more than a third *part* of the property for their *share*, which was *divided* in equal *portions* between them.

PART, PIECE, PATCH.

PART, *v.* Part.

PIECE, in French *piece*, in Hebrew *pas* to diminish; whence also comes PATCH, signifying the thing in its diminished form, that which is less than a whole. The *part* in its strict sense is taken in connexion with the whole; the *piece* is the part detached from the whole; the *patch* is that *piece* which is distinguished from others. Things may be divided into *parts* without any express separation; but when divided into *pieces* they are actually cut asunder. Hence we may speak of a loaf as divided into twelve *parts* when it is conceived only to be so; and divided into twelve *pieces*, when it is really so. On this ground, we talk of the *parts* of a country, but not of the *pieces*; and of a *piece* of land, not a *part* of land. The *piece* is that which may sometimes serve as a whole; but the *patch* is that which is always broken and disjointed, a something imperfect; many things may be formed out of a *piece*; but the *patch* only serves to fill up a chasm.

TO PARTAKE, PARTICIPATE, SHARE.

PARTAKE and PARTICIPATE, the one English, and the other Latin, signify literally to take a *part* in a thing. The former is employed in the proper or improper sense; and the latter in the improper sense only: we may *partake* of a feast, or we may *partake* of pleasure, but we *participate* only in pleasure, or that which is pleasurable.

To *partake* is a selfish action: to *participate* is either a selfish or a benevolent action: we *partake* of that which pleases ourselves; we *participate* in that which pleases another: we *partake* of a meal with a friend; we *participate* in the gifts of Providence, or in the enjoyments which another feels.

To *partake* is the act of taking or getting a thing to one's-self; to SHARE is the act of having a title to a *share*, or being in the act of receiving a *share*: we may, therefore, *partake* of a thing without *sharing* it, and *share* it without *partaking*. We *partake* of things mostly through the medium of the senses: whatever, therefore, we take a *part* in, whether gratuitously or casually, that we

may be said to *partake* of; in this manner we *partake* of an entertainment without *sharing* it: or we *partake* in a design, &c. On the other hand, we *share* things that promise to be of advantage or profit, and what we *share* is what we claim; in this manner we *share* a sum of money which has been left to us in common with others.

PARTICULAR, SINGULAR, ODD, ECCENTRIC, STRANGE.

PARTICULAR, in French *particulier*, Latin *particularis* from *particula* a particle, signifies belonging to a particle or a very small part.

SINGULAR, in French *singulier*, Latin *singularis* from *singulus* every one, which very probably comes from the Hebrew *siglet*, *peculium*, or private.

ODD, probably changed from *add*, signifying something arbitrarily added.

ECCENTRIC, from *ex* and *centre*, signifies out of the centre or direct line.

STRANGE, in French *etrange*, Latin *extra*, and Greek $\epsilon\varsigma$ out of, signifies out of some other part, or not belonging to this part.

All these terms are employed either as characteristics of persons or things. What is *particular* belongs to some small *particle* or point to which it is confined; what is *singular* is *single*, or the only one of its kind; what is *odd* is without an equal or any thing with which it is fit to pair; what is *eccentric* is not to be brought within any rule or estimate, it deviates to the right and the left; what is *strange* is different from that which one is accustomed to see, it does not admit of comparison or assimilation. A person is *particular* as it respects himself; he is *singular* as it respects others; he is *particular* in his habits or modes of action; he is *singular* in that which is about him; we may be *particular* or *singular* in our dress; in the former case we study the minute points of our dress to please ourselves; in the latter case we adopt a mode of dress that distinguishes us from all others.

One is *odd*, *eccentric*, and *strange*, more as it respects established modes, forms, and rules, than individual circumstances: a person is *odd* when his actions or his words bear no resemblance to that of others; he is *eccentric* if he regularly departs from the customary modes of proceeding; he is *strange* when that which he does makes him new or unknown to those who are about him. *Particularity* and *singularity* are not always taken in a bad sense; *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and *strangeness*, are never taken in a good one. A person ought to be *particular* in the choice of his society, his amusements, his

books, and the like; he ought to be *singular* in virtue, when vice is unfortunately prevalent: but *particularity* becomes ridiculous when it respects trifles; and *singularity* becomes culpable when it is not warranted by necessity. As *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and *strangeness*, consist in the violation of good order, of the decencies of human life, or the more important points of moral duty, they can never be justifiable, and are often unpardonable.

When applied to characterize inanimate objects they are mostly used in an indifferent, but sometimes in a bad sense: the term *particular* serves to define or specify, it is opposed to the general or indefinite; a *particular* day or hour, a *particular* case, a *particular* person, are expressions which confine one's attention to one precise object in distinction from the rest; *singular*, like the word *particular*, marks but one object, and that which is clearly pointed out in distinction from the rest; but this term differs from the former, inasmuch as the *particular* is said only of that which one has arbitrarily made *particular*, but the *singular* is so from its own properties: thus a place is *particular* when we fix upon it, and mark it out in any manner so that it may be known from others; a place is *singular* if it have any thing in itself which distinguishes it from others. *Odd*, in an indifferent sense, is opposed to even, and applied to objects in general; an *odd* number, an *odd* person, an *odd* book, and the like: but it is also employed in a bad sense, to mark objects which are totally dissimilar to others; thus an *odd* idea, an *odd* conceit, an *odd* whim, an *odd* way, an *odd* place. *Eccentric* is applied in its proper sense to mathematical lines or circles, which have not the same centre, and is never employed in an improper sense: *strange*, in its proper sense, marks that which is unknown or unusual, as a *strange* face, a *strange* figure, a *strange* place; but in the moral application it is like the word *odd*, and conveys the unfavourable idea of that which is uncommon and not worth knowing; a *strange* noise designates not only that which has not been heard before, but that which it is not desirable to hear; a *strange* place may signify not only that which we have been unaccustomed to see, but that which has also much in it that is objectionable.

PARTICULAR, INDIVIDUAL.

PARTICULAR, *v.* Peculiar.

INDIVIDUAL, in French *individuel*, Latin *individuus*, signifies that which cannot be divided.

Both these terms are employed to express one object; but *particular* is much more specific than *individual*; the *particular* confines us to one object only of many; but *individual* may be said of any one object among many. A *particular* object cannot be misunderstood for any other, while it remains *particular*; but the *individual* object can never be known from other *individual* objects, while it remains only *individual*. *Particular* is a term used in regard to *individuals*, and is opposed to the general: *individual* is a term used in regard to collectives; and is opposed to the whole or that which is divisible into parts.

PASSIVE, SUBMISSIVE.

PASSIVE, in Latin *passivus* from *patior*, and Greek *πασχω* to suffer, signifies disposed to suffer.

SUBMISSIVE, *v.* Humble.

Passive is mostly taken in the bad sense for suffering indignity from another; *submissive* is mostly in a good sense for submitting to another, or suffering one's self to be directed by another; to be *passive* therefore is to be *submissive* to an improper degree.

When men attempt unjustly to enforce obedience none but the *passive*, will submit quietly to the imposition: when men lawfully enforce obedience, none but the unruly and self-willed will fail to be *submissive*.

PATIENCE, ENDURANCE, RESIGNATION.

PATIENCE applies to any troubles or pains whatever, small or great; RESIGNATION is employed only for those of great moment, in which our dearest interests are concerned: *patience* when compared with *resignation* is somewhat negative; it consists in the abstaining from all complaint or indication of what one suffers: but *resignation* consists in a positive sentiment of conformity to the existing circumstances, be they what they may. There are perpetual occurrences which are apt to harass the temper, unless one regards them with *patience*; the misfortunes of some men are of so calamitous a nature, that if they have not acquired the *resignation* of Christians, they must inevitably sink under them.

Patience applies only to the evils that actually hang over us; but there is a *resignation* connected with a firm trust in Providence which extends its views to futurity, and prepares us for the worst that may happen.

As *patience* lies in the manner and temper of suffering, and ENDURANCE in the act; we

may have *endurance* and not *patience*: for we may have much to *endure* and consequently *endurance*; but if we do not *endure* it with an easy mind we have not *patience*: on the other hand we may have *patience* but not *endurance*: for our *patience* may be exercised by momentary trifles, which are not sufficiently great or lasting to constitute *endurance*.

PATIENT, PASSIVE.

PATIENT comes from *patiens*, the active participle of *patior* to suffer; PASSIVE comes from the *passive* participle of the same verb; hence the difference between the words: *patient* signifies suffering from an active principle, a determination to suffer; *passive* signifies suffering or acted upon for want of power to prevent. The former, therefore, is always taken in a good sense; the latter in a bad sense. *Patience* is always a virtue, as it signifies the suffering quietly that which cannot be remedied; *passiveness* as a temper, is a weakness, if not a vice, if it lead us needlessly to endure from others what we ought not to endure, but if it spring from a principle of submission, as opposed to resistance, it is then a Christian grace.

PEACE, QUIET, CALM, TRANQUILLITY.

PEACE, in Latin *pax*, may either come from *pactio* an agreement or compact which produces *peace*, or it may be connected with *pausa*, and the Greek *παύω* to cease.

QUIET, *v. Easy*.

CALM, *v. Calm*.

TRANQUILLITY, in Latin *tranquillitas*, from *tranquillus*, that is *trans*, the intensive syllable, and *quillus* or *quietus*, signifying altogether or exceedingly *quiet*.

Peace is a term of more general application, and more comprehensive meaning than the others; it respects either communities or individuals; but *quiet* respects only individuals or small communities. Nations are said to have *peace*, but not *quiet*; persons or families may have both *peace* and *quiet*. *Peace* implies an exemption from public or private broils; *quiet* implies a freedom from noise or interruption. Every well-disposed family strives to be at *peace* with its neighbours; the *quiet* of a neighbourhood is one of its first recommendations as a place of residence.

Peace and *quiet*, in regard to individuals, have likewise a reference to the internal state of the mind: but the former expresses the permanent condition of the mind, the latter its transitory condition. Serious matters only can disturb our *peace*; trivial matters

may disturb our *quiet*: a good man enjoys the *peace* of a good conscience, but he may have unavoidable cares and anxieties which disturb his *quiet*. There can be no *peace* where a man's passions are perpetually engaged in a conflict with each other; there can be no *quiet* where a man is embarrassed in his pecuniary affairs.

Calm is a species of *quiet*, which respects objects in the natural or the moral world; it indicates the absence of violent motion, as well as violent noise; it is that state which more immediately succeeds a state of agitation. As storms at sea are frequently preceded as well as succeeded, by a dead *calm*, so political storms have likewise their *calms*, which are their attendants, if not their precursors. *Peace*, *quiet*, and *calm*, have all respect to the state contrary to their own; they are properly cessations either from disturbance, or from agitation and tumult. *Tranquillity*, on the other hand, is taken more absolutely: it expresses the situation as it exists in the present moment, independently of what goes before or after; it is sometimes applicable to society, sometimes to natural objects, and sometimes to the mind. The *tranquillity* of the state cannot be preserved unless the authority of the magistrates be upheld; the *tranquillity* of the air and of all the surrounding objects is one thing which gives the country its peculiar charms: the *tranquillity* of the mind in the season of devotion contributes essentially to produce a suitable degree of religious fervour.

As epithets, these terms bear the same relation to each other: people are *peaceable* as they are disposed to promote *peace* in society at large, or in their private relations; they are *quiet*, inasmuch as they abstain from every loud expression, or are exempt from any commotion in themselves; they are *calm* inasmuch as they are exempt from the commotion which at any given moment rages around them; they are *tranquil*, inasmuch as they enjoy an entire exemption from every thing which can discompose. A town is *peaceable* as respects the disposition of the inhabitants; it is *quiet* as respects its external circumstances, or freedom from bustle and noise: an evening is *calm* when the air is lulled into a particular stillness, which is not interrupted by any loud sounds: a scene is *tranquil* which combines every thing calculated to sooth the spirits to rest.

PEACEABLE, PEACEFUL, PACIFIC.

PEACEABLE is used in the proper sense of the word *peace*, as it expresses an exemption from strife or contest (*v. Peace*); but

PEACEFUL is used in its improper sense, as it expresses an exemption from agitation or commotion. Persons or things are *peaceable*; things, particularly in the higher style, are *peaceful*: a family is designated as *peaceable* in regard to its members; a house is designated as a *peaceful* abode, as it is remote from the bustle and hurry of a multitude. PACIFIC signifies either making *peace*, or disposed to make *peace*, and is applied mostly to what we do to others. We are *peaceable* when we do not engage in quarrels of our own; we are *pacific* if we wish to keep *peace*, or make *peace* between others. Hence the term *peaceable* is mostly employed for private concerns, and *pacific* most properly for national concerns: subjects ought to be *peaceable*, and monarchs *pacific*.

PECULIAR, APPROPRIATE, PARTICULAR.

PECULIAR, in Latin *peculiaris*, comes from *pecus* cattle, that is, the cattle which belonged to the slave or servant, in distinction from the master; and the epithet, therefore, designates in a strong manner private property, belonging exclusively to one's self.

APPROPRIATE signifies *appropriated* (v. *To ascribe*).

PARTICULAR, v. *Particular*.

Peculiar is said of that which belongs to persons or things; *appropriate* is said of that which belongs to things only: the faculty of speech is *peculiar* to man, in distinction from all other animals; an address may be *appropriate* to the circumstances of the individual. *Peculiar* designates simple property; *appropriate* designates the right of propriety: there are advantages and disadvantages *peculiar* to every situation; the excellence of a discourse depends often on its being *appropriate* to the season. *Peculiar* and *particular* are both employed to distinguish objects; but the former distinguishes the object by showing its connexion with, or alliance to, others; *particular* distinguishes it by a reference to some acknowledged circumstance; hence we may say that a person enjoys *peculiar* privileges or *particular* privileges: in this case *peculiar* signifies such as are confined to him, and enjoyed by none else; *particular* signifies such as are distinguished in degree and quality from others of the kind.

TO PEEL, PARE.

PEEL, from the Latin *pelis* a skin, is the same as to skin or to take off the skin: to PARE, from the Latin *paro* to trim or make in order, signifies to smooth. The former of these terms denotes a natural, the

latter an artificial process: the former excludes the idea of a forcible separation; the latter includes the idea of separation by means of a knife or sharp instrument; potatoes and apples are *peeled* after they are boiled; they are *pared* before they are boiled: an orange and a walnut are always *peeled*, but not *pared*; a cucumber must be *pared* and not *peeled*: in like manner the skin may sometimes be *peeled* from the flesh, and the nails are *pared*.

PELLUCID, TRANSPARENT.

PELLUCID, in Latin *pellucidus*, changed from *perlucidus*, signifies very shining.

TRANSPARENT, in Latin *transparens*, from *trans* through or beyond, and *pareo* to appear, signifies that which admits light through it.

Pellucid is said of that which is pervious to the light, or of that into which the eye can penetrate; *transparent* is said of that which is throughout bright: a stream is *pellucid* when it admits of the light so as to reflect objects, but it is not *transparent* for the eye.

TO PENETRATE, PIERCE, PERFORATE, BORE.

PENETRATE, v. *Discernment*.

PIERCE, in French *percer*, Chaldee *perch* to break or rend.

PERFORATE, from the Latin *per* through, and *foris* a door, signifies to make a door through.

BORE, in Saxon *borian*, is probably changed from *fore* or *foris* a door, signifying to make a door or passage.

To *penetrate* is simply to make an entrance into any substance; to *pierce* is to go still deeper: to *perforate* and to *bore* are to go through, or at all events to make a considerable hollow. To *penetrate* is a natural and gradual process; in this manner rust *penetrates* iron, water *penetrates* wood; to *pierce* is a violent, and commonly an artificial, process; thus an arrow or a bullet *pierces* through wood. The instrument by which the act of *penetration* is performed is in no case defined; but that of *piercing* commonly proceeds by some pointed instrument: we may *penetrate* the earth by means of a spade, a plough, a knife, or various other instruments; but one *pierces* the flesh by means of a needle, or one *pierces* the ground or a wall by means of a pick-axe.

To *perforate* and *bore* are modes of *piercing* that vary in the circumstances of the action, and the objects acted upon: to *pierce*, in its peculiar use, is a sudden action by which a hollow is produced in any substance; but to *perforate* and *bore* are

commonly the effect of mechanical art. The body of an animal is *pierced* by a dart; but cannon are made by *perforating* or *boring* the iron: channels are formed under ground by *perforating* the earth; these two last words do not differ in sense, but in application; the latter being a term of vulgar use.

To *penetrate* and *pierce* are likewise employed in an improper sense; to *perforate* and *bore* are employed only in the proper sense. The two first bear the same relation to each other as in the former: *penetrate* is, however, only employed as the act of persons; *pierce* is used in regard to things. There is a power in the mind to *penetrate* the looks and actions, so as justly to interpret their meaning; the eye of the Almighty is said to *pierce* the thickest veil of darkness. Affairs are sometimes involved in such mystery, that the most enlightened is unable to *penetrate* either the end or the beginning; shrieks of distress are sometimes so loud as to seem to *pierce* the ear.

PENETRATION, ACUTENESS; SAGACITY.

As characteristics of mind, these terms have much more in them in which they differ than in what they agree: PENETRATION is a necessary property of mind; it exists to a greater or less degree in every rational being that has the due exercise of its rational powers: ACUTENESS is an accidental property that belongs to the mind only, under certain circumstances. As *penetration* (v. *Discernment*) denotes the process of entering into substances physically or morally, so *acuteness*, which is the same as sharpness, denotes the fitness of the thing that performs this process: and as the mind is in both cases the thing that is spoken of, the terms *penetration* and *acuteness* are in this particular closely allied. It is clear, however, that the mind may have *penetration* without having *acuteness*, although one cannot have *acuteness* without *penetration*. By *penetration* we are commonly enabled to get at the truth which lies concealed, by *acuteness* we succeed in piercing the veil that hides it from our view; the former is, therefore, an ordinary, and the latter an extraordinary gift.

SAGACITY, in Latin *sagacitas* from *sagio* to perceive quickly; comes in all probability from the Persian *sag* a dog, whence the term has been peculiarly applied to dogs, and from thence extended to all brutes which discover an intuitive wisdom, and also to children, or uneducated persons, in whom there is more *penetration* than may be expected from the narrow compass of their

knowledge; hence, properly speaking, *sagacity* is natural or uncultivated *acuteness*.

PEOPLE, NATION.

PEOPLE, in Latin *populus*, comes from the Greek *λαος* people, *πληθους* a multitude, and *πολυσ* many. Hence simple idea of numbers is expressed by the word *people*: but the term NATION, from *natus*, marks the connexion of numbers by birth; *people* is therefore the general, and *nation* the specific term. A *nation* is a *people* connected by birth; there cannot, therefore, strictly speaking, be a *nation* without a *people*: but there may be a *people* where there is not a *nation*. * The Jews are distinguished as a *people* or a *nation*, according to the different aspects under which they are viewed: when considered as an assemblage, under the special direction of the Almighty, they are termed the *people* of God, but when considered in regard to their common origin, they are denominated the Jewish *nation*. The Romans are not called the Roman *nation*, because their origin was so various, but the Roman *people*, that is an assemblage, living under one form of government.

In a still closer application *people* is taken for a part of the state, namely, that part of a state which consists of a multitude, in distinction from its government; we speak of the British *people*, the French or the Dutch *people*, when we wish merely to talk of the mass, but we speak of the British *nation*, the French *nation*, and the Dutch *nation*, when public measures are in question, which emanate from the government, or the whole *people*. The English *people* have ever been remarkable for their attachment to liberty: the abolition of the slave trade is one of the most glorious acts of public justice, which was ever performed by the British *nation*. Upon the same ground republican states are distinguished by the name of *people*: but kingdoms are commonly spoken of in history as *nations*. Hence we say the Spartan *people*, the Athenian *people*, the *people* of Genoa, the *people* of Venice; but the *nations* of Europe, the African *nations*, the English, French, German, and Italian *nations*.

PEOPLE, POPULACE, MOB, MOBILITY.

PEOPLE and POPULACE are evidently changes of the same word to express a number. The signification of these terms is that of a number gathered together. *People* is said of any body supposed to be assem-

* Vide Roubaud: „Nation, peuple.“

bled, as well as really assembled: *populace* is said of a body only, when actually assembled. The voice of the *people* cannot always be disregarded; the *populace* in England are fond of dragging their favourites in carriages.

MOB and MOBILITY are from the Latin *mobilis*, signifying moveableness, which is the characteristic of the multitude: hence Virgil's *mobile vulgus*. These terms, therefore, designate not only what is low, but tumultuous. A *mob* is at all times an object of terror: the *mobility*, whether high or low, are a fluttering order that mostly run from bad to worse.

PEOPLE, PERSONS, FOLKS.

The term PEOPLE has already been considered in two acceptations (*v. People, Nation; People, Populace*), under the general idea of an assembly; but in the present case it is employed to express a small number of individuals: the word *people*, however, is always considered as one undivided body, and the word PERSON may be distinctly used either in the singular or plural; as we cannot say one, two, three, or four *people*: but we may say one, two, three, or four *persons*: yet on the other hand, we may indifferently say, such *people* or *persons*; many *people* or *persons*; some *people* or *persons*, and the like.

With regard to the colloquial use of these terms, *people* is employed in general propositions: and *persons* in those which are specific or referring directly to some particular individuals: *people* are generally of that opinion; some *people* think so; some *people* attended; there were but few *persons* present at the entertainment; the whole company consisted of six *persons*.

As the term *people* is employed to designate a promiscuous multitude, it has acquired a certain meanness of acceptation which makes it less suitable than the word *persons*, when *people* of respectability are referred to: were I to say, of any individuals, I do not know who the *people* are, it would not be so respectful as to say, I do not know who those *persons* are: in like manner one says, from *people* of that stamp, better is not to be expected; *persons* of their appearance do not frequent such places.

FOLKS, through the medium of the northern languages, comes from the Latin *vulgus*, the common *people*: it is not unusual to say good *people*, or good *folks*; and in speaking jocularly to one's friends, the latter term is likewise admissible: but in the serious style it is never employed except in

a disrespectful manner: such *folks* (speaking of gamesters) are often put to sorry shifts.

TO PERCEIVE, DISCERN, DISTINGUISH.

PERCEIVE, in Latin *percipio*, or *per* and *cipio*, signifies to take hold of thoroughly.

DISCERN, *v. Discernment*.

DISTINGUISH, *v. Different*.

To *perceive* is a positive, to *discern* a relative, action: we *perceive* things by themselves; we *discern* them amidst many others: we *perceive* that which is remote, or which requires much attention to get an idea of it. We *perceive* by a person's looks and words what he intends; we *discern* the drift of his actions. We may *perceive* sensible or spiritual objects; we commonly *discern* only that which is spiritual: we *perceive* light, darkness, colours, or the truth or falsehood of any thing; we *discern* characters, motives, the tendency and consequences of actions, &c.

To *discern* and *distinguish* approach the nearest in sense to each other; but the former signifies to see only one thing, the latter to see two or more in quick succession. We *discern* what lies in things; we *distinguish* things according to their outward marks; we *discern* things in order to understand their essences; we *distinguish* in order not to confound them together. The conduct of people is sometimes so veiled by art, that it is not easy to *discern* their object; it is necessary to *distinguish* between practice and profession.

PERCEPTION, IDEA, CONCEPTION, NOTION.

PERCEPTION expresses either the act of *perceiving* (*v. To perceive*), or the impression produced by that act; in this latter sense it is analogous to an IDEA (*v. Idea*). The impression of an object that is present to us is termed a *perception*; the revival of that impression, when the object is removed, is an *idea*. A combination of *ideas* by which any image is presented to the mind is a CONCEPTION (*v. To comprehend*); the association of two or more *ideas*, so as to constitute a decision, is a NOTION (*v. Opinion*). *Perceptions* are clear or confused, according to the state of the sensible organs, and the *perceptive* faculty; *ideas* are faint or vivid, vague or distinct, according to the nature of the *perception*; *conceptions* are gross or refined according to the number and extent of one's *ideas*; *notions* are true or false, correct or incorrect, according to the extent of one's knowledge. The

perception which we have of remote objects, is sometimes so indistinct as to leave hardly any traces of the image on the mind; we have in that case a *perception*, but not an *idea*: if we read the description of any object, we may have an *idea* of it; but we need not have any immediate *perception*: the *idea* in this case being complex, and formed of many images of which we have already had a *perception*.

If we present objects to our minds, according to different images which have already been impressed, we are said to have a *conception* of them: in this case, however, it is not necessary for the objects really to exist; they may be the offspring of the mind's operation within itself: but with regard to *notions* it is different, for they are formed respecting objects that do really exist, although perhaps the proportions or circumstances which we assign to them are not real. If I look at the moon, I have a *perception* of it; if it disappear from my sight, and the impression remains, I have an *idea* of it; if an object, differing in shape and colour from that or any thing else which I may have seen, present itself to my mind, it is a *conception*; if of this moon I conceive that it is no bigger than what it appears to my eye, it is a *notion*, which, in the present instance, assigns an unreal property to a real object.

TO PERISH, DIE, DECAY.

PERISH, in French *perir*, in Latin *pereo*, compounded of *per* and *eo*, signifies to go thoroughly away.

DIE, *v. To die.*

DECAY, *v. To decay.*

To *perish* expresses more than to *die*, and is applicable to many objects; for the latter is properly applied only to express the extinction of animal life, and figuratively to express the extinction of life or spirit in vegetables, or other bodies; but the former is applied to express the dissolution of substances, so that they lose their existence as aggregate bodies. What *perishes*, does not always *die*, although whatever *dies*, by that very act *perishes* to a certain extent. Hence we say that wood *perishes*, although it does not *die*; people are said either to *perish* or *die*: but as the term *perish* expresses even more than *dying*, it is possible for the same thing to *die* and not *perish*; thus a plant may be said to *die* when it loses its vegetative power; but it is said to *perish* if its substance crumbles into dust.

To *perish* expresses the end; to *decay*, the process by which this end is brought

about: a thing may be long in *decaying*, but when it *perishes* it ceases at once to act or to exist; things may, therefore, *perish* without *decaying*; they may likewise *decay* without *perishing*. Things which are altogether new, and have experienced no kind of *decay*, may *perish* by means of water, fire, lightning, and the like: on the other hand, wood, iron, and other substances may begin to *decay*, but may be saved from immediately *perishing* by the application of preventives.

TO PERPETRATE, COMMIT.

The idea of doing something wrong is common to these terms; but **PERPETRATE**, from the Latin *perpetro*, compounded of *per* and *petro*, in Greek *παρρω*, signifying thoroughly to compass or bring about, is a much more determined proceeding than that of **COMMITTING**. One may *commit* offences of various degree and magnitude; but one *perpetrates* crimes only, and those of the more heinous kind. A lawless banditti, who spend their lives in the *perpetration* of the most horrid crimes, are not to be restrained by the ordinary course of justice: he who *commits* any offence against the good order of society exposes himself to the censure of others, who may be his inferiors in certain respects.

TO PERSUADE, ENTICE, PREVAIL UPON.

PERSUADE (*v. Conviction*) and **ENTICE** (*v. To allure*) are employed to express different means to the same end; namely, that of drawing any one to a thing: one *persuades* a person by means of words; one *entices* him either by words or actions; one may *persuade* either to a good or bad thing; but one *entices* commonly to that which is bad; one uses arguments to *persuade*, and arts to *entice*.

Persuade and *entice* comprehend either the means, or the end, or both: **PREVAIL UPON**, comprehends no more than the end: we may *persuade* without *prevailing upon*, and we may *prevail upon* without *persuading*. Many will turn a deaf ear to all our *persuasions*, and will not be *prevailed upon*, although *persuaded*: on the other hand, we may be *prevailed upon* by the force of remonstrance, authority, and the like, without being *persuaded*. We should never *persuade* another to do that which we are not willing to do ourselves; credulous or good-natured people are easily *prevailed upon* to do things which tend to their own injury.

PICTURE, PRINT, ENGRAVING.

PICTURE (*v. Painting*) is any likeness taken by the hand of the artist: the **PRINT** is the copy of the *painting* in a printed state; and the **ENGRAVING** is that which is produced by an *engraver*: every *engraving* is a *print*; but every *print* is not an *engraving*; for the *picture* may be printed off from something beside an *engraving*, as in the case of wood-cuts. The term *picture* is sometimes used for any representation of a likeness without regard to the mode by which it is formed: in this case it is employed mostly for the representations of the common kind that are found in books; but *print* and *engraving* are said of the higher specimens of the art. On certain occasions the word *engraving* is most appropriate, as to take an *engraving* of a particular object; on other occasions the word *print*, as a handsome *print*, or a large *print*.

PILLAR, COLUMN.

PILLAR, in French *pilier*, in all probability comes from *pile*, signifying any thing piled up in an artificial manner. **COLUMN**, in Latin *columna*, from *columen* a prop or support. In their original meaning, therefore, it is obvious that these words differ essentially, although in their present use they refer to the same object. The *pillar* mostly serves as a *column* or support, and the *column* is always a *pillar*; but sometimes a *pillar* does not serve as a prop, and then it is called by its own name; but when it supplies the place of a prop, then it is more properly denominated a *column*. Hence the Monument is a *pillar*, and not a *column*: and the *pillars* on which the roofs of churches are made to rest, may with more propriety be termed *columns*. *Pillar* is more frequently employed in a moral application than *column*, and in that case it always implies a prop. Government is the *pillar* on which all social order rests.

PITEOUS, DOLEFUL, WOEFUL, RUEFUL.

PITEOUS signifies moving *pity* (*v. Pity*).

DOLEFUL, or full of *dole*, in Latin *dolor* pain, signifies indicative of much pain.

WOEFUL or full of *woe*, signifies likewise indicative of *woe*, which from the German *weh* implies pain.

RUEFUL or full of *rue*, from the German *reuen* to repent, signifies indicative of much sorrow.

The close alliance in sense of these words one to another is obvious from the above explanation; *piteous* is applicable to one's ex-

ternal expression of bodily or mental pain; a child makes *piteous* lamentations when it suffers from hunger, or has lost its way; *doleful* applies to those sounds which convey the idea of pain; there is something *doleful* in the tolling of a funeral bell or in the sound of a muffled drum: *woeful* is applied to the circumstances and situations of men; a scene is *woeful* in which we witness a large family of young children suffering under the complicated horrors of sickness and want; *rueful* applies to the outward indications of sorrow depicted in the looks or countenance. The term is commonly applied to the sorrows which spring from a gloomy or distorted imagination, and has therefore acquired a somewhat ludicrous acceptance; hence we find in Don Quixote, the knight of the *rueful* countenance introduced.

PITIABLE, PITEOUS, PITIFUL.

These three epithets drawn from the same word have shades of difference in sense and application.

PITIABLE signifies deserving of *pity*: **PITEOUS**, moving *pity*; **PITIFUL**, full of that which awakens *pity*: a condition is *pitiable* which is so distressing as to call forth *pity*: a cry is *piteous* which indicates such distress as can excite *pity*; a conduct is *pitiful* which makes a character entitled to *pity*.

The first of these terms is taken in a good sense; the last two in an unfavourable sense: what is *pitiable* in a person is independent of any thing in himself; circumstances have rendered him *pitiable*; what is *piteous* and *pitiful* in a man arises from the helplessness and imbecility or worthlessness of his character; the former respects that which is weak; the latter that which is worthless in him: when a poor creature makes *piteous* moans, it indicates his incapacity to help himself as he ought to do out of his troubles; when a man of rank has recourse to *pitiful* shifts to gain his ends, he betrays the innate meanness of his soul.

PITY, COMPASSION.

PITY is in all probability contracted from *piety*.

COMPASSION, in Latin *compassio*, from *con* and *patior*, signifies to suffer in conjunction with another.

The pain which one feels at the distresses of another is the idea common to the signification of these terms, but they differ in the object that causes the distress: the former is excited principally by the weakness or degraded condition of the subject; the lat-

ter by his uncontrollable misfortunes. We *pity* a man of a weak understanding who exposes his weakness: we *compassionate* the man who is reduced to a state of beggary and want. *Pity*, though a tender sentiment, is so closely allied to contempt, that an ingenuous mind is always loath to be the subject of it, since it can never be awakened but by some circumstance of inferiority; it hurts the honest pride of a man to reflect that he can excite no interest but by provoking a comparison to his own disadvantage: on the other hand, such is the general infirmity of our natures, and such our exposure to the casualties of human life, that *compassion* is a pure and delightful sentiment, that is reciprocally bestowed and acknowledged by all with equal satisfaction.

PITY, MERCY.

The feelings one indulges and the conduct one adopts, towards others who suffer for their demerits is the common idea which renders these terms synonymous; but *PITY* lays hold of those circumstances which do not affect the moral character, or which diminish the culpability of the individual: *MERCY* lays hold of those external circumstances which may diminish punishment. *Pity* is often a sentiment unaccompanied with action; *mercy* is often a mode of action unaccompanied with sentiment: we have or take *pity* upon a person, but we show *mercy* to a person. *Pity* is bestowed by men in their domestic and private capacity; *mercy* is shown in the exercise of power; a master has *pity* upon his offending servant in passing over his offences, the magistrate shows *mercy* to a criminal by abridging his punishment. *Pity* lies in the breast of an individual, and may be bestowed at his discretion: *mercy* is restricted by the rules of civil society; it must not interfere with the administration of justice. Young offenders call for *pity*, as their offences are often the fruit of inexperience and bad example, rather than of depravity: *mercy* is an imperative duty in those who have the power of inflicting punishment, particularly in cases where life and death are concerned.

Pity and *mercy* are likewise applied to the brute creation with a similar distinction; *pity* shows itself in relieving real misery, and in lightening burdens; *mercy* is displayed in the measure of pain which one inflicts. One takes *pity* on a poor ass to whom one gives fodder to relieve hunger; one shows it *mercy* by abstaining from laying heavy stripes upon its back.

These terms are moreover applicable to

the Deity, in regard to his creatures, particularly man. God takes *pity* on us as entire dependants upon him: he extends his *mercy* towards us as offenders against him: he shows his *pity* by relieving our wants; he shows his *mercy* by forgiving our sins.

PLACE, SITUATION, STATION, POSITION, POST.

PLACE, in German *platz*, comes from *platt* even or open.

SITUATION, in Latin *situs*, comes from the Hebrew *sat* to put.

STATION, v. *Condition*.

POSITION, in Latin *positio* or *positus*, comes from the same source as *situs*.

Place is the abstract or general term that comprehends the idea of any given space that may be occupied: *station* is the *place* where one stands or is fixed; *situation* and *position* respect the object as well as the place, that is, they signify how the object is put, as well as where it is put. A *place* or a *station* may be either vacant or otherwise; a *situation* and a *position* necessarily suppose some occupied *place*. A *place* is either assigned or not assigned, known or unknown, real or supposed; a *station* is a specifically assigned *place*. We choose a *place* according to our convenience, and we leave it again at pleasure; but we take up our *station*, and hold it for a given period. One inquires for a *place* which is known only by name; the *station* is appointed for us, and is therefore easily found out. Travellers wander from *place* to *place*; soldiers have always some *station*.

The term *place* is said of objects animate or inanimate; *station* only of animate objects; *situation* and *position* only of inanimate: a person chooses a *place*; a thing occupies a *place*, or has a *place* set apart for it; a *station* or *stated* *place* must always be assigned to each person who has to act in concert with others; a person chooses a *situation* according to his convenience.

A *situation* is said of things as they stand with regard to others. *Position* is most commonly said of things as they stand with regard to themselves. The *situation* of a house comprehends the nature of the *place*, whether on high or low ground; and also its relation to other objects, that is, whether higher or lower, nearer or more distant: the *position* of a window in a house is considered as to whether it is straight or crooked; the *position* of a book is considered as to whether it stands leaning or upright, with its face or back forward. *Situation* is moreover said of things that

come there of themselves; *position* only of those things which have been put there at will or by something else. The *situation* of a tree or rock, on some elevated *place*, is pleasant. The faulty *position* of a letter in writing sometimes spoils the whole performance.

Place, *situation*, and *station*, have an improper signification in respect to men in civil society, that is, either to their circumstances or actions; *POST* has no other sense when applied to persons. *Place* is as indefinite as before; it may be taken for that share which we personally have in society either generally, as when every one is said to fill a *place* in society; or particularly for a specific share of its business, as to fill a *place* under government: *situation* is that kind of *place* which specifies either our share in its business, but with a higher import than the general term *place*, or a share in its gains and losses, as the prosperous or adverse *situation* of a man: a *station* is that kind of *place* which denotes a share in its relative consequence, power, and honour; in which sense every man holds a certain *station*: the *post* is that kind of *place* in which he has a specific share in the duties of society.

The *situation* comprehends many duties; but the *post* includes properly one duty only; the word being figuratively employed from the *post*, or particular spot which a soldier is said to occupy. A clerk in a counting-house fills a *place*: a clergyman holds a *situation* by virtue of his office; he is in the *station* of a gentleman by reason of his education, as well as his *situation*: a faithful minister will always consider that his *post* where good is to be done.

TO PLACE, DISPOSE, ORDER.

To *PLACE* is to assign a *place* (*v. Place*) to a thing: to *DISPOSE* is to *place* according to a certain rule; to *ORDER* is to *place* in a certain order.

Things are often *placed* from the necessity of being *placed* in some way or another: they are *disposed* so as to appear to the best advantage.

Books are *placed* on a shelf or in a cupboard to be out of the way; they are *disposed* on shelves according to their size: chairs are *placed* in different parts of a room; prints are tastefully *disposed* round a room.

Material objects only are *placed*: material or spiritual objects are *disposed*: spiritual objects only are *ordered*. To *dispose* in the improper sense is a more partial action than to *order*: one *disposes* for particular occasions; one *orders* for a perma-

nency and in complicated matters: our thoughts may be *disposed* to seriousness in certain cases; our thoughts and wills ought to be *ordered* aright at all times.

PLACE, SPOT, SITE.

A particular or given space is the idea common to these terms; but the former is general and indefinite, the latter specific. *PLACE* is limited to no size nor quantity, it may be large: but *SPOT* implies a very small *place*, such as by a figure of speech is supposed to be no larger than a *spot*: the term *place* is employed upon every occasion; the term *spot* is confined to particular cases: we may often know the *place* in a general way where a thing is, but it is not easy after a course of years to find out the exact *spot* on which it happened. The *place* where our Saviour was buried is to be seen and pointed out, but not the very *spot* where he lay.

The *SITE* is the *spot* on which any thing stands or is situated; it is more commonly applied to a building or any *place* marked out for a specific purpose; as the *site* on which a camp has been formed.

PLAY, GAME, SPORT.

PLAY, from the French *plaire* to please, signifies in general what one does to please one's self.

GAME, in Saxon *gaming*, very probably comes from the Greek *γαμεω* to marry, which is the season for *games*; the word *γαμεω*, itself, comes from *γαίω* to be buoyant or boasting, whence comes our word *gay*.

SPORT, in German *spass* or *posse*, comes from the Greek *παιζω* to jest.

Play and *game* both include exercise, corporeal or mental, or both; but *play* is an unsystematic, *game* a systematic, exercise: children *play* when they merely run after each other, but this is no *game*; on the other hand, when they exercise with the ball according to any rule, this is a *game*; every *game* therefore is a *play*, but every *play* is not a *game*: trundling a hoop is a *play*, but not a *game*: cricket is both a *play* and *game*. One person may have his *play* by himself, but there must be more than one to have a *game*. *Play* is adapted to infants; *games* to those who are more advanced. *Play* is the necessary unbending of the mind to give a free exercise to the body: *game* is the direction of the mind to the lighter objects of intellectual pursuit.

Sport is a bodily exercise connected with the prosecution of some object; it is so far, therefore, distinct from either *play* or *game*:

for *play* may be purely corporeal; *game*, principally intellectual; but *sport* is a mixture of both. The term *game* comprehends the exercise of an art, and the perfection which is attained in that art is the end or source of pleasure; a *sport* is merely the prosecution of an object which may be, and mostly is, attainable by one's physical powers without any exercise of art: a *game*, therefore, is intellectual both in the end and the means; a *sport* only in the end. Draughts, backgammon, cards, and the like, are *games*; but hunting, shooting, racing, bowling, quoits, &c. are termed more properly *sports*: there are, however, many things which may be denominated either *game* or *sport* according as it has more or less of art in it. Wrestling, boxing, chariot-racing, and the like, were carried to such perfection by the ancients that they are always distinguished by the name of *games*, under the different titles of the Olympic, the Pythian, the Nemean, and the Isthmian *games*. Similar exercises, when practised by the rustics in England, have been commonly denominated rural *sports*. Upon this ground *game* is used abstractedly for that part of the *game* in which the whole art lies; and *sport* is used for the end of the *sport* or the pleasure produced by the attainment of that end: thus we say that the *game* is won or lost; to be clever or inexpert at a *game*; to have much *sport*, to enjoy the *sport*, or to spoil the *sport*.

PLEASURE, JOY, DELIGHT, CHARM.

PLEASURE, from the Latin *placeo* to please or give content, is the generic term, involving in itself the common idea of the other terms.

JOY, *v. Glad.*

DELIGHT, in Latin *deliciae*, comes from *delicio* to allure, signifying what allures the mind.

Pleasure is a term of most extensive use: it is opposed to nothing but pain: *joy* and *delight* are both modes or modifications of *pleasure*, differing as to the degree, and as to the objects or sources. *Pleasure*, in its peculiar acceptation, is smaller in degree than either *joy* or *delight*, but in its universal acceptation it defines no degree: the term is indifferently employed for the highest as well as the lowest degree; whereas *joy* and *delight* can be employed only to express a positively high degree. *Pleasure* is produced by any or every object; We may have *pleasure* from the gratification of our senses, from the exercise of our affections, or the exercise of our understandings; *pleasure* from our own selves, or *pleasures* from

others: but *joy* is derived from the exercise of the affections; and *delight* either from the affections or the understanding. In this manner we distinguish the *pleasures* of the table, social *pleasures*, or intellectual *pleasures*; the *joy* of meeting an old friend; or the *delight* of pursuing a favourite object.

Pleasures are either transitory or otherwise; all earthly *pleasure* is in its nature fleeting; and heavenly *pleasure*, on the contrary, lasting. *Joy* is in its nature commonly short of duration, it springs from particular events; one's *joy* may be awakened and damped in quick succession; *delight* is not so fleeting as *joy*, but it may be less so than simple *pleasure*; *delight* arises from a state of outward circumstances which is naturally more durable than that of *joy*; but it is a state seldomer attainable and not so much at one's command as *pleasure*: those only are susceptible of *delight* who have acquired a certain degree of mental refinement; we must have a strong capacity for enjoyment before we can find *delight* in the pursuits of literature, or the cultivation of the arts. *Pleasures* are often calm and moderate; they do not depend upon a man's rank or condition; they are within the reach of all, more or less, and more or less at one's command: *joys* are buoyant; they dilate the heart for a time, but they must and will subside; they depend on casualties which are under no one's control: *delights* are ardent and excessive; they are within the reach of a few only, but depend less on external circumstances than on the temper of the receiver.

Pleasure may be had either by reflection on the past or by anticipation of the future; *joy* and *delight* can be produced only by present objects: we have a *pleasure* in thinking on what we have once enjoyed, or what we may again enjoy; we experience *joy* on the receipt of particularly good news; one may experience *delight* from a musical entertainment. *Pleasure* and *delight* may be either individual or social; *joy* is rather of a social nature: we feel *pleasure* in solitude when locked up only in our own contemplations; we experience *delight* in the prosecution of some great end; we feel *joy* in the presence of those whom we love, when we see them likewise happy.

Pleasure, *joy*, and *delight*, are likewise employed for the things which give *pleasure*, *joy*, or *delight*.

CHARM (*v. Attraction*) is used only in the sense of what *charms*, or gives a high degree of *pleasure*; but not a degree equal to that of *joy* or *delight*, though greater

than that of ordinary *pleasure*; the *joys* of heaven are objects of a Christian's pursuit; the *delights* of matrimony are lasting to those who are susceptible of true affection; the *charms* of rural scenery never fail of their effect whenever they offer themselves to the eye.

PLENTIFUL, PLENTEOUS, ABUNDANT, COPIOUS, AMPLE.

PLENTIFUL and PLENTEOUS signify the presence of *plenty*, *plenitude*, or *fulness*.

ABUNDANT, in Latin *abundantia*, from *abundo* to overflow, compounded of the intensive *ab* and *unda* a wave, signifies literally overflowing.

COPIOUS, in Latin *copiosus*, from *copia*, or *con*, and *opes* wealth, signifies having a store.

AMPLE, *v.* *Ample*.

Plentiful and *plenteous* differ only in use: the former being most employed in the familiar; the latter in the grave style.

Plenty fills, *abundance* does more, it leaves a superfluity: as that, however, which fills suffices as much as that which flows over, the term *abundance* is often employed promiscuously with that of *plenty*; we can indifferently say a *plentiful* harvest, or an *abundant* harvest. *Plenty* is, however, more frequent in the literal sense for that which fills the body; *abundance*, for that which fills the mind, or the desires of the mind: *plenty* of provisions *plenty* of food, *plenty* of corn, wine, and oil: but an *abundance* of words; an *abundance* of riches; an *abundance* of wit or humour. In certain years fruit is *plentiful*, and at other times grain is *plentiful*; in all cases we have *abundant* cause for gratitude to the Giver of all good things.

Copious and *ample* are modes either of *plenty* or *abundance*: the former is employed in regard to what is collected or brought into one point; the term *ample* is used only in regard to what may be extended or expanded: a *copious* stream, or a *copious* flow of words fully designate the quantity which is collected together; an *ample* provision, an *ample* store, an *ample* share, denote that which may at pleasure be increased or diminished.

TO PLUNGE, DIVE.

PLUNGE is but a variation of pluck, from *pello* to drive or force forward.

DIVE is but a variation of *dip*, which is under various forms to be found in the northern languages.

One *plunges* sometimes in order to *dive*;

but one may *plunge* without *diving*, or we may *dive* without *plunging*: to *plunge* is to dart head-foremost into the water; to *dive* is to go to the bottom of the water, or towards it: it is a good practice for bathers to *plunge* into the water when they first go in, although it is not adviseable for them to *dive*; ducks frequently *dive* into the water without ever *plunging*. Thus far they differ in their natural sense; but in the figurative application they differ more widely: to *plunge*, in this case, is an act of rashness; to *dive* is an act of design: a young man hurried away by his passions will *plunge* into every extravagance when he comes into possession of his estate: people of a prying temper seek to *dive* into the secrets of others.

TO POISE, BALANCE.

POISE, in French *peser*, probably comes from *pes* a foot, on which the body is as it were *poised*.

BALANCE, in French *balancer*, from the Latin *bilanx*, or *bis* and *lanx* a pair of scales.

The idea of bringing into an equilibrium is common to both terms; but *poise* is a particular, and *balance* a more general term: a thing is *poised* as respects itself; it is *balanced* as respects other things: a person *poises* a plain stick in his hand when he wants it to lie even; he *balances* the stick if it has a particular weight at each end: a person may *poise* himself, but he *balances* others: when not on firm ground, it is necessary to *poise* one's self; when two persons are situated one at each end of a beam, they may *balance* one another.

POISON, VENOM.

POISON, in French *poison*, comes from the Latin *potio*, a potion or drink.

VENOM, in French *venin*, Latin *venenum*, comes probably from *venae* the veins, because it circulates rapidly through the veins, and infects the blood in a deadly manner.

Poison is a general term; in its original meaning it signifies any potion which acts destructively upon the system; *venom* is a species of deadly or malignant *poison*: a *poison* may be either slow or quick; a *venom* is always most active in its nature: a *poison* must be administered inwardly to have its effect; a *venom* will act by an external application: the juice of the hellebore is a *poison*; the tongue of the adder and the tooth of the viper contain *venom*: many plants are unfit to be eaten on account of the *poisonous* quality which is in them; the Indians are in the habit of dip-

ping the tips of their arrows in a *venomous* juice, which renders the slightest wound mortal.

The moral application of these terms is clearly drawn from their proper acceptation: the *poison* must be infused or injected into the subject; the *venom* acts upon him externally: bad principles are justly compared to *poison*; the shafts of envy are peculiarly *venomous* when directed against those in elevated stations.

POLITE, POLISHED, REFINED.

POLITE (*v. Civil*) denotes a quality; POLISHED, a state: he who is *polite* is so according to the rules of *politeness*; he who is *polished* is *polished* by the force of art: a *polite* man is, in regard to his behaviour, a finished gentleman; but a rude person may be more or less *polished* or freed from rudeness. REFINED rises in sense, both in regard to *polite* and *polished*: a man is indebted to nature, rather than to art, for his *refinement*; but his *politeness* or his *polish*, are entirely the fruit of education. *Politeness* and *polish* do not extend to any thing but externals; *refinement* applies as much to the mind as the body: rules of conduct, and good society, will make a man *polite*; lessons in dancing will serve to give a *polish*; *refined* manners or principles will naturally arise out of *refinement*.

As *polish* extends only to the exterior, it is less liable to excess than *refinement*: when the language, the walk, and deportment of a man is *polished*, he is divested of all that can make him offensive in social intercourse; but if his temper be *refined* beyond a certain boundary, he loses the nerve of character which is essential for maintaining his dignity against the ruder shocks of human life.

POLITICAL, POLITIC.

POLITICAL has the proper meaning of the word *polity*, which, from the Greek *πολιτεία* and *πολις* a city signifies the government either of a city or a country.

POLITIC, like the word *policy*, has the improper meaning of the word *polity*, namely, that of clever management, because the affairs of states are sometimes managed with considerable art and finesse: we speak of *political* government as opposed to that which is ecclesiastic; and of *politic* conduct as opposed to that which is unwise and without foresight: in *political* questions, it is not always *politic* for individuals to set themselves up in opposition to those who are in power; the study of *politics*, as a science, may make a man a clever states-

man; but it may not always enable him to discern true policy in his private concerns.

POOR, PAUPER.

POOR and PAUPER are both derived from the Latin *pauper*, which comes from the Greek *πauρος* small. Poor is a term of general use; *pauper* is a term of particular use: a *pauper* is a *poor* man who lives upon alms or the relief of the parish: the former is, therefore, indefinite in its meaning; the latter conveys a reproachful idea. The word *poor* is used as a substantive only in the plural number; *pauper* is a substantive both in the singular and plural: the *poor* of the parish are, in general, a heavy burden to the inhabitants; there are persons who are not ashamed to live and die *paupers*.

POSITION, POSTURE.

POSITION (*v. Place*) is here used as respects persons, and in this sense is allied to POSTURE, which is an artificial or a set position: if a person stands tiptoe, in order to see to a greater distance, he may be said to put himself into that position; but if a dancer do the same, as a part of his performance, it becomes a posture: so, likewise, when one leans against the wall it is a leaning position.

When one theatrically bends his body backward or forward, it is a posture: one may, in the same manner, sit in an erect position, or in a reclining posture.

POSITIVE, ABSOLUTE, PEREMPTORY.

POSITIVE, in Latin *positivus* from *pono* to put or place, signifies placed or fixed, that is, fixed or established in the mind.

ABSOLUTE (*v. Absolute*) signifies uncontrolled by any external circumstances.

PEREMPTORY, in Latin *peremptorius*, from *perimo* to take away, signifies removing all further question.

Positive is said either of a man's convictions or temper of mind, or of his proceedings; *absolute* is said of his mode of proceeding, or his relative circumstances; *peremptory* is said of his proceeding. *Positive*, as respects a man's conviction, has been spoken of under the article of *confident* (*v. Confident*); in the latter sense it bears the closest analogy to *absolute* or *peremptory*: a *positive* mode of speech depends upon a *positive* state of mind; an *absolute* mode of speech depends upon the uncontrollable authority of the speaker: a *peremptory* mode of speech depends upon the disposition and relative circumstances of the speaker: a decision is *positive*; a command *absolute* or *peremptory*; what is po-

sitive excludes all question; what is *absolute* bars all resistance; what is *peremptory* removes all hesitation.

As adverbs, *positively*, *absolutely*, and *peremptorily* have an equally close connexion: a thing is said not to be *positively* known, or *positively* determined upon, or *positively* agreed to; it is said not to be *absolutely* necessary, *absolutely* true or false, *absolutely* required; it is not to be *peremptorily* decided, *peremptorily* declared, *peremptorily* refused.

Positive and *absolute* are likewise applied to moral objects with the same distinction as before: the *positive* expresses what is fixed, in distinction from the relative which may vary; the *absolute* is that which is independent of every thing: thus, pleasures and pains are *positive*; names in logic are *absolute*; cases in grammar are *absolute*.

POSSESSOR, PROPRIETOR, OWNER, MASTER.

The POSSESSOR has the full power, if not the right, over the object of possession; the PROPRIETOR and OWNER has the unlimited right, but not always the power of immediate disposal. The *proprietor* and the *owner* are the same in signification, though not in application: the first term being used principally in regard to matters of importance; the latter on familiar occasions: the *proprietor* of an estate is a more suitable expression than the *owner* of an estate: the *owner* of a book is more becoming than the *proprietor*. The *possessor* and the MASTER are commonly the same person, when those things are in question which are subject to possession; but the terms are otherwise so different in their original meaning, that they can scarcely admit of comparison: the *possessor* of a house is naturally the *master* of the house; and, in general, whatever a man possesses, that he has in power, and is consequently *master* of; but we may have, legally, the right of possessing a thing, over which we have actually no power of control: in this case, we are nominally *possessor* but virtually not *master*. A minor, or insane person, may be both *possessor* and *proprietor* of that over which he has no control; a man is, therefore, on the other hand, appropriately denominated *master*, not *possessor* of his actions.

POSSIBLE, PRACTICABLE, PRACTICAL.

POSSIBLE, from the Latin *possum* to be able, signifies properly to be able to be done: PRACTICABLE, from *practice* (v. *To exercise*), signifies to be able to put in practice: hence the difference between pos-

sible and practicable is the same as between doing a thing at all, or doing it as a rule. There are many things possible which cannot be called practicable; but what is practicable must, in its nature, be possible. The possible depends solely on the power of the agent; the practicable depends on circumstances: a child cannot say how much it is possible for him to learn until he has tried; schemes have sometimes every thing to recommend them to notice, but their practicability.

The practicable is that which may or can be practised; the PRACTICAL is that which is intended for practice; the former, therefore, applies to that which men devise to carry into practice; the latter to that which they have to practise: projectors ought to consider what is practicable; divines and moralists ought to consider what is practical. The practicable is opposed to the impracticable; the practical to the theoretical or speculative.

POVERTY, INDIGENCE, WANT, NEED.

POVERTY marks the condition of being poor.

INDIGENCE, in Latin *indigentia*, comes from *indigeo* and the Greek *δεομαι* to want, signifying in the same manner as the word WANT, the abstract condition of wanting.

NEED, v. *Necessary*.

Poverty is a general state in which one is abridged of the conveniences of life; indigence is a particular state of poverty, which rises above it in such a degree as to exclude the necessities as well as the conveniences of life; want and need are both partial states, that refer only to individual things, which are wanting to any one. Poverty and indigence comprehend all a man's external circumstances; but want, when taken by itself, denotes the want of food or clothing; need, when taken by itself, implies the want of money, or any other useful article; but they are both more commonly taken in connexion with the object which is wanted, and in this sense they are to the two former, as the species to the genus. Poverty and indigence are permanent states; want and need are temporary: poverty and indigence are the order of Providence, they do not depend upon the individual, and are, therefore, not reckoned as his fault; want and need arise more commonly from circumstances of one's own creation, and tend frequently to one's discredit. Poverty is that which one should learn to bear, so as to lessen its pains; indigence is a calamity which the compassion of others may in some measure al-

leviate, if they cannot entirely obviate; *want*, when it results from intemperance or extravagance, is not altogether entitled to any relief; but *need*, when it arises from casualties that are independent of our demerits, will always find friends.

TO POUR, SPILL, SHED.

POUR is probably connected with *pore*, and the Latin preposition *per*, through, signifying to make to pass as it were through a channel.

SPILL and splash, and the German *spülen* are probably onomatopoeias.

SHED comes from the German *scheiden* to separate, signifying to cast from.

We *pour* with design; we *spill* by accident: we *pour* water over a plant or a bed; we *spill* it on the ground. To *pour* is an act of convenience; to *spill* and *shed* are acts more or less hurtful; the former is to cause to run in small quantities; the latter in large quantities; we *pour* wine out of a bottle into a glass; but the blood of a person is said to be *spilt* or *shed* when his life is violently taken away: what is *poured* is commonly no part of the body from whence it is *poured*; but what is *shed* is no other than a component part: hence trees are said to *shed* their leaves, animals their hair, or human beings to *shed* tears.

POWER, STRENGTH, AUTHORITY, DOMINION.

POWER, in French *pouvoir*, comes from the Latin *possum* to be able; STRENGTH denotes the abstract quality of *strong*.

AUTHORITY, *v. Influence*.

DOMINION, *v. Empire*.

Power is the generic and universal term, comprehending in it that simple principle of nature which exists in all subjects. *Power* is either physical or mental, public or private; in the former case it is synonymous with *strength*, in the latter with *authority*. *Power* in the physical sense respects whatever causes motion; *strength* respects that species of *power* that lies in the vital and muscular parts of the body. *Strength*, therefore, is internal, and depends upon the internal organization of the frame; *power*, on external circumstances. A man may have *strength* to move, but not the *power* if he be bound with cords. Our *strength* is proportioned to the health of the body, and the firmness of its make; our *power* may be increased by the help of instruments.

Civil *power* includes in it all that which enables us to have any influence or control over the actions, persons, property,

&c. of others: *authority* is confined to that species of *power* which is derived from some legitimate source. *Power* exists independently of all right; *authority* is founded only on right. A king has often the *power* to be cruel, but has never the *authority* to be so. Subjects have sometimes the *power* of overturning the government but they can in no case have the *authority*. *Power* may be abused; *authority* may be exceeded. A minister abuses his *power* if he only exerts it to benefit his favourites and oppress the subject; an ambassador exceeds his *authority* who goes beyond the letter of his instructions.

It lies properly with the Supreme *power* to grant privileges, or take them away; but the same may be done by one in whom the *authority* is invested. *Authority* in this sense is applied to the ordinary concerns of life, where the line of distinction is always drawn, between what we can and what we ought to do. There is *power* where we can or may act; there is *authority* only where we ought to act. In all our dealings with others it is necessary to consider in every thing, not what we have the *power* of doing, but what we have the *authority* to do. In matters of indifference, and in what concerns ourselves only, it is sufficient to have the *power* to act, but in all important matters we must have the *authority* of the divine law: a man may have the *power* to read or leave it alone; but he cannot dispose of his person without *authority*. In what concerns others, we must act by their *authority*, if we wish to act conscientiously; when the secrets of another are confided to us, we have the *power* to divulge them, but not the *authority*, unless it be given by him who intrusted them.

Power is indefinite as to degree: one may have little or much *power*: *dominion* is a positive degree of *power*. A monarch's *power* may be limited by various circumstances; a despot exercises *dominion* over all his subjects, high and low. One is not said to get a *power* over any object, but to get an object into one's *power*: on the other hand, we get a *dominion* over an object; thus some men have a *dominion* over the consciences of others.

POWERFUL, POTENT, MIGHTY.

POWERFUL, or full of *power*, is also the original meaning of POTENT; but MIGHT signifies having *might*. *Powerful* is applicable to *strength* as well as *power*: a *powerful* man is one who by his size and make can easily overpower another; and a *powerful* person is one who has much in his

power; *potent* is used only in this latter sense, in which it expresses a larger extent of *power*: a *potent* monarch is much more than a *powerful* prince; *mighty* expresses a still higher degree of *power*; *might* is *power* unlimited by any consideration or circumstance; a giant is called *mighty* in the physical sense, and genius is said to be *mighty* which takes every thing within its grasp; the Supreme Being is entitled either *Omnipotent* or *Almighty*; but the latter term seems to convey the idea of boundless extent more forcibly than the former.

TO PRAISE, COMMEND, APPLAUD,
EXTOL.

PRAISE comes from the German *preisen* to value, and our own word *price*, signifying to give a value to a thing.

COMMEND, in Latin *commendo*, compounded of *com* and *mando*, signifies to commit to the good opinion of others.

APPLAUD, *v. Applause*.

EXTOL, in Latin *extollo*, signifies to lift up very high.

All these terms denote the act of expressing approbation. To *praise* is the most general and indefinite; it may rise to a high degree, but it generally implies a lower degree: we *praise* a person generally; we *commend* him particularly: we *praise* him for his diligence, sobriety, and the like; we *commend* him for his performances, or for any particular instance of prudence or good conduct. To *applaud* is an ardent mode of *praising*; we *applaud* a person for his nobleness of spirit: to *extol* is a reverential mode of *praising*; we *extol* a man for his heroic exploits. *Praise* is confined to no station, though with most propriety bestowed by superiors or equals: *commendation* is the part of a superior; a parent *commends* his child for an act of charity: *applause* is the act of many as well as of one; theatrical performances are the frequent subjects of public *applause*: to *extol* is the act of inferiors, who declare thus decidedly their sense of a person's superiority.

In the scale of signification *commend* stands the lowest, and *extol* the highest; we *praise* in stronger terms than we *commend*: to *applaud* is to *praise* in loud terms; to *extol* is to *praise* in strong terms.

PRAYERS, PETITION, REQUEST, ENTREATY, SUIT.

PRAYER, from the Latin *preco*, and the Greek *παραρωμαι* to pray, is a general term, including the common idea of application to some person for any favour to be granted: PETITION, from *peto* to seek;

REQUEST (*v. To ask*); ENTREATY (*v. To beg*); SUIT from *sue*, in French *suiivre*, Latin *sequor*, to follow after; denote different modes of *prayer*, varying in the circumstances of the action and the object acted upon.

The *prayer* is made more commonly to the Supreme Being; the *petition* is made more generally to one's fellow-creatures; we may, however, *pray* our fellow-creatures, and *petition* our Creator: the *prayer* is made for every thing which is of the first importance to us as living beings: the *petition* is made for that which may satisfy our desires: hence our *prayers* to the Almighty respect all our circumstances as moral and responsible agents; our *petitions* respect the temporary circumstances of our present existence,

Petitions and *requests* are alike made to our fellow-creatures; but the former are a public act, in which many express their wishes to the Supreme Authority; the latter are an individual act between men in their private relations: the people *petition* the king or the parliament; a school of boys *petition* their master: a child makes a *request* to its parent; one friend makes a *request* to another. The *request* marks an equality, but the *entreaty* defines no condition; it differs, however, from the former in the nature of the object and the mode of preferring: the *request* is but a simple expression; the *entreaty* is urgent: the *request* may be made in trivial matters; the *entreaty* is made in matters that deeply interest the feelings: we *request* a friend to lend us a book; we use every *entreaty* in order to divert a person from those purposes which we think detrimental: one complies with a *request*; one yields to *entreaties*. It was the dying *request* of Socrates, that they would sacrifice a cock to Aesculapius: Regulus was deaf to every *entreaty* of his friends, who wished him not to return to Carthage.

The *suit* is a higher kind of *prayer*, varying both in the nature of the subject, and the character of the agent. A gentleman pays his *suit* to a lady; a courtier makes his *suit* to the prince.

PRELUDE, PREFACE.

PRELUDE, from the Latin *ludo* to play, signifies the game that *precedes* another; PREFACE, from the Latin *for* to speak, signifies the speech that *precedes*. The idea of a preparatory introduction is included in both in these terms, but the former consists of actions; the latter of words: the throwing of stones and breaking of win-

dows is the *prelude* on the part of a mob to a general riot; an apology for one's ill-behaviour is sometimes the *preface* to soliciting a remission of punishment. The *prelude* is mostly preparatory to that which is in itself actually bad: the *preface* is mostly preparatory to something supposed to be objectionable. Intemperance in liquor is the *prelude* to every other extravagance: when one wishes to ensure compliance with a request that may possibly be unreasonable, it is necessary to pave the way by some suitable *preface*.

TO PREMISE, PRESUME.

PREMISE. from *pre* and *mitto*, signifies set down beforehand; **PRESUME**, from *sumo* to take, signifies to take beforehand. Both these terms are employed in regard to our previous assertions or admissions of any circumstance; the former is used for what is theoretical or belongs to opinions; the latter is used for what is practical or belongs to facts: we *promise* that the existence of a Deity is unquestionable when we argue respecting his attributes; we *presume* that a person believes in divine revelation when we exhort him to follow the precepts of the Gospel. No argument can be pursued until we have *promised* those points upon which both parties are to agree: we must be careful not to *presume* upon more than what we are fully authorized to take for certain.

TO PRESS, SQUEEZE, PINCH, GRIPE.

PRESS, in Latin *pressus*, participle of *premo*, which probably comes from the Greek *παύω*.

SQUEEZE, in Saxon *squizza*, Latin *quasso*, Hebrew *reshah* to press together.

PINCH is but a variation from *pincer*, *pin*, *spine*.

GRIPE, from the German *greifen*, signifies to seize, like the word grapple or grasp, the Latin *rapio*, the Greek *γρῦναι* to fish or catch, and the Hebrew *geraph* to catch.

The forcible action of one body on another is included in all these terms. In the word *press* this is the only idea; the rest differ in the circumstances. We may *press* with the foot, the hand, the whole body, or any particular limb; one *squeezes* commonly with the hand; one *pinches* either with the fingers or an instrument constructed in a similar form; one *gripes* with teeth, claws, or any instrument that can gain a hold of the object. Inanimate as well as animate objects *press* or *pinch*; but to *squeeze* and *gripe* are more properly the actions of ani-

mate objects; the former is always said of persons, the latter of animals: stones *press* that on which they rest their weight: a door which shuts of itself may *pinch* the fingers; one *squeezes* the hand of a friend; lobsters and many other shell-fish *gripe* whatever comes within their claws.

In the figurative application they have a similar distinction; we *press* a person by importunity, or some coercive measure: an extortioner *squeezes* in order to get that which is given with reluctance; a miser *pinches* himself if he contracts his subsistence; he *gripes* all that comes within his possession.

PRESSING, URGENT, IMPORTUNATE.

PRESSING and **URGENT**, from *to press* and *urge*, are applied as qualifying terms either to persons or things: **IMPORTUNATE**, from the verb *to importune*, which probably signifies to wish to get into port, to land at some port, is applied only to persons. In regard to *pressing*, it is said either of one's demands, one's requests, or one's exhortations; *urgent* is said of one's solicitations or entreaties; *importunate* is said of one's begging or applying for a thing. The *pressing* has more of violence in it; it is supported by force and authority; it is employed in matters of right: the *urgent* makes an appeal to one's feelings; it is more persuasive, and is employed in matters of favour: the *importunate* has some of the force, but none of the authority or obligation of the *pressing*; it is employed in matters of personal gratification. When applied to things, *pressing* is as much more forcible than *urgent*, as in the former case; we speak of a *pressing* necessity, an *urgent* case. A creditor will be *pressing* for his money when he fears to lose it; one friend is *urgent* with another to intercede in his behalf; beggars are commonly *importunate* with the hope of teasing others out of their money.

PRESUMPTIVE, PRESUMPTUOUS, PRESUMING.

PRESUMPTIVE comes from *presume*, in the sense of supposing or taking for granted; **PRESUMPTUOUS**, **PRESUMING** (v. *Arrogance*), come from the same verb in the sense of taking upon one's self, or taking to one's self any importance: the former is therefore employed in an indifferent, the latter in a bad acceptation: a *presumptive* heir is one *presumed* or expected to be heir; *presumptive* evidence is evidence founded on some *presumption* or supposition; so likewise *presumptive* reasoning; but a *pre-*

sumptuous man, a *presumptuous* thought, a *presumptuous* behaviour, all indicate an unauthorized *presumption* in one's own favour.

Presumptuous is a stronger term than *presuming*, because it has a more definite use; the former designates the express quality of *presumption*, the latter the inclination: a man is *presumptuous* when his conduct partakes of the nature of *presumption*; he is *presuming* inasmuch as he shows himself disposed to *presume*: hence we speak of *presumptuous* language, not *presuming* language; a *presuming* temper, not a *presumptuous* temper.

PRETENCE, PRETENSION, PRETEXT.
EXCUSE.

PRETENCE comes from *pretend* (v. *To feign*) in the sense of setting forth any thing independent of ourselves. PRETENSION comes from the same verb in the sense of setting forth any thing that depends upon ourselves. The *pretence* is commonly a misrepresentation; the *pretension* is frequently a miscalculation: the *pretence* is set forth to conceal what is bad in one's self; the *pretension* is set forth to display what is good: the former betrays falsehood, the latter conceit or self-importance: the former can never be employed in a good sense, the latter may sometimes be employed in an indifferent sense: a man of bad character may make a *pretence* of religion by adopting an outward profession; men of the least merit often make the highest *pretensions*.

The *pretence* and PRETEXT alike consist of what is unreal; but the former is not so great a violation of truth as the latter: the *pretence* may consist of truth and falsehood blended; the *pretext* consists altogether of falsehood: the *pretence* may sometimes serve only to conceal or palliate a fault; the *pretext* serves to hide something seriously culpable or wicked: a child may make indisposition a *pretence* for idleness; a thief makes his acquaintance with the servants a *pretext* for getting admittance into a house.

The *pretence* and EXCUSE are both set forth to justify one's conduct in the eyes of others; but the *pretence* always conceals something more or less culpable, and by a greater or less violation of truth; the *excuse* may sometimes justify that which is justifiable, and with strict regard to truth. To oblige one's self under the *pretence* of obliging another, is a despicable trick; illness is an allowable *excuse* to justify any omission in business.

PRETENSION, CLAIM.

PRETENSION (v. *Pretence*) and CLAIM (v. *To ask for*) both signify an assertion of rights, but they differ in the nature of the rights. The first refers only to the rights which are calculated as such by an individual; the latter to those which exist independent of his supposition: there cannot therefore be a *pretension* without some one to pretend, but there may be a *claim* without any immediate *claimant*: thus we say a person rests his *pretension* to the crown upon the ground of being descended from the former king; in hereditary monarchies there is no one who has any *claim* to the crown except the heir in succession. A *pretension* is commonly built upon one's personal merits; a *claim* rests upon the laws of civil society: a person makes high *pretensions* who estimates his merits and consequent deserts at a high rate; he judges of his *claims* according as they are supported by the laws of his country or the circumstances of the case: those who make a *pretension* to the greatest learning are commonly men of shallow information; those who have the most substantial *claims* to the gratitude and respect of mankind are commonly found to be men of the fewest *pretensions*.

PREVAILING, PREVALENT, RULING,
OVERRULING, PREDOMINANT.

PREVAILING and PREVALENT both come from the Latin *prevaleo* to be strong above others.

RULING, OVERRULING, and PREDOMINANT (from *dominor* to rule), signify *ruling* or bearing greater sway than others.

Prevailing expresses the actual state or quality of a particular object: *prevalent* marks the quality of *prevailing*, as it affects objects in general. The same distinction exists between *overruling* and *predominant*. A person has a *prevailing* sense of religion; religious feeling is *prevalent* in a country or in a community. *Prevailing* and *prevalent* mark simply the existing state of superiority: *ruling* and *predominant* express this state, in relation to some other which it has superseded or reduced to a state of inferiority. An opinion is said to be *prevailing* as respects the number of persons by whom it is maintained: a principle is said to be *ruling* as respects the superior influence which it has over the conduct of men more than any other. Particular disorders are *prevalent* at certain seasons of the year, when they affect the generality of persons: a particular taste or fashion is *predominant* which supersedes all other tastes or fashions.

TO PREVENT, ANTICIPATE.

To PREVENT is literally to come beforehand, and ANTICIPATE to take beforehand: the former is employed for actual occurrences; the latter as much for calculations as for actions: to *prevent* is the act of one being towards another; to *anticipate* is the act of a being either towards himself or another. God is said to *prevent* us, if he interposes with his grace to divert our purposes towards that which is right; we *anticipate* the happiness which we are to enjoy in future; we *anticipate* what a person is going to say by saying the same thing before him.

The term *prevent*, when taken in this its strict and literal sense is employed only as the act of the Divine Being; *anticipate* on the contrary, is taken only as the act of human beings towards each other. These words may, however, be farther allied to each other, when under the term *prevention* in its vulgar acceptation is included the idea of hindering another in his proceedings; in which case to *anticipate* is a species of *prevention*; that is, to *prevent* another from doing a thing by doing it one's self.

TO PREVENT, OBVIATE, PRECLUDE.

To PREVENT (*v. To hinder*) is here as in the former case the generic term, the others are specific. What one *prevents* does not happen at all: what one OBVIATES ceases to happen in future: we *prevent* those evils which we know will come to pass if not *prevented*: we *obviate* those evils which we have already felt; that is, we *prevent* their repetition. Crimes and calamities are *prevented*; difficulties, objections, inconveniences, and troubles, are *obviated*. When crowds collect in vast numbers in any small spot, it is not easy to *prevent* mischief; wise precautions may be adopted to *obviate* the inconvenience which necessarily attends a great crowd.

To *prevent* and *obviate* are the acts of either conscious or unconscious agents: to PRECLUDE is the act of unconscious agents only; one *prevents* or *obviates* a thing by the use of means, or else the things themselves *prevent* and *obviate*, as when we say that a person *prevents* another from coming, or illness *prevents* him from coming: a person *obviates* a difficulty by a contrivance, a certain arrangement or change *obviates* every difficulty. We intentionally *prevent* a person from doing that which we disapprove of; his circumstances *preclude* him from enjoying certain privileges. Pre-

vent respects that which is either good or bad; *obviate* respects that which is bad always; *preclude* respects that which is good or desirable.

Ill health *prevents* a person from pursuing his business; employment *prevents* a young person from falling into bad practices; admonition often *obviates* the necessity of punishments; want of education *precludes* a man from many advantages.

PREVIOUS, PRELIMINARY, PREPARATORY, INTRODUCTORY.

PREVIOUS, in Latin *prævi*, compounded of *præ* and *via*, signifies leading the way or going before.

PRELIMINARY, from *præ* and *limen* a threshold, signifies belonging to the threshold or entrance.

PREPARATORY and INTRODUCTORY signify belonging to a preparation or introduction.

Previous denotes simply the order of succession: the other terms, in addition to this, convey the idea of connexion between the objects which succeed each other. *Previous* applies to actions and proceedings in general; as a *previous* question, a *previous* inquiry, a *previous* determination: *preliminary* is employed only for matters of contract: a *preliminary* article, a *preliminary* condition, are what precede the final settlement of any question: *preparatory* is employed for matters of arrangement: the disposing of men in battle is *preparatory* to an engagement; the making of marriage deeds and contracts is *preparatory* to the final solemnization of the marriage: *introductory* is employed for matters of science or discussion; as remarks are *introductory* to the main subject in question; compendiums of grammar, geography, and the like, as *introductory* to larger works, are useful for young people.

PRIDE, VANITY, CONCEIT.

PRIDE is all probability connected with the word *parade*, and the German *pracht* show or splendour, as it signifies that high-flown temper in man which makes him paint to himself every thing in himself as beautiful or splendid.

VANITY, in Latin *vanitas*, from *vain* and *vanus*, is compounded of *ve* or *valde* and *inanis*, signifying exceeding emptiness.

CONCEIT, *v. Conceit*.

The valuing of one's self on the possession of any property is the idea common to these terms, but they differ either in regard to the object or the manner of the action. *Pride* is the term of most extensive import

and application, and comprehends in its signification not only that of the two other terms, but likewise ideas peculiar to itself.

Pride is applicable to every object, small or great; *vanity* is applicable only to small objects: *pride* is good or bad; *vanity* is always bad, it is always emptiness or nothingness. A man is *proud* who values himself on the possession of his literary or scientific talent, on his wealth, rank, power, acquirements, or his superiority over his competitors; he is *vain* of his person, his dress, his walk, or any thing that is frivolous. *Pride* is the inherent quality in man; and while it rests on noble objects, it is his noblest characteristic; *vanity* is the distortion of one's nature flowing from a vicious constitution or education: *pride* shows itself variously according to the nature of the object on which it is fixed; a noble *pride* seeks to display itself in all that can command the respect or admiration of mankind; the *pride* of wealth, power, or other adventitious properties, commonly displays itself in an unseemly deportment towards others; *vanity* shows itself only by its eagerness to catch the notice of others.

Conceit is that species of self-valuation that respects one's talents only; it is so far therefore closely allied to *pride*: a man is said to be *proud* of that he really has, but to be *conceited* of that which he really has not: a man may be *proud* of an excess of merits which he actually possesses; but when he is *conceited* his merits are all in his own *conceit*; the latter therefore obviously founded on falsehood altogether.

PRIDE, HAUGHTINESS, LOFTINESS, DIGNITY.

PRIDE is employed principally as respects the temper of the mind; the other terms are employed either as respects the sentiment of the mind, or the external behaviour.

Pride is here as before (*v. Pride*) a generic term: HAUGHTINESS (*v. Haughty*), LOFTINESS (*v. High*), DIGNITY (*v. Honour*), are but modes of *pride*. *Pride*, inasmuch as it consists purely of self-esteem, is a positive sentiment which one may entertain independently of other persons; *haughtiness* is that mode of *pride* which springs out of one's comparison of one's self with others: the *haughty* man dwells on the inferiority of others; the *proud* man in the strict sense dwells on his own perfections. *Loftiness* is a mode of *pride* which raises the spirit above objects supposed to be inferior; it does not set man so much above

others as above himself, or that which concerns himself. *Dignity* is a mode of *pride* which exalts the whole man, it is the entire consciousness of what is becoming to himself and due to himself.

Pride assumes such a variety of shapes, and puts on such an infinity of disguises, that it is not easy always to recognise it at the first glance; but an insight into human nature will suffice to convince us that it is the spring of all human actions. Whenever we see a man professing humility and self-abasement, or any degree of self-exaltation, we may rest assured that he is equally stimulated with the desire of giving himself in the eyes of others that degree of importance to which in his own eyes he is entitled. *Haughtiness* is an unbending species or mode of *pride* which does not stoop to any artifices to obtain gratification; but compels others to give it what it fancies to be its due. *Loftiness* and *dignity* are equally remote from any subterfuge, but they are in no less degree exempt from the unamiable characteristic in *haughtiness* which makes a man bear with oppressive sway upon others. A *lofty* spirit and a *dignity* of character preserve a man from yielding to the contamination of outward objects, but leave his judgment and feeling entirely free and unbiased with respect to others.

As respects the external behaviour, a *haughty* carriage is mostly unbecoming; a *lofty* tone is mostly justifiable, particularly as circumstances may require; and a *dignified* air is without qualification becoming the man who possesses real *dignity*.

PRIMARY, PRIMITIVE, PRISTINE, ORIGINAL.

PRIMARY, from *primus*, signifies belonging to or like the first. PRIMITIVE, from the same, signifies according to the first.

PRISTINE, in Latin *pristinus*, from *prius*, signifies in former times.

ORIGINAL, signifies containing the origin.

Primary denotes simply the order of succession, and is therefore the generic term; *primitive*, *pristine*, and *original*, include also the idea of some other relation to the thing that succeeds, and are therefore modes of the *primary*. The *primary* has nothing to come before it; in this manner we speak of the *primary* cause as the cause which precedes secondary causes: the *primitive* is that after which other things are formed: in this manner a *primitive* word is that after which, or from which, the derivatives are formed: the *pristine* is that which follows the *primitive*, so as to become customary;

there are but few specimens of the *pristine* purity of life among the professors of Christianity: the *original* is that which either gives birth to the thing, or belongs to that which gives birth to the thing; the *original* meaning of a word is that which was given to it by the makers of the word. The *primary* subject of consideration is that which should precede all others; the *primitive* state of society is that which was formed without a model, but might serve as a model; the *pristine* simplicity of manners may serve as a just pattern for the imitation of present times; the *original* state of things is that which is coeval with the things themselves.

PRINCE, MONARCH, SOVEREIGN,
POTENTATE.

PRINCE, in French *prince*, Latin *princeps* from *primus*, signifies the chief or the first person in the nation.

MONARCH, from the Greek *μοναρχος* alone, and *αρχη* government, signifies one having sole authority.

SOVEREIGN is probably changed from *superregnum*.

POTENTATE, from *potens* powerful, signifies one having supreme power.

Prince is the generic term, the rest are specific terms; every *monarch*, *sovereign*, and *potentate*, is a *prince*, but not *vice versa*. The term *prince* is indefinite as to the degree of power: a *prince* may have a limited or despotic power; but in its restricted sense it denotes a smaller degree of power than any of the other terms: the term *monarch* does not define the extent of the power, but simply that it is undivided as opposed to that species of power which is lodged in the hands of many: *sovereign* and *potentate* indicate the highest degree of power; but the former is employed only as respects the nation that is governed, the latter respects other nations: a *sovereign* in supreme over his subjects; a *potentate* is powerful by means of his subjects. Every man having independent power is a *prince*, let his territory be ever so inconsiderable; Germany is divided into a number of small states which are governed by petty *princes*. Every one reigning by himself in a state of some considerable magnitude, and having an independent authority over his subjects is a *monarch*; kings and emperors therefore are all *monarchs*. Every *monarch* is a *sovereign* whose extent of dominion and number of subjects rises above the ordinary level; he is a *potentate* if his influence either in the cabinet or the field extends very considerably over the affairs of other nations.

PRINCIPLE. MOTIVE.

The PRINCIPLE (v. *Doctrine*) may sometimes be the MOTIVE; but often there is a *principle* where there is no *motive*, and there is a *motive* where there is no *principle*. The *principle* lies in conscious and unconscious agents; the *motive* only in conscious agents: all nature is guided by certain *principles*; its movements go forward upon certain *principles*: man is put into action by certain *motives*; the *principle* is the prime moving cause of every thing that is set in motion; the *motive* is the prime moving cause that sets the human machine into action. The *principle* in its restricted sense comes still nearer to the *motive*, when it refers to the opinions which we form: the *principle* in this case is that idea which we form of things, so as to regulate our conduct; the *motive* is that idea which simply impels to action; the former is therefore something permanent, and grounded upon the exercise of our reasoning powers; the latter is momentary, and arises simply from our capacity of thinking: bad *principles* lead a man into a bad course of life; but a man may be led by bad *motives* to do what is good as well as what is bad.

PRIORITY, PRECEDENCE, PRE-
EMINENCE, PREFERENCE.

PRIORITY denotes the abstract quality of being before others; PRECEDENCE, from *prae* and *cedo*, signifies the state of going before: PRE-EMINENCE signifies being more eminent or elevated than others: PREFERENCE signifies being put before others. *Priority* respects simply the order of succession, and is applied to objects either in a state of motion or rest; *precedence* signifies *priority* in going, and depends upon a right or privilege; *pre-eminence* signifies *priority* in being, and depends upon merit; *preference* signifies *priority* in placing and depends upon favour. The *priority* is applicable rather to the thing than the person; it is not that which is sought for, but that which is to be had: age frequently gives *priority* where every other claim is wanting. The immoderate desire for *precedence* is often nothing but a childish vanity; it is a distinction that flows out of rank and power: a nobleman claims a *precedence* on all occasions of ceremony. The love of *pre-eminence* is laudable, inasmuch as it requires a degree of moral worth which exceeds that of others; a general aims at *pre-eminence* in his profession. Those who are anxious to obtain the best for themselves, are eager to have the *preference*: we seek for the *preference* in matters of choice.

PRIVACY, RETIREMENT, SECLUSION.

PRIVACY literally denotes the abstract quality of *private*; but when taken by itself it signifies the state of being *private*: RETIREMENT literally signifies the abstract act of *retiring*: and SECLUSION that of *secluding* one's self: but *retirement* by itself frequently denotes a state of being retired, or a place of *retirement*; *seclusion*, a state of being *secluded*: hence we say a person lives in *privacy*, in *retirement*, in *seclusion*: *privacy* is opposed to publicity; he who lives in *privacy*, therefore, is one who follows no public line, who lives so as to be little known: *retirement* is opposed to openness or freedom of access; he, therefore, who lives in *retirement* withdraws from the society of others, he lives by himself: *seclusion* is the excess of *retirement*; he who lives in *seclusion* bars all access to himself; he shuts himself from the world. *Privacy* is most suitable for such as are in circumstances of humiliation, whether from their misfortune or their fault: *retirement* is peculiarly agreeable to those who are of a reflective turn; but *seclusion* is chosen only by those who labour under some strong affection of the mind, whether of a religious or a physical nature.

PRIVILEGE, PREROGATIVE, EXEMPTION, IMMUNITY.

PRIVILEGE, in Latin *privilegium*, compounded of *privus* and *lex*, signifies a law made for any individual or set of individuals.

PREROGATIVE, in Latin *praerogativi*, were so called from *prae* and *rogo* to ask, because the people were first asked whom they would have to be consuls: hence applied in our language to the right of determining or choosing first in many particulars.

EXEMPTION, from the verb to *exempt*, and IMMUNITY, from the Latin *immunis* free, are both employed for the object from which one is *exempt* or free.

Privilege and *prerogative* consist of positive advantage; *exemption* and *immunity* of those which are negative: by the former we obtain an actual good, by the latter the removal of an evil.

Privilege, in its most extended sense, comprehends all the rest: for every *prerogative*, *exemption*, and *immunity*, are *privileges*, inasmuch as they rest upon certain laws or customs, which are made for the benefit of certain individuals; but in a restricted sense *privilege* is used only for the subordinate parts of society, and *prerogative* for the su-

perior orders: as they respect the public, *privileges* belong to or are granted to the subject; *prerogatives* belong to the crown. It is the *privilege* of a member of parliament to escape arrest for debt; it is the *prerogative* of the crown to be irresponsible for the conduct of its ministers: as respects private cases it is the *privilege* of females to have the best places assigned to them; it is the *prerogative* of the male to address the female.

Privileges are applied to every object which it is desirable to have; *prerogative* is confined to the case of making one's election, or exercising any special power; *exemption* is applicable to cases in which one is exempted from any tribute, or payment; *immunity*, from the Latin *munus*, an office, is peculiarly applicable to cases in which one is freed from a service: all chartered towns or corporations have *privileges*, *exemptions*, and *immunities*: it is the *privilege* of the city of London to shut its gates against the king.

PROCEEDING, PROCESS, PROGRESS.

The manner of performing actions for the attainment of a given end is the idea comprehended in these terms. PROCEEDING is the most general, as it simply expresses the general idea of the manner of going on; the rest are specific terms, denoting some particularity in the action, object, or circumstance. *Proceeding* is said commonly of such things as happen in the ordinary way of doing business; PROCESS is said of such things as are done by rule: the former is considered in a moral point of view; the latter in a scientific or technical point of view: the freemasons have bound themselves together by a law of secrecy not to reveal some part of their *proceedings*; the *process* by which paper is made has undergone considerable improvements since its first invention.

Proceeding and PROGRESS both refer to the moral actions of men; but the *proceeding* simply denotes the act of going on, or doing something; the *progress* denotes an approximation to the end: the *proceeding* may be only a partial action, comprehending both the beginning and the end; but the *progress* is applied to that which requires time, and a regular succession of action to bring it to a completion: that is a *proceeding* in which every man is tried in a court of law; that is a *progress* which one makes in learning, by the addition to one's knowledge: hence we do not talk of the *proceeding* of life, but of the *progress* of life.

PROCEEDING, TRANSACTION.

PROCEEDING signifies literally the thing that *proceeds*; and *transaction* the thing *transacted*: the former is, therefore, of something that is going forward; the latter of something that is already done: we are witnesses to the whole *proceeding*; we inquire into the whole *transaction*. The term *proceeding* is said of every event or circumstance which goes forward through the agency of men; *transaction* comprehends only those matters which have been deliberately *transacted* or brought to a conclusion: we speak of the *proceedings* in a court of law, or the *transactions* on the Exchange. A *proceeding* may be characterized as disgraceful; a *transaction* as iniquitous.

PROCESSION, TRAIN, RETINUE.

PROCESSION, from the verb *proceed*, signifies the act of going forward or before, that is, in the present instance, of going before others, or one before another.

TRAIN in all probability comes from the Latin *traho*, to draw, signifying the thing drawn after another, and in the present instance the persons who are led after, or follow any object.

RETINUE, from the verb to *retain*, signifies those who are retained as attendants.

All these terms are said of any number of persons who follow in a certain order; but this which is the leading idea in the word *procession*, is but collateral in the terms *train* and *retinue*: on the other hand, the *procession* may consist of persons of all ranks and stations; but *train* and *retinue* apply only to such as follow some person or thing in a subordinate capacity: the former in regard to such as make up the concluding part of some *procession*; the latter only in regard to the servants or attendants on the great. At funerals there is frequently a long *train* of coaches belonging to the friends of the deceased, which close the *procession*; the number of a *retinue* in eastern nations is one criterion by which the wealth of the individual is estimated.

PRODUCTION, PRODUCE, PRODUCT.

The term PRODUCTION expresses either the act of *producing* or the thing *produced*; PRODUCT and PRODUCE express only the thing *produced*: the *production* of a tree from a seed, is one of the wonders of nature; the *produce* will not be considerable.

In the sense of the thing *produced*, *production* is applied to every individual thing that is *produced* by another: in this sense a tree is a *production*; *produce* and *pro-*

duct are applied only to those *productions* which are to be turned to a purpose: the former in a collective sense, and in reference to some particular object; the latter in an abstract and general sense; the aggregate quantity of grain drawn from a field is termed the *produce* of the field; but corn, hay, vegetables, and fruits in general, are termed *products* of the earth: the naturalist examines all the *productions* of nature; the husbandman looks to the *produce* of his lands; the topographer and traveller inquire about the *products* of different countries.

There is the same distinction between these terms in their improper, as in their proper, acceptation: the *production* is whatever results from an effort, physical or mental, as a *production* of genius, a *production* of art, and the like; the *produce* is the amount or aggregate result from physical or mental labour: thus, whatever the husbandman reaps from the cultivation of his land is termed the *produce* of his labour; whatever results from any public subscription or collection is, in like manner, the *produce*: the *product* is employed only in regard to the mental operation of figures, as the *product* from multiplication.

PRODUCTION, PERFORMANCE, WORK.

When we speak of any thing as resulting from any specified operation, we term it a PRODUCTION; as the *production* of an author, signifies what he has *produced* by the effort of his mind: when we speak of any thing as executed or *performed* by some person we term it a PERFORMANCE, as a drawing or a painting is denominated the *performance* of a particular artist. The term *production* cannot be employed without specifying or referring to the source from which it is *produced*, or the means by which it is *produced*; as the *production* of art, the *production* of the inventive faculty, the *production* of the mind, &c.: a *performance* cannot be spoken of without referring to the individual by whom it has been *performed*; hence we speak of this or that person's *performance*. When we wish to specify any thing that results from WORK or labour, it is termed a *work*: in this manner we either speak of the *work* of one's hands, or a *work* of the imagination, a *work* of time, a *work* of magnitude. The *production* results from a complicated operation; the *performance* consists of simple action; the *work* springs from active exertion: Shakspeare's plays are termed *productions*, as they respect the source from which they came, namely, his genius; they might be called his *performances*, as far as respected the per-

formance or completion of some task or specific undertaking; they would be called his *works*, as far as respected the labour which he bestowed upon them. The composition of a book is properly a *production*, when it is original matter; the sketching of a landscape, or drawing a plan, is a *performance*; the compilation of a history is a *work*.

TO PROFESS, DECLARE.

PROFESS, in Latin *professus*, participle of *profiteor*, compounded of *pro* and *fateor* to speak, signifies to set forth, or present to public view.

DECLARE, v. *To declare*.

An exposure of one's thoughts or opinions is the common idea in the signification of these terms; but they differ in the manner of the action, as well as the object: one *professes* by words or by actions: one *declares* by words only: a man *professes* to believe that on which he acts; but he *declares* his belief of it either with his lips or in his writings. A *profession* may be general and partial, it may amount to little more than an intimation: a *declaration* is positive and explicit; it leaves no one in doubt: a *profession* may, therefore, sometimes be hypocritical; he who *professes* may wish to imply that which is not real: a *declaration* must be either directly true or false; he who *declares* expressly commits himself upon his veracity. One *professes* either as respects single actions, or a regular course of conduct; one *declares* either passing thoughts or settled principles. A person *professes* to have taken a certain route, and the like: a Christian *professes* to follow the doctrine and precepts of Christianity; a person *declares* that a thing is true or false, or he *declares* his firm belief in a thing.

To *profess* is employed only for what concerns one's self; to *declare* is likewise employed for what concerns others: one *professes* the motives and principles by which one is guided: one *declares* facts and circumstances with which one is acquainted: one *professes* nothing but what one thinks may be creditable and fit to be known; but one *declares* whatever may have fallen under one's notice, or passed through one's mind, as the case requires; there is always a particular and private motive for *profession*; there are frequently public grounds for making a *declaration*.

PROFLIGATE, ABANDONED, REPROBATE.

PROFLIGATE, in Latin *profligatus*, participle of *profligo*, compounded of the intensive *pro* and *fligo* to dash or beat, signi-

fying completely ruined or lost to every thing.

ABANDONED, v. *To abandon*.

REPROBATE (v. *To reprove*) signifies one thoroughly rejected.

These terms, in their proper acceptation, express the most wretched condition of fortune into which it is possible for any human being to be plunged, and consequently, in their improper application, they denote that state of moral desertion and ruin which cannot be exceeded in wickedness or depravity. A *profligate* man has lost all by his vices, and consequently to his vices alone he looks for the regaining those goods of fortune which he has squandered; an *abandoned* man is altogether *abandoned* to his passions, which having the entire sway over him, naturally impel him to every excess: the *reprobate* man is one who has been reprovved until he becomes insensible to reproof, and is given up to the malignity of his own passions. The *profligate* man is the greatest enemy to society; the *abandoned* man is a still greater enemy to himself: the *profligate* man lives upon the public, whom he plunders or defrauds; the *abandoned* man lives for the indulgence of his own unbridled passions; the *reprobate* man is little better than an outcast both by God and man: unprincipled debtors, gamblers, sharpers, swindlers, and the like, are *profligate* characters; whoremasters, drunkards, spend-thrifts, seducers, and debauchees of all descriptions, are *abandoned* characters: although the *profligate* and *abandoned* are commonly the same persons, yet the young are in general *abandoned*, and those more hackneyed in vice are *profligate*; none can be *reprobate* but those who have been long tried.

PROFUSION, PROFUSENESS.

PROFUSION, from the Latin *profundo* to pour forth, is taken in relation to unconscious objects, which pour forth in great plenty; PROFUSENESS is taken from the same, in relation to conscious agents, who likewise pour forth in great plenty: the term *profusion*, therefore, is put for plenty itself, and the term *profuseness* as a characteristic of persons in the sense of extravagance.

At the hospitable board of the rich, there will naturally be a *profusion* of every thing which can gratify the appetite; when men see an unusual degree of *profusion*, they are apt to indulge themselves in *profuseness*.

PROGRESS, PROGRESSION, ADVANCE, ADVANCEMENT.

A forward motion is designated by these terms: but PROGRESS and PROGRESSION

simply imply this sort of motion; **ADVANCE** and **ADVANCEMENT** also imply an approximation to some object: we may make a *progress* in that which has no specific termination, as a *progress* in learning, which may cease only with life; but the *advance* is only made to some limited point or object in view; as an *advance* in wealth or honour, which may find a termination within the life.

Progress and *advance* are said of that which has been passed over; but *progression* and *advancement* may be said of that which one is passing: the *progress* is made, or the person is in *advance*; he is in the act of *progression* or *advancement*; a child makes a *progress* in learning by daily attention; the *progression* from one stage of learning to another is not always perceptible; it is not always possible to overtake one who is in *advance*: a person's *advancement* is frequently retarded by circumstances.

PROGRESS, PROFICIENCY, IMPROVEMENT.

PROGRESS (*v. Proceeding*) is a generic term, the rest are specific; **PROFICIENCY**, from the Latin *proficio*, compounded of *pro* and *facio*, signifies a profited state, that is to say, a *progress* already made; and **IMPROVEMENT**, from the verb *improved*, signifies an improved condition, that is, *progress* in that which improves. The *progress* here, as in the former paragraph, marks the step or motion onward, and the two others the point already reached; but the term *progress* is applied either in the proper or improper sense, that is, either to those travelling forward, or to those going on step-wise in any work; *proficiency* is applied, in the improper sense, to the ground gained in an art, and *improvement* to what is gained in science or arts; when idle people set about any work, it is difficult to perceive that they make any *progress*; those who have a thorough taste for music or drawing will make a *proficiency* in it which is astonishing to those who are unacquainted with the circumstances; the *improvement* of the mind can never be so effectually and easily obtained as in the period of childhood.

PROMINENT, CONSPICUOUS.

PROMINENT signifies hanging over; **CONSPICUOUS** (*v. Distinguished*) signifies easy to be beheld: the former is, therefore, to the latter, in some measure, as the species to the genus; what is *prominent* is, in general, on that very account *conspicuous*; but many things may be *conspicuous* besides those which are *prominent*. The terms *prominent* and *conspicuous* have, however, an

application suited to their peculiar meaning: nothing is *prominent* but what projects beyond a certain line; every thing is *conspicuous* which may be seen by many: the nose on a man's face is a *prominent* feature, owing to its projecting situation; and it is sometimes *conspicuous*, according to the position of the person: a figure in a *painting* is said to be *prominent*, if it appears to stand forward or before the others; but it is not properly *conspicuous*, unless there be something in it which attracts the general notice, and distinguishes it from all other things: on the contrary it is *conspicuous*, but not expressly *prominent*, when the colours are vivid.

PROMISCUOUS, INDISCRIMINATE.

PROMISCUOUS, in Latin *promiscuus*, from *promisceo*, or *pro* and *misceo* to mingle, signifies thoroughly mingled.

INDISCRIMINATE, from the Latin *in* privative and *discrimen* a difference, signifies without any difference.

Promiscuous is applied to any number of different objects mingled together; *indiscriminate* is only applied to the action in which one does not discriminate different objects: a multitude is termed *promiscuous*, as characterizing the thing; the use of different things for the same purpose, or of the same things for different purposes, is termed *indiscriminate*, as characterizing the person: things become *promiscuous* by the want of design in any one; they are *indiscriminate* by the fault of any one: plants of all descriptions are to be found *promiscuously* situated in the beds of a garden: it is folly to level any charge *indiscriminately* against all the members of any community or profession.

PROMISE, ENGAGEMENT, WORD.

PROMISE, in Latin *promissus*, from *pro* and *mitto*, compounded of *pro* before, and *mitto* to set or fix, that is, to fix beforehand.

ENGAGEMENT, *v. Business*.

The *promise* is specific, and consequently more binding than the *engagement*; we promise a thing in a set form of words, that are clearly and strictly understood: we *engage* in general terms, that may admit of alteration: a *promise* is mostly unconditional; an *engagement* is frequently conditional. In *promises* the faith of an individual is admitted upon his **WORD**, and built upon as if it were a deed; in *engagements* the intentions of an individual for the future are all that are either implied or understood: on the fulfilment of *promises* often depend the most important interests of individuals; an attention to *engagements* is a matter of

mutual convenience in the ordinary concerns of life: a man makes a *promise* of payment, and upon his *promise* it may happen that many others depend for the fulfilment of their *promises*; when *engagements* are made to visit or meet others, an inattention to such *engagements* causes great trouble. As a *promise* and *engagement* can be made only by *words*, the *word* is often put for either, or for both, as the case requires; he who breaks his *word* in small matters cannot be trusted when he gives his *word* in matters of consequence.

PROPORTIONATE, COMMENSURATE, ADEQUATE.

PROPORTIONATE, from the Latin *proportio*, compounded of *pro* and *portio*, signifies having a portion suitable to, or in agreement with, some other object.

COMMENSURATE, from the Latin *commensus* or *commetior*, signifies measuring in accordance with some other thing, being suitable in measure to something else.

ADEQUATE, in Latin *adaequatus*, participle of *adaequo*, signifies made level with some other body.

Proportionate is here a term of general use; the others are particular terms, employed in a similar sense, in regard to particular objects: that is *proportionate* which rises as a thing rises, and falls as a thing falls; that is *commensurate* which is made to rise to the same measure or degree; that is *adequate* which is made to come up to the height of another thing. *Proportionate* is employed either in the proper or improper sense; in all recipes and prescriptions of every kind *proportionate* quantities must always be taken; when a task increases in difficulty and complication, a *proportionate* degree of labour and talent must be employed. *Commensurate* and *adequate* are employed only in the moral sense; the former in regard to matters of distribution, the latter in regard to the equalizing of powers: a person's recompence should in some measure be *commensurate* with his labour and deserts: a person's resources should be *adequate* to the work he is engaged in.

PROPOSAL, PROPOSITION.

PROPOSAL comes from *propose*, in the sense of offer: PROPOSITION comes from *propose*, in the sense of setting down in a distinct form of words. We make a *proposal* to a person to enter into partnership with him; we make a *proposition* to one who is at variance with us to settle the difference by arbitration.

The *proposal* relates altogether to matters

of personal and private interest; the *proposition* is sometimes of an abstract nature; *proposals* are made for the sale or purchase of particular articles, for the establishment of any mercantile concern, for the erection of any institution, and the like; *propositions* are advanced either for or against certain matters of opinion: the *proposal* is to be accepted; the *proposition* is to be admitted.

TO PROROGUE, ADJOURN.

* PROROGUE, from the Latin *prorogo*, signifies to put off, and is used in the general sense of deferring for an indefinite period.

ADJOURN, from *journée* the day, signifies only to put off for a day, or some short period: the former is applied to national assemblies only; the latter is applicable to any meeting.

TO PROVE, DEMONSTRATE, EVINCE, MANIFEST.

PROVE, in Latin *probo*, signifies to make good.

DEMONSTRATE, from the Latin *demonstro*, signifies by virtue of the intensive syllable *de*, to show in a specific manner.

EVINCE, *v.* To argue.

MANIFEST signifies to make *manifest* (*v.* Apparent).

Prove is here the general and indefinite term, the rest imply different modes of *proving*; to *demonstrate* is to prove specifically: we may *prove* any thing by simple assertion; but we must *demonstrate* by intellectual efforts: we may *prove* that we were in a certain place; but we *demonstrate* some point in science: we *prove* our own merit by our actions; we *demonstrate* the existence of a Deity by all that surrounds us.

To *prove*, *evince*, and *manifest*, are the acts either of persons or things; to *demonstrate*, that of persons only; in regard to persons, we *prove* either the facts which we know, or the mental endowments which we possess: we *evince* and *manifest* a disposition or a state of mind: we *evince* our sincerity by our actions, it is a work of time; we *manifest* a friendly or a hostile disposition by a word, or a single action, it is the act of the moment. All these terms are applied to things, inasmuch as they may tend either to produce conviction, or simply to make a thing known: to *prove* and *evince* are employed in the first case; to *manifest* in the latter case: the beauty and order in the Creation *prove* the wisdom of the Creator; a persistence in a particular course of conduct may either *evince* great virtue or

great folly; the miracles wrought in Egypt manifested the Divine power.

TO PROVIDE, PROCURE, FURNISH,
SUPPLY.

PROVIDE, in Latin *provideo*, signifies literally to see before, but figuratively to get in readiness for some future purpose.

PROCURE, v. *To get.*

FURNISH, in French *fournir*.

SUPPLY, in French *suppléer*, Latin *suppleo* from *sub* and *pleo*, signifies to fill up a deficiency, or make up what is wanting.

Provide and *procure* are both actions that have a special reference to the future; *furnish* and *supply* are employed for that which is of immediate concern: one *provides* a dinner in the contemplation that some persons are coming to partake of it; one *procures* help in the contemplation that it may be wanted; we *furnish* a room, as we find it necessary for the present purpose; one *supplies* a family with any article of domestic use. Calculation is necessary in *providing*; one does not wish to *provide* too much or too little: labour and management are requisite in *procuring*; when a thing is not always at hand, or not easily come at, one must exercise one's strength or ingenuity to *procure* it: judgment is requisite in *furnishing*; what one *furnishes* ought to be selected with concern to the circumstances of the individual who *furnishes*: care and attention are wanted in *supplying*; we must be careful to know what a person really wants, in order to *supply* him to his satisfaction. One *provides* against contingencies; one *procures* necessities; one *furnishes* comforts; one *supplies* deficiencies. *Provide* and *procure* are the acts of persons only; *furnish* and *supply* are also the acts of unconscious agents: one's garden and orchard may be said to *furnish* him with delicacies; the earth *supplies* us with food. So in the improper application: the daily occurrences of a great city *furnish* materials for a newspaper; a newspaper to an Englishman, *supplies* almost every other want.

PROVIDENCE, PRUDENCE.

PROVIDENCE and PRUDENCE are both derived from the verb to *provide*: but the former expresses the particular act of providing; the latter the habit of providing. The former is applied both to animals and men; the latter is employed only as a characteristic of men. We may admire the *providence* of the ant in laying up a store for the winter; the *prudence* of a parent is displayed in his concern for the future settlement of his child. It is *provident* in a per-

son to adopt measures of escape in situations of peculiar danger; it is *prudent* to be always prepared for contingencies.

PRUDENT, PRUDENTIAL.

PRUDENT (v. *Judgment*) characterizes the person or the thing; PRUDENTIAL characterizes only the thing. *Prudent* signifies having *prudence*; *prudential*, according to rules of *prudence*, or as respects *prudence*. The *prudent* is opposed to the *imprudent* and *inconsiderate*; the *prudential* is opposed to the voluntary: the counsel is *prudent* which accords with the principles of *prudence*; the reason or motive is *prudential*, as flowing out of circumstances of *prudence* or necessity. Every one is called upon at certain times to adopt *prudent* measures; those who are obliged to consult their means in the management of their expenses, must act upon *prudential* motives.

TO PRY, SCRUTINIZE, DIVE INTO.

PRY is in all probability changed from prove, in the sense of try.

SCRUTINIZE comes from the Latin *scrutor* to search thoroughly.

DIVE, v. *To plunge.*

Pry is taken in the bad sense of looking more narrowly into things than one ought: *scrutinize* and *dive into* are employed in the good sense of searching things to the bottom.

A person who *pries* looks into that which does not belong to him: and too narrowly also into that which may belong to him: it is the consequence of a too eager curiosity or a busy meddling temper: a person who *scrutinizes* looks into that which is intentionally concealed from him; it is an act of duty flowing out of his office: a person who *dives* penetrates into that which lies hidden very deep; he is impelled to this action by the thirst of knowledge and a laudable curiosity.

A love of *prying* into the private affairs of families makes a person a troublesome neighbour: it is the business of the magistrate to *scrutinize* all matters which affect the good order of society: there are some minds so imbued with a love of science that they delight to *dive into* the secrets of nature.

TO PUBLISH, PROMULGATE, DIVULGE,
REVEAL, DISCLOSE.

PUBLISH, v. *To advertise.*

PROMULGATE, in Latin *promulgatus* participle of *promulgo* or *provulgo*, signifies to make vulgar.

DIVULGE, in Latin *divulgo*, that is, in *diversos vulgo*, signifies to make vulgar in different parts.

REVEAL, in Latin *revelo*, from *velo* to veil, signifies to take off the veil or cover.

DISCLOSE signifies to make the reverse of close.

To *publish* is the most general of these terms, conveying in its extended sense the idea of making known; but it is in many respects indefinite; we may make known to many or few; but to *promulgate* is always to make known to many. We may *publish* that which is a domestic or a national concern; we *promulgate* properly only that which is of general interest: the affairs of a family or of a nation are *published* in the newspapers; doctrines, principles, precepts, and the like, are *promulgated*. We may *publish* things to be known, or things not to be known; we *divulge* things mostly not to be known: we may *publish* our own shame, or the shame of another, or we may *publish* that which is advantageous to another; but we commonly *divulge* the secrets or the crimes of another. To *publish* is said of that which was never before known, or never before existed; to *reveal* and *disclose* are said of that which has been only concealed or lay hidden: we *publish* the events of the day; we *reveal* the secret or the mystery of a transaction; we *disclose* the whole of an affair which has never been properly accounted for, from beginning to end.

TO PURPOSE, PROPOSE.

We *PURPOSE* (v. *To design*) that which is near at hand, or immediately to be set about; we *PROPOSE* that which is more distant: the former requires the setting before one's mind, the latter requires deliberation and plan. We *purpose* to go to town on a certain day; we *propose* to spend our time in a particular study.

TO PUT, PLACE, LAY, SET.

PUT is in all probability contracted from *positus* participle of *pono* to place.

PLACE, v. *To place*.

LAY, in Saxon *legan*, German *legen*, Latin *loco*, and Greek *leyouai*, signifies to cause to lie; and *SET*, in German *setzen*, Latin *sisto*, from *sto* to stand, signifies to cause to stand. *Put* is the most general of all these terms; *place*, *lay*, and *set*, are but modes of *putting*; one *puts*, but the way of *putting* it is not defined; we may *put* a thing into one's room, one's desk, one's pocket, and the like; but to *place* is to *put* in a specific manner, and for a specific purpose; one *places* a book on a shelf as a fixed *place* for it, and in a position most suitable to it. To *lay* and *set* are still more

specific than *place*; the former being applied only to such things as can be made to lie; and *set* only to such as can be made to stand: a book may be said to be *laid* on the table when placed in a downward position; and *set* on a shelf when *placed* on one end; we *lay* ourselves down on the ground; we *set* a trunk upon the ground.

Q.

QUALIFICATION, ACCOMPLISHMENT.

The *QUALIFICATION* (v. *Competent*) serves the purpose of utility; the *ACCOMPLISHMENT* serves to adorn: by the first we are enabled to make ourselves useful; by the second we are enabled to make ourselves agreeable.

The *qualifications* of a man who has an office to perform must be considered: of a man who has only pleasure to pursue the *accomplishments* are to be considered. A readiness with one's pen, and a facility at accounts, are necessary *qualifications* either for a school or a counting-house; drawing is one of the most agreeable and suitable *accomplishments* that can be given to a young person.

TO QUALIFY, TEMPER, HUMOUR.

QUALIFY, v. *Competent*.

TEMPER, from *tempero*, is to regulate the temperament.

HUMOUR, from *humor*, is to suit to the humour.

Things are *qualified* according to circumstances: what is too harsh must be *qualified* by something that is soft and lenitive; things are *tempered* by nature so that things perfectly discordant should not be combined; things are *humoured* by contrivance: what is subject to many changes requires to be *humoured*; a polite person will *qualify* a refusal by some expression of kindness; Providence has *tempered* the seasons so as to mix something that is pleasant in them all. Nature itself is said to be *humoured* when art is employed: but the *tempers* of men require still more to be *humoured*.

QUALITY, PROPERTY, ATTRIBUTE.

QUALITY, in Latin *qualitas* from *qualis* such, signifies such as a thing really is.

PROPERTY, which is changed from *propriety* and *proprius* proper or one's own, signifies belonging to a thing as an essential ingredient.

ATTRIBUTE, in Latin *attributus*, participle of *attribuo* to bestow upon, signifies the things bestowed upon or assigned to another.

The *quality* is that which is inherent in the thing and co-existent; the *property* is that which belongs to it for the time being; the *attribute* is the *quality* which is assigned to any object. We cannot alter the *quality* of a thing without altering the whole thing; but we may give or take away *properties* from bodies at pleasure, without entirely destroying their identity; and we may ascribe *attributes* at discretion.

QUARREL, BROIL, FEUD.

QUARREL, *v.* *Difference.*

BROIL probably comes from *brawl*, a noisy quarrel.

FEUD, in German *fehde*, is connected with the word *fight*, including active hostility.

Quarrel is the general and ordinary term; *broil* and *feud* are particular terms.

The idea of a variance between two parties is common to these terms; but the former respects the complaints and charges which are reciprocally made; *broil* respects the confusion and entanglement which arises from a contention and collision of interests; *feud* respects the hostilities which arise out of the variance. There are *quarrels* where there are no *broils*, and there are both where there are no *feuds*; but there are no *broils* and *feuds* without *quarrels*: the *quarrel* may sometimes be secret, and sometimes manifest itself only in a coolness of behaviour: the *broil* is a noisy kind of *quarrel*, it always breaks out in loud, and mostly reproachful language: *feud* is a deadly kind of *quarrel*, which is heightened by mutual aggravations and insults. *Quarrels* are lamentable when they take place between members of the same family; *broils* are frequent among profligate and restless people who live together; *feuds* were general in former times between different families of the nobility.

QUARREL, AFFRAY, OR FRAY.

QUARREL, *v.* *Difference.*

AFFRAY or FRAY, from *frico* to rub, signifies the collision of the passions.

A *quarrel* is indefinite, both as to the cause and the manner in which it is conducted; an *affray* is a particular kind of *quarrel*: a *quarrel* may subsist between two persons from a private difference; an *affray* always takes place between many upon some public occasion: a *quarrel* may be carried on merely by words; an *affray* is commonly conducted by acts of violence: many angry words pass in a *quarrel* between two hasty people; many are wounded, if not killed in *affrays*, when opposite parties meet.

QUESTION, QUERY.

QUESTION, *v.* *To ask.*

QUERY is but a variation of *quaere*, from the verb *quaero* to seek or inquire.

Questions and *queries* are both put for the sake of obtaining an answer; but the former may be for a reasonable or unreasonable cause; a *query* is mostly a rational question: idlers may put *questions* from mere curiosity; learned men put *queries* for the sake of information.

QUICKNESS, SWIFTNESS, FLEETNESS, CELERITY, RAPIDITY, VELOCITY.

These terms are all applied to the motion of bodies, of which QUICKNESS, from *quick*, denotes the general and simple idea which characterizes all the rest. *Quickness* is near akin to life, and is directly opposed to slowness. SWIFTNESS, in all probability from the German *schweifen* to roam; and FLEETNESS, from fly; express higher degrees of quickness. CELERITY, probably from *celer* a horse; VELOCITY, from *volo* to fly; and RAPIDITY, from *rapio* to seize or hurry along, differ more in application than in degree. *Quick* and *swift* are applicable to any objects; men are *quick* in moving, *swift* in running: dogs hear *quickly*, and run *swiftly*; a mill goes *quickly* or *swiftly* round, according to the force of the wind: *fleetness* is the peculiar characteristic of winds or horses; a horse is *fleet* in the race, and is sometimes described to be as *fleet* as the winds: that which we wish to characterize as particularly *quick* in our ordinary operations, we say is done with *celerity*; in this manner our thoughts pass with *celerity* from one object to another: those things are said to move with *rapidity* which seem to hurry every thing away with them; a river or stream moves with *rapidity*; time goes on with a *rapid* flight: *velocity* signifies the *swiftness* of flight, which is a motion that exceeds all others in *swiftness*: hence, we speak of the *velocity* of a ball shot from a cannon, or of a celestial body moving in its orbit; sometimes the words, *rapidity* and *velocity*, are applied in the improper sense by way of emphasis to the very *swift* movements of other bodies: in this manner the wheel of a carriage is said to move *rapidly*; and the flight of an animal or the progress of a vessel before the wind is compared to the flight of a bird in point of *velocity*.

R.

RACE, GENERATION, BREED.

RACE, *v.* *Family.*

GENERATION, in Latin *generatio* from *genero*, and the Greek *γεννᾶω*, to engender or beget, signifies the thing begotten.

BREED signifies that which is *bred* v. (*To breed*). These terms are all employed in regard to a number of animate objects which have the same origin; the former two are said of human beings, the latter only of brutes: *race* is employed in regard to the dead as well as the living: *generation* is employed only in regard to the living: hence we speak of the *race* of the Heraclidae, the *race* of the Bourbons, the *race* of the Stuarts and the like; but the present *generation*, the whole *generation*, a worthless *generation*, and the like: *breed* is said of those animals which are brought forth, and brought up in the same manner. Hence, we denominate some domestic animals as of a good *breed*, where particular care is taken not only as to the animals from which they come, but also of those which are brought forth.

RADIANCE, BRILLIANCY.

Both these terms express the circumstance of a great light in a body; but **RADIANCE**, from *radius* a ray, denotes the emission of rays, and is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to bodies naturally luminous, like the heavenly bodies; and **BRILLIANCY** (v. *Bright*), denotes the whole body of light emitted, and may, therefore, be applied equally to natural and artificial light. The *radiancy* of the sun, moon, and stars, constitutes a part of their beauty; the *brilliancy* of a diamond is frequently compared with that of a star.

RAPACIOUS, RAVENOUS, VORACIOUS.

RAPACIOUS, in Latin *rapax*, from *rapio* to seize, signifies seizing or grasping any thing with an eager desire to have.

RAVENOUS, from the Latin *rabies* fury, and *rapio* to seize, signifies the same as *rapacious*.

VORACIOUS, from *voro* to devour, signifies an eagerness to devour.

The idea of greediness, which forms the leading feature in the signification of all these terms, is varied in the subject and the object: *rapacious* is the quality peculiar to beasts of prey; *ravenous* and *voracious* are common to all animals, when impelled by hunger. The beasts of the forest are *rapacious* at all times; all animals are more or less *ravenous* or *voracious*, as circumstances make them: a lion is *rapacious* when it seizes on its prey: it is *ravenous* in the act of consuming it. The word *ravenous* respects the haste with which one eats; the word *voracious* respects the quantity which one consumes: a *ravenous* person is loath to wait for the dressing of his food; he consumes it without any preparation: a *voracious* person not only eats in haste, but he consumes great

quantities. Abstinence from food, for an unusual length, will make any healthy creature *ravenous*; habitual intemperance in eating, or a diseased appetite, will produce *voracity*.

RAPINE, PLUNDER, PILLAGE.

The idea of property taken from another contrary to his consent is included in all these terms: but the term **RAPINE** includes most violence; **PLUNDER** includes removal or carrying away; **PILLAGE** search and scrutiny after a thing. A soldier who makes a sudden incursion into an enemy's country, and carries away whatever comes within his reach, is guilty of *rapine*; he goes into a house full of property and carries away much *plunder*; he enters with the rest of the army into a town, and stripping it of every thing that was to be found, goes away loaded with *pillage*; mischief and bloodshed attend *rapine*; loss attends *plunder*; distress and ruin follow wherever there has been *pillage*.

RARE, SCARCE, SINGULAR.

RARE, in Latin *rarus*, comes from the Greek *ραιος* rare.

SCARCE, in Dutch *schaers* sparing, comes from *scheren* to cut or clip, and signifies cut close.

SINGULAR, v. *Particular*.

Rare and *scarce* both respect number or quantity, which admit of expansion or diminution: *rare* is a thinned number, a diminished quantity; *scarce* is a short quantity.

Rare is applied to matters of convenience or luxury; *scarce* to matters of utility or necessity: that which is *rare* becomes valuable, and fetches a high price; that which is *scarce* becomes precious, and the loss of it is seriously felt. The best of every thing is in its nature *rare*; there will never be a superfluity of such things; there are many curious plants, or particular animals, which, owing to circumstances, are always *rare*; that which is most in use will, in certain cases, be *scarce*; when the supply of an article fails, and the demand for it continues, it naturally becomes *scarce*. An aloe in blossom is a *rarity*, for nature has prescribed such limits to its growth as to give but very few of such flowers: the paintings of the old masters are daily becoming more *scarce* because time will diminish their quantity, although not their value.

What is *rare* will often be *singular*, and what is *singular* will often, on that account, be *rare*: but these terms are not necessarily applied to the same object: fewness is the idea common to both; but *rare* is said of that of which there might be more; while

singular is applied to that which is single, or nearly single in its kind. The *rare* is that which is always sought for; the *singular* is not always that which one esteems: a thing is *rare* which is difficult to be obtained; a thing is *singular* for its peculiar qualities, good or bad. Indian plants are many of them *rare* in England, because the climate will not agree with them; the sensitive plant is *singular*, as its quality of shrinking from the touch distinguishes it from all other plants.

Scarce is applied only in the proper sense to physical objects; *rare* and *singular* are applicable to moral objects. One speaks of a *rare* instance of fidelity, of which many like examples cannot be found; of a *singular* instance of depravity, when a parallel case can *scarcely* be found.

RASHNESS, TEMERITY, HASTINESS, PRECIPITANCY.

RASHNESS denotes the quality of *rash*, which, like the German *rasch*, and our word, *rush*, comes from the Latin *ruo*, expressing hurried and excessive motion.

TEMERITY, in Latin *temeritas*, from *temerè*, possibly comes from the Greek *τημερον* at the moment, denoting the quality of acting by the impulse of the moment.

HASTINESS, *v. Angry and Cursory.*

PRECIPITANCY, from the Latin *pre* and *cipio*, signifies the quality or disposition of taking things before they ought to be taken.

Rashness and *temerity* have a close alliance with each other in sense; but they have a slight difference which is entitled to notice: *rashness* is a general and indefinite term, in the signification of which an improper celerity is the leading idea: this celerity may arise either from a vehemence of character, or a temporary ardour of the mind: in the signification of *temerity*, the leading idea is want of consideration, springing mostly from an overweening confidence, or a presumption of character. *Rashness* is, therefore, applied to corporeal actions, as the jumping into a river, without being able to swim, or the leaping over a hedge, without being an expert horseman; *temerity* is applied to our moral actions, particularly such as require deliberation, and a calculation of consequences. *Hastiness* and *precipitancy* are but modes or characteristics of *rashness*, and consequently employed only in particular cases, as *hastiness* in regard to our movements, and *precipitancy* in regard to our measures.

RATE, PROPORTION, RATIO.

RATE, *v. To estimate.*

RATIO has the same origin and original meaning as *rate*.

PROPORTION, *v. Proportionate.*

Rate and *ratio* are in sense species of *proportion*: that is, they are supposed or estimated *proportions*, in distinction from *proportions* that lie in the nature of things. The first term, *rate*, is employed in ordinary concerns; a person receives a certain sum weekly at the *rate* of a certain sum yearly: *ratio* is applied only to numbers and calculations; as two is to four, so is four to eight, and eight to sixteen; the *ratio* in this being double: *proportion* is employed in matters of science, and in all cases where the two more specific terms are not admissible; the beauty of an edifice depends upon observing the doctrine of *proportions*; in the disposing of soldiers a certain regard must be had to *proportion* in the height and size of the men.

RAVAGE, DESOLATION, DEVASTATION.

RAVAGE comes from the Latin *rapio*, and the Greek *αγραζω*, signifying a seizing or tearing away.

DESOLATION, from *solus* alone, signifies made solitary or reduced to solitude.

DEVASTATION, in Latin *devastatio*, from *devasto* to lay waste, signifies reducing to a waste or desert.

Ravage expresses less than either *desolation* or *devastation*; a breaking, tearing, or destroying, is implied in the word *ravage*; but *desolation* signifies the entire unpeopling a land, and *devastation* the entire clearing away of every vestige of cultivation. Torrents, flames, and tempests, *ravage*; war, plague, and famine, *desolate*; armies of barbarians, who inundate a country, carry *devastation* with them wherever they go.

Ravage is employed likewise in the moral application; *desolation* and *devastation* only in the proper application to countries. Disease makes its *ravages* on beauty; death makes its *ravages* among men in a more terrible degree at one time than at another.

RAY, BEAM.

RAY (*v. Gleam*) is indefinite in its meaning; it may be said either of a large or small quantity of light: **BEAM** (*v. Gleam*) is something positive; it can be said only of that which is considerable. We can speak of *rays* either of the sun, or the stars, or any other luminous body; but we speak of the *beams* of the sun or the moon. The *rays* of the sun break through the clouds; its *beams* are scorching at noon-day.

A room can scarcely be so shut up, that

a single ray of light shall not penetrate through the crevices; the sea, in a calm moonlight night, presents a beautiful spectacle, with the moon's beams playing on its waves.

TO REACH, STRETCH, EXTEND.

REACH, through the medium of the northern languages, as also the Latin *rego* in the word *porrigo*, and the Greek *ορεγω*, comes from the Hebrew *rekang* to draw out, and *arek*, length.

STRETCH is but an intensive of *reach*.

EXTEND, *v.* To extend.

The idea of drawing out in a line is common to these terms, but they differ in the mode and circumstances of the action. To *reach* and to *stretch* is employed only for drawing out in a straight line, that is, lengthwise; *extend* may be employed to express the drawing out in all directions. In this sense a wall is said to *reach* a certain number of yards; a neck of land is said to *stretch* into the sea: a wood *extends* many miles over a country. As the act of persons, in the proper sense, they differ still more widely; *reach* and *stretch* signify drawing to a given point, and for a given end; *extend* has no such collateral meaning. We *reach* in order to take hold of something; we *stretch* in order to surmount some object: a person *reaches* with his arm in order to get down a book; he *stretches* his neck in order to see over another person: in both cases we might be said simply to *extend* the arm or the neck, where the collateral circumstance is not to be expressed.

In the improper application, they have a similar distinction: to *reach* is applied to the movements which one makes to a certain end, and is equivalent to arriving at, or attaining. A traveller strives to *reach* his journey's end as quickly as possible; an ambitious man aims at *reaching* the summit of human power or honour. To *stretch* is applied to the direction which one gives to another object, so as to bring it to a certain point; a ruler *stretches* his power or authority to its utmost limits. To *extend* retains its original unqualified meaning; as when we speak of *extending* the meaning or application of a word, of *extending* one's bounty or charity, *extending* one's sphere of action, and the like.

READY, APT, PROMPT.

READY, *v.* Easy.

APT, in Latin *aptus*, signifies literally fitness.

PROMPT, *v.* Expedition.

Ready is in general applied to that which

has been intentionally prepared for a given purpose; *promptness* and *aptness* are species of *readiness*, which lie in the personal endowments or disposition: hence we speak of things being *ready* for a journey; persons being *apt* to learn, or *prompt* to obey or to reply. *Ready*, when applied to persons, characterizes the talent; as a *ready* wit: *apt* characterizes their habits; as *apt* to judge by appearance, or *apt* to decide hastily: *prompt* characterizes more commonly the particular action, and denotes the willingness of the agent, and the quickness with which he performs the action; as *prompt* in executing a command, or *prompt* to listen to what is said.

REASONABLE, RATIONAL.

Are both derived from the same Latin word *ratio* reason, which, from *ratus* and *reor* to think, signifies the thinking faculty.

REASONABLE signifies accordant with reason; RATIONAL signifies having reason; the former is more commonly applied in the sense of right reason, propriety, or fairness; the latter is employed in the original sense of the word *reason*: hence we term a man *reasonable* who acts according to the principles of right reason; and a being *rational*, who is possessed of the *rational* or *reasoning* faculty, in distinction from the brutes. It is to be lamented that there are much fewer *reasonable* than there are *rational* creatures.

TO REBOUND, REVERBERATE, RECOIL.

To REBOUND is to bound or spring back: a ball *rebounds*. To REVERBERATE is to *verberate* or beat back: a sound *reverberates* when it echoes. To RECOIL is to *coil* or whirl back: a snake *recoils*. The former two are rarely used in an improper application; but we may say of *recoil*, that a man's schemes will *recoil* on his own head.

TO RECEDE, RETREAT, RETIRE, WITHDRAW, SECEDE.

To RECEDE is to go back; to RETREAT is to draw back; the former is a simple action, suited to one's convenience; the latter is a particular action, dictated by necessity: we *recede* a few steps in order to observe an object more distinctly; we *retreat* from the position we have taken in order to escape danger. To RETIRE and WITHDRAW originally signify the same as *retreat*, that is, to draw back or off; but they agree in application mostly with *recede*: to *recede* is to go back from a given spot; but to *retire* and *withdraw* have respect to the place or the presence of the persons: we may *recede* on

an open plain; but we *retire* or *withdraw* from a room, or from some company. In this application *withdraw* is the more familiar term; *retire* may likewise be used for an army; but it denotes a much more leisurely action than *retreat*: a general *retreats*, by compulsion, from an enemy; but he may *retire* from an enemy's country when there is no enemy present.

Recede, *retire*, and *withdraw*, are also used in a moral application; *SECEDE* is used only in this sense: a person *recedes* from his engagement, which is seldom justifiable; he *retires* from business, or *withdraws* from a society. To *secede* is a public act: men *secede* from a religious or political body; *withdraw* is a private act; they *withdraw* themselves as individual members from any society.

RECEIPT, RECEPTION.

RECEIPT comes from *receive*, in its application to inanimate objects, which are taken into possession.

RECEPTION comes from the same verb, in the sense of treating persons at their first arrival: in the commercial intercourse of men, the *receipt* of goods or money must be acknowledged in writing; in the friendly intercourse of men, their *reception* of each other will be polite or cold, according to the sentiments entertained towards the individual.

TO RECEIVE, ACCEPT.

The idea of taking, from the Latin *capio*, is common to these words; but to *RECEIVE* is to take back; to *ACCEPT* is to take to one's self: the former is an act of right, we *receive* what is our own; the latter is an act of courtesy, we *accept* what is offered by another. To *receive* simply excludes the idea of refusal; to *accept* includes the idea of consent; we may *receive* with indifference or reluctance; but we *accept* with willingness; the idea of *receiving* is included in that of *accepting*, but not *vice versa*: what we *receive* may either involve an obligation or not; what we *accept* always involves the return of like courtesy at least: he who *receives* a debt is under no obligation, but he who *receives* a favour is bound by gratitude; and he who *accepts* a present will feel himself called upon to make some return.

TO RECKON, COUNT, OR ACCOUNT, NUMBER.

RECKON, *v.* To calculate.

COUNT, or *ACCOUNT*, *v.* To calculate.

NUMBER signifies to put in the *number*.

The idea of estimating is here common to

these terms, which differ less in meaning than in application: *reckon* is the most familiar; *account* and *number* are employed only in the grave style: we *reckon* it a happiness to enjoy the company of a particular friend; we ought to *account* it a privilege to be enabled to address our Maker by prayer; we must all expect to be one day *numbered* with the dead.

TO RECLAIM, REFORM.

RECLAIM, from *clamo* to call, signifies to call back to its right place that which has gone astray.

REFORM signifies to *form* anew that which has changed its *form*: they are allied only in their application to the moral character.

A man is *reclaimed* from his vicious courses by the force of advice or exhortation; he may be *reformed* by various means, external or internal.

A parent endeavours to *reclaim* a child, but too often in vain; the offender is in general not *reformed*.

TO RECLINE, REPOSE.

To *RECLINE* is to lean back; to *REPOSE* is to place one's self back: he who *reclines* *reposes*; but we may *recline* without *reposing*: when we *recline* we put ourselves into a particular *position*; but when we *repose* we put ourselves into that position which is the most easy.

RECOGNISE, ACKNOWLEDGE.

RECOGNISE, in Latin *recognoscere*, is to take knowledge of, or bring to one's own knowledge.

ACKNOWLEDGE, *v.* To acknowledge.

To *recognise* is to take cognisance of that which comes again before our notice; to *acknowledge* is to admit to one's knowledge whatever comes fresh under our notice: we *recognise* a person whom we have known before; we *recognise* him either in his former character, or in some newly assumed character; we *acknowledge* either former favours, or those which have been just received: princes *recognise* certain principles which have been admitted by previous consent; they *acknowledge* the justice of claims which are preferred before them.

RECORD, REGISTER, ARCHIVE.

RECORD is taken for the thing *recorded*; *REGISTER*, either for the thing *registered*, or the place in which it is *registered*: *ARCHIVE*, mostly for the place, and sometimes for the thing: *records* are either historical details, or short notices; *registers*

are but short notices of particular and local circumstances; *archives* are always connected with the state: every place of antiquity has its *records* of the different circumstances which have been connected with its rise and progress; in public *registers* we find accounts of families, and of their various connexions; in *archives* we find all legal deeds and instruments which involve the interests of the nation, both in its internal and external economy.

TO RECOVER, RETRIEVE, REPAIR, RECRUIT.

RECOVER is to get again under one's cover or protection.

RETRIEVE, from the French *trouver* to find, is to find again.

REPAIR, in French *reparer*, Latin *reparo*, from *paro* to get, signifies likewise to get again, or make a thing good as it was before.

RECRUIT, in French *recru*, from *cru* and the Latin *cresco* to grow, signifies to grow again, or come fresh again.

Recover is the most general term, and applies to objects in general; *retrieve*, *repair*, and the others, are only partial applications: we *recover* things either by our own means or by casualties; we *retrieve* and *repair* by our own efforts only: we *recover* that which has been taken, or that which has been lost: we *retrieve* that which we have lost; we *repair* that which has been injured; we *recruit* that which has been diminished: we *recover* property from those who wish to deprive us of it; we *retrieve* our misfortunes, or our lost reputation; we *repair* the mischief which has been done to our property; we *recruit* the strength which has been exhausted.

RECOVERY, RESTORATION.

RECOVERY, is one's own act; **RESTORATION** is the act of another: we *recover* the thing we have lost, when it comes again into our possession; but it is *restored* to us by another: a king *recovers* his crown by force of arms, from the hands of a usurper; his crown is *restored* to him by the aid of his people: the *recovery* of property is good fortune; the *restoration* of property an act of justice.

Both are employed likewise in regard to one's health: but the former simply designates the regaining of the health; the latter refers to the instrument by which it is brought about: the *recovery* of his health is an object of the first importance to every man; the *restoration* of one's health seldom depends upon the efficacy of medicine, than the benignant operation of nature.

RECTITUDE, UPRIGHTNESS.

RECTITUDE is properly rightness, which is expressed in a stronger manner by **UPRIGHTNESS**: we speak of the *rectitude* of the judgment; but of the *uprightness* of the mind, or of the moral character, which must be something more than straight, for it must be elevated above every thing mean or devious.

TO REDEEM, RANSOM.

REDEEM, in Latin *redimo*, is compounded of *re* and *emo* to buy off, or back to one's self.

RANSOM is in all probability a variation of *redeem*.

Redeem is a term of general application; *ransom* is employed only on particular occasions: we *redeem* persons as well as things; we *ransom* persons only; we may *redeem* by labour, or any thing which supplies an equivalent to money; we *ransom* with money only: we *redeem* a watch, or whatever has been given in pawn; we *ransom* a captive: *redeem* is employed in the improper application; *ransom* only in the proper sense: we may *redeem* our character, our life, or our honour; and in this sense our Saviour *redeems* repentant sinners; but those who are *ransomed* only recover their bodily liberty.

REDRESS, RELIEF.

REDRESS, like *address* (*v. Accost*) in all probability comes from the Latin *dirigo*, signifying to direct or bring back to the former point.

RELIEF, *v. To help*.

Redress is said only with regard to matters of right and justice; *relief* to those of kindness, and humanity: by power we obtain *redress*; by active interference we obtain a *relief*: an injured person looks for *redress* to the government; an unfortunate person looks for *relief* to the compassionate and kind. *Redress* applies to public as well as private grievances; *relief* applies only to private distresses: under a pretence of seeking *redress* of grievances, mobs are frequently assembled to the disturbance of the better disposed; under a pretence of soliciting charitable *relief*, thieves gain admittance into families.

TO REDUCE, LOWER.

REDUCE is to bring down, and **LOWER** to make *low* or *lower*, which proves the close connexion of these words in their original meaning; it is, however, only in their improper application that they have any further

connexion. *Reduce* is used in the sense of lessen, when applied to number, quantity, price, &c.; *lower* is used in the same sense when applied to price, demands, terms, &c.: the former, however, occurs in cases where circumstances as well as persons are concerned; the latter only in cases where persons act: the price of corn is *reduced* by means of importation; a person *lowers* his price or his demand when he finds them too high. As a moral quality, the former is much stronger than the latter: a man is said to be *reduced* to an abject condition; but to be *lowered* in the estimation of others, to be *reduced* to a state of slavery, to be *lowered* in his own eyes.

TO REFER, RELATE, RESPECT, REGARD.

REFER, from the Latin *re* and *fero*, signifies literally to bring back; and RELATE from the participle *latus* of the same verb, signifies brought back, the former is, therefore, transitive, and the latter intransitive. One *refers* a person to a thing; one thing *refers*, that is, *refers* a person, to another thing: one thing *relates*, that is, is *related*, to another. To *refer* is an arbitrary act, it depends upon the will of an individual; we may *refer* a person to any part of a volume, or to any work we please: to *relate* is a conditional act, it depends on the nature of things; nothing *relates* to another without some point of accordance between the two; orthography *relates* to grammar, that is, by being a part of the grammatical science. Hence it arises that *refer* when employed for things, is commonly said of circumstances that carry the memory to events or circumstances; *relate* is said of things that have a natural connexion: the religious festivals and ceremonies of the Roman Catholics have all a *reference* to some events that happened in the early periods of Christianity; the notes and observations at the end of a book *relate* to what has been inserted in the text.

Refer and *relate* carry us back to that which may be very distant; but RESPECT and REGARD (*v. To esteem*) turn our views to that which is near. The object of the action *refer* and *relate* is indirectly acted upon, and consequently stands in the oblique case: we *refer* to an object; a thing *relates* to an object: but the object of the action *respect* and *regard* is directly acted upon, therefore it stands in the accusative or objective case: we *respect* or *regard* a thing, not to a thing. Whatever *respects* or *regards* a thing has a moral influence over it; but the former is more commonly employed than the

latter: it is the duty of the magistrates to take into consideration whatever *respects* the good order of the community: what *relates* to a thing is often more intimately connected than what *respects*; and, on the contrary, what *respects* comprehends in it more than what *relates*. To *relate* is to *respect*; but to *respect* is not always to *relate*: the former includes every species of affinity or accordance; the latter only that which flows out of the properties and circumstances of things: when a number of objects are brought together, which fitly associate, and properly *relate* one to the other, they form a grand whole, as in the case of any scientific work which is digested into a scheme; when all the incidental circumstances which *respect* either moral principles or moral conduct are properly weighed, they enable one to form a just judgment.

Respect is said of objects in general; *regard* mostly of that which enters into the feeling: laws *respect* the general welfare of the community; the due administration of the laws *regards* the happiness of the individual.

REFORM, REFORMATION.

REFORM has a general application; REFORMATION a particular application: whatever undergoes such a change as to give a new form to an object occasions a *reform*; when such a change is produced in the moral character, it is termed a *reformation*: the concerns of a state require occasional *reform*; those of an individual require *reformation*. When *reform* and *reformation* are applied to the moral character, the former has a more extensive signification than the latter: the term *reform* conveying the idea of a complete amendment; *reformation* implying only the process of amending or improving.

A *reform* in one's life and conversation will always be accompanied with a corresponding increase of happiness; when we observe any approach to *reformation*, we may cease to despair of the individual.

TO REFUSE, DECLINE, REJECT, REPEL, REBUFF.

REFUSE (*v. To deny*) signifies simply to pour back, that is, to send back, which is the common idea of all these terms.

DECLINE, in Latin *declino*, signifies literally to turn aside. REJECT, from *jacio* to throw, to cast back; REPEL, from *pello* to drive, to drive back. REBUFF, from *buff* or *puff*, to puff one back, or send off with a puff.

Refuse is an unqualified action, it is ac-

accompanied with no expression of opinion; *decline* is a gentle and indirect mode of refusal; *reject* is a direct mode, and conveys a positive sentiment of disapprobation: we *refuse* what is asked of us, for want of inclination to comply; we *decline* what is proposed from motives of discretion; we *reject* what is offered to us, because it does not fall in with our views: we *refuse* to listen to the suggestions of our friends; we *decline* an offer of service: we *reject* the insinuations of the interested and evil-minded. To *refuse* is said only of that which passes between individuals; to *reject* is said of that which comes from any quarter; requests and petitions are *refused* by those who are solicited; opinions, propositions, and counsels, are *rejected* by particular communities: the king *refuses* to give his assent to a bill; the parliament *rejects* a bill.

To *repel* is to *reject* with violence; to *rebuff* is to *refuse* with contempt. We *refuse* and *reject* that which is either offered, or simply presents itself, for acceptance: but we *repel* and *rebuff* that which forces itself into our presence, contrary to our inclination: we *repel* the attack of an enemy, or we *repel* the advances of one who is not agreeable; we *rebuff* those who put that in our way that is offensive. Importunate persons must necessarily expect to meet with *rebuffs*; delicate minds feel a *refusal* as a *rebuff*.

TO RELATE, RECOUNT, DESCRIBE.

RELATE, in Latin *relatus*, participle of *refero*, signifies to bring that to the notice of others which has before been brought to our own notice.

RECOUNT is properly to *count* again, or *count* over again.

DESCRIBE, from the Latin *scribo* to write, is literally to write down.

The idea of giving an account of events or circumstances is common to all these terms, which differ in the object and circumstances of the action. *Relate* is said generally of all events, both of those which concern others as well as ourselves; *recount* is said only of those which concern ourselves: those who *relate* all they hear often *relate* that which never happened; it is a gratification to an old soldier to *recount* all the transactions in which he bore a part during his military career. We *relate* events that have happened at any period of time immediate or remote; we *recount* mostly those things which have been long passed: in *recounting*, the memory reverts to past scenes, and *counts* over all that has deeply interested the mind. Travellers are pleased to

relate to their friends whatever they have seen remarkable in other countries; the *recounting* of our adventures in distant regions of the globe has a peculiar interest for all who hear them. We may *relate* either by writing or by word of mouth; we *recount* only by word of mouth; writers of travels sometimes *relate* more than they have either heard or seen; he who *recounts* exploits of heroism, will always meet with a delighted audience.

Relate and *recount* are said of that only which has passed; *describe* is said of that which exists: we *relate* the particulars of our journey; and we *describe* the country we pass through. Personal adventure is always the subject of a *relation*; the quality and condition of things are those of the *description*. We *relate* what happened on meeting a friend; we *describe* the dress of the parties, or the ceremonies which are usual on particular occasions.

RELATION, RECITAL, NARRATION.

RELATION, from the verb *relate*, denotes the act of *relating*.

RECITAL from *recite*, denotes the act of *reciting*.

NARRATION, from *narrate* denotes the thing *narrated*, *Relation* is here, as in the former paragraph (v. *To relate*), the general, and the others particular terms. *Relation* applies to every object which is related whether of a public or private nature; history is the *relation* of national events; biography is the *relation* of particular lives: *recital* is the *relation* or repetition of actual or existing circumstances; we listen to the *recital* of misfortunes, distresses, and the like. The *relation* may concern matters of indifference: the *recital* is always of something that affects the interests of some individual: the pages of the journalist are filled with the *relation* of daily occurrences which simply amuse in the reading; but the *recital* of another's woes often draws tears from the audience to whom it is made.

Relation and *recital* are seldom employed but in connexion with the object *related* or *recited*: *narrative* is mostly used by itself: hence we say the *relation* of any particular circumstance; the *recital* of one's calamities; but an affecting *narrative* or a simple *narrative*.

RELATION, RELATIVE, KINSMAN, KINDRED.

RELATION is here taken to express the person *related*; it is, as in the former paragraph, the general term both in sense and application: *RELATIVE* is employed only

as respects the particular individual to whom one is *related*: KINSMAN designates the particular kind of *relation*, and KINDRED is a collective term to comprehend all one's *relations* or those who are akin to one. In abstract propositions we speak of *relations*; a man who is without *relations* feels himself an outcast in society: in designating one's close and intimate connexion with persons we use the term *relative*; our near and dear *relatives* are the first objects of our regard: in designating one's *relationship* and connexion with persons, *kinsman* is preferable; when a man has not any children he frequently adopts one of his *kinsmen* as his heir: when the ties of *relationship* are to be specified in the persons of any particular family, they are denominated *kindred*; a man cannot abstract himself from his *kindred* while he retains any spark of human feeling.

TO RELAX, REMIT.

The general idea of lessening is that which allies these words to each other; but they differ very widely in their original meaning, and somewhat in their ordinary application; RELAX, from the word *lax* or loose, signifies to make loose, and in its moral use to lessen any thing in its degree of tightness or rigour; to REMIT, from *re* and *mitto* to send back, signifies to take off in part or entirely that which has been imposed; that is, to lessen in quantity. In regard to our attempts to act, we may speak of *relaxing* in our endeavours, and *remitting* our labours or exertions; in regard to our dealings with others, we may speak of *relaxing* in discipline, *relaxing* in the severity or strictness of our conduct, of *remitting* a punishment or *remitting* a sentence. The discretionary power of showing mercy when placed in the hands of the sovereign serves to *relax* the rigour of the law; when the punishment seems to be disproportioned to the offence, it is but equitable to *remit* it.

REMAINS, RELICS.

REMAINS signifies literally what *remains*: RELICS, from the Latin *relinquo* to leave, signifies what is left. The former is a term of general and familiar application; the latter is specific. What *remains* after the use or consumption of any thing is termed the *remains*; what is left of any thing after a lapse of years is the *relic* or *relics*. There are *remains* of buildings mostly after conflagration; there are *relics* of antiquity in most monasteries and old churches.

Remains are of value, or not, according to circumstances; *relics* always derive a value from the person to whom they were sup-

posed originally to belong. The *remains* of a person, that is, what corporeally *remains* of a person, after the extinction of life, will be respected by his friend; a bit of a garment that belonged, or was supposed to belong, to some saint, will be a precious *relic* in the eyes of a superstitious Roman Catholic.

REMARK, OBSERVATION, COMMENT, NOTE, ANNOTATION, COMMENTARY.

REMARK (*v. To notice*); and OBSERVATION (*v. To notice*); and COMMENT, in Latin *commentum*, from *comminiscor* to call to mind; are either spoken or written: NOTE, ANNOTATION (*v. Note*); COMMENTARY a variation of *comment*; are always written. *Remark* and *observation* admitting of the same distinction in both cases, have been sufficiently explained in the article referred to: *comment* is a species of remark which often loses in good-nature what it gains in seriousness; it is mostly applied to particular persons or cases, and more commonly employed as a vehicle of censure than of commendation; when not employed in personal cases, it serves for explanation. The other terms are used in this sense only, but with certain modifications; the *note* is most general, and serves to call the attention to as well as illustrate particular passages in the text: *annotations* and *commentaries* are more minute; the former being that which is added by way of appendage; the latter being employed in a general form; as the *annotations* of the Greek scholiasts, and the *commentaries* on the sacred writings.

TO REPEAT, RECITE, REHEARSE, RECAPITULATE.

The idea of going over any words, or actions, is common to all these terms. REPEAT, from the Latin *repeto* to seek, or go over again, is the general term, including only the common idea. To RECITE, REHEARSE, and RECAPITULATE, are modes of *repetition*, conveying each some accessory idea. To *recite* is to *repeat* in a formal manner; to *rehearse* is to *repeat* or *recite* by way of preparation; to *recapitulate* is to *repeat* in a minute and specific manner. We *repeat* both actions and words; we *recite* only words: we *repeat* single words, or even sounds; we *recite* always a form of words: we *repeat* our own words, or the words of another: we *recite* only the words of another: we *repeat* for purposes of general convenience; we *recite* for the convenience or amusement of others; we *rehearse* for some specific purpose, either for the amusement or instruction of others;

we *recapitulate* for the instruction of others. We *repeat* that which we wish to be heard; we *recite* a piece of poetry before a company; we *rehearse* the piece in private, which we are going to *recite* in public; we *recapitulate* the general heads of that which we have already spoken in detail. A master must always *repeat* to his scholars the instruction which he wishes them to remember; Homer is said to have *recited* his verses in different parts; players *rehearse* their different parts before they perform in public; ministers *recapitulate* the leading points in their discourse.

To *repeat* is commonly to use the same words; to *recite*, to *rehearse*, and to *recapitulate*, do not necessarily require any verbal sameness. We *repeat* literally what we hear spoken by another; but we *recite* and *rehearse* events; and we *recapitulate* in a concise manner what has been uttered in a particular manner. An echo *repeats* with the greatest possible precision; Homer *recites* the names of all the Grecian and Trojan leaders, together with the names and account of their countries, and the number of the forces which they commanded; Virgil makes Aeneas *rehearse* before Dido and her courtiers the story of the capture of Troy, and his own adventures; a judge *recapitulates* evidence to a jury.

To *repeat*, *recite*, and *recapitulate*, are employed in writing, as well as in speaking; *rehearse* is only a mode of speaking. It is sometimes a beauty in style to *repeat* particular words on certain occasions; an historian finds it necessary to *recapitulate* the principal events of any particular period.

REPENTANCE, PENITENCE, CONTRITION, COMPUNCTION, REMORSE.

REPENTANCE, from *re* back, and *pæniteo* to be sorry, signifies thinking one's self wrong for something past: PENITENCE, from the same source, signifies simply sorrow for what is amiss. CONTRITION, from *contero* to rub together, is to bruise as it were with sorrow; COMPUNCTION, from *compungo* to prick thoroughly; and REMORSE, from *remordeo* to have a gnawing pain; all express modes of *penitence* differing in degree and circumstance. *Repentance* refers more to the change of one's mind with regard to an object, and is properly confined to the time when this change takes place; we therefore, strictly speaking, *repent* of a thing but once; we may, however, have *penitence* for the same thing all our lives. *Repentance* may be felt for trivial matters; we may *repent*

of going or not going, speaking or not speaking: *penitence* refers only to serious matters; we are *penitent* only for our sins.

Repentance may be felt for errors which concern only ourselves, or at most offences against our fellow-creatures; *penitence*, and the other terms, are applicable only to offences against the moral and Divine law. We may *repent* of not having made a bargain that we afterwards find would have been advantageous, or we may *repent* of having done any injury to our neighbour; but our *penitence* is awakened when we reflect on our unworthiness or sinfulness in the sight of our Maker. This *penitence* is a general sentiment, which belongs to all men as offending creatures; but *contrition*, *compunction*, and *remorse*, are awakened by reflecting on particular offences: *contrition* is a continued and severe sorrow, appropriate to one who has been in a continued state of peculiar sinfulness: *compunction* is rather an occasional but sharp sorrow, provoked by a single offence, or a moment's reflection; *remorse* may be temporary, but it is a still sharper pain awakened by some offence of peculiar magnitude and atrocity. The prodigal son was a *contrite* sinner; the brethren of Joseph felt great *compunction* when they were carried back with their sacks to Egypt; David was struck with *remorse* for the murder of Uriah.

These four terms depend not so much on the measure of guilt, as on the sensibility of the offender. In those who have most offended, and are come to a sense of their own condition, *penitence* will rise to deep *contrition*. There is no man so hardened that he will not some time or other feel *compunction* for the crimes he has committed. He who has the liveliest sense of the Divine goodness, will feel keen *remorse* whenever he reflects on any thing that he has done, by which he fears to have forfeited the favour of so good a Being.

REPETITION, TAUTOLOGY.

REPETITION is to TAUTOLOGY as the genus to the species: the latter being as a species of vicious repetition. There may be frequent repetitions which are warranted by necessity or convenience; but *tautology* is that which nowise adds to either the sense or the sound. A *repetition* may, or may not, consist of literally the same words; but *tautology*, from the Greek *ταυτος* the same, and *λογος* a word, supposes such a sameness in expression, as renders the signification the same. In the liturgy of the Church of England there are some *repetitions*, which add to the solemnity of the

worship; in most extemporary prayers there is *tautology*, that destroys the religious effect of the whole.

REPREHENSION, REPROOF.

Personal blame or censure is implied by both these terms, but the former is much milder than the latter. By **REPREHENSION** the personal independence is not so sensibly affected as in the case of **REPROOF**: people of all ages and stations whose conduct is exposed to the investigation of others are liable to *reprehension*; but children only, or such as are in a subordinate capacity are exposed to *reproof*. *Reprehension* amounts to little more than passing an unfavourable sentence upon the conduct of another: *reproof* adds to this an unfriendly address to the offender. The master of a school may be exposed to the *reprehension* of the parents for any supposed impropriety: his scholars are subject to his *reproof*.

TO REPRESS, RESTRAIN, SUPPRESS.

To **REPRESS** is to press back or down: to **RESTRAIN** is to strain back or down: the former is the general, the latter the specific term: we always *repress* when we *restrain*, but not *vice versa*. *Repress* is used mostly for pressing down, so as to keep that inward which wants to make its appearance: *restraint* is an habitual *repression* by which a thing is kept in a state of lowness: a person is said to *repress* his feelings when he does not give them vent either by his words or actions; he is said to *restrain* his feelings when he never lets them rise beyond a certain pitch: the innocent vivacity of youth should not be *repressed*; but their wildness and intemperance ought to be *restrained*.

To *repress* is simply to keep down or to keep from rising within one's self. To **SUPPRESS** is to keep under: a parent *represses* every tumultuous passion in a child; a judicious commander *suppresses* a rebellion by a timely and resolute exercise of authority. Hence the term *repress* is used only for the feelings or the movements of the mind: but *suppress* may be employed for that which is external. We *repress* violence; *suppress* publications or information.

REPRIEVE, RESPITE.

REPRIEVE comes in all probability from the French *repris*, participle of *reprendre*, and the Latin *reprehendo*, signifying to take back or take off that which has been laid on.

RESPITE, in all probability is changed

from *respiratus*, participle of *respiro*, signifying to breathe again.

The idea of a release from any pressure or burden is common to these terms; but the *reprieve* is that which is granted; the *respite* sometimes comes to us in the course of things: we gain a *reprieve* from any punishment or trouble which threatens us; we gain a *respite* from any labour or weight that presses upon us. A criminal gains a *reprieve* when the punishment of death is commuted for that of transportation; a debtor may be said to obtain a *reprieve* when, with a prison before his eyes, he obtains such indulgence from his creditors as sets him free; there is frequently no *respite* for persons in a subordinate station, when they fall into the hands of a hard task-master; Sisyphus is feigned by the poets to have been condemned to the toil of perpetually rolling a stone up a hill as fast as it rolled back, from which toil he had no *respite*.

REPROACH, CONTUMELY, OBLOQUY.

REPROACH, *v.* To blame.

CONTUMELY, from *contumeo*, that is, *contra tumeo*, signifies to swell up against.

OBLOQUY, from *ob* and *loquor*, signifies speaking against or to the disparagement of any one.

The idea of contemptuous or angry treatment of others is common to all these terms; but *reproach* is the general, *contumely* and *obloquy* are the particular terms. *Reproach* is either deserved or undeserved; the name of Puritan is applied as a term of *reproach* to such as affect greater purity than others; the name of Christian is a name of *reproach* in Turkey; *contumely* is always undeserved; it is the insolent swelling of a worthless person against merit in distress; our Saviour was exposed to the *contumely* of the Jews: *obloquy* is always supposed to be deserved; it is applicable to those whose conduct has rendered them objects of general censure, and whose name therefore has almost become a *reproach*. A man who uses his power only to oppress those who are connected with him will naturally and deservedly bring upon himself much *obloquy*.

REPROACHFUL, ABUSIVE, SCURRILOUS.

REPROACHFUL or full of *reproach* (*v.* *Reproach*).

ABUSIVE, or full of *abuse* (*v.* *Abuse*).

SCURRILOUS, in Latin *scurrilis*, from *scurra*, signifies like a buffoon or saucy jester.

Reproachful, when applied to persons, signifies full of *reproaches*; when to things,

deserving of *reproach*: *abusive* is only applied to the person: *scurrilous* is employed as an epithet either for persons or things. The conduct of a person is *reproachful* inasmuch as it provokes or is entitled to the *reproaches* of others; the language of a person is *reproachful* when it abounds in *reproaches*, or partakes of the nature of a *reproach*: a person is *abusive* who indulges himself in *abuse* or *abusive* language; and he is *scurrilous* who adopts *scurrility* or *scurrilous* language.

When applied to the same object, whether to the person or to the thing, they rise in sense: the *reproachful* is less than the *abusive*, and this than the *scurrilous*: the *reproachful* is sometimes warranted by the provocation; but the *abusive* and *scurrilous* are always unwarrantable; *reproachful* language may be, and generally is, consistent with decency and propriety of speech; *abusive* and *scurrilous* language are outrages against the laws of good-breeding, if not of morality. A parent may sometimes find it necessary to address an unruly son in *reproachful* terms: or one friend may adopt a *reproachful* tone to another; none, however, but the lowest orders of men, and those only when their angry passions are awakened, will descend to *abusive* or *scurrilous* language.

TO REPROBATE, CONDEMN.

To REPROBATE is much stronger than to CONDEMN: we always *condemn* when we *reprobate*, but not *vice versa*: to *reprobate* is to condemn in strong and reproachful language. We *reprobate* all measures which tend to loosen the ties by which men are bound to each other; we *condemn* all disrespectful language towards superiors. We *reprobate* only the thing; we *condemn* the person also: any act of disobedience in a child cannot be too strongly *reprobated*; a person must expect to be *condemned* when he involves himself in embarrassments through his own imprudence.

RESERVE, RESERVATION.

RESERVE and RESERVATION from *servo* to keep, both signify a keeping back, but differ as to the object and the circumstance of the action. *Reserve* is applied in a good sense, to any thing natural or moral which is kept back to be employed for a better purpose on a future occasion; *reservation* is an artful keeping back for selfish purposes: there is a prudent *reserve* which every man ought to keep in his discourse with a stranger; equivocators deal altogether in mental *reservation*.

TO RESERVE, RETAIN.

RESERVE, from the Latin *servo* to keep, signifies to keep back.

RETAIN, from *teneo* to hold, signifies to hold back; they in some measure, therefore, have the same distinction as keep and hold.

To *reserve* is an act of more specific design; we *reserve* that which is the particular object of our choice: to *retain* is a simple exertion of our power; we *retain* that which is once come in our possession. To *reserve* is employed only for that which is allowable; we *reserve* a thing, that is, keep it back with care for some future purpose; to *retain* is often an unlawful act; a debtor frequently *retains* in his hands the money which he has borrowed.

To *reserve*, whether in the proper or improper application, is employed only as the act of a conscious agent; to *retain* is often the act of an unconscious agent: we *reserve* what we have to say on a subject until a more suitable opportunity offers; the mind *retains* the impressions of external objects, by its peculiar faculty, the memory; certain substances are said to *retain* the colour with which they have been dyed.

REST, REMAINDER, REMNANT, RESIDUE.

REST evidently comes from the Latin *resto*, in this case, though not in the former (*v. Ease*), signifying what stands or remains back.

REMAINDER literally signifies what remains after the first part is gone. REMNANT is but a variation of *remainder*.

RESIDUE, from *resido*, signifies likewise what remains back.

All these terms express that part which is separated from the other and left distinct: *rest* is the most general, both in sense and application; the others have a more specific meaning and use: the *rest* may be either that which is left behind by itself or that which is set apart as a distinct portion; the *remainder*, *remnant*, and *residue*, are the quantities which remain when the other parts are gone. The *rest* is said of any part, large or small; but the *remainder* commonly regards the smaller part which has been left after the greater part has been taken. A person may be said to sell some and give away the *rest*: when a number of hearty persons sit down to a meal, the *remainder* of the provisions, after all have been satisfied, will not be considerable. *Rest* is applied either to persons or things; *remainder* only to things: some were of that opinion, but the *rest* did

not agree to it: the *remainder* of the paper was not worth *preserving*. *Remnant* from *remanens* in Latin, is a species of *remainder*, applicable only to cloth or whatever remains unsold out of whole pieces; as a *remnant* of cotton, linen, and the like. *Residue* is another species of *remainder*, employed in less familiar matters: the *remainder* is applied to that which remains after a consumption or removal has taken place, the term *residue* is applied to that which remains after a division has taken place: hence we speak of the *remainder* of the corn, the *remainder* of the books, and the like; but the *residue* of the property, the *residue* of the effects, and the like.

RESTORATION, RESTITUTION, REPARATION, AMENDS.

RESTORATION is employed in the ordinary application of the verb *restore*: RESTITUTION, from the same verb, is employed simply in the sense of making good that which has been unjustly taken. *Restoration* of property may be made by any one, whether the person taking it or not: *restitution* is supposed to be made by him who has been guilty of the injustice. The dethronement of a king may be the work of one set of men, his *restoration* that of another; it is the bounden duty of every individual who has committed any sort of injustice to another to make *restitution* to the utmost of his power.

Restitution and REPARATION are both employed in the sense of undoing that which has been done to the injury of another; but the former respects only injuries that affect the property, and *reparation* those which affect a person in various ways. He who is guilty of theft, or fraud, must make *restitution* by either *restoring* the stolen article or its full value: he who robs another of his good name, or does any injury to his person, has it not in his power so easily to make *reparation*.

Reparation and AMENDS (v. *Compensation*) are both employed in cases where some mischief or loss is sustained: but the term *reparation* comprehends the idea of the act of *repairing*, as well as the thing by which we *repair*; *amends* is employed only for the thing that will *amend* or make better: hence we speak of the *reparation* of an injury; but of the *amends* by itself. The term *reparation* comprehends all kinds of injuries, particularly those of a serious nature; that of *amends* is applied only to matters of inferior importance.

It is impossible to make *reparation* for taking away the life of another. It is easy

to make *amends* to any one for the loss of a day's pleasure.

RESTORE, RETURN, REPAY.

RESTORE, in Latin *restauro*, from the Greek *σταυρος* a pale, signifies properly to new pale, that is, to repair by a new paling, and, in an extended application, to make good what has been injured or lost.

RETURN signifies properly to turn again, or to send back; REPAY to pay back.

The common idea of all these terms is that of giving back. What we *restore* to another may or may not be the same as what we have taken; what we *return* and *repay* must be precisely the same as we have received: the former in application to general objects, the latter in application only to pecuniary matters. We *restore* upon a principle of equity; we *return* upon a principle of justice and honour; we *repay* upon a principle of undeniable right. We cannot always claim that which ought to be *restored*; but we can not only claim but enforce the claim in regard to what is to be *returned* or *repaid*: an honest man will be scrupulous not to take any thing from another without *restoring* to him its full value. Whatever we have borrowed we ought to *return*; and when it is money which we have obtained, we ought to *repay* it with punctuality. We *restore* to many as well as to one, to communities as well as to individuals: a king is *restored* to his crown: or one nation *restores* a territory to another: we *return* and *repay* not only individually, but personally and particularly: we *return* a book to its owner; we *repay* a sum of money to him from whom it was borrowed.

Restore and *return* may be employed in their improper application, as respects the moral state of persons and things; as a king *restores* a courtier to his favour, or a physician *restores* his patient to health: we *return* a favour; we *return* an answer or a compliment. *Repay* may be figuratively employed in regard to moral objects, as an ungrateful person *repays* kindnesses with reproaches.

TO RESTRAIN, RESTRICT.

RESTRAIN (v. *Coerce*) and RESTRICT are but variations from the same verb; but they have acquired a distinct acceptation: the former applies to the desires, as well as the outward conduct; the latter only to the outward conduct. A person *restrains* his inordinate appetite; or he is *restrained* by others from doing mischief: he is *restricted* in the use of his money. To *restrain* is

an act of power; but to *restrict* is an act of authority or law: the will or the actions of a child are *restrained* by the parent; but a patient is *restricted* in his diet by a physician, or any body of people may be *restricted* by laws.

RETALIATION, REPRISAL.

RETALIATION from *retaliate*, in Latin *retaliatum*, participle of *retalio*, compounded of *re* and *talis* such, signifies such again, or like for like. REPRISAL, in French *reprisal* from *repris* and *reprendre*, in Latin *reprehendo* to take again, signifies to take in return for what has been taken. The idea of making another suffer in return for the suffering he has occasioned is common to these terms; but the former is employed in ordinary cases; the latter mostly in regard to a state of warfare, or to active hostilities. A trick practised upon another in return for a trick is a *retaliation*; but a *reprisal* always extends to the capture of something from another, in return for what has been taken. When neighbours fall out, the incivilities and spite of the one are too often *retaliated* by like acts of incivility and spite on the part of the other: when one nation commences hostilities against another, it produces *reprisals* on the part of the other. *Retaliation* is frequently employed in a good sense for what passes innocently between friends: *reprisal* has always an unfavourable sense.

TO RETARD, HINDER.

RETARD, from the Latin *tardus* slow, signifies to make slow.

HINDER, v. *To hinder*.

To *retard* is applied to the movements of any object forward; to *hinder* is applied to the person moving or acting: we *retard* or make slow the progress of any scheme towards completion; we *hinder* or keep back the person who is completing the scheme: we therefore often *retard* a thing by *hindering* the person; but we frequently *hinder* a person without expressly *retarding*, and on the contrary the thing is *retarded* without the person being *hindered*. The publication of a work is sometimes *retarded* by the *hinderances* which an author meets with in bringing it to a conclusion; but a work may be *retarded* through the idleness of printers and a variety of other causes which are independent of any *hinderance*. So in like manner a person may be *hindered* in going to his place of destination; but we do not say that he is *retarded*, because it is only the execution of an object, and not

the simple movements of the person, which are *retarded*.

RETORT, REPARTEE.

RETORT, from *re* and *torqueo* to twist or turn back, to recoil, is an ill-natured reply: REPARTEE, from the word *part*, signifies a smart reply, a ready taking one's own part. The *retort* is always in answer to a censure for which one returns a like censure; the *repartee* is commonly in answer to the wit of another, where one returns wit for wit. In the acrimony of disputes it is common to hear *retort* upon *retort* to an endless extent; the vivacity of discourse is sometimes greatly enhanced by the quick *repartee* of those who take a part in it. There is nothing wanting in order to make a *retort*, but the disposition to aggravate one with whom we are offended; the talent for *repartee* is altogether a natural endowment, which does not depend in any degree upon the will of the individual.

RETRIBUTION, REQUITAL.

RETRIBUTION, from *tribuo* to bestow, signifies a bestowing back or giving in return.

REQUITAL, v. *Reward*.

Retribution is a particular term; *requital* is general: the *retribution* comes from Providence; *requital* is the act of man: *retribution* is by way of punishment; *requital* is mostly by way of reward: *retribution* is not always dealt out to every man according to his deeds; it is a poor *requital* for one who has done a kindness to be abused.

RETROSPECT, REVIEW, SURVEY.

RETROSPECT is literally looking back, from *retro* behind, and *spicio* to behold or cast an eye upon.

A REVIEW is a view repeated; and a SURVEY is a looking over at once, from the French *sur* upon, and *voir* to see.

A *retrospect* is always taken of that which is past and distant; a *review* may be taken of that which is present; every *retrospect* is a species of *review*, but every *review* is not a *retrospect*. We take a *retrospect* of our past life in order to draw salutary reflections from all that we have done and suffered; we take a *review* of any particular circumstance which is passing before us, in order to regulate our present conduct. The historian takes a *retrospect* of all the events which have happened within a given period; the journalist takes a *review* of all the events that are passing within the time in which he is living.

The *review* may be said of the past as well as the present; it is a view not only of what is, but what has been: the *survey* is entirely confined to the present; it is a view only of that which is.

We take a *review* of what we have already *viewed* in order to get a more correct insight into it; we take a *survey* of a thing in all its parts in order to get a comprehensive *view* of it, in order to examine it in all its bearings. A general occasionally takes a *review* of all his army; he takes a *survey* of the fortress which he is going to besiege or attack.

TO REVERT, RETURN.

REVERT is the Latin, and RETURN the English word; the former is used however only in few cases, and the latter in general cases: they are allied to each other in the moral application to matters of discussion; a speaker *reverts* to what has already passed on a preceding day; he *returns* after a digression to the thread of his discourse; we may always *revert* to something different, though more or less connected with that which we are discussing; we always *return* to that which we have left: we turn to something by *reverting*; we continue the same thing by *returning*.

TO REVILE, VILIFY.

REVILE, from the Latin *vilis*, signifies to reflect upon a person, or retort upon him that which is vile: VILIFY, signifies to make a thing vile, that is, to set it forth as vile.

To *revile* is a personal act, it is addressed directly to the object of offence, and is addressed for the purpose of making the person vile in his own eyes: to *vilify* is an indirect attack which serves to make the object appear vile in the eyes of others. *Revile* is said only of persons; to *vilify* is said also of things.

REVISAL, REVISION, REVIEW.

REVISAL, REVISION, and REVIEW, all come from the Latin *video* to see, and signify looking back upon a thing or looking at it again; the terms *revisal* and *revision* are however mostly employed in regard to what is written; *review* is used for things in general. The *revisal* of a book is the work of the author, for the purposes of correction: the *review* of a book is the work of the critic, for the purpose of estimating its value. *Revisal* and *revision* differ neither in sense nor application, unless that the former is more frequently employed abstractedly from the object revised,

and *revision* mostly in conjunction; whoever wishes his work to be correct, will not spare a *revisal*; the *revision* of classical books ought to be intrusted only to men of profound erudition.

TO REVIVE, REFRESH, RENOVATE, RENEW.

REVIVE, from the Latin *vivo* to live, signifies to bring to life again; to REFRESH, to make fresh again; to RENEW and RENOVATE, to make new again. The restoration of things to their primitive state is the common idea included in these terms; the difference consists in their application. *Revive*, *refresh*, and *renovate*, are applied to animal bodies; *revive* expressing the return of motion and spirits to one who was for the time lifeless; *refresh* expressing the return of vigour to one in whom it has been diminished: the air *revives* one who is faint; a cool breeze *refreshes* one who flags from the heat. *Revive* and *refresh* respect only the temporary state of the body; *renovate* respects its permanent state, that is, the health of the body: one is *revived* and *refreshed* after a partial exhaustion: one's health is *renovated* after having been considerably impaired.

Revive is applied likewise in the moral sense; *refresh* and *renovate* mostly in the proper sense; *renew* only in the moral sense. A discussion is said to be *revived*, or a report to be *revived*; a clamour is said to be *renewed*, or entreaties to be *renewed*: customs are *revived* which have lain long dormant, as it were dead; practices are *renewed* that have ceased for a time.

RICHES, WEALTH, OPULENCE, AFFLUENCE.

RICHES, in German *reichthum*, from *reiche* a kingdom, comes from the Latin *rego* to rule; because *riches* and power are intimately connected.

WEALTH, from *weal*, signifies well-being.

OPULENCE, from the Latin *opes* riches, denotes the state of having riches.

AFFLUENCE, from the Latin *ad* and *fluo*, denotes either the act of riches flowing in to a person, or the state of having things poured in.

Riches is a general term denoting any considerable share of property, but without immediate reference to a possessor; *wealth* denotes the prosperous condition of the possessor; *opulence* characterizes the present possession of great *riches*; *affluence* denotes the increasing *wealth* of the individual. *Riches* are a condition opposed to

poverty; the whole world is divided into rich and poor: *wealth* is that positive and substantial share in the goods of fortune which distinguishes an individual from his neighbours, *Opulence* is likewise a positively great share of *riches*, but refers rather to the external possessions, than to the condition of the man. He who has much money has great *wealth*; but he who has much land, much cattle, many houses, and the like, is properly denominated *opulent*. *Affluence* is a term peculiarly applicable to the fluctuating condition of things which flow in quantities, or flow away in equally great quantities. Hence we do not say that a man is *opulent*, but that he is *affluent* in his circumstances. *Wealth* and *opulence* are applied to individuals, or communities; *affluence* is applicable only to an individual.

The *wealth* of a nation must be procured by the industry of the inhabitants; the *opulence* of a town may arise from some local circumstance in its favour, as its favourable situation for trade and the like; he who lives in *affluence* is apt to forget the uncertain tenure by which he holds his *riches*. We speak of *riches* as to their effects upon men's minds and manners; it is not every one who knows how to use them: we speak of *wealth* as it raises a man in the scale of society; the *wealthy* merchant is an important member of the community: we speak of *opulence* as it indicates the flourishing state of the individual; an *opulent* man shows unquestionable marks of his *opulence* around him: we speak of *affluence* to characterize the abundance of the individual; we show our *affluence* by the style of our living.

RIDICULE, SATIRE, IRONY, SARCASM.

RIDICULE, *v.* To deride.

SATIRE, in Latin *satyr*, probably from *sat* and *ira* abounding in anger.

IRONY, in Greek *εἰρωνία*, signifies dissimulation.

SARCASM, from the Greek *σαρκασμος* and *σαρκίζω*: from *σαρξ* flesh, signifies biting or nipping *satire*. so as it were to tear the flesh.

Ridicule has simple laughter in it, *satire* has a mixture of ill-nature or severity: the former is employed in matters of trifling nature; but *satire* is employed either in personal or grave matters: *irony* is disguised *satire*; an *ironist* seems to praise that which he really means to condemn: *sarcasm* is bitter and personal *satire*; all the others may be successfully and properly employed to expose folly and vice; but *sarcasm*, which

is the indulgence only of personal resentment, is never justifiable.

RIGHT, JUST, FIT, PROPER.

RIGHT, in German *recht*, Latin *rectus*, signifies upright, not leaning to one side or the other, standing as it ought.

JUST, in Latin *justus*, from *jus* law, signifies according to a rule of right.

FIT, *v.* *Fit*.

PROPER, in Latin *proprius*, signifies belonging to a given rule.

Right is here the general term; the other terms express modes of *right*. *Right* and wrong are defined by the written will of God, or are written in our hearts according to the original constitutions of our nature; the *just* and *unjust* are determined by the written laws of men; the *fit* and *proper* are determined by the established principles of civil society.

The *right* and wrong depend upon no circumstances; what is once *right* or wrong is always *right* or wrong; but the *just* or unjust, *proper* or improper, are relatively so according to circumstances: it is a *just* rule for every man to have that which is his own; but what is *just* to the individual may be unjust to society. It is *proper* for every man to take charge of his own concerns; but it would be improper for a man, in an unsound state of mind, to undertake such a charge.

Right is applicable to all matters, important or otherwise; *just* is employed only in matters of essential interest; *proper* is rather applicable to the minor concerns of life. As Christians, we desire to do that which is *right* in the sight of God and man; as members of civil society, we wish to be *just* in our dealings; as rational and intelligent beings, we wish to do what is *fit* and *proper* in every action, however trivial.

RIGHT, CLAIM, PRIVILEGE.

RIGHT signifies in this sense what it is *right* for one to possess, which is in fact a word of large meaning: for since the *right* and the wrong depend upon indeterminate questions, the *right* of having is equally indeterminate in some cases with every other species of *right*. A CLAIM (*v.* To ask for) is a species of *right* to have that which is in the hands of another; the *right* to ask another for it. The PRIVILEGE (*v.* Privilege) is a species of *right* peculiar to particular individuals or bodies.

Right, in its full sense, is altogether an abstract thing which is independent of human laws and regulations; *claims* and *privileges*

are altogether connected with the establishments of society.

Liberty, in the general sense, is an unalienable *right* which belongs to man as a rational and responsible agent; it is not a *claim*, for it is set above all question and all condition; nor is it a *privilege*, for it cannot be exclusively granted to one being, nor unconditionally be taken away from another.

Between *right* and power there is often as wide a distinction as between truth and falsehood; we have often a *right* to do that which we have no power to do, and the power to do that which we have no *right* to do; slaves have a *right* to the freedom which is enjoyed by creatures of the same species with themselves, but they have not the power to use this freedom as others do. We have often a *claim* to a thing which is not in our power to substantiate; and, on the other hand, *claims* are set up in cases which are totally unfounded on any *right*. *Privileges* are *rights* granted to individuals, depending either upon the will of the grantor or the circumstances of the receiver, or both; *privileges* are therefore partial *rights* transferable at the discretion of persons individually or collectively.

RIPE, MATURE.

RIPE is the English, MATURE the Latin word; the former has a universal application both proper and improper; the latter has mostly an improper application. The idea of completion in growth is simply designated by the former term; the idea of moral perfection, as far at least as it is attainable, is marked by the latter: fruit is *ripe* when it requires no more sustenance from the parent stock; a judgment is *mature* which requires no more time and knowledge to render it perfect or fitted for exercise: in the same manner a project may be said to be *ripe* for execution, or a people *ripe* for revolt; and on the contrary, reflection may be said to be *mature* to which sufficiency of time has been given, and age may be said to be *mature* which has attained the highest pitch of perfection. *Ripeness* is however not always a good quality; but *maturity* is always a perfection: the *ripeness* of some fruit diminishes the excellence of its flavour: there are other fruits which have no flavour until they come to *maturity*.

TO RISE, ISSUE, EMERGE.

To RISE, *v.* To arise.

ISSUE, *v.* To arise.

EMERGE, *v.* Emergency.

To *rise* may either refer to open or enclosed spaces; *issue* and *emerge* have both a reference to some confined body; a thing may either *rise* in a body, without a body, or out of a body; but it *issues* and *emerges* out of a body. A thing may either *rise* in a plain or wood; it *issues* out of a wood: it may either *rise* in water or out of the water; it *emerges* from the water; that which *ris*es out of a thing comes into view by becoming higher: in this manner an air balloon might *rise* out of a wood; but that which *issues* comes out in a line with the object; horsemen *issue* from a wood; that which *issues* comes from the very depths of a thing, and comes as it were out as a part of it; but that which *emerges* proceeds from the thing in which it has been, as it were, concealed. Hence in the moral application, a person is said to *rise* in life without a reference to his former condition; but the *emerges* from obscurity: colour *ris*es in the face; but words *issue* from the mouth.

TO ROT, PUTREFY, CORRUPT.

The dissolution of bodies by an internal process is implied by all these terms: but the first two are applied to natural bodies only: the last to all bodies natural and moral. ROT is the strongest of all these terms; it denotes the last stage in the progress of dissolution: PUTREFY expresses the progress towards rottenness; and CORRUPTION the commencement. After fruit has arrived at its maturity, or proper state of ripeness, it *rots*: meat which is kept too long *putrefies*: there is a tendency in all bodies to *corruption*: iron and wood *corrupt* with time; whatever is made, or done, or wished by men, is equally liable to be *corrupt*, or to grow *corrupt*.

ROUNDNESS, ROTUNDITY.

ROUNDNESS, and ROTUNDITY both come from the Latin *rotundus* and *rota* a wheel, which is the most perfectly round body which is formed: the former term is however applied to all objects in general; the latter only to solid bodies which are round in all directions: one speaks of the *roundness* of a circle, the *roundness* of the moon, the *roundness* of a tree: but the *rotundity* of a man's body which projects in a *round* form in all directions, and the *rotundity* of a full cheek, or the *rotundity* of a turnip.

ROUTE, ROAD, COURSE.

ROUTE comes in all probability from *rotundus* round, signifying the round which one goes.

ROAD comes no doubt from *ride*, signi-

fyng the place where one rides, as *COURSE*, from the Latin *cursus* (v. *Course*), signifies the place where one walks or runs.

Route is to *road* as the species to the genus: a *route* is a circular kind of *road*; it is chosen as the circuitous direction towards a certain point: the *road* may be either in a direct or indirect line; the *route* is always indirect: the *route* and *road* are pursued in their beaten track; the *course* is often chosen in the unbeaten track: an army or a company go a certain *route*; foot passengers are seen to take a certain *course* over fields.

ROYAL, REGAL, KINGLY.

ROYAL and REGAL, from the Latin *rex* a king, though of foreign origin, have obtained more general application than the corresponding English term KINGLY. *Royal* signifies belonging to a king, in its most general sense; *regal*, in Latin *regalis*, signifies appertaining to a king, in its particular application; *kingly* signifies properly like a king. A *royal* carriage, a *royal* residence, *royal* salute, *royal* authority, all designate the general and ordinary appurtenances to a king: *regal* government, *regal* state, *regal* power, *regal* dignity, denote the peculiar properties of a king: *kingly* always implies what is becoming a king, or after the manner of a king; a *kingly* crown is such as a king ought to wear; a *kingly* mien, that which is after the manner of a king.

TO RUB, CHAFE, FRET, GALL.

To RUB, through the medium of the northern languages, comes from the Hebrew *rup*; it is the generic term, expressing simply the act of moving bodies when in contact with each other; to CHAFE, from the French *chauffer*, and the Latin *calfacere* to make hot, signifies to rub a thing until it is heated: to FRET, like the word *fritter*, comes from the Latin *frico* to rub or crumble, signifying to wear away by rubbing: to GALL, from the noun *gall*, signifies to make as bitter or painful as *gall*, that is, to wound by rubbing. Things are rubbed sometimes for purposes of convenience; but they are chafed, fretted, and galled, injuriously: the skin is liable to chafe from any violence; leather will fret from the motion of a carriage; when the skin is once broken, animals will become galled by a continuance of the friction. These terms are likewise used in the moral sense, to denote the action of things on the mind, where the distinction is clearly kept up; we meet with rubs from the op-

posing sentiments of others: the angry humours are chafed; the mind is fretted and made sore by the frequent repetition of small troubles and vexations; pride is galled by humiliations and severe degradations.

RUPTURE, FRACTURE, FRACTION.

RUPTURE, from *rumpo* to break or burst, and FRACTURE or FRACTION, from *frango* to break, denote different kinds of breaking, according to the objects to which the action is applied. Soft substances may suffer a rupture; as the rupture of a blood-vessel: hard substances a fracture; as the fracture of a bone. Rupture and fraction, though not fracture, are used in an improper application; as the rupture of a treaty, or the fraction of a unit into parts.

RURAL, RUSTIC.

Although both these terms, from the Latin *rus* country, signify belonging to the country; yet the former is used in a good, and the latter in an indifferent or a bad sense. RURAL applies to all country objects, except man; it is, therefore, always connected with the charms of nature: RUSTIC applies only to persons, or what is personal, in the country, and is, therefore, always associated with the want of culture. Rural scenery is always interesting; but the rustic manners of the peasants have frequently too much that is uncultivated and rude in them to be agreeable: a rural habitation may be fitted for persons in a higher station; but a rustic cottage is adapted for the poorer inhabitants of the country.

S.

SAFE, SECURE.

SAFE, in Latin *salvus*, comes from the Hebrew *salah*, to be tranquil.

SECURE, v. *Certain*.

Safety implies exemption from harm, or the danger of harm; *secure*, the exemption from danger; a person may be safe or saved in the midst of a fire, if he be untouched by the fire, but he is, in such a case, the reverse of secure. In the sense of exemption from danger, *safety* expresses much less than *security*; we may be safe without using any particular measures; but none can reckon on any degree of security without great precaution; a person may be very safe on the top of a coach, in the day time, but if he wish to secure himself, at night, from falling off, he must be fastened.

SAGE, SAGACIOUS, SAPIENT.

SAGE and SAGACIOUS are variations from the Latin *sagax* and *sagio*, probably from the Persian *sag* a dog, sagacity being the peculiar property of a dog.

SAPIENT is in Latin *sapiens*, from *sapio*, which is either from the Greek σοφος wise, or in the sense of tasting, from the Hebrew *sephah* the lip.

The first of these terms has a good sense in application to men, to denote the faculty of discerning immediately, which is the fruit of experience, and very similar to that *sagacity* in brutes which instinctively perceives the truth of a thing without the deductions of reason; *sapient*, which has very different meanings in the original, is now employed only in regard to animals which are trained up to particular arts; its use is therefore mostly burlesque.

SAKE, ACCOUNT, REASON, PURPOSE, END.

These terms, all employed adverbially, modify or connect propositions: hence, one says, for his SAKE, on his ACCOUNT, for this PURPOSE, and to this END.

Sake, which comes from the word to seek, is mostly said of persons; what is done for a person's *sake* is the same as because of his seeking or at his desire; one may, however, say in regard to things, for the *sake* of good order, implying what good order requires: *account* is indifferently employed for persons or things; what is done on a person's *account* is done in his behalf, and for his interest; what is done on *account* of indisposition is done in consequence of it, the indisposition being the cause: *reason*, *purpose*, and *end*, are applied to things only: we speak of the *reason* as the thing that justifies: we explain why we do a thing when we say we do it for this or that *reason*: we speak of the *purpose* and the *end* by way of explaining the nature of the thing: the propriety of measures cannot be known unless we know the *purpose* for which they were done; nor will a prudent person be satisfied to follow any course, unless he knows to what *end* it will lead.

SALUTE, SALUTATION, GREETING.

SALUTE, and SALUTATION, from the Latin *salus*, signifies literally wishing health to a person.

GREETING, comes from the German *grüssen* to kiss or salute.

Salute respects the thing, and *salutation* the person giving the *salute*: a *salute* may consist either of a word or an action; *salutations* pass from one friend to another:

the *salute* may be either direct or indirect; the *salutation* is always direct and personal: guns are fired by way of a *salute*; bows are given in the way of a *salutation*; *greeting* is a familiar kind of *salutation*, which may be given verbally or in writing.

SANGUINARY, BLOODY, BLOOD-THIRSTY.

SANGUINARY, from *sanguis*, is employed both in the sense of BLOODY, or having *blood*, and BLOOD-THIRSTY, or the thirsting after *blood*. *Sanguinary* in the first case, relates only to *blood* shed, as a *sanguinary* engagement, or a *sanguinary* conflict; *bloody* is used in the familiar application, to denote the simple presence of *blood*, as a *bloody* coat, or a *bloody* sword.

In the second case, *sanguinary* is employed to characterize the tempers of persons only; *blood-thirsty* to characterize the tempers of persons or animals: the French revolution has given us many specimens how *sanguinary* men may become who are abandoned to their own furious passions; tigers are by nature the most *blood-thirsty* of all creatures.

SAP, UNDERMINE.

SAP signifies the juice which springs from the root of a tree; hence to *sap* signifies to come at the root of any thing by digging: to UNDERMINE signifies to form a mine under the ground, or under whatever is upon the ground: we may *sap*, therefore, without *undermining*; and *undermine* without *sapping*: we may *sap* the foundation of a house without making any mine underneath; and in fortifications we may *undermine* either a mound, a ditch, or a wall, without striking immediately at the foundation: hence, in the moral application, to *sap* is a more direct and decisive mode of destruction; to *undermine* is a gradual, and may be a partial action. Infidelity *saps* the morals of a nation; courtiers *undermine* one another's interests at court.

TO SATISFY, PLEASE, GRATIFY.

To SATISFY (v. *Contentment*) is rather to produce pleasure indirectly; to PLEASE (v. *Agreeable*) is to produce it directly: the former is negative, the latter positive: as every desire is accompanied with more or less pain, *satisfaction*, which is the removal of desire, is itself to a certain extent pleasure; but what *satisfies* is not always calculated to *please*; nor is that which *pleases*, that which will always *satisfy*.

Plain food satisfies a hungry person, but does not *please* him when he is not hungry; *social* enjoyments *please*, but they are very far from *satisfying* those who do not restrict their indulgencies. To GRATIFY is to *please* in a high degree, to produce a vivid pleasure: we may be *pleased* with trifles: but we are commonly *gratified* with such things as act strongly either on the senses or the affections: an epicure is *gratified* with those delicacies which suit his taste; an amateur in music will be *gratified* with hearing a piece of Handel's composition finely performed.

TO SATISFY, SATIATE, GLUT, CLOY.

To SATISFY is to take enough: SATIATE is a frequentative, formed from *satis* enough, signifying to have more than enough.

GLUT, in Latin *glutio*, from *gula* the throat, signifies to take down the throat. *Satisfaction* brings pleasure; *satiety* is attended with disgust; *glutting* is an act of intemperance: CLOYING is the consequence of *glutting*. Every healthy person *satisfies* himself with a regular portion of food; children, if unrestrained, seek to *sate* their appetites, and *cloy* themselves by their excesses; brutes, or men debased into brutes, *glut* themselves with that which is agreeable to their appetites.

The first three terms are employed in a moral application; the last only in a natural or proper sense: we *satisfy* desires in general, or any particular desire; we *sate* the appetite for pleasure; one *gluts* the eyes or the ears by any thing that is horrid or painful.

TO SAVE, SPARE, PRESERVE, PROTECT.

To SAVE is to make safe (*v. Safe*).

SPARE, in German *sparen* comes from the Latin *parco*, and the Hebrew *parek* to free.

PRESERVE, compounded of *prae* and *servo* to keep, signifies to keep off.

PROTECT, *v. To defend*.

The idea of keeping free from evil is the common idea of all these terms, and the peculiar signification of the term *save*; they differ either in the nature of the evil kept off, or the circumstances of the agent: we may be *saved* from every kind of evil; but we are *spared* only from those which it is in the power of another to inflict; we may be *saved* from falling, or *saved* from an illness; a criminal is *spared* from punishment, or we may be *spared* by Divine Providence in the midst of some calamity: we may be *saved* and *spared* from any evils, great or small; we are *preserved* and *protected* only

from evils of magnitude: we may be *saved* either from the inclemency of the weather, or the vicissitudes of life; we may be *spared* the pain of a disagreeable meeting, or we may be *spared* our lives; we are *preserved* from ruin or *protected* from oppression. To *save* and *spare* apply to evils that are actual and temporary; *preserve* and *protect* to those which are possible or permanent: we may be *saved* from drowning, or we may *save* a thing instead of throwing it away; or a person may be *spared* from the sentence of the law; but we are *preserved* from the inclemency of the weather, or we *preserve* with care that which is liable to injury, or we are *protected* from the attacks of robbers.

To *save* may be the effect of accident or design; to *spare* is always the effect of some design or connexion; to *preserve* and *protect* are the effect of a special exertion of power; the latter in a still higher degree than the former: we may be *preserved*, by ordinary means, from the evils of human life; but we are *protected* by Divine Providence, from the assaults of those who aim at doing us mischief.

SCARCITY, DEARTH.

SCARCITY (*v. Rare*) is a generic term to denote the circumstance of a thing being *scarce*.

DEARTH, which is the same as dearthness, is a mode of *scarcity* applied in the literal sense to provisions mostly, as provisions are mostly dear when they are *scarce*; the word *dearth* therefore denotes *scarcity* in a high degree; whatever men want, and find it difficult to procure, they complain of its *scarcity*; when a country has the misfortune to be visited with a famine, it experiences the frightfullest of all *dearths*.

SCHOLAR, PUPIL, DISCIPLE.

SCHOLAR and DISCIPLE are both applied to such as learn from others: the former is said only of those who learn the rudiments of knowledge; the latter of one who acquires any art or science from the instruction of another: PUPIL conveys also the idea of wardship as well as of instruction: the *scholar* is opposed to the teacher; the *pupil* to the guardian; the *disciple* to the master: children are *scholars* or *pupils*; adult persons may be *disciples*.

Scholars chiefly employ themselves in the study of words; *disciples*, as the *disciples* of our Saviour, in the study of things: we are the *scholars* or *pupils* of any one under whose care we are placed, or from whom we learn any thing; we are the *disciples*

only of distinguished persons, or such as communicate useful knowledge.

SCHOOL, ACADEMY.

The Latin term *schola* signifies a loitering-place, a place for desultory conversation or instruction, from the Greek *σχολη* leisure; hence it has been extended to any place where instruction is given, particularly that which is communicated to youth, which being an easy task to one who is familiar with this subject is considered as a relaxation rather than a labour.

ACADEMY derives its name from the Greek *ακαδημία* the name of a public place in Athens, where the philosopher Plato first gave his lectures, which afterwards became a place of resort for learned men; hence societies of learned men have since been termed *academies*.

The leading idea in the word SCHOOL is that of instruction given and doctrine received; in the word *academy* is that of association among those who have already learned: hence we speak in the literal sense of the *school* where young persons meet to be taught, or in the extended and moral sense of the old and new *school*, the Pythagorean *school*, the philosophical *school*, and the like; but the *academy* of arts or sciences, the French *academy*, being members of any *academy*, and the like.

TO SCOFF, GIBE, JEER, SNEER.

SCOFF comes from the Greek *οκωπτω* to deride.

GIBE and JEER are connected with the word gabble or jabber, denoting an unseemly mode of speech.

SNEER is connected with sneeze and nose, the member by which *sneering* is performed.

Scoffing is a general term for expressing contempt; we may *scoff* either by *gibes*, *jeers*, or *sneers*; or we may *scoff* by opprobrious language and contemptuous looks; the *gibe* and *jeer* consist of words: the former has most of ill-nature and reproach in it; the latter has more of ridicule or satire in it; they are both, however, applied to the actions of vulgar people, who practise their coarse jokes on each other. *Scoff* and *sneer* are directed either to persons or things, as the object; *gibe* and *jeer* only towards persons: *scoff* is taken only in the proper sense; *sneer* derives its meaning from the literal act of *sneering*; the *scoffer* speaks lightly of that which deserves serious attention; the *sneerer* speaks either actually with a *sneer*, or as it were by implication with a *sneer*: the *scoffers* at religion set at nought all thoughts of decorum, they

openly avow the little estimation in which they hold it; the *sneerers* at religion are more sly, but not less malignant; they wish to treat religion with contempt, but not to bring themselves into the contempt they deserve.

TO SCRUPLE, HESITATE, WAVER.

SCRUPLE, *v.* *Conscientious.*

HESITATE, *v.* *To demur.*

WAVER, from the word *wave*, signifies to move backward and forward like a *wave*.

To *scruple* simply keeps us from deciding; the terms *hesitation* and *wavering* bespeak a fluctuating or variable state of the mind: we *scruple* simply from motives of doubt as to the propriety of a thing; we *hesitate* and *waver* from various motives, particularly such as affect our interests. Conscience produces *scruples*, fear produces *hesitation* irresolution, produces *wavering*: a person *scruples* to do an action which may hurt his neighbour or offend his maker; he *hesitates* to do a thing which he fears may not prove advantageous to him; he *wavers* in his mind betwixt going or staying, according as his inclinations impel him to the one or the other.

SEAL, STAMP.

SEAL is a specific; STAMP, a general term: there cannot be a *seal* without a *stamp*; but there may be many *stamps* where there is no *seal*. The *seal*, in Latin *sigillum*, signifies a signet or little sign, consisting of one's coat of arms or any device; the *stamp* is, in general, any impression whatever, which has been made by *stamping*, that is, any impression which is not easily to be effaced. In the improper sense, the *seal* is the authority; thus to set one's *seal* is the same as to authorize, and the *seal* of truth is any outward mark which characterizes it: but in the *stamp* is the impression by which we distinguish the thing; thus a thing is said to bear the *stamp* of truth, of sincerity, of veracity, and the like.

SEAMAN, WATERMAN, SAILOR, MARINER.

All these words denote persons occupied in navigation; the SEAMAN, as the word implies, follows his business on the sea; the WATERMAN is one who gets his livelihood on fresh water; the SAILOR and the MARINER are both specific terms to designate the *seaman*: every *sailor* and *mariner* is a *seaman*; although every *seaman* is not a *sailor* or *mariner*: the former is one who is employed about the la-

borious part of the vessel; the latter is one who traverses the ocean to and fro, who is attached to the water, and passes his life upon it.

Men of all ranks are denominated *seamen*, whether officers or men, whether in a merchantman or a king's ship: *sailor* is only used for the common men, or, in the sea phrase, for those before the mast, particularly in vessels of war; hence our *sailors* and soldiers are spoken of as the defenders of our country; a *mariner* is an independent kind of *seaman* who manages his own vessel, and goes on an expedition on his own account; fishermen, and those who trade along the coast, are in a particular manner distinguished by the name of *mariners*.

TO SECOND, SUPPORT.

To **SECOND** is to give the assistance of a *second* person; to **SUPPORT** is to bear upon one's own shoulders. To *second* does not express so much as to *support*: we *second* only by our presence, or our word; but we *support* by our influence, and all the means that are in our power: we *second* a motion by a simple declaration of our assent to it; we *support* a motion by the force of persuasion; so likewise we are said always to *second* a person's views when we give him openly our countenance by declaring our approbation of his measures; and we are said to *support* him when we give the assistance of our purse, our influence, or any thing essential for the attainment of an end.

SECOND, SECONDARY, INFERIOR.

SECOND and **SECONDARY** both come from the Latin *secundus*, changed from *sequundus* and *sequor* to follow, signifying the order of succession: the former simply expresses this order; but the latter includes the accessory idea of comparative demerit: a person stands *second* in a list, or a letter is *second* which immediately succeeds the first; a consideration is *secondary*, or of *secondary* importance, which is opposed to that which holds the first rank.

Secondary and **INFERIOR** both designate some lower degree of a quality: but *secondary* is only applied to the importance or value of things; *inferior* is applied generally to all qualities: a man of business reckons every thing as *secondary* which does not forward the object he has in view; men of *inferior* abilities are disqualified by nature for high and important stations, although they may be more fitted for lower stations than those of greater abilities.

Second, is taken improperly in the sense

of inferior; we say of a person he is *second* to none in talent.

SECRET, HIDDEN, LATENT, OCCULT, MYSTERIOUS.

SECRET (*v. Clandestine*) signifies known to one's self only.

HIDDEN, *v. To conceal*.

LATENT, in Latin *latens*, from *lateo* to lie hid, signifies the same as hidden.

OCCULT, in Latin *occultus*, participle of *occulo*, compounded of *oc* or *ob* and *culo* or *colo* to cover over by tilling or ploughing, that is, to cover over with the earth.

MYSTERIOUS, *v. Dark*.

What is *secret* may be known to some one; what is *hidden* may be known to no one: it rests in the breast of an individual to keep a thing *secret*; it depends on the course of things if any thing remains *hidden*: every man has more or less of that which he wishes to keep *secret*; the talent of many lies *hidden* for want of opportunity to bring it into exercise; as many treasures lie *hidden* in the earth for want of being discovered and brought to light. A *secret* concerns only the individual or individuals who hold it; but that which is *hidden* may concern all the world: sometimes the success of a transaction depends upon its being kept *secret*; the stores of knowledge which remain *hidden* may be much greater than those which have been laid open.

The latent is what is *secret* or concealed in cases where it ought to be open: a *latent* motive is that which a person intentionally, though not justifiably, keeps to himself: the *latent* cause for any proceeding is that which is not revealed.

Occult and *mysterious* are species of the *hidden*: the former respects that which has a veil naturally thrown over it; the latter respects that mostly which is covered with a supernatural veil: an *occult* science is one that is *hidden* from the view of persons in general; *occult* causes or qualities are those which lie too remote to be discovered by the inquirer: the operations of Providence are said to be *mysterious*, as they are altogether past our finding out; many points of doctrine in our religion are equally *mysterious*, as connected with and dependent upon the attributes of the Deity.

Mysterious is sometimes applied to human transactions in the sense of throwing a veil intentionally over any thing, in which sense it is nearly allied to the word *secret*, with this distinction, that what is *secret* is often not known to be *secret*; but that which is *mysterious* is so only in the eyes of others. Things are sometimes conducted with such

secrecy that no one suspects what is passing until it is seen by its effects; an air of *mystery* is sometimes thrown over that which is in reality nothing when seen: hence *secrecy* is always taken in a good sense, since it is so great an essential in the transactions of men; but *mystery* is often employed in a bad sense; either for the affected concealment of that which is insignificant, or the purposed concealment of that which is bad: an expedition is said to be *secret*, but not *mysterious*; on the other hand, the disappearance of a person may be *mysterious*, but is not said to be *secret*.

SECULAR, TEMPORAL, WORLDLY.

SECULAR, in Latin *secularis*, from *seculum* an age or division of time, signifies belonging to time or this life.

TEMPORAL, in Latin *temporalis*, from *tempus* time, signifies lasting only for a time.

WORLDLY signifies after the manner of the world.

Secular is opposed to ecclesiastical, *temporal* and *worldly* are opposed to spiritual or eternal.

The idea of the *world*, or the outward objects and pursuits of the *world*, in distinction from that which is set above the *world*, is implied in common by all the terms; but *secular* is an indifferent term, applicable to the allowed pursuits and concerns of men; *temporal* is used either in an indifferent or a bad sense; and *worldly* mostly in a bad sense; as contrasted with things of more value.

The office of a clergyman is ecclesiastical, but that of a schoolmaster is *secular*; the upper house of parliament consists of lords spiritual and *temporal*; *worldly* interest has a more powerful sway upon the minds of the great bulk of mankind than their spiritual interests: whoever enters into the holy office of the ministry with merely *secular* views of preferment, chooses a very unfit source of emolument; a too eager pursuit after *temporal* advantages and *temporal* pleasures is apt to draw the mind away from its regard to those which are eternal; *worldly* applause will weigh very light against the reproaches of one's own conscience.

SEDULOUS, DILIGENT, ASSIDUOUS.

SEDULOUS, from the Latin *sedulus*, and *sedeo*, signifies sitting close to a thing.

DILIGENT, *v. Active, diligent.*

ASSIDUOUS, *v. Active. diligent.*

The idea of application is expressed by both these epithets, but *sedulous* is a particular, *diligent* is a general term: one is *sedulous* by habit; one is *diligent* either

habitually or occasionally: a *sedulous* scholar pursues his studies with a regular and close application; a scholar may be *diligent* at a certain period, though not invariably so. *Sedulity* seems to mark the very essential property of application, that is, adhering closely to an object; but *diligence* expresses one's attachment to a thing, as evinced by an eager pursuit of it: the former, therefore, bespeaks the steadiness of the character; the latter merely the turn of one's inclination: one is *sedulous* from a conviction of the importance of the thing: one may be *diligent* by fits and starts, according to the humour of the moment.

Assiduous and *sedulous* both express the quality of sitting or sticking close to a thing, but the former may, like *diligent*, be employed on a partial occasion; the latter is always permanent: we may be *assiduous* in our attentions to a person; but we are *sedulous* in the important concerns of life.

Sedulous peculiarly respects the quiet employments of life; a teacher may be entitled *sedulous*: *diligent*, respects active employments; one is *diligent* at work: *assiduity* holds a middle rank; it may be employed equally for that which requires active exertion, or otherwise: we may be *assiduous* in the pursuits of literature, or we may be *assiduous* in our attendance upon a person, or the performance of any office.

TO SEE, PERCEIVE, OBSERVE.

SEE, in the German *sehen*, Greek *θεωρεω*, Hebrew *sacah* or *soah*, is a general term; it may be either a voluntary or involuntary action: **PERCEIVE**, from the Latin *percipio* or *per* and *cipio* to take into the mind, is always a voluntary action; and **OBSERVE** (*v. To notice*) is an intentional action. The eye *sees* when the mind is absent; the mind and the eye *perceive* in conjunction: hence, we may say that a person *sees*, but does not *perceive*: we *observe* not merely by a simple act of the mind, but by its positive and fixed exertion. We *see* a thing without knowing what it is; we *perceive* a thing, and know what it is; but the impression passes away; we *observe* a thing, and afterwards retrace the image of it in our mind. We *see* a star when the eye is directed towards it; we *perceive* it move if we look at it attentively; we *observe* its position in different parts of the heavens. The blind cannot *see*, the absent cannot *perceive*, the dull cannot *observe*.

Seeing, as a corporeal action, is the act only of the eye; *perceiving* and *observing* are actions in which all the senses are concerned. We *see* colours, *perceive* the state

of the atmosphere, and *observe* its changes. *Seeing* sometimes extends farther in its application to the mind's operations, in which it has an indefinite sense; but *perceive* and *observe* have both a definite sense: we may *see* a thing distinctly and clearly; or otherwise; we *perceive* it always with a certain degree of distinctness; and *observe* it with a positive degree of minuteness: we *see* the truth of a remark; we *perceive* the force of an objection; we *observe* the reluctance of a person.

See is either employed as a corporeal or incorporeal action; *perceive* and *observe* are obviously a junction of the corporeal and incorporeal. We *see* the light with our eyes, or we *see* the truth of a proposition with our mind's eye; but we *perceive* the difference of climate, or we *perceive* the difference in the comfort of our situation; we *observe* the motions of the heavenly bodies.

TO SEEM, APPEAR.

The idea of coming to the view is expressed by both these terms; but the word SEEM rises upon that of APPEAR. *Seem*, from the Latin *similis* like, signifies literally to *appear* like, and is therefore a species of *appearance*, which from the Latin *appareo* or *pareo*, and the Greek *παρειμι* to be present, signifies to be present, or before the eye. To *seem* requires some reflection and comparison of objects in the mind one with another; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to matters that may be different from what they *appear*, or of an indeterminate kind: that the sun *seems* to move, is a conclusion which we draw from the exercise of our senses, and by comparing this case with others of a similar nature; it is only by a farther research into the operations of nature that we discover this to be no conclusive proof of its motion. To *appear*, on the contrary, is the express act of the things themselves on us; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to such objects as make an impression on us: to *appear* is the same as to present itself: the stars *appear* in the firmament, but we do not say that they *seem*; the sun *appears* dark through the clouds.

They are equally applicable to moral as well as natural objects with the above mentioned distinction. *Seem* is said of that which is dubious, contingent, or future; *appear*, of that which is actual, positive, and past. A thing *seems* strange which we are led to conclude as strange from what we see of it; a thing *appears* clear when we have a clear conception of it: a plan *seems* practicable or impracticable; an author *appears* to understand his subject or the contrary. It *seems*

as if all effort to reform the bulk of mankind will be found inefficient; it *appears* from the long catalogue of vices which are still prevalent, that little progress has hitherto been made in the work of reformation.

SELF-WILL, SELF-CONCEIT, SELF-SUFFICIENT.

SELF-WILL signifies the *will* in one's self: SELF-CONCEIT, *conceit* of one's self: SELF-SUFFICIENCY, *sufficiency* in one's self. As characteristics they come very near to each other, but *self-will* is that depravity of the will which refuses to submit to every control; it is born with a person, and is among the earliest indications of character; *self-conceit* is a vicious habit of the mind which is superinduced on the original character; it is that which determines in matters of judgment: a *self-willed* person thinks nothing of right or wrong; whatever the impulse of the moment suggests, is the motive to action: the *self-conceited* person is always much concerned about right and wrong, but it is only that which he conceives to be right and wrong: *self-sufficiency* is a species of *self-conceit* applied to action: as a *self-conceited* person thinks of no opinion but his own; a *self-sufficient* person refuses the assistance of every one in whatever he is called upon to do.

SENIOR, ELDER, OLDER.

These are all comparatives expressive of the same quality, and differ therefore less in sense than in application.

SENIOR is employed not only in regard to the extent of age, but also to duration either in office or any given situation: ELDER is employed only in regard to age: an officer in the army is a *senior* by virtue of having served longer than another; a boy is a *senior* in a school either by virtue of his age, his standing in the school, or his situation in the class: when therefore, age alone is to be expressed, *elder* is more suitable than *senior*; the *elder* children or the *elder* branches of a family are clearly understood to include those who have priority of age.

Senior and *elder* are both employed as substantives; OLDER only as an adjective: hence we speak of the *seniors* in a school, or the *elders* in an assembly; but an *older* inhabitant, an *older* family.

Elder has only a partial use; *older* is employed in general cases: in speaking of children in the same family we may say, the *elder* son is heir to the estate; he is *older* than his brother by ten years.

SENSE, JUDGMENT.

SENSE (*v. Feeling*) signifies in general the faculty of feeling corporeally or perceiving mentally; in the latter case it is synonymous with JUDGMENT, which is a special operation of the mind. *The *sense* is that primitive portion of the understanding which renders an account of things; and the *judgment* that portion of the reason which selects or rejects from this account. The *sense* is, so to speak, the reporter which collects the details, and exposes the facts; the *judgment* is the *judge* that passes sentence upon them. According to the strict import of the terms, the *judgment* depends upon the *sense*, and varies with it in degree. He who has no *sense* has no *judgment*; and he who loses *sense* loses *judgment*: since *sense* supplies the knowledge of things, and *judgment* pronounces upon them, it is evident that there must be *sense* before there can be *judgment*.

On the other hand, *sense* may be so distinguished from *judgment*, that there may be *sense* without *judgment*, and *judgment* without *sense*: *sense* is the faculty of perceiving in general; it is applied to abstract science as well as general knowledge: *judgment* is the faculty of determining, that is, of determining mostly in matters of practice. It is the lot of many, therefore, to have *sense* in matters of theory, who have no *judgment* in matters of practice; whilst others, on the contrary, who have nothing above common *sense* will have a soundness of *judgment* that is not to be surpassed.

Nay, farther, it is possible for a man to have good *sense*, and yet not a solid *judgment*: as they are both natural faculties, men are gifted with them as variously as with every other faculty. By good *sense* a man is enabled to discern, as it were intuitively, that which requires another of less *sense* to ponder over and study; by a solid *judgment* a man is enabled to avoid those errors in conduct which one of a weak *judgment* is always falling into.

There is, however, this distinction between *sense* and *judgment*, that the deficiencies of the former may be supplied by diligence and attention; but a defect in the latter is to be supplied by no efforts of one's own. A man may improve his *sense* in proportion as he has the means of information; when the *judgment* has once been matured by age, it remains unimproveable by time or circumstance.

When employed as epithets, the terms *sensible* and *judicious* serve still more clearly

to distinguish the two primitives. A writer or a speaker is said to be *sensible*; a friend or an adviser is said to be *judicious*. *Sense* displays itself in the conversation or the communication of one's ideas; *judgment* in the propriety of one's actions. A *sensible* man may be an entertaining companion, but a *judicious* man in any post of command is an inestimable treasure. *Sensible* remarks are always calculated to please; *judicious* measures are always indispensable.

SENSIBLE. SENSITIVE, SENTIENT.

All these epithets, which are derived from the same source (*v. To feel*), have obviously a great sameness of meaning, though not of application. SENSIBLE and SENSITIVE both denote the capacity of being moved to feeling: SENTIENT implies the very act of feeling. *Sensible* expresses either a habit of the body and mind, or only a particular state referring to some particular object: a person may be *sensible* of things in general, or *sensible* of cold, *sensible* of injuries, *sensible* of the kindnesses which he has received from an individual. *Sensitive* signifies always an habitual or permanent quality; it is the characteristic of objects; a *sensitive* creature implies one whose sense is by distinction quickly to be acted upon: a *sensitive* plant is a peculiar species of plant, marked for the property of having *sense* or being *sensible* of the touch.

Sensible and *sensitive* have always a reference to external objects; but *sentient* expresses simply the possession of feeling, or the power of feeling, and excludes the idea of the cause. Hence, the terms *sensible* and *sensitive* are applied only to persons or corporeal objects: but *sentient* is likewise applicable to spirits; *sentient* beings may include angels as well as men.

SENSIBLE, PERCEPTIBLE.

These epithets are here applied not to the persons capable of being impressed, but to the objects capable of impressing: in this case SENSIBLE (*v. To feel*) applies to that which acts on the senses merely; PERCEPTIBLE (*v. To see*), to that which acts on the senses in conjunction with the mind. All corporeal objects are naturally termed *sensible*, inasmuch as they are *sensible* to the eye, the ear, the nose, the touch, and the taste; particular things are *perceptible*, inasmuch as they are to be *perceived* or recognised by the mind. Sometimes *sensible* signifies discernible by means of the senses, as when we speak of a *sensible* difference in the atmosphere, and in this case it comes nearer to the meaning of *perceptible*; but the

* Vide Roubaud: „Sens, jugement.“

latter always refers more to the operation of the mind than the former: the difference between colours is said to be scarcely *perceptible* when they approach very near to each other; so likewise the growth of a body is said not to be *perceptible* when it cannot be marked from one time to another by the difference of state.

SENSUALIST, VOLUPTUARY, EPICURE.

The SENSUALIST lives for the indulgence of his senses; the VOLUPTUARY (from *voluptas* pleasure) is devoted to his pleasures, and as far as these pleasures are the pleasures of sense, the *voluptuary* is a *sensualist*: the EPICURE from *Epicurus* is one who makes the pleasures of sense his god, and in this sense he is a *sensualist* and a *voluptuary*. In the application of these terms, however, the *sensualist* is one who is a slave to the grossest appetites; the *voluptuary* is one who studies his pleasures so as to make them the most valuable to himself; the *epicure* is a species of *voluptuary* who practises more than ordinary refinement in the choice of his pleasures.

SENTENCE, PROPOSITION, PERIOD, PHRASE.

SENTENCE, in Latin *sententia*, is but a variation of *sentiment* (v. *Opinion*).

PROPOSITION, v. *Proposal*.

PERIOD, in Latin *periodus*, Greek *περίοδος*, from *περί* about and *οδος* way, signifies the circuit or round of words, which renders the sense complete.

PHRASE, from the Greek *φράζω* to speak, signifies the words uttered.

The *sentence* consists of any words which convey sentiment: the *proposition* consists of the thing set before the mind; hence the term *sentence* has more special regard to the form of words, and the *proposition* to the matter contained: they are both used technically or otherwise: the former in grammar and rhetoric; the latter in logic. The *sentence* is simple and complex; the *proposition* is universal or particular. *Period* and *phrase*, like *sentence*, are forms of words, but they are solely so, whereas the *sentence* depends on the connexion of ideas by which it is formed: we speak of *sentences* either as to their structure or their sentiment; hence the *sentence* is either grammatical or moral: but the *period* regards only the structure; it is either well or ill turned: the term *phrase* denotes the character of the words; hence it is either vulgar or polite, idiomatic or general: the *sentence* must consist of at least two words to make sense; the *phrase* may be a single word or otherwise.

TO SENTENCE, DOOM, CONDEMN.

To SENTENCE, or pass *sentence*, is to give a final opinion or decision which is to influence the fate of an object.

CONDEMN, from *damnum* a loss, is to pass such a *sentence* as shall be to the hurt of an object.

DOOM, which is a variation from *damnum*, has the same meaning.

Sentence is the generic, the two others specific terms. *Sentence* and *condemn* are used in the juridical as well as the moral sense; *doom* is employed in the moral sense only. In the juridical sense, *sentence* is indefinite; *condemn* is definite: a criminal may be sentenced to a mild or severe punishment; he is always *condemned* to that which is severe; he is *sentenced* to imprisonment, or transportation, or death; he is *condemned* to the galleys, to transportation for life, or to death.

In the moral application they are in like manner distinguished. To *sentence* is a softer term than to *condemn*, and this is less than to *doom*. *Sentence* applies to inanimate objects; *condemn* and *doom* only to persons or that which is personal. A person is *sentenced* to pass his time in town or in the country: a thing is *sentenced* to be thrown away which is esteemed as worthless: we may be *condemned* to hear the prating of a loquacious body; we may be *doomed* to spend our lives in penury and wretchedness. *Sentence*, particularly when employed as a noun, may even be favourable to the interests of a person; *condemn* is always prejudicial, either to his interests, his comfort, or his reputation; *doom* is always destructive of his happiness, it is that which always runs most counter to the wishes of an individual. It is of importance for an author, that a critic should pronounce a favourable *sentence* on his works; immoral writers are justly *condemned* to oblivion or perpetual infamy; they are sometimes *doomed* to hear their own names pronounced with execration.

A *sentence* and *condemnation* is always the act of some person or conscious agent; *doom* is sometimes the fruit of circumstances. Tarquin the Proud was *sentenced* by the Roman people to be banished from Rome; Regulus was *condemned* to the most cruel death by the Carthaginians: many writers have been *doomed* to pass their lives in obscurity and want, whose works have acquired for them lasting honours after their death.

SENTENTIOUS, SENTIMENTAL.

SENTENTIOUS signifies having or abounding in sentences or judgments; SEN-

TIMENTAL, having *sentiment* (v. *Opinion*). Books and authors are termed *sententious*; but travellers, society, intercourse, correspondence, and the like, are characterized as *sentimental*. Moralists, whose works and conversation abound in moral *sentences* like Dr. Johnson's, are termed *sententious*; novelists and romance writers, like Mrs. Radcliffe, are properly *sentimental*. *Sententious* books always serve for improvement; *sentimental* works, unless they are of a superior order, are in general hurtful.

SENTIMENT, SENSATION, PERCEPTION.

SENTIMENT and **SENSATION** are obviously derived from the same source (v. *To feel*).

PERCEPTION, from *perceive* (v. *To see*), expresses the act of *perceiving*, or the impressions produced by *perceiving*.

The impressions which objects make upon the person are designated by all these terms; but the *sentiment* has its seat in the heart, the *sensation* is confined to the senses; and the *perception* rests in the understanding. *Sentiments* are lively, *sensations* are grateful, *perceptions* are clear.

Gratitude is a *sentiment* the most pleasing to the human mind; the *sensation* produced by the action of electricity on the frame is generally unpleasant; a nice *perception* of objects is one of the first requisites for perfection in any art. * *Sentiment* renders us alive to the happiness or misery of others as well as our own; *sensation* is purely physical; it makes us alive only to the effects of external objects on our physical organs: *perceptions* carry us into the district of science; they give us an interest in all the surrounding objects as intellectual observers. A man of spirit or courage receives marks of honour, or affronts, with very different *sentiments* from the poltroon: he who bounds his happiness by the present fleeting existence must be careful to remove every painful *sensation*: we judge of objects as complex or simple according to the number of *perceptions* which they produce in us.

TO SEPARATE, SEVER, DISJOIN, DETACH.

SEPARATE v. *To abstract*.

SEVER is but a variation of *separate*.

DISJOIN, signifies to destroy a junction.

DETACH signifies to destroy a contact.

Whatever is united or joined in any way may be *separated*, be the junction natural

or artificial; but to *sever* is a mode of *separating* natural bodies, or bodies naturally joined: we may *separate* in part or entirely; we *sever* entirely: we *separate* with or without violence; we *sever* with violence only: we may *separate* papers which have been pasted together, or fruits which have grown together; but the head is *severed* from the body, or a branch from the trunk. To *separate* may be said of things which are only remotely connected; *disjoin* is said of that which is intimately connected so as to be joined: we *separate* as convenience requires; we may *separate* in a right or a wrong manner; we mostly *disjoin* things which ought to remain joined: we *separate* syllables in order to distinguish them; but they are sometimes *disjoined* in writing by accidental erasure. To *detach* has an intermediate sense betwixt *separate* and *disjoin*, applying to bodies which are neither so loosely connected as the former, nor so closely as the latter: we *separate* things that directly meet in no point: we *disjoin* those which meet in every point; we *detach* those things which meet in one point only. To *separate* is either a corporeal or mental action; *disjoin* most commonly only a corporeal; and *detach* a mental action: we may *separate* ideas in the mind; we *disjoin* the material parts of bodies; we *detach* persons, that is, the minds of persons, from their party.

SEQUEL, CLOSE.

SEQUEL is a species of **CLOSE**; it is that which follows by way of termination; but the *close* is simply that which *closes*, or puts an end to any thing. There cannot be a *sequel* without a *close*, but there may be a *close* without a *sequel*. A story may have either a *sequel* or a *close*; when the end is detached from the beginning so as to follow, it is a *sequel*; if the beginning and end are uninterrupted, it is simply a *close*. When a work is published in distinct parts, those which follow at the end may be termed the *sequel*: if it appears all at once, the concluding pages are the *close*.

SERIES, COURSE.

SERIES, which is also *series* in Latin, comes from *sero* or *necto* to bind, and signifies order and connexion.

COURSE, in Latin *cursus*, from the word *curro*, signifies the direction in which things run one after another.

There is always a *course* where there is a *series*, but not *vice versa*. Things must have some sort of connexion with each other in order to form a *series*, but they need simply to follow in order to form a *course*;

* Abbé Girard: „Sentiment, sensation, perception.“

thus a *series* of events respects those which flow out of each other; a *course* of events, on the contrary, respects those which happen unconnectedly within a certain space: so in like manner, the numbers of a book, which serve to form a whole, are a *series*; and a number of lectures following each other at a given time are a *course*: hence, likewise the technical phrase infinite *series* in algebra.

SERVANT, DOMESTIC, MENIAL, DRUDGE.

In the term **SERVANT** is included the idea of the service performed: in the term **DOMESTIC**, from *domus* a house, is included the idea of one belonging to the house or family: in the word **MENIAL**, from *manus* the hand, is included the idea of labour; and in the term **DRUDGE**, that of *drudgery*. We hire a *servant* at a certain rate, and for a particular service; we are attached to our *domestics* according to their assiduity and attention to our wishes; we employ as a *menial*, one who is unfit for a higher employment; and a *drudge* in any labour, however hard and disagreeable.

SERVITUDE, SLAVERY, BONDAGE.

SERVITUDE expresses less than **SLAVERY**, and this less than **BONDAGE**.

Servitude, from *servio*, conveys simply the idea of performing a service, without specifying the principle upon which it is performed. Among the Romans *servus* signified a slave, because all who served were literally slaves, the power over the person being almost unlimited. The mild influence of Christianity has corrected men's notions with regard to their rights, as well as their duties, and established *servitude* on the just principle of a mutual compact, without any infraction on that most precious of all human gifts, personal liberty. *Slavery*, which marks a condition incompatible with the existence of this invaluable endowment, is a term odious to the Christian ear: it had its origin in the grossest state of society; the word being derived from the German *slave*, or *Slavonians*, a fierce and intrepid people, who made a long stand against the Romans, and, being at last defeated, were made *slaves*. *Slavery*, therefore, includes not only *servitude*, but also the odious circumstance of the entire subjection of one individual to another; a condition which deprives him of every privilege belonging to a free agent, and a rational creature; and which forcibly bends the will and affections of the one to the humour of the other, and converts a

thinking being into a mere senseless tool in the hands of its owner.

Bondage, from to *bind*, denotes the state of being *bound*, that is, *slavery* in its most aggravated form, in which, to the loss of personal liberty, is added cruel treatment; the term is seldom applied in its proper sense to any persons but Israelites in Egypt. In a figurative sense, we speak of being *slaves* to our passions, and under the *bondage* of sin, in which cases the terms preserve precisely the same distinction.

The same distinction exists between the epithets **SERVILE** and **SLAVISH**, which are employed only in the moral application. He who is *servile* has the mean character of a servant, but he is still a free agent; but he who is *slavish* is bound and fettered in every possible form.

SHADE, SHADOW.

SHADE and **SHADOW**, in German *schatten*, are in all probability connected with the word *shine*, *show*, (v. *To show*, &c.).

Both these terms express that darkness which is occasioned by the sun's rays being intercepted by any body; but *shade* simply expresses the absence of the light, and *shadow* signifies also the figure of the body which thus intercepts the light. Trees naturally produce a *shade*, by means of their branches and leaves: and wherever the image of the tree is reflected on the earth that forms its *shadow*. It is agreeable in the heat of summer to sit in the *shade*; the constancy with which the *shadow* follows the man has been proverbially adopted as a simile for one who clings close to another. The distinction between these terms, in the moral sense, is precisely the same; a person is said to be in the *shade*, if he lives in obscurity or unnoticed; „the law (says St. Paul) is a *shadow* of things to come.“

TO SHAKE, TREMBLE, SHUDDER, QUIVER, QUAKE.

SHAKE, **SHUDDER**, **QUIVER**, and **QUAKE**, all come from the Latin *quatio* or *cutio* to shake, through the medium of the German *schutteln*, *schutten*, the Italian *scuotere*, and the like.

TREMBLE comes from the Latin *tremo*. To *shake* is a generic term, the rest are but modes of *shaking*: to *tremble* is to *shake* from an inward cause, or what appears to be so: in this manner a person *trembles* from fear, from cold, or weakness; and a leaf which is imperceptibly agitated by the air is also said to *tremble*: to *shudder* is to *tremble* violently: *quiver* and to *quake* are both to *tremble* quickly; but the former de-

notes rather a vibratory motion, as the point of a spear when thrown against wood; the latter a quick motion of the whole body, as in the case of bodies that have not sufficient consistency in themselves to remain still.

TO SHAKE, AGITATE, TOSS.

SHAKE, *v.* To shake.

AGITATE, in Latin *agito*, is a frequentative of *ago* to drive, that is, to drive different ways.

TOSS is probably contracted from *torsi*, perfect of *torqueo*, to whirl.

A motion more or less violent is signified by all these terms, which differ both in the manner and the cause of the motion. *Shake* is indefinite, it may differ in degree as to the violence; to *agitate* and *toss* rise in sense upon the word *shake*: a breeze *shakes* a leaf, a storm *agitates* the sea, and the waves *toss* a vessel to and fro: large and small bodies may be *shaken*; large bodies are *agitated*: a handkerchief may be *shaken*; the earth is *agitated* by an earthquake. What is *shaken* and *agitated* is not removed from its place; but what is *tossed* is thrown from place to place. A house may frequently be *shaken* while the foundation remains good; the waters are most *agitated* while they remain within their bounds; but a ball is *tossed* from hand to hand.

To *shake* and *toss* are the acts either of persons or things; to *agitate* is the act of things when taken in the active sense. A person *shakes* the hand of another, or the motion of a carriage *shakes* persons in general, and *agitates* those who are weak in frame: a child *tosses* his playthings about, or the violent motion of a vessel *tosses* every thing about which is in it. To *shake* arises from external or internal causes; we may be *shaken* by others, or *shake* ourselves from cold: to *agitate* and *toss* arise always from some external action, direct or indirect; the body may be *agitated* by violent concussion from without, or from the action of perturbed feelings; the body may be *tossed* by various circumstances, and the mind may be *tossed* to and fro by the violent action of the passions. Hence the propriety of using the terms in the moral application. The resolution is *shaken*, as the tree is by the wind; the mind is *agitated* like troubled waters; a person is *tossed* to and fro in the ocean of life, as the vessel is *tossed* by the waves.

SHARP, ACUTE, KEEN.

SHARP, in German, &c. *scharp*, comes from *scheren* to cut.

ACUTE, *v.* *Acute*.

KEEN, *v.* *Acute*.

The general property expressed by these epithets is that of *sharpness* or an ability to cut. The term *sharp* is generic and indefinite; the two others are modes of *sharpness* differing in the circumstance or the degree: the *acute* is not only more than *sharp* in the common sense, but signifies also *sharp* pointed: a knife may be *sharp*; but a needle is properly *acute*. Things are *sharp* that have either a long or a pointed edge; but the *keen* is applicable only to the long edge; and that in the highest degree of *sharpness*: a common knife may be *sharp*; but a razor or a lancet are properly said to be *keen*. These terms preserve the same distinction in their figurative use. Every pain is *sharp* which may resemble that which is produced by cutting; it is *acute* when it resembles that produced by piercing deep: words are said to be *sharp* which have any power in them to wound; they are *keen* when they cut deep and wide.

TO SHINE, GLITTER, GLARE, SPARKLE, RADIATE.

SHINE, in Saxon *schinean*, German *scheinen*, is in all probability connected with the word *show*, see, &c.

GLITTER and GLARE are variations from the German *gleissen*, *glänzen*, &c. which have a similar meaning.

To SPARKLE signifies to produce sparks, and *spark* is in Saxon *spearce*, low German and Dutch *spark*.

To RADIATE, from the Latin *radius* a ray, is to produce rays.

The emission of light is the common idea conveyed by these terms. To *shine* expresses simply this general idea: *glitter* and the other verbs include some collateral ideas in their signification.

To *shine* is a steady emission of light; to *glitter* is an unsteady emission of light, occasioned by the reflection on transparent or bright bodies: the sun and moon *shine* whenever they make their appearance; but a set of diamonds *glitter* by the irregular reflection of the light on them; or the brazen spire of a steeple *glitters* when the sun in the morning *shines* upon it.

Shine specifies no degree of light, it may be barely sufficient to render itself visible, or it may be a very strong degree of light: *glare* on the contrary denotes the highest possible degree of light; the sun frequently *glares* when it *shines* only at intervals.

To *shine* is to emit light in a full stream; but to *sparkle* is to emit it in small portions; and to *radiate* is to emit it in long lines. The fire *sparkles* in the burning of wood;

or the light of the sun *sparkles* when it strikes on knobs or small points: the sun *radiates* when it seems to emit its light in rays.

SHOCK, CONCUSSION.

SHOCK denotes a violent *shake* or agitation; CONCUSSION, a shaking together. The *shock* is often instantaneous, but does not necessarily extend beyond the act of the moment; the *concussion* is permanent in its consequences, it tends to derange the system. Hence the different application of the terms: the *shock* may affect either the body or the mind; the *concussion* affects properly only the body, or corporeal objects: a violent and sudden blow produces a *shock* at the moment it is given; but it does not always produce a *concussion*: the violence of a fall, will, however, sometimes produce a *concussion* in the brain, which in future affects the intellect.

TO SHOOT, DART.

To SHOOT and DART, in the proper sense, are clearly distinguished from each other, as expressing different modes of sending bodies to a distance from a given point. From the circumstances of the actions arise their different application to other objects in the improper sense; as that which proceeds by *shooting* goes forth from a body unexpectedly, and with great rapidity; so, in the figurative sense, a plant *shoots* up that comes so unexpectedly as not to be seen; a star is said to *shoot* in the sky, which seems to move in a *shooting* manner, from one place to another: *dart*, on the other hand, or that which is *darted*, moves through the air visibly, and with less rapidity: hence the quick movements of persons or animals are described by the word *dart*; a soldier *darts* forward to meet his antagonist, a hare *darts* past any one in order to make her escape.

SHORT, BRIEF, CONCISE, SUCCINCT, SUMMARY.

SHORT, in French *court*, German *kurz*, Latin *curtus*, Greek *κυρτος*.

BRIEF, in Latin *brevis*, in Greek *βραχυς*.

CONCISE, in Latin *concisus*, signifies cut into a small body.

SUCCINCT, in Latin *succinctus*, participle of *succingo*, to tuck up, signifies brought within a small compass.

SUMMARY, v. *Abridgment*.

Short is the generic, the rest are specific terms: every thing which admits of dimensions may be short, as opposed to the long, that is, either naturally or artificially the rest are species of artificial shortness, or

that which is the work of art: hence it is that material, as well as spiritual, objects may be termed *short*; but the *brief*, *concise*, *succinct*, and *summary*, are intellectual or spiritual only. We may term a stick, a letter, or a discourse, *short*; but we speak of *brevity* only in regard to the mode of speech; *conciseness* and *succinctness* as to the matter of speech; *summary* as to the mode either of speaking or action: the *brief* is opposed to the prolix; the *concise* and *succinct* to the diffuse; the *summary* to the circumstantial or ceremonious. It is a matter of comparatively little importance whether a man's life be long or *short*; but it deeply concerns him that every moment be well spent. *Brevity* of expression ought to be consulted by speakers even more than by writers; *conciseness* is of peculiar advantage in the formation of rules for young persons; and *succinctness* is a requisite in every writer, who has extensive materials to digest; a *summary* mode of proceeding may have the advantage of saving time, but it has the disadvantage of incorrectness, and often of injustice.

TO SHOW, POINT OUT, MARK, INDICATE.

SHOW, in German *schauen*, &c. Greek *θεαομαι*, comes from the Hebrew *shoah* to look upon.

To POINT OUT is to fix a *point* upon a thing.

MARK, v. *Mark*, impression.

INDICATE, v. *Mark*, sign.

Show is here the general term, and the others specific: the common idea included in the signification of them all is that of making a thing visible to another. To *show* is an indefinite term; one *shows* by simply setting a thing before the eyes of another: to *point out* is specific; it is to *show* some particular *point* by a direct and immediate application to it: we *show* a person a book, when we put it into his hands; but we *point out* the beauties of its contents by accompanying the action with some particular movement, which shall direct the attention of the observer in a specific manner. Many things, therefore, may be *shown* which cannot be *pointed out*: a person *shows* himself, but he does not *point* himself out; towns, houses, gardens, and the like, are *shown*; but single things of any description are *pointed out*.

To *show* and *point out* are personal acts, which are addressed from one individual to another; but to *mark* is an indirect means of making a thing visible or observable: a person may *mark* something in the absence

of others, by which he intends to distinguish it from all others: thus a tradesman *marks* the prices and names of the articles which he sets forth in his shop. We *show* by holding in one's hand; we *point* out with the finger; we *mark* with a pen or pencil. To *show* and *mark* are the acts either of a conscious or an unconscious agent; to *point out* is the act of a conscious agent only; to *indicate*, that of an unconscious agent only: persons or things *show*, persons only *point out*, and things only *indicate*.

As applied to things, *show* is a more positive term than *mark* or *indicate*: that which *shows* serves as a proof; that which *marks* serves as a rule or guide for distinguishing. Nothing *shows* us the fallacy of forming schemes for the future, more than the daily evidences which we have of the uncertainty of our existence; nothing *marks* the character of a man more strongly than the manner in which he bestows or receives favours. To *mark* is commonly applied to that which is habitual and permanent; to *indicate* to that which is temporary or partial. A single act or expression sometimes *marks* the ruling temper of the mind; a look may *indicate* what is passing in the mind at the time.

TO SHOW, EXHIBIT, DISPLAY.

SHOW, *v. To show.*

EXHIBIT, *v. To give.*

DISPLAY, in French *deployer*, in all probability is changed from the Latin *plico*, signifying to unfold or set forth to view.

To *show* is here, as before, the generic term; to *exhibit* and *display* are specific: they may all designate the acts either of persons or things: the first, however, does this either in the proper or the improper sense; the two latter rather in the improper sense. To *show* is an indefinite action applied to every object: we may *show* that which belongs to others, as well as ourselves; we commonly *exhibit* that which belongs to ourselves; we *show* corporeal or mental objects; we *exhibit* that which is mental, or the work of the mind: one *shows* what is worth seeing in a house or grounds; one *exhibits* his skill on a stage. To *show* is an indifferent action; we may *show* accidentally or designedly, to please others, or to please ourselves; we *exhibit* and *display* with an express intention, and that mostly to please ourselves: we may *show* in a private or a public manner before one or many; we commonly *exhibit* and *display* in a public manner, or at least in such a manner as will enable us best to be seen. *Exhibit* and *display* have this farther distinction, that the former is mostly taken in a good or an in-

different sense, [the latter in a bad sense: we may *exhibit* our powers from a laudable ambition to be esteemed; but we seldom make a *display* of any quality from any motive but vanity: what we *exhibit* is, therefore, intrinsically good; what we *display* may often be only an imaginary or fictitious excellence. A musician *exhibits* his skill on any particular instrument; a fop *displays* his gold seals; or an ostentatious man *displays* his plate, or his fine furniture.

When said of things, to *show* is, as before, altogether indefinite, and implies simply to bring to view; *exhibit* implies to bring inherent properties to light, that is, apparently by a process; to *display* is to set forth so as to strike the eye: the windows on a frosty morning will *show* the state of the weather; experiments with the air pump *exhibit* the many wonderful and interesting properties of air; the beauties of the creation are peculiarly *displayed* in the spring season.

SHOW, EXHIBITION, REPRESENTATION, SIGHT, SPECTACLE.

SHOW signifies the thing shown (*v. To show*); EXHIBITION signifies the thing exhibited (*v. To show*); REPRESENTATION, the thing represented; SIGHT, the thing to be seen; and SPECTACLE, from the Latin *specto*, stands for the thing to be beheld.

Show is here, as in the former article, the most general term. Every thing set forth to view is *shown*; and if set forth for the amusement of others, it is a *show*. This is the common idea included in the terms *exhibition* and *representation*; but *show* is a term of vulgar meaning and application; the others have a higher use and signification. A *show* consists of that which merely pleases the eye; it is not a matter either of taste or art, but merely of curiosity: an *exhibition*, on the contrary, presents some effort of talent or some work of genius; and a *representation* sets forth the image or imitation of some thing by the power of art: hence we speak of a *show* of wild beasts; an *exhibition* of paintings; and a theatrical *representation*. The conjuror makes a *show* of his tricks at a fair to the wonder of the gazing multitude; the artist makes an *exhibition* of his works; *representations* of men and manners are given on the stage. *Shows*, *exhibitions*, and *representations* are presented by some one to the view of others; *sights* and *spectacles* present themselves to view. *Sight*, like *show*, is a vulgar term; and *spectacle* the nobler term. Whatever is to be seen to excite notice is a *sight*, in which general sense it would comprehend

every *show*, but in its particular sense it includes only that which casually offers itself to view: a *spectacle*, on the contrary, is that species of *sight* which has something in it to interest either the heart or the head of the observer: processions, reviews, sports, and the like, are *sights*; but battles, bull-fights, or public games of any description are *spectacles*, which interest but shock the feelings.

SHOW, OUTSIDE, APPEARANCE, SEMBLANCE.

Where there is **SHOW** (*v. To show*) there must be **OUTSIDE** and **APPEARANCE**; but there may be the last without the former. The term *show* always denotes an action, and refers to some person as agent; but the *outside* may be merely the passive quality of some thing. We speak, therefore, of a thing as mere *show*; to signify that what is shown is all that exists; and in this sense it may be termed mere *outside*, as, consisting only of what is on the *outside*.

In describing a house, however, we speak of its *outside*, and not of its *show*; as also of the *outside* of a book, and not of the *show*. *Appearance* denotes an action as well as *show*; but the former is the act of an unconscious agent, the latter of one that is conscious and voluntary: the *appearance* presents itself to the view; the *show* is purposely presented to view. A person makes a *show* so as to be seen by others; his *appearance* is that which *shows* itself in him. To look only to *show*, signifies to be concerned for that only which will attract notice; to look only to the *outside* signifies to be concerned only for that which may be seen in a thing, to the disregard of that which is not seen: to look only to *appearance* signifies the same as the former, except that *outside* is said in the proper sense of that which literally strikes the eye; but *appearances* extend to a man's conduct, and whatever may affect his reputation.

SEMBLANCE or **SEEMING** (*v. To seem*) always conveys the idea of an unreal *appearance*, or at least is contrasted with that which is real; he who only wears the *semblance* of friendship would be ill deserving the confidence of a friend.

SHOW, PARADE, OSTENTATION.

These terms are synonymous when they imply abstract actions: **SHOW** is here, as in the preceding article, taken in the vulgar sense; **OSTENTATION** and **PARADE** include the idea of something particular: a man makes a *show* of his equipage, furniture, and the like, by which he strikes the eye

of the vulgar, and seeks to impress them with an idea of his wealth and superior rank; a man makes a *parade* with his wealth, his knowledge, his charities, and the like, by which he endeavours to give weight and dignity to himself or his proceedings: *show* is, therefore, but a simple setting forth to view; but *parade* requires art, it is a forced effort to attract notice by the number and extent of the ceremonies. The terms *show* and *parade* are confined to the act of *showing*; or the means which are employed to *show*, but *ostentation* necessarily includes the purpose for which the display is made: he who does a thing so as to be seen and applauded by others, does it from *ostentation*, particularly in application to acts of charity, or of public subscription, in which a man strives to impress others with the extent of his wealth by the liberality of his gift.

SHOWY, GAUDY, GAY.

SHOWY, having or being full of *show* (*v. Show, outside*), is mostly an epithet of dispraise; that which is *showy* has seldom any thing to deserve notice beyond that which catches the eye; **GAUDY**, from the Latin *gaudeo* to rejoice, signifies literally full of joy; and is applied figuratively to the exterior of objects, but with the annexed bad idea of being striking to an excess: **GAY**, on the contrary, which is only a contraction of *gaudy*, is used in the same sense as an epithet of praise. Some things may be *showy*, and in their nature properly so; thus the tail of a peacock is *showy*: artificial objects may likewise be *showy*, but they will not be preferred by persons of taste. That which is *gaudy* is always artificial and faulty, and is always chosen by the vain, the vulgar, and the ignorant; a maid-servant will bedizen herself with *gaudy*-coloured ribbons: that which is *gay* is either nature itself, or nature imitated in the best manner; spring is a *gay* season, and flowers are its *gayest* accompaniments.

SICK, SICKLY, DISEASED, MORBID.

SICK denotes a partial state; **SICKLY** a permanent state of the body: he who is *sick* may be made well; but he who is *sickly* is seldom really well: a person may be *sick* from the effect of cold, violent exercise, and the like; but he is *sickly* only from constitution.

Sickly expresses a permanent state of indisposition; but **DISEASED** expresses a violent state of derangement without specifying its duration; it may be for a time only, or for a permanency; the person, or his constitution, is *sickly*; the person, or his frame,

or particular parts, as his lungs, his brain, and the like, may be *diseased*. *Sick*, *sickly*, and *diseased*, may all be used in a moral application; **MORBID** is used in no other. *Sick* denotes a partial state, as before, namely, a state of disgust, and is always associated with the object of the *sickness*; we are *sick* of turbulent enjoyments, seek for tranquillity: *sickly* and *morbid* are applied to the habitual state of the feelings or character; a *sickly* sentimentality, a *morbid* sensibility; *diseased* is applied in general to individuals or communities, to persons or to things; a person's mind is in a *diseased* state when it is under the influence of corrupt passions or principles; society is in a *diseased* state when it is overgrown with wealth and luxury.

SICKNESS, ILLNESS, INDISPOSITION.

SICKNESS denotes the state of being *sick* (v. *Sick*): **ILLNESS** that of being *ill* (v. *Evil*): **INDISPOSITION** that of being not well disposed. *Sickness* denotes the state generally or particularly; *illness* denotes it particularly: we speak of *sickness* as opposed to good health; in *sickness* or in health; but of the *illness* of a particular person: when *sickness* is said of the individual, it designates a protracted state; a person may be said to have much *sickness* in his family. *Illness* denotes only a particular or partial *sickness*: a person is said to have had an *illness* at this or that time, in this or that place, for this or that period. *Indisposition* is a slight *illness*, such as is capable of deranging him either in his enjoyments or in his business; colds are the ordinary causes of *indisposition*.

SIGN, SIGNAL.

SIGN and **SIGNAL** are both derived from the same source (v. *Mark*, *sign*), and the latter is but a species of the former.*

The *sign* enables us to recognise an object; it is therefore sometimes natural: *signal* serves to give warning; it is always arbitrary.

The movements which are visible in the countenance are commonly the *signs* of what passes in the heart: the beat of the drum is the *signal* for soldiers to repair to their post.

We converse with those who are present by *signs*; we make ourselves understood by those who are at a distance by means of *signals*.

SIGNAL, MEMORABLE.

SIGNAL signifies serving as a sign.

* Vide Girard: „Signe, signal.”

MEMORABLE, signifies worthy to be remembered.

They both express the idea of extraordinary, or being distinguished from every thing: whatever is *signal* deserves to be stamped on the mind, and to serve as a sign of some property or characteristic; whatever is *memorable* impresses upon the memory, and refuses to be forgotten: the former applies to the moral character; the latter to events and times: the Scriptures furnish us with many *signal* instances of God's vengeance against impenitent sinners, as also of his favour towards those who obey his will; the Reformation is a *memorable* event in the annals of ecclesiastical history.

TO SIGNALIZE, DISTINGUISH.

To **SIGNALIZE**, or make one's self a sign of any thing, is a much stronger term than simply to **DISTINGUISH**; it is in the power of many to do the latter, but few only have the power of effecting the former: the English have always *signalized* themselves for their unconquerable valour in battle; there is no nation that has not *distinguished* itself, at some period or another, in war.

SIGNIFICANT, EXPRESSIVE.

The **SIGNIFICANT** is that which serves as a sign; the **EXPRESSIVE** is that which speaks out or declares: the latter is therefore a stronger term than the former: a look is *significant* when it is made to express an idea that passes in the mind; but it is *expressive* when it is made to express a feeling of the heart: looks are but occasionally *significant*, but the countenance may be habitually *expressive*. *Significant* is applied in an indifferent sense, according to the nature of the thing signified; but *expressive* is always applied to that which is good: a *significant* look may convey a very bad idea; but an *expressive* countenance always expresses good feeling.

The distinction between these words is the same when applied to things as to persons: a word is *significant* of whatever it is made to signify; but a word is *expressive* according to the force with which it conveys an idea. The term *significant*, in this case, simply explains the nature; but the epithet *expressive* characterizes it as something good: technical terms are *significant* only of the precise ideas which belong to the art; most languages have some terms which are peculiarly *expressive*, and consequently adapted for poetry.

SIGNIFICATION, MEANING, IMPORT, SENSE.

The **SIGNIFICATION** (v. *To express*) is

that of which the word is made the sign; the MEANING is that which the person attaches to it; the IMPORT is that which is imported or carried into the understanding; the SENSE is that which is comprehended by the sense or the understanding.

The *signification* of a word includes either the whole or the part of what is understood by it; the *meaning* is that which a person wishes to convey, this is correct or incorrect according to the information of him who explains it; the *import* includes its whole force and value; the *sense* of a word is applicable frequently to a part of the *signification*.

The *signification* of a word is fixed by the standard of custom; the *import* of a term is estimated by the various acceptations in which it is employed; a *sense* is sometimes arbitrarily attached to a word which is widely different from that in which it is commonly acknowledged.

It is necessary to get the true *signification* of every word, or the particular *meaning* attached to it, to weigh the *import* of every term, and to comprehend the exact *sense* in which it is taken. Every word expressing either a simple, or a complex idea, is said to have a *signification*, though not an *import*. Technical and moral terms have an *import* and different *senses*. A child learns the *significations* of simple terms as he hears them used; a writer must be acquainted with the full *import* of every term which he has occasion to make use of. The different *senses* which words admit of is a great source of ambiguity and confusion with illiterate people.

Signification and *import* are said mostly of single words only; *sense* is said of words either in connexion with each other, or as belonging to some class: thus we speak of the *signification* of the word house, of the *import* of the term love; but the *sense* of the sentence, the *sense* of the author; the employment of words in a technical, moral, or physical *sense*.

TO SIGNIFY, IMPLY.

SIGNIFY, *v.* To express.

IMPLY, from the Latin *implico* to fold in, signifies to fold or involve an idea in any object.

These terms may be employed either as respects actions or words. In the first case *signify* is the act of the person making known by means of a sign, as we *signify* our approbation by a look: *imply* marks the value or force of the action; our assent is *implied* in our silence. When applied to words or marks, *signify* denotes the positive and established act of the thing; *imply* is its relative act:

a word *signifies* whatever it is made literally to stand for; it *implies* that which it stands for figuratively or morally. The term house *signifies* that which is constructed for a dwelling; the term residence *implies* something superior to a house. A cross, thus + *signifies* addition in arithmetic or algebra; a long stroke, thus — with a break in the text of a work, *implies* that the whole sentence is not completed. It frequently happens that words which *signify* nothing particular in themselves, may be made to *imply* a great deal by the tone, the manner, and the connexion.

TO SIGNIFY, AVAIL.

SIGNIFY (*v.* To *signify*) is here employed with regard to events of life, and their relative importance. AVAIL (*v.* To *avail*) is never used otherwise. That which a thing *signifies* is what it contains; if it *signifies* nothing, it contains nothing, and is worth nothing; if it *signifies* much, it contains much, or is worth much. That which *avails* produces; if it *avails* nothing it produces nothing, it is of no use; if it *avails* much, it produces or is worth much.

We consider the end as to its *signification*, and the means as to their *avail*. Although it is of little or no *signification* to a man what becomes of his remains, yet no one can be reconciled to the idea of leaving them exposed to contempt; words are but too often of little *avail* to curb the unruly wills of children.

SILENCE, TACITURNITY.

The Latins have the two verbs *sileo* and *taceo*; the former of which is interpreted by some to signify to cease to speak; and the latter not to begin to speak: others maintain the direct contrary. According to the present use of the words, SILENCE expresses less than TACITURNITY: the *silent* man does not speak; the *taciturn* man will not speak at all. The Latins designated the most profound *silence* by the epithet of *taciturna silentia*.

Silence is either occasional or habitual; it may arise from circumstances or character: *taciturnity* is mostly habitual, and springs from disposition. A loquacious man may be *silent* if he has no one to speak to him, and a prudent man will be *silent* when he finds that speaking would be dangerous: a *taciturn* man, on the other hand, may occasionally make an effort to speak, but he never speaks without an effort. When *silence* is habitual, it does not spring from an un-

* Vide Abbé Roubaud: „Silencieux, taciturne.“

amiable character; but *taciturnity* has its source in a vicious temper of the mind. A *silent* man may frequently contract a habit of *silence* from thoughtfulness, modesty, or the fear of offending: a man is *taciturn* only from the sullenness and gloominess of his temper. Habits of retirement render men *silent*; savages seldom break their *silence*: company will not correct *taciturnity*, but rather increase it. Seneca says, Talk little with others and much with yourself: the *silent* man observes this precept; the *taciturn* man exceeds it.

SILENT, DUMB, MUTE, SPEECHLESS.

Not speaking is the common idea included in the signification of these terms, which differ either in the cause or the circumstance: **SILENT** (*v. Silent*) is altogether an indefinite and general term, expressing little more than the common idea. We may be *silent* because we will not speak, or we may be *silent* because we cannot speak; but in distinction from the other terms it is always employed in the former case. **DUMB**, from the German *dumm* stupid or idiotic, denotes a physical incapacity to speak; hence persons are said to be born *dumb*; they may likewise be *dumb* from temporary physical causes, as from grief, shame, and the like, a person may be struck *dumb*. **MUTE**, in Latin *mutus*, Greek *μῦτος* from *μῦω* to shut, signifies a shut mouth, a temporary disability to speak from arbitrary and incidental causes: hence the office of mutes, or of persons who engage not to speak for a certain time; and, in like manner, persons are said to be *mute* who dare not give utterance to their thoughts. **SPEECHLESS**, or void of speech, denotes a physical incapacity to speak from incidental causes; as when a person falls down *speechless* in an apoplectic fit, or in consequence of a violent contusion.

SIMILE, SIMILITUDE, COMPARISON.

SIMILE and **SIMILITUDE** are both drawn from the Latin *similis* like: the former signifying the thing that is like; the latter either the thing that is like, or the quality of being like: in the former sense only it is to be compared with *simile*, when employed as a figure of speech or thought; every thing is a *simile* which associates objects together on account of any real or supposed likeness between them; but a *similitude* signifies a prolonged or continued *simile*. The latter may be expressed in a few words, as when we say the god-like Achilles; but the former enters into minute circumstances of **COMPARISON**, as when Homer compares

any of his heroes fighting and defending themselves against multitudes, to lions who are attacked by dogs and men. Every *simile* is more or less a *comparison*, but every *comparison* is not a *simile*: the latter *compares* things only as far as they are alike; but the former extends to those things which are different: in this manner, there may be a *comparison* between large things and small, although there can be no good *simile*.

SIMPLE, SINGLE, SINGULAR.

SIMPLE, in Latin *simplex* or *sine plicā* without a fold, is opposed to the complex which has many folds, or to the compound which has several parts involved or connected with each other. **SINGLE** and **SINGULAR** (*v. One*) are opposed, one to double, and the other to multifarious. We may speak of a *simple* circumstance as independent of any thing; of a *single* instance or circumstance as unaccompanied by any other: and a *singular* instance as one that rarely has its like. In the moral application, *simpli-city*, as opposed to duplicity in the heart, can never be excessive; but when it lies in the head, so that it cannot penetrate the folds and doublings of other persons, it is a fault. *Singleness* of heart and intention is that species of *simplicity* which is altogether to be admired; *singularity* may be either good or bad according to circumstances; to be *singular* in virtue is to be good; to be *singular* in manner is affectation.

SIMPLE, SILLY, FOOLISH.

SIMPLE, *v. Simple*.

SILLY is but a variation of *simple*.

FOOLISH signifies like a *fool* (*v. Fool*).

The *simple*, when applied to the understanding, implies such a contracted power as is incapable of combination; *silly* and *foolish* rise in sense upon the former, signifying either the perversion or the total deficiency of understanding: the behaviour of a person may be *silly*, who from any excess of feeling, loses his sense of propriety; the conduct of a person will be *foolish* who has not judgment to direct himself. Country people may be *simple* owing to their want of knowledge: children will be *silly* in company, if they have too much liberty given to them; there are some persons who never acquire wisdom enough to prevent them from committing *foolish* errors.

SIMULATION, DISSIMULATION.

SIMULATION, from *similis*, is the making one's self like what one is not: and **DISSIMULATION** from *dissimilis* unlike, is the making one's self appear unlike what one

really is. The hypocrite puts on the semblance of virtue to recommend himself to the virtuous. The dissembler conceals his vices when he wants to gain the simple or ignorant to his side.

SINCERE, HONEST, TRUE, PLAIN.

SINCERE (*v. Candid*) is here the most comprehensive term: **HONEST** (*v. Honesty*), **TRUE**, and **PLAIN** (*v. Even*) are but modes of *sincerity*.

Sincerity is a fundamental characteristic of the person; a man is *sincere* from the conviction of his mind; *honesty* is the expression of the feeling, it is the dictate of the heart; we look for a *sincere* friend and an *honest* companion: *truth* is a characteristic of *sincerity*, for a *sincere* friend is a *true* friend; but *sincerity* is a permanent quality in the character; and *true* may be an occasional one: we cannot be *sincere* without being *true*, but we may be *true* without being *sincere*.

In like manner a *sincere* man must be *plain*: since *plainness* consists in an unvarnished style; the *sincere* man will always adopt that mode of speech which expresses his sentiments most forcibly; but it is possible for a person to be occasionally *plain* who does not act from any principle of *sincerity*.

Sincerity is the habitual principle of communicating our real sentiments; and the *honest*, *true*, and *plain*, are only the modes which it adopts in making the communication: *sincerity* is therefore altogether a personal quality, but the other terms are applied also to the acts, as an *honest* confession, a *true* acknowledgment, and a *plain* speech.

SITUATION, CONDITION, STATE, PREDICAMENT, PLIGHT, CASE.

SITUATION, *v. Place*.

CONDITION, *v. Condition*.

STATE, in Latin *status*, from *sto* to stand, signifies the point stood upon.

SITUATION is said generally of objects as they respect others; *condition* as they respect themselves. Whatever affects our property, honour, liberty, and the like, constitutes our *situation*; whatever affects our person immediately is our *condition*; a person who is unable to pay a sum of money to save himself from a prison is in a bad *situation*: a traveller who is left in a ditch robbed and wounded is in a bad *condition*. *Situation* and *condition* are said of that which is contingent and changeable: *state*, of that which is comparatively stable or established. A tradesman is in a good *situation* who is carrying on a good trade: his affairs

are in a good *state* if he is enabled to answer every demand and to keep up his credit. Hence it is that we speak of the *state* of health, and the *state* of the mind; not the *situation* or *condition*, because the body and mind are considered as to their general frame, and not as to any relative or particular circumstances; so likewise, a *state* of infancy, a *state* of guilt, a *state* of innocence, and the like; but not either a *situation* or a *condition*.

When speaking of bodies there is the same distinction in the terms, as in regard to individuals. An army may be either in a *situation*, a *condition*, or a *state*. An army that is on service may be in a critical *situation*, with respect to the enemy and its own comparative weakness; it may be in a deplorable *condition* if it stand in need of provisions and necessaries: an army that is at home will be in a good or bad *state*, according to the regulations of the commander in chief. Of a prince who is threatened with invasion from foreign enemies, and with a rebellion from his subjects, we should not say that his *condition*, but his *situation*, was critical. Of a prince, however, who like Alfred was obliged to fly, and to seek safety in disguise and poverty, we should speak of his hard *condition*: the *state* of a prince cannot be spoken of, but the *state* of his affairs and government, may; hence, likewise, *state* may with most propriety be said of a nation: but *situation* seldom, unless in respect to other nations, and *condition* never. On the other hand, when speaking of the poor, we seldom employ the term *situation*, because they are seldom considered as a body in relation to other bodies; we mostly speak of their *condition* as better or worse, according as they have more or less of the comforts of life; and of their *state* as regards their moral habits.

These terms may likewise be applied to inanimate objects; and upon the same grounds, a house is in a good *situation* as respects the surrounding objects; it is in a good or bad *condition* as respects the painting, and exterior, altogether; it is in a bad *state* as respects the beams, plaster, roof, and interior structure altogether. The hand of a watch is in a different *situation* every hour; the watch itself may be in a bad *condition* if the wheels are clogged with dirt; but in a good *state* if the works are altogether sound and fit for service.

Situation and *condition* are either permanent or temporary. **PREDICAMENT**, from the Latin *predico* to assert or declare, signifies the committing one's self by an assertion; and when applied to circumstances,

it expresses a temporary embarrassed *situation* occasioned by an act of one's own: hence we always speak of bringing ourselves into a *predicament*. **PLIGHT**, contracted from the Latin *plicatus*, participle of *plico* to fold, signifies any circumstance in which one is disagreeably entangled; and **CASE** (*v. Case*) signifies any thing which may befall us, or into which we fall mostly, though not necessarily contrary to our inclination. Those two latter terms therefore denote a species of temporary condition; for they both express that which happens to the object itself, without reference to any other. A person is in an unpleasant *situation* who is shut up in a stage-coach with disagreeable company. He is in an awkward *predicament* when in attempting to please one friend he displeases another. He may be in a wretched *plight* if he is overturned in a stage at night, and at a distance from any habitation. He will be in evil *case* if he is compelled to put up with a spare and poor diet.

SIZE, MAGNITUDE, GREATNESS, BULK.

SIZE, from the Latin *cisus* and *caedo* to cut, signifies that which is cut or framed according to a certain proportion.

MAGNITUDE, from the Latin *magnitudo*, answers literally to the English word **GREATNESS**.

BULK, *v. Bulky*.

Size is a general term including all manner of dimension or measurement; *magnitude* is employed in science or in an abstract sense to denote some specific measurement; *greatness* is an unscientific term applied in the same sense to objects in general: *size* is indefinite, it never characterizes any thing either as large or small; but *magnitude* and *greatness* always suppose something great; and *bulk* denotes a considerable degree of *greatness*: things which are diminutive in *size* will often have an extraordinary degree of beauty, or some other adventitious perfection to compensate the deficiency; astronomers have classed the stars according to their different *magnitudes*; *greatness* is considered by Burke as one source of the sublime; *bulk* is that species of *greatness* which destroys the symmetry, and consequently the beauty, of objects.

SKETCH, OUTLINES.

A **SKETCH** may form a whole; **OUTLINES** are but a part: the *sketch* may comprehend the *outlines*, and some of the particulars; *outlines*, as the term bespeaks, comprehend only that which is on the exterior surface: the *sketch*, in drawing, may serve as a landscape, as it presents some of

the features of a country; but the *outlines* serve only as bounding lines, within which the *sketch* may be formed. So in the moral application we speak of the *sketches* of countries, characters, manners, and the like, which serve as a description; but of the *outlines* of a plan, of a work, a project, and the like, which serve as a basis on which the subordinate parts are to be formed: barbarous nations present us with rude *sketches* of nature; an abridgment is little more than the *outlines* of a larger work.

SKIN, HIDE, PEEL, RIND.

SKIN, which is in German *schin*, Swedish *skinn*, Danish *skind*, probably comes from the Greek *σκηρος*, a tent or covering.

HIDE, in Saxon *hyd*, German *haut*, Low German *huth*, Latin *cutis*, comes from the Greek *κευθειν*, to hide, cover.

PEEL, in German *fell*, &c. Latin *pellis* a skin, in Greek *φελλος* or *φλοιος* bark comes from *φλαω* to burst or crack, because bark is easily broken.

RIND is in all probability changed from round, signifying that which goes round and envelops.

Skin is the term in most general use, it is applicable both to human creatures and to animals; *hide* is used only for the *skins* of large animals; we speak of the *skins* of birds or insects; but of the *hides* of oxen or horses and other animals, which are to be separated from the body and converted into leather. *Skin* is equally applied to the inanimate and the animate world; but *peel* and *rind* belong only to inanimate objects: the *skin* is generally said of that which is interior, in distinction from the exterior, which is the *peel*: an orange has both its *peel* and its thin *skin* underneath; an apple, a pear, and the like, has a *peel*. The *peel* is a soft substance on the outside; the *rind* is generally of a harder substance: in regard to a stick, we speak of its *peel* and its inner *skin*; in regard to a tree, we speak of its bark and its *rind*: hence, likewise, the term *rind* is applied to cheese, and other incrustated substances that envelop *bodies*.

SLACK, LOOSE.

SLACK, in Saxon *slaec*, Low German *slack*, French *lache*, Latin *laxus*, and **LOOSE**, in Saxon *laes*, both come from the Hebrew *halatz* to make free or loose; they differ more in application than in sense: they are both opposed to that which is close bound; but *slack* is said only of that which is tied, or that with which any thing is tied; while *loose* is said of any substances, the parts of which do not adhere closely: a rope

is *slack* in opposition to the tight rope, which is stretched to its full extent; and in general cords or strings are said to be *slack* which fail in the requisite degree of tightness; but they are said to be *loose* in an indefinite manner, without conveying any collateral idea: thus the string of an instrument is denominated *slack* rather than *loose*; on the other hand, *loose* is said of many bodies to which the word *slack* cannot be applied: a garment is *loose*, but not *slack*; the leg of a table is *loose*, but not *slack*. In the moral application that which admits of extension lengthwise is denominated *slack*; and that which fails in consistency and close adherence is *loose*: trade is in general *slack*, or the sale of a particular article is *slack*; but an engagement is *loose*, and principles are *loose*.

TO SLANT, SLOPE.

SLANT is probably a variation of *leant*, and SLOPE of *slip*, expressive of a sideward movement or direction: they are the same in sense, but different in application: *slant* is said of small bodies only; *slope* is said indifferently of all bodies, large and small: a book may be made to *slant* by lying in part on another book, a desk, a table; but a piece of ground is said to *slope*.

TO SLEEP, SLUMBER, DOZE, DROWSE, NAP.

SLEEP, in Saxon *slaepan*, low German *slap*, German *schlaf*, is supposed to come from the Low German *slap* or *slack* slack, because *sleep* denotes an entire relaxation of the physical frame.

SLUMBER, in Saxon *slumeran*, &c. is but an intensive verb of *schlummern*, which is a variation from the preceding *slaepan*, &c.

DOZE, in Low German *dusen*, is in all probability a variation from the French *dors*, and the Latin *dormio* to *sleep*, which was anciently *dermio*, and comes from the Greek *δεγμα* a skin, because people lay on skins when they *slept*.

DROWSE, is a variation of *doze*.

NAP is in all probability a variation of *nob* and *nod*.

Sleep is the general term; to *slumber* is to *sleep* lightly and softly; to *doze* is to incline to *sleep*, or to begin *sleeping*; to *nap* is to *sleep* for a time: every one who is not indisposed *sleeps* during the night; those who are accustomed to wake at a certain hour of the morning commonly *slumber* only after that time: there are many who, though they cannot *sleep* in a carriage, will yet be obliged to *doze* if they travel in the night;

in hot climates the middle of the day is commonly chosen for a *nap*.

SLEEPY, DROWSY, LETHARGIC.

SLEEPY (v. *To sleep*) expresses either a temporary or a permanent state: DROWSY which comes from the Low German *drusen*, and is a variation of *doze* (v. *To sleep*) expresses mostly a temporary state; LETHARGIC, from *lethargy*, in Latin *lethargia*, *ληθαργια*, compounded of *ληθη* forgetfulness, and *αργος* swift, signifying a proneness to forgetfulness or *sleep*, describes a permanent or habitual state.

Sleepy, as a temporary state, expresses also what is natural or seasonable; *drowsiness* expresses an inclination to *sleep* at unseasonable hours: it is natural to be *sleepy* at the hour when we are accustomed to retire to rest; it is common to be *drowsy* when sitting still after dinner. *Sleepiness*, as a permanent state, is an infirmity to which some persons are subject constitutionally; *lethargy* is a disease with which people, otherwise the most wakeful, may be occasionally attacked.

TO SLIP, SLIDE, GLIDE.

SLIP is in low German, *slipan*, Latin *labor* to slip, and *libo* to pour, which comes from the Greek *λειβουμαι* to pour down as water does, and the Hebrew *salap* to turn aside.

SLIDE is a variation of *slip*, and GLIDE of *slide*.

To *slip* is an involuntary, and *slide* a voluntary motion: those who go on the ice in fear will *slip*; boys *slide* on the ice by way of amusement. To *slip* and *slide* are lateral movements of the feet; but to *glide* is the movement of the whole body, and just that easy motion which is made by *slipping*, *sliding*, flying, or swimming: a person *glides* along the surface of the ice when he *slides*; a vessel *glides* along through the water. In the moral and figurative application, a person *slips* who commits unintentional errors; he *slides* into a course of life, who wittingly, and yet without difficulty, falls into the practice and habits which are recommended; he *glides* through life if he pursues his course smoothly and without interruption.

SLOW, DILATORY, TARDY, TEDIOUS.

SLOW is doubtless connected with *sloth* and *slide*, which kind of motion when walking is the *slowest* and the *laziest*.

DILATORY, from the Latin *defero*, *dilatus*, to defer, signifies prone to defer.

TARDY, from the Latin *tardus*, signifies literally slow.

TEDIOUS, from the Latin *taedium* weariness, signifies causing weariness.

Slow is a general and unqualified term applicable to the motion of any object or to the motions and actions of persons in particular, and to their dispositions also; *dilatory* relates to the disposition only of persons: we are *slow* in what we are about; we are *dilatory* in setting about a thing. *Slow* is applied to corporeal or mental actions; a person may be *slow* in walking, or *slow* in conceiving: *tardy* is applicable to mental actions; we are *tardy* in our proceedings or our progress; we are *tardy* in making up accounts or in concluding a treaty. We may be *slow* with propriety or not; to our own inconvenience or that of others: when we are *tedious* we are always so improperly; he who is *tedious* is *slow* to the annoyance of others.

TO SMEAR, DAUB.

To **SMEAR** is literally to do over with *smear*, in Saxon *smear*, German *schmeer*, in Greek *μυγος* a salve. To **DAUB**, from *do* and *ub*, *über voer*, signifies literally to do over with any thing unseemly, or in any unsightly manner.

To *smear* in the literal sense is applied to such substances as may be rubbed like grease over a body; if said of grease itself it may be proper, as coachmen *smear* the coach wheels with tar or grease; but if said of any thing else it is an improper action, and tends to disfigure, as children *smear* their hands with ink, or *smear* their clothes with dirt. To *smear* and *daub* are both actions which tend to disfigure; but we *smear* by means of rubbing over; we *daub* by rubbing, throwing, or any way covering over: thus a child *smears* the window with his finger, or he *daubs* the wall with dirt. By a figurative application, *smear* is applied to bad writing, and *daub* to bad painting: indifferent writers who wish to excel are fond of retouching their letters until they make their performance a sad *smear*; bad artists, who are injudicious in the use of their pencil, load their paintings with colour, and convert them into *daubs*.

SMELL, SCENT, ODOUR, PERFUME, FRAGRANCE.

SMELL and *melt* are in all probability connected together, because *smells* arise from the evaporation of bodies.

SCENT, changed from *sent*, comes from the Latin *sentio* to perceive or feel.

ODOUR, in Latin *odor*, comes from *oleo*, in Greek *οζω* to smell.

PERFUME, compounded of *per* or *pro* and *fumo* or *fumus* a smoke or vapour, that is, the vapour that issues forth.

FRAGRANCE, in Latin *fragrantia*, comes from *fragro*, anciently *frago*, that is, to perfume or smell like the *fraga* or strawberry.

Smell and *scent* are said either of that which receives, or that which gives the *smell*; the *odour*, the *perfume*, and *fragrance*, of that which communicates the *smell*. In the first case, *smell* is said generally of all living things without distinction; *scent* is said only of such animals as have the peculiar faculty of tracing objects by their *smell*: some persons have a much quicker *smell* than others, and some have an acuter *smell* of particular objects than they have of things in general: dogs are remarkable for their quickness of *scent*, by which they trace their masters and other objects to an immense distance.

In the second case *smell* is compared with *odour*, *perfume*, and *fragrance*, either as respects the object communicating the *smell*, or the nature of the *smell* which is communicated. *Smell* is indefinite in its sense, and universal in its application; *odour*, *perfume*, and *fragrance*, are species of *smell*: every object is said to *smell* which acts on the olfactory nerves; flowers, fruits, woods, earth, water, and the like, have a *smell*; but *odour* is said of that which is artificial; *perfume* and *fragrance* of that which is natural: the burning of things produces an *odour*; *perfume* and *fragrance* arise from flowers or sweet-smelling herbs, spices, and the like. The terms *smell* and *odour* do not specify the exact nature of that which issues from bodies; they may both be either pleasant or unpleasant; but *smell*, if taken in certain connexions, signifies a bad *smell*, and *odour* signifies that which is sweet: meat which is kept too long will have a *smell*, that is of course a bad *smell*; the *odours* from a sacrifice are acceptable, that is, the sweet *odours* ascend to heaven. *Perfume* is properly a wide-spreading *smell*, and when taken without any epithet signifies a pleasant *smell*; *fragrance* never signifies any thing but what is good; it is the sweetest and most powerful *perfume*: the *perfume* from flowers and shrubs is as grateful to one sense as their colours and conformation are to the other; the *fragrance* from groves of myrtle and orange trees surpasses the beauty of their fruits or foliage.

TO SOAK, DRENCH, STEEP.

SOAK is a variation of *suck*.

DRENCH is a variation of *drink*.

STEEP, in Saxon *steopan*, &c. from the Hebrew *satep*, signifies to overflow or overwhelm.

The idea of communicating or receiving a liquid is common to these terms. We *soak* things in water when we wish to soften them; animals are *drenched* with liquid as a medicinal operation. A person's clothes are *soaked* in rain when the water has penetrated every thread: he himself is *drenched* in the rain when it has penetrated as it were his very body; *drench* therefore in this case only expresses the idea of *soak* in a stronger manner. To *steep* is a species of *soaking* employed as an artificial process; to *soak* is however a permanent action by which hard things are rendered soft; to *steep* is a temporary action by which soft bodies become penetrated with a liquid: thus salt meat requires to be *soaked*; fruits are *steeped* in brandy.

SOBER, GRAVE.

SOBER (*v. Abstemious*) expresses the absence of all exhilaration of spirits: **GRAVE** (*v. Grave*) expresses a weight in the intellectual operations which makes them proceed slowly. *Sobriety* is therefore a more natural and ordinary state for the human mind than *gravity*: in our pleasures we may observe *sobriety* which keeps us from every unseemly ebullition of mirth; but on particular occasions where the importance of the subject ought to weigh on the mind it becomes us to be *grave*. At a feast we have need of *sobriety*; at a funeral we have need of *gravity*: *sobriety* extends to many more objects than *gravity*; we must be *sober* in our thoughts and opinions, as well as in our outward conduct and behaviour; but we can be *grave*, properly speaking, only in our looks and our outward deportment.

SOCIAL, SOCIABLE.

SOCIAL, from *socius* a companion, signifies belonging or allied to a companion, having the disposition of a companion; **SOCIABLE**, from the same, signifies able or fit to be a companion; the former is an active, the latter a passive quality: *social* people seek others; *sociable* people are sought for by others. It is possible for a man to be *social* and not *sociable*; to be *sociable* and not *social*: he who draws his pleasures from society without communicating his share to the common stock of entertainments is *social* but not *sociable*; men of a taciturn disposition are often in this case; they receive more than they give: he on the contrary who has talents to please company, but not the

inclination to go into company, may be *sociable* but is seldom *social*. *Social* and *sociable* are likewise applicable to things, with a similar distinction; *social* intercourse is that intercourse which men have together for the purposes of society; *social* pleasures are what they enjoy by associating together: a *sociable* party is one, where every one exerts himself to please and enliven his companions.

SOCIETY, COMPANY.

SOCIETY (*v. Association*) and **COMPANY** (*v. Association*) here express either the persons associating or the act of associating.

In either case *society* is a general, and *company* a particular, term; as respects persons associating, *society* comprehends either all the associated part of mankind, as when we speak of the laws of *society*, the well-being of *society*; or it is said only of a particular number of individuals associated, in which latter case it comes nearest to *company*, and differs from it only as to the purpose of the association. A *society* is always formed for some solid purpose, as the *Humane Society*; and a *company* is always brought together for pleasure or profit, as has already been observed.

Good sense teaches us the necessity of conforming to the rules of the *society* to which we belong: good-breeding prescribes to us to render ourselves agreeable to the *company* of which we form a part.

When expressing the abstract action of associating, the term *society* is even more general and indefinite than before; it expresses that which is common to mankind; and *company* that which is peculiar to individuals. The love of *society* is inherent in our nature: every one naturally prefers the *company* of his own friends and connexions to that of strangers. *Society* is a permanent and habitual act; *company* is only a particular act suited to the occasion: it behoves us to shun the *society* of those from whom we can learn no good, although we may sometimes be obliged to be in their *company*. The *society* of intelligent men is desirable for those who are entering life; the *company* of facetious men is agreeable in travelling.

SOFT, MILD, GENTLE, MEEK.

SOFT, in Saxon *soft*, German *sanft*, comes most probably from the Saxon *sib*, Gothic *sef*, Hebrew *sabbath* rest.

MILD, in Saxon *milde*, German *milde*, &c. Latin *mollis*, Greek *μελικος*, comes from *μελισσω* to soothe with soft words, and *μελι* honey.

GENTLE, v. Gentle.

MEEK, like the Latin *mitis*, may in all probability come from the Greek *μεῖω* to make less, signifying to make one's self small, to be humble.

Soft and *mild* are employed both in the proper and the improper application; *meek* only in the moral application: *soft* is opposed to the hard; *mild* to the sharp or strong.

All bodies are said to be *soft* which yield easily to the touch or pressure, as a *soft* bed, the *soft* earth, *soft* fruit. Some bodies are said to be *mild* which act weakly, but pleasantly, on the taste, as *mild* fruit, or a *mild* cheese; or on the feelings, as *mild* weather. Things which in their nature might be boisterous, are said to be *gentle*, as a *gentle* breeze.

In the improper application, *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, may be applied to that which acts weakly upon others, or is easily acted upon by others; *meek* is said of that only which is acted upon easily by others: in this sense they are all employed as epithets, to designate either the person, or that which is personal.

In the sense of acting weakly, but pleasantly, on others, *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, are applied to the same personal properties, but with a slight distinction in the sense: the voice of a person is either *soft* or *mild*; it is naturally *soft*, it is purposely made *mild*; a *soft* voice strikes agreeably upon the ear; a *mild* voice, when assumed by those who have authority dispels all fears in the minds of inferiors. A person moves either *softly* or *gently*, but in the first case he moves with but little noise, in the second he moves with a slow pace. It is necessary to walk *softly* in the chamber of the sick, that they may not be disturbed; it is necessary for a sick person to move *gently*, when he first attempts to go abroad after his confinement.

To tread *softly* is an art which is acquired from the dancing-master; to go *gently* is a voluntary act: we may go a *gentle* or a quick pace at pleasure. Words are either *soft*, *mild*, or *gentle*; a *soft* word falls lightly upon the person to whom it is addressed; it does not excite any angry sentiment; the proverb says, „A *soft* answer turneth away wrath.“ A reproof is *mild* when it falls easily from the lips of one who has power to oppress and wound the feelings; a censure, an admonition, or a hint, is *gentle*, which bears indirectly on the offender, and does not expose the whole of his infirmity to view: a kind father tries the efficacy of

mild reproofs; a prudent friend will try to correct our errors by *gentle* remonstrances.

In like manner we say that punishments are *mild* which inflict but a small portion of pain; they are opposed to those which are severe: those means of correction are *gentle*, which are opposed to those that are violent. Persons, or their manners, are termed *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, but still with similar distinctions: a *soft* address, a *soft* air, and the like, are becoming or not, according to the sex: in that which is denominated the *softer* sex, these qualities of *softness* are characteristic excellencies; in the male sex they are compatible only in a small degree with manly firmness of carriage. *Mild* manners are peculiarly becoming in superiors, whereby they win the love and esteem of those who are in inferior stations. *Gentle* manners are becoming in all persons who take a part in social life: *gentleness* is, in fact, that due medium of *softness* which is alike suitable to both sexes, and which it is the object of polite education to produce.

In the sense of being acted on easily, the disposition is said to be not only *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, but also *meek*: *softness* of disposition and character is an infirmity both in the male and female, but particularly in the former; it is altogether incompatible with that steadiness and uniformity of conduct which is requisite for every man who has an independent part to act in life: a man of a *soft* disposition often yields to the entreaties of others, and does that which his judgment condemns. *Mildness* of disposition unfits a man altogether for command, and is to be clearly distinguished from that *mildness* of conduct which is founded on principle. *Gentleness*, as a part of the character, is not so much to be recommended as *gentleness* from habit; human life contains so much in itself that is rough, that the *gentle* disposition is unable to make that resistance which is requisite for the purposes of self-defence. *Meekness* is a Christian virtue forcibly recommended to our practice by the example and precepts of our blessed Saviour; it consists not only in an unresisting, but a forgiving temper, a temper that is unruffled by injuries and provocations; it is, however, an infirmity, if it springs from a want of spirit, or an unconsciousness of what is due to ourselves: *meekness*, therefore, as a natural temper, sinks into meanness and servility; but when, as an acquired temper, built upon principle, and moulded into a habit of the mind, it is the grand distinctive characteristic of the religion we profess.

Gentle and *meek* are likewise applied to animals: a horse is *gentle*, as opposed to

one that is spirited; the lamb is a pattern of meekness, and yields to the knife of the butcher without a struggle or a groan.

SOLICITATION, IMPORTUNITY.

SOLICITATION is general; IMPORTUNITY is particular: it is importunate or troublesome solicitation. Solicitation indeed gives trouble to a certain extent, but it is not always unreasonable: there may be cases in which we may yield to the solicitations of friends, to do that which we have no objection to be obliged to do: but importunity is that solicitation which never ceases to apply for that which it is not agreeable to give. We may sometimes be urgent in our solicitations of a friend to accept some proffered honour; the solicitation however, in this case, although it may even be troublesome, yet it is sweetened by the motive of the action: the importunity of beggars is often a means of extorting money from the passenger.

SOLITARY, SOLE, ONLY, SINGLE.

SOLITARY and SOLE are both derived from *solus* alone or whole.

ONLY, that is *onely*, signifies the quality of unity.

SINGLE is an abbreviation of singular (*v. Simple*).

All these terms are more or less opposed to several or many. *Solitary* and *sole* signify one left by itself; the former mostly in application to particular sensible objects, the latter in regard mostly to moral objects: a *solitary* shrub expresses not only one shrub, but one that has been left to itself: the *sole* cause or reason signifies that reason or cause which stands unsupported by any thing else. *Only* does not include the idea of desertion or deprivation, but it comprehends that of want or deficiency: he who says he has *only* one shilling in his pocket means to imply, that he wants more, or ought to have more. *Single* signifies simply one or more detached from others, without conveying any other collateral idea: a *single* sheet of paper may be sometimes more convenient than a double one: a *single* shilling may be all that is necessary for the present purpose: there may be *single* ones, as well as a *single* one; but the other terms exclude the idea of there being any thing else. A *solitary* act of generosity is not sufficient to characterize a man as generous: with most criminals the *sole* ground of their defence rests upon their not having learnt to know and do better: harsh language and severe looks are not the *only* means of correcting the faults of others: *single* instances

of extraordinary talents now and then present themselves in the course of an age.

In the adverbial form, *solely*, *only*, and *singly*, are employed with a similar distinction. The disasters which attend an unsuccessful military enterprise are seldom to be attributed *solely* to the incapacity of the general: there are many circumstances both in the natural and moral world which are to be accounted for *only* by admitting a providence as presented to us in Divine revelation: there are many things which men could not effect *singly* that might be effected by them conjointly.

SOLITARY, DESERT, DESOLATE.

SOLITARY, *v. Alone*.

DESERT is the same as *deserted*.

DESOLATE, in Latin *desolatus*, signifies made *solitary*.

All these epithets are applied to places, but with different modifications of the common idea of solitude which belongs to them. *Solitary* simply denotes the absence of all beings of the same kind; thus a place is *solitary* to a man, where there is no human being but himself: *desert* conveys the idea of a place made *solitary* by being shunned from its unfitness as a place of residence; *deserts* are places of such wildness as seem to frighten away almost inhabitants: *desolate* conveys the idea of a place made *solitary*, or bare of inhabitants, and all traces of habitation, by violent means; every country may become *desolate* which is exposed to the inroads of a ravaging army.

TO SOLVE, RESOLVE.

SOLVE and RESOLVE both come from the Latin *solvo*, in Greek *λυω*, in Hebrew *sal* to loosen.

Between *solve* and *resolve* there is no considerable difference either in sense or application: the former seems merely to speak of unfolding in a general manner that which is wrapped up in obscurity: to *resolve* is rather to unfold it by the particular method of carrying one back to first principles; we *solve* a problem, and *resolve* a difficulty.

SOME, ANY.

SOME, probably contracted from *so a* one or *such a* one, is altogether restrictive in its sense: ANY, from *a* one, is altogether universal and indefinite. *Some* applies to one particular part in distinction from the rest: *any* to every individual part without distinction. *Some* think this, and others that: *any* person might believe if he would; *any* one can conquer his passions who calls in the aid of religion. In con-

sequence of this distinction in sense, *some* can only be used in particular affirmative propositions; but *any*, which is equivalent to all, may be either in negative, interrogative, or hypothetical propositions: *some* say so: does *any* one believe it? He will not give to *any*.

SOON, EARLY, BETIMES.

All these words are expressive of time; but **SOON** respects some future period in general; **EARLY**, or *ere*, before, and **BETIMES**, or by the time, before a given time, respect some particular period at no great distance. A person may come *soon* or *early*; in the former case he may not be long in coming from the time that the words are spoken; in the latter case he comes before the time appointed. He who rises *soon* does nothing extraordinary; but he who rises *early* or *betimes* exceeds the usual hour considerably. *Soon* is said mostly of particular acts, and is always dated from the time of the person speaking, if not otherwise expressed; come *soon* signifies after the present moment; *early* and *betimes* if not otherwise expressed, have always respect to some specific time appointed; come *early* will signify a visit, a meeting, and the like; do it *betimes* will signify before the thing to be done is wanted. An *early* attention to religious duties will render them habitual and pleasing; we must begin *betimes* to bring the stubborn will into subjection.

SORRY, GRIEVED, HURT.

SORRY and **GRIEVED** are epithets somewhat differing from their primitives *sorrow* and *grief* (v. *Affliction*), inasmuch as they are applied to ordinary subjects. We speak of being *sorry* for any thing however trivial, which concerns ourselves; but we are commonly *grieved* for that which concerns others. I am *sorry* that I was not at home when a person called upon me: I am *grieved* that it is not in my power to serve a friend who stands in need. Both these terms respect only that which we do ourselves: **HURT** (v. *To displease* and *To injure*) respects that which is done to us, denoting painful feeling from *hurt* or wounded feelings we are *hurt* at being treated with disrespect.

SOUL, MIND.

The terms, or the equivalents to them, have been employed by all civilized nations to designate that part of human nature which is distinct from matter. The **SOUL**, however, from the German *seele*, &c. and the Greek *ζωή* to live, like the *anima* of the

Latin, which comes from the Greek *ανεμος* wind or breath, is represented to our mind by the subtlest or most ethereal of sensible objects, namely, breath or spirit, and denotes properly the quickening or vital principle. **MIND**, on the contrary, from the Greek *μενος*, which signifies strength, is that sort of power which is closely allied to, and in a great measure dependant upon, corporeal organization: the former is, therefore, the immortal, and the latter the mortal, part of us; the former connects us with angels, the latter with brutes: in the former we distinguish consciousness and will, which is possessed by no other created being that we know of; in the latter we distinguish nothing but the power of receiving impressions from external objects, which we call ideas, and which we have in common with the brutes. There are minute philosophers, who, from their extreme anxiety after truth, deny that we possess any thing more than what this poor composition of flesh and blood can give us; and yet, methinks, sound philosophy would teach us that we ought to prove the truth of one position, before we assert the falsehood of its opposite; and consequently, that if we deny that we have any thing but what is material in us, we ought first to prove that the material is sufficient to produce the reasoning faculty of man. Now it is upon this very impossibility of finding any thing in matter as an adequate cause for the production of the *soul*, that it is conceived to be an entirely distinct principle. If we had only the *mind*, that is, an aggregate of ideas or sensible images, such as is possessed by the brutes, it would be no difficulty to conceive of this as purely material, since the act of receiving images is but a passive act, suited to the inactive property of matter: but when the *soul* turns in upon itself, and creates for itself by abstraction, combination, and deduction, a world of new objects, it proves itself to be the most active of all principles in the universe; it then positively acts upon matter instead of being acted upon by it. But not to lose sight of the distinction drawn between the words *soul* and *mind*. I simply wish to show that the vulgar and the philosophical use of these terms altogether accord, and are both founded on the true nature of things; namely, that the word *soul* is taken for the active and living principle, and *mind* is considered as the storehouse or receiver: thus we say that a person is the *soul* of the society in which he acts; or that we treasure any thing in the *mind*, it makes an impression on the *mind*.

SOUND . SANE , HEALTHY .

SOUND and **SANE**, in Latin *sanus*, comes probably from *sanguis* the blood, because in that lies the seat of health or sickness.

HEALTHY, v. *Healthy*.

Sound is extended in its application to all things that are in the state in which they ought to be, so as to preserve their vitality; thus animals and vegetables are said to be *sound* when in the former there is nothing amiss in their breath, and in the latter in their root. By a figurative application, wood and other things may be said to be *sound* when they are free from any symptom of decay: *sane* is applicable to human beings, in the same sense, but with reference to the mind; a *sane* person is opposed to one that is insane: *healthy* expresses more than either *sound* or *sane*; we are *healthy* in every part, but we are *sound* in that which is essential for life; he who is *sound* may live, but he who is *healthy* enjoys life.

SOUND, TONE.

SOUND, in Latin *sonus*, and **TONE**, in Latin *tonus*, may probably both come from the Greek *τονος*, from *τενω* to stretch or exert, signifying simply an exertion of the voice; but I should rather derive *sound* from the Hebrew *shaon* a noise.

Sound is that which issues from any body, so as to become audible; *tone* is a species of *sound* which is produced from particular bodies: a *sound* may be accidental; we may hear the *sounds* of waters or leaves, of animals or men: *tones* are those particular *sounds* which are made either to express a particular feeling, or to produce harmony; a sheep will cry for its lost young in a *tone* of distress; an organ is so formed as to send forth the most solemn *tones*.

SPACE, ROOM.

SPACE, in Latin *spatium*, Greek *σταδιον*, Aeol. *σταδιον* a race-ground.

ROOM, in Saxon *rum*, &c. Hebrew *ra-mah* a wide place.

These are both abstract terms, expressive of that portion of the universe which is supposed not to be occupied by any solid body: *space* is a general term, which includes within itself that which infinitely surpasses our comprehension; *room* is a limited term, which comprehends those portions of *space* which are artificially formed: *space* is either extended or bounded; *room* is always a bounded *space*: the *space* between two objects is either natural, incidental, or

designedly formed; the *room* is that which is the fruit of design, to suit the convenience of persons: there is a sufficient *space* between the heavenly bodies to admit of their moving without confusion; the value of a house essentially depends upon the quantity of *room* which it affords: in a row of trees there must always be vacant *spaces* between each tree; in a coach there will be *room* for only a given number of persons.

Space is only taken in the natural sense; *room* is also employed in the moral application: in every person there is ample *room* for amendment or improvement.

TO SPEAK, SAY, TELL.

SPEAK, Saxon *specan*, is probably changed from the German *sprechen*, and connected with *brechen* to break, the Latin *precor* to pray, and the Hebrew *barek* to bless.

SAY, in Saxon *seegan*, German *sagen*, Latin *seco* or *sequor*, changed into *dico*, and Hebrew *shoch* to *speak* or *say*.

TELL, in Saxon *taellan*, low German *tellan*, &c. is probably an onomatopoeia in language.

To *speak* may simply consist in uttering an articulate sound; but to *say* is to communicate some idea by means of words: a child begins to *speak* the moment it opens its lips to utter any acknowledged sound; but it will be some time before it can *say* any thing; a person is said to *speak* high or low, distinctly or indistinctly; but he *says* that which is true or false, right or wrong: we *speak* sense or nonsense: we *speak* intelligibly or unintelligibly: but we *say* what we think at the time. In an extended sense, *speak* may refer as much to sense as to sound; but then it applies only to general cases, and *say* to particular and passing circumstances of life: it is a great abuse of the gift of speech not to *speak* the truth; it is very culpable in a person to *say* that he will do a thing and not to do it.

To *say* and *tell* are both the ordinary actions of men in their daily intercourse; but *say* is very partial, it may comprehend single unconnected sentences, or even single words: we may *say* yes or no; but we *tell* that which is connected and which forms more or less of a narrative. To *say* is to communicate that which passes in our own minds, to express our ideas and feelings as they rise; to *tell* is to communicate events or circumstances respecting ourselves or others: when every one is allowed to *say* what he likes and what he thinks, there will commonly be more *speakers* than hearers; those who accustom themselves to *tell* long

stories impose a tax upon others, which is not repaid by the pleasure of their company.

Men's reputations depend upon what others say of them; reports are spread by means of one man telling another.

TO SPEAK, TALK, CONVERSE, DISCOURSE.

SPEAK, v. *To speak.*

TALK is but a variation of *tell* (v. *To speak*).

CONVERSE, v. *Conversation.*

DISCOURSE, in Latin *discursus*, expresses properly an examining or deliberating upon.

The idea of communicating with, or communicating to, another, by means of words, is the common signification of all these terms: to *speak* is an indefinite term, specifying no circumstance of the action; we may *speak* only one word or many; but we *talk* for a continuance: we *speak* from various motives; we *talk* for pleasure; we *converse* for improvement, or intellectual gratification: we *speak* with or to a person; we *talk* commonly to others, we *converse* with others. *Speaking* a language is quite distinct from writing; public *speaking* has at all times been cultivated with great care under popular governments: *talking* is mostly the pastime of the idle and the empty; those who think least *talk* most: *conversation* is the rational employment of social beings, who seek by an interchange of sentiments to purify the affections, and improve the understanding.

Conversation is the act of many together; *talk* and *discourse* may be the act of one addressing himself to others: *conversation* loses its value when it ceases to be general; *talk* has seldom any value but what the *talker* attaches to it; a *discourse* derives its value from the nature of the subject, as well as the character of the *speaker*: *conversation* is adapted for mixed companies; children *talk* to their parents, or to their companions; parents and teachers *discourse* with young people on moral duties.

SPECIAL, SPECIFIC, PARTICULAR.

SPECIAL, in Latin *specialis* signifies belonging to the species: **PARTICULAR**, belonging to a particle or small part; **SPECIFIC**, in Latin *specificus*, from *species* a species, and *facio* to make, signifies making a species. The *special* is that which comes under the general; the *particular* is that which comes under the *special*: hence we speak of a *special* rule; but a *particular* case. *Particular* and *specific* are both applied to the properties of individuals; but

particular is said of the contingent circumstances of things, *specific* of their inherent properties; every plant has something *particular* in itself different from others, it is either longer or shorter, weaker or stronger; but its *specific* property is that which it has in common with its species; *particular* is, therefore, the term adapted to loose discourse: *specific* is a scientific term which describes things minutely.

The same may be said of *particularize* and *specify*; we *particularize* for the sake of information; we *specify* for the sake of instruction: in describing a man's person and dress we *particularize* if we mention every thing singly which can be said upon it; in delineating a plan it is necessary to *specify* time, place, distance, materials, and every thing else which may be connected with carrying it into execution.

TO SPEND, EXHAUST, DRAIN.

SPEND, contracted from *expend*, in Latin *expendo* to pay away, signifies to give from one's self.

EXHAUST, from the Latin *exhaurio* to draw out, signifies to draw out all that there is.

DRAIN, a variation of *draw*, signifies to draw dry.

The idea of taking from the substance of any thing is common to these terms; but to *spend* is less than to *exhaust*, and that less than to *drain*: every one who exerts himself, in that degree *spends* his strength; if the exertions are violent he *exhausts* himself; a country which is *drained* of men is supposed to have no more left. To *spend* may be applied to that which is either external or inherent in a body; *exhaust* to that which is inherent; *drain* to that which is external of the body in which it is contained: we may speak of *spending* our wealth, our resources, or our time; but of *exhausting* our strength, our vigour, our voice, and the like; of *draining*, in the proper application, a vessel of its liquid, or, in the improper application, *draining* a treasury of its contents: hence arises this farther distinction, that to *spend* and to *exhaust* may tend, more or less, to the injury of a body; but to *drain* may be to its advantage. In as much as what is *spent* or *exhausted* may be more or less essential to the soundness of a body, it cannot be parted with without diminishing its value, or even destroying its existence; as when a fortune is *spent* it is gone, or when a person's strength is *exhausted* he is no longer able to move: on the other hand, to *drain*, though a more complete evacuation, is

always injurious, but sometimes even useful to a body; as when the land is drained of a superabundance of water.

TO SPEND OR EXPEND, WASTE, DISSIPATE, SQUANDER.

SPEND and **EXPEND** are variations from the Latin *expendo*; but *spend* implies simply to turn to some purpose, or make use of; to *expend* carries with it like wise the idea of exhausting; and **WASTE**, moreover, comprehends the idea of exhausting to no good purpose: we *spend* money when we purchase any thing with it; we *expend* it when we lay it out in large quantities, so as essentially to diminish its quantity; individuals *spend* what they have; government *expends* vast sums in conducting the affairs of a nation; all persons *waste* their property who have not sufficient discretion to use it well: we *spend* our time, or our lives, in any employment; we *expend* our strength and faculties upon some arduous undertaking; we *waste* our time and talents in trifles.

DISSIPATE, in Latin *dissipatus*, from *dissipo*, that is, *dis* and *cipo*, in Greek *σῑπω* to scatter, signifies to scatter different ways, that is, to *waste* by throwing away in all directions: **SQUANDER**, which is a variation of *wander* signifies to make to run wide apart. Both these terms, therefore, denote modes of *wasting*; but the former seems peculiarly applicable to that which is *wasted* in detail upon different objects, and by a distraction of the mind; the latter respects rather the act of *wasting* in the gross, in large quantities, by planless profusion: young men are apt to *dissipate* their property in pleasures; the open, generous, and thoughtless, are apt to *squander* their property.

SPIRITUOUS, SPIRITED, SPIRITUAL, GHOSTLY.

SPIRITUOUS signifies having *spirit* as a physical property, after the manner of *spirituous* liquors: **SPIRITED** is applicable to the animal *spirits* of either men or brutes; a person or a horse may be *spirited*: **SPIRITUAL** and **GHOSTLY** signify belonging generally to the *spirit* or *ghost*, in distinction from what is corporeal. *Spiritual* applies either to beings, or to objects which engage the attention; angels are *spiritual* agents; death, immortality, and all religious subjects, are denominated *spiritual*: *ghostly* is seldom used but in a religious sense for a *spiritual* agent; the devil is called our *ghostly* enemy.

SPREAD, SCATTER, DISPERSE.

SPREAD, v. *To spread.*

SCATTER, like *shatter*, is a frequentative of *shake* (v. *To shake*).

DISPERSE, v. *To dispel.*

Spread applies equally to divisible or indivisible bodies: we *spread* our money on the table, or we may *spread* a cloth on the table: but *scatter* is applicable to divisible bodies only; we *scatter* corn on the ground. *To spread* may be an act of design or otherwise, but mostly the former; as when we *spread* books or papers before us: *scatter* is mostly an act without design; a child *scatters* the papers on the floor. When taken, however, as an act of design, it is done without order; but *spread* is an act done in order: thus hay is *spread* out to dry, but corn is *scattered* over the land. Things may *spread* in one direction, or at least without separation; but they *disperse* in many directions, so as to destroy the continuity of bodies: a leaf *spreads* as it opens in all its parts, and a tree also *spreads* as its branches increase; but a multitude *disperses*, an army *disperses*. Between *scatter* and *disperse* there is no other difference than that one is immethodical and involuntary, the other systematic and intentional: flowers are *scattered* along a path, which accidentally fall from the hand; a mob is *dispersed* by an act of authority; sheep are *scattered* along the hills; religious tracts are *dispersed* among the poor.

TO SPREAD, EXPAND, DIFFUSE.

SPREAD, in Saxon *sprepan*, low German *spreadan*, high German *spreiten*, is an intensive of *breit* broad, signifying to stretch wide.

EXPAND, in Latin *expando*, compounded of *ex* and *pando* to open, and the Greek *παῖνω* to show or make appear, signifies to open out wide.

DIFFUSE, v. *Diffuse.*

To spread is the general, the other two are particular terms. *To spread* may be said of any thing which occupies more space than it has done, whether by a direct separation of its parts, or by an accession to the substance; but to *expand* is to *spread* by means of separating or unfolding the parts: a mist *spreads* over the earth; a flower *expands* its leaves: a tree *spreads* by the growth of its branches; the opening bud *expands* when it feels the genial warmth of the sun.

Spread and *expand* are used likewise in a moral application; *diffuse* is seldom used in any other application: *spread* is here,

as before, equally indefinite as to the mode of the action; every thing *spreads*, and it *spreads* in any way; but *expansion* is that gradual process by which an object opens or unfolds itself after the manner of a flower: *diffusion* is that process of *spreading* which consists literally in pouring out in different ways.

Evils *spread*, and reports *spread*; the mind *expands*, and prospects *expand*: knowledge *diffuses* itself, or cheerfulness is *diffused* throughout a company.

TO SPREAD, CIRCULATE, PROPAGATE, DISSEMINATE.

To SPREAD (*v. To spread, expand*) is said of any object material or spiritual; the rest are mostly employed in the moral application. To *spread* is to extend to an indefinite width; to CIRCULATE is to *spread* within a circle; thus news *spreads* through a country: but a story *circulates* in a village, or from house to house, or a report is *circulated* in a neighbourhood. *Spread* and *circulate* are the acts of persons or things; PROPAGATE and DISSEMINATE are the acts of persons only. The thing *spreads* and *circulates*, or it is *spread* and *circulated*, by some one; it is always *propagated* and *disseminated* by some one. *Propagate*, from the Latin *propago* a breed, and *disseminate*, from *semen* a seed, are here figuratively employed as modes of *spreading*, according to the natural operations of increasing the quantity of any thing which is implied in the two terms. What is *propagated* is supposed to generate new subjects; as when doctrines, either good or bad, are *propagated* among the people so as to make them converts: what is *disseminated* is supposed to be sown in different parts, thus principles are *disseminated* among youth.

SPRING, FOUNTAIN, SOURCE.

SPRING denotes that which *springs*; the word, therefore, carries us back to the point from which the water issues. FOUNTAIN, in Latin *fons*, from *fundo* to pour out, signifies the *spring* which is visible on the earth; and SOURCE (*v. Origin*) is said of that which is not only visible, but runs along the earth. *Springs* are to be found by digging a sufficient depth in all parts of the earth; in mountainous countries, and also in the East, we read of *fountains* which form themselves, and supply the surrounding parts with refreshing streams: the *sources* of rivers are always to be traced to some mountain.

These terms are all used in a figurative

sense: in the Bible the Gospel is depicted as a *spring* of living waters; the eye as a *fountain* of tears. In the general acceptation the term *source* is used for the channel through which any event comes to pass, the primary cause of its happening: war is the *source* of many evils to a country; an imprudent step in the outset of life is oftentimes the *source* of ruin to a young person.

TO SPRING, START, STARTLE, SHRINK.

SPRING, *v. To spring.*

START is in all probability an intensive of *stir*.

STARTLE is a frequentative of *start*.

SHRINK, is probably an intensive of *sink*, signifying to sink into itself.

The idea of a sudden motion is expressed by all these terms, but the circumstances and mode differ in all; *spring* is indefinite in these respects, and is therefore the most general term. To *spring* and *start* may be either voluntary or involuntary movements, but the former is mostly voluntary, and the latter involuntary; a person *springs* out of bed, or one animal *springs* upon another; a person or animal *starts* from a certain point to begin running, or *starts* with fright from one side to the other. To *startle* is always an involuntary action; a horse *starts* by suddenly flying from the point on which he stands; but if he *startles* he seems to fly back on himself and stops his course; to *spring* and *start* therefore always carry a person farther from a given point; but *startle* and *shrink* are movements within one's self; *startling* is a sudden convulsion of the frame which makes a person to stand in hesitation whether to proceed or not; *shrinking* is a contraction of the frame within itself; any sudden and unexpected sound makes a person *startle*; the approach of any frightful object makes him *shrink* back: *spring* and *start* are employed only in the proper sense of corporeal movements: *startle* and *shrink* are employed in regard to the movements of the mind as well as the body.

TO SPRINKLE, BEDEW.

To SPRINKLE is a frequentative of *spring*, and denotes either an act of nature or design: to BEDEW is to cover with *dew*, which is an operation of nature. By *sprinkling*, a liquid falls in sensible drops upon the earth; by *bedewing*, it covers by imperceptible drops: rain *besprinkles* the earth; dew *bedews* it. So likewise, figuratively, things are *sprinkled* with flour: the cheeks are *bedewed* with tears.

TO SPROUT, BUD.

SPROUT, in Saxon *sprytan*, low German *sprouten*, is doubtless connected with the German *spritzen* to spurt. *spreiten* to spread, and the like.

To BUD is to put forth buds; the noun *bud* is a variation from button, which it resembles in form. To *sprout* is to come forth from the stem; to *bud*, to put forth in buds.

SPURIOUS, SUPPOSITITIOUS, COUNTERFEIT.

SPURIOUS, in Latin *spurius*, or Greek *σπουδαῖν*, that is, one conceived by a woman, because the ancients called the female *spurium*; hence, one who is of uncertain origin on the father's side is termed *spurious*.

SUPPOSITITIOUS, from *suppose*, signifies to be supposed or conjectured, in distinction from being positively known.

COUNTERFEIT, *v. To imitate*.

All these terms are modes of the false; the two former indirectly, the latter directly: whatever is uncertain that might be certain, and whatever is conjectural that might be conclusive, are by implication false; that which is made in imitation of another thing, so as to pass for it as the true one, is positively false. Hence, the distinction between these terms, and the ground of their applications. An illegitimate offspring is said to be *spurious* in the literal sense of the word, the father in this case being always uncertain; and any offspring which is termed *spurious* falls necessarily under the imputation of not being the offspring of the person whose name they bear. In the same manner an edition of a work is termed *spurious* which comes out under a false name: *supposititious* expresses more or less of falsehood, according to the nature of the thing. A *supposititious* parent implies little less than a directly false parent; but in speaking of the origin of any person in remote periods of antiquity, it may be merely *supposititious* or conjectural from the want of information. *Counterfeit* respects rather works of art which are exposed to imitation: coin is *counterfeit* which bears a false stamp, and every invention which comes out under the sanction of the inventor's name, is likewise a *counterfeit* if not made by himself or by his consent.

TO SPURT, SPOUT.

To SPURT and SPOUT are, like the German *spritzen*, variations of *spreiten* to spread (*v. To spread*), and *springen* to

spring (*v. To arise*); they both express the idea of sending forth liquid in small quantities from a cavity; the former however, does not always include the idea of the cavity, but simply that of springing up; the latter is however confined to the circumstance of issuing forth from some place; dirt may be *spurted* in the face by means of kicking it up; or blood may be *spurted* out of a vein when it is opened, water out of the mouth, and the like; but a liquid *spouts* out from a pipe. To *spurt* is a sudden action arising from a momentary impetus given to a liquid either intentionally or incidentally; the beer will *spurt* from a barrel when the vent peg is removed: to *spout* is a continued action produced by a perpetual impetus which the liquid receives equally from design or accident; the water *spouts* out from a pipe which is denominated a *spout*, or it will *spurt* out from any cavity in the earth, or in a rock which may resemble a *spout*; a person may likewise *spout* water in a stream from his mouth. Hence the figurative application of these terms; any sudden conceit which compels a person to an eccentric action is a *spurt*, particularly if it springs from ill-humour or caprice; to *spout*, on the other hand, is to send forth a stream of words in imitation of the stream of liquid, and is applied to those who affect to turn speakers, in whom there is commonly more sound than sense.

STAFF, STAY, PROP, SUPPORT.

From STAFF in the literal sense (*v. Staff*) comes *staff* in the figurative application; any thing may be denominated a *staff* which holds up after the manner of a *staff* particularly as it respects persons; bread is said to be the *staff* of life; one person may serve as a *staff* to another. The *staff* serves in a state of motion; the STAY and PROP are employed for objects in a state of rest: the *stay* makes a thing *stay* for the time being, it keeps it from falling; it is equally applied to persons and things: we may be a *stay*, to a person who is falling by letting his body rest against us; in the same manner buttresses against a wall, and shores against a building serve the purpose of stays while they are repairing. For the same reason that part of a female's dress which serves as a *stay* to the body is denominated *stays*; the *prop* keeps a thing up for a permanency; every pillar on which a building rests is a *prop*; whatever therefore requires to be raised from the ground and kept in that state may be set upon *props*; between the *stay* and the *prop* there is this

obvious distinction, that as the *stay* does not receive the whole weight, it is put so as to receive it indirectly, by leaning against the object; but the *prop*, for a contrary reason, is put upright underneath the object so as to receive the weight directly: the derivation of this word *prop*, from the Dutch *proppe* a plug, and the German *pfropfen* a cork, does not seem to account very clearly for its present use in English.

Stay and *prop* may be figuratively extended in their application with the same distinction in their sense; a crust of bread may serve as a *stay* to the stomach; a person's money may serve as a *prop* for the credit of another. SUPPORT is altogether taken in the moral and abstract sense: whatever *supports*, that is, bears the weight of an object, is a *support*, whether in a state of motion like a *staff*, or in a state of rest like a *stay*; whether to bear the weight in part like a *stay*, or altogether like a *prop*, it is still a *support*: but the term is likewise employed on all occasions in which the other terms are not admissible. Whatever *supports* existence, whether directly or indirectly, is a *support*: food is the *support* of the animal body; labour or any particular employment is likewise one's *support*, or the indirect means of gaining the *support*; hope is the *support* of the mind under the most trying circumstances; religion, as the foundation of all our hopes, is the best and surest *support* under affliction.

STAFF, STICK, CRUTCH.

STAFF, in low German *staff*, &c. in Latin *stipes*, in Greek *στύπη*, comes from *στυπω* *stipo* to fix.

STICK signifies that which can be stuck in the ground.

CRUTCH, as changed from *cross*, is a *staff* or *stick* which has a cross bar at the top.

The ruling idea in a *staff* is that of firmness and fixedness; it is employed for leaning upon: the ruling idea in the *stick* is that of sharpness with which it can penetrate, it is used for walking and ordinary purposes; the ruling idea in the *crutch* is its form, which serves the specific purpose of support in case of lameness; a *staff* can never be small, but a *stick* may be large; a *crutch* is in size more of a *staff* than a common *stick*.

TO STAGGER, REEL, TOTTER.

STAGGER is in all probability a frequentative from the German *steigen*, and

the Greek *στοιχεῖν* to go, signifying to go backward and forward.

To REEL signifies to go like a reel in a winding manner.

TOTTER most probably comes from the German *zittern* to tremble, because to totter is a tremulous action.

All these terms designate an involuntary and unsteady motion; they vary both in the cause and the mode of the action; *staggering* and *reeling* are occasioned either by drunkenness or sickness; *tottering* is purely the effect of weakness, particularly weakness of old age: a drunken man always *staggers* as he walks; one who is giddy *reels* from one part to another: to *stagger* is a much less degree of unsteadiness than to *reel*; for he who *staggers* is only thrown a little out of the straight path, but he who *reels* altogether loses his equilibrium; *reeling* is commonly succeeded by falling. To *stagger* and *reel* are said as to the carriage of the whole body; but *totter* has particular reference to the limbs; the knees and the legs *totter*, and consequently the footsteps become *tottering*. In an extended application, the mountains may be said to *stagger* and to *reel* in an earthquake: the houses may *totter* from their very bases. In a figurative application, the faith or the resolution of a person *staggers* when its hold on the mind is shaken, and begins to give way: a nation or a government will *totter* when it is torn by intestine convulsions.

TO STRAIN, SOIL, SULLY, TARNISH.

STAIN, v. *Blemish*.

SOIL and SULLY, from the French *souiller*, signifies to smear with dirt.

TARNISH, in French *ternir*, probably from the Latin *tero* to bruise.

All these terms imply the act of diminishing the brightness of an object; but the term *stain* denotes something grosser than the other terms, and is applied to inferior objects: things which are not remarkable for purity or brightness may be *stained*, as hands when *stained* with blood, or a wall *stained* with chalk; nothing is *sullied* or *tarnished*, but what has some intrinsic value; a fine picture or piece of writing may be easily *soiled* by a touch of the finger: the finest gloss is the soonest *tarnished*: hence in the moral application, a man's life may be *stained* by the commission of some gross immorality: his honour may be *sullied*, or his glory *tarnished*.

TO STAND, STOP, REST, STAGNATE.

To STAND, in German *stehen*, &c

Latin *sto*, Greek *ιστημι* to stand; Hebrew *sut* to settle.

STOP, in Saxon *stoppan*, &c. conveys the ideas of pressing, thickening, like the Latin *stipa*, and Greek *στειβειν*; whence it has been made in English to express immovability.

REST, *v. Ease*.

STAGNATED, in Latin *stagnatus*, participle of *stagnare*, comes from *stagnum* a pool, and that either from *sto* to stand, because waters stand perpetually in a pool, or from the Greek *τεγνος* an inclosure, because a pool is an inclosure for waters.

The absence of motion is expressed by all these terms; *stand* is the most general of all the terms; to *stand* is simply not to move; to *stop* is to cease to move: we *stand* either for want of inclination or power to move; but we *stop* from a disinclination to go on; to *rest* is to *stop* from an express dislike to motion; we may *stop* for purposes of convenience, or because we have no farther to go, but we *rest* from fatigue; to *stagnate* is only a species of *standing* as respects liquids; water may both *stand* and *stagnate*; but the former is a temporary, the latter a permanent *stand*: water *stands* in a puddle, but it *stagnates* in a pond or in any confined space.

All these terms admit of an extended application; business *stands* still, or there is a *stand* to business; a mercantile house *stops*, or *stops* payment; an affair *rests* undecided, or *rests* in the hands of a person; trade *stagnates*. *Stand*, *stop*, and *rest*, are likewise employed transitively, but with a wide distinction in the sense; to *stand* in this case is to set one's self up to resist; as to *stand* the trial, to *stand* the test: to *stop* has the sense of hinder; as to *stop* a person who is going on, that is, to make him *stop*: to *rest* is to make a thing *rest* or *lean*; a person *rests* his argument upon the supposed innocence of another.

STATE, REALM, COMMONWEALTH.

The STATE is that consolidated part of a nation in which lies its power and greatness.

The REALM, from *royaume* a kingdom, is any state whose government is monarchical.

The COMMONWEALTH is the grand body of a nation, consisting both of the government and people, which forms the *commonwealth*, *welfare*, or *wealth*.

The ruling idea in the sense and application of the word *state* is that of government in its most abstract sense; affairs of

state may either respect the internal regulations of a country, or it may respect the arrangement of different *states* with each other. The term *realm* is employed for the nation at large, but confined to such nations as are monarchical and aristocratical; peers of the *realm* sit in the English parliament by their own right. The term *commonwealth* refers rather to the aggregate body of men, and their possessions, rather than to the government of a country: it is the business of the minister to consult the interests of the *commonwealth*.

The term *state* is indefinitely applied to all communities, large or small, living under any form of government: a petty principality in Germany, and the whole German or Russian empire, are alike termed *states*. *Realm* is a term of dignity in regard to a nation; France, Germany, England, Russia, are, therefore, with most propriety termed *realms*, when spoken of either in regard to themselves or in general connexions. *Commonwealth* although not inappropriately applied to any nation, is most fitted for republics, which have hardly fixedness enough in themselves to deserve the name of *state*.

TO STICK, CLEAVE, ADHERE.

STICK, in Saxon *stican*, low German *steken*, Latin *stigo*, Greek *στιγω* to prick, Hebrew *stock* to press.

CLEAVE, in Saxon *cleofen*, low German *kliven*, Danish *klæve*, is connected with our words glue and lime. in Latin *gluten*, Greek *ζωλλα* lime.

ADHERE, *v. To attach*.

To *stick* expresses more than to *cleave*, and *cleave* than *adhere*: things are made to *stick* either by incision into the substance, or through the intervention of some glutinous matter; they are made to *cleave* and *adhere* by the intervention of some foreign body: what *sticks* becomes so fast joined as to render the bodies inseparable; what *cleaves* and *adheres* is less tightly bound, and more easily separable.

Two pieces of clay will *stick* together by the incorporation of the substance in the two parts; paper is made to *stick* to paper by means of glue: the tongue in a certain state will *cleave* to the roof of the mouth: paste, or even occasional moisture, will make soft substances *adhere* to each other, or to hard bodies.

Stick is seldom employed in the moral sense, but in the familiar and inelegant style; *cleave* and *adhere* are peculiarly proper in the moral acceptation. Persons in the moral sense *cleave* to each other by

never parting company; and they *adhere* to each other by uniting their interests.

TO STIFLE, SUPPRESS, SMOTHER.

STIFLE is a frequentative of *stuff*, in Latin *stipo*, and Greek *στυφω* to make tight or close.

SUPPRESS, *v.* To repress.

SMOTHER, as a frequentative of smut or smoke, signifies to cover with smut or smoke.

Stifle and *smother* in their literal sense will be more properly considered under the article of *Suffocate*, &c. (*v.* To suffocate); they are here taken in a moral application.

The leading idea in all these terms is that of keeping out of view: *stifle* is applicable to the feelings only; *suppress* to the feelings or the outward circumstances; *smother* to outward circumstances only: we *stifle* resentment; we *suppress* anger: the former is an act of some continuance; the latter is the act of the moment: we *stifle* our resentment by abstaining to take any measures of retaliation; we *suppress* the rising emotion of anger, so as not to give it utterance or even the expression of a look. It requires time and powerful motives to *stifle*, but only a single effort to *suppress*; nothing but a long course of vice can enable a man to *stifle* the admonitions and reproaches of conscience; a sense of prudence may sometimes lead a man to *suppress* the joy which an occurrence produces in his mind.

In regard to outward circumstances, we say that a book is *suppressed* by the authority of government; that vice is *suppressed* by the exertions of those who have power: an affair is *smothered* so that it shall not become generally known, or that the fire is *smothered* under the embers.

STILL, YET.

STILL and **YET** as adverbs of time both convey the idea of time but the former is more indefinite and includes the idea of something done before, the latter is more specific: we say, of a servant; he has not *yet* got a place, where the moment only is to be specified; but he is *still* out of place, when the idea of continuance is to be included.

TO STIR, MOVE.

STIR, in German *storen*, old German *stiren* or *steren*, Latin *turbo*, Greek *τurbη* or *θορυβη* trouble or tumult.

MOVE, *v.* Motion

Stir is here a specific, *move* a generic term; to *stir* is to *move* so as to disturb the

rest and composure either of the body or mind; hence the term *stir* is employed to designate an improper or unauthorized motion; children are not allowed to *stir* from their seats in school hours; a soldier must not *stir* from the post which he has to defend; atrocious criminals or persons raving mad are bound hand and foot, that they may not *stir*.

STOCK, STORE.

STOCK, from *stick*, *stoke*, *stow*, and *stuff*, signifies any quantity laid up.

STORE, in Welch *stor*, comes from the Hebrew *satar* to hide.

The ideas of wealth and stability being naturally allied, it is not surprising that *stock*, which expresses the latter idea, should also be put for the former, particularly as the abundance here referred to serves as a foundation in the same manner as *stock* in the literal sense does to a tree.

Store likewise implies a quantity; but agreeable to the derivation of the word, it implies an accumulated quantity. Any quantity of materials which is in hand may serve as a *stock* for a given purpose; thus a few shillings with some persons may be their *stock* in trade; any quantity of materials brought together for a given purpose may serve as a *store*; thus the industrious ant collects a *store* of grain for the winter: we judge of a man's substantial property by the *stock* of goods which he has on hand; we judge of a man's disposable property by the *store* which he has. The *stock* is that which must increase of itself; it is the source and foundation of industry: the *store* is that from which we draw in time of need. By a *stock* we gain riches; by a *store* we guard against want.

The same distinction subsists between these words in their moral application; he who wishes to speak a foreign language must have a *stock* of familiar words; *stores* of learning are frequently lost to the world for want of means and opportunity to bring them forth to public view.

As verbs, to *stock* and to *store* both signify to provide; but the former is a provision for the present use, and the latter for some future purpose: a tradesman *stocks* himself with such articles as are most saleable; a fortress or a ship is *stored*: a person *stocks* himself with patience, or *stores* his memory with knowledge.

STORY, TALE.

STORY, *v.* Anecdote.

TALE, *v.* Fable.

The *story* is either an actual fact, or

something feigned; the *tale* is always feigned: *stories* are circulated respecting the accidents and occurrences which happen to persons in the same place; *tales* of distress are told by many merely to excite compassion. When both are taken for that which is fictitious, the *story* is either an untruth, or falsifying of some fact, or it is altogether an invention; the *tale* is always an invention. As an untruth, the *story* is commonly told by children: and as a fiction, the *story* is commonly made for children: the *tale* is of deeper invention, formed by men of mature understanding, and adapted for persons of mature years.

STRAIN, SPRAIN, STRESS, FORCE.

STRAIN and SPRAIN are without doubt variations of the same word, namely, the Latin *stringo* to pull tight, or to stretch: they have now, however, a distinct application: to *strain* is to extend beyond its ordinary length by some extraordinary effort; to *sprain* is to *strain* so as to put out of its place, or extend to an injurious length: the ankle and the wrist are liable to be *sprained* by a contusion: the back and other parts of the body may be *strained* by over-exertion.

Strain and STRESS are kindred terms, as being both variations of stretch and *stringo*; but they differ now very considerably in their application figuratively we speak of *straining* a nerve, or *straining* a point, to express making exertions, beyond our ordinary powers; and morally we speak of laying a *stress* upon any particular measure or mode of action, signifying to give a thing importance: the term *strain* (v. *Stress*) may be put for the course of sentiment which we express, and the manner of expressing it; *stress* (v. *Stress*) may be put for the efforts of the voice in uttering a word or syllable: a writer may proceed in a *strain* of panegyric or invective: a speaker or a reader lays a *stress* on certain words by way of distinguishing them from others. To *strain* is properly a species of FORCING; we may *force* in a variety of ways, that is, by the exercise of *force* upon different bodies, and in different directions; but to *strain* is to exercise *force* by stretching or prolonging bodies: thus to *strain* a cord is to pull it to its full extent; but we may speak of *forcing* any hard substance in, or *forcing* it out, or *forcing* it through, or *forcing* it from a body: a door or a lock may be *forced* by violently breaking them: but a door or a lock may be *strained* by putting the hinges or the spring out of its place. So likewise

a person may be said to *force* himself to speak, when by a violent exertion he gives utterance to his words; but he *strains* his throat or his voice when he exercises the *force* on the throat or lungs so as to extend them. *Force* and *stress* as nouns are in like manner comparable when they are applied to the mode of utterance: we must use a certain *force* in the pronunciation of every word; this therefore is indefinite and general: but the *stress* is that particular and strong degree of *force* which is exerted in the pronunciation of certain words.

STRAIGHT, RIGHT, DIRECT.

STRAIGHT, from the Latin *strictus*, participle of *stringo* to tighten or bind, signifies confined, that is, turning neither to the right nor left. *Straight* is applied, therefore, in its proper sense, to corporeal objects; a path which is *straight*, is kept within a shorter space than if it were curved. RIGHT and DIRECT, from the Latin *rectus*, regulated or made as it ought, are said of that which is made by the force of the understanding, or by an actual effort, what one wishes it to be: hence, the mathematician speaks of a *right* line, as the line which lies most justly between two points, and has been made the basis of mathematical figures; and the moralist speaks of the *right* opinion, as that which has been formed by the best rule of the understanding; and, on the same ground, we speak of a *direct* answer, as that which has been framed so as to bring soonest and easiest to the point desired.

STRAIT, NARROW.

STRAIT, in Latin *strictus*, participle of *stringo* to bind close, signifies bound tight, that is, brought into a small compass: NARROW, which is a variation of near, expresses a mode of nearness or closeness. *Strait* is a particular term; *narrow* is general: *straitness* is an artificial mode of narrowness; a coat is *strait* which is made to compress a body within a small compass: *narrow* is either the artificial or the natural property of a body; as a *narrow* ribbon, or a *narrow* leaf.

That which is *strait* is so by the means of other bodies; as a piece of water confined close on each side by land, is called a *strait*: that which is so of itself is *narrow*; thus a piece of land whose prolonged sides are at a small distance from each other is *narrow*.

The same distinction applies to these terms in their moral use: a person in *straitened* circumstances is kept, by means of his cir-

cumstances, from incurring expenses; a person who is in *narrow* circumstances is represented as having but a small extent of property.

STRANGER, FOREIGNER, ALIEN.

STRANGER, in French *étranger*, Latin *extraneus* or *extra*, in Greek *εξ*, signifies out of, that is, out of another country: FOREIGNER, from *foris* abroad, and ALIEN, from *alienus* another's, have obviously the same original meaning: they have, however, deviated in their acceptations. *Stranger* is a general term, and applies to one not known, or not an inhabitant, whether of the same or another country; *foreigner* is applied only to *strangers* of another country; and *alien* is a technical term applied to *foreigners* as subjects or residents, in distinction from natural-born subjects. Ulysses, after his return from the Trojan war, was a *stranger* in his own house; the French are *foreigners* in England, and the English in France; neither can enjoy, as *aliens*, the same privileges in a *foreign* country as they do in their own.

From *stranger* and *alien* come the verbs to *estrangle* and *alienate*, which are extended in their meaning and application; the former signifying to make the understanding or mind of a person *strange* to an object, and the latter to make the heart or affections of one person *strange* to another: thus we may say that the mind becomes *alienated* from one object, when it is has fixed its affections on another; or a person *estranges* himself from his family.

As epithets *strange*, *foreign* and *alien*, are all used in an extended application in the same sense as a *strange* object, something *foreign* to the purpose, and *alien* from God.

STREAM, CURRENT, TIDE.

A fluid body in a progressive motion is the object described in common by these terms: STREAM is the most general, the other two are but modes of the *stream*: *stream*, in Saxon *stream*, in German *strom*, is an onomatopoeia which describes the prolongation of any body in a narrow line along the surface; a CURRENT, from *curro* to run, is a running *stream*; and a TIDE, from *tide*, German *zeit*, Danish *tid* time, is a periodical *stream* or *current*. All rivers are *streams*, which are more or less gentle, according to the nature of the ground through which they pass; the force of the *current* is very much increased by rocks, or by means of artificial impediments: the *tide* is high

or low, strong or weak, at different hours of the day; when the *tide* is high the *current* is strongest.

From knowing the proper application of these terms, their figurative use becomes obvious: a *stream* of air, or a *stream* of light, is a prolonged body of air or light: a *current* of air is a continued *stream* that has rapid motion: streets and passages, which are open at each extremity, are the channels of such *currents*: in the moral sense the *tide* is the ruling fashion or propensity of the day; it is in vain to stem the *tide* of folly, it is wiser to get out of its reach.

TO STRENGTHEN, FORTIFY, INVIGORATE.

STRENGTHEN, from *strength*, and FORTIFY, from *fortis* and *facio*, signify to make strong: INVIGORATE, signifies to put in vigour (v. *Energy*).

Whatever adds to the *strength*, be it in ever so small a degree, *strengthens*; exercise *strengthens* either body or mind: whatever gives *strength* for a particular emergence *fortifies*; religion *fortifies* the mind against adversity: whatever adds to the *strength* so as to give a positive degree of *strength*, *invigorates*; morning exercise in fine weather *invigorates*.

STRENUOUS, BOLD.

STRENUOUS, in Latin *strenuus*, from the Greek *στορνής* undaunted, untamed, that is, *στορνῖω* to be without all rein or control.

BOLD, v. *Bold*.

Strenuous expresses much more than *bold*; *boldness* is a prominent idea, but it is only one idea which enters into the signification of *strenuousness*; it combines likewise fearlessness, activity, and ardour. An advocate in a cause may be *strenuous*, or *bold*; in the former case he omits nothing that can be either said or done in favour of the cause, he is always on the alert, he heeds no difficulties or danger: but in the latter case he only displays his spirit in the undisguised declaration of his sentiments. *Strenuous* supporters of any opinion are always strongly convinced of the truth of that which they support, and warmly impressed with a sense of its importance; but the *bold* supporter of an opinion may be impelled rather with the desire of showing his *boldness* than maintaining his point.

STRESS, STRAIN, EMPHASIS, ACCENT.

STRESS, v. *Strain*.

STRAIN, v. *Strain*.

EMPHASIS, from the Greek *παῖνω* to appear, signifies making to appear.

ACCENT, in Latin *accentus*, from *cano* to sing, signifies to suit the tune or tone of the voice.

Stress and *strain* are general both in sense and application: the former still more than the latter: *emphasis* and *accent* are modes of the *stress*. *Stress* is applicable to all bodies, the powers of which may be tried by exertion; as the *stress* upon a rope, upon a shaft of a carriage, a wheel or spring in a machine: the *strain* is an excessive *stress*, by which a thing is thrown out of its course; there may be a *strain* in most cases where there is a *stress*: but *stress* and *strain* are to be compared with *emphasis* and *accent*, particularly in the exertion of the voice, in which case the *stress* is a strong and special exertion of the voice, on one word, or one part of a word, so as to distinguish it from another; but the *strain* is the undue exertion of the voice beyond its usual pitch, in the utterance of one or more words: we lay a *stress* for the convenience of others; but when we *strain* the voice it is as much to the annoyance of others as it is hurtful to ourselves. The *stress* may consist in an elevation of voice, or a prolonged utterance; the *emphasis* is that species of *stress* which is employed to distinguish one word or syllable from another: the *stress* may be accidental; but the *emphasis* is an intentional *stress*: ignorant people and children are often led to lay the *stress* on little and unimportant words in a sentence; speakers sometimes find it convenient to mark particular words, to which they attach a value, by the *emphasis* with which they utter them. The *stress* may be casual or regular, on words or syllables; the *accent* is that kind of regulated *stress* which is laid on one syllable to distinguish it from another; there are many words in our own language, such as subject, object, present, and the like, where to distinguish the verb from the noun, the *accent* falls on the last syllable for the former, and on the first syllable for the latter.

In reference to the use of words, these terms may admit of a farther distinction; for we may lay a *stress* or *emphasis* on a particular point of our reasoning, in the first case, by enlarging upon it longer than on other points; or, in the second case, by the use of stronger expressions or epithets. The *strain* or *accent* may be employed to designate the tone or manner in which we express ourselves, that is, the spirit of our discourse: in familiar language, we talk of a person's proceeding in a *strain* of pane-

gyric, or of censure; but, in poetry, persons are said to pour forth their complaints in tender *accents*.

STRICT, SEVERE.

STRICT, from *strictus* bound or confined, characterizes the thing which binds or keeps in control: **SEVERE** (v. *Austere*) characterizes in the proper sense the disposition of the person to inflict pain, and in an extended application the thing which inflicts pain. The term *strict* is, therefore, taken always in the good sense; *severe* is good or bad, according to the circumstances: he who has authority over others must be *strict* in enforcing obedience, but it is possible to be very *severe* in punishing those who are under us, and yet very lax in all matters of duty.

STRONG, FIRM, ROBUST, STURDY.

STRONG is in all probability a variation of *strict*, which is in German *streng*, because strength is altogether derived from the close texture of bodies.

ROBUST, in Latin *robustus*, from *robur*, signifies literally having the strength of oak.

STURDY, like the word stout, steady (v. *Firm*), comes in all probability from *stehen* to stand, signifying capable of standing.

Strong is here the generic term; the others are specific, or specify strength under different circumstances; *robust* is a positive and high degree of strength, arising from a peculiar bodily make; *sturdy* indicates not only strength of body but also of mind: a man may be *strong* from the strength of his constitution, from the power which is inherent in his frame; but a *robust* man has strength both from the size and texture of his body, he has a bone and nerve which is endowed with great power. A little man may be *strong*, although not *robust*; a tall, stout man, in full health, may be termed *robust*.

A man may be *strong* in one part of his body and not in another; he may be *stronger* at one time, from particular circumstances than he is at another; but a *robust* man is *strong* in his whole body: and as he is *robust* by nature, he will cease to be so only from disease.

Sturdiness lies both in the make of the body and the temper of the mind: a *sturdy* man is capable of making resistance, and ready to make it; he must be naturally *strong*, and not of slender make, but he need not be *robust*: a *sturdy* peasant presents us with a man who, both by nature

and habit is formed for withstanding the inroads of an enemy.

Every object is termed *strong* which is the reverse of weak; those only are termed *robust* who have bodily requisites to make them more than ordinary *strong*; those only are *sturdy* whose habits of life qualify them both for action and for endurance.

STUPID, DULL.

STUPID, in Latin *stupidus*, from *stupere* to be amazed or bewildered, expresses an amazement which is equivalent to a deprivation of understanding; **DULL**, through the medium of the German *toll* and Swedish *stollig*, comes from the Latin *stultus* simple or foolish, and denotes a simple deficiency. *Stupidity* in its proper sense is natural to a man, although a particular circumstance may have a similar effect upon the understanding; he who is questioned in the presence of others may appear very *stupid* in that which is otherwise very familiar to him. *Dull* is an incidental quality, arising principally from the state of the animal spirits: a writer may sometimes be *dull* who is otherwise vivacious and pointed; a person may be *dull* in a large circle while he is very lively in private intercourse.

SUAVITY, URBANITY.

SUAVITY is literally sweetness; and **URBANITY** the refinement of the city, in distinction from the country: inasmuch, therefore, as a polite education tends to soften the mind and the manners, it produces *suavity*: but *suavity* may sometimes arise from natural temper, and exist therefore without *urbanity*; although there cannot be *urbanity* without *suavity*. By the *suavity* of our manners we gain the love of those around us; by the *urbanity* of our manners we render ourselves agreeable companions; hence also arises another distinction that the term *suavity* may be applied to other things, as the voice, or the style; but *urbanity* to manners only.

SUBJECT, LIABLE, EXPOSED, OBNOXIOUS.

SUBJECT, in Latin *subjectus*, participle of *subjicio* to cast under, signifies thrown underneath.

LIABLE, compounded of *lie* and *able*, signifies ready to lie near or lie under.

EXPOSED, in Latin *expositus*, participle of *expono*, compounded of *ex* and *pono*, signifies set out, set within the view or reach.

OBNOXIOUS, in Latin *obnoxius*, com-

pounded of *ob* and *noxiam* mischief, signifies in the way of mischief.

All these terms are applied to those circumstances in human life by which we are affected independently of our own choice. Direct necessity is included in the term *subject*: whatever we are obliged to suffer, that we are *subject* to; we may apply remedies to remove the evil, but often in vain: *liable* conveys more the idea of casualty; we may suffer that which we are *liable* to, but we may also escape the evil if we are careful: *exposed* conveys the idea of a passive state into which we may be brought either through our own means or through the instrumentality of others; we are *exposed* to that which we are not in a condition to keep off from ourselves; it is frequently not in our power to guard against the evil; *obnoxious* conveys the idea of a state into which we have altogether brought ourselves; we may avoid bringing ourselves into the state, but we cannot avoid the consequences which will ensue from being thus involved. We are *subject* to disease, or *subject* to death: tender people are *liable* to catch cold; all persons are *liable* to make mistakes: a person is *exposed* to insults who provokes the anger of a low-bred man: a minister sometimes renders himself *obnoxious* to the people, that is, puts himself in the way of their animosity.

To *subject* and *expose*, as verbs, are taken in the same sense: a person *subjects* himself to impertinent freedoms by descending to indecent familiarities with his inferiors; he *exposes* himself to the derision of his equals by an affectation of superiority.

SUBJECT, SUBORDINATE, INFERIOR, SUBSERVIENT.

SUBJECT, v. Subject.

SUBORDINATE, compounded of *sub* and *order*, signifies to be in an order that is under others.

INFERIOR, in Latin *inferior*, comparative of *inferus* low, which probably comes from *infero* to cast into, because we are cast into places that are low.

SUBSERVIENT, compounded of *sub* and *servio*, signifies serving under something else.

These terms may either express the relation between persons to persons, or things to things. *Subject* in the first case respects the exercise of power; *subordinate* is said of the station and office; *inferior*, either of a man's outward circumstances or of his merits and qualifications; *subservient*, of one's relative services to another, but always in a bad sense. According to

the law of nature, a child should be *subject* to his parents; according to the law of God and man he must be *subject* to his prince; the good order of society cannot be rightly maintained unless there be some to act in a *subordinate* capacity: men of *inferior* talent have a part to act which, is of no less importance than that sustained by men of the highest endowment: men of no principle or character will be most *subservient* to the base purposes of those who pay them best.

In the second instance *subject* has the same sense as in the preceding article (*v. Subject*), where it is taken to express the relation of persons to things; *subordinate* designates the degree of relative importance between things; *inferior* designates every circumstance which can render things comparatively higher or lower; *subservient* designates the relative utility of things under certain circumstances, but not always in the bad sense. All things in this world are *subject* to change; matters of *subordinate* consideration ought to be entirely set out of the question, when any grand object is to be obtained; things of *inferior* value must necessarily sell for an *inferior* price: there is nothing so insignificant but it may be made *subservient* to some purpose.

TO SUBJECT, SUBJUGATE, SUBDUE.

SUBJECT signifies to make subject.

SUBJUGATE, from *jugum* a yoke, signifies to bring under the yoke.

SUBDUE, *v. To conquer.*

Subject is here the generic; the two others specific terms: we may *subject* either individuals or nations; but we *subjugate* only nations. We *subject* ourselves to reproach, to inconvenience, or to the influence of our passions; one nation *subjugates* another: *subjugate* and *subdue* are both employed with regard to nations that are compelled to submit to the conqueror; but *subjugate* expresses even more than *subdue*, for it implies to bring into a state of permanent submission: whereas to *subdue* may be only a nominal and temporary subjection: Caesar *subjugated* the Gauls, for he made them subjects to the Roman empire; but Alexander *subdued* the Indian nations, who revolted after his departure.

TO SUBSIDE, ABATE, INTERMIT.

SUBSIDE, from the Latin *sub* and *se-deo*, signifies to settle to the bottom.

ABATE, *v. Abate.*

INTERMIT, from the Latin *inter* and *mitto*, signifies to leave a space or interval between.

A settlement after agitation is the peculiar meaning of *subside*. That which has been put into commotion *subsides*; heavy particles *subside* in a fluid that is at rest, and tumults are said to *subside*: a diminution of strength characterizes the meaning of *abate*; that which has been high in action may *abate*; the rain *abates* after it has been heavy; and a man's anger *abates*: alternate action and rest is implied in the word *intermit*; whatever is in action may sometimes cease from action; labour without *intermission*, is out of the power of man.

SUBSTANTIAL, SOLID.

SUBSTANTIAL, signifies having a substance: **SOLID**, signifies having a firm substance. The *substantial* is opposed to that which is thin and has no consistency; the *solid* is opposed to the liquid, or that which is of loose consistency. All objects which admit of being handled are in their nature *substantial*; those which are of so hard a texture as to require to be cut are *solid*. *Substantial* food is that which has a consistency in itself, and is capable of giving fulness to the empty stomach: *solid* food is meat in distinction from drink.

In the moral application an argument is said to be *substantial*, which has weight in itself; a reason is *solid* which has a high degree of *substantiality*.

SUCCESSION, SERIES, ORDER.

SUCCESSION signifies the act or state of *succeeding* (*v. To follow*).

SERIES, *v. Series.*

ORDER, *v. To place.*

Succession is a matter of necessity or casualty: things *succeed* each other, or they are taken in *succession* either arbitrarily or by design: the *series* is a connected *succession*; the *order*, the *ordered* or arranged *succession*. We observe the *succession* of events as a matter of curiosity; we trace the *series* of events as a matter of intelligence; we follow the *order* which the historian has pursued as a matter of judgment; the *succession* may be slow or quick; the *series* may be long or short; the *order* may be correct or incorrect.

SUCCESSIVE, ALTERNATE.

What is **SUCCESSIVE** follows directly; what is **ALTERNATIVE** follows indirectly. A minister preaches *successively* who preaches every Sunday uninterruptedly at the same hour; but he preaches *alternately* if he preaches on one Sunday in the morning, and the other Sunday in the afternoon at

the same place. The *successive* may be accidental or intentional; the *alternate* is always intentional: it may rain for three *successive* days, or a fair may be held for three *successive* days: trees are placed sometimes in *alternate* order, when every other tree is of the same size and kind.

TO SUFFER, BEAR, ENDURE, SUPPORT.

SUFFER, in Latin *suffero*, compounded of *sub* and *fero*, signifies bearing up or firm underneath.

BEAR, v. *To bear*.

ENDURE, in Latin *induro*, signifies to harden or be hardened.

SUPPORT, from the Latin *sub* and *porto*, signifies to carry up or to carry from underneath ourselves, or to receive the weight.

To *suffer* is a passive and involuntary act; it denotes simply the being a receiver of evil: to *bear* is positive and voluntary; it denotes the manner in which we receive the evil. „Man,“ says the Psalmist, „is born to *suffering* as the sparks fly upwards;“ hence the necessity for us to *bear* with patience the numerous and diversified evils to which we are obnoxious.

To *bear* is a single act of the resolution, and relates only to common ills: we *bear* disappointments and crosses: to *endure* is a continued and powerful act of the mind; we *endure* severe and lasting pains both of body and mind: we *endure* hunger and cold; we *endure* provocations and aggravations; it is a making ourselves by our own act insensible to external evils. The first object of education should be to accustom children to *bear* contradictions and crosses, that they may afterwards be enabled to *endure* every trial and misery.

To *bear* and *endure* signify to receive becomingly the weight of what befalls ourselves; to *support* signifies to bear either our own or another's evils; we may either *support* ourselves, or be *supported* by others: we *bear*, from the capacity which is within ourselves; but we *support* ourselves by foreign aid, that is, by the consolations of religion, the participation and condolence of friends, and the like.

The words *suffer* and *endure* are said only of persons and personal matters; to *bear* and *support* are said also of things, signifying to receive a weight: in this case they differ principally in degree of weight received. To *bear* is said of any weight, large or small, and either of the whole or any part of the weight; *support* is said of a great weight and the whole weight. The beams or the foundation *bear* the weight of

a house; but the pillars upon which it is raised, or against which it leans, *support* the weight.

TO SUFFOCATE, STIFLE, SMOTHER, CHOKE.

SUFFOCATE, in Latin *suffocatus*, participle of *suffoco*, compounded of *sub* and *faux*, signifies to constrain or tighten the throat.

STIFLE is a frequentative of *stuff*, that is, to *stuff* excessively.

SMOTHER is a frequentative of *smoke*.

CHOKE is probably a variation of *cheek*, in Saxon *ceac*, because strangulation is effected by a compression of the throat under the cheek-bone.

These terms express the act of stopping the breath, but under various circumstances and by various means; *suffocation* is produced by every kind of means, external or internal, and is therefore the most general of these terms; *stifling* proceeds by internal means, that is, by the admission of foreign bodies into the passages which lead to the respiratory organs: we may be *suffocated* by excluding the air externally, as by gagging, confining closely, or pressing violently: we may be *suffocated* or *stifled* by means of vapours, close air, or smoke. To *smother* is to *suffocate* by the exclusion of air externally, as by covering a person entirely with bed-clothes: to *choke* is a mode of *stifling* by means of large bodies, as a piece of food lodging in the throat or the larynx.

SUPERFICIAL, SHALLOW, FLIMSY.

The **SUPERFICIAL** is that which lies only at the surface; it is therefore by implication the same as the **SHALLOW**, which has nothing underneath: *shallow* being a variation of hollow or empty. Hence a person may be called either *superficial* or *shallow*, to indicate that he has not a profundity of knowledge; but otherwise, *superficiality* is applied to exercise of the thinking faculty, and *shallowness* to its extent. Men of free sentiments are *superficial* thinkers, although they may not have understandings more *shallow* than others. *Superficial* and *shallow* are applicable to things as well as persons: **FLIMSY** is applicable to things only. *Flimsy* most probably comes from flame, that is flamy, showy, easily seen through. In the proper sense we may speak of giving a *superficial* covering of paint or colour to a body; of a river or piece of water being *shallow*; of cotton or cloth being *flimsy*. In the improper sense a survey or a glance may be

superficial which does not extend beyond the *superficies* of things; a conversation or a discourse may be *shallow*, which does not contain a body of sentiment; a work or performance may be *flimsy* which has nothing solid in it to engage the attention.

SURFACE, SUPERFICIES.

SURFACE, compounded of *sur* for *super* and *face*, is a variation of the Latin term **SUPERFICIES**; and yet they have acquired this distinction, that the former is the vulgar, and the latter the scientific term; of course the former has a more indefinite and general application than the latter. A *surface* is either even or uneven, smooth or rough; but the mathematician always conceives of a plane *superficies* on which he founds his operations.

TO SURROUND, ENCOMPASS, ENVIRON, ENCIRCLE.

SURROUND in old French *surround*, signifies, by means of the intensive syllable *sur* over, to go all round.

ENCOMPASS, compounded of *en* or *in* and *compass*, signifies to bring within a certain compass formed by a circle; so likewise **ENVIRON**, from the Latin *gyrus*, and the Greek *γυγος* a circle, and also **ENCIRCLE**, signify to bring within a circle.

Surround is the most literal and general of all these terms, which signify to inclose any object either directly or indirectly. We may *surround* an object by standing at certain distances all round it; in this manner a town, a house, or a person, may be *surrounded* by other persons, or an object may be *surrounded* by inclosing it in every direction, and at every point; in this manner a garden is *surrounded* by a wall. To *encompass* is to *surround* in the latter sense, and applies to objects of a great or indefinite extent; the earth is *encompassed* by the air, which we term the atmosphere; towns are *encompassed* by walls. To *surround* is to go round an object of any form, whether square or circular, long or short; but to *environ* and to *encircle* carry with them the idea of forming a circle round an object; thus a town or a valley may be *environed* by hills, a basin of water may be *encircled* by trees, or the head may be *encircled* by a wreath of flowers.

In an extended or moral sense we are said to be *surrounded* by objects which are in great numbers, and in different directions about us: thus a person living in a particular spot where he has many friends may say he is *surrounded* by his friends; so likewise a particular person may say that he is

surrounded by dangers and difficulties: but in speaking of man in a general sense, we should rather say he is *encompassed* by dangers, which expresses in a much stronger manner our peculiarly exposed condition.

TO SUSTAIN, SUPPORT, MAINTAIN.

SUSTAIN, compounded of *sus* or *sub* and *teneo* to hold, signifies to hold or keep up.

SUPPORT, v. *To countenance*.

MAINTAIN, v. *To assert*.

The idea of exerting one's self to keep an object from sinking is common to all these terms, which vary either in the mode or the object of the action. To *sustain* and *support* are passive, and imply that we bear the weight of something pressing upon us; *maintain* is active, and implies that we exert ourselves so as to keep it from pressing upon us. We *sustain* a load; we *support* a burden; we *maintain* a contest. The principal difficulty in an engagement is often to *sustain* the first shock of the attack: a soldier has not merely to *support* the weight of his arms, but to *maintain* his post. What is *sustained* is often temporary; what is *supported* is mostly permanent: a loss or an injury is *sustained*; pain, distress, and misfortunes, are *supported*: *maintain*, on the other hand, is mostly something of importance or advantage; credit must always be *maintained*.

We must *sustain* a loss with tranquillity; we must *support* an affliction with equanimity; we must *maintain* our honour, by the rectitude of our conduct.

SYMMETRY, PROPORTION.

SYMMETRY, in Latin *symmetria*, Greek *συμμετρία* from *συν* and *μετρον*, signifies a measure that accords.

PROPORTION, in Latin *proportio*, compounded of *pro* and *portio*, signifies every portion or part according with the other, or with the whole.

The signification of these terms is obviously the same, namely, a due admeasurement of the parts to each other and to the whole: but *symmetry* has now acquired but a partial application to the human body; and *proportion* is applied to every thing which admits of dimensions and an adaptation of the parts: hence we speak of *symmetry* of feature; but *proportion* of limbs, the *proportion* of the head to the body.

SYMPATHY, COMPASSION, COMMISERATION, CONDOLENCE.

SYMPATHY, from the Greek *συμ* or *συν* with, and *παθος* feeling, has the literal

meaning of fellow-feeling, that is, a kindred or like feeling, or feeling in company with another. **COMPASSION** (v. *Pity*); **COMMISERATION**, from the Latin *com* and *miseria* misery; **CONDOLENCE**, from the Latin *con* and *doleo* to grieve, signify a like suffering, or a suffering in company. Hence it is obvious that according to the derivation of the words, the *sympathy* may either be said of pleasure or pain, the rest only of that which is painful. *Sympathy* preserves its original meaning in its application, for we laugh or cry by *sympathy*; this may, however, be only a mere physical affection.

Sympathy when taken in a sense the most closely allied to compassion, does not go beyond the feeling another's pleasures or pains; we may *sympathize* with others without essentially serving them. *Compassion*, on the other hand, is not only a moral, but an active feeling; if we feel *compassion*, we naturally turn our thoughts towards relieving the object.

Compassion is awakened by any sort of suffering, but particularly those that are attributable to misfortune. *Commiseration* is a stronger feeling awakened by deep distress, above all by the troubles which people bring on themselves; a criminal going to suffer the penalty of the law demands *commiseration* and the calamities of human life equally call for *commiseration*.

Compassion may be awakened in the minds of persons of very unequal condition; *commiseration* supposes a certain distance, at least in the external condition of the parties; whence it is represented as the feeling which our wretchedness excites in the Supreme Being. *Condolence* supposes an entire equality; it excludes every thing but what flows out of the courtesy and good-will of one friend to another, and is called forth by events which the parties on either side are equally exposed to; we *condole* with a person on the death of a relative.

SYSTEM, METHOD.

SYSTEM, in Latin *systema*, Greek *συστημα* from *συστημι* or *συν* and *ιστημι* to stand together, signifies that which is put together so as to form a whole.

METHOD, in Latin *methodus* from Greek *μετα* and *οδος* a way by which any thing is effected.

System expresses more than *method*, which is but a part of *system*: *system* is an arrangement of many single or individual objects according to some given rule, so as to make them coalesce. *Method* is the manner of this arrangement, or the principle upon which this arrangement takes place. The term

system, however, applies to a complexity of objects; but arrangement, and consequently *method*, may be applied to every thing that is to be put into execution. All sciences must be reduced to *system*; and without *system* there is no science: all business requires *method*; and without *method* little can be done to any good purpose.

T.

TO TAKE, RECEIVE.

To **TAKE**, which in all probability comes from the Latin *tactum*, participle of *tango* to touch, is a general term; **RECEIVE** (v. *To receive*) is specific.

To *take* signifies to make one's own by coming in exclusive contact with it; to *receive* is to take under peculiar circumstances. We *take* either from things or persons; we *receive* from persons only: we *take* a book from the table; we *receive* a parcel which is sent us: we *take* either with or without the consent of the person; we *receive* it with his consent, or according to his wishes: a robber *takes* money when he can find it; a friend *receives* the gift of a friend.

TALKATIVE, LOQUACIOUS, GARRULOUS.

TALKATIVE implies ready or prone to talk (v. *To Speak*).

LOQUACIOUS, from *loquor* to speak or talk, has the same original meaning.

GARRULOUS, in Latin *garrulus*, from *garrio* to blab, signifies prone to tell or make known.

These reproachful epithets differ principally in the degree. To *talk* is allowable, and consequently it is not altogether so unbecoming to be occasionally *talkative*; but *loquacity*, which implies an immoderate propensity to *talk*, is always bad, whether springing from affectation or an idle temper; and *garrulity*, which arises from the excessive desire of communicating, is a failing that is pardonable only in the aged, who have generally much to tell.

TASTE, FLAVOUR, RELISH, SAVOUR.

TASTE comes from the Teutonic *tasten* to touch lightly, and signifies either the organ which is easily affected, or the act of discriminating by a light touch of the organ, or the quality of the object which affects the organ; in this latter sense it is closely allied to the other terms.

FLAVOUR most probably comes from the Latin *flo* to breathe, signifying the rarefied essence of bodies which affect the organ of taste.

RELISH is derived by Minshew from *re-lecher* to lick again, signifying that which pleases the palate so as to tempt to a renewal of the act of *tasting*.

SAVOUR, in Latin *sapor* and *sapio* to smell, taste, or be sensible, most probably comes from the Hebrew *sapah* the mouth or palate, which is the organ of taste.

Taste is the most general and indefinite of all these; it is applicable to every object that can be applied to the organ of *taste*, and to every degree and manner in which the organ can be affected: some things are *tasteless*, other things have a strong *taste*, and others a mixed *taste*. The *flavour* is the predominating *taste*, and consequently is applied to such objects as may have a different kind or degree of *taste*; an apple may not only have the general *taste* of apple, but also a *flavour* peculiar to itself: the *flavour* is commonly said of that which is good, as a fine *flavour*, a delicious *flavour*; but it may designate that which is not always agreeable, as the *flavour* of fish, which is unpleasant in things that do not admit of such a *taste*. The *relish* is also a particular *taste*; but it is that which is artificial, in distinction from the *flavour*, which may be the natural property. We find the *flavour* such as it is: we give the *relish* such as it should be, or we wish it to be: milk and butter receive a *flavour* from the nature of the food with which the cow is supplied; sauces are used in order to give a *relish* to the food that is dressed with them.

Savour is a term in less frequent use than the others, but, agreeable to the Latin derivation, it is employed to designate that which smells as well as *tastes*, as a sweet-smelling *savour*; so likewise, in the moral application, a man's actions or expressions may be said to *savour* of vanity. *Taste* and *relish* may be moreover compared as the act of persons: we *taste* whatever affects our *taste*; but we *relish* that only which pleases our *taste*: we *taste* fruits in order to determine whether they are good or bad; we *relish* fruits as a dessert, or at certain seasons of the day. So likewise, in the moral application, we have a *relish* for books, for learning, for society, and the like.

TASTE, GENIUS.

TASTE, in all probability from the Latin *tactum* and *tango* to touch, seems to designate the capacity to derive pleasure from an object: **GENIUS** designates the power we have for accomplishing any object. He who derives particular pleasure from music may be said to have a *taste* for music; he

who makes very great proficiency in the theory and practice of music, may be said to have a *genius* for it. It is obvious, therefore, that we may have a *taste* without having *genius*; but it would not be possible to have *genius* for a thing without having a *taste* for it; for nothing can so effectually give a *taste* for any accomplishment, as the capacity to learn it, and the susceptibility of all its beauties, which circumstances are inseparable from *genius*.

TAX, DUTY, CUSTOM, EXCISE, TOLL, IMPOST, TRIBUTE, CONTRIBUTION.

The idea of something given by the people to the government is expressed by all these terms.

TAX, in French *taxe*, Latin *taxo*, from the Greek *τασσω*, *ταξω*, to dispose or put in order, signifies what is disposed in order for each to pay.

CUSTOM signifies that which is given under certain circumstances, according to *custom*.

EXCISE Latin *excisus* from *excido* signifies that which is cut off or taken under certain circumstances from one's goods or property.

DUTY signifies that which is given as a due or debt.

TOLL in Saxon *toll*, &c. Latin *tetorium* from the Greek *τετος* a custom, signifies a particular kind of custom or due.

Tax is the most general of these terms, and applies to or implies whatever is paid by the people to the government, according to a certain estimate: the *customs* are a species of *tax* which were formerly regulated by *custom* rather than any definite law; the *customs* now apply particularly to what is paid by merchants for the goods which they import from abroad: the *excise* is a *tax* applicable to goods of home growth or manufacture; the *duty* is a specific estimate of what is due upon goods according to their value or kind and is equally applicable to goods of foreign or home production; *toll* is that species of *tax* which serves for the repair of roads and havens.

The preceding terms refer to that which is levied by authority on the people; but they do not directly express the idea of levying or paying: **IMPOST**, on the contrary, signifies literally that which is imposed; and **TRIBUTE** that which is paid or yielded: the former, therefore, exclude that idea of coercion which is included in the latter. The *tax* is levied by the consent of many; the *impost* is imposed by the will of one; and the *tribute* is paid at the demand of one or a few: the *tax* serves for the sup-

port of the nation; the *impost* and the *tribute* serve to enrich a government. Conquerors lay heavy *imposts* upon the conquered countries; distant provinces pay a *tribute* to the princes to whom they owe allegiance. CONTRIBUTION signifies the *tribute* of many in unison, or for the same end, in this general sense it includes all the other terms; for *taxes* and *imposts* are alike paid by many for the same purpose; but as the predominant idea in *contribution* is that of common consent, it supposes a degree of freedom in the agent which is incompatible with the exercise of authority expressed by the other terms: hence the term is with more propriety applied to those cases in which men voluntarily unite in giving towards any particular object; as charitable *contributions*, or *contributions* in support of a war; but it may be taken in the general sense of a forced payment, as in speaking of military *contribution*.

TAX, RATE, ASSESSMENT.

TAX, agreeable to the above explanation (*v. Tax*), and RATE, from the Latin *ratus* and *reor* to think or estimate, both derive their principal meaning from the valuation or proportion according to which any sum is demanded from the people; but the *tax* is imposed directly by the government for public purposes, as the land *tax*, the window *tax*, and the like: and the *rate* is imposed indirectly for the local purposes of each parish, as the church *rates*, the poor *rates*, and the like. The *tax* and *rate* is a general rule or ratio, by which a certain sum is raised upon a given number of persons; the ASSESSMENT is the application of that rule to the individual.

The house-duty is a tax upon houses, according to their real or supposed value; the poor's *rate* is a *rate* laid on the individual likewise, according to the value of his house, or the supposed rent which he pays: the *assessment*, in both these, is the valuation of the house, which determines the sum to be paid by each individual: an equitable *tax* must not bear harder upon one class of the community than another: an equitable *assessment* must not bear harder upon one inhabitant than another.

TO TEASE, VEX, TAUNT, TANTALIZE, TORMENT.

TEASE is most probably a frequentative of tear.

VEX, *v. To displease.*

TAUNT, is probably contracted from *tantalize*.

TANTALIZE *v. To aggravate.*

TORMENT, from the Latin *tormentum* and *torqueo* to twist, signifies to give pain by twisting, or griping. The idea of acting upon others so as to produce a painful sentiment is common to all these terms; they differ in the mode of the action, and in the degree of the effect.

All these actions rise in importance: to *tease* consists in that which is most trifling; to *torment* in that which is most serious. We are *teased* by a fly that buzzes in our ears; we are *vexed* by the carelessness and stupidity of our servants; we are *taunted* by the sarcasms of others: we are *tantalized* by the fair prospects which only present themselves to disappear again: we are *tormented* by the importunities of troublesome beggars. It is the repetition of unpleasant trifles which *teases*; it is the crossness and perversity of things which *vex*; it is the contemptuous and provoking behaviour which *taunts*; it is the disappointment of awakened expectations which *tantalizes*; it is the repetition of grievous troubles which *torments*. We may be *teased* and *tormented* by that which produces bodily or mental pain: we are *vexed*, *taunted*, and *tantalized* only in the mind. Irritable and nervous people are most easily *teased*; captious and fretful people are most easily *vexed* or *taunted*; sanguine and eager people are most easily *tantalized*: in all these cases the imagination or the bodily state of the individual serves to increase the pain: but persons are *tormented* by such things as inflict positive pain.

TEGUMENT, COVERING.

TEGUMENT, in Latin *tegumentum*, from *tego* to cover, is properly but another word to express the sense of COVERING, yet it is now employed in cases where the term *covering* is inadmissible. *Covering* signifies mostly that which is artificial; but *tegument* is employed for that which is natural: clothing is the *covering* for the body; the skin of vegetable substances, as seeds is called the *tegument*. The *covering* is said of that which covers the outer surface: the *tegument* is said of that which covers the inner surface; the pods of some seeds are lined with a soft *tegument*.

TEMPERAMENT, TEMPERATURE.

TEMPERAMENT and TEMPERATURE are both used to express that state which arises from the tempering of opposite or varying qualities; the *temperament* is said of animal bodies, and the *temperature* of the atmosphere. Men of a sanguine *temperament* ought to be cautious in their diet; all

bodies are strongly affected by the *tempera-
ture* of the air.

TEMPLE, CHURCH.

* These words designate an edifice destined for the exercise of religion; but **TEMPLE** is adapted to the lofty style, and **CHURCH** to the familiar style, at least as far as regards the Christian revealed religion; for, in regard to Paganism, the term which originated with heathens is the ordinary term in the place of *church*. *Temple* conveys the idea of that which is august; it marks in the proper sense that edifice which is consecrated to the Deity; *church* seems to indicate something more common; it serves particularly for the assembly of the faithful. Nothing profane ought to enter the *temple* of the Lord: nothing ought to be permitted in our *churches* which does not contribute to the edification of Christians.

The mind and heart of man are the *temple* of the living God; it is there he wishes to be adored: the *church* is that place where, as a social being, he offers his vows to his Maker.

TEMPORARY, TRANSIENT, TRANSITORY, FLEETING.

TEMPORARY, from *tempus* time, characterizes that which is intended to last only for a time, in distinction from that which is permanent; **TRANSIENT**, that is, passing, or in the act of passing, characterizes what in its nature exists only for the moment; **TRANSITORY**, that is, apt to pass away, characterizes every thing in the world which is formed only to exist for a time, and then to pass away; **FLEETING**, which is derived from the verb to *fly* and *flight*, is but a stronger term to express the same idea as *transitory*: an office or a service may be *temporary*; a glance *transient*; our pleasures *transitory*; joys *fleeting*.

TENACIOUS, PERTINACIOUS.

To be **TENACIOUS** is to hold a thing close, to let it go with reluctance: to be **PERTINACIOUS** is to hold it out in spite of what can be advanced against it, the prepositive syllable *per* having an intensive force. A man of a *tenacious* temper insists on trifles that are supposed to affect his importance; a *pertinacious* temper insists on every thing which is apt to affect his opinions. *Tenacity* and *pertinacity* are both foibles, but the former is sometimes more excusable than the latter.

We may be *tenacious* of that which is

good, as when a man is *tenacious* of whatever may affect his honour; but we cannot be *pertinacious* in any thing but opinions, and that too in cases when they are least defensible. It commonly happens that people are most *tenacious* of being thought to possess that in which they are most deficient, and most *pertinacious* in maintaining that which is most absurd.

TENDENCY, DRIFT, SCOPE, AIM.

TENDENCY, from to *tend*, denotes the property of tending towards a certain point, which is the characteristic of all these words, but this is applied only to things and **DRIFT**, from the verb to *drive*; **SCOPE**, from the Greek *σκοπεσθαι* to look; and **AIM**, from the verb to *aim* (v. *Aim*); all characterize the thoughts of a person looking forward into futurity, and directing his actions to a certain point. Hence we speak of the *tendency* of certain principles or practices as being pernicious; the *drift* of a person's discourse: the *scope* which he gives himself either in treating of a subject, or in laying down a plan; a person *aims* to excel, or *aims* to supplant another, and the like.

TENET, POSITION.

The **TENET** is the opinion which we hold in our own minds; the **POSITION** is that which we lay down for others. Our *tenets* may be hurtful, our *positions* false. The *tenets* of the different denominations of Christians are scarcely to be known or distinguished; they often rest upon such trivial points: the *positions* which an author lays down must be very definite and clear when he wishes to build upon them any theory or system.

TERM, LIMIT, BOUNDARY.

* **TERM**, in Latin *terminus*, from the Greek *τερμα* and end, is the point that ends, and that to which we direct our steps: **LIMIT**, from the Latin *limes* a landmark, is the line which we must not pass: **BOUNDARY**, from to *bound*, is the obstacle which interrupts our progress, and prevents us from passing.

We are either carried towards or away from the *term*; we either keep within *limits*, or we overstep them; we contract or extend a *boundary*.

The *term* and the *limit* belong to the thing; by the *term* it is ended: the *boundary* is extraneous of it. The Straits of Gibraltar was the *term* of Hercules's voyages: it was said, with more eloquence than truth,

* Vide Girard : „Temple, église.“

* Vide Girard : „Termes, limites, bornes.“

that the *limits* of the Roman empire were those of the world: the sea, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, are the natural *boundaries* of France. We see the *term* of our evils only in the *term* of our life: our desires have no *limits*; their gratification only serves to extend our prospects indefinitely: those only are happy whose fortune is the *boundary* of their desires.

TERRITORY, DOMINION.

Both these terms respect a portion of country under a particular government; but the word **TERRITORY** brings to our minds the land which is included; **DOMINION** conveys to our minds the power which is exercised: the *territory* speaks of that which is in its nature bounded; *dominion* may be said of that which is boundless. A petty prince has his *territory*; the monarch of a great empire has *dominions*.

It is the object of every ruler to guard his *territory* against the irruptions of an enemy; ambitious monarchs are always aiming to extend their *dominions*.

THANKFULNESS, GRATITUDE.

THANKFULNESS, or a *fulness* of thanks, is the outward expression of a grateful feeling.

GRATITUDE, from the Latin *gratitude*, is the feeling itself. Our *thankfulness* is measured by the number of our words; our *gratitude* is measured by the nature of our actions. A person appears very *thankful* at the time, who afterwards proves very *ungrateful*. *Thankfulness* is the beginning of *gratitude*: *gratitude* is the completion of *thankfulness*.

THEORY, SPECULATION.

THEORY, from the Greek *θεωρεω* to behold, and **SPECULATION**, from the Latin *specto* to behold, are both employed to express what is seen with the mind's eye. *Theory* is the fruit of reflection, it serves the purposes of science; practice will be incomplete when the *theory* is false: *speculation* belongs more to the imagination: it has therefore less to do with realities: it is that which cannot be reduced to practice and can therefore never be brought to the test of experience. Hence it arises that *theory* is contrasted sometimes with practice to designate its insufficiency to render a man complete; and *speculation* is put for that which is fanciful and unreal: a general who is so only in *theory* will acquit himself miserably in the field; a religionist who is so only in *speculation* will make a wretched Christian.

THEREFORE, CONSEQUENTLY, ACCORDINGLY.

THEREFORE, that is for this reason marks a deduction: **CONSEQUENTLY**, that is, in *consequence*. marks a *consequence*: **ACCORDINGLY**, that is, according to something, implies an agreement or adaptation. *Therefore* is employed particularly in abstract reasoning; *consequently* is employed either in reasoning or in the narrative style; *accordingly* is used principally in the narrative style. Young persons are perpetually liable to fall into error through inexperience; they ought *therefore* the more willingly to submit themselves to the guidance of those who can direct them: the French nation is reduced to a state of moral anarchy; *consequently* nothing but time and good government can bring the people back to the use of their sober senses: every preparation was made, and every precaution was taken; *accordingly* at the fixed hour they proceeded to the place of destination.

THICK, DENSE.

Between **THICK** and **DENSE** there is little other difference, than that the latter is employed to that express species of *thickness* which is philosophically considered as the property of the atmosphere in a certain condition; hence we speak of *thick* in regard to hard or soft bodies, as a *thick* board, or *thick* cotton, solid or liquid, as a *thick* cheese or *thick* milk; but the term *dense* only in regard to the air in its various forms, as a *dense* air, a *dense* vapour, a *dense* cloud.

THIN, SLENDER, SLIGHT, SLIM.

THIN, in Saxon *thinne*, German *dünn*, Latin *tener*, from *tendo*, in Greek *τενω* to extend or draw out, and the Hebrew *taken* to grind or reduce to powder.

SLENDER, **SLIGHT**, and **SLIM**, are all variations from the German *schlank*, which are connected with the words *slime* and *sling*, as also with German *schlingen* to wind or wreath, and *schlange* a serpent, designating the property of length and smallness, which is adapted for bending or twisting. *Thin* is the generic term, the rest are specific: *thin* may be said of that which is small and short, as well as small and long; *slender* is always said of that which is small and long: a board is *thin* which wants solidity or substance; a poplar is *slender* because its tallness is disproportioned to its magnitude or the dimensions of its circumference. *Thinness* is sometimes a natural property; *slight* and *slim* are applied to that which is artificial: the leaves of trees are

of a *thin* texture; a board may be made *slight* by continually planing; a paper box is very *slim*. *Thinness* is a good property sometimes; *thin* paper is frequently preferred to that which is thick: *slightness* and *slimness*, which is a greater degree of *slightness*, are always defects; that which is made *slight* is unfit to bear the stress that will be put upon it; that which is *slim* is altogether unfit for the purpose proposed: a carriage that is made *slight* is quickly broken, and always out of repair; paper is altogether too *slim* to serve the purpose of wood.

TO THINK, REFLECT, PONDER, MUSE.

THINK, in Saxon *thincan*, German *denken*, &c. comes from the Hebrew *dan* to direct, rule, or judge.

REFLECT, in Latin *reflecto*, signifies literally to bend back, that is, to bend the mind back on itself.

PONDER. from *pondus* a weight, signifies to weigh.

MUSE, from *musa* a song, signifies to dwell upon with the imagination.

To *think* is a general and indefinite term; to *reflect* is a particular mode of *thinking*; to *ponder* and *muse* are different modes of *reflecting*, the former on grave matters, the latter on matters that interest either the affections or the imagination: we *think* whenever we receive or recall an idea to the mind; but we *reflect* only by recalling, not one only, but many ideas: we *think* if we only suffer the ideas to revolve in succession in the mind; but in *reflecting* we compare, combine, and judge of those ideas which thus pass in the mind: we *think*, therefore, of things past, as they are pleasurable or otherwise: we *reflect* upon them as they are applicable to our present condition: we may *think* on things past, present, or to come; we *reflect*, *ponder*, and *muse* mostly on that which is past or present. The man *thinks* on the days of his childhood, and wishes them back; the child *thinks* on the time when he shall be a man, and is impatient until it is come: the man *reflects* on his past follies, and tries to profit by experience; he *ponders* on any serious concern that affects his destiny, and *muses* on the happy events of his childhood.

TO THINK, SUPPOSE, IMAGINE, BELIEVE, DEEM.

To THINK is here, as in the preceding article, the generic term. It expresses, in common with the other terms, the act of having a particular idea in the mind; but it is indefinite as to the mode and the object of the action. To *think* may be the act of

the understanding, or of the *imagination*: to SUPPOSE and IMAGINE are rather the acts of the *imagination* than of the understanding. To *think*, that is, to have any thought or opinion upon a subject, requires reflection; it is the work of time: to *suppose* and *imagine* may be the acts of the moment. We *think* a thing right or wrong; we *suppose* it to be true or false; we *imagine* it to be real or unreal. To *think* is employed promiscuously in regard to all objects, whether actually existing or not: to *suppose* applies to those which are uncertain or precarious; *imagine*, to those which are unreal. *Think* and *imagine* are said of that which affects the senses immediately; *suppose* is only said of that which occupies the mind. We *think* that we hear a noise as soon as the sound catches our attention; in certain states of the body or mind we *imagine* we hear noises which were never made; we *think* that a person will come to-day, because he has informed us that he intends to do so; we *suppose* that he will come to-day, at a certain hour, because he came at the same hour yesterday.

When applied to the events and circumstances of life, to *think* may be applied to any time, past, present, or to come, or where no time is expressed; to *suppose* is more aptly applied to a future time; and *imagine* to a past or present time. We *think* that a person has done a thing, is doing it, or will do it; we *suppose* that he will do it; we *imagine* that he has done it, or is doing it. A person *thinks* that he will die; *imagines* that he is in a dangerous way: we *think* that the weather will be fine to-day; we *suppose* that the affair will be decided.

In regard to moral points, in which case the word DEEM may be compared with the others, to *think* is a conclusion drawn from certain premises. I *think* that a man has acted wrong: to *suppose* is to take up an idea arbitrarily or at pleasure; we argue upon a *supposed* case, merely for the sake of argument: to *imagine* is to take up an idea by accident, or without any connexion with the truth or reality; we *imagine* that a person is offended with us, without being able to assign a single reason for the idea: to *deem* is to form a conclusion; things are *deemed* hurtful or otherwise in consequence of observation.

To *think* and *believe* are both opposite to knowing or perceiving; but *think* is a more partial action than *believe*: we *think* as the thing strikes us at the time; we *believe* from a settled deduction: hence it expresses much less to say that I *think* a person speaks the truth, than that I *believe* that he speaks the

truth. We are at liberty to say, I *think*, or I *believe* that the account is made out right; but we ought to say, I *believe* in the efficacy of religious duties, in a future state &c. &c.

THOUGHTFUL, CONSIDERATE, DELIBERATE.

THOUGHTFUL, or full of *thinking* (v. *To think, reflect*); CONSIDERATE, or ready to *consider* (v. *To consider, reflect*); and DELIBERATE, ready to *deliberate* (v. *To consult*); rise upon each other in their signification; he who is *thoughtful* does not forget his duty; he who is *considerate* pauses, and *considers* properly what is his duty; he who *deliberates* *considers* *deliberately*. It is a recommendation to a subordinate person to be *thoughtful* in doing what is wished of him: it is the recommendation of a confidential person to be *considerate*, as he has often to judge according to his own discretion; it is the recommendation of a person who is acting for himself in critical matters to be *deliberate*. There is this farther distinction in the word *deliberate*, that it may be used in the bad sense to mark a settled intention to do evil; young people may sometimes plead in extenuation of their guilt, that their misdeeds do not arise from *deliberate* malice.

THREAT, MENACE.

THREAT is of Saxon origin; MENACE is of Latin extraction. They do not differ in signification; but as is frequently the case, the Saxon is the familiar term, and the Latin word is employed only in the higher style. We may be *threatened* with either small or great evils. One individual *threatens* to strike another; a general *menaces* the enemy with an attack: a person is *threatened* with a look; he is *menaced* with a prosecution by his adversary.

TIME, SEASON.

TIME is here the generic term; it is taken either for the whole or the part: SEASON is any given portion of *time*. We speak of *time* when the simple idea of *time* only is to be expressed, as the *time* of the day, or the *time* of the year; the *season* is spoken of in reference to some circumstances; the year is divided into four parts, called the *seasons*, according to the nature of the weather: hence, in general, that *time* is called the *season* which is suitable for any particular purpose; youth is the *season* for improvement. It is a matter of necessity to choose the *time*; it is an affair of wisdom to choose the *season*.

TIME, PERIOD, AGE, DATE, AERA, EPOCH.

TIME (v. *Time*) is, as before, either from *time* in general, or *time* in particular; all the other terms are taken for particular portions of *time*. *Time*, in the sense of a particular portion of *time*, is used indefinitely, and in cases where the other terms are not so proper: there is a *time* when we should not only number our days, but our hours.

Time included within any given points is termed a PERIOD, from the Greek *περίοδος*, signifying a course, round, or any revolution: thus, the *period* of day, or of night, is the space of *time* comprehended between the rising and setting, or setting and rising of the sun; the *period* of a year comprehends the space which the earth requires for its annual revolution. So, in an extended and moral application, we have stated *periods* in our life for particular things: during the *period* of infancy a child is in a state of total dependance on its parents; a *period* of apprenticeship has been appointed for youth to learn different trades. The term is employed not only to denote the whole intervening space of *time*, but also the particular concluding point, which makes it equivalent in sense to the termination of the existence of any body, as to put a *period* to one's existence, for to kill one's self, or be killed.

An AGE is a species of *period* comprehending the life of a man, and consequently referring to what is done by men living within that *period*: hence we speak of the different *ages* that have existed since the commencement of the world, and characterize this or that *age* by the particular degrees of vice or virtue, genius and the like, for which it is distinguished. The DATE is that *period* of *time* which is reckoned from the *date* or commencement of a thing to the *time* that it is spoken of: hence we speak of a thing as being of a long or a short *date*, that is, of being of long or short duration.

AERA, in Latin *aera*, probably from *aes*, brass, signifying coin with which one computes; and EPOCH, from the Greek *εποχή*, from *επαύω* to stop, signifying a resting-place; both refer to points of *time* rendered remarkable by events: but the term *aera* is more commonly employed in the literal sense for points of computation in chronology, as the Christian *aera*; the term *epoch* is indefinitely employed for any period distinguished by remarkable events: the grand rebellion is an *epoch* in the history of England.

TIMELY, SEASONABLE.

The same distinction exists between the epithets **TIMELY** and **SEASONABLE**. The former signifies within the time, that is, before the time is past; the latter according to the season or what the season requires. A *timely* notice prevents that which would otherwise happen: a *seasonable* hint seldom fails of its effect because it is *seasonable*. We must not expect to have a *timely* notice of death but must be prepared for it at any time; an admonition to one who is on a sick-bed is very *seasonable*, when given by a minister or a friend.

TIMESERVING, TEMPORIZING.

TIMESERVING and **TEMPORIZING**, are both applied to the conduct of one who adapts himself servilely to the time and season; but a *timeserver* is rather active, and a *temporizer* passive. A *timeserver* avows those opinions which will serve his purpose: the *temporizer* forbears to avow those which are likely for the time being to hurt him. The former acts from a desire of gain, the latter from a fear of loss. Sycophant courtiers must always be *timeservers*: ministers of state are frequently *temporizers*.

TORMENT, TORTURE.

TORMENT (v. *To teaze*) and **TORTURE**, both come from *torqueo* to twist, and express the agony which arises from a violent twisting or griping of any part; but the latter which is more immediately derived from the verb, expresses much greater violence and consequent pain than the former. *Torture* is an excess of *torment*. We may be *tormented* by a variety of indirect means; but we are *tortured* only by the direct means of the rack, or similar instruments. *Torment* may be permanent: *torture* is only for a time, or on certain occasions. It is related in history that a person was once *tormented* to death, by a violent and incessant beating of drums in his prison: the Indians practise every species of *torture* upon their prisoners. A guilty conscience may *torment* a man all his life: the horrors of an awakened conscience are a *torture* to one who is on his death-bed.

TRADE, COMMERCE, TRAFFIC, DEALING.

TRADE, in Italian *tratto*, Latin *tracto* to treat, signifies the transaction of business.

COMMERCE, v. *Intercourse*.

TRAFFIC, in French *traffique*, Italian *traffico*, compounded of *tra* or *trans* and

facio, signifies to make over from one to another.

DEALING, from the verb to *deal*, in German *theilen* to divide, signifies to get together in parts according to a certain ratio, or at a given price.

The leading idea in *trade* is that of carrying on business for purposes of gain; the rest are but modes of *trade*: *commerce* is a mode of *trade* by exchange; *traffic* is a sort of personal *trade*, a sending from hand to hand; *dealing* is a bargaining or calculating kind of *trade*. *Trade* is either on a large or small scale; *commerce* is always on a large scale: we may *trade* retail or wholesale; we always carry on *commerce* by wholesale: *trade* is either within or without the country; *commerce* is always between different countries: there may be a *trade* between two towns; but there is a *commerce* between England and America, between France and Germany: hence it arises that the general term *trade* is of inferior import when compared with *commerce*. The *commerce* of a country, in the abstract and general sense, conveys more to our mind, and is a more noble expression, than the *trade* of a country, as the merchant ranks higher than the *tradesman*, and a *commercial* house, than a *trading* concern. *Trade* may be altogether domestic, and betwixt neighbours; the *traffic* is that which goes forward betwixt persons at a distance: in this manner there may be a great *traffic* betwixt two towns or cities, as betwixt London and the capitals of the different counties. *Trade* may consist simply in buying and selling according to a stated valuation; *dealings* are carried on in matters that admit of a variation: hence we speak of *dealers* in wool, in corn, seeds, and the like, who buy up portions of these goods, more or less, according to the state of the market.

These terms will also admit of an extended application; hence we speak of the risk of *trade*, the narrowness of a *trading* spirit; the *commerce* of the world, a legal, or illicit *commerce*; to make a *traffic* of honours, of principles, of places, and the like; *plain-dealing*, or *underhand-dealing*.

TO TRANSFIGURE, TRANSFORM, METAMORPHOSE.

TRANSFIGURE is to make to pass over into another figure; **TRANSFORM** and **METAMORPHOSE** is to put into another form: the former being said only of spiritual beings, and particularly in reference to our Saviour; the other two terms being applied to that which has a corporeal form.

Transformation is commonly applied to

that which changed its outward form; in this manner a harlequin *transforms* himself into all kinds of shapes and likenesses, *Metamorphosis* is applied to the form internal as well as external, that is, to the whole nature; in this manner Ovid describes, among others, the *metamorphoses* of Narcissus into a flower, and Daphne into a laurel: with the same idea we may speak of a rustic being *metamorphosed*, by the force of art, into a fine gentleman.

**TREACHEROUS, TRAITOROUS,
TREASONABLE.**

These epithets are applied to one who betrays his trust; but **TREACHEROUS** (*v. Faithless*) respects a man's private relations; **TRAITOROUS**, his public relation to his prince and his country: he is a *treacherous* friend, and a *traitorous* subject. We may be *treacherous* to our enemies as well as our friends, for nothing can lessen the obligation to preserve the fidelity of promise; we may be *traitorous* to our country by abstaining to lend that aid which is in our power, for nothing but death can do away the obligation which we owe to it by the law of nature. *Traitorous* and **TREASONABLE** are both applicable to subjects: but the former is extended to all public acts; the latter only to those which affect the supreme power: a soldier is *traitorous* who goes over to the side of the enemy against his country; a man is guilty of *treasonable* practices who meditates the life of the king, or aims at *subverting* his government: a man may be a *traitor* under all forms of government; but he can be guilty of *treason* only in a monarchical state.

TO TREASURE, HOARD.

The idea of laying up carefully is common to these verbs; but to **TREASURE** is to lay up for the sake of preserving; to **HOARD**, to lay up for the sake of accumulating; we *treasure* up the gifts of a friend; the miser *hoards* up his money: we attach a real value to that which we *treasure*; a fictitious value to that which is *hoarded*. To *treasure* is used either in the proper or improper sense; to *hoard* only in the proper sense; we *treasure* a book on which we set particular value, or we *treasure* the words or maxims of another in our recollection; the miser *hoards* in his coffers whatever he can scrape together.

TREATMENT, USAGE.

TREATMENT, implies the act of treating, and **USAGE** that of using; *treatment* may be partial or temporary; but *usage* is

properly employed for that which is permanent or continued: a passer-by may meet with *ill-treatment*; but children and domestics are liable to meet with *ill-usage*. All persons may meet with *treatment* from others with whom they casually come in connexion; but *usage* is applied more properly to those who are more or less in the power of others: children may receive good or *ill usage* from those who have the charge of them, servants from their masters, or wives from their husbands.

TREMBLING, TREMOUR, TREPIDATION.

All these terms are derived from the same source (*v. Agitation*), and designate a general state of agitation: **TREMBLING** is not only the most familiar, but also the most indefinite term of the three; **TREPIDATION** and **TREMOUR** are species of *trembling*. *Trembling* expresses any degree of involuntary shaking of the frame, from the affection either of the body or the mind: cold, nervous affections, fear, and the like, are the ordinary causes of *trembling*: *tremour* is a slight degree of *trembling*, which arises only from a mental affection; when the spirits are agitated, the mind is thrown into a *tremour* by any trifling incident: *trepidation* is more violent than either of the two, and springs from the defective state of the mind, it shows itself in the action, or the different movements of the body, rather than in the body; those who have not the requisite composure of mind are apt to do what is required of them with *trepidation*. *Trembling* is either an occasional or an habitual infirmity; there is no one who may not be sometimes seized with a *trembling*, and there are those who from a lasting disease, or from old age, are never rid of it; *tremour* is but occasional and consequently depends rather on the nature of the occasion; no one who has a proper degree of modesty can make his first appearance in public without feeling a *tremour*: *trepidation* may be either occasional or habitual, but oftener the latter, since it arises rather from the weakness of the mind than the strength of the cause.

Trembling and *tremulous* are applied as epithets either to persons or things: a *trembling* voice evinces *trepidation* of mind, a *tremulous* voice evinces a *tremour* of mind: notes in music are sometimes *trembling*; the motion of the leaves of trees is *tremulous*,

**TRIFLING, TRIVIAL, PETTY, FRIVOLOUS,
FUTILE.**

TRIFLING, TRIVIAL, both come from

trivium, a common place of resort where three roads meet, and signify common.

PETTY is in French *petit* little, in Latin *putus* a boy or minion, and the Hebrew *pethi* foolish.

FRIVOLOUS, in Latin *frivulus*, comes in all probability from *frio* to crumble into dust, signifying reduced to nothing.

FUTILE, in Latin *futilis*, from *futio* to pour out, signifies cast away as worthless.

All these epithets characterize an object as of little or no value: *trifling* and *trivial* differ only in degree; the latter denoting a still lower degree of value than the former. What is *trifling* or *trivial* is that which does not require any consideration, and may be easily passed over as forgotten: *trifling* objections can never weigh against solid reason; *trivial* remarks only expose the shallowness of the remarker: what is *petty* is beneath our consideration, it ought to be disregarded and held cheap; it would be a *petty* consideration for a minister of state to look to the small savings of a private family: what is *frivolous* and *futile* is disgraceful for any one to consider; the former in relation to the objects of our pursuit, or attachment, the latter only in regard to matters of reasoning; dress is a *frivolous* occupation when it forms the chief business of a rational being; out of a multiplicity of criticisms many are sure to be *futile*.

TROOP, COMPANY.

In a military sense a TROOP is among the horse what a COMPANY is among the foot; but this is only a partial acceptation of the terms. *Troop*, in French *troupe*, Spanish *tropa*, Latin *turba*, signifies an indiscriminate multitude; *company* (v. *To accompany*) is any number joined together, and bearing each other *company*: hence we speak of a *troop* of hunters, a *company* of players; a *troop* of horsemen, a *company* of travellers.

TO TROUBLE, DISTURB, MOLEST.

Whatever uneasiness or painful sentiment is produced in the mind by outward circumstances is effected either by TROUBLE (v. *Affliction*), by DISTURBANCE (v. *Commotion*), or by MOLESTATION (v. *To inconvenience*). *Trouble* is the most general in its application; we may be *troubled* by the want of a thing, or *troubled* by that which is unsuitable: we are *disturbed* and *molested* only by that which actively *troubles*. Pecuniary wants are the greatest *troubles* in life; the perverseness of servants, the indisposition or ill behaviour of children, are domestic *troubles*: but the noise of children is

a *disturbance*, and the prospect of want *disturbs* the mind. *Trouble* may be permanent; *disturbance* and *molestation* are temporary, and both refer to the peace which is destroyed: a *disturbance* ruffles or throws out of a tranquil state; a *molestation* burdens or bears hard either on the body or the mind: noise is always a *disturbance* to one who wishes to think or to remain in quiet; talking, or any noise, is a *molestation* to one who is in an irritable frame of body or mind.

TROUBLESOME, IRKSOME, VEXATIOUS.

These epithets are applied to the objects which cause *trouble* or *vexation*.

IRKSOME is compounded of *irk* and *some*, from the German *argern* vexation, which probably comes from the Greek *αργος*.

TROUBLESOME (v. *To afflict*) is here, as before, the generic term; *irksome* and VEXATIOUS are species of the *troublesome*; what is *troublesome* creates either bodily or mental pain; what is *irksome* creates a mixture of bodily and mental pain; and what is *vexatious* creates purely mental pain. What requires great exertion, or exertions coupled with difficulties, is *troublesome*; in this sense the laying in stores for the winter is a *troublesome* work for the ants, and compiling a dictionary is a *troublesome* labour to some writers: what requires any exertion which we are unwilling to make, or interrupts the peace which we particularly long for, is *irksome*; in this sense giving and receiving visits is *irksome* to others; what comes across our particular wishes, or disappoints us in a particular manner, is *vexatious*; in this sense the loss of a prize which we had hoped to gain may be *vexatious*.

TRUTH, VERACITY.

TRUTH belongs to the thing: VERACITY to the person: the *truth* of the story is admitted upon the *veracity* of the narrator.

TRY, TEMPT.

TRY, v. *To attempt*.

TEMPT, v. *To attempt*.

To *try* is to call forth one's ordinary powers; to *tempt* is a particular species of trial: we *try* either ourselves or others; we *tempt* others: we *try* a person only in the path of his duty; but we may *tempt* him to depart from his duty: it is necessary to *try* the fidelity of a servant before you place confidence in him; it is wicked to *tempt* any one to do that which we should think it wrong to do ourselves: our strength is *tried* by frequent experiments; we are *tempted*, by the weakness of our principles, to give way to the violence of our passions.

TUMULTUOUS, TUMULTUARY.

TUMULTUOUS signifies having tumult; TUMULTUARY, disposed for tumult: the former is applied to objects in general; the latter to persons only: in *tumultuous* meetings the voice of reason is the last thing that is heard; it is the natural tendency of large and promiscuous assemblies to become *tumultuary*.

TUMULTUOUS, TURBULENT, SEDITIOUS, MUTINOUS.

TUMULTUOUS (*v. Bustle*) describes the disposition to make noise; TURBULENT marks a hostile spirit of resistance to authority; SEDITIOUS marks a spirit of resistance to government; MUTINOUS marks a spirit of resistance against officers either in the army or navy: electioneering mobs are always *tumultuous*; the young and ignorant are so averse to control, that they are easily led by the example of an individual to be *turbulent*; among the Romans the people were in the habit of holding *seditious* meetings, and sometimes the soldiery would be *mutinous*.

TURGID, TUMID, BOMBASTIC.

TURGID and TUMID both signify swoln, but they differ in their application: *turgid* belongs to diction, as a *turgid* style; *tumid* is applicable to the water and other objects, as the *tumid* waves. BOMBASTIC, from *bombastic* a kind of cotton, signifies puffed up like cotton, and is, like *turgid*, applicable to words; but the *bombastic* includes the sentiments expressed; *turgidity* is confined mostly to the mode of expression. A writer is *turgid*, who expresses a simple thought in lofty language: a person is *bombastic* who deals in large words and introduces high sentiments in common discourse.

TO TURN, BEND, TWIST, DISTORT, WRING, WREST, WRENCH.

TURN, in French *tourner*, comes from the Greeck *τρογνῶ* to turn, and *τρογρός* a turner's wheel.

BEND, *v. Bend*.

TWIST, in Saxon *getwysan*, German *zweyen* to double, comes from *zwey* two.

DISTORT, in Latin *distortus*, participle of *destorqueo*, compounded of *dis* and *torqueo*, signifies to turn violently aside.

To *turn* signifies in general to put a thing out of its place in an uneven line; to *bend*, and the rest, are species of *turning*: we *turn* a thing by moving it from one point to another: thus we *turn* the earth over: to *bend* is simply to change its direction; thus a stick is *bent*: to *twist* is to *bend* many

times, to make many *turns*: to *distort* is to *turn* or *bend* out of the right course; thus the face is *distorted* in convulsions. To *WRING* is to *twist* with violence; thus linen which has been wetted is *wrung*: to *WREST* or *WRENCH* is to separate from a body by means of *twisting*; thus a stick may be *wrested* out of the hand, or a hinge *wrenched* off the door.

The same distinction holds good in the moral application: we *turn* a person from his design; we *bend* the will of a person; we *twist* the meaning of words to suit our purposes: we *distort* them as to give them an entirely false meaning; we *wring* a confession from one; or *wrest* the meaning of a person's words.

TURN, BENT.

These words are only compared here in the figurative application, as respects the state of a person's inclination: the *TURN* is therefore, as before, indefinite as to the degree; it is the first rising inclination: *BENT* is a positively strong *turn*, a confirmed inclination; a child may early discover a *turn* for music or drawing; but the real *bent* of his genius is not known until he has made a proficiency in his education, and has had an opportunity of trying different things.

TO TURN, WIND, WHIRL, TWIRL, WRITHE.

To *TURN* (*v. To turn*) is, as before, the generic term; the rest are but modes of *turning*; that is, *WIND*, to *turn* a thing round in a regular manner; *WHIRL*, to *turn* it round in any irregular and unmeaning way; *WRITHE*, to *turn* round in convolution within itself. A worm seldom moves in a straight line; it is, therefore, always *turning*; sometimes it lies, and sometimes it *writhes* in agony: a wheel is *whirled* round by the force of gunpowder: a top is *twirled* by a child in play.

U.

UNBELIEF, INFIDELITY, INCREDULITY.

UNBELIEF (*v. Belief*) respects matters in general; INFIDELITY (*v. Faithful*) is *unbelief* as respects Divine revelation; INCREDULITY is *unbelief* in ordinary matters. *Unbelief* is taken in an indefinite and negative sense; it is the want of *belief* in any particular thing that may or may not be *believed*: *infidelity* is a more active state of mind; it supposes a violent and total rejection of that which ought to be *believed*: *in-*

credulity is also an active state of mind, in which we oppose a *belief* to matters that may be rejected. *Unbelief* does not of itself convey any reproachful meaning; it depends upon the thing disbelieved: *infidelity* is taken in the worst sense for a blind and senseless perversity in refusing belief: *incredulity* is often a mark of wisdom. The Jews are *unbelievers* in the mission of our Saviour; the Turks are *infidels*, inasmuch as they do not believe in the Bible; Deists and Atheists are likewise *infidels*, inasmuch as they set themselves up against Divine revelation; well-informed people are always *incredulous* of stories respecting ghosts and apparitions.

TO UNCOVER, DISCOVER.

To UNCOVER, like DISCOVER, implies to take off the covering; but the former refers mostly to an artificial material, and occasional covering; the latter to a natural, moral, and habitual covering: plants are *uncovered*, that they may receive the benefit of the air; they are *discovered* to gratify the researches of the botanist.

UNDER, BELOW, BENEATH.

UNDER, like hind in behind, and the German *unter*, *hinter*, &c. are all connected with the preposition *in* implying the relation of enclosure.

BELOW denotes the state of being low: and BENEATH from the German, *nieder*, and the Greek *νεωθε* or *ενεωθε* downwards, has the same original signification. It is evident, therefore, from the above, that the preposition *under* denotes any situation of retirement or concealment; *below*, any situation of inferiority or lowness, and *beneath*, the same, only in a still greater degree. We are covered or sheltered by that which we stand *under*; we excel or rise above that which is *below* us; we look down upon that which is *beneath* us: we live *under* the protection of government; the sun disappears when it is *below* the horizon; we are apt to tread upon that which is altogether *beneath* us.

UNDERSTANDING, INTELLECT, INTELLIGENCE.

UNDERSTANDING (v. *To conceive*) being the Saxon word, is employed to describe a familiar and easy operation of the mind in forming distinct ideas of things. INTELLECT (v. *Intellect*) is employed to mark the same operation in regard to higher and more abstruse objects. The *understanding* applies to the first exercise of the rational powers: it is therefore aptly said of children and sa-

vages that they employ their *understandings* on the simple objects of perception; a child uses his *understanding* to distinguish the dimensions of objects, or to apply the right names to the things which come before his notice.

Intellect, being a matured state of the *understanding*, is most properly applied to the efforts of those who have their powers in full vigour: we speak of *understanding* as the characteristic distinction between man and brute; but human beings are distinguished from each other by the measure of their *intellect*.

Intellect and INTELLIGENCE are derived from the same word; but *intellect* describes the power itself, and *intelligence* the exercise of that power: the *intellect* may be hidden, but the *intelligence* brings it to light; we speak of *intelligence* as displayed in the countenance of a child whose looks evince that he has exerted his *intellect*, and thereby proved that it exists. Hence it arises that the word *intelligence* has been employed in the sense of knowledge or information, because these are the express fruits of *intelligence*: we must know by means of *intelligence*; but we may be ignorant with a great share of *intellect*.

UNDETERMINED, UNSETTLED, UNSTEADY, WAVERING.

UNDETERMINED (v. *To determine*) is a temporary state of the mind; UNSETTLED is commonly more lasting: we are *undetermined* in the ordinary concerns of life; we are *unsettled* in matters of opinion: we may be *undetermined* whether we shall go or stay; we are *unsettled* in our faith or religious profession.

Undetermined and *unsettled* are applied to particular objects: UNSTEADY and WAVERING are habits of the mind: to be *unsteady* is in fact to be habitually *unsettled* in regard to all objects. An *unsettled* character is one that has no settled principles: an *unsteady* character has an unfitness in himself to settle. *Undetermined* describes one uniform state of mind, namely, the want of determination: *wavering* describes a changeable state, namely, the state of determining variously at different times. *Undetermined* is always taken in an indifferent, *wavering* mostly in a bad sense; we may frequently be *undetermined* from the nature of the case; but a person is mostly *wavering* from a defect in his character. A parent may with reason be *undetermined* as to the line of life which he shall choose for his son; men of soft and timid characters are always

wavering in the most trivial, as well as the most important concerns of life.

TO UNFOLD, UNRAVEL, DEVELOPE.

To UNFOLD is to open that which has been folded; to UNRAVEL is to open that which has been *ravelled* or tangled; to DEVELOPE is to open that which has been wrapt in an *envelope*. The application of these terms therefore to moral objects is obvious: what has been *folded* and kept secret is *unfolded*; in this manner a hidden transaction is *unfolded* by being related circumstantially: what has been entangled in any mystery or confusion is *unravelled*: in this manner a mysterious transaction is *unravelled*, if any circumstance is fully accounted for: what has been wrapped up so as to be entirely shut out from view is *developed*; in this manner the plot of a play or novel, or the talent of a person, is *developed*.

UNHAPPY. MISERABLE, WRETCHED.

UNHAPPY is literally not to be happy; it is a negative condition: MISERABLE from *misereor* to pity, is to deserve pity; that is to be positively and extremely *unhappy*: WRETCHED, from our word *wreck*, the Saxon *wrecca* an exile, and the like, signifies cast away or abandoned; that is, particularly *miserable*. As happiness lies properly in the mind, *unhappy* is taken in the proper sense, with regard to the state of the feelings; but is figuratively extended to the outward circumstances which occasion the painful feelings; we lead an *unhappy* life, or are in an *unhappy* condition: as that which excites the compassion of others must be external, and the state of abandonment must of itself be an outward state, *miserable* and *wretched* are properly applied to the outward circumstances which cause the pain, and improperly to the pain which is occasioned. We can measure the force of these words, that is to say, the degree of *unhappiness* which they express, only by the circumstance which causes the *unhappiness*. An *unhappy* man is indefinite; as we may be *unhappy* from slight circumstances, or from those which are important; a child may be said to be *unhappy* at the loss of a plaything; a man is *unhappy* who leads a vicious life: *miserable* and *wretched* are more limited in their application; a child cannot be either *miserable* or *wretched*; and he who is so, has some serious cause either in his own mind or in his circumstances to make him so: a man is *miserable* who is tormented by his conscience; a mother will be *wretched* who sees her child violently torn from her.

The same distinction holds good when

taken to designate the outward circumstances themselves; he is an *unhappy* man whom nobody likes, and who likes nobody; every criminal suffering the punishment of his offences is an *unhappy* man. The condition of the poor is particularly *miserable* in countries which are not blessed with the abundance that England enjoys. Philoctetes, abandoned by the Greeks in the island of Lemnos, a prey to the most poignant grief and the horrors of indigence and solitude, was a *wretched* man.

Unhappy is only applicable to that which respects the happiness of man; but *miserable* and *wretched* may be said of that which is mean and worthless in its nature; a writer may be either *miserable* or *wretched* according to the lowness of the measure at which he is rated; so likewise any performance may be *miserable* or *wretched*; a house may be *miserable* or *wretched*, and the like.

UNIMPORTANT, INSIGNIFICANT, IMMATERIAL, INCONSIDERABLE.

The want of *importance*, of *consideration*, of *signification*, and of *matter* or substance, is expressed by these terms. They differ therefore principally according to the meaning of the primitives; but they are so closely allied that they may be employed sometimes indifferently. UNIMPORTANT regards the consequences of our actions: it is *unimportant* whether we use this or that word in certain cases: INCONSIDERABLE and INSIGNIFICANT respect those things which may attract notice; the former is more adapted to the grave style, to designate the comparative low value of things; the latter is a familiar term which seems to convey a contemptuous meaning: in a description we may say that the number, the size, the quantity, &c. is *inconsiderable*; in speaking of persons we may say they are *insignificant* in stature, look, talent, station, and the like; or, speaking of things, an *insignificant* production, or an *insignificant* word: IMMATERIAL is a species of the *unimportant*, which is applied only to familiar subjects; it is *immaterial* whether we go to-day or to-morrow; it is *immaterial* whether we have few or many.

UNLESS, EXCEPT.

UNLESS, which is equivalent to *if less*, if not, or if one fail, is employed only for the particular case; but EXCEPT has always a reference to some general rule, of which an *exception* is hereby signified: I shall not do it *unless* he ask me; no one can enter *except* those who are provided with tickets.

UNOFFENDING, INOFFENSIVE,
HARMLESS.

UNOFFENDING denotes the act of not *offending*: INOFFENSIVE the property of not being disposed or apt to offend: HARMLESS, the property of being void of harm. *Unoffending* expresses therefore only a partial state; *inoffensive* and *harmless* mark the disposition and character. A child is *unoffending* as long as he does nothing to offend others: a creature is *inoffensive* that has nothing in itself that can offend; but that is *harmless* which has neither the will nor the power to *harm*. Domestic animals are frequently very *inoffensive*; it is a great recommendation to say of a quack medicine that it is *harmless*.

UNRULY, UNGOVERNABLE, REFRAC-
TORY.

UNRULY marks the want of disposition to be ruled: UNGOVERNABLE, an absolute incapacity to be governed: the former is a temporary or partial error, the latter is an habitual defect in the temper: a volatile child will be occasionally *unruly*; any child of strong passions will become *ungovernable* by excessive indulgence: we say that our wills are *unruly*, and our tempers are *ungovernable*. The *unruly* respects that which is to be ruled or turned at the instant; the *ungovernable* respects that which is to be put into a regular course: a child is *unruly* in his actions, and *ungovernable* in his conduct. Hence REFRACTORY, from the Latin *refringo* to break open, marks the disposition to break every thing down before it: it is the excess of the *unruly* with regard to children: the *unruly* is however negative; but the *refractory* is positive: a child is *unruly* if in any degree he gives trouble in the *ruling*; he is *refractory* if he refuses altogether to be ruled.

UNSEARCHABLE, INSCRUTABLE.

These terms are both applied to the Almighty, but not altogether indifferently; for that which is UNSEARCHABLE is not set at so great a distance from us as that which is INSCRUTABLE: for that which is *searched* is in common concerns easier to be found than that which requires a *scrutiny*. The ways of God are all to us finite creatures more or less *unsearchable*; but the mysterious plans of Providence as frequently evinced in the affairs of men are altogether *inscrutable*.

UNSPEAKABLE, INEFFABLE, UNUTTER-
ABLE, INEXPRESSIBLE.

UNSPEAKABLE and INEFFABLE, from

the Latin *for* to speak, have precisely the same meaning; but *unspeakable* is said of objects in general, particularly of that which is above human conception, and surpasses the power of language to describe; as the *unspeakable* goodness of God: INEFFABLE is said of such objects as cannot be painted in words with adequate force; as the *ineffable* sweetness of a person's look: UNUTTERABLE and INEXPRESSIBLE are extended in their signification to that which is incommunicable by signs from one being to another; thus grief is *inutterable* which it is not in the power of the sufferer by any sounds to bring home to the feelings of another; grief is *inexpressible* which is not to be expressed by looks, or words, or any signs. *Unutterable* is therefore applied only to the individual who wishes to give *utterance*: *inexpressible* may be said of that which is to be expressed concerning others: our own pains are *unutterable*; the sweetness of a person's countenance is *inexpressible*.

UNTIMELY, ILL-TIMED.

UNTIMELY is directly opposed to *timely*, and signifies before the time appointed; as an *untimely* death: but ILL-TIMED is indirectly opposed, signifying at the wrong time; as an *ill-timed* remark.

UNTRUTH, FALSEHOOD, FALSITY, LIE.

UNTRUTH is an *untrue* saying; FALSEHOOD and LIE are *false* sayings: *untruth* of itself reflects no disgrace on the agent; it may be unintentional or not: a *falsehood* and a *lie* are an intentional *false* saying, differing only in degree as to the guilt of the offender: a *falsehood* is not always spoken for the express intention of deceiving, but a *lie* is uttered only for the worst of purposes. Some persons have a habit of telling *falsehoods* from the mere love of talking: those who are guilty of bad actions endeavour to conceal them by *lies*. Children are apt to speak *untruths* for want of understanding the value of words: travellers from a love of exaggeration are apt to introduce *falsehoods* into their narrations: it is the nature of a *lie* to increase itself to a tenfold degree: one *lie* must be backed by many more.

Falsehood is also used in the abstract sense for what is *false*. FALSITY is never used but in the abstract sense, for the property of the *false*. The former is general, the latter particular in the application: the truth or *falsehood* of an assertion is not always to be distinctly proved; the *falsity* of any particular person's assertion may be proved by the evidence of others.

UNWORTHY, WORTHLESS.

UNWORTHY is a term of less reproach than WORTHLESS; for the former signifies not to be *worthy* of praise or honour; the latter signifies to be without all worth, and consequently in the fullest sense bad. It may be a mark of modesty or humility to say that I am an *unworthy* partaker of your kindness; but it would be folly and extravagance to say, that I am a *worthless* partaker of your kindness. In regard to one another we are often *unworthy* of the distinctions or privileges we enjoy; in regard to our Maker we are all *unworthy* of his goodness: for we are all *worthless* in his eyes.

USAGE, CUSTOM, PRESCRIPTION.

The USAGE is what one has been long used to do; CUSTOM (*v. Custom*) is what one generally does; PRESCRIPTION is what one is *prescribed* to do. The *usage* requires force and sanction by dint of time; the *custom* acquires sanction by the frequency of its being done or the numbers doing it; the *prescription* acquires force by the authority which *prescribes* it, namely, the universal consent of mankind. Hence it arises that *customs* vary in every age, but that *usage* and *prescription* supply the place of written law.

TO UTTER, SPEAK, ARTICULATE, PRONOUNCE.

UTTER, from *out*, signifies to put out; that is, to send forth a sound: this therefore is a more general term than SPEAK, which is to utter an intelligible sound. We may *utter* a groan; we *speak* words only, or that which is intended to serve as words. To speak therefore is only a species of *utterance*; a dumb man has *utterance* but not *speech*.

ARTICULATE and PRONOUNCE are modes of *speaking*; to *articulate*, from *articulum* a joint, is to *pronounce* distinctly the letters or syllables of words; which is the first effort of a child beginning to *speak*. It is of great importance to make a child *articulate* every letter when he first begins to *speak* or read. To *pronounce*, from the Latin *pronuncio* to speak out loud, is a formal mode of *speaking*.

A child must first *articulate* the letters and the syllables, then he *pronounces* or sets forth the whole word; this is necessary before he can *speak* to be understood.

V.

VACANCY, VACUITY, INANITY.

VACANCY and VACUITY both denote

the space unoccupied, or the abstract quality of being unoccupied. INANITY, from the Latin *inanis*, denotes the abstract quality of emptiness, or of not containing any thing: hence the former terms *vacancy* and *vacuity* are used in an indifferent sense; *inanity* always in a bad sense: there may be a *vacancy* in the mind, or a *vacancy* in life, which we may or may not fill up as we please; but *inanity* of character denotes the want of the essentials that constitute a character.

There are *vacuities* in the happiest life, which it is not in the power of the world to fill.

VAIN, INEFFECTUAL, FRUITLESS.

VAIN, *v. Idle*.

INEFFECTUAL, that is, not *effectual* (*v. Effective*).

FRUITLESS, that is, without *fruit*, signifies not producing the desired fruit of one's labour.

These epithets are all applied to our endeavours; but the term *vain* is the most general and indefinite; the other terms are particular and definite. What we aim at, as well as what we strive for, may be *vain*; but *ineffectual* and *fruitless* refer only to the end of our labours. When the object aimed at is general in its import, it is common to term the endeavour *vain* when it cannot attain this object; it is *vain* to attempt to reform a person's character until he is convinced that he stands in need of reformation: when the means employed are inadequate for the attainment of the particular end, it is usual to call the endeavour *ineffectual*; cool arguments will be *ineffectual* in convincing any one inflamed with a particular passion; when labour is specifically employed for the attainment of a particular object, it is usual to term it *fruitless* if it fail; peacemakers will often find their labours rendered *fruitless* by the violent passions of angry opponents.

VALUABLE, PRECIOUS, COSTLY.

VALUABLE signifies fit to be *valued*; PRECIOUS, having a high price; COSTLY, costing much money. *Valuable* expresses directly the idea of *value*; *precious* and *costly* express the same idea indirectly: on the other hand, that which is *valuable* is only said to be fit or deserving of *value*; but *precious* and *costly* denote that which is highly *valuable*, according to the ordinary measure of *valuing* objects, that is, by the *price* they bear: hence, the two latter express the idea much more strongly than the former. A book is *valuable* according to its contents, or according to the estimate which

men set upon it, either individually or collectively. The Bible is the only *precious* book in the world that has an intrinsic *value* above all *price*. There are many *costly* things, which are only *valuable* to the individuals who are disposed to expend money upon them.

VALUE, WORTH, RATE, PRICE.

VALUE, from the Latin *valeo* to be strong, respects those essential qualities which constitute its strength.

WORTH in German *werth*, from *währen* to perceive, signifies that good which is experienced or felt to exist in a thing.

RATE, *v. Proportion*.

PRICE, in Latin *pretium*, from the Greek *πρᾶσσω* to sell, signifies what a thing is sold for.

Value is a general and indefinite term applied to whatever is really good or conceived as such in a thing; the *worth* is that good only which is conceived or known as such. The *value* therefore of a thing is as variable as the humours and circumstances of individuals; it may be nothing or something very great in the same object at the same time in the eyes of different men. The *worth* is however that value which is acknowledged; it is therefore something more fixed and permanent: we speak of the *value* of external objects which are determined by taste; but the *worth* of things as determined by rule. The *value* of a book that is out of print is fluctuating and uncertain; but its real *worth* may not be more than what it would fetch for waste paper. The *rate* and *price* are the measures of that *value* or *worth*; the former in a general, the latter in a particular application to mercantile transactions. Whatever we give in exchange for another thing, whether according to a definite or an indefinite estimation, that is said to be done at a certain *rate*; thus we purchase pleasure at a dear *rate*, when it is at the expense of our health: *price* is the *rate* of exchange estimated by coin or any other medium; hence *price* is a fixed *rate*, and may be figuratively applied in that sense to moral objects; as when health is expressly sacrificed to pleasure, it may be termed the *price* of pleasure.

TO VALUE, PRIZE, ESTEEM.

To VALUE is in the literal sense to fix the real *value* of a thing. PRIZE, signifying to fix a *price*, and ESTEEM (*v. Esteem*), are both modes of *valuing*. In the extended sense, to *value* may mean to ascertain the relative or supposititious *value* of a thing: in this sense men *value* gold above silver,

or an appraiser *values* goods. To *value* may either be applied to material or spiritual subjects, to corporeal or mental actions: *prize* and *esteem* are taken only as mental actions; the former in reference to sensible or moral objects, the latter only to moral objects: we may *value* books according to their market price, or we may *value* them according to their contents; we *prize* books only for their contents, in which sense *prize* is a much stronger term than *value*; we also *prize* men for their usefulness to society; we *esteem* their moral characters.

VARIATION, VARIETY.

VARIATION denotes the act of *varying* (*v. To change*); VARIETY denotes the quality of *varying*, or the thing *varied*. The astronomer observes the *variations* in the heavens; the philosopher observes the *variations* in the climate from year to year: *variety* is pleasing to all persons, but to none so much as the young and the fickle; there is an infinite *variety* in every species of objects animate or inanimate.

VENAL, MERCENARY,

VENAL, from the Latin *venalis*, signifies saleable or ready to be sold, which, applied as it commonly is to persons, is a much stronger term than MERCENARY (*v. Mercenary*). A *venal* man gives up all principle for interest; a *mercenary* man seeks his interest without regard to principle: *venal* writers are such as write in favour of the cause that can promote them to riches or honours; a servant is commonly a *mercenary* who gives his services according as he is paid: those who are loudest in their professions of political purity are the best subjects for a minister to make *venal*; a *mercenary* spirit is apt to be engendered in the minds of those who devote themselves exclusively to trade.

VENIAL, PARDONABLE.

VENIAL, from the Latin *venia* pardon or indulgence, is applied to what may be tolerated without express disparagement to the individual, or direct censure; but the PARDONABLE is that which may only escape severe censure, but cannot be allowed: garrulity is a *venial* offence in old age; levity in youth is *pardonable* in single instances.

VERBAL, ORAL, VOCAL.

VERBAL, from *verbum* a word, signifies after the manner of a spoken word; ORAL, from *os* a mouth, signifies by word of mouth; and VOCAL, from *vox* the voice,

signifies by the voice: the two former of these words are used to distinguish speaking from writing; the latter to distinguish the sounds of the voice from any other sounds, particularly in singing: a *verbal* message is distinguished from a written one; *oral* tradition is distinguished from that which is handed down to posterity by means of books; *vocal* music is distinguished from instrumental; *vocal* sounds are more harmonious than those which proceed from any other bodies.

VEXATION, MORTIFICATION, CHAGRIN.

VEXATION, *v. To displease.*

MORTIFICATION, *v. To humble.*

CHAGRIN, in French *chagrin*, from *aigrir*, and the Latin *acer*, sharp, signifies a sharp point.

Vexation arises principally from our wishes and views being crossed; *mortification*, from our pride and self-importance being hurt; *chagrin*, from a mixture of the two: disappointments are always attended with more or less of *vexation*, according to the circumstances which give pain and trouble; an exposure of our poverty may be more or less of a *mortification*, according to the value which we set on wealth and grandeur; a refusal of a request will produce more or less of *chagrin* as it is accompanied with circumstances more or less *mortifying* to our pride.

VIEW, SURVEY, PROSPECT.

VIEW (*v. To look*), and SURVEY, compounded of *vey* or *view* and *sur* over, mark the act of the person, namely, the looking at a thing with more or less attention: PROSPECT, from the Latin *prospectus* and *prospicio* to see before, designates the thing seen. We take a *view* or *survey*; the *prospect* presents itself: the *view* is of an indefinite extent; the *survey* is always comprehensive in its nature. Ignorant people take but narrow *views* of things; men take more or less enlarged *views*, according to their cultivation: the capacious mind of a genius takes a *survey* of all nature. The *view* depends altogether on the train of a person's thoughts; the *prospect* is set before him, it depends upon the nature of the thing: our *views* of advancement are sometimes very fallacious; our *prospects* are very delusive; both occasion disappointment: the former is the keener, as we have to charge the miscalculation upon ourselves. Sometimes our *prospects* depend upon our *views*, at least in matters of religion; he who forms erroneous *views*

of a future state has but a wretched *prospect* beyond the grave.

VIEW, PROSPECT, LANDSCAPE.

VIEW and PROSPECT (*v. View, prospect*), though applied here to external objects of sense, have a familiar distinction as in the preceding article. The *view* is not only that which may be seen, but that which actually is seen; the *prospect* is that which may be seen: that ceases to be a *view* which has not an agent to *view*, but a *prospect* exists continually whether seen or not: hence we speak of our *view* being intercepted, but not our *prospect* intercepted; a confined or bounded *view*, but a lively or dreary *prospect*. *View* is an indefinite term; it may be said either of a number of objects, or of a single object, of a whole, or of a part; *prospect* is said only of an aggregate number of objects: we may have a *view* of a town, of a number of scattered houses, of a single house, or of the spire of a steeple; but the *prospect* comprehends that which comes within the range of the eye. *View* may be said of that which is seen directly or indirectly; *prospect* only of that which directly presents itself to the eye; hence a drawing of an object may be termed a *view*, although not a *prospect*. *View* is confined to no particular objects; *prospect* mostly respects rural objects; and LANDSCAPE respects no others, *Landscape, landskip, or landshape*, denotes any portion of country which is in a particular form: hence the *landscape* is a species of *prospect*. A *prospect* may be wide, and comprehend an assemblage of objects both of nature and art; but a *landscape* is narrow, and lies within the compass of the naked eye: hence it is also that *landscape* may be taken also for the drawing of a *landscape*, and consequently for a species of *view*: the taking of *views* or *landscapes* is the last exercise of the learner in drawing.

VIOLENT, FURIOUS, BOISTEROUS, VEHEMENT, IMPETUOUS.

VIOLENT, signifies having force (*v. Force*).

FURIOUS signifies having *fury* (*v. Anger*).

BOISTEROUS in all probability comes from *bestir*, signifying ready to *bestir* or come into motion.

VEHEMENT, in Latin *vehemens*, compounded of *veho* and *mens*, signifies carried away by the mind or the force of passion.

IMPETUOUS signifies having an *impetus*.

Violent is here the most general term, including the idea of force or violence, which is common to them all; it is as general in its application as in its meaning. When *violent* and *furious* are applied to the same objects, the latter expresses a higher degree of the former: thus a *furious* temper is *violent* to an excessive degree; a *furious* whirlwind is *violent* beyond measure. *Violent* and *boisterous* are likewise applied to the same objects; but the *boisterous* refers only to the *violence* of the motion or noise: hence we say that a wind is *violent*, inasmuch as it acts with great force upon all bodies; it is *boisterous*, inasmuch as it causes the great motion of bodies: a *violent* person deals in violence of every kind; a *boisterous* person is full of *violent* action.

Violent, *vehement*, and *impetuous*, are all applied to persons, or that which is personal: a man is *violent* in his opinions, *violent* in his measures, *violent* in his resentments; he is *vehement* in his affections or passions, *vehement* in pursuing an object, *vehement* in expression: *violence* transfers itself to some external object on which it acts with force; but *vehemence* respects that species of *violence* which is confined to the person himself: we may dread *violence*, because it is always liable to do mischief: we ought to suppress our *vehemence*, because it is injurious to ourselves: a *violent* partisan renders himself obnoxious to others; a man who is *vehement* in any cause puts it out of his own power to be of use. *Impetuosity* is rather the extreme of *violence* or *vehemence*: an *impetuous* attack is an excessively *violent* attack; an *impetuous* character is an excessively *vehement* character.

VISION, APPARITION, PHANTOM, SPECTRE, GHOST.

VISION, from the Latin *visus* seeing or seen, signifies either the act of seeing or thing seen: APPARITION, from *appear*, signifies the thing that appears. As the thing seen is only the improper signification, the term *vision* is never employed but in regard to some agent: the *vision* depends upon the state of the *visual* organ; the *vision* of a person whose sight is defective will frequently be fallacious; he will see some things double which are single, long which are short, and the like. In like manner, if the sight be miraculously impressed, his *vision* will enable him to see that which is supernatural: hence it is that *vision* is either true or false, according to the circumstances of the individual; and a *vision* sig-

nifying a thing seen, is taken for a supernatural exertion of the *vision*: *apparition*, on the contrary, refers us to the object seen; this may be true or false according to the manner in which it presents itself. Feverish people often think they see *visions*; timid and credulous people sometimes take trees and posts for *apparitions*.

PHANTOM, from the Greek *φανω* to appear, is used for a false *apparition*, or the appearance of a thing otherwise than what it is; thus the *ignis fatuus*, vulgarly called Jack-o' Lantern, is a *phantom*.

SPECTRE, from *specio* to behold, and GHOST, from *geist* a spirit, are the *apparitions* of immaterial substances. *Spectre* is taken for any spiritual being that appears; but *ghost* is taken only for the spirits of departed men who appear to their fellow-creatures: and *spectres* and *ghosts* exist mostly in the imagination of the young and the ignorant.

VOTE, SUFFRAGE, VOICE.

VOTE, in Latin *votum* from *voveo* to vow, is very probably from *vox* a voice, signifying the voice that is raised in supplication to heaven.

SUFFRAGE, in Latin *suffragium*, is in all probability compounded of *sub* and *frango* to break out or declare for a thing,

VOICE is here figuratively taken for the voice that is raised in favour of a thing.

The *vote* is the wish itself whether expressed or not; the *suffrage* and the *voice* are the wish that is expressed: a person has a *vote*; he gives his *vote*, *suffrage*, or *voice*. The *vote* applies to concerns of importance; the *suffrage* is a *vote* given only in particular cases; the *voice* is a partial or occasional wish expressed only in matters of minor importance &c.

The *vote* and *voice* are given either for or against a person or thing; the *suffrage* is commonly given in favour of a person: in all public assemblies the majority of *votes* decides the question; members of Parliament are chosen by the *suffrages* of the people; in the execution of a will every executor has a *voice* in all that is transacted.

W.

WAKEFUL, WATCHFUL, VIGILANT.

We may be WAKEFUL without being WATCHFUL; but we cannot be *watchful* without being *wakeful*.

Wakefulness is an affair of the body, and depends upon the temperament; *watchfulness* is an affair of the will, and depends upon the determination: some persons are

more *wakeful* than they wish to be; few are as *watchful* as they ought to be.

VIGILANCE, from the Latin *vigil*, and the Greek *αγᾰλλος*, *αγᾰλλιαω* to be on the alert, expresses a high degree of *watchfulness*: a sentinel is *watchful* who on ordinary occasions keeps good *watch*; but it is necessary for him on extraordinary occasions, to be *vigilant*, in order to detect whatever may pass.

We are *watchful* only in the proper sense of *watching*; but we may be *vigilant* in detecting moral as well as natural evils.

TO WANDER, TO STROLL, RAMBLE, ROVE, ROAM, RANGE.

WANDER, in German *wandern*, is a frequentative of *wenden* to turn, signifying to turn frequently.

To STROLL is probably an intensive of to *roll*, that is, to go in a planless manner.

RAMBLE, from the Latin *re* and *ambulo*, is to walk backward and forward; and ROVE is probably a contraction of *ramble*.

ROAM is connected with our word *room*, space, signifying to go in a wide space, and the Hebrew *rom*, to be violently moved backward and forward.

RANGE, from the noun *range*, a rank, row, or extended space, signifies to go over a great space. The idea of going in an irregular and free manner is common to all these terms.

To *wander* is to go in no fixed path; to *stroll* is to *wander* out of a path that we had taken. To *wander* may be an involuntary action; a person may *wander* to a great distance, or for an indefinite length of time; in this manner a person *wanders* who has lost himself in a wood: to *stroll* is a voluntary action, limited at our discretion; thus when a person takes a walk, he sometimes *strolls* from one path into another as he pleases.

To *ramble* is to *wander* without any object, and consequently with more than ordinary irregularity; in this manner he who sets out to take a walk, without knowing or thinking where he shall go, *rambles* as chance directs. To *rove* is to *wander* in the same planless manner, but to a wider extent; a fugitive who does not know his road *roves* about the country in quest of some retreat.

To *roam* is to *wander* from the impulse of a disordered or uneasy mind: in this manner a lunatic who has broken loose may *roam* about the country; so likewise a person who travels about, because he cannot rest in quiet at home, may also be said to

roam in quest of peace. To *range* is the contrary of to *roam*; as the former indicates a disordered state of mind, the latter indicates a composure and fixedness; we *range* within certain limits, as the hunter *ranges* the forest, the shepherd *ranges* the mountains.

TO WANT, NEED, LACK.

To be without is the common idea expressed by these terms: but to WANT is to be without that which contributes to our comfort, or is an object of our desire; to NEED is to be without that which is essential for our existence or our purposes; to LACK, which is probably a variation from *leak*, and a term not in frequent use, expresses little more than the general idea of being without, unaccompanied by any collateral idea. From the close connexion which subsists between desiring and *want*, it is usual to consider what we *want* as artificial, and what we *need* as natural and indispensable: what one man *wants* is a superfluity to another; but that which is *needed* by one is in like circumstances *needed* by all: tender people *want* a fire when others would be glad not to have it; all persons *need* warm clothing and a warm house in the winter.

To *want* and *need* may extend indefinitely to many or all objects; to *lack*, or be deficient, is properly said of a single object; we may *want* or *need* every thing; we *lack* one thing, we *lack* this or that: he who *wants* nothing is a happy man; he who *needs* nothing ought to be satisfied with his lot; he who *lacks* understanding, virtue, or religion, is to be pitied.

WATERMAN, BOATMAN, FERRYMAN.

These three terms are employed for persons who are engaged with boats; but the term WATERMAN is specifically applied to such whose business it is to let out their boats and themselves for a given time; the BOATMAN may use a boat only occasionally for the transfer of goods; a FERRYMAN uses a boat only for the conveyance of persons or goods across a particular river or piece of water.

WAVE, BILLOW, SURGE, BREAKER.

WAVE, from the Saxon *waegan*, and German *wiegen* to weigh or rock, is applied to water in an undulating state; it is, therefore, the generic term, and the rest are specific terms: those waves which swell more than ordinarily are termed BILLOWS, which is derived from *bulge* or *bilge*, and German *balg*, the paunch or belly: those

waves which rise higher than usual, are termed SURGES, from the Latin *surgo* to rise: those waves which dash against the shore, or against vessels, with more than ordinary force, are termed BREAKERS.

WAY, MANNER, METHOD, MODE,
COURSE, MEANS.

All these words denote the steps which are pursued from the beginning to the completion of any work. The WAY is both general and indefinite; it is either taken by accident or chosen by design: the MANNER and METHOD are species of the way chosen by design; the former in regard to others. Whoever attempts to do that which is strange to him, will at first do it in an awkward way; the manner of conferring a favour is often more than the favour itself; experience supplies men in the end with a suitable method of carrying on their business. Method is said of that which requires contrivance; MODE, of that which requires practice and habitual attention; the former being applied to matters of art, and the latter to mechanical actions: the master has a good method of teaching to write; the scholar has a good or bad mode of holding his pen. The COURSE and the MEANS are the way which we pursue in our moral conduct: the course is the course of measures which are adopted to produce a certain result; the means collectively for the course which leads to a certain end: in order to obtain legal redress, we must pursue a certain course in law; law is one means of gaining redress, but we do wisely, if we can, to adopt the safer and pleasanter means of persuasion and cool remonstrance.

WEAK, FEEBLE, INFIRM.

WEAK, in Saxon *wace*, Dutch *wack*, German *schwach*, is in all probability an intensive of *weich* soft, which comes from *weichen* to yield, and this from *bewegen* to move.

FEEBLE, probably contracted from *failable*.

INFIRM, v. *Debility*.

The Saxon term *weak* is here, as it usually is, the familiar and universal term; *feeble* is suited to a more polished style; *infirm* is only a species of the *weak*: we may be *weak* in body or mind; but we are commonly *feeble* and *infirm* only in the body; we may be *weak* from disease, or *weak* by nature, it equally conveys the gross idea of a defect: but the term *feeble* and *infirm* are qualified expressions for *weakness*: a child is *feeble* from its infancy; an old man

is *feeble* from age; the latter may likewise be *infirm* in consequence of sickness. We pity the *weak*, but their *weakness* often gives us pain; we assist the *feeble* when they attempt to walk; we support the *infirm* when they are unable to stand. The same distinction exists between *weak* and *feeble* in the moral use of the words: a *weak* attempt to excuse a person conveys a reproachful meaning; but the efforts which we make to defend another may be praiseworthy, although *feeble*.

TO WEAKEN, ENFEEBLE, DEBILITATE,
ENERVATE, INVALIDATE.

To WEAKEN is to make *weak* (v. *Weak*), and is, as before, the generic: to ENFEEBLE is to make *feeble* (v. *Weak*): to DEBILITATE is to cause *debility* (v. *Debility*): to ENERVATE is to *unnerve*; and to INVALIDATE is to make not valid or strong: all of which are but modes of *weakening* applicable to different objects. To *weaken* may be either a temporary or permanent act when applied to persons; *enfeeble* permanent either as to the body or the mind: we may be *weakened* suddenly by severe pain; we are *enfeebled* in a gradual manner, either by the slow effects of disease or age. To *weaken* is either a particular or a complete act; to *enfeeble*, to *debilitate*, and *enervate*, are properly partial acts: what *enfeebles* deprives of vital or essential power; what *debilitates* may lessen power in one particular, though not in another; the severe exercise of any power, such as the memory or the attention, will tend to *debilitate* that faculty; what *enervates* acts particularly on the nervous system; it relaxes the frame, and unfits the person for action either of body or mind. To *weaken* is said of things as well as persons; to *invalidate* is said of things only: we *weaken* the force of an argument by an injudicious application; we *invalidate* the claim of another by proving its informality in law.

WEARISOME, TIRESOME, TEDIOUS.

WEARISOME (v. *To weary*) is the general and indefinite term; TIRESOME (v. *To weary*); and TEDIOUS, causing *tedium*, a specific form of *wearisomeness*: common things may cause *weariness*; that which acts painfully is either *tiresome* or *tedious* but in different degrees; the repetition of the same sounds will grow *tiresome*; long waiting in anxious suspense is *tedious*: there is more of that which is physical in the *tiresome*, and of that which is mental in the *tedious*.

TO WEARY, TIRE, JADE, HARASS.

To WEARY is a frequentative of *wear*, that is, to *wear* out the strength.

To TIRE, from the French *tirer* and the Latin *traho* to draw, signifies to *draw* out the strength.

To JADE is the same as to *goad*.

HARRASS, *v. Distress*.

Long exertion *wearies*; a little exertion will *tire* a child or weak man; forced exertions *jade*; painful exertions, or exertions coupled with painful circumstances, *harass*: the horse is *jaded* who is forced on beyond his strength; the soldier is *harassed* who marches in perpetual fear of an attack from the enemy. We are *wearied* with thinking when it gives us pain to think any longer; we are *tired* of our employment when it ceases to give us pleasure; we are *jaded* by incessant attention to business; we are *harassed* by perpetual complaints which we cannot redress.

WEIGHT, HEAVINESS, GRAVITY.

WEIGHT, from to *weigh*, is that which a thing *weighs*.

HEAVINESS, from *heavy* and *heave*, signifies the abstract quality of the *heavy*, or difficult to heave.

GRAVITY, from the Latin *gravis*, likewise denotes the same abstract quality.

Weight is indefinite; whatever may be *weighed* has a *weight*, whether large or small: *heaviness* and *gravity* are the property of bodies having a great *weight*. *Weight* is only opposed to that which has or is supposed to have no *weight*, that is, what is incorporeal or immaterial; for we may speak of the *weight* of the lightest conceivable bodies, as the *weight* of a feather: *heaviness* is opposed to lightness; the *heaviness* of lead is opposed to the lightness of a feather.

Weight lies absolutely in the thing; *heaviness* is relatively considered with respect to the person: we estimate the *weight* of things according to a certain measure: we estimate the *heaviness* of things by our feelings.

Gravity is that species of *weight*, which is scientifically considered as inherent in certain bodies; the term is therefore properly scientific.

WEIGHT, BURDEN, LOAD.

WEIGHT, *v. Weight*.

BURDEN, from *bear*, signifies the thing borne.

LOAD, in German *laden*, is supposed by Adelung to admit of a derivation from

different sources; but he does not suppose that which appears to me the most natural, namely, from *lay*, which becomes in our preterite *laid*, particularly since in low German and Dutch *laden*, to *load*, is contracted into *laeyen*, and the literal meaning of *load* is to lay on or in any thing.

The term *weight* is here considered in common with the other terms, in the sense of a positive *weight*, as respects the persons or things by which it is allied to the word *burden*: *weight* is said either of persons or things; the *burden* more commonly respects persons; the *load* may be said of either: a person may sink under the *weight* that rests upon him; a platform may break down from the *weight* upon it; a person sinks under his *burden* or *load*; a cart breaks down from the *load*: The *weight* is abstractedly taken for what is, without reference to the cause of its being there; *burden* and *load* have respect to the person or thing by which they are produced; accident produces the *weight*; a person takes a *burden* upon himself, or has it imposed upon him; the *load* is always laid on: it is not proper to carry any *weight* that exceeds our strength; those who bear the *burden* expect to reap the fruit of their labour; he who carries *loads* must be contented to take such as are given him.

In the moral application, these terms mark the pain which is produced by a pressure; but *weight* and *load* rather describe the positive severity of the pressure; the *burden* respects the temper and inclinations of the sufferer; the *load* is in this case a very great *weight*: a minister of state has a *weight* on his mind at all times, from the heavy responsibility which attaches to his station: one who labours under strong apprehensions or dread of an evil has a *load* on his mind; any sort of employment is a *burden* to one who wishes to be idle; and time unemployed is a *burden* to him who wishes to be in action.

WELL-BEING, WELFARE, PROSPERITY, HAPPINESS.

WELL-BEING may be said of one or many, but more of a body; the *well-being* of society depends upon a due subordination of the different ranks of which it is composed. WELFARE, or *faring well*, from the German *fahren* to go, respects the good condition of an individual; a parent is naturally anxious for the *welfare* of his child.

Well-being and *welfare* consist of such things as more immediately affect our existence: PROSPERITY, which comprehends both *well-being* and *welfare*, includes like-

wise all that can add to the enjoyments of man; the *prosperity* of a state, or of an individual, therefore, consists in the increase of wealth, honours, and the like: as outward circumstances more or less affect the **HAPPINESS** of man; *happiness* is often substituted for *prosperity*; but it must never be forgotten that *happiness* properly lies only in the mind, and that consequently *prosperity* may exist without *happiness*; but *happiness*, at least as far as respects a body of men, cannot exist without some portion of *prosperity*.

WHOLE, ENTIRE, COMPLETE, TOTAL, INTEGRAL.

* **WHOLE** excludes subtraction; **ENTIRE** excludes division; **COMPLETE** excludes deficiency: a *whole* orange has had nothing taken from it; an *entire* orange is not yet cut; and a *complete* orange is grown to its full size: it is possible, therefore, for a thing to be *whole* and not *entire*; and to be both, and yet not *complete*: an orange cut into parts is *whole* while all the parts remain together, but it is not *entire*: hence we speak of a *whole* house, an *entire* set, and a *complete* book. The *wholeness* or integrity of a thing is destroyed at one's pleasure; its *completeness* depends upon circumstances.

TOTAL denotes the aggregate of the parts; *whole* the junction of all the parts: the former is, therefore, employed more in the moral sense to convey the idea of extent, and the latter mostly in the proper sense: hence we speak of the *total* destruction of the *whole* city, or of some particular houses; the *total* amount of expense of the war. *Whole* and *total* may in this manner be employed to denote things as well as qualities: in regard to material substances a *whole* is always opposed to the parts of which it is composed; the *total* is the collected sum of the parts; and the **INTEGRAL** is the same as the *integral* number.

The first four may likewise be employed as adverbs; but *wholly* is a more familiar term than *totally* in expressing the idea of extent; *entirely* is the same as undividedly; *completely* is the same as perfectly, without any thing wanting: we are *wholly* or *totally* ignorant of the affair; we are *entirely* at the disposal or service of another; we are *completely* at variance in our accounts.

WICKED, INIQUITOUS, NEFARIOUS.

WICKED (v. *Bad*) is here the generic term; **INIQUITOUS**, from *iniquus* unjust,

signifies that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the law of right betwixt man and man; **NEFARIOUS**, from the Latin *nefas* wicked or abominable, is that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the most sacred obligations. The term *wicked*, being indefinite, is commonly applied in a milder sense than *iniquitous*: and *iniquitous* than *nefarious*: it is *wicked* to deprive another of his property, unlawfully, under any circumstances: but it is *iniquitous* if it be done by fraud and circumvention; and *nefarious* if it involves any breach of trust.

TO WILL, WISH.

The **WILL** is that faculty of the soul which is the most prompt and decisive; it immediately impels to action: the **WISH** is but a gentle motion of the soul towards a thing. We can *will* nothing but what we can effect; we may *wish* for many things which lie above our reach. The *will* must be under the entire control of reason, or it will lead a person into every mischief: *wishes* ought to be under the direction of reason; or otherwise they may greatly disturb our happiness.

WILLINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, SPONTANEOUSLY.

To do a thing **WILLINGLY** is to do it with a good will; to do a thing **VOLUNTARILY** is to do it of one's own accord: the former respects one's *willingness* to comply with the wishes of another; the latter respects our freedom from foreign influence. It is pleasant to see a child do his task *willingly*; it is pleasant to see a man *voluntarily* engage in any service of public good. **SPONTANEOUSLY** is but a mode of the *voluntary*, applied, however, more commonly to inanimate objects than to the will of persons: the ground produces *spontaneously*, when it produces without culture; and words flow *spontaneously*, which require no effort on the part of the speaker to produce them. If, however, applied to the will, it bespeaks in a stronger degree the totally unbiassed state of the agent's mind: the *spontaneous* effusions of the heart are more than the *voluntary* services of benevolence. The *willing* is opposed to the *unwilling*, the *voluntary* to the mechanical or *involuntary*, the *spontaneous* to the reluctant or the artificial.

WISDOM, PRUDENCE.

WISDOM (v. *Wit*) consists in speculative knowledge; **PRUDENCE** (v. *Prudent*) in that which is practical: the former knows

* Vide Girard: „Entier, complet.“

what is past; the latter by foresight knows what is to come: many wise men are remarkable for their want of *prudence*; and those who are remarkable for *prudence* have frequently no other knowledge of which they can boast.

WIT, HUMOUR, SATIRE, IRONY, BURLESQUE.

WIT, like wisdom, according to its original, from *weissen* to know, signifies knowledge, but it has so extended its meaning as to signify that faculty of the mind by which knowledge or truth is perceived. *Wit* lies most in the *spontaneous* assemblage of ideas and putting them together with quickness and variety, HUMOUR is a species of *wit* which flows out of the *humour* of a person. *Wit*, as distinguished from *humour*, may consist of a single brilliant thought: but *humour* runs in a vein; it is not a striking, but an equable and pleasing, flow of *wit*. SATIRE, from *satyr*, probably from *sat* and *ira* abounding in anger, and IRONY, from the Greek *εἰρωνία* simulation and dissimulation, are personal and censorious sorts of *wit*; the first of which openly points at the object, and the second in a covert manner takes its aim, BURLESQUE is rather a species of *humour*, than direct *wit*, which consists in an assemblage of ideas extravagantly discordant. *Satire* and *irony* are the most ill-natured kinds of *wit*; *burlesque* stands in the lowest rank.

WITH, BY, FROM.

WITH, and BY both relate to the agent or the means by which an end is effected; but the former expresses a close and immediate connection between the agent and the means, the latter only a remote connection: he was wounded *by* a dagger, refers more to the instrument than to the actor; he was killed *with* a dagger conveys the collateral idea of a choice of weapons and consequently of a person choosing. Dr. Robertson in his history of Scotland has the following passage. When one of the old Scottish kings was making an enquiry into the tenure by which his nobles held their lands, they started up and drew their swords: „*By* these said they,“ we acquired our lands and *with* these, we will defend them.

With has reference to the actor; *by* to the means; *from* to the cause from which a consequence proceeds: a man is puffed up *with* pride; he sends a letter *by* the post; or he dies *from* over-exertion.

WONDER, ADMIRE, SURPRIZE, ASTONISH, AMAZE.

WONDER, in German *wundern*, &c. in all probability a variation of *wander*; because *wonder* throws the mind off its bias.

ADMIRE, from the Latin *miror*, and the Hebrew *marah* to look at, signifies looking at attentively.

SURPRIZE, compounded of *sur* and *prize*, or the Latin *prehendo*, signifies to take on a sudden.

ASTONISH, from the Latin *attonitus*, and *tonitru* thunder, signifies to strike as it were with the overpowering noise of thunder.

AMAZE signifies to be in a *maze*, so as not to be able to collect one's self.

That particular feeling which any thing unusual produces on our minds is expressed by all these terms, but under various modifications. *Wonder* is the most indefinite in its signification or application, but it is still the least vivid sentiment of all: it amounts to little more than a pausing of the mind, a suspension of the thinking faculty, an incapacity to fix on a discernible point in an object that rouses our curiosity: the ignorant *wonder* at every thing because they know nothing. *Admiration* is *wonder* mixed with esteem or veneration: the *admirer* suspends his thoughts, not from the vacancy but the fulness of his mind. *Surprise* and *astonishment* both arise from that which happens unexpectedly; they are species of *wonder* differing in degree, and produced only by the events of life: the *surprise*, as its derivation implies, takes us unawares; we are *surprized* if that does not happen which we calculate upon, as the absence of a friend whom we looked for; or we are *surprized* if that happens which we did not calculate upon; thus we are *surprized* to see a friend returned whom we supposed was on his journey: *astonishment* may be awakened by similar events which are more unexpected and more unaccountable: thus we are *astonished* to find a friend at our house whom we had every reason to suppose was many hundred miles off; or we are *astonished* to hear that a person has got safely through a road which we conceived to be absolutely impassable.

Surprise may for a moment startle; *astonishment* may stupefy and cause an entire suspension of the faculties; but *amazement* has also a mixture of perturbation. We may be *surprized* and *astonished* at things in which we have no particular interest: we are mostly *amazed* at that which immediately concerns us. We may be *surprized* agreeably or otherwise; we may be *astonished* at that

which is agreeable, although *astonishment* is not itself a pleasure; but we are *amazed* at that which happens contrary to our inclination. We are agreeably *surprized* to see our friends unexpectedly: we are *astonished* at great instances of perfidy in others: we are *amazed* at the sudden and unexpected events which have come upon us to our ruin.

A man is *surprized* with what is new or unexpected; he is *astonished* at what is vast or great; he is *amazed* with what is incomprehensible.

WONDER, MIRACLE, MARVEL, PRODIGY, MONSTER.

WONDER is that which causes *wonder* (v. *Wonder*).

MIRACLE, in Latin *miraculum*, and *miror* to *wonder*, comes from the Hebrew *merah* seen, signifying that which strikes the sense. MARVEL is a variation of *miracle*.

PRODIGY, in Latin *prodigium*, from *prodigo*, or *procul* and *ago* to launch forth, signifies the thing launching forth.

MONSTER, in Latin *monstrum*, comes from *monco* to advise or give notice; because among the Romans any unaccountable appearance was considered as an indication of some future event.

Wonders are natural: *miracles* are supernatural. The whole Creation is full of *wonders*; the Bible contains an account of the *miracles* which happened in those days. *Wonders* are real; *marvels* are often fictitious; *prodigies* are extravagant and imaginary. Natural history is full of *wonders*; travels abound in *marvels* or in *marvellous* stories, which are the inventions either of the artful or the ignorant and credulous: ancient history contains numberless accounts of *prodigies*. *Wonders* are agreeable to the laws of nature; they are *wonderful* only as respects ourselves: *monsters* are violations of the laws of nature. The production of a tree from a grain of seed is a *wonder*; but the production of a calf with two heads is a *monster*.

WORD, TERM, EXPRESSION.

*WORD is here the generic term; the other two are specific. Every TERM and EXPRESSION is a *word*; but every *word* is not denominated a *term* or *expression*. Language consists of *words*; they are the connected sounds which serve for the communication of thought. *Term*, from *terminus* a boundary, signifies any *word* that has a specific or limited meaning; *expression* (v.

* Vide Girard: „Term, expression.“

To *express*) signifies any *word* which conveys a forcible meaning. Usage determines *words*; science fixes *terms*; sentiment provides *expressions*. The purity of a style depends on the choice of *words*; the precision of a writer depends upon the choice of his *terms*; the force of a writer depends upon the aptitude of his *expressions*.

The grammarian treats on the nature of *words*; the philosopher weighs the value of scientific *terms*; the rhetorician estimates the force of *expressions*.

WORK, LABOUR, TOIL, DRUDGERY.

WORK, in Saxon *weorc*, Greek *εργον*, Hebrew *areg*.

LABOUR, v. *To labour*.

TOIL, probably connected with *till*.

DRUDGERY, v. *Servant*.

Work is the general term, as including that which calls for the exertion of our strength: *labour* differs from it in the degree of exertion required; it is hard *work*: *toil* expresses a still higher degree of painful exertion: *drudgery* implies a mean and degrading *work*. Every member of society must *work* for his support, if he is not in independent circumstances: the poor are obliged to *labour* for their daily subsistence: some are compelled to *toil* incessantly for the pittance which they earn: *drudgery* falls to the lot of those who are the lowest in society. A man wishes to complete his *work*; he is desirous of resting from his *labour*; he seeks for a respite from his *toil*; he submits to *drudgery*.

WORK, OPERATION.

WORK (v. *Work*) is simple exertion: OPERATION is a combined exertion.

Work may be purely mechanical; the *operation* has mostly a method: the day-labourer performs his *work* by the use of his hands only; a medical man performs an *operation* by the exercise of his skill.

WRITER, PENMAN, SCRIBE.

WRITER is an indefinite term; every one who *writes* is called a *writer*; but none are PENMEN but such as are expert at their pen. Many who profess to teach *writing* are themselves but sorry *writers*; the best *penmen* are not always the best teachers of *writing*. The SCRIBE is one who *writes* for the purpose of copying; he is therefore an official *writer*.

WRITER, AUTHOR.

WRITER refers us to the act of *writing*; AUTHOR to the act of *inventing*. There are therefore many *writers*, who are not

authors; but there is no *author* of books who may not be termed a *writer*: compilers and contributors to periodical works are *writers*, but not *authors*. Poets and historians are properly termed *authors*, but not *writers*.

Y.

YOUTHFUL, JUVENILE, PUERILE.

YOUTHFUL signifies full of *youth*, or in the complete state of *youth*: **JUVENILE**, from the Latin *juvenis*, signifies the same but **PUERILE** from *puer* a boy, signifies literally *boyish*. Hence the first two terms

are taken in an indifferent sense; but the latter in a bad sense, or at least always in the sense of what is suitable to a boy only: thus we speak of *youthful* vigour, *youthful* employments, *juvenile* performances, *juvenile* years, and the like: but *puerile* objections, *puerile* conduct, and the like. Sometimes *juvenile* is taken in the bad sense when speaking of *youth* in contrast with men, as *juvenile* tricks; but *puerile* is a much stronger term of reproach, and marks the absence of manhood in those who ought to be men. We expect nothing from a *youth* but what is *juvenile*; we are surprized and dissatisfied to see what is *puerile* in a man.

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